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INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE Ma dissertation doctorale porte sur une question simple qui peut succinctement se résumer de la manière suivante : la Cour constitutionnelle développe-t-elle un modèle de procédure pénale ? Cette question me paraissait intéressante dès lors que l'extension du socle de compétence de la Cour constitutionnelle au titre II de la Constitution a considérablement renforcé la « constitutionnalisation » du droit pénal sensu lato et que le catalogue constitutionnel belge des droits fondamentaux a subi un véritable bouleversement à la suite de l'évolution des droits et libertés garantis par les instruments internationaux, dont la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme. Afin de disposer des bases nécessaires pour appréhender ce sujet d'étude, il convenait, d'une part, de déterminer les possibilités d'action de la Cour constitutionnelle dès l'instant où sa saisine se réalise par voie de questions préjudicielles ou de recours en annulation et de cerner l'éventuelle ingéniosité juridique que la doctrine prête à la Cour pour étendre son analyse au delà de la vision manichéenne de la constitutionnalité. D'autre part, il était nécessaire de procéder à une recension des arrêts prononcés par la Cour constitutionnelle, dans le but toujours de vérifier si, et, le cas échéant, comment la Cour s'inscrit ou non dans une logique définie de la procédure pénale. J'ai, dès lors, après avoir rappelé le socle de compétence de la Cour constitutionnelle, la manière dont cette dernière est saisie et les techniques récurrentes auxquelles la Cour recourt dans la construction de ses arrêts, procédé à un inventaire des principaux arrêts prononcés par la Cour constitutionnelle en procédure pénale. Sciemment, j'ai pris comme point de départ de cette recension l'année 1998 qui a vu entrer en vigueur la loi du 12 mars 1998, dite Franchimont, dont le but était de donner un cadre légal et résolument actuel à l'information et à l'instruction. Une fois ce travail réalisé, j'ai entrepris de déterminer s'il était possible de dégager des prises de position répétées de la Cour qui s'imposeraient comme autant de « fondamentaux » qui jalonnent la procédure pénale. QUELS SONT LES FONDAMENTAUX DE LA COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE EN PROCEDURE PENALE ? De la jurisprudence de la Cour constitutionnelle, il me paraît qu'il est possible de dégager 7 fondamentaux qui balisent la procédure pénale. 1. LA DISTINCTION ENTRE LES PARTIES AU PROCES PENAL ET LES PHASES PROCEDURALES 1. L'on sait que la Cour constitutionnelle estime qu'il existe une différence fondamentale entre le ministère public, d'une part, et l'inculpé et la partie civile, d'autre part. Pour la Cour, cette distinction repose sur un critère objectif : le premier accomplit, dans l'intérêt de la société, les missions de service public relatives à la recherche et à la poursuite des infractions ; les seconds défendent leur intérêt personnel . Cette différence justifie raisonnablement que, tout particulièrement au long de l'instruction, le ministère public jouisse de prérogatives dont la constitutionnalité ne peut être appréciée en procédant à une comparaison de sa situation avec celle de l'inculpé. 2. Lors de la phase du jugement, la différence tend à s'amenuiser. Il serait toutefois hasardeux de soutenir que le ministère public devient une partie comme les autres. En effet, par la Cour de cassation – dans un arrêt du 19 décembre 2012 discuté dont l'analyse m'éloignerait de mon sujet – retient que « la mission impartie au ministère public ne se réduit pas à celle d'un accusateur. Il intervient aussi au procès pour proposer au juge une solution de justice ». La Cour constitutionnelle insiste pareillement sur le rôle imparti au ministère public qui ne se cantonne pas à celui d'une simple partie au procès pénal au regard des missions qui sont les siennes. Cependant, si la distinction entre les différentes parties au procès répressif repose sur un critère objectif, la Cour constitutionnelle m'admettrait pas que cette seule différence puisse porter atteinte au principe de l'égalité des armes ce qui l'amènerait inévitablement à rétablir l'égalité. 2. LE DROIT D'ACCES AU JUGE 3. L'approche de la Cour constitutionnelle quant au droit d'accès à un tribunal est tout en nuance. Pour la Cour, ce droit peut ne pas être absolu et peut souffrir de limitations. Ainsi, la Cour insiste sur le fait que si le droit d'accès au juge peut être soumis à des conditions de recevabilité, celles-ci ne peuvent aboutir à restreindre le droit de manière telle qu'il s'en trouve atteint dans sa substance même. Une telle motivation n'est pas sans rappeler la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme sur le sujet. En effet, pour la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, « ce droit d'accès au tribunal se trouve atteint lorsque sa réglementation cesse de servir les buts de la sécurité juridique et de la bonne administration de la justice et constitue une sorte de barrière qui empêche le justiciable de voir son litige tranché au fond par la juridiction compétente ». On aperçoit immédiatement que, la question du droit d'accès au juge est, sous certains aspects, intimement liée à celle du formalisme procédural. 3. LE FORMALISME PROCEDURAL 4. Par l'examen des règles de forme, la Cour renforce le contrôle qu'elle porte sur le droit d'accès au juge. En effet, la Cour en réalisant une distinction entre les règles de fond – entendues comme le droit garanti ou protégé – et de forme –qui déterminent les manières de procéder –elle confère un volet substantiel à certaines règles procédurales. Ce faisant, la Cour garantit l'effectivité du droit revendiqué qui est souvent dépendante de la protection procédurale qui l'encadre. 4. LA NON-INTERFERENCE DANS LES CHOIX D'OPPORTUNITE DU LEGISLATEUR 5. La Cour constitutionnelle ne se prononce pas sur le caractère approprié ou non du choix opéré par le législateur. Elle n'est pas le juge de « l'opportunité législative ».Son contrôle porte, en fait, sur l'adéquation d'une mesure au but recherché et l'existence d'un rapport raisonnable entre les moyens employés et l'objectif visé. Cependant, à nouveau, la Cour s'autorisera à sanctionner le choix du législateur s'il était porté atteinte, sans justification raisonnable, aux droits d'une catégorie de citoyens. 5. LE RESPECT DES DROITS DE LA DEFENSE 6. Au fil de sa jurisprudence, la Cour constitutionnelle se montre intensément attentive au respect des droits de la défense et au droit à un procès équitable qui, à vrai dire, sont l'essence même de la procédure pénale. La Cour veille, au stade du jugement, à assurer l'égalité des armes entre l'accusation et la défense à laquelle le droit à la contradiction est étroitement lié. Pour la Cour constitutionnelle, l'effectivité des droits de la défense passe encore par la protection de la relation de confiance qui doit se créer entre le justiciable et l'avocat qui le conseille et le défend. Le secret professionnel de l'avocat constitue « l'un des principes fondamentaux sur lesquels repose l'organisation de la justice dans une société démocratique ». 7. De manière globale, on notera que la notion de droits de la défense garantie par la Cour constitutionnelle est viscéralement marquée du sceau de la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme mais il lui revient d'intégrer ces données dans le système procédural belge en ayant égard aux choix réalisés par le législateur. 6. LA DIFFERENCIATION ENTRE LES PROCEDURES JUDICIAIRES 8. La Cour semble, a priori, rejeter une comparaison d'office entre les règles de la procédure civile et celles de la procédure pénale quand bien même la première constitue le droit commun. La Cour rappelle que vouloir établir un parallélisme entre les règles de la procédure civile et celles de la procédure pénale n'est pas nécessairement pertinent. En effet, l'application de règles procédurales différentes dans des circonstances différentes n'implique pas en soi l'émergence d'une discrimination. 7. LA PREVISIBILITE 9. Certains arrêts prononcés par la Cour constitutionnelle permettent de mettre en lumière l'importance que cette dernière accorde à la condition de prévisibilité. En droit pénal, sensu stricto, la Cour a pu rappeler qu'il découle de l'article 12, alinéa 2, de la Constitution que la loi pénale doit être formulée en des termes qui permettent à chacun de connaître, au moment où il adopte un comportement, si ce comportement est punissable ou non et la peine éventuellement encourue. Les principes de légalité et de prévisibilité ne se cantonnent toutefois pas au droit pénal, sensu stricto, mais sont applicables à l'ensemble de la procédure pénale en ce compris aux stades de l'information et de l'instruction. Ces principes entendent exclure tout risque d'intervention arbitraire de la part du pouvoir exécutif ou du pouvoir judiciaire dans l'établissement et l'application des peines. En somme, l'exigence de prévisibilité de la procédure pénale garantit à tout citoyen qu'il ne pourra faire l'objet d'une information, d'une instruction et de poursuites que selon une procédure établie par la loi et dont il peut prendre connaissance avant sa mise en oeuvre. CHAPITRE 3. VERS LA RECOMPOSITION DE LA PROCEDURE PENALE ? 10. Si, pour ma part, la Cour constitutionnelle dégage des « principes constants » qu'elle s'astreint à respecter, peut-on nécessairement en déduire que la Cour entend s'inscrire dans un modèle précis de procédure pénale ? Pour appréhender cette question, il convient naturellement d'apprécier si la Cour constitutionnelle, par les orientations qu'elle confère à ses arrêts, ouvre au juge judiciaire des perspectives qui lui permettront de se libérer d'une interprétation traditionnelle de la norme pour satisfaire aux exigences d'aujourd'hui envisagées sous l'angle du respect de la personne et de ses droits fondamentaux ? Il me paraît que la Cour y parvient par le recours au dialogue des jurisprudences. 1. LE DIALOGUE DES JURISPRUDENCES 11. Le dialogue des jurisprudences se caractérise par l'emprunt de motivations émanant de juridictions nationales ou de juridictions étrangères ou internationales qui deviennent décisoires dans les arrêts de la Cour constitutionnelle. 12. La Cour constitutionnelle s'est résolument et immédiatement positionnée en faveur du dialogue des jurisprudences. Nombre des arrêts que nous avons répertoriés se réfèrent expressément à la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme dont elle fait sien les enseignements. Au fil des années, les emprunts à la jurisprudence strasbourgeoise se sont accentués et non plus seulement en termes de référence mais encore en termes de contenu. La suprématie, selon la Cour constitutionnelle, de notre Charte fondamentale sur la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme n'enraie nullement ce dialogue. Par ces emprunts, la Cour constitutionnelle renforce, selon moi, ces « principes fondamentaux », et par là même leur autorité persuasive, en s'appuyant sur la notoriété et le rayonnement international de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme. Un tel dialogue contribue à promouvoir le caractère universel des garanties fondamentales inhérentes au procès pénal et oblige à la confrontation des idées entre les juridictions ce qui doit permettre, me semble-t-il, de surmonter les tensions entre elle et la Cour de cassation. Il est vrai que ces deux hautes juridictions s'affrontent sur certains points, mais ces divergences ne doivent pas être exagérées car je persiste à penser que ces deux Cours doivent avoir l'intelligence stratégique de coordonner leur interprétation, dès lors que de telles divergences de jurisprudence en procédure pénale le sont toujours au détriment du justiciable alors que le but premier des règles de procédure est d'assurer la protection des droits fondamentaux de ce dernier. Ceci étant ce dialogue des jurisprudences ne va-t-il pas faire craindre l'émergence d'une « oligarchie » des juges et à plus forte raison que des juges pourraient s'émanciper par rapport à la loi en saisissant d'autres juges qui pourraient mettre le législateur « hors jeu »? 2. L' « OLIGARCHIE » DES JUGES 13. Je crois qu'il ne faut pas amplifier le phénomène car la Cour constitutionnelle privilégie l'interprétation téléologique et rappelons-le elle n'entend pas, en règle, substituer son appréciation à celle du législateur si le choix est raisonnable. Par ailleurs, pour faire très bref, la Cour constitutionnelle devient le lieu de débats et d'échanges d'arguments où le travail légistique est réexaminé au regard des droits et libertés garantis par la Constitution couplés bien souvent à la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme. Si bien que les juges constitutionnels belges et, par ricochet le législateur, lorsqu'il obtempère aux injonctions qui lui sont faites par ces derniers, s'alignent sur l'appréciation de l'équité du procès telle qu'elle se dégage des positions adoptées par la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme. Mais le pouvoir du dernier mot appartient au législateur. 14. A l'inverse ne pourrait-on penser que de facto en raison de la composition de la Cour qui contient en son sein d'anciens mandataires politiques, le pouvoir législatif ne garde-t-il pas une certaine mainmise sur le contrôle de la constitutionnalité des lois ? 3. LA COMPOSITION DE LA COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE Répondre à cette question relève du divinatoire et poserait en postulat que le juge, ancien parlementaire, serait un défenseur de la norme critiquée ce qui ne peut scientifiquement être démontré. Il ne paraît, dès lors, qu'il s'agit là d'une crainte infondée. Un dernier point doit, en revanche, être souligné : le pragmatisme et le conséquentialisme de la Cour. CHAPITRE 4. PRAGMATISME ET CONSEQUENTIALISME DE LA COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE 15. Une autre grande tendance se dégage des arrêts analysés, le pragmatisme dont fait preuve la Cour dans le but d'assurer une véritable praticabilité à la procédure. 16. En parallèle au pragmatisme, le moyen conséquentialiste ne peut être négligé. Bien évidemment, tous les arrêts prononcés par la Cour ont nécessairement une conséquence dans leur sphère d'application. En l'espèce, par conséquentialisme il faut entendre plus précisément les positions adoptées par la Cour qui sont teintées de réalisme « politique » qui répond à des impératifs budgétaires ou de sécurité nationale ou encore à une volonté populaire. Ces données réelles et par toujours facile à identifier peuvent évidemment constituer autant des contraintes susceptibles de limiter la liberté d'appréciation par la Cour d'un modèle de procédure pénale. CONCLUSIONS 17. Alors, en définitive, est-il possible de répondre à ma question initiale : la Cour constitutionnelle développe-t-elle un modèle de procédure pénale ? A l'examen, il paraît illusoire, voire naïf, de vouloir répondre à cette interrogation de manière catégorique. Une telle réponse manquerait de nuances et prêterait nécessairement le flanc à la critique. Il faut donc procéder par touches successives et observer que le critère phare du raisonnement de la Cour constitutionnelle devient celui de l'équité du procès. La Cour n'en garde pas moins à l'esprit qu'elle doit maintenir la cohérence du système juridique dans lequel elle se meut et que ses interventions sont, somme toute, conditionnées par les recours et les questions qui lui sont adressés et qui dépendront, pour ces dernières, de l'attitude adoptée par le juge a quo. Par ailleurs, la Cour ne manque pas de souligner que la procédure pénale reste encadrée par le principe de légalité sans que la marge de manœuvre du pouvoir judiciaire – et de la Cour constitutionnelle elle-même – ne puisse jamais aller au-delà d'une interprétation raisonnablement prévisible des règles de procédure fixées par le seul législateur. Enfin, l'argument conséquentialiste, qu'il n'est pas toujours aisé de distinguer dans le raisonnement de la Cour, peut complètement chambouler la grille de lecture que l'analyste tenterait de dresser. En conclusion, s'il ne fallait retenir qu'une chose de ma thèse c'est que la si la Cour constitutionnelle ne développe pas un modèle de procédure pénale, il n'en est pas moins vrai, qu'à l'aulne du procès équitable, dont il ne paraît guère possible de cerner le périmètre d'action, elle refaçonne résolument cette procédure.

Riassunto/Abstract Il presente lavoro di tesi fa parte di un progetto svolto nell'ambito di una collaborazione fra Regione Toscana e Istituto di Geoscienze e Georisorse (IGG) del CNR di Pisa, avente per obiettivo lo studio di una metodologia per l'individuazione delle zone di protezione di pozzi o sorgenti idropotabili, distribuiti sul territorio regionale toscano, nonché la presentazione di un esempio di delimitazione relativa al campo pozzi Greti, località fiume Greve in Chianti. L'acqua è una risorsa indispensabile per la vita, per lo sviluppo e per l'ambiente. Essa è una risorsa finita e vulnerabile, parzialmente rinnovabile visti i tempi necessari a ripristinare situazioni di eventuali sovra-sfruttamenti, e che richiede un'efficiente gestione per la sua difesa e salvaguardia in modo da garantire la sua utilizzazione anche alle generazioni future. Spesso è soggetta ad emergenze sia dal punto di vista qualitativo che quantitativo. Dal punto di vista qualitativo, le emergenze derivano da eventuali situazioni di inquinamento originato da svariate sostanze utilizzate sui terreni, scarichi di rifiuti di vario genere e composti di origine industriale. Dal punto di vista quantitativo, le acque possono essere soggette a problemi tipo il sovra- sfruttamento, l'abbassamento del livello della falda, la mancanza o la riduzione di nuovi apporti idrici alle sorgenti. E' evidente notare che il manifestarsi delle contaminazioni dell'acqua delle falde idriche dipende non solo dalla vulnerabilità degli acquiferi, ma anche dalla suscettibilità di un acquifero nel processo di interazione acqua-roccia ad assorbire i contaminanti e permettere la loro propagazione lungo l'acquifero stesso. La vulnerabilità degli acquiferi sottende a vari fattori quali la capacità di auto- depurazione del terreno, la soggiacenza della falda, la connessione tra falda e i corsi d'acqua e soprattutto al grado di protezione degli acquiferi. Le zone di protezione, assieme a quelle di tutela assoluta e di rispetto, costituiscono le aree di salvaguardia. In dettaglio, la zona di tutela assoluta rappresenta la zona immediatamente prospiciente l'opera di presa (10 metri di raggio dal punto di captazione); la zona di rispetto costituisce una porzione di territorio intorno alla zona di tutela assoluta che viene sottoposta a vincoli e destinazioni d'uso tali da tutelare la risorsa idrica (in assenza di altre individuazioni ha una estensione di 200 metri di raggio dal punto di captazione); la zona di protezione rappresenta un'area più vasta per la cui delimitazione è necessario tener conto dell'intera area di ricarica della falda, delle emergenze naturali e artificiali e delle zone di riserva. La difesa degli acquiferi dall'inquinamento è rivolta ad aree che sono già interessate da inquinamento, oppure a quelle che potrebbero esserlo ad esempio in aree di urbanizzazione, mediante piani di tutela elaborati dalle Regioni. Queste devono prevedere degli interventi che privilegino la tutela delle zone di captazione dell'acqua e del territorio circostante, attraverso uno stretto controllo delle possibili fonti di contaminazione. In questo lavoro è stata effettuata, prima di tutto, una attenta analisi sulla legislazione inerente le aree di salvaguardia, partendo dalla normativa comunitaria che detta le linee guida per la tutela della risorsa idrica destinata al consumo umano, fino ad arrivare alle norme emanate da alcune regioni italiane. E' infatti compito delle Regioni la scelta del criterio per l'individuazione delle aree di salvaguardia e la delimitazione delle stesse sul territorio. Uno degli obiettivi della tesi è stato quello di affrontare gli aspetti scientifici sulla delimitazione delle zone di protezione intorno ai campi-pozzi, che insieme a quelle di tutela assoluta vanno a formare le aree di salvaguardia. I criteri utilizzati per la delimitazione delle zone di protezione, indicati dalla normativa, sono: (a) di tipo geologico e riguardano la presentazione dell'ubicazione del campo pozzi, il riconoscimento delle strutture geologiche e l'individuazione dei processi geologici che hanno interessato l'area di studio; (b) idrogeologici, questi prevedono lo studio dell'intera area di ricarica della falda e consistono nel definire le aree di salvaguardia mediante considerazioni tecnico- scientifiche basate sulle conoscenze di idrochimica sotterranea e sulle caratteristiche stratigrafico - strutturale dell'acquifero; (c) geochimici, questi si basano su analisi idrogeochimiche e isotopiche delle acque e vengono utilizzati non solo per definirne gli aspetti qualitativi, ma anche per la ricostruzione dei diversi circuiti idrici. Il progetto all'interno del quale si è sviluppata la tesi ha previsto come prima fase l'individuazione, da parte delle varie AATO (Autorità di Ambito Territoriale Ottimale) coordinate dalla Regione Toscana, di opere di captazione ritenute prioritarie nell'intero scenario regionale. In seconda fase si è proceduto all'acquisizione delle informazioni necessarie mediante il recupero e la rielaborazione di tutti i dati relativi alle aree di studio già in possesso delle AATO. Infine, si è proceduto all'esecuzione di nuove analisi, fornendo specifici programmi per la raccolta dei dati. L'acquisizione e la produzione dei nuovi dati sono state curate dalle varie AATO, mentre il mio lavoro, all'interno dell'IGG-CNR è stato rivolto sia alla acquisizione di nuovi dati che all'elaborazione degli stessi. Infine, si è proceduto alla effettiva delimitazione della zona di protezione sul caso specifico Greti, individuata tramite un criterio metodologico d'insieme che si avvale, in una prima fase, dello studio dell'assetto delle formazioni geologiche caratteristiche dell'area, dell'analisi idrogeologica delle stesse, nonché delle deduzioni tratte dall'indagine idrodinamica dell'acquifero. Tutto ciò, validato dai risultati ricavati dalle analisi chimiche e isotopiche effettuate sulle sorgenti poste sui rilievi e su una serie di pozzi individuati nei pressi del campo pozzi, ha consentito di circoscrivere una zona di protezione, che in parte si discosta dalla traccia del bacino idrografico del Fiume Greve in Chianti. In particolare, lo studio delle formazioni geologiche e del loro assetto, tramite l'analisi delle sezioni nell'area di Greve, ha permesso di evidenziare un assetto idrostrutturale che, relativamente agli acquiferi in roccia, favorisce un flusso idrico sotterraneo da N a S. In conclusione, questo tipo di approccio multi-disciplinare ha permesso di studiare nel dettaglio il bacino di alimentazione del campo pozzi "Greti" e di delimitarne la zona di protezione ponendo l'accento su quell'area che contribuisce maggiormente all'alimentazione della falda captata dal pozzo in esame. Sarà compito degli enti locali adottare interventi, come prescrizioni o particolari destinazioni d'uso del territorio, da inserire negli strumenti urbanistici sia generali che di settore che permetteranno una migliore difesa della risorsa idrica sotterranea. Una considerazione generale, che deriva dal presente lavoro, porta a riconoscere nello strumento delle aree di protezione un'utile strategia per la tutela di una così preziosa risorsa: salvaguardia non fine a se stessa ma coniugata al crescente bisogno di sviluppo sostenibile delle aree urbane e sub-urbane e uso sostenibile delle risorse naturali. La nozione di uso sostenibile, in particolare, della risorsa idropotabile, traduce la necessità di trovare un equilibrio tra le esigenze di sviluppo economico legate allo sfruttamento di tali risorse e gli imperativi della loro protezione e conservazione a medio e lungo termine, in maniera tale che l'uso attuale delle risorse naturali non comprometta il loro impiego futuro. Di fondamentale importanza, è il fatto che le risorse del pianeta debbano essere gestite in modo da assicurare il soddisfacimento sia delle generazioni presenti che di quelle future. Ciò implica la possibilità di configurare, anche a livello internazionale, un vero e proprio diritto umano fondamentale all'acqua. A tale diritto individuale, corrisponderebbe un obbligo degli Stati di far sì che le attività di sfruttamento economico delle risorse stesse siano in ogni caso compatibili con l'obiettivo di assicurare acqua potabile in quantità e qualità sufficiente a sostenere le necessità basilari delle popolazioni interessate. Abstract The present job of thesis makes part of a project developed within a collaboration among Region Tuscany and Institute of geosciences and earth resources (IGG) of the CNR in Pisa, having for objective the study of a methodology for the individualization of the zones of protection of wells or rising drinking water , distributed on the Tuscan regional territory, as well as the presentation of an example of delimitation related to the field wells Pebbly shores, place Heavy river in Chianti. Water is an essential resource for the life, for the development and the environment. It is an ended resource and vulnerability, partially renewable visas the necessary times to restore situations of possible overexploitations, and that it asks for an efficient management for her defense and safeguard so that to also guarantee her use to the future generations. It is often subject to emergencies both from the qualitative point of view that quantitative. From the qualitative point of view, the emergencies derive from possible situations of pollution originated from varied substances used on the grounds, unloading of refusals of various kind and mixtures of industrial origin. It 'obvious to note that the occurrence of water contamination of the aquifer depends not only on groundwater vulnerability, but also from the susceptibility of an aquifer in the process of interaction water-rock to absorb the contaminants and to allow their propagation along the same aquifer. The vulnerability of the aquiferis subtends to various factors what the ability of auto-purification of the ground, the depth to of the stratum, the connection between stratum and the courses of water and above all to the degree of protection of the aquifers. The zones of protection, together with those of absolute guardianship and of respect, they constitute the areas of safeguard. In detail, the zone of absolute guardianship immediately represents the overlooking zone the work of taking (10 meters ray from the point of uptake ); the zone of respect constitutes a portion of territory around the zone of absolute guardianship that is submitted to ties and such destinations of use by to protect the water (in absence of other individualizations it has an extension of 200 meters ray from the point of uptake) resource; the zone of protection represents a vast area for whose delimitation it is necessary to take into account of the whole area of recharge of the stratum, of the natural and artificial emergencies and of the backup zones. The defense of the acquiferis from the pollution is turned to areas that are already interested by pollution, or to those that could be for instance it in areas of urbanization, through plans of guardianship elaborated by the Regions. These must foresee some interventions that privilege the guardianship of the zones of uptake of the water and the surrounding territory through a narrow control of the possible sources of contamination. In this job she has been effected, everything, a careful analysis on the inherent legislation the areas of safeguard, departing from the normative community that says the lines it drives for the guardianship of the water resource destined to the human consumption, thin to reach the norms emanated by some Italian regions. And' in fact performs some Regions the choice of the criterion for the individualization of the areas of safeguard and the delimitation of the same on the territory. One of the objectives of the thesis have been that to face the scientific aspects on the delimitation of the zones of protection around the field-wells, that together with those of absolute guardianship they go to form the areas of safeguard. The criterions used for the delimitation of the zones of protection, pointed out by the normative one, are:(a) type geologic and they concern the presentation of the location of the field wells, the recognition of the structures geological and the individualization of the geologic trials that have interested the area of study; (b) hydrogeological, these foresee the study of the whole area of recharge of the stratum and they consist of defining the areas of safeguard through considerations technical - scientific based on the knowledge of underground hydrogeochemistry and on the characteristic structural - stratigraphic of the aquifer; (c) geochemical, these are founded on hydrogeochemical analysis and isotopic of the waters and you/they are not only used for defining its aspects qualitative, but also for the reconstruction of the different water circuits. The project inside which the thesis is developed has as before expectation phase the individualization, from the various AATO (Authority of Optimal Territorial Circle) coordinated by the Region Tuscany, of works of uptake held priority in the whole regional scenery. In second phase already proceeds to the acquisition of the necessary information through the recovery and the reprocessing of all the data related to the areas of study in possession of the AATO. Finally proceeds to the execution of new analyses furnishing specific programs for the harvest of the data. The acquisition and the production of the new data have been taken care of by the various AATO, while my job, inside the IGG-CNR you/he/she has been turned both to the acquisition of new data and to the elaboration of the same. Finally proceeds to the real delimitation of the zone of protection on the case specific Pebbly shores, individualized together through a methodological criterion of that uses, in a first phase, of the study of the order of the geological formations characteristics of the area, of the idrogeological analysis of the same, as well as of the deductions drawn by the hydrodynamic investigation of the aquifer. Everything, validated by the results obtained by the chemical and isotopic analyses effected on the sources mails on the reliefs and on a series of wells individualized near the field wells, has allowed to circumscribe a zone of protection, that partly him far from the trace of the hydrographic basin of the Heavy River in Chianti. Particularly, the study of the geological formations and of their order, through the analysis of the sections in the area of Heavy, she has allowed to underline an idrostructural trim that, relatively to the acquiferis in rock, it favors an underground water flow from N to S. In conclusion, this type of fine-disciplinary approach has allowed to study in the detail the basin of feeding of the field wells "Pebbly shores" and to delimit its zone of protection setting the accent on that area that mostly contributes to the feeding of the stratum gained by the well in examination. she will be performed some local corporate body to adopt interventions as prescriptions or particular destinations of use of the territory, to insert in the urbanistic tools is general that of sector that they will allow a best defense of the underground water resource. A general consideration, that derives from the present job, brings to recognize in the tool of the areas of protection an useful strategy for the guardianship of such a precious resource: safeguard not end to herself but conjugated to the increasing need of sustainable development of the urban and sub-urban areas and sustainable use of the natural resources. The notion of sustainable use, particularly, of the drinking water resources , translates the necessity to find an equilibrium between the tied up demands of economic development to the exploitation of such resources and the imperatives of their protection and maintenance to middle and long term, in such way that the actual use of the natural resources doesn't jeopardize their future employment. Of fundamental importance, it is the fact that the resources of the planet must have managed so that to assure the satisfaction both of the present generations that of those future. This implicates the possibility to shape, also to international level, a real fundamental human right to the water. To such individual right, it would correspond an obligation of States to do yes that the activities of economic exploitation of the resources themselves are in every case compatible with the objective to assure drinkable water in quantity and enough quality to sustain the fundamental necessities of the interested populations.

Dall'analisi dell'evoluzione della giurisprudenza amministrativa condotta in questo lavoro emergono alcuni elementi importanti per comprendere come si sviluppa il ragionamento del giudice nell'esercizio del sindacato sulla discrezionalità amministrativa e tecnica. Ritengo che si possa affermare che sono due i concetti fondamentali che stanno alla base del ragionamento del giudice: 1) principio di ragionevolezza e figure sintomatiche dell'eccesso di potere; 2) elementi esterni di supporto al ragionamento ovvero elementi esterni di completamento del ragionamento dell'amministrazione. Con riguardo al primo aspetto, la giurisprudenza amministrativa sembra ormai costante nel fare applicazione, ancorché a volte non venga espressamente richiamato, del principio di ragionevolezza. Le figure sintomatiche dell'eccesso di potere vengono utilizzate non per accertare se l'amministrazione abbia perseguito l'interesse pubblico predefinito dalle norme attribuite del potere ma se la scelta sia stata o meno conforme al principio di ragionevolezza stesso. La figura sintomatica che meglio di ogni altra fornisce il senso di questo mutamento di prospettiva è rappresentata dal difetto di istruttoria: se il giudice ritiene che l'amministrazione non abbia effettuato la necessaria istruttoria ciò costituisce da solo motivo di invalidità dell'atto senza che occorre verificare se tale mancanza si sia risolta in concreto nella mancanza di tutela dell'interesse pubblico. La ragionevolezza è pertanto divenuta una sorta di "regola di condotta" cui l'amministrazione deve uniformare il proprio comportamento. Le figure sintomatiche dell'eccesso di potere costituiscono forme di esemplificazione concreta della stessa regola di condotta nell'ambito di un meccanismo che sta alla base della formazione di tutte le regole di condotta generali. Nell'esperienza amministrativa prima e in quella giurisprudenziale poi, l'osservazione delle vicende concrete ha condotto alla enucleazione di alcuni comportamenti dell'amministrazione che si risolvevano in una violazione degli interessi giuridici protetti. Questa esemplificazione amministrativa e giurisprudenziale ha consentito di fare ritenere che quella condotta dovesse essere in qualche modo sanzionata con il rimedio della invalidità dell'atto amministrativo. In altri termini, si è ritenuto che quel determinato comportamento fosse contrario alla regola della ragionevolezza. In questa prospettiva le figure sintomatiche non solo altro che comportamenti dell'amministrazione, tipizzati soprattutto in sede giurisprudenziale, che si pongono in contrasto con il principio di ragionevolezza. Da quanto esposto ne consegue che se l'amministrazione pone in essere una determinata attività rispondente ad una figura sintomatica ciò è sufficiente per ritenere violata la regola di condotta generale della ragionevolezza. Non esiste dunque diversità tra ragionevolezza e figure sintomatiche in quanto quest'ultime non solo altro che il nome "concreto" delle singole condotte poste in essere dall'amministrazione in contrasto con la ragionevolezza che è il nome "generale" del comportamento standard che l'amministrazione deve porre in essere. Questa modalità di operare dell'amministrazione e i conseguenti poteri del giudice riprendono, pur nella diversità dei contesti, i concetti privatistici di buona fede e dei poteri del giudice. La buona fede costituisce una regola generale di condotta, prevista dal codice civile che non ne fornisce una definizione, cui devono uniformare il proprio comportamenti i singoli. La Cassazione, anche in questo ambito, è ricorsa ad una sorta di tipizzazione dei comportamenti contrari alla regola generale della buona fede all'esito dell'osservazione dei comportanti che nella prassi vengono posti in essere. Si parla di tipizzazione giurisprudenziale dei comportamenti contrari alla buona fede. Ad esempio la Cassazione ritiene che sia in contrasto con la buona fede il comportamento di chi non comunica all'altra parte determinati dati o elementi in suo possesso relativi alla natura del bene oggetto di contrattazione. Una volta che il giudice accerta la presenza di questa condanna sanziona il comportamento per violazione della regola della buona fede. Ritengo che possa essere svolto un utile parallelismo tra il meccanismo che presiede all'accertamento della violazione del principio di ragionevolezza e il meccanismo che presiede all'accertamento della violazione del principio di buona fede con riferimento in particolare ai poteri privati. E cioè valutare il ragionamento che fa il giudice civile per sindacare i poteri privati alla luce dei principi generali di buona fede e correttezza. Da questa analisi comparativa sono emersi spunti di interesse per valutare il sindacato sull'eccesso di potere. La Cassazione si è occupata soprattutto del sindacato giurisdizionale relativo alle delibere societarie e in particolare ha affrontato la questione relativa al cosiddetto abuso del potere di maggioranza in ambito societario. E'interessante dunque stabilire qual è il ragionamento che fa il giudice civile quando sindaca il potere privato alla luce del principio di buona fede e qual è il ragionamento del giudice rispetto al principio di ragionevolezza. Ho riscontrato una certa analogia almeno con riguardo alle modalità del sindacato. Come noto, le delibere societarie sono adottate da persone giuridiche private nell'esercizio di un potere privato. La Cassazione ha affermato che la società non deve abusare del proprio potere e lo strumento che si utilizza per stabilire se nel nostro caso la società ha abusato del potere è costituito dal principio generale di buona fede e correttezza. Se il potere privato è esercitato con modalità che si pongono in contrasto con il principio di buona fede ci troviamo in un caso di abuso del potere. La dottrina civilistica ha chiarito che per aversi abuso di potere nel diritto privato è necessario che la norma assegni un potere discrezionale al soggetto privato. Se dunque vi è un potere privato discrezionale e l'ente lo esercita violando il principio della buona fede il comportamento integra gli estremi di un abuso del potere che viene sanzionato, in presenza di una società, con il rimedio dell'annullamento della delibera. Evidente dunque che compaiono tutte le componenti proprie del sindacato sui poteri pubblici e cioè: potere, discrezionalità, figura sintomatica, regola di condotta, rimedio dell'annullamento. La differenza è data dal fatto che nel diritto pubblico per sindacare il potere pubblico si utilizza il principio generale di ragionevolezza, nel diritto privato il principio di buona fede. 2. Il percorso del ragionamento del giudice modulato alla luce delle singole figure sintomatiche. Se il rapporto tra figure sintomatiche e ragionevolezza deve essere inteso, alla luce dell'analisi della giurisprudenza svolta in questo lavoro, come rapporto tra comportamenti singoli tipizzati dalla giurisprudenza e regola generale di condotta, l'altra questione centrale analizzata ha riguardato la rilevanza di altri elementi esterni che consentono di pervenire a quella valutazione. In altri termini si tratta di stabilire come il giudice arrivi a ritenere che quel difetto di istruttoria o quell'errore di fatto siano rilevanti e dunque costituiscano una vera e propria figura sintomatica. E' questo il piano della individuazione e ricostruzione del ragionamento dell'amministrazione e del giudice. Quando il giudice amministrativo è chiamato dal ricorrente ad accertare l'esistenza di un vizio di incompetenza o di violazione di legge, egli deve istituire un confronto fra l'atto impugnato e la norma regolativa della competenza o di altro aspetto che si assume violato. Ovviamente le cose si complicano quando il ricorrente denuncia l'inosservanza da parte dell'amministrazione della ratio legis, ossia della finalità perseguita, del suo significato in relazione ad altre norme che con essa formano un sistema (arg. ex art. 1363 c.c.), della "intenzione del legislatore" (art. 12 preleggi). In questo caso, infatti, l'indagine richiesta finisce quasi con il coincidere con quella che il giudice compie in relazione ad una denuncia di sviamento di potere (che segue anch'essa l'identificazione del fine della legge). Quando il vizio prospettato nel ricorso corrisponde ad una figura sintomatica l'operazione richiesta al giudice è più complessa e varia anche in rapporto alle singole figure sintomatiche. Si pensi, ad esempio, al motivo con cui il ricorrente segnala un difetto di istruttoria. Se l'atto omesso è prescritto dalla legge (per es. un parere obbligatorio) allora la censura si risolve in una denuncia di violazione di legge. Se, come accade nella maggior parte dei casi, l'omissione non riguarda un atto o un operazione prevista dalla legge, ma un atto o un operazione che, a giudizio del ricorrente, doveva essere compiuto, il giudice è chiamato a stabilire se "i presupposti di fatto"che devono sussistere per la legittimazione del provvedimento sono stati debitamente accertati ossia se le "risultanze dell'istruttoria" (art. 3, l. 241/1990) siano adeguate rispetto all'accertamento richiesto. Il giudice, vagliando la ricostruzione del fatto, operato dall'amministrazione, procede in sostanza ad una sua ricostruzione, istituisce un suo collegamento tra i "presupposti di fatto" e le "ragioni giuridiche che hanno determinato la decisione": compie cioè un operazione logicogiuridica dal cui esito (se conforme o difforme da quello compiuto dall'amministrazione) dipende l'esito del ricorso. Da tenere presente che pure la Corte di Cassazione, che non è giudice del fatto, conosce di esso "quante volte i giudici del merito vi siano pervenuti attraverso criteri illogici o antigiuridici"1. A maggior ragione tale sindacato viene esercitato dal giudice amministrativo che, pur investito, con l'azione di annullamento, di una funzione sostanzialmente cassatoria, può conoscere del fatto, com'è attestato dalla presenza che risale alle origini della giustizia amministrativa di alcuni, sia pur limitati, mezzi istruttori. Aggiungerei che la cognizione e la ricostruzione del fatto spetta al giudice amministrativo anche in certi casi in cui viene denunciata una violazione di leggi: quando ad es. il ricorrente nega che la concreta fattispecie sia riconducibile alla previsione normativa di cui l'amministrazione ha fatto applicazione. Facciamo, adesso, l'esempio del motivo con cui viene denunciata la violazione della prassi: la prassi, poniamo, di tollerare piccole violazioni edilizie, contraddette dal provvedimento impugnato (un ordine di demolizione). Poiché la prassi, in questo caso, consiste in un comportamento negativo, protratto nel tempo, il giudice è chiamato ad accertare in primo luogo se tale prassi sia effettivamente esistente (a fronte di una difesa processuale dell'amministrazione volta a negarla) e se, in secondo luogo, una volta accertata l'esistenza di un comportamento tollerante ma contra legem protratto nel tempo, voglia dare fondatezza al motivo di censura. Quel che è certo, in casi del genere, è che il fatto che viene in rilievo nel processo non è soltanto quello "presupposto" alla decisione - come esprime l'art. 3, della l. 241/1990 – ma un contegno protratto nel tempo che viene assunto come termine di controllo rispetto all'atto impugnato. Qualcosa di analogo si verifica quando viene denunciata una disparità di trattamento. Qui il confronto viene sollecitato in relazione ad un singolo precedente (o anche rispetto ad un atto contemporaneo: per es. una stessa infrazione disciplinare commessa da una persona alla quale sono applicate sanzioni diverse). Il giudice, in questo caso, mette a confronto due situazioni intese non come pure e semplici situazioni fattuali, ma anche come situazioni giuridicamente qualificate. Se un dirigente ed un suo autista si sono appropriati indebitamente di una somma dell'amministrazione, ben può la sanzione disciplinare essere differenziata: perché alla identità del comportamento, trattandosi di correi, corrisponde una diversità di situazioni soggettive, perchè dal dirigente si pretende un senso del dovere ben maggiore di quello che si può pretendere da un autista. Sicchè ben si giustificano due sanzioni disciplinari diverse per le due persone. Il ragionamento del giudice amministrativo in questo caso, non è diverso da quello che svolge la Corte Costituzionale quando è chiamata a decidere una questione di legittimità costituzionale per violazione dell'art. 3 Cost. Per valutare se le situazioni che, secondo il rimettente siano effettivamente uguali, sicchè non giustificherebbe un trattamento normativo diverso, la Corte deve mettere a confronto le due situazioni esaminando non soltanto gli assetti fattuali ma anche quelli che rientrano nella qualifica semigiuridica. L'argomentazione del giudice amministrativo, è ancora difforme di fronte ad una censura di violazione del principio di proporzionalità (anch'essa ricondotta al paradigma dell'eccesso di potere). Qui il confronto che il giudice è chiamato ad effettuare non è tra due atti o tra due situazioni, ma riguarda il rapporto tra la misura presa e l'obiettivo perseguito. Se fra queste due entità vi è sproporzione il giudice lo stabilisce, per un verso, passando in rassegna le misure giuridiche possibili, alternative a quelle prese, ossia mediante una ricognizione del complessivo quadro normativo (per stabilire, ad es., se lo stesso obiettivo poteva essere perseguito con una servitù di passaggio anziché con una espropriazione); e per altro verso, facendo riferimento a massime di esperienza (per es. per realizzare un edificio scolastico bastano 5000 mq anziché i due ettari previsti dalla dichiarazione di pubblica utilità). Analoga ma non identica, è l'operazione mentale richiesta da una censura di manifesta ingiustizia. Anche in questo caso, a differenza che nella disparità di trattamento, non viene in rilievo un confronto tra due situazioni. Il giudizio che il ricorrente sollecita è fondamentalmente un giudizio di valore: giusta o ingiusta è la misura presa? Un giudizio che non è quello soggettivo del giudice. Se l'ingiustizia deve essere manifesta, per giustificare l'accoglimento del motivo, deve essere tale che tutti la possono cogliere, appunto perché manifesta. Ancora. Il motivo che è proposto avverso il provvedimento (per es. la valutazione di una prova di esame) impugnato perché la Commissione non ha stabilito criteri di massima o li ha stabiliti in modo troppo generico (il difetto o l'insufficienza dell' "autolimite"). Qui il giudice deve stabilire se i criteri stabiliti nel bando o nella legge sono sufficienti a guidare la condotta dei commissari o debbono essere integrati: un operazione logica con la quale il giudice finisce per vestire i panni del commissario scrupoloso e quindi, ancora una volta, confermando la valutazione della commissione (quando respinge il ricorso) o sostituendo a quella la propria valutazione. Infinite sono poi le variazioni possibili in presenza di una censura di insufficienza della motivazione. Qui il giudice può ritenere adeguata la motivazione così come è formulata nel provvedimento impugnato; può ritenerla sostanzialmente sufficiente, sebbene non articolata adeguatamente (e in questo caso il giudice sostanzialmente la integra); può ritenere che, alla luce della difesa dell'amministrazione nel giudizio, la motivazione sia sufficiente (il divieto di integrazione giudiziale non sempre viene assicurato); può cogliere una contraddizione tra due motivi posti alla base dell'annullamento; può risalire ad altro atto dell'amministrazione, anche non richiamato dal provvedimento impugnato (art. 3, co. 3, l. 241/1990) per ricavarne una motivazione sufficiente; può pervenire alla conclusione che se anche la motivazione non è corretta e che, quindi, avrebbe dovuto essere diversa, l'esito del procedimento sarebbe stato lo stesso. In definitiva, la sentenza del giudice amministrativo in un processo in cui il ricorrente prospetta figure sintomatiche di eccesso di potere, difficilmente si esaurisce in un sillogismo o in una sussunsione. Fatti, voleri, qualificazioni giuridiche, massime di esperienza, principi economici (si pensi ai criteri di economicità ed efficacia enunciati dall'art. 1, l. 241/1990) idiosincrasie personali, confluiscono tutti in una pronuncia che riguarda una situazione concreta ma che è intessuta di proporzioni generiche o universali2. Naturalmente, queste conclusioni valgono per qualunque giudizio in qualunque processo, quando la domanda di annullamento dell'atto poggia su figure sintomatiche dell'eccesso di potere, la sentenza ha delle peculiarità, sul piano logico-giuridico, che si è cercato di evidenziare.

La ricerca si propone di definire le linee guida per la stesura di un Piano che si occupi di qualità della vita e di benessere. Il richiamo alla qualità e al benessere è positivamente innovativo, in quanto impone agli organi decisionali di sintonizzarsi con la soggettività attiva dei cittadini e, contemporaneamente, rende evidente la necessità di un approccio più ampio e trasversale al tema della città e di una più stretta relazione dei tecnici/esperti con i responsabili degli organismi politicoamministrativi. La ricerca vuole indagare i limiti dell'urbanistica moderna di fronte alla complessità di bisogni e di nuove necessità espresse dalle popolazioni urbane contemporanee. La domanda dei servizi è notevolmente cambiata rispetto a quella degli anni Sessanta, oltre che sul piano quantitativo anche e soprattutto sul piano qualitativo, a causa degli intervenuti cambiamenti sociali che hanno trasformato la città moderna non solo dal punto di vista strutturale ma anche dal punto di vista culturale: l'intermittenza della cittadinanza, per cui le città sono sempre più vissute e godute da cittadini del mondo (turisti e/o visitatori, temporaneamente presenti) e da cittadini diffusi (suburbani, provinciali, metropolitani); la radicale trasformazione della struttura familiare, per cui la famiglia-tipo costituita da una coppia con figli, solido riferimento per l'economia e la politica, è oggi minoritaria; l'irregolarità e flessibilità dei calendari, delle agende e dei ritmi di vita della popolazione attiva; la mobilità sociale, per cui gli individui hanno traiettorie di vita e pratiche quotidiane meno determinate dalle loro origini sociali di quanto avveniva nel passato; l'elevazione del livello di istruzione e quindi l'incremento della domanda di cultura; la crescita della popolazione anziana e la forte individualizzazione sociale hanno generato una domanda di città espressa dalla gente estremamente variegata ed eterogenea, frammentata e volatile, e per alcuni aspetti assolutamente nuova. Accanto a vecchie e consolidate richieste – la città efficiente, funzionale, produttiva, accessibile a tutti – sorgono nuove domande, ideali e bisogni che hanno come oggetto la bellezza, la varietà, la fruibilità, la sicurezza, la capacità di stupire e divertire, la sostenibilità, la ricerca di nuove identità, domande che esprimono il desiderio di vivere e di godere la città, di stare bene in città, domande che non possono essere più soddisfatte attraverso un'idea di welfare semplicemente basata sull'istruzione, la sanità, il sistema pensionistico e l'assistenza sociale. La città moderna ovvero l'idea moderna della città, organizzata solo sui concetti di ordine, regolarità, pulizia, uguaglianza e buon governo, è stata consegnata alla storia passata trasformandosi ora in qualcosa di assai diverso che facciamo fatica a rappresentare, a descrivere, a raccontare. La città contemporanea può essere rappresentata in molteplici modi, sia dal punto di vista urbanistico che dal punto di vista sociale: nella letteratura recente è evidente la difficoltà di definire e di racchiudere entro limiti certi l'oggetto "città" e la mancanza di un convincimento forte nell'interpretazione delle trasformazioni politiche, economiche e sociali che hanno investito la società e il mondo nel secolo scorso. La città contemporanea, al di là degli ambiti amministrativi, delle espansioni territoriali e degli assetti urbanistici, delle infrastrutture, della tecnologia, del funzionalismo e dei mercati globali, è anche luogo delle relazioni umane, rappresentazione dei rapporti tra gli individui e dello spazio urbano in cui queste relazioni si muovono. La città è sia concentrazione fisica di persone e di edifici, ma anche varietà di usi e di gruppi, densità di rapporti sociali; è il luogo in cui avvengono i processi di coesione o di esclusione sociale, luogo delle norme culturali che regolano i comportamenti, dell'identità che si esprime materialmente e simbolicamente nello spazio pubblico della vita cittadina. Per studiare la città contemporanea è necessario utilizzare un approccio nuovo, fatto di contaminazioni e saperi trasversali forniti da altre discipline, come la sociologia e le scienze umane, che pure contribuiscono a costruire l'immagine comunemente percepita della città e del territorio, del paesaggio e dell'ambiente. La rappresentazione del sociale urbano varia in base all'idea di cosa è, in un dato momento storico e in un dato contesto, una situazione di benessere delle persone. L'urbanistica moderna mirava al massimo benessere del singolo e della collettività e a modellarsi sulle "effettive necessità delle persone": nei vecchi manuali di urbanistica compare come appendice al piano regolatore il "Piano dei servizi", che comprende i servizi distribuiti sul territorio circostante, una sorta di "piano regolatore sociale", per evitare quartieri separati per fasce di popolazione o per classi. Nella città contemporanea la globalizzazione, le nuove forme di marginalizzazione e di esclusione, l'avvento della cosiddetta "new economy", la ridefinizione della base produttiva e del mercato del lavoro urbani sono espressione di una complessità sociale che può essere definita sulla base delle transazioni e gli scambi simbolici piuttosto che sui processi di industrializzazione e di modernizzazione verso cui era orientata la città storica, definita moderna. Tutto ciò costituisce quel complesso di questioni che attualmente viene definito "nuovo welfare", in contrapposizione a quello essenzialmente basato sull'istruzione, sulla sanità, sul sistema pensionistico e sull'assistenza sociale. La ricerca ha quindi analizzato gli strumenti tradizionali della pianificazione e programmazione territoriale, nella loro dimensione operativa e istituzionale: la destinazione principale di tali strumenti consiste nella classificazione e nella sistemazione dei servizi e dei contenitori urbanistici. E' chiaro, tuttavia, che per poter rispondere alla molteplice complessità di domande, bisogni e desideri espressi dalla società contemporanea le dotazioni effettive per "fare città" devono necessariamente superare i concetti di "standard" e di "zonizzazione", che risultano essere troppo rigidi e quindi incapaci di adattarsi all'evoluzione di una domanda crescente di qualità e di servizi e allo stesso tempo inadeguati nella gestione del rapporto tra lo spazio domestico e lo spazio collettivo. In questo senso è rilevante il rapporto tra le tipologie abitative e la morfologia urbana e quindi anche l'ambiente intorno alla casa, che stabilisce il rapporto "dalla casa alla città", perché è in questa dualità che si definisce il rapporto tra spazi privati e spazi pubblici e si contestualizzano i temi della strada, dei negozi, dei luoghi di incontro, degli accessi. Dopo la convergenza dalla scala urbana alla scala edilizia si passa quindi dalla scala edilizia a quella urbana, dal momento che il criterio del benessere attraversa le diverse scale dello spazio abitabile. Non solo, nei sistemi territoriali in cui si è raggiunto un benessere diffuso ed un alto livello di sviluppo economico è emersa la consapevolezza che il concetto stesso di benessere sia non più legato esclusivamente alla capacità di reddito collettiva e/o individuale: oggi la qualità della vita si misura in termini di qualità ambientale e sociale. Ecco dunque la necessità di uno strumento di conoscenza della città contemporanea, da allegare al Piano, in cui vengano definiti i criteri da osservare nella progettazione dello spazio urbano al fine di determinare la qualità e il benessere dell'ambiente costruito, inteso come benessere generalizzato, nel suo significato di "qualità dello star bene". E' evidente che per raggiungere tale livello di qualità e benessere è necessario provvedere al soddisfacimento da una parte degli aspetti macroscopici del funzionamento sociale e del tenore di vita attraverso gli indicatori di reddito, occupazione, povertà, criminalità, abitazione, istruzione, etc.; dall'altra dei bisogni primari, elementari e di base, e di quelli secondari, culturali e quindi mutevoli, trapassando dal welfare state allo star bene o well being personale, alla wellness in senso olistico, tutte espressioni di un desiderio di bellezza mentale e fisica e di un nuovo rapporto del corpo con l'ambiente, quindi manifestazione concreta di un'esigenza di ben-essere individuale e collettivo. Ed è questa esigenza, nuova e difficile, che crea la diffusa sensazione dell'inizio di una nuova stagione urbana, molto più di quanto facciano pensare le stesse modifiche fisiche della città. ; The research aims to define guidelines for the preparation of a plan that deals with quality of life and well-being. The reference to the quality and well-being is positively innovative, because imposes to organs of the government to relate with the subjectivity of active citizens and, at the same time, makes clear the need for a broader and transversal approach to the city and a more close relationship of technicians/experts with the leaders of political and administrative bodies. The research investigates the limits of modern town-planning theory in front of the complexity of new needs expressed by contemporary urban populations. The demand for services has changed significantly compared to that one of the Sixties, not only on the quantity but also and especially in terms of quality, because of the social changes that have transformed the modern city, from the point of view of the structure and the cultural request: the intermittent citizenship, so cities are increasingly experienced and enjoyed by citizens of the world (tourists and/or visitors, temporarily present) and popular citizens (suburban, provincial, metropolitan); radical transformation of the family structure, so the family-type consisting of a couple with children, solid benchmark for the economy and politics, is now minority; the irregularity and flexibility of calendars, diaries and rhythms of life of the population active, and social mobility, so individuals have trajectories of life and daily practices less determined by their social origins of what happened in the past; the elevation of the level of education and thus the increase in demand for culture; the growth of elderly population and the strong social individualism have generated a demand for the city expressed by the people extremely varied and diverse, fragmented and volatile, and in some aspects quite new. Close to old and consolidated requests - the city efficient, functional, productive, accessible to all - there are new questions, ideals and needs such as beauty, variety, usability, security, the ability to amaze and entertain, sustainability, the search for new identities, questions that express a desire to live and enjoy the city, to fell good into the city, questions that can no longer be satisfied through a welfare simply based on education, health, pension system and social security. The modern city or the modern idea of the city, based only on the concepts of order, regularity, cleaning, equality and good governance was handed over to the past history turning into something very different hard to represent, describe, tell. The contemporary city can be represented in many different ways, both on town-planning way and social way: in the recent literature there is the obvious difficulty of defining and enclose within certain limits the subject "city" and the lack of a strong belief in the interpretation of political, economic and social transformations that have invested society and the world in the last century. The contemporary city, beyond the administrative areas, territorial expansion and urban structures, infrastructure, technology, functionalism and global markets, is also a place of human relations, representation of the relationship between individuals and urban spaces where these relationship move. The city is both physical concentration of people and buildings, but also variety of uses and groups, it's the place of dense social relations where processes of cohesion or social exclusion occur, a place of cultural norms that govern behaviour and identity, expressed physically and symbolically through public spaces of city life. It's necessary a new approach to study the contemporary city, made up of cross-contamination and knowledge provided by other disciplines such as sociology and human sciences, which help to build the image commonly known of the city and the territory, landscape and environment. The representation of the urban social life varies according to what it is considered, in a specific historic moment and in a given context, a situation of well-being. The modern town-planning aimed at maximum level of well-being for individuals and communities, modelling on "real needs of people": in the old urban systems manuals appears a "Plan of services" as an appendix to the master plan, which includes services distributed on the surrounding areas, a sort of "social master plan" to avoid neighborhoods separated by segments of population or classes. In the contemporary city globalization, new forms of marginalization and exclusion, the advent of the so-called "new economy", the re-definition of the production base and the labour market are urban expression of a social complexity that can be defined trough transactions and symbolic exchanges, rather than trough processes of industrialization and modernization towards which the historic city, adopted modern, was oriented. All of this questions are the expression of that complex of matters which are currently described as "the new welfare", opposed to the one essentially based on education, on health, on the pension system and on social assistances. The research has therefore examined the traditional tools of town-planning and territorial programming in their operational and institutional dimension: the main destination of these instruments is the classification and accommodation of services and urban containers. It's evident, however, that in order to answer to the many questions of complexity, needs and desires expressed by contemporary society the actual allocations to "make city" must necessarily overcome the concepts of "standards" and "zoning" that are too rigid and unable to adapt to a growing demand for quality and services and at the same time inadequate to manage the relationship between collective space and domestic space. In this sense it is important to consider the relationship between housing types and urban morphology and hence the environment around the house, which establishes the relationship "from the house to the city" because it is in this duality that it is possible to define the relationship between private domestic spaces and public spaces and contextualize questions of roads, shops, meeting places, accesses. After the convergence from the wide urban scale construction to the architectural scale, the attention moves from the architectural scale to the scale of urban constructions, since the criterion of well-being goes through the different scales of habitable space. Moreover, in territorial systems with a widespread well-being and a high level of economic development there's an emerging awareness that the very concept of well-being is no longer linked only to the ability of collective and/or individual income: today the quality of life is measured in terms of environmental quality and social inclusion. Thus the need of an instrument of knowledge of the contemporary city to be attached to the Plan, containing criteria to be observed in the design of urban spaces in order to determine the quality and well-being, in the meaning of "quality of feeling good", of urban environment. Obviously, to reach quality and well-being it is necessary to satisfy macroscopic aspects of social functioning and living standards, through the indicators of income, employment, poverty, crime, housing, education, etc., and also first needs, basic and elementary, and secondary, cultural and changing, moving through the welfare state to a general feeling of well-being, to wellness in a holistic sense, all expressions of a desire for mental and physical beauty and a new relationship of the body with the environment, then real expression of a need for an individual and collective wellbeing. And it is this need, new and difficult, which creates the widespread feeling of a starting new urban season, much more than physical changes of the city could represent.

Millainen on Euroopan unionin kansainvälinen asema? Onko Euroopan unionilla uskottavaa ulkopolitiikkaa? Vaikka Euroopan unioni on yksi maailman merkittävimmistä toimijoista kaupan ja kansainvälisen vaihdon alalla sekä maailman suurin avunantaja, vaikuttaa siltä, että poliittisesti sillä ei ole vaikutusvaltaa. Väitöskirjassani tutkin, onko talouden jättiläinen todellakin poliittinen kääpiö. Tutkimuskirjallisuutta analysoimalla olen etsinyt niitä EU:n piirteitä, joiden on nähty estävän unionia toimimasta todellisena kansainvälisenä toimijana; samalla olen pyrkinyt selittämään, millainen kokonaisuus EU on verrattuna tavanomaiseen ulkopoliittiseen toimijaan, valtioon, ja miten EU sopii kansainväliseen ympäristöön. Lopuksi tutkin EU:n politiikkaa laajentumisprosessissa, jossa jäseniksi otettiin Keski- ja Itä-Euroopan valtioita. EU:n ulkopolittisen toimijuuden esteinä on usein nähty puuttuva tai vaillinainen sotilaallinen aspekti ja heikko päätöksentekojärjestelmä. Kun ulkopolitiikka perinteisesti ymmärretään sotilaalliseksi toiminnaksi kriisitilanteissa, EU:n on nähty olevan kyvytön sekä määrittelemään intressinsä ja tekemään päätöksiä että toimimaan sotilaallisesti tilanteen ratkaisemiseksi. Miksi kansallisen identiteetin ja intressin puuttuminen sekä sotilaallisten toimintamahdollisuuksien vajavuus ovat niin merkittäviä ongelmia globalisoituvassa maailmassa, jossa taloudellisen vallan uskotaan olevan poliittista tärkeämpää? Kun valtiot yhä enenevässä määrin määrittelevät turvallisuusuhkansa toisin kuin sotilaallisin termein, miksi kyky sotilaalliseen toimintaan on yhä olennaista? Valtio on ollut kansainvälisen politiikan hallitseva toimija niin kauan, että meidän on vaikea tunnustaa, että tämän hetken kansainvälisessä politiikassa toimija tarvitsee erilaisia piirteitä kuin ne valtion tunnusomaiset piirteet ja kapasiteetit, joiden avulla se saattoi vahvistaa asemansa ensisijaisena toimijana. Tämän hetken kansainvälisessä järjestelmässä EU:n monenkeskisyyteen ja neuvotteluihin perustuva päätöksentekojärjestelmä saattaa osoittautua pikemminkin vahvuudeksi kuin heikoudeksi. Parhaassa tapauksessa EU pystyy hyväksikäyttämään globalisaation aiheuttamia muutoksia valtion suvereenisuuteen ja tehtäviin, ja rakentamaan tehokkaamman hallitsemisen järjestelmän. EU:n asema ei-valtiollisena toimijana mahdollistaa erilaisten toimijuuden tapojen käyttämisen, minkä seurauksena EU saattaa olla valtiota paremmin varustettu ratkaisemaan uusia turvallisuusuhkia vaikka unionin tavat vaikuttaa ovat näkymättömämpiä kuin sotilaallinen hyökkäys, ne eivät ole vailla vaikutusta. EU ei ole vähemmän kuin valtio, vaan enemmän. Sen kehitys vastaa kansainvälisen järjestelmän kehitystä ja vie sitä osaltaan poispäin valtiokeskeisyydestä. EU:n merkittävin ongelma ei ole sotilaallisen aspektin vajavaisuus, vaan se, miten rakentaa uskottava identiteetti ja saada kansalaisten kannatus Eurooppalaiselle hallinnolle. Tutkimus osoittaa, että vahvistaakseen kansainvälistä asemaansa EU:n ei tarvitse kehittää itseään federalistisempaan suuntaan, vaan käyttää hyväkseen globalisoituvan järjestelmän tarjoamia uusia mahdollisuuksia. ; Dwarf, adolescent or superpower? The European Union on the international field It seems to be a part of common knowledge that the European Union is an economic giant but a political dwarf. Although none can claim that the EU does not possess significant resources, for some reason these resources do not seem to help the EU to have much influence in foreign policy matters. Despite its large network of diplomatic relations, and its position as one of the most significant aid donors and trading partners in the world, many suggest that it has not succeeded in its attempts to develop its economic influence also into a political one. In my study I wish to examine if the EU is such an unfit actor on the international field. I will analyze how the international system (of states) defines the properties of actors, and how the definition is changing. There are two basic questions in this work: First, what position does the international system offer to the EU? Secondly, how does the EU utilize the position given to it? To find answers, I will examine a state as an actor, the international system of states, and the properties and actions of the EU. The EU in the system of states Since the international system is a system of states, the position of a state as a primary actor seems to be universal and eternal. In this thesis it is claimed that the EU is a new kind of a polity challenging the position of a Westphalian state. If the EU succeeds in this, it will have consequences for the whole international system. Yet, to be able to act in the system, the EU must not only challenge the position of a state, but also adapt to the requirements of the actorness; the EU must resemble a state in some respects to get recognized as an actor. There still is an on going test of statehood, and as long as the EU does not pass it, it is hard to consider it as an actor in its own right. The position of a state is connected to the development of the international system overall. The effects of globalization, modernization and democratization are creating new kinds of environments and cultures with new possibilities and threats. Increased interdependence between national economies and production added to the fact that all types of exchange are becoming ever more global restrict the ability of a state to act as fully sovereign . Globalisation includes many processes that affect the position of a state. The meaning of properties like sovereignty and military resources is changing, as well as a state s position on the international field. Change does not happen only inside a state and in its position, however, but also international structures change, affecting the way actors behave with each other. I claim that although the state is losing its position, it is still the dominant actor in international politics, and other polities hoping to get a position of an actor must be comparable with it: after all, structures do not change so quickly, and actors are constituted by them. The changing international context opens up the possibility to increase the importance of the EU. Sovereignty and military resources that once determined the state s position as a dominant actor have partly lost their meaning; not having them should not prevent the EU from being an actor. Furthermore, the EU might have properties that make it better capable to manage in the globalizing and fragmenting world. A foreign policy actor Rather than an international organization, the EU is a new type of political system, made up of national and European institutions that are constituted in relation to each other . The national institutions of member states and the EU institutions are so closely interwoven that they cannot be conceived as separate political systems. On the other hand, the EU is not a state, and we have many reasons to assume that it will not be one (unless the definition of a state changes). While it has some capabilities states traditionally own, it lacks others. This appears to make it an actor in some issue-areas, but not in all of them. Foreign policy has traditionally been connected to a state, it is concerned with the relation of a state to other states in the international system; it is connected to the idea of national aims and interests, and involves mobilizing national resources. Although foreign policy in its most visible form is high politics concerning high diplomacy and war, in practice most of the time it is low politics including low-level diplomatic practices between ministries and also economic policy as a means of reaching foreign policy aims. Foreign policy does not entail military force; as Karen Smith puts it, the recourse to military instruments can indicate a failure of foreign policy . In this work I will suggest that the reason why foreign policy is connected solely to states is not that making foreign policy is possible only for nation states and governments; rather it has to do with states position as primary actors in the international system. When certain conditions are metconcerning among others, a decision-making system non-state actors are also able to conduct foreign policy. There is no single EU foreign policy, but on some occasions member states agree on common interests and objectives, and mobilize national and collective resources to fulfill them: they conduct common foreign policy . For the EU, foreign policy means that its member states and institutions, to use Smith s words, have expressed a unified position in response to external events and/or formulated a plan of action directed towards the fulfillment of specified political/security objectives, and have agreed to use Community/CFSP instruments and/or instruments under national competence in a coordinated way to implement it . Even though the common foreign policy is important for the EU s ability to act as an actor, it must be put into the larger context of external relations, otherwise we fail to see the EU s importance on the international field. The division between political and economic matters has always been vague, but it is even more so at the time of globalization. It seems that those foreign policies connecting intergovernmental and community issue-areas, like the enlargement policy, have been among the most successful policies. The enlargement policy can be considered foreign and security policy because of its political and security-related aims, although the EU has applied the practices of the CFSP ­ common position and joint action ­ only a couple of times during many years of the enlargement policy. Although the EU may appear as a weak actor in high policy areas, it is an effective negotiator of low policy matters, including trade and aid, that belong to the Community issue-area . The EU does not act like a traditional foreign policy player. But what usually is seen as its weakness, may turn out to be a strength. In the contemporary international system it may be a benefit that an actor is able to take different forms in different situations, as the EU is forced to do due to its nature of lying between an international organization and a state. A civilian power There are certain requirements for an actor presented in the literature of IR, and usually these requirements do not include statehood or military resources. However, the polity´s own properties do not determinate totally the entity s position on the international field. Entry to the system is dependent on whether or not the other actors give recognition. It is claimed in this work that usually only states are recognized as actors, but even though the EU is not a state, it has at least partial recognition in practice, since it is accepted as a partner in negotiations, diplomatic relations, trade and aid. But the EU seems to suffer from a lack of credibility, or prestige that prevents it from having much of an influence especially in international crises, like in the Palestinian question. Still, by recognizing the EU as an actor in its own right ­ even partially states decrease the significance of sovereignty, and weaken their own position as primary actors. Hence, the EU may change the structure of the international system, and make room for other polities too; or, it may become a state. One possible direction of developing the EU is to strengthen its image as a civilian power. According to Hans W. Maull, a civilian power accepts the necessity of cooperation with other actors when pursuing international objectives; utilizes non-military, primarily economic means to secure its goals; and is willing to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management. In this thesis the term civilian power refers to an actor who trusts in cooperation, respects and enforces international values and norms as defined by international institutions and treaties, and acts through diplomacy, economic means and international institutions. Manners suggests, on the other hand, that the EU may be more important normatively than in an empirical way, since it sets normative world standards. He continues that due to its power over opinion , idée force , or ideological power , the EU would best be conceived as a normative power Europe. The EU s normative power is a significant dimension of this thesis, but I will also examine other ways of using power including the Union s foreign policy instruments. I agree with Manners that the EU s ability to shape conceptions of normality in international relations is what makes it a normative power , but I suggest that it is a part of its special nature as a civilian power ­ although also military powers may use and have used normative power. The EU clearly attempts to gain legitimacy through expansion of democratic and human rights norms, but this is not the whole picture of the EU. It is difficult to evaluate in which direction the EU will develop; even more difficult is to describe the outcome of European integration. More than a state I will propose that the EU lacks some of the properties of a state ­ although I do not see that the difference is so remarkable in the end ­ but that it does not make the EU an unfit actor in the international system; quite the contrary, the European integration includes elements that may make the EU better suitable to the international system than the traditional sovereign state. Hence, it will be suggested that instead of being less than a state the EU is actually more than a state. Within changing structure of the international system, resources and properties of states ­ sovereignty, structure of hierarchy and military resources, among others ­ will not be so significant that they guarantee the state s dominant position; quite the contrary, the strong actor have to be able to handle with global capitalism, regionalism, interdependence, and security threats raising from various sources. When the system has been increasingly perceived as interdependent, and states ability to govern has been deemed to be in question, an entity like the EU seems to be well placed to act on behalf of its members as a manager of the interdependence. Through European integration we also may find new answers to some of the problems caused by the nature of the international system itself. In this connection I will especially consider democracy and security issues, although there exists other similar issues too, for example minorities and refugees. The EU might be ­ or it might become - the first truly post-modern polity, and it is impossible to explain its significance by concentrating only on its CFSP. The change of the international system is important in giving room for an actor like the EU, but structures do not totally create actorness; the development and action of the EU reflects the dynamic relationship between structures and agency. The EU is born from the combination of external demand and opportunities, and political will and imagination of its founders. Hence, the importance of the EU cannot be evaluated by studying either its internal capacities or external opportunities; they both together create the EU s capacity to act and have an influence on the international field. Yet, internal factors associated with legitimacy and efficacy of policy processes influence the perceptions other actors have of the EU, and create expectations of the EU s ability to act. Additionally, states must create new ways of acting in the changing international system, this suggests that our picture of an actor and its ways of having an influence and making policy may be at least partially out-dated. I wish to suggest that by studying the EU within an approach that takes both structures and internal capabilities into consideration we might get new ideas about actorness overall.

Minority and community are concepts that have dominated the analysis of Christians in the Arab world, leading to a perception of Middle-Eastern societies as confessional or sectarian mosaics. This paradigm posits that religious and political identities and dynamics are closely intertwined in countries where the dominant culture is Islam, and that religious and ethnic groups live side by side, maintaining limited interactions while their immutable identities offer a strong potential for conflict. This work questions the paradigm of the mosaic by focusing on identity formation and interaction across religious boundaries over a period that extends from the later decades of Ottoman rule in Transjordan (1870) to present Jordan (1997). It asks whether confessionnal identities are by nature conflictual and if the 'minority' concept is the only relevant one to evaluate the degree of social, political and economic participation of non-Moslems in countries where Islam is the dominant culture. The approach is inductive and historical but mobilises concepts from the disciplines of social and political anthropology and political sociology. The dissertation comprises of 10 chapters set chronologically and covering the period 1870 to 1997. Taking a historical approach, it focuses on the modalities of exchanges, transactions, cooperation and communication (looking at kinship, mariage patterns, the role of women, economic cooperation, and various aspects of local and national politics) between Christians and Moslems and between several Christian denominations in Jordan (Orthodox and Roman Catholic, or Latin, in particular), more particularly in the town of Madaba however set within a broader national and international context. These broader contexts (that encompass the politics of states and of transnational Church actors over time) allow to bridge between the local and other levels to document how institutions regulate identity formation and cross-communal interactions. Over a century, Madaba provides the background, widely open to the rest of the country and the world, of a social, religious and political history of Arab Christian families. The work combines historical and anthropological approches and sources (in particular so far unexploited parish and Vatican archives, together with other archival sources). It questions the nature and the maintenance of the social and political link between Christians and Moslems in Madaba and in Jordan, and the changes that have affected identity boundaries between groups: both as Christians and Moslems, but equally as members of different Christian denominations, particularly in the context of missionary activities. The thesis defended here is that it is time to 'break the mosaic' so as to cast light from the inside on the societies and polities within which Christians in the Arab world are inserted. The title of the dissertation refers both to this paradigm and to the Byzantine mosaics that have made Madaba famous as an archaeological site. In place of the static image of the mosaic, the dissertation offers successive episodes of a moving picture where political powers, Churches (missionary or not), those local families that transfer their assets to Amman, the Jordanian capital, and the national arena, negotiate the organisation of local social interactions. One important contribution of the dissertation is to document how the tribe, over more than a century, remains a central social form to express identities, regulate economic and political interactions, and manage conflict both between Christians and between Christians and Moslems. Communal identities, however central they have become since the inception of the modern state, do not appear to threaten the cohesion of the society and the polity, either at the local or national levels. The maintenance of tribal identities is dealt with throughout the dissertation as a dynamic process in which both successive states, regimes, social actors at the national and local levels play a part, in particular in the historical context of the arrival of the Palestinians in Jordan and in the town of Madaba. At another level, the dissertation deals extensively with the institutional relations between the Greek Orthodox and the Roman Catholic Churches and the Jordanian state, bringing a new insight into a previously under-studied domain. Finally, this work offers an argument about the relationships between state and society in contemporary Jordan by interrogating the changing nature of the social pact between the Hashemite regime and local constituencies, more specifically with non-Moslems but also with Transjordanians as opposed to Palestinians. This work is therefore not a mere monograph about Christians in the town of Madaba: looking at a 'marginal' and local phenomenon, it enlightens broader social, political and historical dynamics. ; En partant d'un phénomène observé 'à la marge' afin de mieux illustrer ce qui se passe au centre, ce travail aborde des questions fondamentales pour la compréhension des sociétés du Moyen-Orient en déconstruisant notamment la catégorie de 'minorité', en s'interrogeant sur la nature du lien social entre chrétiens et musulmans dans l'agglomération de Madaba et au-delà dans la Jordanie contemporaine et en analysant la construction des identités collectives sur plus d'un siècle (1870-1997). Sont proposés d'autres paradigmes que ceux des traditions orientaliste et développementaliste pour l'analyse des minorités en pays musulmans. Ces traditions postulent la primauté du facteur religieux dans la formation et l'expression des identités sociales et envisagent les sociétés arabes comme des 'mosaïques' formées de groupes ethnoconfessionnels homogènes, relativement hermétiques les uns aux autres et inscrits dans une hiérarchie de statuts. On s'est plutôt inspiré ici de l'approche sur les frontières et les interactions entre groupes ethniques proposée par F. Barth en lui adjoignant une certaine profondeur historique et en intégrant une analyse des rapports entre le pouvoir politique et les groupes sociaux. Il s'agit de poser les affiliation religieuses et confessionnelles comme des constructions sociales et historiques dont on peut étudier le développement, les méandres et les interactions avec d'autres types d'affiliation. S'inspirant de tous les travaux récents portant sur la construction des identités collectives, qu'il s'agisse de nations ou d'ethnies, l'approche choisie défend une conception plurielle et mouvante des identités décrites en termes de processus dynamiques et interactionnels en s'interrogeant sur les temporalités et les facteurs de continuité/changement et en montrant des continuité beaucoup plus longues que celles qui posent la période coloniale comme période charnière de fixation des identités collectives. En plus d'une méthodologie d'observation anthropologique du terrain et des acteurs, quatre types principaux de sources ont été exploités : la littérature des voyageurs occidentaux, les archives paroissiales et missionnaires (en particulier celles de la Propaganda Fide à Rome), les témoignages oraux, la littérature d'histoire locale produite à Madaba. On a adopté un plan chronologique découpé en trois périodes principales. A l'intérieur de chaque partie, l'analyse thématique a été privilégiée en suivant, dans l'agglomération de Madaba depuis sa fondation en 1880, les alliances matrimoniales, politiques et économiques entre chrétiens et musulmans et entre groupes de différents rites chrétiens (essentiellement orthodoxes et latins) afin de déterminer où passent les frontières de l'identité et comment elles changent. Une variété d'acteurs institutionnels et individuels, dont certains apparaissent à un moment historique donné, influent sur la forme de ces frontières : les administrations des États qui se succèdent et leur personnel, les hiérarchies ecclésiastiques, les prêtres, les Grandes Puissances occidentales et leurs représentants locaux, les intellectuels de formation moderne, les partis politiques, les notables traditionnels et modernes, les organisations de la société civile, les émigrés et les immigrés, les tribus et leurs membres. Centré sur l'agglomération de Kérak, dont sont issus les chrétiens qui fondent Madaba en 1880, le prologue fait apparaître que, dans la Syrie du Sud (Transjordanie) du milieu du XIXe siècle, les institutions ecclésiastiques (grecques orthodoxes) et impériales (ottomanes) n'ont que très peu d'influence sur ce territoire situé à l'extrême périphérie de l'empire. Minoritaires sur le plan démographique et dispersés sur le territoire, les chrétiens ne sont pas marginalisés du fait de leur appartenance religieuse car l'ordre tribal des relations sociales assure différents niveaux d'intégration sociale et de coopération politique et économique entre lignages chrétiens et musulmans en fonction d'autres critères que ceux de l'appartenance religieuse. Les chrétiens sont fragmentés en plusieurs clans et tribus sans que l'on puisse repérer de cohésion confessionnelle. Sur le plan de la pratique religieuse, c'est une forme de syncrétisme qui prévaut. L'impossibilité des échanges matrimoniaux entre chrétiens et musulmans n'est pas nécessairement perçue comme témoignant d'un frontière religieuse infranchissable mais s'inscrit dans le contexte plus vaste des règles qui régissent les alliances matrimoniales entre tribus. L'appartenance religieuse est avant tout un marqueur d'identité tribale. La première partie analyse comment l'ordre communautaire religieux apparaît dans les dernières décennies du XIXe siècle, sous l'action conjuguée des organisations missionnaires (protestantes et catholiques) et de l'administration alors que les Ottomans entreprennent de rétablir leur autorité sur la Syrie du Sud. Autour de la fondation du village de Madaba par des lignages chrétiens immigrés de Kérak sous l'impulsion des missionnaires latins, on montre comment de nouveaux acteurs religieux et civils entreprennent d'imposer un ordre communautaire des relations sociales à travers l'éducation missionnaire, le marquage d'espaces chrétiens, le contrôle des alliances matrimoniales, de nouvelles pratiques cultuelles, l'accès aux instances de représentation administratives et juridiques ottomanes. Les modalités d'insertion des tribus chrétiennes qui fondent Madaba dans leur environnement permettent de mettre en lumière les résistances à l'ordre communautaire par l'établissement de partenariats économiques et d'alliances politiques avec les tribus musulmanes du lieu selon des logiques lignagères persistantes où les acteurs instrumentalisent à leur profit les nouvelles ressources communautaires fournies par les Églises ou les consulats européens. Au cours du XXe siècle, la Transjordanie, d'abord sous mandat britannique, accède à l'indépendance. Malgré ce changement politique, le régime monarchique se perpétue sans que les modalités d'insertion sociale des chrétiens ne soient bouleversées au niveau du pays dans son ensemble ou au sein de l'agglomération de Madaba. La deuxième partie se penche alors sur la manière dont l'État hachémite et les Églises majoritaires (grecque orthodoxe et romaine catholique) négocient les frontières des espaces communautaires à travers la législation sur les communautés confessionnelles et leurs prérogatives religieuses, éducatives et caritatives. Le traitement différencié accordé par l'État aux différentes Église en présence ainsi que des relations diverses entre les hiérarchies ecclésiastiques et les laïcs des communautés sont deux dimensions qui contribuent à empêcher la cohésion des chrétiens pris comme un ensemble. Le statut politique des chrétiens est ensuite étudié non en isolation mais en parallèle avec celui d'autres groupes sociaux, Circassiens, bédouins, réfugiés palestiniens, familles musulmanes transjordaniennes du nord et du sud, etc. afin de poser question quant à la réalité d'un statut minoritaire et à l'existence d'une majorité politique dans le royaume hachémite. Il ressort que le régime octroie aux communautés chrétiennes et aux familles chrétiennes de notables (anciens ou modernes) un espace privilégié d'expression et de représentation qui leur permet d'occuper une place centrale, et non marginale, dans la société. Dans le même temps, il est difficile d'identifier une norme identitaire autre qu'hachémite et il apparaît qu'une des modalités d'exercice du pouvoir monarchique repose sur la cooptation d'individus et de familles appartenant à tous les groupes de la société. Dans un second temps, recentrer l'analyse sur l'agglomération de Madaba permet d'observer comment les acteurs locaux relaient les efforts de l'État qui visent à maintenir une fragmentation sociale selon des clivages communautaires et lignagers afin de résister à la formation d'identités politiques transversales qui mettraient en danger sa stabilité. La modernité politique et économique n'en engendre pas moins un système de relations multiples entre chrétiens et musulmans que l'on peut repérer à travers les alliances politiques lors d'épisodes électoraux, dans les mouvements associatifs, dans les partenariats économiques, dans les partis politiques ou lors d'épisodes de conflit aigus tels celui de Septembre noir. En parallèle, les logiques tribales continuent à ordonner conflit et coopération entre groupes de religions différentes qui se définissent d'abord selon leur affiliation lignagère. C'est le cas, en particulier, dans les domaines de l'économie agricole et pastorale traditionnelle, dans les épisodes de règlement de conflits de sang ou d'honneur où prévaut encore le droit coutumier, parfois à l'encontre des prescription du droit musulman. La fragmentation des chrétiens en groupes lignagers est ainsi préservée sans que ne s'effectue une communautarisation incluant une dimension politique. De même, les valeurs qui permettent aux chrétiens de participer pleinement à l'échange social, telles l'honneur individuel ou collectif, le prestige familial, la limitation de l'autonomie des femmes, ne sont pas menacées par l'imposition de normes islamiques. A partir des années 1970, la polarisation de la population du royaume hachémite entre Jordaniens 'de souche' et Jordaniens 'd'origine palestinienne' amène un processus de différenciation identitaire dans lequel l'organisation tribale en vient à symboliser l'identité jordanienne. Dans le même temps, les islamistes deviennent la principale force d'opposition que le régime tente d'endiguer en réaffirmant son propre caractère musulman et en islamisant de nouveaux espaces de la vie publique. Ces changements de paradigmes de la société politique jordanienne touchent Madaba, ville mixte où cohabitent Jordaniens des tribus et Palestiniens réfugiés, chrétiens et musulmans. De plus, les équilibres démographiques et politiques de la ville penchent de plus en plus en faveur des musulmans. Les chrétiens, autrefois majoritaires, entreprennent alors de défendre leur position de prééminence dans la ville. Les stratégies qu'ils mettent en place pour combattre une double logique de minorisation (en tant que chrétiens et Jordaniens 'de souche') font l'objet de la dernière partie de ce travail. On montre tout d'abord comment les chrétiens résistent sur le terrain à un recul de la neutralité religieuse de l'espace public et à leur mise en minorité démographique et politique (conseil municipal) dans l'agglomération et comment ils se redéploient dans l'espace urbain, créent des réseaux de soutien financier avec les immigrés, amorcent un rapprochement entre Églises, compensent dans le champ politique national la perte de leur hégémonie locale. Dans un second temps, on se penche sur la littérature d'histoire locale que produisent les chrétiens de Madaba afin d'analyser comment ces derniers, en reformulant leur histoire ancienne et récente, se construisent à la fois des identités confessionnelles, ethniques et lignagères et comment elles sont rendues compatibles afin de lutter contre une marginalisation symbolique. Le dernier chapitre se penche sur les élections législatives de 1997 afin d'illustrer la manière dont les chrétiens utilisent leurs imaginaires identitaires comme vecteurs de mobilisation politique à l'occasion des élections législatives, nouvelle arène de compétition depuis la libéralisation de la vie politique intervenue en 1989. Malgré l'existence d'un siège chrétien réservé pour la circonscription de Madaba, ce n'est pas la mobilisation communautaire qui apparaît comme efficace mais bien plutôt le discours des solidarités tribales, éventuellement (mais non nécessairement) en conjonction avec l'appartenance partisane ou confessionnelle. On peut alors avancer que les chrétiens participent pleinement aux dynamiques de la société dans son ensemble. Tout au long de la période étudiée, la parenté joue un rôle central comme vecteur essentiel de l'identification des groupes, que ceux ci soient dans un espace rural ou urbain. Les chrétiens de Madaba mobilisent les mêmes ressources symboliques que les autres groupes avec lesquels ils sont en contact. Comme l'ensemble de la société, les chrétiens participent à une multitude d'échanges et d'interactions et se positionnent en fonction de ces interactions. Au-delà de l'étude de cas qui s'ancre dans une ville moyenne de la Jordanie centrale, ce travail s'interroge en conclusion sur le système politique jordanien et sur les modes de légitimation de sa monarchie. Les analyses en termes de construction nationale sont critiquées, le terme de 'minorité' est mis en question tout comme le présupposé classique d'une imbrication nécessairement étroite du religieux et du politique dans les pays dits, ou qui se disent, musulmans.

Thèse de socio-histoire comparée du politique rédigée entre 2002 et 2007 dans le cadre d'une co-tutelle franco-italienne. ; This PhD deals with the forms of public and political activism developed by conservative Catholic women in the Italian Unione fra le donne cattoliche d'Italia (UDCI) and the French Ligue patriotique des Françaises (LPDF) before the 1944 and 1945 that allows full citizenship to French and Italian women. It led me to explore in depth two distinct paths by which such organizations managed to mobilize, and politicize conservative women, despite their avowedly non-feminist and non-political ideologies stances. By examining individual political trajectories in the context of collective political stances, this research provides a new insight on processes of politicization at a moment of broader democratization in French and Italian politics (1902-19 in Italy, 1902-33 in France). I could identifyied a "liberal" path of politicization for the French organization: French Catholic Women officially supported the Republic and since 1902 enteredparticipated since 1902 in the political arena through financing and canvassing for male candidates. This path is quite different to the "instransigeant" Italian one. In Italy, since the suffrage was restricted, the Catholic Church forbade Catholic women to enter the political competition. In this perspective, the association used lobbying and cultural action to influence male politicians and led them to propose laws in favour of the Church and of women (i.e. mothers). ; Cette recherche historique qui croise les apports des études de genre, de la science politique et de la sociologie religieuse met en lumière la façon singulière dont les militantes d'action féminine catholique sont venues à la politique en France et en Italie durant les premières décennies du XXe siècle. Deux associations catholiques féminines de masse ont fait l'objet de cette analyse comparée : la Ligue patriotique des Françaises active de 1902 à 1933 et l'Unione fra le donne cattoliche d'Italia de 1909 à 1919. La thèse réalisée dans le cadre d'un doctorat en co-tutelle entre l'Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales et l'Université de Rome 'La Sapienza' s'est appuyée sur différents fonds d'archives qui ont été dépouillés, pour certains d'entre eux intégralement, durant cinq ans. La problématique qui a guidé cette recherche est celle de l'activité politique féminine conservatrice dans des contextes d'exclusion des femmes du suffrage. Si l'activité des suffragistes, des féministes, des militantes socialistes de la période contemporaine est bien connue, les mobilisations conservatrices sont restées dans l'ombre de l'histoire, malgré leur caractère massif et durable. Le point de départ de mon travail a été de comprendre comment les femmes qui n'étaient pas féministes, dans le sens où ce terme est défini par les organisations féminines en faveur du suffrage et des femmes au début du siècle dernier, se sont mobilisées pour faire émerger une parole féminine conservatrice. Il fallait éclairer les modalités d'action de ces femmes, saisir le paradoxe de leur engagement à la fois conservateur sur le plan politique, religieux et social et en même temps porteur de redéfinition pratique des normes de genre. Tout en étant très attachées à un ordre social inégalitaire et à une hiérarchie des genres sous-tendus par la reconquête du terrain perdu par l'Église, certaines de ces femmes ont dans certains contextes pu faire preuve d'une contestation plus ou moins silencieuse des normes en vigueur dans l'Église et dans la société. La comparaison est centrale dans cette démarche. L'Italie et la France sont deux pays que les contextes de sécularisation et de séparation de l'Etat de l'Église catholique rapprochent. Leur système politique libéral repose sur l'exclusion des femmes du corps électoral d'abord sur des motifs juridiques – elles ne sont pas libres depuis le Code civil de 1804 en France et en Italie –, puis politiques – jugées trop proches de l'Église et sous la coupe du clergé. Mais dans ces contextes proches, la naissance de l'action catholique féminine prend des formes distinctes. La Ligue patriotique des Françaises voit le jour en 1902, en tant qu'entreprise électorale pourvoyeuse de subsides pour les candidats catholiques. Tandis qu'en Italie, ce ne sont pas les élections qui provoquent l'apparition d'une association de laïques organisées mais le congrès féministe de Rome en 1908. Le cas italien fait saillir les spécificités du rapport à la politique de l'association française. Bien que s'en défendant, en France, les femmes de la Ligue entrent dans l'arène politique, non pas pour voter directement mais pour prendre une part dans la division sexuelle du travail militant qu'elle justifient par les compétences supposées de leur sexe. A l'œuvre en 1902, lors des municipales de 1904, des législatives de 1906, elles diffusent les tracts des candidats catholiques, collent des affiches, gèrent les caisses électorales, nettoient les listes électorales dans les mairies, et même monnayer leur « devoir conjugal » contre une promesse de vote pour le bon candidat. Cette activité se poursuit de façon plus discrète après 1906, date à laquelle le pape Pie X leur interdit toute action politique. Tout autre est la situation italienne, où, parce que le non expedit du pape Pie IX déconseille la participation des catholiques italiens au jeu démocratique censitaire d'un Royaume d'Italie impie, les femmes catholiques n'ont pas vocation à contribuer à la rechristianisation du pays par les urnes. C'est l'articulation complexe de ces deux cas, auxquels vient s'ajouter un troisième acteur qu'est la hiérarchie vaticane, qui est au centre de l'analyse comparée. Ce travail s'est appuyé sur des archives mais aussi une littérature scientifique de différentes disciplines : outre les travaux d'histoire du catholicisme, d'histoire du genre, d'histoire sociale, d'histoire de l'éducation et d'histoire de la Grande Guerre, les ouvrages de science politique, de la sociologie des mobilisations sont venus enrichir le corpus des sources secondaires. Des sources inattendues pour l'histoire du genre aux sources inexploitées Plusieurs types de fonds dans chacun des trois pays – France, Italie, Vatican – ont été consultés. Des sondages ponctuels dans des fonds américains – Schlesinger Librairy, spécialisée sur l'histoire des femmes, et Boston College, université de la Compagnie de Jésus, à Boston ont complété ces consultations principales. Les fonds français sont constitués des fonds de l'association Ligue patriotique des Françaises (1902-1933), déposés à l'Action catholique des femmes ; des Archives historiques des archevêchés de Lyon et de Paris, des Archives départementales du Rhône, des Alpes-Maritimes, du Tarn, de l'Yonne – dont certains n'ont parfois rien donné -, des Archives nationales, série F7 « partis et associations politiques ». Ce dernier choix de ne prendre en considération que les documents identifiés comme relevant d'une activité politique était justifié par la volonté d'attester montrer qu'un engagement conservateur féminin avait existé et était identifié comme tel par les pouvoirs publics. La perception de la Ligue patriotique des Françaises sous l'angle de son activité politique indique une féminisation précoce de la profession politique par le biais de cette association connexe de l'Action libérale populaire. Une deuxième phase de dépouillement a été effectuée à Rome. Le fonds personnel de Cristina Giustiniani Bandini, première présidente et fondatrice de l'Unione fra le donne cattoliche d'Italia (U.D.C.I.) en 1909 a été intégralement dépouillé. Il est conservé près l'Archive général de l'ordre prêcheur (dominicains) en l'Église Sainte-Sabine de Rome. Les archives d'État de Rome (Archivio di stato di Roma) ont été sondées pour établir une comparaison dans la surveillance politique de ces associations catholiques féminines. La localisation des sources révèle ainsi que l'Action catholique féminine italienne n'est pas structurée comme une organisation à vocation politique ou sociale. Elle n'est pas déclarée auprès des autorités, il n'y a pas de trace aux Archives d'Etat en tant qu'association politique ou de bienfaisance. Enfin, les Archives secrètes vaticanes ont offert un regard inédit sur ces associations. Ces matériaux inexploités jusqu'ici – papiers du fonds personnel Pie XI, fonds Pie IX ouvert à la consultation depuis septembre 2006 – ou qui n'avaient jamais été consultés pour l'action catholique féminine française et italienne – fonds Secrétairie d'État pour les pontificats de Léon XIII, Pie X et Benoît XV ; Affaires ecclésiastiques extraordinaires France et Italie – ont été d'une importance majeure dans cette recherche. Ils permettent de comprendre le regard porté par l'institution sur ces associations mais aussi la complexité du rapport à l'autorité de ces organisations de laïques qui avaient un pied dans l'Église et un pied dans la société. La presse de ces deux associations a également été dépouillée. Organisation de la thèse L'exploitation du matériau a été organisée de façon thématique et chronologique. Trois parties scandent ce travail. La première porte sur l'émergence et le développement des deux organisations, la seconde s'intéresse à la citoyenneté sociale mise en œuvre par ces associations et enfin, une troisième partie examine l'élaboration complexe d'une citoyenneté politique qui ne passe pas nécessairement par le vote dans un premier temps puis qui intègre le suffrage féminin au lendemain de la Grande Guerre. La première partie de la thèse traite de la genèse du militantisme d'action catholique féminine de part et d'autre des Alpes. Elle éclaire la naissance, le développement et l'institutionnalisation de chacune des deux associations. Un premier chapitre retrace la naissance de la Ligue patriotique des Françaises à Paris, durant les derniers mois de l'année 1901. Il montre comment un premier noyau parisien composé de femmes consacrées sans toutefois qu'elles portent un habit religieux et d'« entrepreneuses » - comme certaines dirigeantes se définissent -, rompues à l'entreprise électorale de leur mari sous le Second Empire et la IIIe République, a créé une organisation de laïque qui gagne très vite la Province. Forte de 300 000 adhérentes dès son troisième anniversaire, la Ligue est d'abord une œuvre électorale, qui doit fournir aux candidats catholiques des subsides et des propagandistes zélées dans le contexte de structuration de l'offre politique par les partis. La loi de 1901 sur les associations, votée pour contrôler les congrégations religieuses offre alors une opportunité inattendue d'organisation pour ces catholiques. L'échec aux élections législatives de 1906 et l'évolution des positions pontificales vers un rejet de la démocratie chrétienne et de l'engagement politique des catholiques marque l'arrêt officiel de l'œuvre électorale pour les femmes. Dès 1907, l'action sociale et religieuse sont mises au premier plan : c'est par elles, et par elles seules, que les femmes referont la société chrétienne et non par les urnes. Dans la pratique cependant, l'interdit est contourné jusqu'en 1914. Peu de temps après, en 1909, est proclamée la naissance de l'Union entre les femmes catholiques d'Italie. Les cérémonies de béatification de Jeanne d'Arc en avril de cette même année sont l'occasion de lier les deux organisations qui se placent ainsi sous la protection de la sainte. La vierge guerrière symbolise le renouveau de l'apostolat féminin sous tendu par une spiritualité de combat qui prend tout son sens dans un contexte de laïcisation des institutions d'Etat. Le deuxième chapitre porte sur cette « petite sœur italienne » qui naît au lendemain du congrès féministe de Rome de mai 1908, qui avait vu des femmes catholiques prendre part au vote d'une motion supprimant le caractère obligatoire de l'instruction religieuse à l'école. Une aristocrate romaine proche du pape Pie X, la princesse Cristina Giustiniani Bandini, mobilise ses réseaux religieux et nobiliaires pour fonder une association de laïques sur le même modèle que la Ligue. Mais, contrairement aux Parisiennes, la dirigeante romaine se place dans une ligne intransigeante et refuse toute forme de participation politique féminine. Il n'est pas question de voir les Italiennes financer les candidats catholiques aux élections locales – les seules où ils sont autorisés à se présenter en tant que tels par la hiérarchie ecclésiale jusqu'en 1912, ni de réclamer le suffrage. La mise en conformité de la cité terrestre avec la cité céleste se fera par l'action religieuse, par les pèlerinages, par une piété féminine accrue et éventuellement par les œuvres de bienfaisance. Dans ces deux contextes, qui ont pour point commun l'affirmation de l'État nation sur des bases laïques et l'institution d'un régime démocratique fondé sur le citoyen masculin, la capacité des femmes catholiques à imposer leur programme politique dans le débat public se traduit donc par des modalités d'action différentes. Dirigées toutes deux par des aristocrates, défendant une hiérarchie sociale, une hiérarchie de genre et une hiérarchie religieuse ces femmes ont, pour certaines d'entre-elles, maintenu leur autonomie à travers ce militantisme conservateur. Une deuxième partie s'intéresse aux déclinaisons d'une citoyenneté sociale féminine. Elle montre comment au sein de ces associations l'acception restrictive de la citoyenneté politique identifiée au vote, attribut masculin en France et en Italie jusqu'en 1945, est contournée pour proposer une autre forme d'appartenance à la cité. Cette citoyenneté sociale est alors définie comme l'ensemble des droits et des devoirs assignés aux femmes en tant que mères biologiques ou spirituelles, afin de transposer à l'ensemble de la société les activités de soin, de prise en charge des œuvres sociales, aujourd'hui désignées sous le terme de care. Le troisième chapitre porte sur l'action sociale catholique. Il intègre de façon comparée les étapes du passage de la dame patronnesse à la militante d'action catholique. Il montre comment la résolution de la question sociale « les Évangiles à la main » se heurte à la différence des positions sociales des militantes : la solution corporatiste où patronnes et ouvrières sont réunies dans une même structure est difficilement envisageable dans les comités composés d'ouvrières. Si la Ligue délègue cette question délicate aux syndicats féminins chrétiens, l'Union italienne entend monopoliser l'encadrement des catholiques en contrôlant les syndicats des professions pensées comme féminines – infirmières, institutrices, téléphonistes.-. À travers l'organisation chrétienne de ces occupations féminines s'opère dans certains cas une professionnalisation de ces activités. Tant en France qu'en Italie, le brevet d'aptitude vient se substituer à la formation uniquement religieuse pour devenir enseignante ou infirmière d'Etat. Cette professionnalisation s'étend après la Grande Guerre à d'autres activités féminines : la formation professionnelle est proposée en France aux agricultrices, aux ouvrières. Elle est sous-tendue par l'idée que l'élite féminine militante doit d'abord être une élite de professionnelles. Cependant, la crise des années Trente met un frein à cette activité quand la mère au foyer devient le cheval de bataille de l'Église catholique. Une deuxième dimension de cette citoyenneté sociale est son enracinement dans l'expérience de la maternité qui est présentée par ces associations comme constitutive du genre féminin. Bien que la plupart des dirigeantes n'aient pas d'enfants – parce qu'elles sont vierges consacrées ou tertiaires - elles entendent néanmoins promouvoir la maternité. Se distinguant des associations natalistes plutôt républicaines en France, les catholiques s'inscrivent dans la mouvance familialiste. Mais, elles se singularisent par le fait que cette promotion de la maternité est faite par des femmes, pour des femmes. On observe alors des nuances importantes sur l'acception de la maternité : celle-ci peut être entendue comme la mise au monde des enfants mais aussi le maternage d'autres enfants dans le cadre d'un célibat chaste et consacré. En France, la Ligue établit parallèlement à d'autres institutions républicaines des institutions d'aide aux mères – gouttes de lait, consultation du nourrisson, mutualités maternelles et prix. Ainsi, la Ligue patriotique organise t-elle la fête des mères au mois de mai à partir de 1917 : le prix des mères méritantes est remis aux adhérentes de condition modeste, mères de famille nombreuse et d'observance religieuse rigoureuse. En Italie, c'est surtout la dimension religieuse de la maternité qui est privilégiée à travers la promotion de la dévotion mariale mais aussi de saintes du quotidien comme Anne Marie Taigi, mère de famille battue par son mari qui avait des extases dans ses activités domestiques. Sous le fascisme, un retour à l'action sociale s'opère quand l'Union rejoint les action de l'œuvre nationale de la maternité et de l'enfance et mène « l'apostolat du berceau » (1929). C'est également en tant que mères que ces femmes portent leurs revendications auprès des gouvernements. Le maternalisme catholique se décline de part et d'autre des Alpes et conduit parfois ces associations hostiles au féminisme à rejoindre les positions des féministes laïques sur la recherche en paternité ou la protection de la maternité. Cette acception de la maternité rompt avec l'idée que parce que les femmes mettent au monde un enfant, elles feront de bonnes mères. Au cœur de l'action de ces associations se trouve le projet d'une pédagogie maternelle chrétienne destinée à apprendre aux mères biologiques à être des éducatrices. C'est l'objet d'un cinquième chapitre. Cette pédagogie s'adresse en premier lieu aux ouvrières, redoublant la relation de maternage entre la patronne et ses employées par une relation de mère spirituelle à une mère biologique. Mais les mères de la petite bourgeoisie sont elles aussi invitées à devenir des éducatrices de leurs filles et à s'investir dans la formation des futurs citoyens chrétiens. Les éducatrices catholiques doivent prendre une place centrale dans la famille et dans la société soit en devenant des institutrices catholiques, soit en se fédérant dans des associations de pères et de mères de famille pour mener une activité de lobbying au nom de la défense de leurs enfants. En France, les ligueuses prennent une part active dans la guerre scolaire du début du siècle, tandis qu'en Italie, les aristocrates de l'Union qui font pression sur les hommes politiques de leur entourage pour maintenir l'instruction religieuse dans les écoles primaires en 1912. Elles parviennent ainsi à avoir un monopole sur les demandes d'instruction religieuse formulées par les parents dans les écoles de Rome et font office d'intermédiaire entre les parents d'élèves et les autorités municipales qui accordent cet enseignement dans les écoles. Dans une troisième partie, c'est le passage à la citoyenneté politique qui est analysé. Un sixième chapitre analyse l'épisode de la Grande Guerre comme un moment à la fois de rupture avec les positions de ces associations et d'accélération de certains processus d'inclusion des femmes catholiques dans la gestion des affaires publiques. La guerre ouvre une période d'élargissement de l'action publique pour les deux associations. La professionnalisation de certaines occupations comme les infirmières s'accélère. La matrice maternaliste de l'action collective légitime la prise en charge des enfants des classes populaires, des soldats mutilés etc. L'action des associations ne vise plus seulement à attirer les âmes d'élites mais véritablement à assumer l'œuvre d'assistance que les pouvoirs publics ne peuvent fournir. À la faveur de cette crise, le rôle des congrégations exilées est reconnu en France et celui des laïques de la L.P.D.F. sanctionné positivement par les décorations nationales et religieuses que reçoivent la plupart des dirigeantes, tant en France qu'en Italie. Les jeunes femmes non mariées, les mères célibataires deviennent aussi les cibles des politiques mises en place par la Ligue, tandis qu'en Italie, il semblerait que l'élargissement de l'action sociale suscite un rappel à l'ordre quant à la collaboration avec les non catholiques. La guerre ouvre la voie d'une réconciliation avec les autorités laïques qui passe avant tout par une action locale. S'appuyant sur les notables, sur les réseaux d'œuvres religieuses préexistantes, l'U.D.C.I. acquiert rapidement un rôle important dans les Comités d'assistance civile qui gèrent bon nombre de problèmes matériels liés à la guerre. En France, l'Union sacrée se fait aussi dans certaines communes, mais la reconnaissance de l'action civile des ligueuses sera d'avantage symbolique. Ainsi, nous voyons comment le contexte national structure la façon dont sera pensée et légitimée l'action civile des associations féminines catholiques. Elle passe par une reconnaissance locale puis nationale, en Italie, où l'U.D.C.I. se voit accorder la personnalité juridique au lendemain du conflit. En revanche, là où le poids des instances locales de représentation démocratique reste dominé par les institutions nationales, il s'agit plutôt d'une reconnaissance symbolique. Le dernier chapitre de la thèse montre comment les militantes d'action catholique ont participé aux premières consultations électorales sans pour autant détenir le droit de vote et ont ensuite abandonné ces pratiques une fois celui-ci admis comme un moyen de faire changer les lois. En Italie, en revanche, le rapport à la politique plus difficile évolue après la guerre vers des positions plus ouvertes au suffrage féminin. S'esquissent ainsi les linéaments d'une politisation féminine contrainte à la fois par le contexte politique et religieux national et par les propriétés sociales des dirigeantes dont le recrutement n'est pas identique dans chacun des pays. Définissant par la pratique tout autant que par les discours l'activité politique légitime pour des femmes catholiques, ces citoyennes catholiques se positionnent d'abord contre le suffrage féminin, manifestant leur appartenance à la communauté politique et nationale par les œuvres sociales et religieuses. S'appuyant sur leur mission d'apôtres du XXe siècle, pour résoudre la question sociale « l'Évangile à la main », les militantes revendiquent un rôle d'expertise de plus en plus important dans le travail social. De la dame patronnesse aristocrate du début du siècle à la travailleuse sociale qualifiée d'origine plus modeste de l'entre-deux-guerres s'est amorcé un processus de politisation féminine et de professionnalisation. La préparation des femmes au suffrage devient alors une activité importante de la Ligue, qui organise des conférences de préparation civique, qui publie des brochures et veut inciter les femmes à adopter le suffrage familial dans un premier temps, puis individuel dans un second temps. En Italie, en 1925 le bref épisode de l'autorisation du vote pour les femmes de plus de trente ans, mères et épouses de soldats, voit l'Union intervenir pour solliciter les inscriptions sur les listes électorales. Celles-ci ne purent cependant voter jusqu'en 1946. Cette thèse contribue ainsi à repenser les catégories de citoyenneté habituellement définies en rapport avec le suffrage et à comprendre la façon dont les associations de femmes catholiques ont contribué à l'apprentissage de la vie politique durant les premières décennies du XXe siècle en France et en Italie. La citoyenneté telle que l'entendent ces associations est d'abord une citoyenneté sociale, fondée par l'expérience de la maternité spirituelle ou biologique, et vécue à travers la mise en œuvre d'institutions sociales. La citoyenneté politique qui se manifeste par le vote n'est pas considérée, dans un premier temps, comme une pratique légitime pour les femmes catholiques dans chacun des pays. Toutefois, l'intervention dans les affaires politique et la façon dont les femmes de ces associations se pensent comme des sujets politiques et interviennent en leur nom dans les affaires publiques attestent de la volonté de contourner le suffrage masculin. En France, dans un contexte de ralliement de l'Église catholique à la République et de suffrage universel, même les femmes sont invitées à participer de façon indirecte à la compétition électorale. En Italie, un modèle de politisation intransigeante domine : les catholiques hommes et femmes sont invités à se tenir à distance de la compétition électorale. Au terme de la Grande guerre, ces prises de positions se rejoignent. Dans cette évolution, la Grande Guerre a constitué un moment d'accélération plus que de rupture et a ouvert une période de réconciliation entre ces associations catholiques et les pouvoirs publics laïcs. Ce travail invite à une compréhension plus large de l'engagement féminin en intégrant ces associations de masse qu'ont été les associations catholiques. Prises entre la nécessité de se distinguer des féministes et des hommes catholiques, ces associations ont défini des cadres d'action légitimes pour des femmes conservatrices, attachées aux normes de genre inégalitaires mais soucieuses de se ménager des marges d'autonomie. Cette recherche permet de mieux saisir la complexité des rapports sociaux de sexe et de classe en adoptant des questionnements de science politique et de sociologie. Malgré leur conservatisme et leur hostilité au suffrage, ces associations ont été des lieux de socialisation politique et religieuse qui ont marqué les premières générations d'électrices tant en France qu'en Italie. Et on ne peut comprendre pourquoi le vote féminin a d'abord été un vote démocrate-chrétien sans s'intéresser à la façon dont ces milliers de femmes ont appris à « bien voter » durant les premières décennies du siècle dernier.

Inhaltsangabe: Migration und Behinderung sind Phänomene der menschlichen Natur, deren Begriffe vermutlich sehr unterschiedliche Assoziationen in der Gesellschaft wecken. Zwischen dem fremd aussehenden Migranten und dem körperlich beeinträchtigten Behinderten scheinen Welten zu liegen, die sich höchstens dann berühren mögen, wenn eine Person von beiden Erscheinungen betroffen ist. Als "doppelte Behinderung" ließe sich dieser Umstand provokant bezeichnen. Doch tragen beide Phänomene keineswegs klare und trennscharfe Konturen. Vielmehr werfen ihre uneindeutigen Muster Fragen auf: Wann ist man eigentlich Migrant, Ausländer oder Mensch mit Migrationshintergrund? Wann ist man physisch oder psychisch geschädigt? Wann ist man Mensch mit Behinderung? Schließlich sind weder ein Migrationshintergrund noch eine Behinderung statische, mit dem Träger verankerte Eigenschaften, die per definitionem entsprechende Konsequenzen nach sich ziehen. Wie sich einerseits ein migrierter Mensch in seiner Lebensgestaltung und gesellschaftlichen Partizipation behindert erleben kann, vermag sich andererseits eine körperlich beeinträchtigte Person unter Umständen vor allem als Fremder seiner kulturellen Umwelt empfinden. Die Relativität von Behinderung und die Diversität von Migration lassen schließlich beide Erscheinungen mitunter sehr nahe kommen. Denn: Auch Behinderung kann Kultur und Kultur eine Behinderung sein. Die Bedeutungen von Kultur und Fremde für den Behinderungskontext stellen das zentrale Thema dieses Buches dar. Anhand der Betrachtung der Lebenswelten von Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund werden Zusammenhänge von Kultur und Behinderung erörtert und Konsequenzen für die Fachrichtung der Heilpädagogik analysiert. Der Anspruch dieser Untersuchung ist die umfassende und gerechte Beantwortung folgender Ausgangsfrage: In welchem Maße werden Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland in ihrer personalen und sozialen Integration gestört und welche Folgen tragen die Erkenntnisse für das Verständnis von Behinderung und die Theorie und Praxis der Heilpädagogik? Es wird hypothetisch angenommen, dass die ursprünglich nicht-deutsche Bevölkerung vor allen Dingen auf Grund soziokultureller Umstände in ihrer selbstbestimmten Lebensführung und gesellschaftlichen Partizipation eingeschränkt werden und somit Behinderungen erfahren. Kann diese Aussage belegt werden, ist Behinderung als ein Umstand zu begreifen, der nicht zwingend eine physische oder psychische Schädigung des betroffenen Individuums bedingt. Überdies träge die Heilpädagogik damit eine Verantwortung gegenüber Menschen mit Wanderungsgeschichte. Um für die Auseinandersetzung mit der Fragestellung und den Behauptungen eine transparente Basis herzustellen, werden eingangs die Grundbegriffe Migration, Behinderung, Heilpädagogik sowie Kultur und Interkulturalität definiert und erläutert (Kapitel 2). Die Lebenswelten von Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland stellen den Mittelpunkt des folgenden Kapitels dar. Untergliedert in fünf Gesichtspunkte werden ihre subjektiven Lebenswirklichkeiten untersucht und hinterfragt, in welchem Maße Personen mit Wanderungsgeschichte behindert werden (Kapitel 3). Die Feststellungen dieser Erörterung zeigen auf, dass Desintegration, Einschränkung und Benachteiligung nicht grundsätzlich in Verbindung mit körperlichen Bedingungen eines Menschen stehen. Behinderung wird gemeinhin jedoch an physische und psychische Beeinträchtigungen des Individuums geknüpft. Aus diesem Grund werden in Kapitel 4 das traditionelle Behinderungsverständnis kritisch analysiert und Überlegungen für eine differente, an biologischen als auch sozialen und kulturellen Aspekten ausgerichtete Betrachtung des Behinderungsphänomens dargelegt. Die Konzeption jenes Behinderungsmodells löst zugleich kritische Überlegungen bezüglich der Strukturen der Heilpädagogik als Institution der Behindertenhilfe aus und legt Barrieren der heilpädagogischen Wissenschaft und Praxis offen. Auf dieser Grundlage basierend wird ein alternatives Konzept einer interkulturell ausgerichteten und an Integration orientierten Heilpädagogik skizziert und schließlich seine Eignung für den Personenkreis der Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund überprüft (Kapitel 5). Der Rahmen dieser Studie schließt sich mit Schlussfolgerungen der gewonnenen Erkenntnisse in einem letzten Schritt (Kapitel 6.) Die Frage, wer wirklich behindert ist, stellt nicht nur in der hier geführten Auseinandersetzung den zentralen Untersuchungsgegenstand dar sondern ist auch Schwerpunkt vieler anderer Analysen und Diskurse innerhalb wie mitunter auch außerhalb der Heilpädagogik. Dem Anspruch einer allgemeingültigen Beantwortung der Frage kann dieses Buch selbstverständlich nicht gerecht werden. Jedoch ergeben sich aus der Untersuchung der Lebenswelten von Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund aufschlussreiche Hinweise und praxisnahe Erkenntnisse für die genannte Fragestellung, die wiederum der Wissenschaft und Praxis der Heilpädagogik zu Gute kommen.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Inhaltsverzeichnis: 1.Einleitung5 2.Grundlagen8 2.1MIGRATION8 2.2BEHINDERUNG13 2.3HEILPÄDAGOGIK17 2.4KULTUR UND INTERKULTURALITÄT20 3.Die Lebenswelten von Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland22 3.1MIGRATIONSSPEZIFISCHE ASPEKTE22 3.1.1Migrationshintergrund22 3.1.2Migrationsphasen23 3.1.3Identität24 3.2PERSÖNLICHE ASPEKTE26 3.2.1Der Charakter26 3.2.2Emotionales Befinden27 3.2.3Kultur28 3.2.4Sprache29 3.2.5Ökonomische Lage30 3.2.6Gesundheit31 3.2.7Die Diagnose "Behinderung"34 3.3JURISTISCHE ASPEKTE36 3.4ASPEKTE ALLTÄGLICHER LEBENSFELDER39 3.4.1Bildung39 3.4.2Erwerbstätigkeit41 3.4.3Wohnsituation42 3.5SOZIALE ASPEKTE43 3.5.1Sozialleben44 3.5.2Fremdenfeindlichkeit45 3.6Die erschwerten Lebensbedingungen von Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund - ein erstes Fazit46 4.Wer ist behindert, wer wird behindert? - ein bio-sozio-kulturelles Konzept von Behinderung49 4.1DIE BEHINDERUNG DES ANDEREN49 4.2DAS BIO-SOZIO-KULTURELLE BEHINDERUNGSMODELL54 4.2.1Das Fundament des Modells54 4.2.2Definition von Behinderung und dem behinderten Menschen56 4.2.3Klassifizierung von Behinderung57 4.2.4Der ätiologische Hintergrund58 4.2.5Die Grenzen des Modells61 4.2.6Zusammenfassung63 4.3WER IST WIRKLICH BEHINDERT? - EIN ZWEITES FAZIT64 5.Heilpädagogik im interkulturellen Kontext67 5.1DIE BARRIEREN DER HEILPÄDAGOGIK67 5.1.1Das Behinderungsverständnis67 5.1.2Die Individuumszentrierung68 5.1.3Das Erziehungsparadigma69 5.1.4Die Einzigartigkeit70 5.2DIE INTERKULTURELLE HEILPÄDAGOGIK72 5.2.1Grundlagen des Konzepts72 5.2.2Die Wesensbegründung74 5.2.3Der Auftrag75 5.2.4Das Nutzerprofil76 5.2.5Der Handlungsansatz76 5.2.6Zusammenfassung80 5.3HEILPÄDAGOGIK FÜR MENSCHEN MIT MIGRATIONSHINTERGRUND - EIN DRITTES FAZIT82 6.Schlussfolgerungen86 Literaturverzeichnis88Textprobe:Textprobe: Kapitel 4.1, Die Behinderung des Anderen: Bereits zu Beginn dieser Arbeit (Kapitel 2.2) wurde festgestellt, dass das Behinderungsphänomen stark von der Sichtweise des Betrachters abhängig ist und gemäß des Paradigmas und eigener Interessen unterschiedlich definiert und bewertet wird. Dennoch ist auch zu vermerken, dass die allgemeine Ansicht, Behinderung basiere grundsätzlich auf einer individuellen Beeinträchtigung, von Wissenschaftlern unterschiedlicher Ausrichtungen überwiegend vertreten wird. Nicht nur medizinisch dominierte Behinderungsmodelle wie das der WHO sondern auch gesellschaftsorientierte Erklärungsansätze wie entsprechend der Disability Studies führen Behinderungen in gewissem Grade auf körperliche Schädigungen zurück. Für den angenommenen Zusammenhang zwischen Schädigung und Behinderung stellen sich vor allem zwei Fragen, die es zu erörtern gilt: Was ist eine Schädigung? Eine organische Schädigung scheint auf den ersten Blick einen absoluten Charakter zu haben. Jedoch sind Schädigungen der Körperstruktur und -funktionen des Menschen von dem kulturellen Hintergrund abhängig. Kleinwüchsigkeit gilt in Deutschland beispielsweise als körperliche Beeinträchtigung. In Ethnien, bei denen Menschen eine allgemein geringere Körpergröße aufweisen, ist Kleinwüchsigkeit jedoch keine Besonderheit, sie wird nicht als körperliche Schädigung verstanden. Schädigungen gelten vor allen Dingen dann als solche, wenn auf Grund jener körperlichen Merkmale die gewohnten Anforderungen nicht erfüllt werden können. So ist die Kompetenz der Mobilität bei Nomadenkulturen besonders essentiell, in anderen Kulturen tragen sprachliche Kompetenzen für den alltäglichen Handel eine enorme Bedeutung. Notwendigkeiten und kulturspezifische Deutungsmuster beeinflussen entscheidend die Auslegung einer Schädigung. Demzufolge ist nicht nur Behinderung relativ, auch ihre angenommene Voraussetzung, die Schädigung, ist nicht universell fassbar. Warum bedingt die Behinderung eine Schädigung? Nach geläufiger Auffassung äußert sich eine Behinderung in Form der Einschränkung der Selbstverwaltung und Partizipation eines Menschen. Alfred Sander geht mit seinem ökosystemischen Behinderungsverständnis sogar noch weiter: "Gestörte oder ungenügende Integration ist […] nicht eine Folge von Behinderung und auch nicht ein Aspekt von Behinderung, sondern sie ist die Behinderung selbst. Die Behinderung besteht in ungenügender Integration." Nichtsdestotrotz setzen Sander und andere Wissenschaftler eine Schädigung oder Leistungsminderung der Behinderung voraus. Dabei stellt sich jedoch die Frage, weshalb überhaupt eine körperliche Beeinträchtigung vorliegen muss, um von einer Behinderung zu sprechen. Muss ein Mensch bestimmte Erwartungen erfüllen, um Behinderung zu erfahren? Ist nicht, auch im Sinne (heil)pädagogisch sinnvollen Intervenierens, viel relevanter, wie sich ein Mensch erlebt und gleichberechtigt an der Gesellschaft teilnimmt anstatt welche Bedingungen er für seinen Zustand erfüllt? Behinderungen liegen zweifelsohne gewissen Umständen zu Grunde. Anfallsleiden, Traumata oder Organstörungen bedarf es wahrzunehmen und auch für die pädagogische Arbeit zu berücksichtigen. Eine ausschließliche Konzentration auf soziale Folgen wäre demnach kurzsichtig und ungenügend. Jedoch erscheint es problematisch, Behinderung in absolute Abhängigkeit körperlicher Kriterien zu stellen. Die Migrationsthematik öffnet für die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Gegenstand der Behinderung einen interessanten Zugang. Sie veranschaulicht, dass Individuen durchaus auch unabhängig von körperlichen Merkmalen Einschränkungen ihrer persönlichen Lebensführung und der gesellschaftlichen Teilhabe erfahren können. Nicht die Eigenschaften einer Person sondern seine Lebensumstände behindern. Doch auch entsprechende Lebensumstände haben einen Ursprung. Dem soziologischen Behinderungsmodell von Günther Cloerkes zu Folge stellt die Andersartigkeit eines Merkmals einer Person den Grundbaustein einer Behinderung dar. Durch soziokulturelle Bewertungsmuster wird ein als abnormal geltendes Merkmal als negativ klassifiziert und in Folge einer negativen sozialen Reaktion eine Behinderung konstruiert. Was bei einem körperlich deformierten Menschen der Fall sein kann, lässt sich also auch bei einer anders aussehenden oder sich anders verhaltenden Person mit Migrationshintergrund realisieren: Die Behinderung des Anderen. Was ist das Andere? Das Andere ist der komplementäre Gegensatz zum Eigenen. Dem Menschen sind gewohnte Umgebungen, bekannte Personen oder routinierte Handlungen vertraut, sie geben Sicherheit, Durchschaubarkeit und ein Gefühl von Heimat, können gleichzeitig jedoch auch als einengend und verpflichtend wahrgenommen werden. Das Andere hingegen wirkt verunsichernd und bedrohlich auf den Menschen, reizt, verlockt und überrascht ihn aber auch. Wird das Andere überdies als unvertraut empfunden, ist von Fremde zu sprechen. Bereits mit der Geburt in eine "fremde Welt" und der fortwährenden Auseinandersetzung mit dem Umfeld erfährt der Mensch sein Selbst und Fremdheit, in dessen Dialog er seine Identität herausbildet. Doch Fremde liegt nicht nur in der Außenwelt sondern auch im Menschen selber. Splitter oder Pickel, Träume oder Triebe können als uneigen wahrgenommen werden. Auch Aufforderungen von Eltern oder Erziehern, ein anderes Verhalten an den Tag zu legen, vermittelt einem Kind mitunter das Gefühl, dass böse, unerwünschte, fremde Instanzen in ihm stecken. Um innere Diskrepanzen fassbar machen zu können und das Selbst zu schützen und zu stärken, werden äußere Fremdheitserscheinungen als Projektionsfläche, unter anderem für eigene Aggression, Gier oder Ängste, benutzt. Verfolgung, Diskriminierung und Beschuldigung von Bevölkerungsgruppen, aus historischer Sicht beispielsweise von Hexen, Zigeunern oder Juden, können als Aufhänger für die Auseinandersetzung mit inneren Unsicherheiten interpretiert werden. Die Abwehr des inneren Fremden, Behütung des Selbst und Widerstand gegen äußeres Fremdes zur Unterbindung eines Chaosempfindens auf Grund der Komplexität der Welt realisiert sich auf persönlicher und gesellschaftlicher, aber auch auf politischer Ebene. Die Konstruktion von Nationalstaaten dient beispielsweise der Sicherung der Homogenität und Harmonie des Eigenen durch klare Grenzen. Andersartigkeit und Fremde sind folglich Bestandteile der menschlichen Natur und der Umgang mit ihnen, von Neugier über Ablehnung bis hin zur Vernichtung, ist abhängig von der Gestalt des Selbstkonzepts eines Individuums, einer Gruppe oder Nation. Und was ist anders an dem Menschen? Personen unterscheiden sich im Denken und Handeln, in ihren Geschmäckern, Interessen, Meinungen, und Zielen. Sie sehen unterschiedlich aus und leben unter unterschiedlichen Voraussetzungen. Auch wenn sich Menschen als Mitglieder einer kulturellen Gemeinschaft an Normen ausrichten und sich gegenseitig anpassen mögen, so bleibt dennoch immer auch eine Heterogenität zwischen ihnen bestehen. Doch auch Unterschiede sind verschieden. Betrachtet man die Differenzen zwischen einem achtundvierzigjährigen Maurer und einer dreizehnjährigen Schülerin, lässt sich vom Aussehen über das Geschlecht und Alter bis hin zu den Wohnverhältnissen, persönlichen Vorlieben und Lebensvorstellungen eine Fülle von Aspekten finden, in denen sich beide Personen vollkommen unterscheiden. Doch nicht nur ihre individuellen Eigenschaften sind ungleich sondern damit einhergehend auch ihre Positionen. Das Alter beispielsweise limitiert oder erlaubt ein politisches Wahlrecht, Bildungsstand und Kompetenzen entscheiden über die gesellschaftliche Stellung und der finanzielle Status richtet über das Maß an Selbstbestimmung und Unabhängigkeit. Ungleichheiten zwischen Menschen realisieren sich also auf zwei Ebenen. Michael Maschke spricht hierbei von horizontalen und vertikalen Ungleichheiten. Demnach existiert auf wagerechter Ebene eine Vielzahl an Kategorien, in denen sich Menschen unterscheiden. Die Gestalt dieser Aspekte ist maßgeblich für die Stellung des Menschen in der gesellschaftlichen Hierarchie und stützt damit vertikale Differenzen. Die Betrachtung sozialer Heterogenität in Form von waagerechten und senkrechten Ungleichheiten ist für die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Phänomen der Behinderung sehr aufschlussreich. Entsprechend dieser Konzeption lassen sich körperliche Beeinträchtigungen wie auch migrationsspezifische Erscheinungen als Merkmale eines Menschen verstehen, die sich von einer sozial und kulturell konstruierten Normalität abheben und als anders eingeschätzt werden. Andersartigkeiten werden gemäß kulturspezifischer Bewertungsmuster positiv, negativ oder ambivalent beurteilt und lösen entsprechende Reaktionen aus, die die vertikale Stellung des Menschen beeinträchtigen und ihn schließlich behindern. Menschen werden in Anlehnung an Anne Waldschmidt demnach "nicht auf Grund gesundheitlicher Beeinträchtigungen behindert, sondern durch das soziale System, das Barrieren gegen ihre Partizipation errichtet.". Der Umstand, als anders oder fremd wahrgenommen zu werden, kann folglich die Grundlage für soziale Benachteiligung und Ausgrenzung schaffen und Behinderungen konstruieren. Doch hat diese Konzeption auch ihre Grenzen. Die Gesellschaft stellt zweifelsohne einen existenziellen Bestandteil des Lebens eines Menschen dar und trägt eine wesentliche Bedeutung für dessen Lebensgestaltung. Wie sehr die eigene Körperstruktur und Körperfunktionen eine Person in ihrem individuellen und gesellschaftlichen Leben beeinträchtigen, hängt maßgeblich von sozialen Strukturen ab. So können aufgeschlossene Haltungen und Hilfesysteme einer Gesellschaft körperliche Beeinträchtigungen wie eine starke Sehschwäche oder Geheinschränkungen entscheidend kompensieren oder gar nahezu aufheben. Zugleich ist die Gesellschaft in der Lage, in Form intoleranter Einstellungen und Ausgrenzung von Menschen Behinderungen überhaupt erst zu schaffen. Jedoch ist Gesellschaft nicht alles, was ein Individuum ausmacht. Körperliche Umstände können einen Menschen auch direkt und unmittelbar beeinträchtigen, in dem sie beispielsweise Schmerz auslösen oder die selbstständige Lebensführung nicht zulassen. Folglich gehen Behinderungen weder grundsätzlich nur von gesellschaftlichen Umständen aus, noch kann Gesellschaft als einziges Medium zur Regulierung von Behinderungen betrachtet werden. Der Gegenstand der Andersartigkeit gibt somit wesentliche Aufschlüsse für das Phänomen der Behinderung und die Gestalt der Lebenswelten von Menschen mit Migrationsgeschichte. Seine soziologische Perspektive scheint entsprechend der Komplexität des "Systems Behinderung" als Erklärungsansatz allerdings nicht umfassend genug. Wie schließlich Behinderung in Anbetracht dieser Feststellungen in vollem Umfang definiert und erklärt werden kann, wird in dem nächsten Kapitel thematisiert.

Russia's military assertion and direct interventions in its near-abroad have become one of the defining features of the 21st century. After years of being on the back foot in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's breakup, Moscow has been making a seemingly ever-expanding series of dramatic moves to reestablish some form of its lost security posture. It is worth asking whether behavior like this on the part of powers suspicious of the United States and its allies is an outlier or likely to increasingly become the norm, and why this might be so.Sumantra Maitra's recently published book 'The Sources of Russian Aggression: Is Russia a Realist Power?' (Rowman & Littlefield, 2024) seeks to make sense of the motivations for this increasing turn to interventionism by Russia towards its neighbors. Preferring to focus on Stephen Walt's Balance of Threat theory, Maitra shows how Moscow came over time to the conclusions that currently fuel its policies today and how that decision making process was a logical outcome to the radical uncertainty of international politics, regardless of how one feels about the wisdom of specific Russian actions.According to Balance of Threat theory, the overriding security concern of states is less about the global balance of power (though this is a factor) than it is the situational relationship between countries and the specific threat, often in the form of attempts to change the status quo, posed by one to the other. Proximity, the state of relations, and historical grievance therefore combine to dictate what the primary counterbalancing position of a state will be. Russia, for example, sees the continuous expansion of the NATO alliance ever closer to its borders as an existential danger since the proximity of potentially hostile forces shows no sign of limiting its advances. On the flip side, but still in accordance with Balance of Threat theory, European states generally find the closer location of the Russian state far more threatening than the more distant but more powerful United States.Most Western audiences are probably used to Balance of Threat theory being deployed in a U.S.-based or North Atlantic-based context, but the interesting part of Maitra's work here is to show just how well its theories work for the largely land-based security concerns of the Russian state. As he writes, "Security considerations take precedence over ideology and ideological alliances survive longer when interests align." While China could, one day, threaten Russia, the constant alterations to the balance of power that is NATO's growth is seen as the more immediate danger. This danger, then, produces a desire to view Russia's vulnerable land borders and near abroad in zero-sum terms, particularly on its western and southwestern flanks. Maitra uses this understanding — that Balance of Threat is a mostly defensive posture (at least as seen by domestic Russian elites) — to emphasize an important and unique element of Moscow's calculations: the danger posed by "color revolutions." A sudden break with the past and the start of a new or revolutionary regime can always raise suspicions of its old allies due to its conscious break with established order. It is this insecurity, and the danger that a new regime may be able to appeal for support from abroad, that stokes fears of encirclement in Moscow. Thus, the threat of foreign influence over smaller nations bordering Russia is viewed as a direct attack on the Russian ability to maintain a secure frontier. Russia's first militarized strike abroad after relations broke down with the Western powers came in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008. Georgia's turn towards Western nations in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution saw the rise of the Saakashvili government and its push to overhaul much of Georgian politics at home and abroad. The Kremlin-backed government of Autonomous Republic of Adjara was replaced, and Moscow feared that Tbilisi intended to do the same to the other two autonomous regions in Georgia. Its influence already on the wane in Georgia proper, the Kremlin concluded it was better to salvage two regions rather than potentially lose it all. More important, however, was the calculus that creating an active conflict zone would scare NATO away from Georgia and deter other countries in the Russian orbit from making similar changes to their foreign policy. Though the war was a victory for Moscow, it exposed many problems in the Russian ability to project power far afield.Despite the fact that much of Maitra's text was written before the outbreak of full scale war in Ukraine in 2022, the nature of that country's position in Russian strategy is a major theme of the book, and the strategic assumptions about Russian denial strategy in their near-abroad made by the author hold up. Going back to the Orange Revolution in 2005 and on through the Maidan and Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russian activities in the country have taken on the aspect of "strategic denial." This follows as a sequel to the events in Georgia. The overriding fear among the Russian elite was that shrinking influence in Ukraine would mean the entire country could become a NATO proxy where nothing, not even perhaps the primary anchorage of the Black Sea fleet, could be salvaged. And with this fear came a certainty in Moscow that every domestic upheaval in the country was a plot designed to bring about the loss of any sphere of influence whatsoever. Better, the Russians came to think, to retain part of a country than to see a loss of influence over the whole.Maitra leaves his readers with a warning: rhetoric about the specific nature of the Putin government is unhelpful since the issues of Russia's desire to retain predominance in its near abroad are geographic. This means they are effectively timeless and not limited to one regime. A Russian state under a more open or democratic government is still a Russian state with a desire to retain strategic autonomy in its own neighborhood as a way of maintaining its position against the other great powers. These issues are not going anywhere anytime soon, so it is worth understanding the actual motivations behind the Russian foreign policy establishment as opposed to framing the conflict as something that can be dealt with in short order with moralistic rhetoric about the clash of the "authoritarian" and "democratic" worlds. The failure to account for the well-established fact that great powers seek spheres of influence shows a disconnect with many in the North Atlantic alliance with the actual motivations of statecraft as it is practiced in much of the world.What delving into this one specific example while using an international relations perspective – that of balance of threat theory – makes clear is that intentions do not matter when large security alliances expand. What ends up expanding is the uncertainty they bring ever closer to a rival power's center of gravity. Should the alliance network emphasize a values conformity among its members, the chances that a government would radically reorient its traditional, regionally rooted diplomatic orientations in a way other powers located nearby might interpret as hostile increases. Indeed, this process of action-reaction has other applications beyond Russia, The logic of NATO, both as a security and as an almost missionary-like alliance seems to be repeating in other parts of the world where the United States seeks to shore up its security arrangements. By invoking the idea of permanent commitments around shared values, the avenues of diplomacy are reduced rather than increased, and the risk of offensive action by rival powers escalates.

If there is a "Chekhov's gun" in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, it consists of circa $300 billion worth of central bank assets sitting in the coffers of the U.S. and (more so) its close allies. Frozen at the outset of Moscow's invasion, the money represents both the object of the strongest sanctions taken so far against a state outside of a UN-authorized regime, and, at the same time, the possible target for even more dramatic further escalatory measures.The question at the moment is whether G7 states will make the crucial transition from "freezing" to "seizing" – i.e., liquidate the funds and then reallocate them to assist Ukraine. The issue has gathered urgency amidst flagging support in the U.S. and in Europe for continuing to expend funds on shoring up Ukraine's struggling defenses.At home in the U.S., the bipartisan REPO Act endorsed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would empower the President to "confiscate ... Russian sovereign assets'' and to then deposit them into a "Ukraine Support Fund" that would aid in reconstruction, recovery, and the "welfare of the Ukrainian people." Those goals, if vague, are hardly objectionable. But using seized sovereign assets to promote them is, as a matter of law, untested and problematic. As a matter of economic statecraft, meanwhile, it is still more inadvisable, for several reasons. These include the significant risk of alienating allies, further discrediting U.S. "dollar power", boosting China's prestige and its own "yuanization" aims, and endangering U.S. assets abroad.Piercing the Veil of SovereigntyThe legal objections are quite simple to summarize. The norm of sovereign immunity is one of the most well-established customs in international law. In the eyes of many experts, it is precisely the firmness of this bedrock principle that has allowed exceptions, such as litigation for commercial disputes involving states, to become reliable.The rule is reflected in the law of countries around the world, including in the U.S.'s own Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. China, notably, has only as of this year finally implemented legislation for immunity that clearly separates commerce from matters of state, putting foreign businesses and investors on equal footing as litigants — which should be seen as a victory for U.S. interests in its market.Despite immunity's inarguable applicability to central banks, advocates of asset seizure have pointed to the custom of "countermeasures'' to justify their project. These are illegal acts taken by states injured by a previous wrong of another state, and intended only to induce the latter to cease its misbehavior. Usually, only a directly injured party (here, Ukraine) can take such actions, but emerging arguments for "collective countermeasures"would extend the field of retaliators for some core wrongs to include any state in the global community.Experts critical of asset seizure have pointed out, however, that doctrinal support is lacking. As Vanderbilt Law School's Ingrid (Wuerth) Brunk rightly summarizes: "There is little or no state practice on countermeasures for reparations ... There is little practice of third-party countermeasures, little or no practice of countermeasures used to deny immunity, and no practice that provides clear support for denying central bank immunity as a countermeasure."Meanwhile, given that most of the funds currently lie in special accounts at the financial services company Euroclear, any repercussions would also be primarily borne not by Washington, but rather by its European allies. That fact has prompted considerable opposition to the initiative among European policymakers, despite their willingness to join earlier rounds of sanctions. After all, Europe's leaders are, in effect, being deputized to carry out a policy of financial warfare whose costs they will have to bear right along with that policy's targets.First of all, the precedent of a geopolitically-motivated confiscation could threaten the euro's hard-won status as the world's second reserve currency. The euro's attractiveness has been based on numerous ingredients, obviously including Europe's economic productivity, stability, and growth potential; however, its apparent security for asset-holders as compared with the more thoroughly weaponized U.S. financial system is also a key factor. And then there is, of course, European states' relatively far greater vulnerability than Washington in the case of any escalations of the broader NATO-Russia conflict.It is understandable why the EU has so far balked on agreement to a plan of outright confiscation of Russian funds. It has, instead, begun to implement a much more moderate approach of reallocating to Kyiv the sizable interest payments being generated by the frozen assets. However, the G7 is still due to discuss the proposal for seizure at its next meeting. The Biden administration, along with Canada and Japan, remain strong backers of this idea.A Financial Coalition of the Willing?Debates are intensifying. For example, when Swiss lawmakers discussed reparations involvement this month, the motions were adopted in the Senate by 21 votes to 19, with three abstentions. Some senators worried about "weakening" international law protections, which "exist to protect small states." Those misgivings are still more widely shared beyond Europe, of course, as large swathes of the Global South know precisely how vulnerable they can already be to Western sanctions. A dubious new practice of asset confiscation would make U.S. dollar power, already a subject of widespread discontent, even more unpalatable.If the G7 financial offensive provokes as much backlash as it seems poised to, could China stand to benefit? Certainly, Beijing is likely to reap diplomatic dividends from perceptions that Western financial warfare has become too extreme. Xi Jinping's Party center has emphasized portraying China as a law-abiding global power, especially by embracing UN institutions (where it, of course, exerts great influence at little cost). The contrast with a G7 maneuvering around the UN at every turn makes a potent impression in the Global South.A separate question is whether China's vision of a "de-dollarized" world could receive a boost from Western confiscation efforts. Certainly, Beijing has long sought to increase the yuan's share of global foreign currency reserves and cross-border usage, and has made some recent progress. The RMB would indeed become more attractive as dollar and euro accounts began to look ever more vulnerable to seizure.But it has a long way to go. Currently, the yuan is only the fifth global reserve currency, still narrowly trailing the yen and the pound. It is also limited by domestic economic issues and, especially China's strict capital controls and heavily managed exchange rates. As a recent article produced for a PRC Ministry of Education research project phrased it, given all of the current obstacles to international use of the RMB, even for Russia itself, "de-dollarization cannot be a complete renminbization."Still, intensified weaponization of Western currencies could indeed boost China's yuan efforts, and, more significantly, provide a major stimulus to plans for a BRICS basket reserve currency. The move would simultaneously improve Beijing's reputation as an apparently more responsible actor with respect to foreign assets, while also perversely incentivizing it to further experiment with its own nascent unilateral sanctions regime.A managed process of de-dollarization with cross-bloc participation could be a good thing, but a chaotic transition triggered by Western hubris, provoking similar ventures by great power rivals, would not be. Like the "coalition of the willing" that supported the illegal Iraq War in 2003, arguably helping to normalize behaviors like those of Russia today, the coalition now aligning for ever-escalating financial warfare may ultimately weaken international law protections for everyone, not only their intended targets. It is time to put a freeze on the transition to seizure.

It's official — the Pentagon is becoming a bank. Well, sort of. At a March 8th event on dual-use technology at SXSW in Austin, Texas, director of the Office of Strategic Capital Jason Rathje announced that his team has officially received the internal authority to grant executive loans and loan guarantees, a first within the Pentagon.
The Office of Strategic Capital, or OSC, was created in response to growing concern over China's investment in next-generation technology. According to its investment strategy, released Friday, March 8th, the OSC will invest in firms researching and developing 14 "critical technologies," including hypersonics, quantum computing, microelectronics, autonomous systems, and artificial intelligence.
After surviving a rocky first year — punctuated by allegations of conflicts of interest from Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and hard questions over its funding — the OSC is now close to licensing its first funds as part of a joint lending program with the Small Business Administration. OSC loans require private funding to match their loans, giving a pathway for smaller defense tech companies with aggressive investment strategies to enter the mix.
Venture capitalists have poured money into many of the items now on the "critical technologies" list, making them well-poised to benefit from OSC loans. By one New York Times estimate, venture capital firms went from spending around $6.7 billion on military tech in 2016 to $34 billion in 2022.
However, they have generated relatively few government contracts so far, leading some tech entrepreneurs to accuse the Pentagon of paying lip service to innovation without actually funding innovative ventures. According to Palantir, a "unicorn" of the defense tech world founded by Peter Thiel, the top 100 venture-funded military start-ups have only generated somewhere between $2-5 billion in government contracts. Part of this is because of Silicon Valley's"move fast and break things" approach, which sees the Pentagon's bureaucracy as little more than a straightjacket.
Marc Andreessen, the co-founder of Andreessen Horowitz and an investor in many defense tech firms through his American Dynamism initiative, embodies this psyche, defined by an infatuation with new technology and a repudiation of the precautionary principle, which urges prudence in the face of uncertainty. In an essay Andreessen authored entitled "The Techno-Optimist Manifesto," he writes, "We believe the techno-capital machine is not anti-human – in fact, it may be the most pro-human thing there is. It serves us. The techno-capital machine works for us. All the machines work for us."
This is where the message of defense tech venture capitalists differs from that of the prime contractors like RTX (previously known as Raytheon) and Lockheed Martin; instead of waxing lyrical about security, tech stalwarts evangelize about wielding artificial intelligence to overcome the frailties of human nature itself. Buoyed by their "yes, and…" theater-kid ethos, their beguiling promise is to usher in a near-utopia at the hands of the "Techno-Capital Machine."
That is, if the government steps aside. "Silicon valley is a builder culture, and Washington is never going to be a builder culture," argued Katherine Boyle, the co-founder of Andreessen's American Dynamism initiative. "I think people just have to come to terms with that."
So what does this "material philosophy" look like in practice? Shield AI, a company Andreessen has invested in through American Dynamism, offers AI-powered autonomous swarms that claim to own "the kill chain from start to end" like a "scene from Top Gun 2." Palantir has demonstrated a language model that analyzes battlefields and generates courses of action for a human operator. As defense analyst Van Jackson puts it, the OSC has "created various regulatory exemptions and federally guaranteed loans to incentivize VCs to go big on death-tech."
Even if their promises are more grandiose, the business model of capitalizing on instability remains familiar. On a panel about public/private partnerships at SXSW, former Olympian turned venture capitalist Larsen Jensen said that Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a "tremendous catalyst" for changing the national security investing environment.
"There have been many other catalysts that have occurred, if you think back prior to that, 9/11 was a catalyst," Jensen said. "Many companies that otherwise would not exist in the defense industry, such as General Atomics, probably owe a big portion of their success due to a geopolitical catalyst that was, you know, unfortunate for the United States obviously, but the Predator probably wouldn't be as prolific as it is now, and the early innings of autonomy wouldn't be as important as it is now, were it not for that tragedy."
It doesn't take a Luddite to realize that the Pentagon should exercise caution when partnering with VC firms on exploring technologies such as AI-powered language models and autonomous weapons. As Craig Martell, the head of the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office at the Pentagon, warns, AI chatbots "speak authoritatively, so we just believe them," despite the fact that these devices often spit out misleading or outright false answers. In a new report from Public Citizen, Robert Weissman and Savannah Wooten argue that autonomous weapons can lead to dehumanization or even loss of human control. "AI-driven swarms involve autonomous agents that would interact with and coordinate with each other, likely in ways not foreseen by humans and also likely indecipherable to humans in real-time," Weissman and Wooten write.
The Pentagon has some guardrails in place that urge caution with technology like artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons. A Pentagon directive, issued just a month after the creation of the OSC in January 2023, requires autonomous weapons to be designed to allow human operators to exercise "appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force," establishes testing and evaluation standards for autonomous weapons, and mandates a chain of review for approval, among other requirements.
But a number of critics outside of the department question whether this approach goes far enough. A Human Rights Watch/Harvard Law School International Human Rights clinic review of the policy noted that the directive allows for significant loopholes, among them allowing the senior review of autonomous weapons to be waived "in cases of urgent military need." Weissman and Wooten argue that the "biggest shortcoming of the directive, however, is that it permits the development and deployment of lethal autonomous weapons at all."
Venture capital firms are looking for more buy-in on the back end, an issue the OSC can't quite solve. As adjunct professor at Stanford University Steve Blank explains, "There's a demand problem, not a funding problem." For the venture capitalists, this requires convincing the U.S. government to sideline concerns they may have about emerging technologies and buy into the techno-utopian vision they are selling.
In order to persuade the government to be more in line with the brash futurism of Silicon Valley, venture capital-backed defense tech firms are ramping up their lobbying operations. In 2023, Palantir spent over $5 million on their formal lobbying operations, lobbying Congress against "the regulation of AI." Shield AI, which spent over $1 million on lobbying in 2023, lobbied the Department of Defense directly on "issues around autonomy and artificial intelligence." Anduril, another defense technology company backed by Andreessen, spent over $1.5 million lobbying Congress on issues related to "unmanned and autonomous systems," including autonomous sentry towers on the U.S.-Mexico border.
OpenAI, the creator of ChatGPT, has also signaled it may want in on Pentagon dollars. As the Intercept reported, earlier this year OpenAI quietly removed language that prohibits the military from using its technology. This week, former Sen. Norm Coleman registered as a lobbyist for OpenAI.The OSC is Silicon Valley's biggest step toward molding the Pentagon in its own image, a sign they are making inroads with top brass leaders. But should the venture capitalists continue to rush the development and deployment of untested, risky technologies, even as they cash in massively in the process, someone needs to commit the cardinal sin of prudence by stepping in and setting some rules.

"America was ready for renewal. The world was there to remake. There were at least two more years to get it done."So concludes Alex Ward's recent book "The Internationalists: The Fight to Restore American Foreign Policy after Trump," a detailed account of President Joe Biden's first two years in office. Ward's deeply reported narrative ends in late April of 2023, with national security adviser Jake Sullivan delivering a speech at the Brookings Institution that symbolically brought the neoliberal era to an end.The story that Ward — national security reporter at Politico — tells is a compelling one. Biden's foreign policy team — led by consummate DC insiders who dubbed themselves "the A-team" — understood their mandate as working to bring Washington out of the abyss of the Trump years. Watching Donald Trump win the White House had led to a soul-searching moment for Democrats in the foreign policy establishment, pushing those who eventually became Biden's braintrust to embrace a new paradigm. "Sullivan had changed during the Trump years after working to define a progressive foreign policy, one that would appeal to denizens of the heartland as well as the well-heeled and well-intentioned urban elites," writes Ward. "The Democratic candidate, having watched his opponent in the Oval Office and the campaign trail, had also come to the conclusion that the usual message on foreign policy needed a first-page rewrite." The party would work to overturn what they perceived as the ills of Trumpism by re-embracing international allies and partners, and restoring American global leadership of the global "rules-based order." But, Ward writes, "force would be used only when the foundations of the world that the United State had helped build since 1945 were at risk. Otherwise, the guns would be holstered." The theme that Sullivan and others settled on to define Biden's foreign policy was "a foreign policy for the middle class." At times, Ward treats this approach with a critical eye, pointing to a number of inconsistencies in administration policy. But the ultimate narrative arc in the book is more clean: After a rocky start, with the nadir being the courageous but poorly managed conclusion to the United States' two-decade war in Afghanistan, the Biden administration recovered its mojo with its response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.Despite some bumps in the road, Biden and his team had begun to rebuild U.S. foreign policy, with a renewed focus on working with allies, upholding democratic norms, and protecting the so-called rules-based international order.That story has changed dramatically since the book's conclusion, which brings the reader up to April 2023, nearly a year ago. A lot has happened since then, and not so much in favor of Ward's narrative arc. If it were a classic VH-1 Face the Music episode, this is the exact point where the clouds roll in on our A-Team and everything goes careening off track, perhaps forever.And so, the response to the war in Ukraine is presented by Ward as a success. The methodical and comprehensive preparations in the months leading up to the invasion serve as a foil to the haphazard approach that marked the withdrawal from Afghanistan. According to Ward, the Biden team prepared for many possible contingencies, even though the political leadership in Ukraine was doubtful of U.S. intelligence that suggested an invasion was likely.The final chapter of "The Internationalists," before the epilogue that lays out Sullivan's speech at Brookings, features Biden's triumphant visit to Kyiv. During his address in the Ukrainian capital, says Ward, the president "wanted to prove that Bidenism worked — and the world just needed more of it." For Biden, Russia's invasion had served as a global test of democracy, and democracy had prevailed. Over the last year, however, the war has reached a "stalemate" — others say a war of attrition, with Moscow winning it. Despite these changing realities, the Biden administration has proven unwilling and unable to shift its strategy or messaging away from an understanding of the war as a fight for democracy that can only be won through military means. The message is losing favor in Washington, particularly among congressional Republicans, and politics in Washington have moved slowly against continued aid for Ukraine.Meanwhile, in its reaction to the Hamas incursion into Israel on October 7, the Biden administration has squandered any global legitimacy and consistency it had built in its first two-plus years in power, and undermined its message on the war in Ukraine. In just over five months, the White House has laid bare the hypocrisy and inconsistency of its stated commitment to human rights and the international order and left Washington isolated on the world stage. Things were different in May 2021 when war broke out in Gaza. Just like today, Biden chose to fully back Israel's war publicly while reportedly pressuring the Israeli prime minister behind closed doors. Biden chose to negotiate "methodically and quietly" with Benjamin Netanyahu and opted against playing a significant public role. The White House, according to Ward, welcomed the pressure from their left flank that played a role in the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, reached after 11 days of conflict. It was, according to the author, indicative of Biden's broader foreign policy vision: "Core issues that challenge the world order or America's leadership get his full effort. Everything else, the United States will help if it can."The response to that war is treated by the administration as a success, as it helped keep the conflict relatively short and contained. The opposite has resulted from that strategy today. Biden continues to publicly back Israel's war, both rhetorically and materially. Despite a breathless string of reports that Washington has privately expressed its "frustration" or "concern" with Tel Aviv, Israel's war continues seemingly without restriction as the Palestinian death toll surpasses 30,000. The White House has been largely dismissive of progressives calling for a sustainable ceasefire, and the risk of a regional conflagration persists.The Biden administration's response to what is happening in Gaza has also blatantly betrayed any ostensible commitment to human rights and international law, which had been so important to the White House when it came to Ukraine. "The reason the administration was set to dive headfirst into intense preparations was to defend the rules-based international order," Ward writes about Biden's mindset after receiving intelligence that Russia might go into Ukraine in late 2021. "If Putin succeeded in wiping Ukraine off the map, the world America helped build would crumble on this administration's watch." The White House has consistently made the case that the stakes of Russia's invasion of Ukraine are the future of democracy itself. The Biden administration has lambasted Moscow's violations of international law. In April 2022, Biden even accused Vladimir Putin of committing genocide in Ukraine. Yet when the International Court of Justice ruled earlier this year that it was "plausible" that Israel was carrying out a genocide in Gaza, the White House called the accusation "unfounded." Administration officials have consistently refused to condemn alleged Israeli war crimes, including the bombing of hospitals and the forced displacement and starvation of the civilian population. Instead of pushing for a ceasefire, the U.S. has continued to support Israel's war. Biden himself often ties the wars in Ukraine and Gaza into one larger, global project, including the ongoing effort to pass a spending package that combines $60 billion in aid for Kyiv with $17 billion for Tel Aviv.In addition to Joe Biden's campaign slogan of "a foreign policy for the middle class," Ward tries to tack on a few more principles that could define the president's approach. "He had developed a doctrine of sorts over two years in office," Ward writes. "Stand true with allies. Defend democracy. Avoid escalatory conflict. Preserve the rules-based order." On almost every count, he has failed to live up to those lofty goals.

The U.S.-China relationship has emerged from one of its lowest points in decades and successfully entered a new, albeit cautious and uncertain, phase of renewed dialogue and cooperation, verging on a delicate detente. Months of high-level meetings and diplomatic signaling have paved the way for a summit between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping in San Francisco tomorrow, marking Xi's first visit to the United States since 2017. Among the substantive agreements the two may reportedly announce are a pledge limiting the use of artificial intelligence in nuclear command and control systems as well as autonomous weapons such as drones, and a deal to limit the flow of fentanyl from China to the United States. Even absent such agreements, the summit broadly represents an affirmation of the Biden administration's approach to China: "intense diplomacy" is possible amid "intense competition." But it also exposes this approach's fatal flaw: managing tensions through dialogue will, in the long run, not be enough. Sustainable peace and stability ultimately requires getting at the root causes of those tensions, and must be built upon a foundation of genuine negotiation and compromise to slow down the escalating military competition and arms race between the two countries. Washington has yet to wake up.To start, this is a detente deferred. The Biden-Xi summit comes nearly a year to the day since the two met in Bali, Indonesia, seeking to mend the rupture caused by then-Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan last August, and laying the groundwork for wide-ranging diplomatic engagement in the months ahead. This was to include a trip by Secretary of State Antony Blinken to China in February, the first by a member of Biden's Cabinet, but that was canceled amid the diplomatic fallout over the Chinese spy balloon. The relationship came to a sudden, grinding halt, but channels gradually reopened in the subsequent months, driven in no small part by China's own economic woes.The two sides now have a chance for redemption. A sign that this time is different would be Xi agreeing to Biden's longstanding request to reopen military-to-military channels that were shuttered following Pelosi's visit to Taiwan and have remained closed. If the summit produces this or other tangible outcomes, and contributes to a sustained lowering of tensions and further rounds of high-level dialogue, this would represent a powerful affirmation of the Biden administration's overall approach to China from the beginning.In its first few years, the administration spoke of placing the United States in a "position of strength," by repairing and revitalizing its alliance system, coordinating with those allies to increase economic and geopolitical pressure on China, and "getting our own house in order" by overcoming the Covid-19 pandemic and implementing economic and political reform at home.From this position of strength, the administration then moved toward creating a new status quo in the relationship, setting new terms and norms that would mark a clear and final departure from the decades-long era of "engagement" and the true start of the era of "competition." Whereas Trump took a sledgehammer to the foundations of engagement, Biden has sought to build a comprehensive and coherent approach out of the rubble, one designed to last for the decades ahead.The "new terms" of the relationship are that the United States and its allies will adopt aggressive, and sometimes unprecedented, military, economic, and diplomatic policies to secure their interests, but that dialogue and cooperation on common challenges would continue for their own sake, and in fact would serve as a release valve for the tensions and pressures of competition.Speaking on background to the press, a senior White House official stressed that "our China policy has not changed." Indeed, the Biden-Xi summit represents the logical evolution and maturation of the administration's approach, exemplifying what "responsible competition" means in practice. "Intense competition requires and demands intense diplomacy to manage tensions and to prevent competition from verging into conflict or confrontation," the official said.A key pillar of "intense diplomacy" is "guardrails," particularly military-to-military dialogue and crisis management mechanisms meant to ensure that aggressive maneuvers from both sides do not cause an accident that inadvertently sparks a crisis which metastasizes into a wider war neither seeks.This is where the Biden administration's vision goes wrong. Even if there is a re-opening of some military channels, Beijing has a history of not picking up the phone. In its view, "guardrails" of this sort serve as a source of moral hazard, creating a safety net that only incentivizes and encourages the United States to engage in military activities that Beijing sees as anathema to its interests, security, and prestige.Throughout the current thaw, Beijing has demonstrated its conviction to maintain an assertive military posture, instigating tensions with the Philippines in the South China Sea, threatening Taiwan with a record number of aircraft incursions, and repeatedly harassing U.S. and allied forces conducting patrols in the region. Last month, the Pentagon declassified evidence demonstrating that the PLA Air Force had engaged in more "coercive and risky" actions over the past two years than in the entire decade prior.At a CSIS event last week, Congressman Raja Krishnamoorthi, ranking member of the House Select Committee on China, asked matter-of-factly: "Wouldn't it make more sense for us to open a military-to-military communications channel right now, when just the other day, a bomber, one of our bombers, was approached within 10 feet by a J-11 fighter of the People's Liberation Army, and almost had a collision? Imagine what would have happened if there's a fatality."This question reflects either a basic misunderstanding of the strategic dynamics between the two sides, or a deliberate, willful ignorance: for Beijing, the risk and uncertainty is the point.As the Stimson Center's Yun Sun wrote in July, "Beijing thinks that such dialogue serves as a guardrail or a safety net that allows the United States to keep conducting military activity in the western Pacific without fear of repercussions," and that answering crisis hotlines is "a sign of weaknesses and an indication that it is willing to deescalate, which defeats the entire purpose of brinkmanship.""Beijing wants Washington to worry about China's provocative military acts, to ask for reassurance, and then not receive it," Sun continued. "Ultimately, to manage crises and prevent conflict, China believes the United States must stop talking and start eliminating what Beijing sees as the source of tension: Washington's presence in the western Pacific."The Biden-Xi summit is, of course, an unmitigated good. But the Biden administration's China policy will ultimately have amounted to a tragic failure, for it has failed to grapple with the fundamental contradiction at the heart of the relationship: the United States' primary tool for maintaining the status quo and responding to military tensions with China — military power, pressure, and deterrence — is, from Beijing's perspective, the underlying structural cause of those tensions.Sun further observes that "within China, there is an increasingly popular (if fatalistic) view that a military crisis may be inevitable, and perhaps even desirable," as "Beijing and Washington need to reach an impasse akin to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962… before they can sit down and negotiate the terms of their coexistence," including establishing "ground rules the United States will follow when operating in China's periphery."Unfortunately, history is likely to remember Biden as the president who only set the stage for the crisis that eventually forced such a reckoning, rather than the one who had the political courage, strategic foresight, and diplomatic acumen to face down this reckoning himself.

Last week I was honored to be moderator for a discussion with Greg Lukianoff and Rikki Schlott on their new book "Canceling the American Mind" at the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco.  Link here, if the embed above doesn't work Here are my questions. I shared them with Greg and Rickki ahead of time, so the actual questions are a bit shorter. But this may give you some interesting background, and I think they're good questions to ponder in general. 1) The book is full of great stories. Perhaps you can help everyone get a sense of the book with one or two of the most informative cancellation stories. 2) I notice a progression in your work. "Coddling" has moved to "canceling" and is moving to "censorship."  People think of  "canceling" as a social phenomenon, twitter pile-ons. But, as you show in the book, it has now moved on to organized institutional censorship, in universities, scientific societies and publications,  medicine and medical schools, journalism, media and tech, publishing, psychotherapy, law schools, and corporations, which not only punish transgressors but enforce ideological conformity. I'd like you to choose a few stories, explain some of these mechanisms,— for example "DEI" bureaucracies, speech surveillance, curriculum mandates, and so on. 3) There is an important distinction between free speech and academic freedom. It is one thing to censor and fire people for political tweets, but entirely another that whole lines of research are censored — covid, sex and biology, race and policing are examples. And the spread of censorship to the formerly hard sciences seems more damaging than just how much of a lost cause the humanities are. Yet academic freedom in research and teaching is not absolute. If you're hired to research and teach cosmology, the university is right to say you can't do lots of creationism, and the right to invest in what it thinks are promising fields.  I don't like "where do you draw the line" discussions, but I would like your thoughts on academic freedom. It also strikes me that we find your stories so compelling simply because the things people are censored for seem so reasonable, and their censorship so ridiculous. Yet the ideologues think we're ridiculous. It's not clear that academic freedom is the central issue, rather than just how ridiculous and politicized most universities have become in their teaching and research priorities. Perhaps free speech and academic freedom are  necessary but not sufficient to fix universities.4) A softball: Free speech is all well and good but surely "hate speech and disinformation must be regulated." —usually stated in that maddening subject-free passive voice, leaving who and how unsaid.5) Censorship now infects the government. Since you wrote the book, the twitter files and the savage Missouri V. Biden injunction have come out, detailing how the government got tech companies to silence its political critics. A notable example includes the Great Barrington declaration signatories who turned out to be right about masks, vaccine mandates, lockdowns, and school closures.  I fear that social media and AI regulation are really all about censoring political speech, which now includes scientific discourse. Are you?6) You also wrote the book before the Hamas terrorist attack in Israel. Campuses and much of Europe exploded with pro-Hamas protests. University leaders, used to denouncing every small injustice in the world, issued muddles. Long-time donors are rebelling. Well, they say, don't you believe in freedom of speech and academic freedom? If we want to go on a campus rampage with "kill the jews" signs, that's freedom of speech. If we want to run an exercise in class where we make Jewish students stand apart, that's academic freedom.   Follow up: In my view, the main lesson is not the hilarious hypocrisy, or a pointless "where do you draw the line" on free speech.  The real question is why universities have chosen to admit, hire, and promote so many people who, given free speech, choose to use it on murderous anti-semitism? How do you process these events?7) Your book valiantly tries to balance "left" and "right." I want to push us to a more nuanced view, which may help to defuse partisan sentiments. It's not really "left" and "right," as most people on each side still support free speech.  [Greg pushed back hard on that, which was very interesting.] Rather there is a small, but influential minority of each that is the enemy of free speech. And let's get past whose "fault" it is.a) Let's start with the left. I think of the free speech enemies as the totalitarian progressives, sometimes called "woke," but I try to avoid that charged term. Who do you see the as enemies of free speech on the left, what do they want, and what dangers they pose? b) Now on the right. I was surprised to learn how much cancellation is coming from the right.  Who are they? In your book, I count some ham handed anti-woke politicians, some traditional book-banning social conservatives, a smattering of "national conservatives," "common good conservatives" and a vortex of Trump supporters rallying around his peccadillos. But I shouldn't put words in your mouth. Who are they and what do they want?c) You try to be even handed, but I want to push you on that. The anti-speech forces on the left have won the long march through the institutions. You describe a string of selection mechanisms starting in grade school to enforce left-wing ideological conformity. They're on the advance. On the right you describe have ham-handed "anti-woke" legislators, and what you call a "fringe theory from the Opus Dei wing of the conservative movement." The the left has Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and Stanford.  You cite right-wing cancellations at Collin College, University of Rhode Island, Montana State and University of Kentucky. Is not the present danger to freedom really mostly from the small minority of left-wing activists, and the crowd of bien-pensants who go along with them?8) I have to admit I'm a bit disappointed about your "cures."  Maybe depressed is the right word — if you two don't have magic bullets, we're in real trouble. You outline a radical restructuring of universities, which is great, but not who is going to take over universities to do it. You emphasize nice rules for a better rhetoric: free speech, logic and evidence, ignore what someone said about another topic, no ad-hominem attacks, and so on. But the opponents of free speech ignore traditional enlightenment rhetoric for a reason. The far left says that logic and evidence are colonialist white supremacist racist thinking; we don't have to listen to evil people. And faced with their latest ideological word salad, it's hard to see what there is to discuss on a factual basis anyway. The far right says, we are faced with a Maoist / Bolshevik cultural revolution, aimed at seizing power. There's no free speech in a war. Voluntarily abiding by better rhetoric doesn't seem likely. Neither side likes your "free speech culture." 9) Let's close with another softball. As you note, free speech is a rare and recent idea. Censorship for political or religious reasons has been the norm in human societies.  In your words, why is freedom of speech and thought so crucial? 

Key Takeaways from the Africa Evidence Summit CIDR PanelAt the 2023 Africa Evidence Summit, panelists Jeanine Condo (Chief Executive Officer, The Centre for Impact, Innovation and Capacity building for Health Information Systems and Nutrition), Rose Oronje (Director of Public Policy and Knowledge Translation, and Head of Kenya Office, AFIDEP), Aurelia Munene (Founder of Eider Africa), and Constantine Manda (Assistant Professor of Political Science, UC Irvine) joined moderator Daniel Posner (Professor of International Development, UCLA) to explore the varied incentives for African scholars to publish. Amy Shipow (Project Manager, CEGA Global Networks) and Maya Ranganath (Associate Director, CEGA Global Networks and Inclusion) synthesize the discussion to shed light on the publication gap and generate insights on how barriers can be alleviated to allow African scholars to participate fully in scholarly publication.Jeanine Condo speaks on the panel at the 2023 Africa Evidence Summit | Luft Ventures"The research infrastructure on the [African] continent remains very low. Few publications are a reflection of the limited investments governments are putting into research […] There are biases in journals. As a PhD student studying in the US, I was told that I should have my Western professor as a co-author to get published." — Rose Oronje, Director of Public Policy and Knowledge Translation, and Head of Kenya Office, AFIDEP.The Collaboration for Inclusive Development Research (CIDR), co-led by CEGA and the Network for Impact Evaluation Researchers in Africa (NIERA), aims to shift norms in global development research towards a more inclusive ecosystem. At the 2023 Africa Evidence Summit in Nairobi, we organized a panel to discuss how differing incentives and resources contribute to publishing disparities between researchers from high income countries (HIC) and those from low- and -middle-income countries (LMICs). The panel also probed the role of journals, universities, and researchers in HICs in exacerbating (or mitigating) this problem.We present the major themes of the discussion below, which shed light on the barriers and opportunities that African scholars face along the education to evidence-use pipeline.Co-authorship with scholars from HICs can serve as a helpful career stepping stone; however, it is only a small step in changing the research ecosystem to produce more African scholarship.Dr. Condo shared that working with and publishing together with CEGA affiliated professor Paul Gertler was an important lever for her career. Yet, African scholars often face internalized pressure (due to external biases) towards co-authoring with scholars from HICs. When Dr. Oronje asked the nearly 500 Summit attendees, "How many African scholars here are first authors when you submit a publication?," hardly anyone raised their hand, leading her to share that not even she submits academic publications as a first author.Panelists shared the structural obstacles African researchers face to conduct their own rigorous social science research.Since most African universities are "teaching" institutions and prioritize this over research, scholars are left with limited time to pursue their own research agendas. Moreover, faculty are rarely trained to mentor or share resources with their students — challenges that are further exacerbated by the significant time constraints they face. Access to scholars with experience publishing at top-tier universities is also privileged for HIC students, who can more easily build subject-matter expertise simply by attending office hours and speaking with other students and faculty. Without this similar exposure to the most relevant literature and resources, African students instead spend more self-directed time finding, reading, and engaging with a variety of potentially less relevant work."Last year, I was challenging the Vice Chancellor of the University of Rwanda — I am breastfeeding but I am expected to publish three papers. How can I have more space and time to be an equal competitor?" — Jeanine CondoFemale scholars face additional barriers to publishing, even at the highest levels of academia.Dr. Condo recently published a paper on gender inequities in publishing, which outlined that in papers from sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), men comprised 61% of first authors, 65% of last authors, and 66% of single authors. A recent survey of over 200 alumni of SSA STEM PhD programs confirmed that women obtain less university and external funding for graduate studies than their male counterparts. Female panelists shared that they had to push back against senior leadership with regard to career expectations in the face of reproductive and domestic responsibilities; they are expected to achieve the same results as their male counterparts but are constrained by additional, invisibilized labor.Given these constraints to African-led authorship, what are the potential solutions to incentivize and support publishing?"Money is the problem and the solution," Dr. Manda shared. Existing funds should be leveraged to support and nurture African researchers so that journals will be eager to publish their work. Dr. Condo recently wrote a grant to research the effects of providing monetary incentives for researchers to publish, instead of accepting small consultancies, where their contributions were less likely to be recognized by name. Preliminary results suggest that this is an effective incentive for SSA researchers. Similarly, panelists cited the dedicated research and pilot funding that CEGA provides to African scholars helps them pursue their own research interests.Investing in the quality of African journals is essential, and can be accomplished through different mechanisms.Panelists urged researchers to publish important work in African journals, which can signal the quality of the journal, can make findings more accessible, and uphold the ethical responsibility to share results with the communities of study. Dr. Oronje also emphasized the need for African scholars to sit on the editorial boards of such journals.Concurrently, HIC journals are making strides to improve geographic equity; for example, PLOS recently announced a policy that authors conducting research outside of their country of origin will be asked to complete a questionnaire that details the ethical, cultural, and scientific considerations taken to uphold inclusivity in their research, including if local authors are included among the authorship list. Making journals open access was another solution proposed by the panel. Initiatives like the Northwestern Research Feedback Project provides LMIC scholars, who have a desk-rejected paper from the Journal of Development Economics (JDE), the opportunity to be matched with a HIC scholar for feedback. While the author is not reconsidered for JDE, it is hoped that the paper can be improved for other submissions.Both Africa-based and HIC-based non-governmental organizations can complement African universities by offering dedicated mentorship to African scholars.Through her work as the founder of Eider Africa, panelist Aurelia Munene is striving to decrease the sense of isolation researchers experience, especially among recent graduates looking to publish. Her organization offers mentorship on essential research and writing skills as well as supports enhancing curricula at African universities. Additionally, panelists mentioned the importance of identifying resources (such as Afrobarometer, the Harvard Dataverse, or datasets of published papers) and training students to use them.While the panel began with discussion about differing incentives to publish, the conversation evolved to mirror CIDR's fundamental goals: how can we best support African researchers so that journals will actively seek out African scholars to publish their research and policymakers will hasten to apply their results?If you are working in this space, we invite you to let us know what you think! We will soon launch an online survey for students, faculty, research professionals, journal editors, and funders to share their thoughts on the current state of inclusion in the evidence ecosystem and ways to improve it. Please watch for the official announcement of this online survey later this month. The results of the survey and other CIDR research will be released in 2024.It Takes a Village to Raise a Researcher was originally published in CEGA on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.