Suchergebnisse

AbstractAs Britain prepares for a possible referendum on continued membership of the European Union, it is essential that more careful thought is paid to the dynamics of referendums. Polling data reveal the existence of a substantial knowledge deficit in the UK and other parts of the EU: large numbers of voters simply do not understand the EU. There is also reason to question the conventional view that voters can correct for such a deficit by using cues from opinion leaders and the media. The experience of recent referendums in other EU member states suggests that many voters will take part in the proposed British referendum without independent and informed knowledge of the issues at stake, that many will have been swayed by partisan elite opinion, and that many will decide on the basis of their views about domestic politics rather than their views about Europe.

In a recent article, aim to measure the 'Electoral College winner's advantage'-in particular, the extent to which the winner's electoral vote margin of victory is magnified as a result of (i) the 'two electoral vote add-on' given to each state and (ii) the 'winner-take-all' mode of casting state electoral votes. Their results are based on two sets of one million simulated two-candidate elections. This note has two purposes. The first is to demonstrate that RHR's simulation estimates can be calculated precisely using the theory of voting power measurement. The second is to correct several flaws in RHR's analysis, the most substantial of which pertains to the effect of the two electoral vote add-on, which actually has a negative effect on the winner's advantage. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

An E-voting system is end-to-end verifiable if arbitrary external parties can check whether the result of the election is correct or not. It is tally-hiding if it does not disclose the full election result but rather only the relevant information, such as e.g. the winner of the election. In this thesis we pursue the goal of constructing an end-to-end verifiable tally-hiding E-voting system using fully homomorphic encryption. First we construct an alteration of the GSW levelled fully homomorphic encryption scheme based on the learning with errors over rings assumption. We utilize a key homomorphic property of this scheme in order to augment the scheme by a distributed key generation and distributed decryption. This leads to a passively secure 4-round multi-party computation protocol in the common random string model that can evaluate arithmetic circuits of arbitrary size. The complexity of this protocol is quasi-linear in the number of parties, polynomial in the security parameter and polynomial in the size of the circuit. By using Fiat-Shamir-transformed discrete-log-based zero-knowledge proofs we achieve security against active adversaries in the random oracle model while preserving the number of 4 rounds. Based on this actively secure protocol we construct an end-to-end verifiable tally-hiding E-voting system that has quasi-linear time complexity in the number of voters.

Using bilateral migration flow data from the 2010 population census of Nepal, this paper provides evidence on the importance of public infrastructure and services in determining migration flows. The empirical specification, based on a generalized nested logit model, corrects for the non-random selection of migrants. The results show that migrants prefer areas that are nearer to paved roads and have better access to electricity. Apart from electricity's impact on income and through income on migration, the econometric results indicate that migrants attach substantial amenity value to access to electricity. These findings have important implications for the placement of basic infrastructure projects and the way benefits from these projects are evaluated

"Voter verifiability" is a notion offered by some electronic voting schemes, which develops into an important issue of democracy in the electronic world. The idea is to endow each voter with the facility of verifying that his vote is counted correctly. The check mechanism for the correct count of the vote can be provided by means of a voting receipt. On the other hand, whenever one has a receipt that serves to check the correct casting and tallying of the vote, it can also be used as the proof for the content of the vote. This may lead to voter coercion and ballot-selling, which in turn injures democracy. Hence, previous versions of the electronic voting schemes have avoided giving receipts to the voters, and introduced the concept of receipt-freeness as an integral part of the voting system. Nonetheless, e-voting can only be made to work if voters trust in the system, and receipts are useful in building this trust. "Pret a Voter" is an e-voting scheme proposed by Chaum, Ryan et al, which provides voter verifiability without any threat of voter coercion and ballot-selling; because, the receipt does not tell anything about the content of the vote to anybody except for the voter himself. The last version, "Pret a Voter: All-In-One" scheme proposed in 2007 also solves the problem of handling the Single Transferable Voting (STV) elections efficiently. We focus on STV elections and propose a protocol modification for the elections; in which political parties, whose votes remain below a certain barrier, are eliminated. Our proposal prevents the loss of votes used for the eliminated parties and distributes them securely to the second or higher choices of their voters. This protocol is then applied to the Pret a Voter: All-In-One scheme, which we suitably modify to enhance the security of its ballot-construction phase. We finally adapt the STV protocol to Turkish parliamentary elections, by taking into consideration the present details of the tallying strategy within each election region.

This article analyzes the level of development of electronic public administration, which is moving into the electoral sphere. The phenomenon of remote electronic voting is considered as a sequential process caused by the transformation of the paradigm of public administration, where anthropocentrism begins to acquire more pronounced characteristics. Within the framework of the issues under consideration, it would be correct to state that modern methods of voting are not only a mechanism for the legitimate transfer of power from one entity to another, but also a public service to facilitate the expression of the will of citizens.

With Super Tuesday in the rearview mirror,
Louisiana's presidential primary and other elections straight ahead, and the
2024 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature to start soon, now is a good
time for Louisiana to review its ballot integrity as other
states surpass it on this account.

Historically, the state has done well compared to
others in terms of votes cast under the name of an individual being cast by
that individual, who is a citizen residing at the address registered. It was
one of the early adopters of photo identification and positive identification
upon registering and at the polls.

However, while one can register
to vote online or mail that mandates eventual photographic identification preferably
in the form of a driver's license or special identification card (which require
other documents assuring an accurate identity) also acceptable is any photo ID
and some other documentation containing name and address.  Presentation of verified photo ID also isn't
needed when registering at a site that dispenses government benefits and the
registerer also receives those benefits.

Magnifying the threat to ensuring that caster
of a vote is an actual individual accurately registered to vote as that
individual is that one can vote without a government picture ID backed by
definitive identification. The state can issue one with positive picture
identification from another source, but, even more troubling, a person can vote
in Louisiana without any picture ID at all by swearing an affidavit and
answering correctly identifying information enrolled a registration.

It's not
hard to beat such a system. For example, a political operative could gather
information from people at a congregate setting, perhaps with the cooperation
of their relatives, then send in imposters on election day who provided with
the correct information when quizzed successfully impersonate the registrant. The
same could occur with college students out of state.

For that reason, Louisiana is classified
among the states by the National Conference of State Legislatures as "photo ID
requested," as opposed to its more stringent categorization of "strict photo
ID," such as in Georgia where a voter must present a Georgia driver's license
(even if expired), or an ID card issued by the state of Georgia or the federal
government; or a free voter ID card issued by the state or county (like
Louisiana's); or a U.S. passport; or a valid employee ID card containing a
photograph from any branch, department, agency, or entity of the U.S.
Government, Georgia, or any county, municipality, board, authority or other
entity of the state; or a valid U.S. military identification card; or a valid
tribal photo ID. If not, the voter casts a provision ballot that is counted
only if the person returns to the registrar's office within three working days
with the acceptable ID. This is the kind of law Louisiana should have.

Also leaky is Louisiana's absentee voting rules. It's
good in that it requires for most
individuals wanting to vote absentee a request to do so, with three exceptions:
people with disabilities who are homebound, anybody age 65 or older, and
nursing home residents. Absentee ballots are sent automatically to the homebound
and can be for the elderly, while registrars visit nursing homes to solicit and
witness ballots cast. All such ballots must be witnessed.

Still, ballot harvesting can occur under these conditions,
even if state law says witnesses unrelated to voters may witness only one
ballot, because if parish election boards ignore this (as
happened last year in Caddo that caused overturning of the results of its
sheriff's election) integrity measures can be defeated. Worse, unscrupulous
individuals can intercept or entice ballots and mark them without the knowledge
of voters. This can be countered by adopting a signature requirement like Mississippi's,
where the registrar checks the voter's signature and invalidates those that
blatantly don't match.

Fortunately, some legislation has been proposed to
ameliorate these problems, particularly Republican state Sen. Heather Cloud's SB 226 that
forces election boards to follow the law in regards to required information on absentee
ballots. Still, nothing has been introduced to add a signature verification requirement.

Nor has anything been introduced that would
tighten photo ID requirements. That also would vault the state into the category
of best practices when it comes to voting integrity. There's nothing more important
than elections that are as fraud-free as possible, because any fraudulent vote
stains the democratic process and people's trust in government, and states should
do as much as possible to implement measures such as these that present next-to-no
burden on voters that accomplish this objective.

"Voter verifiability" is a notion offered by some electronic voting schemes, which develops into an important issue of democracy in the electronic world. The idea is to endow each voter with the facility of verifying that his vote is counted correctly. The check mechanism for the correct count of the vote can be provided by means of a voting receipt. On the other hand, whenever one has a receipt that serves to check the correct casting and tallying of the vote, it can also be used as the proof for the content of the vote. This may lead to voter coercion and ballot-selling, which in turn injures democracy. Hence, previous versions of the electronic voting schemes have avoided giving receipts to the voters, and introduced the concept of receipt-freeness as an integral part of the voting system. Nonetheless, e-voting can only be made to work if voters trust in the system, and receipts are useful in building this trust. "Pret a Voter" is an e-voting scheme proposed by Chaum, Ryan et al, which provides voter verifiability without any threat of voter coercion and ballot-selling; because, the receipt does not tell anything about the content of the vote to anybody except for the voter himself. The last version, "Pret a Voter: All-In-One" scheme proposed in 2007 also solves the problem of handling the Single Transferable Voting (STV) elections efficiently. We focus on STV elections and propose a protocol modification for the elections; in which political parties, whose votes remain below a certain barrier, are eliminated. Our proposal prevents the loss of votes used for the eliminated parties and distributes them securely to the second or higher choices of their voters. This protocol is then applied to the Pret a Voter: All-In-One scheme, which we suitably modify to enhance the security of its ballot-construction phase. We finally adapt the STV protocol to Turkish parliamentary elections, by taking into consideration the present details of the tallying strategy within each election region.

This paper examines the claim that democratic decision making is epistemically valuable. Focussing on communication and voting, circumstances are identified under which groups are able to reliably identify the 'correct alternative.' Employing formal models from social epistemology, group performance under varying conditions in a simple epistemic task is scrutinized. Simulation results show that larger majority requirements can favour the veto power of closed-minded individuals, but can also increase precision in well-functioning groups. Reasonable scepticism against other people's opinions can provide a useful impediment to overly quick convergence onto a false consensus when independent information acquisition is possible.

Lowering the voting age from 18 to 16 years has recently been a hot topic of the political debate in many democratic countries. This study investigated whether the voting quality of 16–17‐year‐olds is inferior to that of the voting population. Shortly before the 2021 German federal election, two samples, representative for age and gender, indicated personal preferences about various political issues and weighted them according to importance, allowing for the calculation of individual expected values for political parties. Participants then indicated their voting choice. These choices were normatively correct when individuals voted for the party that best reflected their preferences, that is, the one maximizing the expected value. Results show that the voting decisions of 16–17‐year‐olds were as good as those by eligible voters. The study indicates that the exclusion of 16–17‐year‐old Germans in democratic elections cannot be justified by their lack of decision‐making ability.

The deployment of effective and efficient information and communication technologies (ICTs) remains a major priority for the smooth running of electoral management systems worldwide. To guarantee the integrity of the electoral voting process and ensure the reliability of the electoral results, selecting the correct vendor with the requisite expertise is a key success factor that cannot be ignored. This paper proposes a framework for selecting a vendor to offer support and implementation services using the Voting Solutions for All People (VSAP) programme as a case study. Our proposed framework uses a hybrid multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) methodology comprising the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) and technique for order of preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS). Consistency tests and sensitivity analysis are carried out to check the quality of the expert's inputs and the robustness of our approach respectively. Our work offers a better understanding of the role a hybrid AHP-TOPSIS method plays in selecting a suitable vendor to play an effective role in enhancing the voter system's credibility in a democratic process. Again, the study extends the application of MCDM methods to areas such as supplier selection for electoral voting systems. © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. ; Tomas Bata University in Zlin [IGA/CebiaTech/2021/001]