Suchergebnisse

This paper examines Hegel's claim that philosophy "has no other object than God" as a claim about the essentiality of the idea of God to philosophy. On this idealist interpretation, even atheistic philosophies would presuppose rationally evaluable ideas of God, despite denials of the existence of anything corresponding to those ideas. This interpretation is then applied to Hegel's version of idealism in relation to those of two predecessors, Leibniz and Kant. Hegel criticizes the idea of the Christian God present within his predecessors in terms of his own heterodox reading of the Trinity in order to resolve a paradox affecting them – the "paradox of perspectivism".

Examines John Rawl's more recent conceptions of justice. There are 3 key senses in which 'justice as fairness' could be said to constitute a political account; its independence from controversial religious or philosophical doctrines; independence from comprehensive moral ideals, and its historical context. (SJK)

Deep disagreement exists as to how the values of liberty & equality are best served. The nature of this disagreement is discussed, as well as the conflict between moral & political values, focusing on the idea of justice-as-fairness as a practical basis for informed & willing political agreement between citizens viewed as free & equal persons. S. McAneny

Abstract
When Marx dissected the capitalist economy and intervened in the international workers' movement, he did so in the service of freeing people from alien, uncontrolled power. His political project was the realisation of what he called the social republic, and his theoretical project was to identify the forces that promote or retard this political project. In order to bring out the specificity and cogency of the social-republican Marx, this essay uproots the positive-freedom reading that has overgrown the edifice of his thought. Marx certainly hoped for 'real freedom', which is a sort of self-realisation. He also hoped for a sort of collective self-determination. And he thought that collective self-determination was a prerequisite for general self-realisation. But Marx also thought that generalised freedom from domination was a prerequisite for collective self-determination.