Suchergebnisse

Introduction -- Theoretical background -- Reconstructing the treaty concept -- The limits of informality in the expression of consent to be bound -- State consent in treaty withdrawal cases -- Succession to public order treaties -- State consent and reservations to human rights treaties -- Conclusion

Comments on the question of whether to develop a national ballistic missile defense system & whether the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM), ratified by the US & USSR, remains in force despite the latter's breakup. Graham presents arguments in support the president's right to decide, stating that the Constitution gives him the supreme national authority in foreign policy. The Senate's role ceases after it approves a treaty. The many important multilateral & bilateral international arms control agreements with the USSR have not been questioned, but would be in jeopardy if the treaty were declared invalid. The US supports adherence to international law, & must, therefore, not set a precedent of breaking its agreements. Intent to withdraw could be achieved through the use of the treaty's supreme interests withdrawal clause & adherence to its conditions. L. A. Hoffman

ABSTRACT This research aims to analyze the behavior of United State who decide to withdraw from Intermediate-range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF Treaty). INF Treaty is a post cold war agreement between the United States and Uni Soviet which limited the use and development of ground missile with the range of 500-5.500 km. The INF Treaty became the treaties that eliminates missile threat in the Euro-Atlantic region. After more than thirty years, United State decided to withdraw from the agreement even though the dcision might be dangerous for Euro-Atlamtic region. This research uses an explanative qualitative method, and literature sources to collect the data. Therefore, Researcher uses a theory, which is offensive realism in order to answer the motive behind United State's withdrawal. These research perceives that the treaty was not accordance anymore with the United States objective in developing missile to achieve hegemony in missile development. Keywords: United States, Russia, INF Treaty, Offensive Realism

President Donald Trump has announced that the United States will leave the multilateral Open Skies Treaty (OST). Russia could soon follow. The Trump administration would thus continue the US withdrawal from cooperative security and destroy another piece of the arms control architecture. Its continued dismantling, a new arms race, and the return of armed conflict and nuclear warfare scenarios threaten Europe's security and strategic stability. The OST permits cooperative observation flights over the territories of the States Parties. This allows for maintaining a minimum of military transparency and confidence-building, even in times of crisis. Such observation flights cannot be replaced by national satellite reconnaissance, especially since it is only available to a few states. Having the option to conduct independent observations is particularly important for allies in regions of tension. Germany and European partners must make a strong commitment to maintaining the OST.

President Donald Trump has announced that the United States will leave the multilateral Open Skies Treaty (OST). Russia could soon follow. The Trump administration would thus continue the US withdrawal from cooperative security and destroy an­other piece of the arms control architecture. Its continued dismantling, a new arms race, and the return of armed conflict and nuclear warfare scenarios threaten Europe's security and strategic stability. The OST permits cooperative observation flights over the territories of the States Parties. This allows for maintaining a minimum of military transparency and confidence-building, even in times of crisis. Such observation flights cannot be replaced by national satellite reconnaissance, especially since it is only available to a few states. Having the option to conduct independent observations is par­ticularly important for allies in regions of tension. Germany and European partners must make a strong commitment to maintaining the OST. (Autorenreferat)

The United States occupation of Haiti — despite benevolent intentions — was a thinly-disguised military dictatorship. The official view of the Department of State that the numerous U. S. officials there were merely advisers to the legitimate Haitian government, acting in accordance with limitations prescribed by treaty, was a polite fiction. It deceived no one, particularly the large number of Haitians who resented foreign experiments in benevolent despotism in their land.The real ruler of Haiti, as the system had evolved by the pivotal year of 1928 — the last "normal" year before the political crisis which precipitated withdrawal — was General John H. Russell, United States Marine Corps, the U. S. High Commissioner. The nominal ruler, President Louis Borno, generally relied upon his U. S. advisers. In Russell's own words "[Borno] has never taken a step without first consulting me." When differences arose, usually as a result of pressures exerted on Borno by local politicians, General Russell was free to make appropriate concessions. But his will prevailed in any showdown conflict. The General was noted for his fairness, however, and his relations with Haitian officials were usually harmonious. Yet his military background, combined with his devotion to efficiency and economy, was not well-suited to preparing a dependent people for enlightened self-rule.