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Robust political economy is the attempt to theorize about political institutions in such a way as to guard against the knowledge and incentive problems that we can expect will threaten the public good in the real world. An implication of this attempt is the need to reason symmetrically about whether a proposed institution is liable to be as prone to failure due to knowledge and incentive problems as the situations it is designed to address. Another implication is that one should be wary of ad hoc institutional or policy proposals, that is, proposals that are not grounded in systematic tendencies to mitigate the knowledge and incentive problems. With these implications in mind, I am not convinced that the alternative institutions, conceptions of the state, and conceptions of social justice defended by my critics meet the test of robustness that, I maintain, can best be met through decentralization of power down to the level of the individual.

This article has been published as the introduction of the special issue in Japan Forum ("Japanese Political Economy Revisited: Abenomics and Institutional Change") and as an introduction to the book (Japanese Political Economy Revisited: Abenomics and Institutional Change, Routledge) ; This introductory article to the special issue on "Japanese Political Economy Revisited: Diverse Corporate Change, Institutional Transformation, and Abenomics" starts with a short summaryof the changing perceptions of Japan's political economy from its meteoric rise as worldwide leading model in the 1970s and 1980s to its demotiontoa problem and reform case since the later 1990s. Based on this overview, it identifies some striking issue and open questions in this conventional view of Japan's political economy as problem and the high expectations on Abenomics as Japan's current economic reform programme. Then we discuss the articles of the special issue and their new contributionsto a better understanding of the developments at the corporate level as well as institutional change and economic reforms at the macro level in the last two decades. Finally, this introductory article ends with a short outlineof a new research programme and four central research questions about the Japanese political economy.

This article has been published as the introduction of the special issue in Japan Forum ("Japanese Political Economy Revisited: Abenomics and Institutional Change") and as an introduction to the book (Japanese Political Economy Revisited: Abenomics and Institutional Change, Routledge) ; This introductory article to the special issue on "Japanese Political Economy Revisited: Diverse Corporate Change, Institutional Transformation, and Abenomics" starts with a short summaryof the changing perceptions of Japan's political economy from its meteoric rise as worldwide leading model in the 1970s and 1980s to its demotiontoa problem and reform case since the later 1990s. Based on this overview, it identifies some striking issue and open questions in this conventional view of Japan's political economy as problem and the high expectations on Abenomics as Japan's current economic reform programme. Then we discuss the articles of the special issue and their new contributionsto a better understanding of the developments at the corporate level as well as institutional change and economic reforms at the macro level in the last two decades. Finally, this introductory article ends with a short outlineof a new research programme and four central research questions about the Japanese political economy.

Introduction / Matthew J. Webb & Albert Wijeweera -- The economics of conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tract Region of Bangladesh / Syed Serajul Islam -- The political economy of Sikh separatism: ethnic identity, federalism and the distortions of post-independence agrarian development in Punjab-India / Jugdep S. Chima -- The political economy of the ethnonationalist uprising in Pakistani Balochistan, 1999-2013 / Farhan Hanif Siddiqi -- Nepal's protracted transition: explaining the continuing political and economic impasse / Pramod K. Kantha -- India's indigenization of military aircraft design & manufacturing: towards a fifth generation fighter / Michael B. Charles & Elisabeth Sinnewe -- The war on terror and its economic impact on Pakistan / Howard Brasted & Zahir Ahmed -- Terrorist activities and financial market performance: evidence from Sri Lanka / Albert Wijeweera -- Greed, grievance and violent separatism in South Asia / Matthew J. Webb -- The Himalayan ranges, glaciers, lakes and rivers: an international ecological, economic and military outlook / Lavanya Vemsani -- Defense, security and the economy in South Asian countries / Christos Kollias & Stephanos Papadamou -- A survival analysis of the onset of peace in South Asia / Ali C. Tasiran & Zainab Kazim Ali -- Conclusion

"If we all agree that our current social-political moment is tenuous and unsustainable (and indeed, that may be the only thing we can agree on right now), then how do markets, governments, and people interact in this next era of capitalist societies? In A Political Economy of Justice, a team of luminary social scientists consider the strained state of our political economy in terms of where it can go from here. "We look squarely at how normative and positive questions about political economy interact with each other," the editors write. "From that beginning, we aspire to chart a way forward to a just economy." Across 14 essays that blister with relevance to our moment as a society and polity, A Political Economy of Justice sketches the boundaries of a new theory of justice: the measures of a just political economy; the role of firms; the roles of institutions and governments. The editors' introduction makes clear that these are no half-effort book chapters from busy luminaries; they are wholly original works born of a set of guiding principles and deeply, communally edited. The result, they hope, is something greater than what is typically achieved by an academic volume"--

Haiti is governed by a small economic elite and the majority of its poor and marginalized population has no access to power. This report analyses the historical roots of the deep socio-economic and political cleavage in Haiti and the consequences of repeated cycles of foreign interference, economic liberalization policies, increased food insecurity and natural disasters. The report reveals that the elections in 2010/2011 and 2015/2016 only served to exacerbate this cleavage. The elections in 2016 had a record low participation of 17.3%. Many of Haiti's poor abstained from voting due to lack of confidence in the elections, as well as due to extremely difficult socio-economic conditions post-earthquake in 2010/2011, and post-Hurricane Matthew in 2016. Since the earthquake in 2010, there has been a heavy presence of international actors in Haiti. Whereas several of these actors put pressure on Haiti to hold elections relatively short time after the disaster, most of the foreign actors, and particularly the United States and the EU, showed little concern about fraud and low voter turnout. The elections brought President Michel Martelly to power in 2011 and President Jovenel Moïse to power in 2016, both of them representing the economic elite in Haiti. They invested in agribusiness and special economic zones benefiting the economic elite, but further marginalizing small-scale farmers. These two presidents also succeeded in reestablishing the Haitian Army, an institution with extremely bad reputation in Haiti, due to its past severe human rights violations. ; Haiti: A Political Economy Analysis ; publishedVersion

In competitive authoritarian systems, aspiring autocrats must win elections and marginalize the political opposition. In Belarus, President Alexander Lukashenko's strategy for political hegemony heavily relied on socioeconomic co-optation, offering privileges to supporters and imposing sanctions on dissenters. In an economy dominated by the state, co-optation had a coercive effect on behavior. Without sizable areas of activity autonomous from the government, citizens could not defy or mitigate the cost of reprisals for openly supporting the political opposition. Through co-optation, Lukashenko weakened the opposition and built an authoritarian regime without resorting to extensive political violence, which could have undermined his claim of public legitimacy.

A review essay on books by: Robert H. Bates (Ed), Toward a Political Economy of Development: A Rational Choice Perspective (Berkeley & Los Angeles, Calif, & London: U of California Press, 1988); Barry Hindess, Politics and Class Analysis (Oxford & New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987); & M. V. Nadkarni, Farmers' Movements in India (Ahmedabad: Allied Private Publishers, 1987 [see listings in IRPSPPD No. 21]). These works illustrate the current shift in locus, character, & orientation of the field of political economy. In Nadkarni's work, India's political economy is presented as administered capitalism. The farmers' movement in the state of Karnataka is chronicled, emphasizing its class nature. In Hindess's work, the social science paradigms that attempt to explain political action by reducing it to expressions of class forces are examined, pointing out the inappropriateness of class analysis for the study of certain complexities of the modern world. Bates's collection on the rational choice paradigm in political economy is criticized as eclectic & uneven in quality. D. Generoli

Report commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ; This report uses a political economy analysis to shed light on some of the paradoxes that characterize Mozambique mid 2017: Entrenched poverty, the resuscitated armed conflict/war, the trust crisis between the Mozambican (Frelimo) government and its development partners, the spiralling debt and the party-state. Since 2017, Mozambique is arguably at one of its most critical moments since the end of the civil war, in a crisis-like cocktail of political, economic and social problems. By the time of writing, the Mozambican authorities only released the content of the Kroll report (an independent forensic audit of the 'secret' loans taken up in 2013) in summary form. Mozambique defaulted on its foreign debt in 2016, which has become unsustainable for the immediate future. The 'secret' loans explain a smaller part of the new debt, while heavy international and domestic borrowing and public spending after the discovery of large new mineral resources drove up the debt levels. The economy unhinged not by a full-blown resource curse, but rather by the mere prospect of large future income from the offshore LNG gas and coal, which we dubbed the "presource curse". ; publishedVersion

[eng] The article 1 addresses the role of political parties and studies whether popularity shocks are crucial for electoral accountability beyond their effects on voter behavior. It specifically examines the impact of the revelation of information about a government's conduct on the types of candidates who stand for election. The empirical test focuses on the Brazilian city council elections in 2004 and 2008. The identification approach exploits the randomness of the timing of the release of audit reports on the use of federal funds by municipal governments. The study finds that when the audit reveals a high level of corruption (i.e., when it represents a negative popularity shock), the parties supporting the incumbent select more educated candidates. On the contrary, parties pick, on average, less educated candidates when the audit finds low levels of corruption (i.e., when it represents a positive popularity shock). These effects are stronger in municipalities that have easier access to local media. The evidence confirms that parties are strategic players that consider specific features of the electoral competition when making decisions and that their decisions are affected by shocks that influence the electoral race. The article 2 is devoted to examining aspects of the voter preference assumptions. Citizen assessment of government performance is a cornerstone of successful democratic functioning. However, accountability is a double-edged sword. When voters misunderstand the stakes, and provide the wrong incentives to elected officials, political accountability leads to an implementation of suboptimal welfare policies. This paper reveals that an electorate can demand clientelism. To address this question, I study the behavior of voters in a context of vote-buying in Brazilian politics known as the drought industry. The data cover the Brazilian democratic elections from 1998 to 2012, and as empirical strategies I implement both fixed-effects models with panel data and a regression discontinuity design with heterogeneous treatment effects. I find evidence that after a drought, voters increase the vote share of local incumbent parties that are politically aligned with the central government to ensure the inflow of partisan government aid relief. Such behavior reinforces the central government's incentives to bias policies in favor of politically aligned municipalities to influence elections. Consequently, the cycle of distortion of aid relief allocation is perpetuated. In connection with the findings indicating that the incidence of droughts and the Brazilian political economy are directly linked, the article 3 investigates the behavior of the local governments regarding the level of corruption. The analysis studies whether the allocation of aid relief policies increases the level of corruption in the context of natural disasters. More specifically, the study investigates the number of federal emergency declarations against droughts, as a proxy for aid relief, and the number of irregularities in the local governments' expenditures found by auditors in Brazilian cities during a full mayor's term. The study implements an instrumental variable approach exploiting the quasi-random nature of the cycle component of a municipality's aridity relative to its trend. The findings show that an additional recognition of the state of emergency leads to an increase in corruption per capita for an entire term of a mayor.