Italy and the 2011 Libyan crisis: a display of inconsistency and ineffectiveness ; Italijos ir 2011m. Libijos krizė: nenuoseklumo ir neefektuvumo pavaizdavimas
The Italian foreign policy is the topic of the present research; more precisely, the policies pursued in relation to the Libyan crisis of the year 2011. The most recent events taking place in the African country bring along the necessity of shedding a new light on the role of the Western state that most interests had to defend in Libya, and that is still very much concerned by the latter situation at a time when a new possible military intervention is considered. The object of the research is the Italian foreign policy considered from the beginning of the Libyan crises in 2011, namely from when protests against the government started in Benghazi and clashes with the police took place in mid February, until the end of the NATO mission Operation Unified Protector in Libya on October 31 of that same year, following the death of Col. Gaddafi and the defeat of the loyalist forces. The goal of the research is to identify the Italian postures and their consistency with its actual behaviour during the Libyan crisis, evaluating if the Italian foreign policy has been capable of serving the national interest. The tasks of the research are to justify the choice of the neorealist theoretical framework introducing the main vectors of Italian foreign policy from 1945 to the present and their relations with the Libyan case, to assess the status of the relations between Italy and Libya at the end of the year 2010, to trace the Italian diplomatic and political rhetoric related to the crisis understanding the rational behind the Italian formal positioning, to check it against the actual Italian actions along the crisis, and to assess the results achieved. Document analysis is the research method employed, and the results indicate that Italy displayed a negligent management of the crisis since non-linearity, inconsistency and ineffectiveness were recurrent features to be found in its behaviour, sided by a lack of understanding of the overall Libyan situation. The Italian stances and actions were taken into account through a neorealist theoretical framework. The conclusion of the work is that the Italian foreign policy in relation to the Libyan crisis of 2011 have showed strong signs of non-linearity and inconsistency during the last phase of the crisis, and that the results achieved can not be considered satisfactory in any of the two phases, whilst in both of them an important lack of knowledge on key elements related to the issue has been displayed.