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AbstractWhile science communication is increasingly being discussed as a third mission alongside research and teaching, there is little research on how universities and research organizations deal with issues regarding the quality of science communication. This article examines, from an organizational perspective, which new forms of quality assurance processes scientific organizations in Germany apply when addressing quality risks for science communication such as exaggeration in press releases or in the online communication of individual faculty members. Six focus group discussions were conducted with 22 participants (rectors or presidents of universities, heads of communication, ombudsmen, and high-impact researchers). Based on the results, proposals were developed to extend central as well as decentral organizational structures to assure good scientific communication practice. Their possible implementation was discussed in a workshop with representatives of all abovementioned groups. In conclusion, recommendations for future institutional policy are presented.

This thesis focuses on the question of the information transmitted to consumers by the markets and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) on the environmental quality of products. This work takes place in a context where, on one hand, consumers' awareness increase concerning this dimension, and on the other hand, firms increasingly display a social or environmental responsibility whose reality is often contested. The first paper investigates the role of price as a possible substitute channel of communication. The purpose is to examine how a green firm competing against a brown firm can solve the asymmetric information issue. For this purpose, we develop a simple vertically differentiated duopoly model where firms can signal their quality through prices. To represent an increasing pressure of the competition on the low-quality segment, we make the hypothesis that the brown good is sold at the marginal cost. The result is extreme: there do not exist any situations where the green firm can solve the asymmetric information issue. The second paper takes into account the informative role of NGOs concerning the type of firms. We are interested in how their informational behavior impacts the signaling strategy of firms. The interaction between the price signaling strategy of the firm and the information released by the NGO yield fruitful results concerning the path of green information.When consumers cannot verify corporate social goodwill, firms may be reluctant to uphold a pledge of social goodwill. We show how imperfect monitoring can mitigate this moral hazard problem. We augment the standard model of price signaling by allowing consumers to use the results of independent monitoring as a complementary source of information. Monitoring corrects for consumers' arbitrary beliefs. Before sending a price signal to consumers, firms pledge or not to invest in social goodwill.With no monitoring, firms do not abide by their pledges of social goodwill when they fail to send a credible signal via price.With monitoring, there ...

This thesis focuses on the question of the information transmitted to consumers by the markets and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) on the environmental quality of products. This work takes place in a context where, on one hand, consumers' awareness increase concerning this dimension, and on the other hand, firms increasingly display a social or environmental responsibility whose reality is often contested. The first paper investigates the role of price as a possible substitute channel of communication. The purpose is to examine how a green firm competing against a brown firm can solve the asymmetric information issue. For this purpose, we develop a simple vertically differentiated duopoly model where firms can signal their quality through prices. To represent an increasing pressure of the competition on the low-quality segment, we make the hypothesis that the brown good is sold at the marginal cost. The result is extreme: there do not exist any situations where the green firm can solve the asymmetric information issue. The second paper takes into account the informative role of NGOs concerning the type of firms. We are interested in how their informational behavior impacts the signaling strategy of firms. The interaction between the price signaling strategy of the firm and the information released by the NGO yield fruitful results concerning the path of green information.When consumers cannot verify corporate social goodwill, firms may be reluctant to uphold a pledge of social goodwill. We show how imperfect monitoring can mitigate this moral hazard problem. We augment the standard model of price signaling by allowing consumers to use the results of independent monitoring as a complementary source of information. Monitoring corrects for consumers' arbitrary beliefs. Before sending a price signal to consumers, firms pledge or not to invest in social goodwill.With no monitoring, firms do not abide by their pledges of social goodwill when they fail to send a credible signal via price.With monitoring, there ...

This thesis focuses on the question of the information transmitted to consumers by the markets and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) on the environmental quality of products. This work takes place in a context where, on one hand, consumers' awareness increase concerning this dimension, and on the other hand, firms increasingly display a social or environmental responsibility whose reality is often contested. The first paper investigates the role of price as a possible substitute channel of communication. The purpose is to examine how a green firm competing against a brown firm can solve the asymmetric information issue. For this purpose, we develop a simple vertically differentiated duopoly model where firms can signal their quality through prices. To represent an increasing pressure of the competition on the low-quality segment, we make the hypothesis that the brown good is sold at the marginal cost. The result is extreme: there do not exist any situations where the green firm can solve the asymmetric information issue. The second paper takes into account the informative role of NGOs concerning the type of firms. We are interested in how their informational behavior impacts the signaling strategy of firms. The interaction between the price signaling strategy of the firm and the information released by the NGO yield fruitful results concerning the path of green information.When consumers cannot verify corporate social goodwill, firms may be reluctant to uphold a pledge of social goodwill. We show how imperfect monitoring can mitigate this moral hazard problem. We augment the standard model of price signaling by allowing consumers to use the results of independent monitoring as a complementary source of information. Monitoring corrects for consumers' arbitrary beliefs. Before sending a price signal to consumers, firms pledge or not to invest in social goodwill.With no monitoring, firms do not abide by their pledges of social goodwill when they fail to send a credible signal via price.With monitoring, there ...

17. Political journalists as communicators. The impact of individual characteristics on their workSection V: Media Messages; 18. The quality of political media coverage; 19. Issues, events and frames in political media coverage; 20. Politicians, parties and political candidates in the news media; 21. Entertaining and emotional elements in political coverage; 22. The political relevance of entertainment media; Section VI: Citizens; 23. Individual political communication and participation; 24. Interpersonal and mass mediated political communication; 25. Uses and perceptions of political media.

Organizational communication : an introduction -- Management theory and organizational communication -- Theoretical foundations : systems, culture, and power -- Ethics and organizational communication -- Managing information -- Communication networks -- Culture, climate, and organizational communication -- Meetings and teams : conflicts and interventions -- Intercultural communication and the organization -- Crisis communication -- Assessing organizational communication quality -- Careers in organizational communication

The associations among the frequency and quality of social interactions and in-the-moment and global well-being have been well-documented. Fewer studies explore whether the content of social interactions is associated with well-being using experimental methods. Drawing from the communicate bond belong theory, seven candidate communication episodes and behaviors were identified. In three studies, participants ( NStudy 1 = 347, NStudy 2 = 310, NStudy 3 = 250) were randomly assigned to engage in one of these communication episodes or behaviors and then completed end-of-day measures of well-being. Compared to participants in the control groups, participants engaging in candidate behaviors experienced increased well-being. MANCOVA results from all studies suggest the frequency of engaging in candidate behaviors was associated with increased well-being. A mini-meta-analysis found a weighted average effect size of d = 0.255. Results suggest that engaging in as little as one communication behavior with one friend in a day can improve daily well-being.

Visual Communication is a collection of high quality, accessible papers offering an overview of the different theoretical perspectives and methods of analysis in this subfield of Communication Sciences. No previous volume draws together this range of related research, which is generally found across the fields of semiotics, art history, design and new media theory. The volume is organized into theoriesand methods, and areas of visual analysis