Suchergebnisse

Following the 1998 Belfast Agreement in Northern Ireland, levels of paramilitary violence have declined substantially. Among loyalists, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and associated Red Hand Commando (RHC) have formally renounced violence, and dissolved their 'military structures', and perhaps the most reticent of all of the major paramilitary groupings, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), has taken on board the central tenets of conflict transformation, and 'stood down' all of its 'active service units' in the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF). Thus, paramilitary violence now is mainly confined to the activities of 'dissident' republican groups, notably the Real and Continuity IRAs, although low-level sectarian violence remains a problem. Such dramatic societal and political change has resulted in a focus on the roles of formal party political leadership as agents of social change. This gaze, however, tends to obscure other important events such as the efforts, structures and approaches taken at the grassroots level to uphold and sustain conflict transformation and to maintain a reduction in violence. This article provides analysis of the role played by former loyalist paramilitary combatants in conflict transformation, and draws on material obtained through significant access to those former paramilitaries engaged in processes of societal shifts. In both personal and structural terms there is evidence of former combatants working to diminish the political tensions that remain as a result of the long-term inter-communal hostility developed across decades of violence and conflict. Adapted from the source document.

For the past thirty years scholars have debated the role of political parties in fiscal, monetary, and social welfare policies. Some argue that Social Democratic parties are more committed to advancing and maintaining welfare protection, while others claim that party ideology has ceased to explain parties' policy choices due to the constraining forces of economic globalization, deindustrialization, and electoral volatility. Indeed, the empirical findings in support of partisan arguments are mixed. Much of this rich literature treats political parties as uniform and cohesive entities when it comes to forming government policy. This work challenges this assumption and advances the argument that ideology and partisan policy preferences play a major role in policy choices, yet they are not necessarily observable at the government or even at the party level. Instead, we often need to look at the individual level -- particularly at the cabinet minister who is in charge of the policy in question to predict policy outcomes. This work innovatively argues that cabinet ministers can have very important policy role as policy agenda setters. Yet, not all ministers are equally effective policy-makers. Some make a difference, while others do not. Loyalists are loyal to their party leader and prioritize office over policy; partisans are party heavyweights and aspiring leaders; and ideologues have fixed policy ideas and are unwilling to compromise for the perks of holding office. Only ideologues and partisans can effectively change social welfare and labour market policy, above and beyond what their government mandates

© 2020, © 2020 Taylor & Francis. This article argues that, at a tactical level, loyalist terrorism in the Irish border region between 1972 and 1974 worked. Cross-border attacks including bombings in Irish towns prompted the Irish government to reinforce security along the border—a long-standing loyalist demand. The loyalist campaign led to the IRA embarking on an effort to punish those who were believed to have passed information to loyalists, resulting in the killing of an Irish Protestant senator and widespread condemnation of the organization in the Republic of Ireland. However, short-term gains were outweighed by a growing perception among nationalists that the British state tolerated or even colluded in such attacks, undermining the British Army's campaign to gain trust (and information) within the Catholic population of Northern Ireland. The article also contends that middle-class loyalists played an important role in mobilizing and equipping loyalist paramilitary organizations. It concludes that the British Army showed an excessive tolerance of loyalists with political capital or ties to the security forces, despite evidence that such individuals were directly supporting the activities of loyalist paramilitaries.

Information available regarding the use of the 'military instrument' by loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland tends to be addressed journalistically. This article states that there is a need for a reinterpretation of loyalist activity employing a synthetic method. It is hoped that the utilisation of the 'strategic approach' will provide this new, academic understanding of loyalist terrorist organisations. Essentially, the strategic approach is concerned with tracing the line of thinking of political actors to comprehend how they propose to achieve their objectives. Emerging as an offshoot from public choice economics, it shares assumptions found in game, drama and rational choice theory. Due to the early hypothesis stage of this research this article will not present findings as such, but will offer an alternative approach and invite comments.

On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Northern Ireland 'Troubles', Ulster's once dominant unionists are an increasingly alienated people. In this timely assessment of the prospects for peace, Steve Bruce examines the embittered world-view of two key sections of Ulster unionism: the loyalist terrorists and the evangelical supporters of Ian Paisley. To get to the heart of the unionist position he asks how they see the last twenty-five years, what they want from the future, what they think they will get, what they will accept, and what they will fight to oppose. Professor Bruce describes the Troubles as a deeply entrenched ethnic conflict. He argues that a failure to appreciate the strength of loyalist identity has prevented a proper understanding of the Troubles and that continued neglect of the majority makes strategies for peace pointless or counter-productive

Examines reasons for the failure of English Canadians to develop a sense of indigenous ethnicity. It is argued that this crisis stems from a nonethnic identity in the Loyalist English ethnic core that is split between a repressed US folk culture & an exalted set of British myths, symbols, & narratives, as seen in the War of 1812. The institutionalization of this tension in religious & class divisions is discussed along with the growth & decline of Loyalism as the dominant form of English Canadian identity & current efforts to revive it. It is concluded that the duality within Loyalism has forced English-speaking Canadians to rely on the weak, neutral Canadian nation-state as a basis of identity. Adapted from the source document.