Suchergebnisse

'There are no two things in the world more different from each other than East-Indian and West Indian-slavery' (Robert Inglis, House of Commons Debate, 1833). In Slavery, Abolitionism and Empire in India, 1772–1843, Andrea Major asks why, at a time when East India Company expansion in India, British abolitionism and the missionary movement were all at their height, was the existence of slavery in India so often ignored, denied or excused? By exploring Britain's ambivalent relationship with both real and imagined slaveries in India, and the official, evangelical and popular discourses which surrounded them, she seeks to uncover the various political, economic and ideological agendas that allowed East Indian slavery to be represented as qualitatively different from its trans-Atlantic counterpart. In doing so, she uncovers tensions in the relationship between colonial policy and the so-called 'civilising mission', elucidating the intricate interactions between humanitarian movements, colonial ideologies and imperial imperatives in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The work draws on a range of sources from Britain and India to provide a trans-national perspective on this little known facet of the story of slavery and abolition in the British Empire, uncovering the complex ways in which Indian slavery was encountered, discussed, utilised, rationalised, and reconciled with the economic, political and moral imperatives of an empire whose focus was shifting to the East

The economics of the Holocaust is a many‐facetted subject that is an integral part of the Holocaust's history. This paper describes some of the results of the new research since 1990 and discusses the economic rationalities employed by the perpetrators in despoiling the Jews. Economic considerations accompanied the timing and pace of the expropriation of Jewish assets and their "Aryanization." The new research also shows that there was widespread collaboration in the expropriation of the Jews by private interests both inside Germany and in German‐controlled Europe and that networks of bureaucrats and private interests joined to achieve Nazi goals. The combination of expropriation and mass murder was one of the aspects of the Holocaust that made it unique.

AbstractRecent developmental state research highlights state-society configurations and contentious politics in shaping industrialization. Still, much of this work focuses on East Asia and tends to sidestep racialized labor exploitation, imperialism, and uneven incorporation into the global capitalist system through the trans-Atlantic slave trade and colonialism as important drivers. Through an historical analysis of Trinidad and Tobago, this paper examines how interventionist industrial policies emerged out of such structures and conditions. It highlights the role of anti-imperial and anti-racist struggles exemplified by the Black Power Movement in Trinidad and Tobago – a social movement comprising workers, marginalized youth, and civic leaders, which sought to overturn a colonial economy, reconfigure hierarchical race relations, address economic injustices, promote democratically negotiated industrialization, and chart a new course for a post-independent, multiracial Trinidad and Tobago. Utilizing archival data, this paper argues that Trinidad and Tobago's government shifted from a passive industrial strategy characteristic of the colonial era to a more active approach from 1970 to 1984 largely in response to forceful demands and demonstrations by the Black Power Movement, which, in turn, led to improved social conditions, nationalization of key industries, the creation of state-owned enterprises, new skills and technological investments, and more. These findings advance developmental state theory by specifying the heretofore largely unacknowledged role of racial justice and anti-imperialist social movements in bringing about a different path from the East Asian model toward industrial and social transformation.

AbstractEarly in the nineteenth century, members in the UK Parliament (MPs) hardly ever debated education. When they did, it was nearly always in the context of aid for the religious instruction of the poor. Indeed, even by 1850, nearly two decades after the first Great Reform Act (1832), the Prime Minister Lord John Russell made the case that a system of compulsory state schooling would be immoral and un-British. Yet, by the '80s, MPs debating in Westminster routinely drew connections between schooling and the most critical social issues of the day: social-class mobility and equity, child welfare, national development, emigration, and the civil service, among others. What explains the expanding, and expansive, political uses that elite policymakers put to schooling? How did schooling and education take on such an aggrandized role in society for British statesmen? To address these questions, this paper combines natural language processing techniques, semantic network, discourse, and regression analyses to read and interpret the ∼1.1 million political speeches given in the UK Houses of Parliament during the long nineteenth century (1804–1913). In contrast to explanations emphasizing the direct role that economic, social, and political development as well as conflict played in the UK state's historic expansion, this piece demonstrates how social scientization, the sweeping international epistemic movement that institutionalized and diffused functionalist social theory, created the context that made it possible for political elites to see and promote schooling as an effective policy instrument of greater cultural rationalization supporting the development of capitalist industrial society.

AbstractLiving on the Edge: An American Generation's Journey through the Twentieth Century (University of Chicago Press, 2021) tells the story of the rarely studied 1900 generation, from their social origins to their old age, as they coped with and adapted to the revolutionary changes of the last century. Using longitudinal data from the Berkeley Guidance Study, the authors followed 420 parents (210 couples) born between 1885 and 1908, all of whom had children born in Berkeley between 1928–29. The analyses, which often challenge conventional wisdom, reveal their status as a "hinge generation," or bridge, between past and present in their educational, work, and family experiences. Following highlights from the authors, four scholars offer critical commentary on the book. Matt Nelson addresses challenges related to analyzing kinship networks and patterns of economic assistance across the Great Depression era, pointing to measurement limitations that obscure important forms of aid. Kelly Condit-Shrestha raises concerns related to race and ethnicity, especially the absence of Black, American Indian, Chinese, Japanese, and Hispanic persons in the original study, as well as to westward migration, American Empire, and white-settler colonialism. Silvia Pedraza addresses crucial social class differences (middle class versus working class) in the expectations and experiences of women, calling for greater clarity in the relationship between women's roles and notions of "respectability." Finally, Evan Roberts takes up some of the complex methodological issues involved in leveraging historical data to understand the life course and identifying the uniquely disruptive nature of social change across generations and countries.

AbstractA significant literature demonstrates that the presence of historic missionary societies—especially Protestant societies—during the colonial period is significantly and positively associated with increased educational attainment and economic outcomes. However, we know less about the mechanisms underlying the long-run consequences of institutions, as it is commonly very hard to disentangle direct effects from indirect effects. One clear way to do so, however, is to explore the long-term impact of missionary influence in places in which the direct beneficiaries of missionary education are no longer present. The present article considers one such region, the Anatolian region of the Ottoman Empire. Due to the ethnic violence and population movements at the start of the twentieth century, the newfound Turkish nation-state was largely religiously homogenous. This provides us with a unique situation to empirically assess the long-run indirect effects of Christian missionary societies on local human capital. For this purpose, I present an original dataset that provides the locations of Protestant mission stations and schools, Ottoman state-run schools, and Armenian community schools contained within Ottoman Anatolia between 1820 and 1914. Contrary to the common association found in the literature, this study does not find missionary presence to be correlated with modern-day schooling. Rather, I find that regions with a heightened missionary presence and an active Christian educational market perform better on the gender parity index for pretertiary schooling during both the Ottoman and Turkish periods.

This article uses Chile's state milk program as a prism to map the trajectory of Chile's social state through three combinations of political, economic, and welfare regimes. It traces the informal strategies deployed by citizens and local service providers and presents a historical typology of these encounters between 1954 and 2010, examining what commodification and decommodification mean to families in their everyday lives and discussing the implications of these findings to the literature on welfare regimes. The most important finding of this article is that regime type shapes but does not determine levels of provision. Welfare provision occurs in everyday interactions between state workers and citizens, and changes in regime type are filtered through and resisted through practices and strategies deployed in face-to-face encounters between local state representatives and citizens. There is often a large gap between central policy and these informal institutions that are created in everyday on-the-ground encounters between local state workers and citizens. Therefore, a second main conclusion of this article is that the informal institutions created at the local provision level coexist, compete, and clash with formal rules. A third conclusion of this article is that, to some extent, people who are regulated by the state also have some capacity to regulate their exchanges with the state, and, at the same time, state workers who organize and are organized by the state to distribute resources exercise discretionary power when implementing social programs.

What is the origin of the Middle Eastern state? Although social scientists have traditionally emphasized the role of the European colonial experience, especially the British and French mandates following World War I, the late Ottoman era from the Edict of Gülhane in 1839 that inaugurated the Tanzimat reforms until World War I represents a period at least as critical to understanding origins of the state in the region. Certain Ottoman provinces known as Eyalet-i Mümtaze or exceptional/special provinces developed under the aegis of the Ottoman Empire that acquired many statelike attributes without becoming independent polities. Moreover, the nature of the Ottoman Imperial center changed to become more similar to that of a territorially delimited state as opposed to the classic multifaceted polity that had been the earlier norm. These developments resulted in a blurring of lines that had traditionally defined state and empire during the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire. To illustrate this change, economic, administrative, and political examples are presented from Egypt and Turkey. This comparative analysis will identify ways the evolution of the two states was similar as well as critical differences such as the extent of foreign intervention and the role played by representative assemblies. The formation of imperial states within the empire as well as the transformation of the empire to become more statelike resulted in strong state institutions in places such as Egypt and Turkey that long preceded the main European colonial intervention in the region after World War I.

Among explanations for the escalating cost of higher education in the United States, two economic theories predominate: the revenue theory of cost and cost disease theory. Since its formulation in the 1960s, distinguished economists have concluded that cost disease theory has convincingly been proven to explain cost escalation in higher education. This article examines three historical dimensions of the cost disease in higher education from the 1870s to the 2010s. First, we explain how the scholarship on the cost disease in higher education has developed over the past 50 years. Second, we concurrently analyze the historical data and the reasoning presented by economists in support of the view that cost disease theory explains cost escalation in higher education. This analysis concludes that the scholarship over the last 50 years provides little validation for that explanation. Finally, we present historical research on cost trends in US higher education from 1875 to 1930. This formative period in US higher education witnessed enormous growth in the national economy. Due to the growth in productivity, cost disease theory would expect costs in higher education, a personal services industry, to rise sharply relative both to costs generally and to the national income. But this historical research reveals that the per capita cost of higher education grew very slowly over this period. These findings consist with our analysis of cost disease scholarship. We therefore conclude that there is little validation that cost disease theory explains cost escalation in US higher education from the 1870s to the 2010s, though it may explain some periods within that span.

Recent research suggests that economic inequality thwarts attempts to establish a welfare state. The corollary of this view is that today's welfare states had witnessed an equality revolution already before the rise of social policies aiming at redistribution. The paper brings this insight to bear on the creation of the welfare state in Sweden, for many the very model of a universal welfare state, and enquires into whether equality really predated the formation of universal welfare policies in the 1950s. We present evidence on inequality based on labor market outcomes and corroborate the view that there has been a sharp reduction in inequality during the 1930s and 1940s. Hence Sweden underwent a true equality revolution prior to the establishment of the welfare state. A leveling of incomes is a necessary precondition for the rise of the universal welfare state, we suggest, because of trust, which correlates negatively with inequality. High trust levels solve the problems associated with collective goods and boosts support for universal solutions of income security. The paper provides a narrative in which the formation of institutions, the removal of large income differentials, and the creation of higher trust levels interacted in the 1930s and 1940s to form the foundation for the welfare state in the 1950s. It adopts a dynamic view of trust by departing from the assumption that trust arises endogenously as a concomitant to changes in the underlying fundamentals like income inequality and redesigned institutional frameworks.

The emergence of postwar welfare states in Europe is usually understood as a social and political phenomenon, as a social policy to prevent against forms of mass poverty and to grant general social rights and entitlements to populations during a period of rising prosperity. Beyond these sociopolitical aspects, the foundation of systems of social security after 1945 also had important cultural and epistemic implications. The promise of the state to provide a generalized form of security represented an important cultural factor in securing the social and political stability of postwar societies in Europe. This article examines some exemplary aspects of the meaning of social security by tracing their historical roots and their effects on postwar welfare states in Western Europe. In order to chart the various, interconnected cultural meanings of social security, it juxtaposes two institutional contexts in which social security and prevention were discussed: an international organization of social security experts and a Swiss life insurance company with an innovative health promotion service. The article shows how security was seen ultimately as an utopian response to the multiplication of risks and damages through the processes of industrialization and modernization and thus reveals how security served as both a technical concept for managing integrated systems of insurance and an instrument of control and calculation to help administer the economic and social policies of modern societies. By focusing on the example of life insurance, it demonstrates how security acted as an umbrella term for a generalized model of prevention that targeted the specific risks of a modern, middle-class consumer society.

We analyze the constituency bases of the congressional parties from 1857 through 1913 by focusing on two key concepts: party homogeneity and party polarization. With a few notable exceptions, prior efforts to assess these concepts have relied upon measures based on members' roll call votes. This is potentially problematic, as such measures are likely endogenous: They reflect the party's actual level of success as much as the party's underlying homogeneity. To address this problem, we construct measures for party homogeneity and polarization that are based on constituency characteristics, using economic-based census data and presidential voting data as proxies. We then examine how these "exogenous" measures compare to roll call-based measures. We find that changes in party unity on roll call votes track shifts in constituency characteristics fairly closely. Substantively, we find that the congressional parties went through three distinct phases during these 56 years: first, a period of extremely high overlap and low party homogeneity during the Civil War and Reconstruction, followed by a period of moderate polarization and homogeneity from the mid-1870s through the early 1890s, and concluding with a period of sharp polarization and high homogeneity, which coincided with the realignment of 1894–96. While the status of the 1894–96 elections as a critical turning point remains controversial in the historical and political science literatures, our results suggest that these elections did lead to a substantial change in the underlying characteristics of the congressional parties.

Tracing the development of the county commission system provides a unique opportunity for examining the nature of participatory government in colonial America. Yet, despite the prominence of the county commission system today, studies of the county commission system and, in fact, all county government have been few (Bromage, 1933: 15-35). Colonial historians have preferred to investigate the New England town and the provincial legislature. Most of these studies (Grant, 1961: 106, 120-127, 150-153; Bushman, 1967: 268-270; Syndor, 1965: 42, 6-73; Gross, 1976: 38-39, 179-181; Pole, 1962: 626-646; Greene, 1959: 485-506; Greene, 1963: 25-47; Cook, 1971:586-608; Zemsky, 1971:28-38; Lockeridge, 1970: 47-49, 119-138, 94; Cook, 1976: 9, 10, 19-22, 80-94, 115-118) have concluded that although the franchise was exercised by most adult male property owners, town councils and colonial legislatures tended to be dominated by a social and economic elite continually returned by the electorate to positions of power. In other words, exercising the vote did not seem to make much practical difference. ' An analysis of county officeholding in colonial Pennsylvania, however, challenges the belief in the universality of such voter behavior. For when male adult property owners gained the opportunity to elect county officials who levied, collected, and disbursed the only direct tax in colonial Pennsylvania, they chose people more like themselves than like the appointed officials who previously controlled county government.