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This volume explores the relation between legal reasoning and logic from both a historical and a systematic perspective. The topics addressed include, among others, conditional legal acts, disjunctions in legal acts, presumptions and conjectures, conflicts of values, Jørgensen´s Dilemma, the Rhetor´s Dilemma, the theory of legal fictions and the categorization of contracts. The unifying problematic of these contributions concerns the conditional structures and, more particularly, the relationship between legal theory and legal reasoning in the context of conditions. The contributions in this

This article investigates the implications of goal-legislation for legal argumentation. In goal-regulation the legislator formulates the aims to be reached, leaving it to the norm-addressee to draft the necessary rules. On the basis of six types of hard cases, it is argued that in such a system there is hardly room for constructing a ratio legis. Legal interpretation is largely reduced to concretisation. This implies that legal argumentation tends to become highly dependent on expert ( non-legal) knowledge.

"This is the first book to bring together distinguished jurisprudential theorists, as well as up-and-coming scholars, to critically assess the nature of legal reasoning. The volume is divided into 3 parts: The first part, General Jurisprudence and Legal Reasoning, addresses issues at the intersection of general jurisprudence - those pertaining to the nature of law itself - and legal reasoning. The second part, Rules and Reasons, addresses two concepts central to two prominent types of theory of legal reasoning. The essays in the third and final part, Doctrine and Practice, delve into the mechanics of legal practice and doctrine, from a legal reasoning perspective"--

This article articulates the implication of Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart's views on formalism for judicial review. Formalism in legal reasoning, being adverse to a court's exercise of discretionary power, defeats the objective of legal reasoning, which is the attainment of justice. The traditional conception of judicial review, which restricts it to the role of the court in establishing the legality of governmental acts, makes legal reasoning formalistic. Hart argues that legal formalism, which means strict adherence to laid-down rules, ought not to be a feature of any aspect of legal reasoning. Thus, legal reasoning in judicial review, if restricted to only establishing the legality of governmental actions and inactions, robs the court of its function in considering both legal and substantive justice. Consequently, this article maintains that the objective of judicial review should also include examining the merit and wisdom of governmental actions and inactions in the light of the principle of substantive justice. Any legal system inclined to realize the principle of substantive justice necessarily deviates from the traditional conception of judicial review. It is sad that even in a country like Nigeria, where recent developments in terms of formulations of fundamental human rights rules and environmental laws point to a change in the traditional conception of judicial review, the Supreme Court still insists on adhering to that conception. The approach adopted by the Nigerian Appeal court in cases of judicial review, which portray a shift from the traditional conception, is commendable and is recommended by this article for every legal system

Artykuł podejmuje kwestię tego, czy rozumowanie prawnicze jest unikalne (wyjątkowe). Autor wysuwa przy tym hipotezę, iż to, co sprawia, że rozumowania prawnicze jawią się jako szczególne na tle rozumowań, z jakich korzysta się w naukach ścisłych i empirycznych, bierze się nie z samego schematu tych rozumowań, lecz środowiska, w jakim się je stosuje. Prawo, jego metodologia, jest bowiem samo w sobie czymś bardzo specyficznym – i to pod wieloma względami. Cechami, które mają wpływ na rozumowanie prawnicze i mogą decydować o jego unikalności, są zaś zwłaszcza: a) normatywny (preskryptywny) charakter prawa, b) trudności z weryfikacją poprawności zawartości prawa na gruncie empirycznym, c) związki prawa z umysłem ludzkim i otaczającym nas światem, d) brak na ogół specjalistycznej (technicznej, filozoficznej, psychologicznej, socjologicznej itd.) wiedzy u sędziów i adwokatów, e) nadzwyczajna rola "autorytetu" w praktyce i nauce prawa. ; This article addresses the issue of the uniqueness of legal reasoning. and, specifically, the author advances the thesis that what makes legal reasoning different from the reasoning employed in demonstrative and empirical sciences and matters of everyday life is not the very form (scheme) of this reasoning but the legal milieu. Thus, he tries to demonstrate that some features of law – such as its normative and prescriptive nature, difficulties with the verification of its content on empirical grounds, its limitations stemming from the physical world and dependence on humans and their minds, as well as the 'unspecialized' character of law agents and the extraordinary role of authority – strongly influence legal reasoning. At the same time these features also allow this reasoning to be unique, despite its adoption of forms of inference that are present elsewhere. ; The Polish governmental programme: 'Mobilność Plus'.