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ESSAY PRESENTS A DETAILED REVIEW OF ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE NAMIBIAN DISPUTE THROUGH UNITED NATIONS NEGOTIATIONS. THE AUTHOR DISCUSSES SOUTH AFRICA'S CHANGING POSITIONS AND REACTIONS TO THE WESTERN INITIATIVE. THE IMPACT OF ZIMBABWE'S ELECTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICAN WILLINGNESS TO COME TO A SETTLEMENT IS NOTED, AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE ARE BRIEFLY DISCUSSED.

 This column publishes every Sunday through Thursday around noon U.S. Central Time (maybe even after sundown on busy days, or maybe before noon if things work out, or even sometimes on the weekend if there's big news) except whenever a significant national holiday falls on the Monday through Friday associated with the otherwise-usual publication on the previous day (unless it is Thanksgiving Day, Independence Day, Christmas, or New Year's Day when it is the day on which the holiday is observed by the U.S. government). In my opinion, in addition to these are also Easter Sunday, Memorial Day and Veterans' Day.With Tuesday, Jul. 4 being Independence Day, I invite you to explore the links connected to this page.

The democratic institutions, especially the electoral institutions for converting votes into seats that were chosen during independence negotiations, have been the key to democratic stability in Mauritius. These institutions emerged out of strategic bargaining structured around a combination of contextual and contingent variables. Conflicting political interests reflecting a combination of class, sectarian and communal interests influenced the institutional preferences of Mauritian elites involved in independence negotiations, leading them to converge on institutional designs that they expected would protect and promote those interests in the new democratic polity. Once in place, the new institutions represented equilibrium outcomes, creating incentives for all actors, engendering a learning curve in peaceful accommodation of inter-group conflicts, and establishing the political basis for social stability, democratic consolidation, and economic development.

AbstractThe democratic institutions, especially the electoral institutions for converting votes into seats that were chosen during independence negotiations, have been the key to democratic stability in Mauritius. These institutions emerged out of strategic bargaining structured around a combination of contextual and contingent variables. Conflicting political interests reflecting a combination of class, sectarian and communal interests influenced the institutional preferences of Mauritian elites involved in independence negotiations, leading them to converge on institutional designs that they expected would protect and promote those interests in the new democratic polity. Once in place, the new institutions represented equilibrium outcomes, creating incentives for all actors, engendering a learning curve in peaceful accommodation of inter-group conflicts, and establishing the political basis for social stability, democratic consolidation, and economic development.

'India After Independence' by Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee and Aditya Mukherjee is reviewed.

The authors look at the Supreme Court's latest fully reasoned decision on independence in Canadian Pacific v. Matsqui, where native tribunals were found to be biased because of certain institutional characteristics. The authors argue that the court employs, on the one hand, a very simplified analysis of independence, but at the same time, sets standards for testing independence and bias in tribunals that are impossible to adequately quantify in practice. Neither the reasoning of Lamer C.J, nor Sopinka J. is adequate to address the full range of tribunal experience; in fact, the Supreme Court examines administrative tribunals as if they were simply smaller courts, without recognizing their inhere/If differences. Subsequent cases on this point have failed to take into account the differences in these opinions. The authors conclude by noting the complexity of issues regarding bias, such as institutional independence, and question the direction of Canadian jurisprudence in this area.

Eighty years ago, in a short essay entitled “What Is Independence?,” Richard Robinson (1902-1996) made two errors that, to my knowledge, remain uncorrected. The errors are (1) claiming that entailment entails consistency (it does not) and (2) misstating the relation of subcontrariness. To make good on my claim that these are errors, I present and explain, in a more systematic way than Robinson does, nine distinct logical relations, one of which is independence. There are independent reasons for making these relations—as well as their relations to one another—better known to philosophers.

The Supreme Court in carrying out the function of judicial power is carried out independently so that it is not possible for intervention from other parties that can affect its function. However, the independence of the Supreme Court has not been fully strung together in accordance with the concept of independence in the exercise of judicial power. This can be seen in the Supreme Court's budget, the amount of which is still determined by the government. This condition will certainly affect its independence, because the budget is a support for the Supreme Court in carrying out the functions of judicial power. In this discussion, the method used is normative juridical. The benefit of this research is that it can become a reference for the Supreme Court to form an independent budget pattern so that it can carry out its functions independently. The conclusion of this study is that the Supreme Court has not been able to carry out its functions independently as outlined in Article 24 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution, so it is necessary to change regulations by aligning the rules so that the Supreme Court can prepare its budget independently.