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Why do thinkers hostile or agnostic toward Christianity find in its apocalyptic doctrines—often seen as bizarre—appealing tools for interpreting politics? This article tackles that puzzle. First, it clarifies the concept of secular apocalyptic thought and its relation to Christianity. I propose that, to avoid imprecision, the study of secular apocalyptic thought should focus on cases where religious apocalyptic thought's influence on secular thinkers is clear because they explicitly reference such thought and its appeal (e.g. Engels's fascination with Christian apocalyptic thought). Second, it argues that the political appeal of apocalyptic thought—and, specifically, what I term cataclysmic apocalyptic thought (CAT)—partly lies in offering resources to navigate persistent challenges in ideal theory. The ideal theorist faces competing goals: formulating an ideal that is utopian and feasible. One potential approach to this challenge is CAT, which embraces a utopian ideal and declares it feasible through identifying crisis as the vehicle to realize it.

This article advances the case for 'normative behaviourism' – a new way of doing political philosophy that tries to turn facts about observable patterns of behaviour, as produced by different political systems, into grounds for specific political principles. This approach is applied to four distinct problems at the heart of the ideal/non-ideal theory and moralism/realism debates: (1) How to distinguish good from bad idealisations; (2) how to rank options of variable feasibility, cost, and danger; (3) how to distinguish legitimate acceptance of a given political system from acceptance based on coercion or false consciousness; and (4) how to translate abstract principles into concrete institutions. Objections against the general viability of normative behaviourism, and against the types of behaviour it tracks, are also considered.

At the heart of Kant's legal-political philosophy lies a liberal, republican ideal of justice understood in terms of private independence (non-domination) and subjection to public laws securing freedom for all citizens as equals. Given this basic commitment of Kant's, it is puzzling to many that he does not consider democracy a minimal condition on a legitimate state. In addition, many find Kant ideas of reform or improvement of the historical states we have inherited vague and confusing. The aim of this paper is to untangle both puzzles by exploring Kant's idea of self-governance. I argue that Kant's idea of self-governance gives us a very good starting point for thinking about how to leave room for a variety of political systems—different ideals—that have grown out of and responding to different contingent historical and cultural circumstances. It also helps us id entify those areas where we want to take extra care to build in safeguards to secure stability and to take sufficiently seriously humankind's truly nasty sides. Autogovernança e Reforma no Republicanismo Liberal de Kant - Teoria Ideal e Não-Ideal na Doutrina do Direito em Kant No centro da filosofia jurídico-política de Kant está um ideal liberal, republicano de justiça compreendido em termos de independência privada (não-dominação) e sujeição às leis públicas que garantem a liberdade para todos os cidadãos como iguais. Dado este compromisso básico de Kant, é intrigante para muitos que ele não considere a democracia uma condição mínima para um Estado legítimo. Além disso, muitos consideram as idéias de Kant quanto à reforma ou melhoria dos estados históricos que herdamos, vagas e confusas. O objetivo deste artigo é desembaraçar os dois quebra-cabeças explorando a ideia de auto-governança de Kant. Eu argumento que a ideia de auto-governança de Kant nos dá um bom ponto de partida para pensar em como deixar espaço para uma variedade de sistemas políticos — diferentes ideais — que cresceram e responderam a diferentes contingências históricas e circunstâncias culturais. Também nos ajuda a identificar as áreas em que queremos ter um cuidado extra para construir salvaguardas para garantir a estabilidade segura e para levar suficientemente a sério os lados verdadeiramente desagradáveis da humanidade.

This paper focuses on the arguments in favor of extending distributive justice beyond national borders. Within the contemporary literature of normative political philosophy, we find arguments for either a global or European extension of distributive justice. Philosophers in favor of the European extension are also often supportive of extending to yet other places, but then the following philosophical question arises: Would the establishment of social justice at the level of the EU encourage or discourage the achievement of global justice? Such a question comes from a 'non-ideal theorizing' approach to evaluating whether or not the organization of distributive justice at the EU level would constitute an approximation to global justice and, thus, be considered as transitionally just. It proposes two positions, namely continuity and discontinuity approaches; the former claims that the extension to the European level encourages global justice while the latter claims it is discouraging. In considering the EU as having a privileged international bargaining power to contribute efficiently to global justice, the paper sides with the continuity approach while proposing an adjustment. The main argument, which is called a compatibility proviso, requires taming the potential harmful effects of the European level, in order to achieve the ideal of global justice in a 'pareto optimal' manner. The proviso strengthens the continuity approach by removing two risks: (1) the extension may stop once the distributive justice is organized at the EU level; but also that (2) such a deepening of the EU integration might be in itself harmful to global justice.

The charge that contemporary political theory has lost touch with the realities of politics is common to both the recent ideal/non-ideal theory debate and the revival of interest in realist thought. However, a tendency has arisen to subsume political realism within the ideal/non-ideal theory debate, or to elide realism with non-ideal theorising. This article argues that this is a mistake. The ideal/non-ideal theory discussion is a methodological debate that takes place within the framework of liberal theory. Realism, contrary to several interpretations, is a distinct and competing conception of politics in its own right that stands in contrast to that of liberal theory. While the two debates are united in a sense that contemporary liberal theory needs to be more realistic, they differ significantly in their understanding of this shortcoming and, more importantly, what it is to do more realistic political theory.

I present a new challenge to the Rawlsian insistence on ideal theory as a compass orienting concrete policy choices. My challenge, focusing on global politics, consists of three claims. First, I contend that our global ideal can become more ambitious over time. Second, I argue that Rawlsian ideal theory's level of ambition might change because of concrete policy choices, responding to moral failures which can be identified and resolved without ideal theory. Third, I argue that we currently face such potentially transformative choices. I conclude that these choices are analytically prior to, rather than derivative from, global ideal theory.

I present a new challenge to the Rawlsian insistence on ideal theory as a compass orienting concrete policy choices. My challenge, focusing on global politics, consists of three claims. First, I contend that our global ideal can become more ambitious over time. Second, I argue that Rawlsian ideal theory's level of ambition might change because of concrete policy choices, responding to moral failures which can be identified and resolved without ideal theory. Third, I argue that we currently face such potentially transformative choices. I conclude that these choices are analytically prior to, rather than derivative from, global ideal theory.