Suchergebnisse

Solving collective action problems, such as poverty reduction or climate change, depends on interactions between governments' and voters' preferences regarding pro-social actions. This paper examines whether the overall direction of change in pro-social public policy precedes public value-change, rather than the other way around. We examine change in the public's pro-social values in six European countries, as measured by the European Social Survey (ESS) during 2002-2012. In these countries, we conducted an expert survey to rate governmental policy that expresses these values over the same period, thereby examining value-change in governmental policy. The chronological comparison of value-change of the public with that of respective governments suggests that changes in pro-social government policies may drive public value-change rather than vice versa. This complements previous studies focused on the opinion-policy connection. Possible political implications are discussed. The promising findings of this initial study point to the importance of conducting larger-scale future studies.

Dans cet article, nous démontrons l'utilité d'une approche microfondamentale dans la compréhension de phénomènes sociaux de plus grande ampleur. Grâce à l'analyse des questions de recours collectifs, qui se sont posées aux différents acteurs, au Canada et en Angleterre, nous établissons un lien informel entre la macrovariable de « structure de l'industrie » et les formes divergentes de réglementation corporatiste instaurées dans les années 1930. Après avoir expliqué les caracteéristiques centrales de l'approche microfondamentale et souligné les aspects importants de la théorie des jeux et du concept de choix rationnel, nous examinons les témoignages élaborés, présentés dans le cadre de commissions et de comités du gouvernement. Ces données comparatives et historiques fournissent les bases qui permettent de comprendre la manière dont les différentes structures de l'industrie ont causé des problèmes de réglementation uniques pour les gouvernements canadien et britannique.This paper argues for the utility of a microfoundational approach to understanding larger social phenomena. Through an analysis of the collective action problems experienced by the various actors in both Canada and England, I wish to establish a causal link between the macro‐level variable "industry structure" and the divergent forms of corporatist regulation instituted in the 1930s. After clarifying the central features of my microfoundational approach and highlighting important aspects of game theory and rational choice explanations, I review the extensive sets of testimonies given before governmental commissions and committees. These comparative and historical data provide the foundations for understanding how distinct industry structures produced unique sets of regulatory problems for the Canadian and British governments.

Studies of the EU accession of the East and Central European Countries have stressed the importance of neo-liberal institutionalism as an explanation for Member State preferences. In this paper it is argued that Member States' preferences over Turkish EU accession are better explained by power politics and neo-realism. It seems therefore that Turkey's way to the EU follows another path than the East and Central Countries. Turkish accession raises the question of the EU's role in a uni-polar world order - whether the EU should develop into an independent actor on the world stage or not. However, when it comes to the interaction among the Member States in order to decide on when to open accession negotiations with Turkey the constitutive values of the EU seriously modify the outcome that pure power politics would have let to. ; Els estudis sobre l'adhesió a la UE dels països de l'Europa Oriental i Central han destacat la importància del neo-institucionalisme liberal com una explicació de preferències dels Estats membres. En aquest treball s'argumenta que les preferències dels Estats membres sobre Turquia a la UE s'expliquen millor per la política del poder i el neo-realisme. Sembla, doncs, d'aquesta manera de Turquia a la UE segueix una ruta diferent dels Països de l'Est i Central. Adhesió de Turquia planteja la qüestió del paper de la UE en un ordre mundial unipolar - si la UE ha d'esdevenir un actor independent en l'escena mundial o no. No obstant això, quan es tracta de la interacció entre els Estats membres per decidir sobre el moment d'obrir les negociacions d'adhesió amb Turquia els valors constitutius de la UE seriosament modificar el resultat que pura política de poder hagués deixat fer-ho.

The aim of this conceptualization article is to formulate propositions about: (1) systemic faults in established money and financial systems, in particular the mechanisms that make for boom-and-bust cycles; and (2) the cognitive and action factors which limit the central banks capabilities to consistently and effectively to regulate or to limit these cycles. Drawing on earlier research (our own as well as that of others), this conceptualization is presented in Section 1. Section 2 identifies a new design and institutional arrangement, which would minimize the boom-and-bust predispositions in money and financial systems. This work builds on earlier research invested in "the Chicago Plan" (from the 1930s) in addition to our own research. Section 3 considers the expected political and ideological constraints on reforming financial systems. Previously operating constraints—including Neo-liberal erosion of New Deal banking arguments and reforms—make for formidable barriers. The paper concludes that reform is necessary—if boom-and-bust cycles on the scale of those since 1929 are to be effectively regulated; but it is suggested that such reform is politically and ideologically difficult if not impossible in the short-run.

a previous version of this paper was presented at the First Annual Danyliw Research Seminar in Contemporary Ukrainian Studies, Ottawa, Canada, September 30 - October 1, 2005 and at PrincetonUniversity's Comparative Politics Luncheon Seminar Series

In addition to legal constraints and social-psychological barriers, in a post-conflict setting mutually beneficial economic transactions might not occur due to the widening gap between the health, quality, and environmental standards of the parties. A lack of incentives during the years of conflict prevent the members of the weaker party, the one economically isolated from the rest of the world, from engaging in the collective learning necessary to upgrade the health and packaging standards of their commodities. In this study, we detail the technical, political, and legal challenges external actors must consider in order to successfully help small businesses in a post-conflict environment. Specifically, we explain how the EU helped Turkish Cypriot beekeepers by supplying funds to support training and educational programs, and upgrade the equipment used by the beekeepers. We demonstrate that third parties, like the EU, can provide the impetus for domestic institutions—such as producers associations, chambers of commerce, and cooperatives—to overcome their collective action problem. [JEL codes: D74, H56, O1]

The problem of collective action is usually identified with social dilemmas. A wider notion of the term collective action problem is introduced, as dilemmas are not the only problems to arise in collective action. The article first presents a typology of collective action problems based on matrix game analysis. Five types are distinguished: distribution, defection, co-ordination, disagreement, and instability problems. Second, the article discusses a number of proposals how to resolve these types of collective action problems, such as altruism, norms, focal points, correlated strategies, collective decision-making, external power, and sanctioning. Whereas the political solutions can be used to resolve all types of problems, the motivational solutions can only facilitate the resolution of some of the problems, and the rational expectation solutions can solve some types and help to solve others.