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This essay explores the good-maximizing role of freedom and stringent moral rights in Green's theory and his assessment of utilitarianism, notably Mill's improved utilitarianism. Though critical of Benthamite utilitarianism, Green was favourably disposed to Mill's version of utilitarianism. Mill sometimes understood the good to be maximized appropriately (especially where Mill embraced the virtue of 'self-development'). The 'practical' strategies recommended by Mill for maximizing good mirrored the very 'practical' strategies that Green's own theory recommended. Green was a 'dispositional' consequentialist: Green's moral theory was a consequentialism of moral self-realization or good will. Sidgwick's assessment of Green's moral theory and Green's selective debt to Kant are adduced in support. Green emerges as an example of 'Kantian consequentialism.'

Abstract
Mohism and Confucianism are usually characterized as utilitarian and anti-utilitarian, respectively. This article argues that although Confucians do not espouse the kind of utilitarianism found in the Mozi, both Confucianism and Mohism qualify as forms of consequentialism in emphasizing that the outcome of a given behavior or action constitutes the basis for determining whether the latter qualifies as morally good. Through an analysis of the classical texts of the Analects and the Mengzi, I demonstrate that the similarities between the Confucian and Mohist perspectives on yi 義 and li 利 are much greater than their supposed differences, which have generally been taken for granted. Like Mohism, Confucianism upholds what we might call a "deliberated utilitarianism."

REINHOLD NIEBUHR'S PROGRAM FOR ETHICAL AND POLITICAL ACTION IS OFTEN DESCRIBED AS ONE OF "UNRESTRICTED" CONSEQUENTIALISM, IN WHICH ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IS BY NECESSITY REDUCED TO A PROCESS WHERE THE ENDS JUSTIFY THE MEANS. DESPITE THE FACT THAT NIEBUHR'S THEORY OF ETHICS CLEARLY CALLS FOR AN EXAMINATION OF THE LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF ONE'S ACTIONS, IT SHOULD NOT BE LABELED IN THIS MANNER. ALTHOUGH NIEBUHR BELIEVED THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE WERE TO BE APPLIED PRAGMATICALLY (ONLY AFTER AN EXAMINATION OF THE LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF ONE'S ACTIONS), THEY WERE TO BE DERIVED DEONTOLOGICALLY. SUCH A POSITION NOT ONLY MADE JUSTICE, RATHER THAN PRUDENCE, THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION BUT DENIED THE CORRECTNESS OF THE CONSEQUENTIALIST TENET THAT THE ENDS JUSTIFY THE MEANS.

Although the influence of Reinhold Niebuhr's thought on political theory has been a profound one, curiously, scholars have quite often misunderstood or misinterpreted his philosophy on issues that are of central importance to his political vision. Specifically, Niebuhr's program for ethical and political action is often described as one of "unrestricted" consequentialism, in which ethical decision making is by necessity reduced to a process where the ends justify the means. Despite the fact that Niebuhr's theory of ethics clearly called for an examination of the likely consequences of one's actions, it should nevertheless not be labeled in this manner.

Abstract
Kant considers eudaimonism as his main opponent and he assumes that his ethics is the only viable alternative to eudaimonism. He does not explicitly address theories differing from both eudaimonism and from his own. I argue that whilst Kant and Act-Consequentialists advocate different normative principles, their positions share the important abstract feature that they establish what is to be done from a rational principle and not based on what is in the self-interest of the respective agent, as Kant thinks eudaimonism does. Act-Consequentialism is thus closer to Kant's ethics than is often assumed. I will demonstrate and vindicate this point with a new interpretation of the Fact of Reason. This reading also establishes that the notion of a Fact of Reason is less contentious than many of Kant's critics believe. We should not expect that the Fact establishes Kantianism. Instead, the Fact is only supposed to count against a specific competing view of morality, namely, eudaimonism. Act-Consequentialists can accept the Fact as well.

AbstractCommentators disagree about the extent to which Kant's ethics is compatible with consequentialism. A question that has not yet been asked is whether Kant had a view of his own regarding the fundamental difference between his ethical theory and a broadly consequentialist one. In this paper I argue that Kant does have such a view. I illustrate this by discussing his response to a well-known objection to his moral theory, namely that Kant offers an implicitly consequentialist theory of moral appraisal. This objection was most famously raised by Mill and Schopenhauer, but also during Kant's time by Pistorius and Tittel. I show that Kant's response to this objection in the second Critique illustrates that he sees the fundamental difference between his moral theory and a broadly consequentialist one to be one that concerns methodology.

Intro -- Contents -- Introduction -- Part I: The Consequentialist Moral Cosmology -- 1. God and Morality in the Seventeenth Century -- 2. Virtue and the Divine Life: Henry More's Moral Theology -- 3. Teleology Transformed: Richard Cumberland's Perfectionistic Natural Law -- Epilogue to Part I -- Part II: Evil and the Divine Consequentialist -- 4. Evil and the Consequentialist Moral Cosmology: Pierre Bayle and British Ethics -- 5. The Ethics of Archbishop William King's De origine mali -- 6. Shaftesbury the Theologian: Virtue as Friendship with God -- 7. Theodicy and the Moral Affections in Francis Hutcheson -- Epilogue to Part II -- Part III: The Anglican Utilitarian Synthesis -- 8. John Gay's "Preliminary Dissertation" -- 9. Edmund Law and the Anglican Utilitarian Tradition -- Epilogue to Part III -- Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- Index.

Abstract

The ethics of social consequences is a means of satisficing non-utilitarian consequentialism that can be used to approach disaster issues. The primary values in the ethics of social consequences are humanity, human dignity and moral rights, and these are developed and realized to achieve positive social consequences. The secondary values found in the ethics of social consequences include justice, responsibility, moral duty and tolerance. Their role and purpose is given by their ability to help achieve and realize moral good. Fair treatment within moral issues stems from applying primary as well as secondary values. The nature of these values cannot be determined exclusively in ordinary circumstances. However, in extraordinary circumstances (disasters), not all the requirements relating to the value structure of the ethics of social consequences need be considered in its entirety. In extraordinary circumstances, values are prioritised and realized. Primary values are realized prior to secondary ones. When prioritizing primary values, the realization of positive social consequences, or at least minimizing the negative social consequences, takes priority over other primary values. In disaster bioethics especially, it is often necessary to find a way to minimize the negative social consequences; thus, actions where positive social consequences are prevalent are preferred.