Es inaudito encontrar un sistema de cualquier tipo basado en computadores en el que el humano no interactúe con él. Incluso aunque se trate de una comunicación exclusivamente entre dos computadores, normalmente se incluye una interfaz que permita solucionar el enlace entre máquinas cuando aparece algún problema [Mulligan et al. 1991]. El usuario, como ser humano, necesita información, lo que se considera una de las pocas constantes en nuestro mundo, independientemente de la cultura a la que pertenezca o en el instante de tiempo en el que transcurra su actividad. Esta necesidad se combina con la ocupación del usuario en otras tareas que requieren su atención, de forma que hay al menos dos focos de atención que compiten por el bien más preciado de cualquier interfaz humano-computador: la atención del usuario. La existencia de diferentes escenarios, en las que el usuario espera resultados diferentes y consecuencias distintas ante la existencia de un error controla la aparición de distintos tipos de aplicaciones y dispositivos para soportar las demandas del usuario en condiciones de multitarea. En estos sistemas, conocidos como Sistemas de Notificación, las interfaces están diseñadas como un medio para acceder a información valiosa para el usuario de una forma efectiva y eficiente sin introducir interrupciones no deseadas en la ejecución de la tarea principal. Pueden encontrarse numerosas implementaciones de Sistemas de Notificación en una gran variedad de plataformas. Quizás en los sistemas de sobremesa son más fácilmente identificables: servicios de mensajería instantánea, aplicaciones que muestran el estado de un sistema, servicios de noticias e indicadores de cantidades almacenadas. Otros ejemplos familiares pueden encontrarse en procesos industriales y tecnológicos como la cadena danzante de Weiser como representación del tráfico de una red [Weiser y Brown 1996], los sistemas de información embarcados en vehículos, los sistemas incorporados en los vehículos para proporcionar información de los sistemas, los sistemas que proporcionan información sobre el entorno, los sistemas multi-monitor que indican los excesos de rango de un sistema y las cabinas de los aviones modernos. De otro lado, un sistema se considera crítico cuando un único fallo debido al sistema, al usuario o al modo en el que el usuario realiza las tareas para las que el sistema se diseñó, puede producir daños graves en el sistema, en su entorno o, aún más grave, en los usuarios del sistema. Ejemplos de este tipo de sistemas pueden encontrarse en los aviones, correspondiéndose con sistemas manejados por usuarios muy especializados. Genéricamente hablando, la evaluación de usabilidad incluye un amplio rango de métodos y técnicas usados por los evaluadores para evaluar, cualitativa o cuantitativamente, distintos aspectos relacionados con la usabilidad. Como soporte al diseño, la evaluación debe permitir, en primer lugar, la verificación de las decisiones de diseño y en segundo lugar elegir entre varias alternativas. Aunque se le conceda gran importancia, la evaluación de cualquier sistema está poco implantada como un proceso más en el ciclo de vida de un producto, ya que se suele considerar un proceso costoso, en tiempo y recursos, y que no añade ningún valor al producto. La evaluación de la interfaz humano-computador permite la comparación de distintas alternativas de diseño de sistemas y, en último lugar, determinar qué sistema es mejor. Por tanto, la evaluación debe proporcionar medidas cuantitativas para determinar la usabilidad de una interfaz y comparar dos interfaces distintas de forma objetiva. Aunque los usuarios de computadores están habituados al uso de Sistemas de Notificación, su evaluación está limitada a probar el valor intrínseco de paradigmas aislados de diseño basados en una única implementación. La evaluación de usabilidad de los Sistemas de Notificación está muy poco desarrollada en las interfaces de propósito general y, particularmente, en las interfaces de los sistemas críticos. Las únicas experiencias disponibles están basadas en datos empíricos reducidos en entornos simulados y en el seguimiento de ciertas guías de diseño probadas por la experiencia. Están guías proceden de aplicaciones militares y, aunque pueden ser cuestionadas desde el punto de vista de la ciencias cognitivas, están ampliamente aceptadas en el diseño de interfaces para Sistemas de Notificación críticos. Los diseñadores de estos sistemas pueden, razonablemente, rechazarlas basándose en su experiencia y en su juicio. Si no existe una evaluación cuantitativa basada en modelos cognitivos entonces el evaluador no puede ser capaz de determinar científicamente los errores en la interfaz. De hecho, puede llegarse a la situación sin salida en la que se enfrenten el juicio y el conocimiento del diseñador con los del evaluador. Esta situación puede resolverse con un marco de evaluación que proporcione datos cuantitativos que muestren si una alternativa de diseño es mejor que otra, basado en principios objetivos. El diseño y la evaluación de las interfaces humano-computador han evolucionado mucho más rápidamente que las teorías basadas en la psicología y la ciencia cognitiva y aún existen un gran número de problemas por resolver. Así, el diseño de interfaces ha evolucionado desde los editores de líneas y aplicaciones a medida con interfaces muy reducidas basadas en crípticos comandos de línea hasta las interfaces WIMP (Windows-Icons-Menus-Pointers), los sistemas de recuperación de la información, los agentes inteligentes, los servidores CSCW (Cooperative and Shared Computer Works), los entornos virtuales, la realidad aumentada, los bits tangibles, la computación ubicua, la web y los múltiples tipos de interfaces capaces de hablar y mostrar emociones. Mientras tanto, la evaluación de la usabilidad ha evolucionado basada principalmente en heurísticas y en la evaluación empírica [Nielsen 1993; Dix et al. 2.003]. La evaluación basada en la teoría ha sido considerada de un valor muy limitado [Landauer 1987] debido a su reducido ámbito de aplicación, aplicable únicamente a características propias de una interfaz y con una capacidad muy reducida para ser aplicada en otros diseños del mundo real, alejado de los laboratorios. Aunque se están realizando grandes esfuerzos para desarrollar teorías que cubran un amplio rango de tópicos, la mayor parte de ellas son solamente ajustes para explicar aplicaciones del día a día [Rudisill et al. 1996]. Actualmente la medida de prestaciones no se realiza frente a requisitos específicos previos al diseño. Es notable la ausencia de este tipo de requisitos en el ciclo de vida para el desarrollo de una interfaz humano-computador. En estos casos, se puede introducir un conjunto de parámetros críticos que permita definir las unidades de medida [Newman et al. 2000]. Estos parámetros son críticos porque el éxito o el fracaso del diseño dependen de forma crítica del cumplimiento de los objetivos fijados para estos parámetros. Los parámetros críticos permiten formalizar un espacio de diseño en el que se re-usa el conocimiento [Cheward et al. 2004], expresando los problemas asociados a una interfaz con un lenguaje consistente y que permite a los expertos expresar juicios a través de una 'evaluación medida' [Caroll et al. 1992]. El principal objetivo de esta tesis es desarrollar un marco de evaluación predictiva para Sistemas de Notificación en Aviónica (SNA) basado en las teorías cognitivas, que pueda proporcionar datos cualitativos y cuantitativos que permita a los diseñadores y evaluadores de interfaces averiguar si la interfaz sea usable antes de construirlo. De este modo, el diseñador de interfaces puede ser capaz de introducir la evaluación como patrones de diseño de la interfaz humano-computador sin requerir recursos adicionales. En esta tesis, la aproximación a la evaluación de la interfaz humano-computador de los Sistemas de Notificación para sistemas críticos en aviónica se propone en varios pasos. En primer lugar se establecen un conjunto de parámetros críticos basado en los modelos psicológicos, para después, realizar una evaluación predictiva de la usabilidad basada en la cuantificación de estos parámetros y, finalmente, aplicar de forma incremental las guías de diseño basándose en una estrategia de escenarios. Esta aproximación permitirá una evaluación sistemática garantizando, por un lado, centrarse en el diseño en términos de objetivos cuantificables, independientemente del evaluador y del usuario y, por otro lado, mejorar de forma continua y agregativa los diseños específicos aplicables a un problema determinado. En esta tesis, la principal contribución es la formalización matemática de cada uno de los parámetros críticos seleccionados para llevar a cabo la evaluación de usabilidad de las interfaces de Sistemas de Notificación integrados en sistemas críticos. El objetivo de esta tesis es conseguir una función de evaluación Ф, tal que aplicada a la interfaz del sistema de notificación permita obtener datos numéricos en el dominio de los números reales. Formalmente, el objetivo es obtener ℜΦ∃∀a)(/IIφ Donde I es la interfaz del sistema de notificación y Ф es la función de evaluación de la usabilidad que produce como resultado un número real. Para evaluar la validez de este marco de evaluación es aplicado a la interfaz de la planta de potencia de dos aviones modernos y a la interfaz de control de la planta de potencia de un avión de transporte militar. La aplicación de este marco de evaluación está basada en la ejecución de tests automáticos implementados en Ada95 aplicados a una caracterización XML de las interfaces. ____________________________________________ ; It's unheard-of to find any system of any kind, whether critical or not, based on computer with no human interaction. Even though it will be a system related with the communication between two computers it is mostly used to find an interface allowing to solve any problem related with the link between computers [Mulligan et al. 1991]. The user of a computer interface, as any human being, needs information, which is considered one of the few constants in our every day world, whatever his culture or activity. This need plays together with other tasks the user has to perform in such a way that there are at least two systems competing for the most appraised resource at any human-computer interface: the user attention. Different usage situations, expectations, and error consequences govern the growing breed of applications and devices being introduced to support multitasking information demands. Referred to as notification systems, these interfaces are generally desired as a means to access valued information in an efficient and effective manner without introducing unwanted interruption to a primary task. They can be found in many implementation forms and on a variety of platforms. Perhaps classic desktop systems are the most readily identifiable—instant messengers, status programs, and news and stock tickers. Other familiar examples such as Weiser's dangling string representation of network, in-vehicle information systems, ambient media, multi-monitor displays hint at the potential range of systems and modern aircraft cockpit. While use of these systems and the range of solutions have skyrocketed, our ability to scientifically recognize, pattern, and improve success within the HCI community has not kept pace. There are surprisingly few efforts in the literature that effectively evaluate usability of the information and interaction design for notification systems. On the other hand, a system will be considered as critic when a sole failure due to the system, the user, or the way the user executes the tasks that the system is designed for could produce serious damage to the system itself, in its surrounds or even tragic damage to the user. Examples of this kind of system can be found on many aircrafts corresponding to critical systems handled by very specialized users. Generically usability evaluation includes a spread set of methods and techniques used by evaluators for examining, qualitatively or quantitatively, several aspects related with usability. As support to the design, evaluation will allow firstly verification of design decisions and secondly to choose among possible alternatives. Although evaluation is recognized as very valuable it is rarely introduced in the design cycle of a product and it is deemed as very hard in terms of time and resources and what is worse is that it does not add any value to the product. Human-computer interface evaluation permits the comparison of different systems and ultimately to determine which system is better. Therefore evaluation shall provide direct measurement units to determine the interface usability and to compare two interfaces objectively. Even though computer users are extensively used for notification systems their evaluation is limited to probe the intrinsic value of some isolated paradigms of design based in a single implementation. The evaluation of notification systems is poorly developed on interfaces for systems in general and extremely rare in critical systems. The only available experiences are based on empirical data on simulated environments and the follow-up of some guidebooks probed by the experience. Those guidebooks come from military applications and even they can be questioned from the cognitive science point of view. These guidebooks are mostly accepted on interface user design for notification critical systems. The designer of these interfaces can justifiably reject them based on his experience and judgement. If there is no quantitative evaluation based on cognitive models then the evaluator will never be able to scientifically determine the errors in the interface. A situation can be reached with no way out, with the designer and the evaluator set against each other with conflicting needs. This situation can be resolved with an evaluation framework, which provides quantitative data showing whether one design is better than the other based on objective principles. Design and evaluation of human-computer interfaces have evolved much faster than theories based on psychology and cognitive science and still there are a number of issues that remain unresolved. The design has evolved since line editors and customized application with interfaces reduced to very cryptic line commands up to interfaces WIMP (Windows-Icons-Menus-Pointers), information recovery systems, smart agents, CSCW (Cooperative and Shared Computer Works) servers, virtual environments, augmented reality, tangible bits, ubiquitous computation, the web and many types of interfaces able to talk and show emotions. Usability evaluation has evolved based only on heuristics and empirical evaluation [Nielsen 1993; Dix et al. 2.003]. Evaluation based on theory has been considered as being of very limited value [Landauer 1987] due to the fact that it has a very limited scope and application areas, applicable only to local features of an interface and with a very reduced capacity to be re-used on other designs in the real world, far away from laboratories. Although a big effort is paid for developing theories covering a wide set of topics most of them are only adjustments so as to explain every day applications. Currently, the performance measurements are not done against specific requirements prior to design. It is notable that there is an absence of this kind of requirements in a human-computer interface development life cycle. In case of absence of performance requirements a set of critical parameters could be introduced in order to define measurement units [Newman et al. 2000]. These parameters are so called critical because the success or failure of a design will depend critically whether the fixed objectives are fulfilled or not. Critical parameters allow formalising a design space [Cheward et al. 2004] which allocates acknowledge re-use, expressing interface problems with a consistent language and let experts to express judgements through a mediated evaluation [Caroll et al. 1992]. The main objective of this thesis is to develop a framework of predictive evaluation for notification system on avionics (NSA) (from aviation electronics) based on cognitive theories which can bring both quantitative and qualitative data which allow interface designers and evaluators to guess whether the system will be usable before it is built. The interface designer will be able to include evaluation on the Human-Computer Interface pattern design without adding any additional resources. In this thesis the approach to usability evaluation for the design of Human-Computer Interface of notification systems for critical design in avionics is proposed in several steps. Firstly to establish the set of critical parameters based on psychological models, then to carry out a predictive usability evaluation based on the quantification of these parameters and finally to apply in an incremental way the design guidelines based on a scenario strategy. This approach will allow a systematic evaluation, achieving on one side to focalize the design in term of quantifiable objectives independently of the evaluator and the user and, on other side improving in a continuous and aggregative way the different designs applicable on a specific problem. In this thesis, the main contribution is a mathematical formalization of each critical parameter for carrying out quantitative usability evaluation on interfaces for notification systems integrated on critical system. The objective is to reach an evaluation function Ф in such a way that applied to the interface of a notification system I it will permit to get quantitative data on the real numbers domain. Formally the objective is to obtain ℜΦ∃∀a)(/IIφ Where I is the interface of the notification system and Ф is the usability evaluation function which produce a real number. To evaluate the validity of this framework it will be applied to two power plant control interfaces of modern aircrafts and to a power plant control interface to be implemented in a military transport aircraft. The application of this framework is based on the execution of automatic test implemented on Ada95 applied to a XML characterization for the interfaces.
In: Koch , L 2004 , ' Der Erste Weltkrieg als Medium der Gegenmoderne : zu den Werken von Walter Flex und Ernst Jünger ' , Doctor of Philosophy , University of Groningen , Groningen .
1. Inleiding Tussen de 'visies op de oorlog' die in de teksten van Walter Flex enerzijds, in die van Ernst Jünger anderzijds tot uitdrukking komen, ligt het trauma van de materiaalslag. Walter Flex, voornamelijk aan het oostfront ingezet, vocht in een van de laatste veldslagen van de door Eric Hobsbawn zo genoemde 'lange' 19de eeuw. Ernst Jünger daarentegen, in België en Frankrijk ingezet, nam deel aan de eerste 'moderne' oorlog van de 20ste eeuw. Walter Flex vervulde in zijn rol van schrijvend soldaat een belangrijke propagandistische functie in de 'geestelijke mobilisatie' van de Duitsers. Geleid door diepgewortelde antimodernistische ressentimenten trachtte hij in zijn werk de oorlog te isoleren van de concrete politieke, sociale en economische context van 1914 en ethisch te interpreteren als manifestatie van een hoognodige 'culturele katharsis' van het Wilhelminische keizerrijk. Zodoende sloot de schrijver, wiens bekendste werk, Der Wanderer zwischen beiden Welten, tussen 1917 en 1933 tot de best verkochte Duitstalige boeken behoorde, aan bij de cultuurkritische geestelijke heroriëntatie van de Duitse 'Bildungsbürger', de hoogopgeleide burgerlijke intellectueel, die de jaren voor de oorlog had ervaren als een tijd van toenemende culturele nivellering en vervlakking en nu het moment zag aangebroken dat eindelijk in een nationale krachtsinspanning de voortschrijdende, heel de maatschappij doordringende modernisering werd gestopt en de socio-culturele klok kon worden teruggezet. In de roes van het 'augustusgevoel' begon de Bildungsbürger in een ware stortvloed van pamfletten, memoranda en krantenartikelen de lof te zingen van een nieuwe tijd, die eens zou aanbreken en geheel in het teken van nationale grandeur zou staan. Van de oorlog verwachtte men - zoals bijvoorbeeld Flex' tijdgenoot Erich Marcks, bekend als biograaf van Bismarck en aan het eind van zijn carrière docerend op de leerstoel die ooit Ranke bezette - het begin van 'een nieuwe bezieling, een innerlijke verrijking en verduitsing van de nieuwe Duitse mens'. Waar tot dan toe 'maatschappij' bestond, zou - zij het in een vorm die paste bij de nieuwe tijd - opnieuw 'gemeenschap' groeien. Vier vernietigende jaren later stond met de ondertekening van het vredesverdrag van Versailles het Duitse keizerrijk en daarmee de intellectuele conservatieve bovenlaag voor een moreel bankroet. De oorlog was verloren, de alom verkondigde 'Duitse opmars' naar een 'plekje onder de zon' was in een 'Duitse treurmars' veranderd, de waarden van de westerse geallieerden hadden getriomfeerd over de Duitse oorlogsideologie. Negen miljoen mensen en onder hen ook twee miljoen Duitse soldaten hadden - althans uit Duits perspectief - voor niets het leven gelaten, en een hele generatie ontheemden keerde terug in een land dat grondig was ontwricht, een land dat zich binnen zijn grenzen had geconformeerd aan de politieke structuren van de winnende coalitie en dat nu zijn vroegere oorlogshelden vooral een sociale en politieke belasting vond. In de werken waarin Ernst Jünger vanuit de jaren twintig terugblikt op de oorlog, weerspiegelt zich hoe zeer hij en anderen waren ontgoocheld door de afloop van de strijd. Maar hoewel Jünger de normen en waarden van het Westen bleef afwijzen en daarmee aanknoopte bij de cultuurkritiek van voor 1914, kwam hij in zijn conclusies voor het heden tot een afwijkend standpunt. Voor hem was duidelijk dat met de immanente logica van de moderne industriële oorlog een elementaire kracht zijn intrede had gedaan die de bestaansvoorwaarden van de mens wezenlijk had veranderd en een terugkeer naar de goede oude tijd definitief verhinderde. In romans en krantenartikelen, maar in het bijzonder in zijn essay Der Arbeiter, ontwikkelt Jünger een antimodernistisch moderniteitsconcept, dat onvoorwaardelijk brak met 'pessimistische' cultuurkritiek en 'optimistisch' geloof in de vooruitgang en een poging deed om technische modernisering te verzoenen met politieke en sociaal-culturele reactie. 2. Thema Aan de hand van de verschillende interpretaties van de Eerste Wereldoorlog in respectievelijk het werk van Walter Flex en dat van Ernst Jünger wordt geprobeerd licht te werpen op de constanten en veranderingen in het Duitse conservatieve denken uit de eerste drie decennia van de 20ste eeuw. Een goede reden om eendiepgaande studie te maken van het werk van Flex ligt in het feit dat in diens teksten de centrale ideologemen ofwel deelaspecten van de burgerlijke oorlogsideologie - de religieus overtrokken interpretatie van de oorlog als een culturele en geestelijke katharsis, de romantische verheerlijking van het soldatenleven als nieuwe volksgemeenschap, het geloof in de charismatische leider - op exemplarische wijze tot uitdrukking komen. Ernst Jünger is gekozen omdat in diens oorlogsboeken de literaire ontwikkeling naar een 'nieuwe zakelijkheid', een tendens die in principe bij alle vertegenwoordigers van de zogenoemde conservatieve revolutie in de jaren twintig valt waar te nemen, pregnant tot uitdrukking komt. Tegen die achtergrond wordt getracht de tussen beide auteurs bestaande verschillen in literaire waarneming en verwerking van de werkelijkheid te definiëren, deze verschillen een plaats te geven binnen het kader van de geschiedenis van mentaliteit en maatschappij, en ze ten slotte te toetsen op de mate waarin zij semantisch compatibel en integreerbaar zijn in het discours van die tijd. Verduidelijkt wordt op op grond van welke retorische overwegingen bepaalde topoi door de auteurs in hun teksten worden ingezet, welke formuleringsstrategieën zij hanteren en welk verwachtingspatroon door hun schrijfstrategie wordt opgeroepen. Daarbij wordt niet vergeten dat de twee auteurs de oorlog vanuit een verschillende biografische, psychische en wereldbeschouwelijke achtergrond beleefden, en dus de analyse van ieders afzonderlijke belevingswereld tegelijk ook licht werpt op belangrijke aspecten van de extra-tekstuele productievoorwaarden. Walter Flex, jaargang 1887, was een typische representant van die groepering onder de Bildungsbürger die hoopte dat de Eerste Wereldoorlog korte metten zou maken met de maatschappelijke modernisering. In zijn werk ontwikkelde Flex een regressieve, antimodernistische samenlevingsutopie, waarin de Bildungsbürger uit de laat-Wilhelminische periode, worstelend met een gevoel van vervreemding en verlies aan status, de verloren gewaande harmonie en geborgenheid herwint in de eenheid die door de oorlog wordt gesmeed. De oorlog wordt in die holistische schrijfstrategie bijna uitsluitend geënsceneerd als geestelijk leerproces, als een leerervaring die sterk genoeg blijkt te zijn de Duitsers uit hun gevoel van morele lethargie te bevrijden. Flex voert zijn lezer een archaïsche oorlogswereld binnen waarin traditionele waarden, die naar Flex' idee al eeuwenlang hun kracht hebben bewezen, het enige zijn dat telt: geloof, offervaardigheid, vriendschap, kameraadschap. Met de afwijzing van het maatschappelijke en politieke moderniseringsproces gepaard gaat een vorm van 'esthetische regressiviteit', die als dominant stijlmiddel alle teksten van Flex semantisch draagt en met haar eclectische naïviteit de doelgroep passend bedient. Aan de gedichten en romans die Flex tijdens de oorlog schreef, valt op dat zij stilistisch en thematisch teruggrijpen op romantisch-ridderlijke rekwisieten en elementen uit de burgerlijk-traditionele waardecanon, terwijl de wrede realiteit van de moderne oorlog volledig wordt genegeerd. Concrete werkelijkheid - hier wordt het werkingsmechanisme van het neohumanistische beschavingsideaal bijzonder duidelijk - moet wijken voor symbolische creatie van gemeenschap en blijft buiten beeld. Ernst Jünger, geboren in 1895, meldde zich in de hoop op een groot 'avontuur' vrijwillig voor het leger. Anders dan bij Flex was in 1914 Jüngers verwachtingspatroon nog niet stabiel en politiek verankerd, de oorlog leek hem vooral een mogelijkheid om te ontsnappen aan de gehate burgerlijke benauwdheid van het ouderlijk huis. Zijn nationaal-conservatieve wereldbeeld ontwikkelde zich pas onder de indruk van de ontluisterende oorlogsroutine en het onverholen echec van de juist door de Duitse Bildungsbürger zo fel gepropageerde 'Duitse missie'. Jünger werd relatief onvoorbereid geconfronteerd met de feitelijke depersonalisatie van het individu in de slijtageslag aan het westfront. De door de burgerlijke oorlogsideologie geboden zingevingspatronen en interpretatiemodellen konden hem, oog in oog met de gruwelijke chaos van de totale oorlog, in geen enkel opzicht bevredigen. In tegenstelling tot Flex, die het rad van de tijd terug wilde draaien, kwam Jünger tot de opvatting dat het bloedige proces van technische onderwerping en vernietiging van de mens, zoals zich dat op exemplarische wijze gemanifesteerd had in de materiaalslag rond Verdun, niet ongedaan viel te maken en dus tot in de uiterste consequentie moest worden geaccepteerd. Anders dan bij Flex, die omwille van de romantische fictie de ware gruwelen van de oorlog verbloemde, ontwikkelt zich in Jüngers oorlogsboeken een affirmatief symbolisch concept. De auteur van In Stahlgewittern observeert met een mengeling van afstand en fascinatie de gruwelen van de loopgravenoorlog, om ze vervolgens als onverschrokken reporter met literaire pretenties geschiedfilosofisch te duiden. Ernst Jünger benutte daarom de relatief moderne vorm van het dagboek, het krantenartikel en het essay voor zijn systematische pogingen zijn beleving van de oorlog op een bovenpersoonlijk plan te tillen en zichzelf te positioneren in het literaire en politieke discours van de Weimarrepubliek. Terwijl het werk van Flex meteen vanaf het eerste oorlogsgedicht werd beheerst door een conglomeraat van onwrikbare ideologemen, weerspiegelt zich in Jüngers teksten een denkbewéging, een die pas in de loop der jaren ideologisch verstarde. In zijn vroege oorlogsboeken In Stahlgewittern (1920) en Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis (1922) experimenteert Jünger met heroïseringsstrategieën, die hij uit het werk van Nietzsche heeft ontwikkeld en die - althans in retrospectief - ten doel hebben de soldaat voor totale psychische overweldiging door de gruwelen van de oorlog te behoeden en zijn daden de schijn van persoonlijke autonomie te verlenen. Aansluitend ontwikkelt de auteur in het midden van de jaren twintig onder invloed van het werk van Oswald Spengler een eigen concept van 'heroïsch realisme', dat de onomkeerbaarheid van de technische modernisering als uitgangspunt neemt en naar het voorbeeld van Georges Sorel en diens mythetheorie een lans breekt voor een totale nationalisering van de maatschappij. Door een steeds weer met veel pathos geënsceneerde affirmatieve houding weet Jünger zo van object en slachtoffer van de geschiedenis weer te veranderen in het subject, dat als dader een zinvolle rol krijgt toegewezen in het historisch proces. In de essays Die totale Mobilmachung (1931) en Der Arbeiter (1932) wordt Jüngers analyse van de Eerste Wereloorlog afgerond. De auteur schetst in die teksten het supranationale visioen van een totale, hiërarchisch georganiseerde arbeidersstaat waarin het individu zijn subjectiviteit en persoonlijkheid heeft verloren en - conform het principe van bevel is bevel - alleen nog een radertje is in het proces van radicale technische mobilisatie van alle krachten. 3. Doel Voor vele studies van de laatste jaren is het typisch dat zij zich in hun beschrijving van het conservatieve Duitse denken beperken tot afzonderlijke periodes, bijvoorbeeld niet verder gaan dan het einde van de Eerste Wereldoorlog of alleen maar de jaren twintig bekijken. Kijkt men echter naar Ulrich Becks theorie van het antimodernisme en neemt men die als uitgangspunt voor een vergelijking tussen het werk van Walter Flex en dat van Ernst Jünger, dan blijkt heel specifiek te beschrijven wat overeenkomst en verschil is binnen de conservatieve wereldbeschouwing tijdens én na de jaren 1914-1918. Duidelijk wordt dat Ernst Jüngers concept van het militante modernisme gezien moet worden als een conservatieve reactie op de schok waarmee de Bildungsbürger ontwaakte uit de ethisch-normatieve droom van de Duitse oorlogsideologie. Ook het denken en schrijven van Walter Flex wordt, aan de hand van centrale topoi als 'protestantisme' en 'nationalisme', gepositioneerd in het 19de- en 20ste-eeuwse milieu van de Bildungsbürger, waardoor een beeld ontstaat van de existentiële gevoelens van hoop die velen in dat milieu met de oorlog verbonden en die in de roes van augustus 1914 tot uitdrukking kwamen. Een zowel synchroon als diachroon perspectief maakt het mogelijk de ingrijpende grenservaring van de oorlogsnederlaag in al haar verwoestende intensiteit te beschrijven en tevens zichtbaar te maken dat de onvoorwaardelijke omhelsing van de techniek die Jünger én de meeste andere representanten van de 'conservatieve revolutie' demonstreerden, een collectieve vorm van verwerking van naoorlogse problemen was. Door niet uit het oog te verliezen waarom de Eerste Wereldoorlog gezien werd als bron van 'culturele vernieuwing', kan ook de 'reactionaire moderniteit' van het conservatieve denken in de jaren twintig in al haar gelaagdheid en aanvechtbaarheid worden begrepen. Wat ook aandacht krijgt, is de vraag wat de psychische, filosofische en ideologische implicaties zijn van het feit dat naast Walter Flex' idealisering van de jeugdig bevlogen martelaar, in de oorlogsboeken van Jünger nu ook de verheerlijking van de emotieloze figuur van de 'stoottroepleider'/'arbeider' treedt. Bekeken wordt hoe diepgaand het zo op het eerste gezicht manifeste verschil in verwerking van de oorlog bij beide auteurs nu feitelijk is, en of die twee literaire personages, die twee in eigentijdse vorm gegoten antropologische types, niet beide een antwoord zijn op dezelfde, oerconservatieve behoefte aan eenheid en integratie van alle in het moderne industriële tijdperk divergerende sociale deelsystemen. Beide schrijvers reageren met hun literaire constructies van wereld en leven op de confrontatie met een door hen als onpersoonlijk ervaren werkelijkheid. Beide worden gedreven door hetzelfde verlangen naar dubbele integratie, die enerzijds een oplossing moet zijn voor klemmende bestaansproblemen van de moderne mens, maar - in vervolg daarop - ook de mens als individu een zinvolle plaats in de samenleving moet geven. Beide schrijvers zagen de oorlog als diepe cesuur in de voortgang van het maatschappelijk leven, voor beide was de oorlog het symbool van een fundamentele crisis, maar tegelijk - conform het narratieve model van een seculiere Apocalyps - ook voorwaarde voor het ontstaan van een nieuwe tijd. Tussen hun beider visies op de oorlog, zoals die in hun teksten tot uitdrukking komen, ligt het trauma van de materiaalslag. Na de duidelijke mislukking van Flex' regressieve utopie, die het burgerlijke verlangen naar een nieuwe persoonlijke totaliteit koppelde aan het streven naar de sociale homogeniteit van de 'volksgemeenschap', kwam Jünger, enkele jaren later, met een progressief concept, waarin hij de mens dwingt zich te conformeren aan het type van de 'arbeider' en zich te wapenen met het pantser van de in het Arbeiter-essay ontworpen 'organische constructie'. Hoe antiburgerlijk zich Jüngers pathos van een 'gevaarlijk leven' ook mag voordoen, ook zijn teksten zijn uitdrukking van een universalistisch denken, een denken dat zijn holistische motivatie heeft aangepast aan de situatie van een als 'bloedturbine' begrepen moderne tijd en dat daarom de 'eenheid mens' alleen nog maar kan zien als een 'geharnast type', dat onvoorwaardelijk is geïntegreerd in het systemisch mechanisme van de 'arbeidsstaat'. Op de uit de dynamiek van de modernisering voortvloeiende onzekerheid reageren beide schrijvers met het ontwerp van een ordening. Maar terwijl Flex nog dacht dat hij centrale elementen van het moderne leven - zoals systeemdifferentiatie, rationalisering, individualisering en technologisering - kon negeren in een romantisch-idealistisch tegenmodel, zag Jünger zich gedwongen technologisering en rationalisering in zijn geschiedfilosofie te integreren, om zo tot een nieuw ontologisch kernperspectief te geraken dat fragmentatie en nivellering teniet zou doen. 4. Methode De studie als geheel sluit aan bij een interdisciplinaire onderzoeksrichting die zich de laatste jaren in de cultuurwetenschappelijke theoriedebatten duidelijk heeft geprofileerd. Meer specifiek oriënteert zij zich op probleemstellingen uit de literairhistorische discoursanalyse, de mentaliteitsgeschiedenis en de historische semantiek. Een analyse van het rond 1900 ontkiemende sociologische discours vormt het kader voor een bespreking van de wezenlijke structuurkenmerken van de moderne tijd, waarna de kern van de studie volgt: een interpretatie van de teksten van Flex en Jünger. Binnen die werkanalyse zijn in het kort drie zwaartepunten te onderscheiden: a. Walter Flex Positionering van het denken en schrijven van Walter Flex in de context van het wereld- en zelfbeeld van de Bildungsbürger in de 19de en het begin van de 20ste eeuw, met speciale aandacht voor Georg Bollenbecks studies over de Duitse Bildungsbürger, tevens refererend aan relevant ideeënhistorisch onderzoek naar de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Fysiognomische en historisch-antropologische beschrijving van de jeugdig bevlogen 'wilsmens', belichaamd door Ernst Wurche, waarschijnlijk Flex' bekendste personage. Analyse van de ontstaansvoorwaarden van de teksten van Walter Flex en het effect van die teksten op het discours van de Bildungsbürger tijdens de oorlog en in de jaren twintig. Analyse van de mate waarin de 'wandelaar tussen twee werelden' een voorbeeldfunctie vervulde, met name voor een lezerspubliek dat in niet onaanzienlijke mate afkomstig was uit de jeugdbeweging. b. Ernst Jünger Bespreking van de oorlogsboeken van Ernst Jünger. Reconstructie van de ontwikkeling in Jüngers denken, lopend vanaf de verschillende heroïseringsstrategieën in Stahlgewitter via de nationaal-revolutionaire fase 1925-1930 tot aan de geschiedfilosofische duiding van oorlog en moderne tijd in het essay Der Arbeiter. Plaatsing van de wereldbeschouwing van Ernst Jünger in het discours en de context van de 'conservatieve revolutie'. Analyse van de ontstaansvoorwaarden en receptie van de teksten, essays en krantenartikelen van Jünger, met extra aandacht voor het effect van die publicaties op de door Michael Wildt zo genoemde 'absolute' generatie. Fysiognomie en antropologische structuur van de 'stoottroepleider'/'arbeider', gezien in het licht van een 'ethologie van de kilte'. c. Vergelijking Kritische vergelijking van Flex en Jünger, toegespitst op de vraag of de conservatieve motivatie in denken en schrijven van beide auteurs 'specifiek' valt te noemen, of anders gezegd: of zij op persoonlijke, eigentijdse wijze een antwoord geven op het verlangen naar individuele en sociale integratie. Positionering van de antropologische aanpak binnen het meest recente onderzoek naar de 'fysiognomie en antropologie van de jaren twintig'. Korte beschouwing van de receptie van beide auteurs in de tijd van het nationaal-socialisme. Beschrijving van de plaats van beide 'wereldoorlogsfysiognomieën' in het symbolische repertoire van de nationaal-socialistische dictatuur.
In: Steen , E J V D 2002 , ' Tribes and territories in transition : the central east Jordan Valley and surrounding regions in the Late Bronze and Early Iron Ages ' , Doctor of Philosophy , University of Groningen , Groningen .
Inleiding De vroege IJzertijd in de zuidelijke Levant wordt vaak omschreven als de 'donkere eeuwen'. Deze periode, die loopt vanaf het einde van de Late Bronstijd tot het begin van de koninkrijken van Juda, Israel, Moab en Ammon kent weinig tot geen literair/historische bronnen, en de bronnen die er zijn, of die betrekking hebben op deze periode, lijken de archeologische bronnen te weerspreken. Niettemin zijn beide, de archeologische en de literair/historische bronnen, voortgekomen uit dezelfde maatschappij, zij het mogelijk uit verschillende segmenten van die maatschappij. Het doel van deze studie is, een model te presenteren dat beide bronnen, de literair/historische en de archeologische, integreert tot één geheel. Dit model gaat uit van de premisse dat de samenleving van de Levant, in elk geval vanaf de Vroege Bronstijd, een tribale samenleving geweest is, bestaande uit een conglomeraat van stammen, en die kan worden gedefinieerd door de volgende eigenschappen: - Loyaliteit aan de eigen groep: de familie, de clan en tenslotte de stam. Deze loyaliteit was tweezijdig: de stam droeg tegelijkertijd verantwoordelijkheid voor haar leden. Deze wederzijdse loyaliteit werd geformaliseerd door het creeren van genealogische verbanden, stambomen, die werden aangepast naarmate de omstandigheden dat 'vereisten'. De term khawa, betaling voor het recht om, al dan niet tijdelijk, in het territorium van een stam te verblijven, betekent ook letterlijk 'broederschap'. Ook in periodes van stabiliteit en een sterke regering hield deze tribale structuur niet op te bestaan. - Flexibiliteit in leefwijze. De manieren waarop leden van een stam in hun onderhoud voorzagen waren flexibel, en voegden zich naar de economische, ecologische en politieke omstandigheden. Jacht, veeteelt (schapen, geiten en kamelen), landbouw, maar ook huurlingschap, smokkel, handel en dergelijke behoorden tot de economische activiteiten van de stammen. Deze flexibiliteit was een belangrijke factor in de economisch onafhankelijke samenleving die kenmerkend was voor de Arabische stammen van de 19e eeuw n.Chr., en die zich in de praktijk onttrok aan de macht van het Ottomaanse rijk. - Mobiliteit. Door de aard van hun economische bezigheden waren stammen mobiel. Tegelijkertijd hadden ze een band met hun territorium, dat een wijd groot gebied kon bestrijken. Territoria waren nooit het eigendom van stammen. Deze konden er slechts rechten op uitoefenen zolang zij zich in het territorium bevonden. Territoria werden dan ook gedeeld door verschillende stammen. - Onderlinge relaties tussen stammen. Wisselwerking in positieve zin was het gedeelde gebruik van territoria of bronnen, vaak geformaliseerd door middel van khawa, en verder de vorming van coalities en confederaties tussen stammen. Negatieve contacten waren rooftochten (ghazu's), en in extreme gevallen soms stammenoorlogen. Deze konden leiden tot veranderingen in de onderlinge machtsverhoudingen en regelmatig tot veranderingen in de territoriale verdeling van het land. De Late Bronstijd De Jordaanvallei De meeste historische bronnen uit de Late Bronstijd zijn van Egyptische oorsprong. Het Egyptische Rijk controleerde een groot deel van de zuidelijke Levant, met als voornaamste doel het veiligstellen van de handel met Mesopotamie. Dat betekent dat er geen reden was voor Egypte om de sociale en politieke structuur van het gebied ingrijpend te wijzigen. Het autochtone systeem van stadstaten bleef bestaan, waarbij de loyaliteit van de koningen van de stadstaten op verschillende manieren gewaarborgd kon worden. De handelsroute naar het zuiden liep vanuit Egypte langs de kust, dan landinwaart en via Beth Shean naar de andere zijde van de Jordaan, langs Pella en Deir 'Alla, en via de Wadi Zerqa naar de vlakte van Amman, waar een handelsknooppunt was. Pella was, zoals blijkt uit de Amarnabrieven en de archeologische resten, een stadstaat onder supervisie van Egypte. Het was een belangrijk knooppunt omdat het de oostzijde bewaakte van de doorsteek door de Jordaan, een kwetsbare etappe op de route. Een andere nederzetting ten zuiden van Pella, Abu Kharaz, was een welvarende nederzetting in de eerste helft van de Late Bronstijd, maar hier zijn geen Egyptische resten gevonden. Vanaf het einde van het Midden Brons neemt de gevestigde bewoning af, en als gevolg daarvan wordt vaak een toename in de nomadische bevolking verondersteld. Het gebied rond Pella was nauwelijks bewoond. Archeologisch materiaal en surveyresultaten laten zien dat de bewoning zich voornamelijk beperkte tot de stad zelf. Deze situatie kan vergeleken worden met die in Transjordanie in de 19e eeuw n.Chr., toen Salt de enige bewoonde stad was in de Belqa. Deze stad stond onder beheer van een coalitie van Bedoeinenstammen, en had een marktfunctie voor de regio, evenals voor de export van goederen naar de westzijde van de Jordaan. In de Jordaanvallei zelf was de gevestigde bewoning geheel verdwenen, tengevolge van de rooftochten en de uitbuiting door de Bedoeinen. De Ottomaanse regering stond machteloos tegenover deze praktijken. In een vergelijkbare situatie moest Pella als versterkt station op de handelsroute, de oversteek van de Jordaan beschermen. Van Pella ging de route naar het zuiden, in de richting van Deir 'Alla. Deir 'Alla was al in het begin van de Late Bronstijd een heiligdom, en vermoedelijk was het in die tijd onafhankelijk. Rondom Deir 'Alla zijn verschillende kleine nederzettingen gevonden, en een begraafplaats bij Kataret es-Samra. Tell el-Hammeh, een kleine kampplaats aan de ingang van de W. Zerqa, vertoont alle kenmerken van een tijdelijk station, maar het aardewerk dat er gevonden is is van hoge kwaliteit. Dit suggereert de mogelijkheid dat Hammeh kampplaats was voor handelaars die door de Zerqavallei trokken. Deze constellatie van nederzettingen doet vermoeden dat de regio rond Deir 'Alla een tribaal centrum vormde, dat tevens een functie had in de Egyptisch – Transjordaanse handelsroute. Moab en de hoogvlakte van Amman in de 14e eeuw Door de Wadi Zerqa werd de hoogvlakte van Amman bereikt. Er zijn geen literair/historische bronnen van of over de hoogvlakte, maar het archeologisch repertoire duidt op contacten zowel met het westen als met Syrie. Het is daarom waarschijnlijk dat ook de hoogvlakte van Amman een handelsknooppunt vormde op de Egyptisch – Transjordaanse handelsroute. Aan de oostelijke ingang tot de Wadi Zerqa bevond zich een heiligdom, Khirbet Umm ed Dananir, met grotten waarin meervoudige begraving plaats vond. Het vermoedelijke administratieve centrum was Sahab, al in het begin van het Laat Brons een ommuurde stad met openbare gebouwen. Het archeologisch repertoire laat zien dat dit gebied bewoond werd door een Canaanitische bevolking, terwijl ook Syrische invloeden aanwezig zijn. Aanwijzingen voor controle vanuit Egypte ontbreken geheel. Deze situatie is vergelijkbaar met die in Gaza en Hebron in de 19e eeuw n.Chr., beide handelsknooppunten die onder controle stonden van leidende stammen in de regio, die tevens de land- en tuinbouw in de regio controleerden. In het gebied van Moab zijn uit deze periode geen aanwijzingen voor gevestigde bewoning gevonden. Literair/historische bronnen doen vermoeden dat dit gebied territorium van Šasu stammen was. Hoewel het voornaamste territorium van deze stammen in Edom lag, is het waarschijnlijk dat ook Moab een Šasu bevolking had. De Amarnabrieven De Amarnabrieven uit het midden van de 14e eeuw zijn een bron van politieke en economische informatie over de zuidelijke Levant. Ze zijn geschreven door de hoofden van stadstaten, gericht aan de Egyptische Farao, en bevatten verslagen van politieke intrigues en verzoeken om militaire hulp. Niet duidelijk is of deze brieven duiden op een economische en sociale achteruitgang in de regio, zoals sommige onderzoekers menen, of dat ze deel uitmaken van de normale diplomatieke correspondentie van deze tijd. De materiele cultuur van deze periode duidt niet op een structurele achteruitgang. De brieven werpen vooral licht op de verdeelde loyaliteiten van de vazalstaten. Het gebied werd bewoond door een gemengde bevolking van stedelingen, dorpelingen en veehoudende nomaden, die samen een maatschappij vormden waarin de sociale verhoudingen werden bepaald door tribale loyaliteiten. De Habiru, een groep sociale outcasts, maakte deel uit van deze maatschappij. Uit de brieven blijkt onder meer dat Pella niet bepaald een loyale vazal van Egypte was. Het werd beschuldigd van het ophouden van een handelskaravaan. Pella was via familierelaties verbonden met Shechem. Shechem werd door de andere stadstaten beschuldigd van banden met de Habiru. De Jordaanvallei in de 13e eeuw In Beth Shean zijn twee stelae gevonden uit de 13e eeuw, uit de regeringsperiode van Seti I. Beide stelae getuigen van onrust in de regio: - De eerste stele beschrijft een locale oorlog tussen de Habiru uit het noorden en 'Aziaten' uit het oosten, gevoerd in de Jordaanvallei. Dergelijke rooftochten waren algemeen in de 19e eeuw n.Chr. De Beni Sakhr uit het noorden en de Howeitat uit Edom roofden regelmatig elkaars kamelen, en beschrijvingen van dergelijke ghazus zijn algemeen in 19e eeuwse reisverslagen. - De tweede stele beschrijft een samenzwering tussen Pella en Hamath tegen Beth Shean. Hieruit blijkt niet alleen dat Egypte haar invloed in Pella verloren had, maar ook dat Pella rooftochten organiseerde ten westen van de Jordaan. Uit het feit dat Egypte geen strafexpeditie naar Pella stuurde kan geconcludeerd worden dat deze situatie geaccepteerd werd, en dat Egypte pogingen ondernam om Pella weer onder controle te krijgen. Het archeologisch repertoire laat zien dat de stad in deze tijd een aantal veranderingen onderging: een Egyptisch openbaar gebouw kreeg een woonfunctie, en er werd een nieuw openbaar gebouw neergezet. In dezelfde periode werd de tempel van Abu Kharaz, ten zuiden van Pella, verlaten. In een poging de handelsroute op veilige afstand langs Pella te leiden, werd de oversteek over de Jordaan naar het zuiden verplaatst, en hier werd een nieuwe versterking gebouwd, Tell es-Sa'idiyeh, 12 km ten noorden van Deir 'Alla. Zowel de architectuur van de gebouwen als de bijzettingen op de begraafplaats van Sa'idiyeh vertonen sterke Egyptische invloeden. Deze wijziging in de handelsroute had ook invloed op de functie van de regio rond Deir 'Alla. De archeologische vondsten in het heiligdom laten zien dat Egypte nu dit deel van de handelsroute onder controle had. Dit wordt ook bevestigd door de sterke toename van het aantal nederzettingen in de regio, die suggereert dat de veiligheid in het gebied toegenomen was. Moab en de hoogvlakte van Amman in de 13e eeuw De 13e eeuw is grotendeels de eeuw van Ramses II. Verschillende topografische lijsten uit zijn regeringsperiode noemen voor het eerst plaatsnamen in Moab, hoewel de identificatie van die plaatsnamen nog onzeker is. De toegenomen interesse van Egypte in de regio kan duiden op toenemende onrust in het westen, waardoor Egypte op zoek ging naar nieuwe routes naar het noorden. Duidelijk is in elk geval dat Egypte contact zocht met de Šasu stammen, en hen probeerde te integreren in een machtsstructuur op de hoogvlakte van Moab. De Balu'a stele, een afbeelding van een plaatselijke heerser die een staf overhandigd krijgt van twee Egyptische goden, weerspiegelt deze nieuwe situatie. De resultaten van de survey van Miller, die overigens met enige voorzichtigheid bekeken moeten worden, duiden op een mogelijk toenemende vestiging tegen het einde van de Late Bronstijd. Zeker is wel dat verschillende nieuwe (versterkte) nederzettingen gesticht werden aan weerszijden van de W. Mujib, zoals Ara'ir en mogelijk Lehun. Een mogelijke parallel voor deze situatie kan gevonden worden in de invoering van de Landwetten van 1858 door de Ottomaanse regering. Deze wetten integreerden de stammen van de regio in het regeringsapparaat door hen hun territorium in effectief eigendom te geven, met de verplichting van belastingbetaling. Het resultaat was een toename in gevestigde bevolking en landbouw in de regio. Deze wetten waren succesvol omdat de plaatselijke bevolking profiteerde van de succesvolle uitvoering ervan. Ook de hoogvlakte van Amman werd in de 13e eeuw gekenmerkt door een toename in nederzettingen, en een toename van noorderlingen in de regio. Umeiri was een belangrijke nieuwe Kanaanitische nederzetting, terwijl het in deze tijd gebouwde Amman Airport Building, dat de functie had van heiligdom en/of crematorium, en een fort bij Mabrak duidelijk noordelijke invloeden in de architectuur vertonen. Het centrum Sahab bleef onveranderd voortbestaan, waaruit blijkt dat de politieke constellatie van het gebied niet structureel veranderde. Duidelijk is in elk geval dat de plaatselijke bevolking en de noorderlingen in goed verband samenwerkten. De 12e eeuw in Moab en op de hoogvlakte van Amman Het begin van de 12e eeuw wordt in de hele zuidelijke Levant gekenmerkt door een plotselinge toename van het aantal kleine, veelal agrarische nederzettingen. Hiervoor zijn verschillende verklaringen gezocht, die varieren van een klimaatsverandering tot structurele overbevolking. Een 'overkoepelende' oorzaak zal gezocht moeten worden in de internationale politieke ontwikkelingen, die ook de Zeevolken naar de Palestijnse kust brachten. Hoe deze internationale ontwikkelingen de verschillende bewoningscentra hebben beinvloed zal echter per regio bekeken moeten worden. Ook in Moab is een plotselinge toename van het aantal nederzettingen geconstateerd, wat duidt op een verstoring van het economische en sociaal evenwicht in de regio. Een aantal van deze nederzettingen is opgegraven. Ze waren over het algemeen versterkt, een teken dat het land nog verre van veilig was. De directe oorzaak hiervoor is mogelijk te vinden op de hoogvlakte van Amman. Het archeologisch repertoire op de hoogvlakte getuigt van plotselinge veranderingen: Umeiri werd onverwacht overvallen en verwoest, het Amman Airport Building kreeg een nieuwe functie, en raakte korte tijd later buiten gebruik. Sahab werd plotseling veel groter. Duidelijk is dat de infrastructuur van het gebied instortte. Mogelijk was dit een gevolg van het instorten van de handel met het noorden, ten gevolge van dezelfde internationale politieke ontwikkelingen die leidden tot de komst van de Zeevolken in het westen. Resultaat was dat de traditionele bronnen van inkomsten – handel en gerelateerde bronnen – verdwenen, en in de strijd om het voortbestaan werden de oude tribale structuren opnieuw van belang, evenals oude territoriale claims. De verschillende groepen reageerden verschillend op de situatie. Een deel vluchtte naar de stad, zoals de uitbreiding van Sahab suggereert. Anderen begonnen landbouw en veeteelt te bedrijven op kleine schaal. Weer anderen verlieten het gebied. Een deel van de bevolking trok mogelijk naar het zuiden, wat leidde tot nieuwe nederzettingen en mogelijk politieke onrust in Moab. Een deel ging naar het westen. De 12e eeuw in de Jordaanvallei De handel tussen de regio van Deir 'Alla en de hoogvlakte van Amman werd gedreven door locale handelaars, die relaties hadden met het marktcentrum in de Vallei. Een dergelijke vorm van handel is bekend uit de 19e eeuw n.Chr., tussen Salt, Nablus en Jeruzalem, of tussen Kerak en Hebron. Toen de infrastructuur op de hoogvlakte instortte zal een aantal van deze handelaars hun toevlucht gezocht hebben in de Deir 'Alla regio. Hier bleef, vermoedelijk dank zij de supervisie van Egypte, de infrastructuur nog functioneren, zij het niet voor lang meer. Een aantal nieuwe nederzettingen werd gesticht langs de benedenloop van de Zerqa. De bewoners van deze nederzettingen waren geen nomaden die leerden zich te vestigen. Ze brachten een ontwikkelde cultuur met zich mee, tradities en vaardigheden, zoals ook blijkt uit het archeologisch repertoire van Deir 'Alla in deze periode. De plotselinge toename in bevolking moet echter een zware druk gelegd hebben op het reeds dichtbevolkte gebied. Met het instorten van de handelsfunctie verloor Egypte zijn belangstelling, en verliet de regio, zoals blijkt uit de archeologische overblijfselen op Deir 'Alla en Sa'idiyeh. Pella werd verwoest in deze periode. De gebeurtenissen van de hoogvlakte van Amman herhaalden zich nu in de regio Deir 'Alla. Verschillende nederzettingen, evenals de tempel in Deir 'Alla en het fort van Sa'idiyeh, werden verlaten. De nieuw gebouwde verdedigingswerken op Deir 'Alla, en het feit dat deze vrijwel direct weer verwoest werden, duiden op territoriumstrijd in de regio. De nederzettingen die verlaten werden behoorden tot de oudste in de regio, wat erop duidt dat de oorspronkelijke bewoners het gebied verlieten. Blijkbaar hadden zij de strijd om het territorium verloren van de nieuwkomers. De literair/historische bronnen, en de archeologische bronnen suggereren dat deze groep, of in elk geval een deel ervan, de Jordaan overstak en zich ten westen ervan vestigde, wellicht samen met een deel van de bevolking die van de hoogvlakte van Amman was gekomen. Het westelijk hoogland in de 12e eeuw Een inscriptie van Farao Merneptah uit het einde van de 13e eeuw noemt voor het eerst de naam 'Israel': "Israel is verwoest, zijn zaad is niet meer". De inscriptie suggereert dat Israel een agressieve groep was, en door Egypte als vijand werd beschouwd. Israel wordt hier genoemd in een rij van traditionele tegenstanders van Egypte. Deze groep is regelmatig in verband gebracht met de Šasu. Over het algemeen wordt verondersteld dat dit 'Israel' dezelfde groep was die verantwoordelijk is voor de vroegste Ijzertijd nederzettingen in het westelijk bergland. Een vergelijking tussen het – agressieve - karakter van Merneptah's Israel, zoals dat door de inscriptie wordt gekarakteriseerd, en dat van de – vreedzame – nederzettingen in het bergland maakt deze veronderstelling echter twijfelachtig. 19e eeuwse bronnen laten zien dat in het begin van de 19e eeuw n.Chr. de regio van de Belqa en Ajlun nauwelijks bewoond was. Dit was een gevolg van de agressieve praktijken van de Beni Sakhr en andere stammen. Pas nadat halverwege de 19e eeuw de Ottomaanse regering eindelijk kans zag deze macht te beteugelen, ontstond een machtsvacuum in het gebied, dat snel werd opgevuld door de vestiging van nieuwe groepen, van zowel kleinere stammen als nieuwkomers in de regio. Het Israel van Merneptah vertoont meer overeenkomst met een agressieve stam zoals de 19e eeuwse Beni Sakhr, dan met vreedzame boeren. Het had het bergland geterroriseerd, en vestiging onmogelijk gemaakt. Uiteindelijk maakte Egypte een einde aan deze macht van Israel, en er ontstond een machtsvacuum in het bergland, waarin zich de nieuwkomers van de overzijde van de Jordaan konden vestigen. De vestigingen in het bergland zijn zelden versterkt, wat duidt op een vreedzaam samenleven van deze groepen. Het archeologisch repertoire van de vindplaats op de berg Ebal is nog een onderwerp van discussie. De opgraver stelt dat hier sprake is van een tribaal heiligdom met twee fasen, waarvan de tweede rond het begin van de 12e eeuw begint. In dat geval zou de eerste fase overeenkomen met de aanwezigheid van Israel in het gebied, en toebehoren aan Israel. De tweede fase komt dan overeen met de bewoning door de nieuwkomers, die het heiligdom opnieuw gewijd en in gebruik genomen hebben. Israel was verslagen, maar niet verdwenen, net zo min als de Beni Sakhr ooit van het toneel verdwenen zijn. Uiteindelijk hebben ze een deel van hun vroegere macht teruggewonnen, en hun naam gegeven aan een nieuwe coalitie, die uitmondde in het Verenigd Koninkrijk
Short synopsis and layout of Chapters of the thesis entitled, A study of Gelugpa sect with comparison to Nyingma Pa sect of Buddhism in TibetAround 2500 years ago, a prince of Skya clan rose against the anguish of life & death and determined to find out the way through which these torments end. That prince was Siddhartha; and whole world came to know him by his enlightened name; Buddha; his path became famous after his name Buddhism. Centuries gone, millennium changed its numbers; still the path showed by the Skya prince is guiding us towards every solution of problem. Today, according to latest sources, nearly 18 countries are more or less Buddhist countries and every fourth person of the world is Buddhist by faith. In past 2500 years, Buddhism crossed all geographical boundaries, spread over continents, touches every sphere of our lives, enjoyed royal patronage as well as sometimes-lethal disservice. However, one thing that makes it above all is that it served the goods. Everywhere it went, it acquired local colours, amalgamated with the local beliefs and reached the culmination theory of the master, Lord Buddha. Nevertheless, some countries were destined to play a little more than merely following the Buddhist rites and rituals. Tibet is one among these countries.Though Tibetan Buddhism is being studied all over, the world at research level but very few research works are being done at home (India). Tibetan has lost their homeland and in India, the Sthaviravdina, the orthodox school of thought was/is in vogue with the exception of the Himalayan region where the Mahayana is being practised since long. So many research works have been done by the scholars from United States and other countries, but most of them are limited to the translation works of the Tibetan Lamas visiting to States or elsewhere. Jeffery Hopkins, Alex Wayman, Michael Rosh is some of the names which have already gain popularity in this regard. It is noteworthy that Buddha taught everyone who came and asked for it. He never attempted to attract people into his new order or he never tried to formulate a new religion. As A K Warder has noted, It is most characteristic of Buddha that he always adapts his talk to the person he is conversing with. His courtesy in argument result from this: it is certainly not his way to denounce the opinions, practice of another to his face, and challenge him to justify them. His method rather is to seem to adopt the others point of view and than by question and answer to improve it until a position, compatible with his own has been arrived at. Thus, he leads his partner in discussion towards the truth as he has discovered it, but so that the partner seems himself to continue his own quest, in whatever form he had taken, and to arrive at higher truth he had previously been aware of, or more convincing moral ideas. Buddhism is the third largest religious system of the world (beside Christianity and Islam at the first two places) and it is the only religious system, which originated in Indian sub-continent and spread all over the world. To know the social, political and economic history of India during the time of Buddha i.e. 6th century BC, there are several sources. However, either to know the ideas and philosophical order of that time, we have to rely upon the testament within the said system and the literature or that of archaeological remains that tell many ideas that can be decipher to date. Both left the scope of interpretation and speculation, which is although, needed to some extent; sometimes portray a shadow over the crux of the systems of ancient era. Nevertheless, I have chosen to discuss about the two religious order of Buddhism of Tibet. The idea itself seems to be very delightful but in the presence of meagre resource materials often discourages a fruitful research and applying the modern research methodology. However, research methodology is not only to solve the problem but quite often to raise a problem instead solving them is also a method to invite further research and hence itself is called an independent research.Tibet, one of the highest countries in the world had received Buddhism from India in 7th century AD when Padmasambhava established the monastic order there. That branch of Buddhism was known as Nyingma or the Red Hats. That was under the reign of King SrongTsan Gampo and the source of establishing the Buddhism was the Indian schools. Besides that, the Chinese school of sudden enlightenment, which was somewhat different from the gradual school of Indian Buddhism, also tried to establish its firm feet in the land of snow. However, the Indian Buddhist pundit defeated the Hashang, Chinese teacher of Buddhism and it was a landmark in the history of Buddhism in Tibet because this decided the way in which Tibet would follow the Buddhism in future. However, this is not highlighted in the historical record of Tibet, but this does not undermine its importance.Centuries passed and the Buddhism after one persecution by the Lang dharma, revived. The newer sects came up with fresh ideas, but the older sect (Nyingma) continued to influence not only the folk wisdom, but the aristocrats too were the followers of Nyingma sect at the time of the introduction of the Gelug sect or the Yellow Hat sect by TsongkhaPa. In my present thesis, I have tried an attempt to described both Nyingma and Gelug through the eyes of modern research methodology. Side by side, I kept the descriptive ideas of the sects where it was needed to highlight the ideas of the Buddhism in the said context. But the presence of different practices itself show the comparison. At that juncture, I have only taken the task of illustrating the facts. However, I have tried to describe Buddhism in general and the two sects in particular in their full length.In the first chapter, I have dealt with the History of Buddhism in India which in my opinion needed more than ever because either the material available now days gives one only an idea about how a prince of Sakya clan achieved enlightenment nearly 26 centuries ago. Or it describes the Buddhist philosophy with all of its technicalities and that too in extol and worshiping manner. Surprisingly sometimes, this attracts even the scholars from not only the non-Buddhist fields, but from the discipline itself. I have tried to be cautious while describing the ideas of the sects and therefore, I have tried to put the historical Buddha and his teaching in one chapter in a simplest possible manner. That will create an interest in both the mind of the Buddhist scholars and show the Buddha from the Tibetan point of view that is scarcely done with the use of research methodology. For this, I have started with the life sketch of the prince Siddhartha from his birth to enlightenment and then the important happenings in the life of Lord Buddha. Writing this, I tried to clarified that whom do we are calling Buddha? A Sakya prince or the emanation of supreme God: one is historical personality who, through his penances and mortification got the way to salvation, the other one who out of his great compassion toward humanity emanates himself for the benefit of sentient beings to show them the path of freedom from all sufferings. In my opinion, here lies the difference between Mahayana and Sthaviravda school of Buddhism. The former claims to be the original successor of Buddhism from 6th century BC and asserts that the way prince Siddhartha got enlightenment; everybody can get it and become Arhat. On the other hand, the highest goal of Mahayana is Buddhahood and the supreme Buddha post is not achievable by a human being. The list of Pli canons is also given in this chapter and the name of six contemporary thinkers of Buddha is listed with their respective philosophies. Renunciation, Bodhicitta and the Right view, these 3 are the base of Mahayana theory of unyavda or the theory of Void, which originated though in India, found its firm feet in the land of snow. These points have been dealt in such a manner that while the research methodology was justified, the traditional Buddhist belief was also taken care of and even a common reader can infer the same conclusion that a Buddhist practitioner found after practicing it for a long duration.In the second chapter, I have put forth the History of Buddhism in Tibet with the background of the subject matter of my thesis. This chapter covers the inception of Buddhism in Tibet during 7th century and; from the first dissemination of it up to the establishment of the Gelugpa School by Je TsongkhP. In addition, I have given a short description of the history of Tibet up to the present time for the continuity of the subject matter. The contents of this chapter cover the history of Buddhism chronologically. In the land of snow, it was really a Herculean task for Padmasambhava to establish Buddhism. This work can only be done by the assimilation of the local beliefs and their gods in Buddhism and Padmasambhava has successfully done so with the help of his other Indian companions like Kamalsheela and others along with the royal patronage of King SrongTsan Gampo. A country following Shamanist practices has seen first time the logic-based religion that was most powerful and widespread at that time all over the Asia and its fragrance was crossed the globe. No wonder Padmasambhava is considered as second Buddha among Tibetans. The introduction of Buddhism in Tibet is linked closely with the introduction of literature as the work was got started in the country by the minister of SrongTsan Gampo, the great Thonmi Sambhota. So, a brief history of Tibetan language & literature was inevitable. Therefore, I have given the Tibetan Alphabets and their Sanskrit and Roman equivalent for the record along with the historical background of the Tibetan language. Here one point I want to be noted. While writing this thesis, I face two major difficulties. One was the Tibetan U-Chan fonts for the computer and the second the method of Romanization of Tibetan and Sanskrit words. For the first, I applied two types of U-Chan fonts namely, U-Chan TTF and L Tibetan. For the second one, I have followed the most accepted form and wherever I feel to express my ideas in either script, I did so. That is why the Romanization is not strict way as of Dr. Snell Grove has typed in his works with the diacritic marks or other with equivalents. After this, I took the historical background of the Chinese Hshng Mahayana that advocated sudden enlightenment and its clash with the Indian school of Buddhism, which was in favour of graduated path to salvation; this shows the reason why the graduated path is being practiced in Tibet and not the Chinese counterpart of it. Then I took the destruction of Buddhism in Tibet by Lang dharma and the resurgence of Buddhism after more than 300 years of being in background. Then the Sharma Schools of thought appeared, the latest of which is Gelugpa, which command good favour among the Tibetan till today. The founder of this sect was TsongkhP. I have put the TsongkhP and GelugP in a separate chapter because of its comprehensiveness, which was the demand of my research topic.In the third chapter, the Padmasambhava and Nyingm School has been placed with all of its possible contents. Firstly, I have taken Padmasambhava and the establishment of Buddhism in Tibet, and then the main characteristics and the salient features of this school of thought were placed under the different sub-chapters.In the fourth chapter, I have continued from the previous chapter about Nyingms and dealt with their practices through which they are known. Therefore, I name it after one of the greatest and famous practice, Dzogchen. Hence the chapter is named as, Terton and other practices in Nyingma. Because of the inbuilt nature of Nyingma sect to adopt Tntric practices, I have tried to put light on the Tntric practices specially.After this, in a short chapter, I have tried to explain why the sectarian tendencies came out from a disciplined system like Buddhism that is considered to be the most logical and scientific in its approach. The content of this chapter, though very short in the number of pages, carry very high value to understand the birth of an ism within the ism. Though I have named it, Emergence of Schism in Buddhism, but in this chapter some other general topics were also covered which are the answers to the curiosities in the field of Tibetan Buddhism. For example, I have given a very brief account of the translation work of the Tibetan literature in Tibet and after 1959, in India and abroad.In the sixth chapter, namely TsongkhP and the Gelugp school of Tibet, I have given the salient features and practices of the sect. Why the actual need to establish this sect was felt by its founder TsongkhaPa when he was already mastered all the then time philosophies through other prevalent sects. The role of Rendw in the educational and philosophical life of TsongkhaPa is evident in all the literature, which TsongkhaPa wrote. In fact when we go through the ascetic life of TsongkhaPa, he seems to be much more powerful than his settled life when his name became famous than himself. Wandering in the search of knowledge through debates, asking every established master to impart knowledge, doing penances, these all create a gamut around TsongkhPs personality that every researcher inspire for. This is more relevant today when we see the education has become a means nothing more than for earning the bread. Also, the followers of TsongkhaPa (with due respect) have indulged themselves in the very politics, which TsongkhaPa had forbid in his lifetime.The content of the GelugP School needed more elaborate study to discuss, so I divided it into two chapters and the chapter-VIIth in its succession, I have tried to highlight the philosophy and ethics of GelugPs, which they are famous for. I named this chapter The stages of path and other teachings of GelugP. The biggest contribution in this regard by the founder of this sect, TsongkhaPa was the Lam Rim teachings. TsongkhaPa during his study time engaged in debate with almost all the teacher of prevalent school of Buddhism in Tibet, and found that debates are the best way to develop the intellect of a person. So he stressed very much on study of the books in his Order and hence started the tradition of Lam-Rim teachings. He himself wrote a big volume named Lam-rim Chen-Mo () and tried to put all the philosophical teachings of Buddha that were required to lead a sanctimonious and virtuous life according to Vinaya. When he found the book to be too voluminous to remember, he prepared a précis form of the book and named it Lam-Tso Nam Sum () which became so famous that the Gelugpa or the yellow hats were sometime called the followers of Lam Tso Nam Sum. I have tried to brief the teaching content of Lam Tso Nam Sum in this chapter. In addition, I have given at the end of this chapter, why the Prsngika Mdhyamika () has an upper hand not only over the other three main school of Buddhism but over the Svatntrika Mdhyamika () too. The eighth and the final chapter is conclusion where the findings of the research work have been stated.I have chosen some colour plates to illustrate what is being said in the test of the chapter. I have also taken care of that the entire collection must represent different traditional source and of different type. This I have done to acquaint my thesis with the different architectural and archaeological remains, which though is not part of my thesis, elucidate Buddhism in much exemplified way.At the end, I have added some photographs that will be of helping material and show the historic and religious personalities in visual.Finally, I want to quote averse from the Dhammapada which describes the Buddhassana or the law of Buddha, with the presupposition that if this verse is being taken care of, be it any sect of sub-sect of Buddhism any where at the globe, Buddhism will succeed in achieving its goal.
As part of a long-term partnership between the World Bank and Brazil, the Federal Government of Brazil sought the World Bank's assistance to review road safety management capacity in Brazil, building both on past experiences in the country and international best practices. This National Road Safety Management Capacity Review, therefore, was prepared by the World Bank, with the support of the Global Road Safety Facility (GRSF). The primary objective of the review is to evaluate the multi-sectoral capacity of road safety management in Brazil, identifying possible road safety challenges and presenting recommendations to address these challenges. The methodology of the review, in accordance with the guidelines of the World Bank Global Road Safety Facility, focused on examinations of key functional aspects of road safety, including institutions, legislation, financing, information, and capacities at all levels of government and among non-government actors. The review was prepared mainly based on interviews of key road safety stakeholders at the federal, state, and municipal levels, members of parliament, NGOs, and the private sector, in addition to direct inspection of roads and on-road behaviors, and the analysis of published research and reports on road safety. In addition, information and understanding gained from previous reviews of the states of São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, and Bahia were also incorporated.
Die Inhalte der verlinkten Blogs und Blog Beiträge unterliegen in vielen Fällen keiner redaktionellen Kontrolle.
Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Blogbetreiber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie einen Blog Beitrag zitieren möchten.
(This post continues part 1 which just looked at the data. Part 3 on theory is here) When the Fed raises interest rates, how does inflation respond? Are there "long and variable lags" to inflation and output? There is a standard story: The Fed raises interest rates; inflation is sticky so real interest rates (interest rate - inflation) rise; higher real interest rates lower output and employment; the softer economy pushes inflation down. Each of these is a lagged effect. But despite 40 years of effort, theory struggles to substantiate that story (next post), it's had to see in the data (last post), and the empirical work is ephemeral -- this post. The vector autoregression and related local projection are today the standard empirical tools to address how monetary policy affects the economy, and have been since Chris Sims' great work in the 1970s. (See Larry Christiano's review.) I am losing faith in the method and results. We need to find new ways to learn about the effects of monetary policy. This post expands on some thoughts on this topic in "Expectations and the Neutrality of Interest Rates," several of my papers from the 1990s* and excellent recent reviews from Valerie Ramey and Emi Nakamura and Jón Steinsson, who eloquently summarize the hard identification and computation troubles of contemporary empirical work.Maybe popular wisdom is right, and economics just has to catch up. Perhaps we will. But a popular belief that does not have solid scientific theory and empirical backing, despite a 40 year effort for models and data that will provide the desired answer, must be a bit less trustworthy than one that does have such foundations. Practical people should consider that the Fed may be less powerful than traditionally thought, and that its interest rate policy has different effects than commonly thought. Whether and under what conditions high interest rates lower inflation, whether they do so with long and variable but nonetheless predictable and exploitable lags, is much less certain than you think. Here is a replication of one of the most famous monetary VARs, Christiano Eichenbaum and Evans 1999, from Valerie Ramey's 2016 review: Fig. 1 Christiano et al. (1999) identification. 1965m1–1995m6 full specification: solid black lines; 1983m1–2007m12 full specification: short dashed blue (dark gray in the print version) lines; 1983m1–2007m12, omits money and reserves: long-dashed red (gray in the print version) lines. Light gray bands are 90% confidence bands. Source: Ramey 2016. Months on x axis. The black lines plot the original specification. The top left panel plots the path of the Federal Funds rate after the Fed unexpectedly raises the interest rate. The funds rate goes up, but only for 6 months or so. Industrial production goes down and unemployment goes up, peaking at month 20. The figure plots the level of the CPI, so inflation is the slope of the lower right hand panel. You see inflation goes the "wrong" way, up, for about 6 months, and then gently declines. Interest rates indeed seem to affect the economy with long lags. This was the broad outline of consensus empirical estimates for many years. It is common to many other studies, and it is consistent with the beliefs of policy makers and analysts. It's pretty much what Friedman (1968) told us to expect. Getting contemporary models to produce something like this is much harder, but that's the next blog post. What's a VAR?I try to keep this blog accessible to nonspecialists, so I'll step back momentarily to explain how we produce graphs like these. Economists who know what a VAR is should skip to the next section heading. How do we measure the effect of monetary policy on other variables? Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz kicked it off in the Monetary History by pointing to the historical correlation of money growth with inflation and output. They knew as we do that correlation is not causation, so they pointed to the fact that money growth preceeded inflation and output growth. But as James Tobin pointed out, the cock's crow comes before, but does not cause, the sun to rise. So too people may go get out some money ahead of time when they see more future business activity on the horizon. Even correlation with a lead is not causation. What to do? Clive Granger's causality and Chris Sims' VAR, especially "Macroeconomics and Reality" gave today's answer. (And there is a reason that everybody mentioned so far has a Nobel prize.) First, we find a monetary policy "shock," a movement in the interest rate (these days; money, then) that is plausibly not a response to economic events and especially to expected future economic events. We think of the Fed setting interest rates by a response to economic data plus deviations from that response, such as interest rate = (#) output + (#) inflation + (#) other variables + disturbance. We want to isolate the "disturbance," movements in the interest rate not taken in response to economic events. (I use "shock" to mean an unpredictable variable, and "disturbance" to mean deviation from an equation like the above, but one that can persist for a while. A monetary policy "shock" is an unexpected movement in the disturbance.) The "rule" part here can be but need not be the Taylor rule, and can include other variables than output and inflation. It is what the Fed usually does given other variables, and therefore (hopefully) controls for reverse causality from expected future economic events to interest rates. Now, in any individual episode, output and inflation and inflation following a shock will be influenced by subsequent shocks to the economy, monetary and other. But those average out. So, the average value of inflation, output, employment, etc. following a monetary policy shock is a measure of how the shock affects the economy all on its own. That is what has been plotted above. VARs were one of the first big advances in the modern empirical quest to find "exogenous" variation and (somewhat) credibly find causal relationships. Mostly the huge literature varies on how one finds the "shocks." Traditional VARs use regressions of the above equations and the residual is the shock, with a big question just how many and which contemporaneous variables one adds in the regression. Romer and Romer pioneered the "narrative approach," reading the Fed minutes to isolate shocks. Some technical details at the bottom and much more discussion below. The key is finding shocks. One can just regress output and inflation on the shocks to produce the response function, which is a "local projection" not a "VAR," but I'll use "VAR" for both techniques for lack of a better encompassing word. Losing faithShocks, what shocks?What's a "shock" anyway? The concept is that the Fed considers its forecast of inflation, output and other variables it is trying to control, gauges the usual and appropriate response, and then adds 25 or 50 basis points, at random, just for the heck of it. The question VARS try to answer is the same: What happens to the economy if the Fed raises interest rates unexpectedly, for no particular reason at all? But the Fed never does this. Ask them. Read the minutes. The Fed does not roll dice. They always raise or lower interest rates for a reason, that reason is always a response to something going on in the economy, and most of the time how it affects forecasts of inflation and employment. There are no shocks as defined.I speculated here that we might get around this problem: If we knew the Fed was responding to something that had no correlation with future output, then even though that is an endogenous response, then it is a valid movement for estimating the effect of interest rates on output. My example was, what if the Fed "responds" to the weather. Well, though endogenous, it's still valid for estimating the effect on output. The Fed does respond to lots of things, including foreign exchange, financial stability issues, equity, terrorist attacks, and so forth. But I can't think of any of these in which the Fed is not thinking of these events for their effect on output and inflation, which is why I never took the idea far. Maybe you can. Shock isolation also depends on complete controls for the Fed's information. If the Fed uses any information about future output and inflation that is not captured in our regression, then information about future output and inflation remains in the "shock" series. The famous "price puzzle" is a good example. For the first few decades of VARs, interest rate shocks seemed to lead to higher inflation. It took a long specification search to get rid of this undesired result. The story was, that the Fed saw inflation coming in ways not completely controlled for by the regression. The Fed raised interest rates to try to forestall the inflation, but was a bit hesitant about it so did not cure the inflation that was coming. We see higher interest rates followed by higher inflation, though the true causal effect of interest rates goes the other way. This problem was "cured" by adding commodity prices to the interest rate rule, on the idea that fast-moving commodity prices would capture the information the Fed was using to forecast inflation. (Interestingly these days we seem to see core inflation as the best forecaster, and throw out commodity prices!) With those and some careful orthogonalization choices, the "price puzzle" was tamped down to the one year or so delay you see above. (Neo-Fisherians might object that maybe the price puzzle was trying to tell us something all these years!) Nakamura and Steinsson write of this problem: "What is being assumed is that controlling for a few lags of a few variables captures all endogenous variation in policy... This seems highly unlikely to be true in practice. The Fed bases its policy decisions on a huge amount of data. Different considerations (in some cases highly idiosyncratic) affect policy at different times. These include stress in the banking system, sharp changes in commodity prices, a recent stock market crash, a financial crisis in emerging markets, terrorist attacks, temporary investment tax credits, and the Y2K computer glitch. The list goes on and on. Each of these considerations may only affect policy in a meaningful way on a small number of dates, and the number of such influences is so large that it is not feasible to include them all in a regression. But leaving any one of them out will result in a monetary policy "shock" that the researcher views as exogenous but is in fact endogenous." Nakamura and Steinsson offer 9/11 as another example summarizing my "high frequency identification" paper with Monika Piazzesi: The Fed lowered interest rates after the terrorist attack, likely reacting to its consequences for output and inflation. But VARs register the event as an exogenous shock.Romer and Romer suggested that we use Fed Greenbook forecasts of inflation and output as controls, as those should represent the Fed's complete information set. They provide narrative evidence that Fed members trust Greenback forecasts more than you might suspect. This issue is a general Achilles heel of empirical macro and finance: Does your procedure assume agents see no more information than you have included in the model or estimate? If yes, you have a problem. Similarly, "Granger causality" answers the cock's crow-sunrise problem by saying that if unexpected x leads unexpected y then x causes y. But it's only real causality if the "expected" includes all information, as the price puzzle counterexample shows. Just what properties do we need of a shock in order to measure the response to the question, "what if the Fed raised rates for no reason?" This strikes me as a bit of an unsolved question -- or rather, one that everyone thinks is so obvious that we don't really look at it. My suggestion that the shock only need be orthogonal to the variable whose response we're estimating is informal, and I don't know of formal literature that's picked it up. Must "shocks" be unexpected, i.e. not forecastable from anything in the previous time information set? Must they surprise people? I don't think so -- it is neither necessary nor sufficient for shock to be unforecastable for it to identify the inflation and output responses. Not responding to expected values of the variable whose response you want to measure should be enough. If bond markets found out about a random funds rate rise one day ahead, it would then be an "expected" shock, but clearly just as good for macro. Romer and Romer have been criticized that their shocks are predictable, but this may not matter. The above Nakamura and Steinsson quote says leaving out any information leads to a shock that is not strictly exogenous. But strictly exogenous may not be necessary for estimating, say, the effect of interest rates on inflation. It is enough to rule out reverse causality and third effects. Either I'm missing a well known econometric literature, as is everyone else writing the VARs I've read who don't cite it, or there is a good theory paper to be written.Romer and Romer, thinking deeply about how to read "shocks" from the Fed minutes, define shocks thus to circumvent the "there are no shocks" problem:we look for times when monetary policymakers felt the economy was roughly at potential (or normal) output, but decided that the prevailing rate of inflation was too high. Policymakers then chose to cut money growth and raise interest rates, realizing that there would be (or at least could be) substantial negative consequences for aggregate output and unemployment. These criteria are designed to pick out times when policymakers essentially changed their tastes about the acceptable level of inflation. They weren't just responding to anticipated movements in the real economy and inflation. [My emphasis.] You can see the issue. This is not an "exogenous" movement in the funds rate. It is a response to inflation, and to expected inflation, with a clear eye on expected output as well. It really is a nonlinear rule, ignore inflation for a while until it gets really bad then finally get serious about it. Or, as they say, it is a change in rule, an increase in the sensitivity of the short run interest rate response to inflation, taken in response to inflation seeming to get out of control in a longer run sense. Does this identify the response to an "exogenous" interest rate increase? Not really. But maybe it doesn't matter. Are we even asking an interesting question? The whole question, what would happen if the Fed raised interest rates for no reason, is arguably besides the point. At a minimum, we should be clearer about what question we are asking, and whether the policies we analyze are implementations of that question. The question presumes a stable "rule," (e.g. \(i_t = \rho i_{t-1} + \phi_\pi \pi_t + \phi_x x_t + u_t\)) and asks what happens in response to a deviation \( +u_t \) from the rule. Is that an interesting question? The standard story for 1980-1982 is exactly not such an event. Inflation was not conquered by a big "shock," a big deviation from 1970s practice, while keeping that practice intact. Inflation was conquered (so the story goes) by a change in the rule, by a big increase in $\phi_\pi$. That change raised interest rates, but arguably without any deviation from the new rule \(u_t\) at all. Thinking in terms of the Phillips curve \( \pi_t = E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t\), it was not a big negative \(x_t\) that brought down inflation, but the credibility of the new rule that brought down \(E_t \pi_{t+1}\). If the art of reducing inflation is to convince people that a new regime has arrived, then the response to any monetary policy "shock" orthogonal to a stable "rule" completely misses that policy. Romer and Romer are almost talking about a rule-change event. For 2022, they might be looking at the Fed's abandonment of flexible average inflation targeting and its return to a Taylor rule. However, they don't recognize the importance of the distinction, treating changes in rule as equivalent to a residual. Changing the rule changes expectations in quite different ways from a residual of a stable rule. Changes with a bigger commitment should have bigger effects, and one should standardize somehow by the size and permanence of the rule change, not necessarily the size of the interest rate rise. And, having asked "what if the Fed changes rule to be more serious about inflation," we really cannot use the analysis to estimate what happens if the Fed shocks interest rates and does not change the rule. It takes some mighty invariance result from an economic theory that a change in rule has the same effect as a shock to a given rule. There is no right and wrong, really. We just need to be more careful about what question the empirical procedure asks, if we want to ask that question, and if our policy analysis actually asks the same question. Estimating rules, Clarida Galí and Gertler. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) is a justly famous paper, and in this context for doing something totally different to evaluate monetary policy. They estimate rules, fancy versions of \(i_t = \rho i_{t-1} +\phi_\pi \pi_t + \phi_x x_t + u_t\), and they estimate how the \(\phi\) parameters change over time. They attribute the end of 1970s inflation to a change in the rule, a rise in \(\phi_\pi\) from the 1970s to the 1980s. In their model, a higher \( \phi_\pi\) results in less volatile inflation. They do not estimate any response functions. The rest of us were watching the wrong thing all along. Responses to shocks weren't the interesting quantity. Changes in the rule were the interesting quantity. Yes, I criticized the paper, but for issues that are irrelevant here. (In the new Keynesian model, the parameter that reduces inflation isn't the one they estimate.) The important point here is that they are doing something completely different, and offer us a roadmap for how else we might evaluate monetary policy if not by impulse-response functions to monetary policy shocks. Fiscal theoryThe interesting question for fiscal theory is, "What is the effect of an interest rate rise not accompanied by a change in fiscal policy?" What can the Fed do by itself? By contrast, standard models (both new and old Keynesian) include concurrent fiscal policy changes when interest rates rise. Governments tighten in present value terms, at least to pay higher interest costs on the debt and the windfall to bondholders that flows from unexpected disinflation. Experience and estimates surely include fiscal changes along with monetary tightening. Both fiscal and monetary authorities react to inflation with policy actions and reforms. Growth-oriented microeconomic reforms with fiscal consequences often follow as well -- rampant inflation may have had something to do with Carter era trucking, airline, and telecommunications reform. Yet no current estimate tries to look for a monetary shock orthogonal to fiscal policy change. The estimates we have are at best the effects of monetary policy together with whatever induced or coincident fiscal and microeconomic policy tends to happen at the same time as central banks get serious about fighting inflation. Identifying the component of a monetary policy shock orthogonal to fiscal policy, and measuring its effects is a first order question for fiscal theory of monetary policy. That's why I wrote this blog post. I set out to do it, and then started to confront how VARs are already falling apart in our hands. Just what "no change in fiscal policy" means is an important question that varies by application. (Lots more in "fiscal roots" here, fiscal theory of monetary policy here and in FTPL.) For simple calculations, I just ask what happens if interest rates change with no change in primary surplus. One might also define "no change" as no change in tax rates, automatic stabilizers, or even habitual discretionary stimulus and bailout, no disturbance \(u_t\) in a fiscal rule \(s_t = a + \theta_\pi \pi_t + \theta_x x_t + ... + u_t\). There is no right and wrong here either, there is just making sure you ask an interesting question. Long and variable lags, and persistent interest rate movementsThe first plot shows a mighty long lag between the monitor policy shock and its effect on inflation and output. That does not mean that the economy has long and variable lags. This plot is actually not representative, because in the black lines the interest rate itself quickly reverts to zero. It is common to find a more protracted interest rate response to the shock, as shown in the red and blue lines. That mirrors common sense: When the Fed starts tightening, it sets off a year or so of stair-step further increases, and then a plateau, before similar stair-step reversion. That raises the question, does the long-delayed response of output and inflation represent a delayed response to the initial monetary policy shock, or does it represent a nearly instantaneous response to the higher subsequent interest rates that the shock sets off? Another way of putting the question, is the response of inflation and output invariant to changes in the response of the funds rate itself? Do persistent and transitory funds rate changes have the same responses? If you think of the inflation and output responses as economic responses to the initial shock only, then it does not matter if interest rates revert immediately to zero, or go on a 10 year binge following the initial shock. That seems like a pretty strong assumption. If you think that a more persistent interest rate response would lead to a larger or more persistent output and inflation response, then you think some of what we see in the VARs is a quick structural response to the later higher interest rates, when they come. Back in 1988, I posed this question in "what do the VARs mean?" and showed you can read it either way. The persistent output and inflation response can represent either long economic lags to the initial shock, or much less laggy responses to interest rates when they come. I showed how to deconvolute the response function to the structural effect of interest rates on inflation and output and how persistently interest rates rise. The inflation and output responses might be the same with shorter funds rate responses, or they might be much different. Obviously (though often forgotten), whether the inflation and output responses are invariant to changes in the funds rate response needs a model. If in the economic model only unexpected interest rate movements affect output and inflation, though with lags, then the responses are as conventionally read structural responses and invariant to the interest rate path. There is no such economic model. Lucas (1972) says only unexpected money affects output, but with no lags, and expected money affects inflation. New Keynesian models have very different responses to permanent vs. transitory interest rate shocks. Interestingly, Romer and Romer do not see it this way, and regard their responses as structural long and variable lags, invariant to the interest rate response. They opine that given their reading of a positive shock in 2022, a long and variable lag to inflation reduction is baked in, no matter what the Fed does next. They argue that the Fed should stop raising interest rates. (In fairness, it doesn't look like they thought about the issue much, so this is an implicit rather than explicit assumption.) The alternative view is that effects of a shock on inflation are really effects of the subsequent rate rises on inflation, that the impulse response function to inflation is not invariant to the funds rate response, so stopping the standard tightening cycle would undo the inflation response. Argue either way, but at least recognize the important assumption behind the conclusions. Was the success of inflation reduction in the early 1980s just a long delayed response to the first few shocks? Or was the early 1980s the result of persistent large real interest rates following the initial shock? (Or, something else entirely, a coordinated fiscal-monetary reform... But I'm staying away from that and just discussing conventional narratives, not necessarily the right answer.) If the latter, which is the conventional narrative, then you think it does matter if the funds rate shock is followed by more funds rate rises (or positive deviations from a rule), that the output and inflation response functions do not directly measure long lags from the initial shock. De-convoluting the structural funds rate to inflation response and the persistent funds rate response, you would estimate much shorter structural lags. Nakamura and Steinsson are of this view: While the Volcker episode is consistent with a large amount of monetary nonneutrality, it seems less consistent with the commonly held view that monetary policy affects output with "long and variable lags." To the contrary, what makes the Volcker episode potentially compelling is that output fell and rose largely in sync with the actions [interest rates, not shocks] of the Fed. And that's a good thing too. We've done a lot of dynamic economics since Friedman's 1968 address. There is really nothing in dynamic economic theory that produces a structural long-delayed response to shocks, without the continued pressure of high interest rates. (A correspondent objects to "largely in sync" pointing out several clear months long lags between policy actions and results in 1980. It's here for the methodological point, not the historical one.) However, if the output and inflation responses are not invariant to the interest rate response, then the VAR directly measures an incredibly narrow experiment: What happens in response to a surprise interest rate rise, followed by the plotted path of interest rates? And that plotted path is usually pretty temporary, as in the above graph. What would happen if the Fed raised rates and kept them up, a la 1980? The VAR is silent on that question. You need to calibrate some model to the responses we have to infer that answer. VARs and shock responses are often misread as generic theory-free estimates of "the effects of monetary policy." They are not. At best, they tell you the effect of one specific experiment: A random increase in funds rate, on top of a stable rule, followed by the usual following path of funds rate. Any other implication requires a model, explicit or implicit. More specifically, without that clearly false invariance assumption, VARs cannot directly answer a host of important questions. Two on my mind: 1) What happens if the Fed raises interest rates permanently? Does inflation eventually rise? Does it rise in the short run? This is the "Fisherian" and "neo-Fisherian" questions, and the answer "yes" pops unexpectedly out of the standard new-Keynesian model. 2) Is the short-run negative response of inflation to interest rates stronger for more persistent rate rises? The long-term debt fiscal theory mechanism for a short-term inflation decline is tied to the persistence of the shock and the maturity structure of the debt. The responses to short-lived interest rate movements (top left panel) are silent on these questions. Directly is an important qualifier. It is not impossible to answer these questions, but you have to work harder to identify persistent interest rate shocks. For example, Martín Uribe identifies permanent vs. transitory interest rate shocks, and finds a positive response of inflation to permanent interest rate rises. How? You can't just pick out the interest rate rises that turned out to be permanent. You have to find shocks or components of the shock that are ex-ante predictably going to be permanent, based on other forecasting variables and the correlation of the shock with other shocks. For example, a short-term rate shock that also moves long-term rates might be more permanent than one which does not do so. (That requires the expectations hypothesis, which doesn't work, and long term interest rates move too much anyway in response to transitory funds rate shocks. So, this is not directly a suggestion, just an example of the kind of thing one must do. Uribe's model is more complex than I can summarize in a blog.) Given how small and ephemeral the shocks are already, subdividing them into those that are expected to have permanent vs. transitory effects on the federal funds rate is obviously a challenge. But it's not impossible. Monetary policy shocks account for small fractions of inflation, output and funds rate variation. Friedman thought that most recessions and inflations were due to monetary mistakes. The VARs pretty uniformly deny that result. The effects of monetary policy shocks on output and inflation add up to less than 10 percent of the variation of output and inflation. In part the shocks are small, and in part the responses to the shocks are small. Most recessions come from other shocks, not monetary mistakes. Worse, both in data and in models, most inflation variation comes from inflation shocks, most output variation comes from output shocks, etc. The cross-effects of one variable on another are small. And "inflation shock" (or "marginal cost shock"), "output shock" and so forth are just labels for our ignorance -- error terms in regressions, unforecasted movements -- not independently measured quantities. (This and old point, for example in my 1994 paper with the great title "Shocks." Technically, the variance of output is the sum of the squares of the impulse-response functions -- the plots -- times the variance of the shocks. Thus small shocks and small responses mean not much variance explained.)This is a deep point. The exquisite attention put to the effects of monetary policy in new-Keynesian models, while interesting to the Fed, are then largely beside the point if your question is what causes recessions. Comprehensive models work hard to match all of the responses, not just to monetary policy shocks. But it's not clear that the nominal rigidities that are important for the effects of monetary policy are deeply important to other (supply) shocks, and vice versa. This is not a criticism. Economics always works better if we can use small models that focus on one thing -- growth, recessions, distorting effect of taxes, effect of monetary policy -- without having to have a model of everything in which all effects interact. But, be clear we no longer have a model of everything. "Explaining recessions" and "understanding the effects of monetary policy" are somewhat separate questions. Monetary policy shocks also account for small fractions of the movement in the federal funds rate itself. Most of the funds rate movement is in the rule, the reaction to the economy term. Like much empirical economics, the quest for causal identification leads us to look at a tiny causes with tiny effects, that do little to explain much variation in the variable of interest (inflation). Well, cause is cause, and the needle is the sharpest item in the haystack. But one worries about the robustness of such tiny effects, and to what extent they summarize historical experience. To be concrete, here is a typical shock regression, 1960:1-2023:6 monthly data, standard errors in parentheses: ff(t) = a + b ff(t-1) + c[ff(t-1)-ff(t-2)] + d CPI(t) + e unemployment(t) + monetary policy shock, Where "CPI" is the percent change in the CPI (CPIAUCSL) from a year earlier. ff(t-1)ff(t-1)-ff(t-2)CPIUnempR20.970.390.032-0.0170.985(0.009)(0.07)(0.013)(0.009)The funds rate is persistent -- the lag term (0.97) is large. Recent changes matter too: Once the Fed starts a tightening cycle, it's likely to keep raising rates. And the Fed responds to CPI and unemployment. The plot shows the actual federal funds rate (blue), the model or predicted federal funds rate (red), the shock which is the difference between the two (orange) and the Romer and Romer dates (vertical lines). You can't see the difference between actual and predicted funds rate, which is the point. They are very similar and the shocks are small. They are closer horizontally than vertically, so the vertical difference plotted as shock is still visible. The shocks are much smaller than the funds rate, and smaller than the rise and fall in the funds rate in a typical tightening or loosening cycle. The shocks are bunched, with by far the biggest ones in the early 1980s. The shocks have been tiny since the 1980s. (Romer and Romer don't find any shocks!) Now, our estimates of the effect of monetary policy look at the average values of inflation, output, and employment in the 4-5 years after a shock. Really, you say, looking at the graph? That's going to be dominated by the experience of the early 1980s. And with so many positive and negative shocks close together, the average value 4 years later is going to be driven by subtle timing of when the positive or negative shocks line up with later events. Put another way, here is a plot of inflation 30 months after a shock regressed on the shock. Shock on the x axis, subsequent inflation on the y axis. The slope of the line is our estimate of the effect of the shock on inflation 30 months out (source, with details). Hmm. One more graph (I'm having fun here):This is a plot of inflation for the 4 years after each shock, times that shock. The right hand side is the same graph with an expanded y scale. The average of these histories is our impulse response function. (The big lines are the episodes which multiply the big shocks of the early 1980s. They mostly converge because, either multiplied by positive or negative shocks, inflation wend down in the 1980s.) Impulse response functions are just quantitative summaries of the lessons of history. You may be underwhelmed that history is sending a clear story. Again, welcome to causal economics -- tiny average responses to tiny but identified movements is what we estimate, not broad lessons of history. We do not estimate "what is the effect of the sustained high real interest rates of the early 1980s," for example, or "what accounts for the sharp decline of inflation in the early 1980s?" Perhaps we should, though confronting endogeneity of the interest rate responses some other way. That's my main point today. Estimates disappear after 1982Ramey's first variation in the first plot is to use data from 1983 to 2007. Her second variation is to also omit the monetary variables. Christiano Eichenbaum and Evans were still thinking in terms of money supply control, but our Fed does not control money supply. The evidence that higher interest rates lower inflation disappears after 1983, with or without money. This too is a common finding. It might be because there simply aren't any monetary policy shocks. Still, we're driving a car with a yellowed AAA road map dated 1982 on it. Monetary policy shocks still seem to affect output and employment, just not inflation. That poses a deeper problem. If there just aren't any monetary policy shocks, we would just get big standard errors on everything. That only inflation disappears points to the vanishing Phillips curve, which will be the weak point in the theory to come. It is the Phillips curve by which lower output and employment push down inflation. But without the Phillips curve, the whole standard story for interest rates to affect inflation goes away. Computing long-run responsesThe long lags of the above plot are already pretty long horizons, with interesting economics still going on at 48 months. As we get interested in long run neutrality, identification via long run sign restrictions (monetary policy should not permanently affect output), and the effect of persistent interest rate shocks, we are interested in even longer run responses. The "long run risks" literature in asset pricing is similarly crucially interested in long run properties. Intuitively, we should know this will be troublesome. There aren't all that many nonoverlapping 4 year periods after interest rate shocks to measure effects, let alone 10 year periods.VARs estimate long run responses with a parametric structure. Organize the data (output, inflation, interest rate, etc) into a vector \(x_t = [y_t \; \pi_t \; i_t \; ...]'\), then the VAR can be written \(x_{t+1} = Ax_t + u_t\). We start from zero, move \(x_1 = u_1\) in an interesting way, and then the response function just simulates forward, with \(x_j = A^j x_1\). But here an oft-forgotten lesson of 1980s econometrics pops up: It is dangerous to estimate long-run dynamics by fitting a short run model and then finding its long-run implications. Raising matrices to the 48th power \(A^{48}\) can do weird things, the 120th power (10 years) weirder things. OLS and maximum likelihood prize one step ahead \(R^2\), and will happily accept small one step ahead mis specifications that add up to big misspecification 10 years out. (I learned this lesson in the "Random walk in GNP.") Long run implications are driven by the maximum eigenvalue of the \(A\) transition matrix, and its associated eigenvector. \(A^j = Q \Lambda^j Q^{-1}\). This is a benefit and a danger. Specify and estimate the dynamics of the combination of variables with the largest eigenvector right, and lots of details can be wrong. But standard estimates aren't trying hard to get these right. The "local projection" alternative directly estimates long run responses: Run regressions of inflation in 10 years on the shock today. You can see the tradeoff: there aren't many non-overlapping 10 year intervals, so this will be imprecisely estimated. The VAR makes a strong parametric assumption about long-run dynamics. When it's right, you get better estimates. When it's wrong, you get misspecification. My experience running lots of VARs is that monthly VARs raised to large powers often give unreliable responses. Run at least a one-year VAR before you start looking at long run responses. Cointegrating vectors are the most reliable variables to include. They are typically the state variable that most reliably carries long - run responses. But pay attention to getting them right. Imposing integrating and cointegrating structure by just looking at units is a good idea. The regression of long-run returns on dividend yields is a good example. The dividend yield is a cointegrating vector, and is the slow-moving state variable. A one period VAR \[\left[ \begin{array}{c} r_{t+1} \\ dp_{t+1} \end{array} \right] = \left[ \begin{array}{cc} 0 & b_r \\ 0 & \rho \end{array}\right] \left[ \begin{array}{c} r_{t} \\ dp_{t} \end{array}\right]+ \varepsilon_{t+1}\] implies a long horizon regression \(r_{t+j} = b_r \rho^j dp_{t} +\) error. Direct regressions ("local projections") \(r_{t+j} = b_{r,j} dp_t + \) error give about the same answers, though the downward bias in \(\rho\) estimates is a bit of an issue, but with much larger standard errors. The constraint \(b_{r,j} = b_r \rho^j\) isn't bad. But it can easily go wrong. If you don't impose that dividends and price are cointegrated, or with vector other than 1 -1, if you allow a small sample to estimate \(\rho>1\), if you don't put in dividend yields at all and just a lot of short-run forecasters, it can all go badly. Forecasting bond returns was for me a good counterexample. A VAR forecasting one-year bond returns from today's yields gives very different results from taking a monthly VAR, even with several lags, and using \(A^{12}\) to infer the one-year return forecast. Small pricing errors or microstructure dominate the monthly data, which produces junk when raised to the twelfth power. (Climate regressions are having fun with the same issue. Small estimated effects of temperature on growth, raised to the 100th power, can produce nicely calamitous results. But use basic theory to think about units.) Nakamura and Steinsson (appendix) show how sensitive some standard estimates of impulse response functions are to these questions. Weak evidenceFor the current policy question, I hope you get a sense of how weak the evidence is for the "standard view" that higher interest rates reliably lower inflation, though with a long and variable lag, and the Fed has a good deal of control over inflation. Yes, many estimates look the same, but there is a pretty strong prior going in to that. Most people don't publish papers that don't conform to something like the standard view. Look how long it took from Sims (1980) to Christiano Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) to produce a response function that does conform to the standard view, what Friedman told us to expect in (1968). That took a lot of playing with different orthogonalization, variable inclusion, and other specification assumptions. This is not criticism: when you have a strong prior, it makes sense to see if the data can be squeezed in to the prior. Once authors like Ramey and Nakamura and Steinsson started to look with a critical eye, it became clearer just how weak the evidence is. Standard errors are also wide, but the variability in results due to changes in sample and specification are much larger than formal standard errors. That's why I don't stress that statistical aspect. You play with 100 models, try one variable after another to tamp down the price puzzle, and then compute standard errors as if the 100th model were written in stone. This post is already too long, but showing how results change with different specifications would have been a good addition. For example, here are a few more Ramey plots of inflation responses, replicating various previous estimatesTake your pick. What should we do instead? Well, how else should we measure the effects of monetary policy? One natural approach turns to the analysis of historical episodes and changes in regime, with specific models in mind. Romer and Romer pass on thoughts on this approach: ...some macroeconomic behavior may be fundamentally episodic in nature. Financial crises, recessions, disinflations, are all events that seem to play out in an identifiable pattern. There may be long periods where things are basically fine, that are then interrupted by short periods when they are not. If this is true, the best way to understand them may be to focus on episodes—not a cross-section proxy or a tiny sub-period. In addition, it is valuable to know when the episodes were and what happened during them. And, the identification and understanding of episodes may require using sources other than conventional data.A lot of my and others' fiscal theory writing has taken a similar view. The long quiet zero bound is a test of theories: old-Keynesian models predict a delation spiral, new-Keynesian models predicts sunspot volatility, fiscal theory is consistent with stable quiet inflation. The emergence of inflation in 2021 and its easing despite interest rates below inflation likewise validates fiscal vs. standard theories. The fiscal implications of abandoning the gold standard in 1933 plus Roosevelt's "emergency" budget make sense of that episode. The new-Keynesian reaction parameter \(\phi_\pi\) in \(i_t - \phi_\pi \pi_t\), which leads to unstable dynamics for ](\phi_\pi>1\) is not identified by time series data. So use "other sources," like plain statements on the Fed website about how they react to inflation. I already cited Clarida Galí and Gertler, for measuring the rule not the response to the shock, and explaining the implications of that rule for their model. Nakamura and Steinsson likewise summarize Mussa's (1986) classic study of what happens when countries switch from fixed to floating exchange rates: "The switch from a fixed to a flexible exchange rate is a purely monetary action. In a world where monetary policy has no real effects, such a policy change would not affect real variables like the real exchange rate. Figure 3 demonstrates dramatically that the world we live in is not such a world."Also, analysis of particular historical episodes is enlightening. But each episode has other things going on and so invites alternative explanations. 90 years later, we're still fighting about what caused the Great Depression. 1980 is the poster child for monetary disinflation, yet as Nakamura and Steinsson write, Many economists find the narrative account above and the accompanying evidence about output to be compelling evidence of large monetary nonneutrality. However, there are other possible explanations for these movements in output. There were oil shocks both in September 1979 and in February 1981.... Credit controls were instituted between March and July of 1980. Anticipation effects associated with the phased-in tax cuts of the Reagan administration may also have played a role in the 1981–1982 recession ....Studying changes in regime, such as fixed to floating or the zero bound era, help somewhat relative to studying a particular episode, in that they have some of the averaging of other shocks. But the attraction of VARs will remain. None of these produces what VARs seemed to produce, a theory-free qualitative estimate of the effects of monetary policy. Many tell you that prices are sticky, but not how prices are sticky. Are they old-Keynesian backward looking sticky or new-Keynesian rational expectations sticky? What is the dynamic response of relative inflation to a change in a pegged exchange rate? What is the dynamic response of real relative prices to productivity shocks? Observations such as Mussa's graph can help to calibrate models, but does not answer those questions directly. My observations about the zero bound or the recent inflation similarly seem (to me) decisive about one class of model vs. another, at least subject to Occam's razor about epicycles, but likewise do not provide a theory-free impulse response function. Nakamura and Steinsson write at length about other approaches; model-based moment matching and use of micro data in particular. This post is going on too long; read their paper. Of course, as we have seen, VARs only seem to offer a model-free quantitative measurement of "the effects of monetary policy," but it's hard to give up on the appearance of such an answer. VARs and impulse responses also remain very useful ways of summarizing the correlations and cross correlations of data, even without cause and effect interpretation. In the end, many ideas are successful in economics when they tell researchers what to do, when they offer a relatively clear recipe for writing papers. "Look at episodes and think hard is not such recipe." "Run a VAR is." So, as you think about how we can evaluate monetary policy, think about a better recipe as well as a good answer. (Stay tuned. This post is likely to be updated a few times!) VAR technical appendixTechnically, running VARs is very easy, at least until you start trying to smooth out responses with Bayesian and other techniques. Line up the data in a vector, i.e. \(x_t = [i_t \; \pi_t\; y_t]'\). Then run a regression of each variable on lags of the others, \[x_t = Ax_{t-1} + u_t.\] If you want more than one lag of the right hand variables, just make a bigger \(x\) vector, \(x_t = [i_t\; \pi_t \; y_t \; i_{t-1}\; \pi_{t-1} \;y_{t-1}]'.\) The residuals of such regressions \(u_t\) will be correlated, so you have to decide whether, say, the correlation between interest rate and inflation shocks means the Fed responds in the period to inflation, or inflation responds within the period to interest rates, or some combination of the two. That's the "identification" assumption issue. You can write it as a matrix \(C\) so that \(u_t = C \varepsilon_t\) and cov\((\varepsilon_t \varepsilon_t')=I\) or you can include some contemporaneous values into the right hand sides. Now, with \(x_t = Ax_{t-1} + C\varepsilon_t\), you start with \(x_0=0\), choose one series to shock, e.g. \(\varepsilon_{i,1}=1\) leaving the others alone, and just simulate forward. The resulting path of the other variables is the above plot, the "impulse response function." Alternatively you can run a regression \(x_t = \sum_{j=0}^\infty \theta_j \varepsilon_{t-j}\) and the \(\theta_j\) are (different, in sample) estimates of the same thing. That's "local projection". Since the right hand variables are all orthogonal, you can run single or multiple regressions. (See here for equations.) Either way, you have found the moving average representation, \(x_t = \theta(L)\varepsilon_t\), in the first case with \(\theta(L)=(I-AL)^{-1}C\) in the second case directly. Since the right hand variables are all orthogonal, the variance of the series is the sum of its loading on all of the shocks, \(cov(x_t) = \sum_{j=0}^\infty \theta_j \theta_j'\). This "forecast error variance decomposition" is behind my statement that small amounts of inflation variance are due to monetary policy shocks rather than shocks to other variables, and mostly inflation shocks. Update:Luis Garicano has a great tweet thread explaining the ideas with a medical analogy. Kamil Kovar has a nice follow up blog post, with emphasis on Europe. He makes a good point that I should have thought of: A monetary policy "shock" is a deviation from a "rule." So, the Fed's and ECB's failure to respond to inflation as they "usually" do in 2021-2022 counts exactly the same as a 3-5% deliberate lowering of the interest rate. Lowering interest rates for no reason, and leaving interest rates alone when the regression rule says raise rates are the same in this methodology. That "loosening" of policy was quickly followed by inflation easing, so an updated VAR should exhibit a strong "price puzzle" -- a negative shock is followed by less, not more inflation. Of course historians and practical people might object that failure to act as usual has exactly the same effects as acting. * Some Papers: Comment on Romer and Romer What ends recessions? Some "what's a shock?"Comment on Romer and Romer A new measure of monetary policy. The greenbook forecasts, and beginning thoughts that strict exogeneity is not necessary. Shocks monetary shocks explain small fractions of output variance.Comments on Hamilton, more thoughts on what a shock is.What do the VARs mean? cited above, is the response to the shock or to persistent interest rates?The Fed and Interest Rates, with Monika Piazzesi. Daily data and interest rates to identify shocks. Decomposing the yield curve with Monika Piazzesi. Starts with a great example of how small changes in specification lead to big differences in long run forecasts. Time seriesA critique of the application of unit root tests pretesting for unit roots and cointegration is a bad ideaHow big is the random walk in GNP? lessons in not using short run dynamics to infer long run properties. Permanent and transitory components of GNP and stock prices a favorite of cointegration really helps on long run propertiesTime series for macroeconomics and finance notes that never quite became a book. Explains VARs and responses.
The Situation In The Middle East ; United Nations S/PV.8260 Security Council Seventy-third year 8260th meeting Wednesday, 16 May 2018, 10 a.m. New York Provisional President: Ms. Wronecka. . (Poland) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Djédjé Equatorial Guinea. . M. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Russian Federation. . Mr. Polyanskiy Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Ms. Eckels-Currie Agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-14999 (E) *1814999* S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 2/12 18-14999 The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East The President: In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary- General for Syria, to participate in this meeting. Mr. De Mistura is joining today's meeting via video-teleconference from Geneva. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I give the floor to Mr. De Mistura. Mr. De Mistura: When I last briefed the Security Council on 9 April, it was at an emergency meeting (see S/PV.8225). On that occasion, I warned of the threats to regional and international peace and security arising from developments in or related to Syria. I know that today it is not an emergency meeting. However, the circumstances of an emergency very much remain. I do not need to remind members that tensions are high and regional and international confrontations have occurred several times. Allow me to highlight some recent events since 9 April. On 13 April, the United States, France and the United Kingdom conducted missile strikes in response to the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in eastern Ghouta. Those countries say that the strikes targeted three research and production facilities near Damascus and Homs. On 29 April, strikes were reported on Syrian Government military facilities in Hamah and Aleppo. Some media outlets attributed those strikes to Israel, alleging that those killed included Iranian personnel. Neither Israel nor Iran responded to those claims. On 8 May, strikes were reported just south of Damascus. Syrian State media attributed those strikes to Israel. Israel did not confirm that claim. Israel then said that it had detected "irregular Iranian activity" in the occupied Golan, which it put on high alert. Between 9 and 10 May, Israel carried out dozens of strikes against presumed Iranian and Syrian Government military targets across southern Syria. The Israeli authorities claim that they were responding to Iranian forces firing rockets from Syrian territory at Israeli military targets in the occupied Syrian Golan. Iran condemned the Israeli strikes and denied those claims. We are not is a position to independently verify every aspect of those incidents. However, even an incomplete picture shows the troubling trajectory of the increasingly frequent and ever more intense international confrontations over Syria, unprecedented since 1973. As the Security Council knows, the Secretary- General has followed those developments with great concern and called for restraint by all parties in order to avoid any acts that could escalate the situation and worsen the suffering of the Syrian people. The Secretary-General stressed that the United Nations has a "duty to remind Member States that there is an obligation, particularly when dealing with matters of peace and security, to act consistently with the Charter of the United Nations, and with international law in general." (S/PV.8233, p. 2) On the issue of chemical weapons, let me again echo the Secretary-General's call for the Security Council to "agree on a dedicated mechanism for ensuring effective accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria" (ibid.). As the Council well knows, as of now, we await the results of the ongoing investigation by the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons following its visit to Douma, with a report to be issued to States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, we have also seen worrying developments elsewhere in Syria. Evacuations from eastern Ghouta were similarly repeated in the eastern Qalamoun area, southern Damascus and northern rural Homs. First, on the military escalation, the pattern has been one of incoming air strikes and artillery and outgoing mortars and rockets towards Damascus. Then there was a negotiation, followed by an agreement for the evacuation of those civilians and fighters unwilling to remain under Syrian Government control or Russian Federation protection guarantees. We have also seen similar evacuation agreements 16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 3/12 being discussed in Idlib province but in a completely different format — the reverse format. This time we are talking about civilians and fighters in Government-controlled areas, namely, Kafraya and Fo'ah, while considering evacuations — beginning with medical evacuations — following the three-year siege and intermittent attacks from armed groups surrounding that area.Let me share with the Council a recurrent concern that I know that all members have. If civilians and fighters are simply funnelled into northern Syria — mostly into Idlib — then that might only postpone another conflict affecting many additional people, which I will discuss later. Therefore, it is important to keep close watch on future developments in Idlib province. Meanwhile, civilians continue to pay a terrible price. To be precise, 110,000 people have been evacuated to north-western Syria and Operation Euphrates Shield areas in the past two months. Many of them are reportedly traumatized and in urgent need of assistance and protection. Humanitarian partners are overwhelmed and stretched quite thin by the scale of those evacuations, but continue to do their utmost to respond to the growing needs, with the Council's assistance.Returning to the topic of Idlib, if a Ghouta scenario were to play out there, the situation could be six times worse, affecting 2.3 million people, half of whom are already internally displaced and would have nowhere else to go. But that is not purely a question of the Syrians' suffering. We fear that any substantial escalation in Idlib, Dar'a or in the north-east might also result in risks not only to Syrian civilians, but also for international peace and security. As we know, many of those areas contain external and international forces. Conflict there might entail confrontations with those forces, thereby leading us down a slippery slope towards regional or potential international conflict. Therefore, discussions at the international level on how to prevent that and on de-escalation are needed, and, although they are taking place, they also need to be very intensive.I was therefore very encouraged to see concrete discussions on de-escalation when I attended the ninth high-level Astana meeting yesterday, which covered the issue of Idlib in particular, as the three guarantors have a say and the means to avoid it. That round of discussions in Astana saw constructive discussions on how that might be achieved. While fully stressing the need to respect Syria's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, we saw at first-hand the parties engage actively on how to avoid a worst-case scenario in Idlib. Moreover, the working group, of which the United Nations is a member and a proactive supporter — as hundreds of thousands of people in Syria expect of us — held its second meeting on the release of detainees, abductees and bodies, and on the identification of missing persons. The members of the working group held constructive discussions on practical and concrete steps to address that key humanitarian issue. The guarantors informed us that they have secured the parties' support — which, if confirmed, is good news — for the activities taking place under the auspices of the working group, which is a positive development. As it is a matter of preliminary discussions, I hope that we will see progress with regard to that complex issue at the working group's next meeting, which we understand will be held in Ankara.De-escalation is indispensable, as the Syrians themselves are telling us, but it is only one of the ingredients necessary to move forward the political process. We also need to overcome concrete challenges to meaningfully follow through with the Geneva process so as to implement resolution 2254 (2015). As instructed by the Secretary-General, I have consulted with a broad spectrum of relevant stakeholders and proactively identified options for a meaningful relaunch of the United Nations-facilitated Geneva process. Over a period of two weeks, I conducted an exhaustive tour of consultations with members of the League of Arab States; representatives of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq; the European Union (EU) High Representative; representatives of several key European countries, Turkey, the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran; and all members of the Council, during what I believe was a very productive and useful retreat in Sweden; United States authorities during my visit to meet with them in Washington, D.C., several days ago; and also the Syrian Government and the opposition, with whom I had constructive discussions on the sidelines of the Astana meeting over the past two days. My deputy, Mr. Ramzy, was also in the region this past weekend in continuous political contact with regional stakeholders, and my chief of political affairs, Mr. Robert Dann, is visting China as we speak to exchange views with officials of that important member of the Security Council.What did I learn from that long tour? Not surprisingly, I returned to Geneva with a mixed picture. S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 4/12 18-14999 Clearly, significant differences remain, but there is also much common ground and interest on the need, first, to de-escalate, secondly, to form a constitutional committee under the auspices of the United Nations, thirdly, to facilitate the establishment of a safe, calm and neutral environment — leading to our shared goals in the political process — and, fourthly, to respect Syria's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. However, those commonalities risk getting glossed over, especially in the absence of serious international dialogue. I will say more on that later. During my tour, my message to all was the need — now more than ever — for robust, strong, proactive and urgent dialogue and consensus at the international level to create the minimum conditions necessary for a realistic and credible political process. As we know, much water has flowed under the bridge and much has happened since resolution 2254 (2015) was adopted. We are therefore becoming increasingly realistic and know that we need a credible political process that takes into account the current situation and does not forget resolution 2254 (2015).As the Secretariat, we are not sitting idle in that regard. We are assessing a number of creative options to update, revive and advance the Geneva-based political process. Let me state for the record that the United Nations remains ever-mobilized and -ready to work on the formation of a constitutional committee in accordance with the final statement of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi. I therefore welcome the intention of the Astana guarantors to actively and regularly engage with the United Nations in Geneva so as to see through a concrete follow-up to the statement since its adoption three and a half months ago.I was also pleased to see a significant number of Member States reaffirm the primacy of the United Nations-led Geneva process, in general, and the need for a constitutional committee working under United Nations auspices, when I was at the EU-United Nations Brussels conference from 24 to 25 April. Those at the conference nearly unanimously reiterated the message that the only solution to the crisis will be political and that only such a political solution will pave the way for reconstruction efforts. Also in Brussels, we saw the entire United Nations system highlight the increasing needs of millions of Syrians, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and neighbouring countries hosting refugees.Let me also note the important contribution of Syrian civil society in Brussels, in particular during a side event organized by the EU and my own Office. Those present did not shy away from debating with one another constructively and intensively on complex issues, such as transitional justice and sanctions. They all demanded the release of all detainees, abductees and missing persons. They all affirmed that any political solution must protect the right of refugees and IDPs. Despite their differences, Syrians — Syrian civil society — displayed a genuine commitment to dialogue and a spirit of negotiation that I hope can be replicated in the formal negotiations.In Brussels I also met with a group of Syrian women activists who stressed that not enough has been done to secure the direct participation of Syrian women in the political process. I committed to translating our collective commitment to that inclusion into concrete measures, and I will count on the Council's support to keep that promise. For instance, in future intra-Syrian talks, I will insist that the relevant number of seats be reserved exclusively for Syrian women. When I am criticized, I hope that the Council will support me. I know it will not be popular, but it needs to be done.Let me briefly touch on an issue that was raised by the civil society in Brussels and by many Syrians elsewhere who have been writing to us, that is, the possible implications of the newly adopted Law No. 10. We are quite aware of the concerns surrounding that law. We, as well as other United Nations partners, are seeking clarifications on the law's goals and repercussions, especially for refugees and IDPs who do not have access to legal documentation.Let me conclude with two bottom lines.First, de-escalation is critical between the Syrian and international stakeholders, both regional and global. We hope that the relevant players can re-establish some overarching rules of the road in that regard. We stand ready to facilitate such a discussion, with focused support from the Council and key countries for the good offices of the Secretary-General and myself.Secondly, we must revive the political process in terms of the constitutional committee, as well as in terms of some initial steps towards the establishment of a safe, calm and neutral environment. We stand ready to facilitate discussions on both. Let me stress that a critical component of either aspect of the political process is active, continuous and positive United 16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 5/12 Nations engagement with the Syrian parties. I repeat once again that we stand ready, today as always, to engage with the Syrian Government in Damascus. We will also continue our contacts with the opposition and Syrian civil society.To unlock and lock those two aspects, careful diplomacy is required more than ever — careful, but proactive diplomacy, including at a high level. Hence, we look with interest to the forthcoming visits to Moscow and meetings of Chancellor Merkel and, later on, President Macron with President Putin, which undoubtedly will not avoid the issue of a political process in Syria. The United Nations believes that there is an urgent need for high-level diplomacy to support de-escalation, avoid any miscalculation and ensure a genuine communication system about a sustainable end to the conflict. With the support of the Secretary-General, we will increase our own efforts to contribute to that endeavour, including by offering further ideas and —if required, which we hope it will be — bridging proposals.The President: I thank Mr. De Mistura for his briefing.I shall now give the floor to the members of the Security Council who wish to make statements.Ms. Eckels-Currie (United States of America): Since this is my first opportunity to congratulate you upon assuming the presidency, Madam President, I would like to do so at this time. I also thank Staffan for his briefing.Last week the world witnessed a new and extremely dangerous escalation in Syria. It should not surprise anyone on the Security Council that Iran was responsible. Iranian forces operating from Syrian territory launched a rocket attack against Israeli citizens — citizens of a sovereign State Member of the United Nations. The United States strongly supports Israel's right to act in self-defence. Iran's reckless and provocative acts last week prove what we have been saying: wherever Iran shows up in the Middle East, chaos follows. Last week's rocket attack against Israel is the latest in a pattern of destabilizing behaviour that is a dire threat to the region's stability.Iran's rocket attack against Israel shows something else too. It puts to bed any myths about why Iran is present in Syria, or what its true objectives might be. The fact is that Iran has installed offensive rocket and missile systems in Syria aimed at Israel. Iran has introduced those threats that were not present in Syria before the conflict; they are now. Iran, together with Hizbullah and other militias, is taking advantage of Syrian territory to establish bases and training camps. They are moving ever closer to Israel. The United States calls on Iran, Hizbullah and their other proxies to take no further provocative steps. If they do, Iran will bear full responsibility for its actions.It is also important to emphasize that Iran's actions do not serve the interests of the Iranian or the Syrian people. The Syrian people get no say in whether Iran threatens war against Syria's neighbours, but it is they who have to live with the consequences.All of us on the Security Council have an important choice to make: we can stay quiet and watch as Iran builds up the infrastructure to create another Hizbullah in Syria, or we can speak up and take steps to put real pressure on Iran to stop. For our part, the United States refuses to stay quiet. Russia in particular has a special responsibility here. Its troops are on the ground, sometimes alongside Iran's. Russia must know that Iran's provocative actions do nothing to help resolve the war in Syria. Russia must know that Iran's actions do just the opposite. They only inflame, prolong and widen the conflict.We heard once again from Staffan today that there has been very little progress on the political track. There has been no progress at all in Geneva, or following Russia's own conferences in Astana and Sochi. Since January, the United Nations was supposed assemble a new constitution drafting committee that would help kick off a new round of talks. The United Nations was supposed to have the ability to choose which people would serve on the committee, and the United Nations was supposed to be empowered to facilitate those talks. Instead, the Al-Assad regime has backtracked, stalled and then refused to cooperate.At the same time, the Syrian regime escalated its brutal military campaign. It seized eastern Ghouta, at the cost of thousands of lives and tens of thousands displaced. It used chemical weapons in Douma. Just yesterday, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission released a report determining that chlorine was used during attacks on 4 February in Saraqib.As reported by the Fact-finding Mission, the facts of that chemical-weapons attack bear the hallmarks S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 6/12 18-14999 of similar attacks conducted by the Al-Assad regime. As we have said before, the United States assesses that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons well over 50 times since the start of the civil war. The Al-Assad regime, with Iran's and Russia's full support, is choosing to pursue a military solution instead of a political solution, and that goes against everything we should stand for as the Security Council.In the aftermath of eastern Ghouta, the need for a real ceasefire could not be more obvious. Already, we see the Al-Assad regime launching new attacks in Idlib and the south-west. As Staffan noted, a Ghouta scenario in Idlib would be six times worse than the horror we saw in recent months in Ghouta. Air strikes in the south-west have tripled in the last month, even though that area is part of a de-escalation zone. Russia is supposed to be a sponsor of that zone. It must urgently meet its commitments to prevent the regime from carrying out attacks and stop Iranian militias from expanding their foothold in the south.Members of the Security Council — all of us — must push the political process forward. There is Council unity behind that goal. There is a clear blueprint for a political solution in resolution 2254 (2015), which we adopted unanimously. We have to send a clear message to the Al-Assad regime and its backers: the end of the conflict can be reached only via the United Nations-led political process. There must be constitutional reform and free and fair elections under United Nations supervision. If the Al-Assad regime does not comply, we need to be prepared to impose real costs on it for its years of defiance and the devastation it has wrought in Syria. If we take those steps, we can start to change the calculus of the Al-Assad regime and its allies in Syria. We can show them that further conflict is not in their interests and that it is time for them to genuinely commit to a political solution. But as we saw last week, the longer we wait, the greater the risk of confrontation. Now is the time to act to reduce tensions and address Iran's designs in Syria. That is how we can prevent further escalation and even worse suffering. There is no time to waste.Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. De Mistura for his briefing. We can see that his personal participation in the meeting on Syria in Astana enabled him to make it a substantive one. We appreciated his call for active diplomacy, which Russia has advocated for from the very beginning. We continue to make significant efforts to facilitate a political settlement in Syria despite the undermining effects of the aggressive action by the United States, the United Kingdom and France in April against a number of civilian structures in Syria. I discerned no sympathy about what happened there in the statement by my United States colleague, despite the fact that it was a blatant breach of international law and did absolutely nothing to advance any kind of a settlement. Furthermore, her statement had an odd, confrontational tone that I felt certainly did not correspond to the message that Mr. De Mistura wanted to convey to all of us today, which is that it will be important for diplomacy to function if the peace that the Syrians have awaited for so long is to finally be established on the ground.Unlike some Security Council member States, which prefer taking unilateral measures to finding ways to solve problems, Russia is focusing on steps to genuinely improve the situation on the ground and advance the prospects for a political settlement. As Mr. De Mistura already noted, the ninth meeting of the participants in the Astana process concluded yesterday in the capital of Kazakhstan, and the guarantors adopted a joint statement. We are grateful to the leadership of Kazakhstan for its steadfast support. The meeting in Astana considered concrete measures for resolving a number of political and humanitarian issues and analysed the situation in the de-escalation zones, which play a key role in maintaining the ceasefire regime, reducing the level of violence and generally stabilizing the situation in Syria. The importance was noted of increasing efforts to help all Syrians and restore normal civilian life and, to that end, of providing fast, safe and unhindered humanitarian access and essential humanitarian and medical assistance, and creating the conditions needed to enable the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes, as well as people's freedom of movement.A second meeting was held of the working group on the liberation of detainees and hostages to discuss the handover of the bodies of the dead and the search for missing persons, with the participation of experts from the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The importance of continuing joint efforts with the aim of building trust among the conflicting parties in Syria was emphasized. The Syrian Government declared its willingness to engage with the working group and decided to appoint a special representative on issues related to its work.16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 7/12 In line with the provisions of resolution 2254 (2015), the meeting affirmed its determination to continuing to promote a political settlement by helping to implement the recommendations of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress held in Sochi. The consultations with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General and the Syrian parties will continue, with a view to establishing the conditions conducive to starting the work of a constitutional committee in Geneva as soon as possible, whose parameters will have to be agreed on by the Syrians themselves. We will get nowhere without their consensus, so there is no point in proposing artificial frameworks for the process, especially if they are based on provisional plans of some kind. Thanks to the Astana process, we have succeeded in generating momentum for a political process based on intra-Syrian talks under the auspices of the United Nations, although, as we have noted, the triple alliance's aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic has significantly limited the room for manoeuvre in that regard.Concerted efforts by the guarantor countries are bringing us steadily closer to eliminating the presence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Jabhat Al-Nusra and other terrorist groups altogether. The recent situation in Syria has continued to be difficult. The guarantor countries' efforts are certainly not being helped by provocative initiatives from external actors, which merely strengthen radical sentiments among groups opposing the legitimate Government and fuel their reluctance to work for negotiated solutions.In Damascus, the operation to liberate the southern regions and suburbs of the capital from ISIL-affiliated groups continues, but Yalda, Babila and Bayt Saham are now fully under the Syrian authorities' control and civilian life there is returning. Russian specialists are helping the Syrian authorities to restore civilian infrastructure. Mines are being cleared, socially significant facilities are being rebuilt and electricity and water services are being restored. In eastern Ghouta, some 65,000 residents previously evacuated from the area have returned to their homes. However, in some other regions where the Syrian Government lacks access, the situation has continued to deteriorate. That is especially true of the Rukban and Al-Tuwaihina refugee camps, as well as the former ISIL capital, Raqqa, where the humanitarian situation is disastrous. Measures must be taken to rectify it without delay. The solution is simple — restore Damascus's sovereignty over those territories as soon as possible.Government forces and Palestinian volunteers, with aerial and artillery support, have continued to combat fierce resistance from terrorist detachments in the Palestinian refugee camp in Yarmouk. The militias wounded several dozen civilians in mortar strikes on residential areas in the north-east area of the camp. In the past week, the territory held by the illegal armed groups in Yarmouk has been significantly reduced.The Syrian army's assault on ISIL positions in Deir ez-Zor province has also been ramped up. ISIL's adherents have incurred considerable losses in manpower and equipment and have been driven out of an area of about 1,500 square kilometres. A large-scale operation to eliminate ISIL is being conducted in the eastern part of Syria with the aim of completely defeating the terrorists based in hard-to-reach desert areas, who have been increasing their attacks on Government forces in the Euphrates region and Homs province.We will continue the difficult work of restoring peace in Syria. Frankly, we are disturbed by some international and regional actors' disrespectful attitude to the issue of Syrian sovereignty, of which we have recently seen alarming manifestations. It is important to understand that this will not help to normalize the situation in Syria or the region as a whole. It fuels the conflict and reduces the prospects for a political settlement. For example, how can we be sure that reckless and illegal actions similar to those that occurred a month ago will not be repeated on some other trumped-up pretext? The reckless conduct of a number of international and regional players who claim to have common sense has considerably slowed progress regarding a settlement of the situation in Syria. If they cannot or will not help us with that, they should at least not interfere.In conclusion, I would like to touch briefly on the remarks by my American colleague. Basically, more than half of her statement was about Iran, not Syria, and Syria is the item on our agenda today, after all. I would also like to ask the Americans some questions we have about that. Before they blame Russia or Iran, I would like to ask what the reason is for the presence of United States forces in Syria and what their real objective is. The territories under their control have become grey areas where extremists of various stripes and real terrorists roam freely. In particular, what is going on with the several hundred ISIL followers who are being held by forces loyal to the United States under United States oversight in the region beyond the S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 8/12 18-14999 Euphrates? They are not being investigated, and nor are they being returned to their countries of origin. We are worried that ISIL will re-emerge in those areas when the United States withdraws from them, which it must do sooner or later.In conclusion, I would like to once again assure the Council of Russia's willingness to support any diplomatic efforts that can bring an end to the miseries of the Syrian people and peace to that long-suffering land.Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): I would like to begin by thanking Mr. De Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, for his briefing. I appreciate his tireless efforts to find a political solution to the conflict.In recent weeks various members of the international community have made tremendous efforts to restore momentum in the political process. China welcomes the latest round of Astana talks and its joint communiqué, and salutes Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkey and Iran for their efforts. We hope that this dialogue will continue to play a positive role in helping to maintain a ceasefire in Syria and advance the Geneva negotiations.China has always maintained that a political solution is the only possible option where the issue of Syria is concerned, and that achieving that goal will require efforts on the international, regional and national fronts. First, the international community should continue to give its support to the United Nations, as the main channel for mediation, and to Mr. De Mistura's efforts to relaunch the Geneva negotiations as soon as possible, on a basis of full respect for Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity and with a view to helping the conflicting parties to engage in negotiations on political governance, the Constitution, elections and counter-terrorism. The Council should remain united in moving the Syrian political process forward.Secondly, the countries involved in the region should take the country's long-term interests and stability into consideration and play a constructive role in helping to find a political solution. China notes that there have been attacks on targets inside Syria. We hope that the parties concerned will remain calm, show restraint and work together to maintain regional peace and stability.Thirdly, both the Syrian Government and the opposition, based on concern for the future of their country and the fundamental interests of their people, should proceed to participate in the Geneva negotiations without preconditions, in accordance with the principle of a dialogue that is Syrian-owned and -led, and on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015), with a view to actively engaging in gradual efforts to reach a settlement that is acceptable to all the parties.For its part, China has been working relentlessly to find a solution. On 13 and 14 May, in the first instance of such an event being held on Syria in China, we hosted an international symposium in Shanghai on the prospects for a political settlement to the Syrian issue. It was attended by Xie Xiaoyan, China's Special Envoy for Syria, a representative of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, and the Special Envoys of the United Kingdom and France for Syria, as well as experts and scholars from many countries. Participants held in-depth discussions on the prospects for a solution, the factors bearing on a political settlement and the role of the international community. Our Special Envoy remains in close contact with the parties concerned in his continuing efforts to help reach a solution. Together with the rest of the international community, China stands ready to continue to play a positive and constructive role in finding a political solution to the issue.Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): We thank the Special Envoy for Syria, Mr. De Mistura, for his update, and we were glad to hear some encouraging notes of optimism in his briefing.Despite the numerous problems on the humanitarian and political fronts in Syria, Kazakhstan believes that it is imperative to continue to promote a settlement of the crisis while implementing resolution 2254 (2015). We are glad that at their meetings held on 14 and 15 May in Astana, the representatives of Syria's Government and opposition, along with those of the guarantor States, unanimously confirmed the importance of continuing the process. Among other issues, they addressed the importance of increasing efforts to ensure compliance with the various agreements reached during the previous eight rounds of the Astana talks. On the other hand, they also agreed that Geneva should remain the main international platform from which to seek and implement a political settlement of the Syrian crisis. It will also be important to continue to support the aims of the Astana talks and further Geneva negotiations, while ultimately merging those important platforms with the aim of achieving positive results.16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 9/12 We thank the Special Envoy for his consultations with various Foreign Ministers at the recent summit of the League of Arab States, as well as with Ms. Federica Mogherini, the European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. His high-level meetings in Moscow, Tehran, Riyadh and Ankara, as well as his consultations with several European ministers and senior representatives of the United States, are also commendable. We are encouraged by his summary today of his meetings and the outcomes of the Astana process, and we note his hopes for progress and his readiness to increase his own efforts and those of several of the principal stakeholders to revive the political process.We can all see that de-confliction and the precautionary measures to safeguard protected sites under humanitarian law are working. So far this year, 500 additional sites have been de-conflicted, as the process is known. Their coordinates have been voluntarily submitted through the United Nations, and today the total number of sites stands at 661.We are hearing a number of continuing questions and concerns about the outlook for Idlib, which should certainly be our top priority, simply because it has such a large population of vulnerable ordinary citizens. We agree with Mr. De Mistura that since Idlib is six times larger than eastern Ghouta, and therefore has six times more civilian residents, it is in an extremely vulnerable position. We cannot afford a war in Idlib and we therefore call on the main stakeholders with an influence on the conflicting parties to hold negotiations at the national and local levels and in the wider region in order to mitigate the potential tensions.We are impressed by the courageous stance of and the sacrifices made by the United Nations, the Red Crescent, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Norwegian Refugee Council, which are serving under the most challenging circumstances.To conclude, we also hope that the Brussels Conference, held on 24 and 25 April, will help to generate conditions conducive to the peaceful resolution of the Syrian crisis.Finally, we emphasize once again that the most important condition for the settlement of the Syrian crisis is a political process, through direct dialogue and the use of confidence-building measures among the parties, without which there can be no lasting results. We should not forget that it is the Syrians themselves who should begin to shape the future political system of the Syrian State, with the necessary legislative reforms, its territorial and administrative structure, and presidential and parliamentary elections, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015).Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We express our gratitude for the briefing that we heard from Mr. Staffan de Mistura, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, to whom we reiterate our support in the discharge of his duties.Once again we cannot but express our sorrow at the fact that this conflict has gone on for six years now and we are still witnessing the ongoing siege and violence suffered by the Syrian people, mainly children, who, in addition to living with the psychological aftermath of the situation, are also in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. We deplore any act of violence that puts human lives at risk and therefore call for an end to the violence and urge the parties to refrain from any hostile, provocative or unilateral actions, in order to prevent any further suffering of the Syrian people and any further destabilization of the region.We welcome the holding of the summit of the three ceasefire guarantors in Ankara, Turkey, in March. We will be focusing closely on the next summit, which will be sponsored by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Likewise, we welcome the recent Astana meeting. We deem its outcome positive, as were the agreements reached one year ago exactly, when the important de-escalation zones were established. We believe that that international initiative has served to reduce the level of violence and has facilitated, and will continue to facilitate, the path to peace and stability in Syria.We therefore call for greater coordination among the local authorities within the de-escalation zones, humanitarian agencies and the Syrian Government, which will make it possible to improve the living conditions of the local population, with a view to contributing to international efforts to end the conflict in Syria.We call once again for efforts to continue with respect to the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), so as to ensure safe, sustained and unhindered humanitarian access to all those who require it. The protection of the civilian population and civilian infrastructure must also be a priority within the S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 10/12 18-14999 framework of respect for international law and international humanitarian law.We deem imperative the voluntary return of internally displaced persons in a safe and dignified manner, as soon as the situation permits. For that to happen, demining will be vital in those areas where it is necessary. We would urge that the political dialogue agenda continue to focus on the release of detainees and abductees, as well as on the identification of missing or deceased persons.We stress the efforts made towards the voluntary return of thousands of people to eastern Ghouta and other cities north and south of Damascus and their subsequent full return. My delegation would draw the attention of the Security Council to the need to protect thousands of innocent civilians, including children and the elderly, and move them to Idlib. It is urgent and pressing that peace be maintained and any escalation of violence avoided in that area, as the aftermath could be tragic.We believe that measures must continue to be taken to reduce the level of violence on the ground, promote confidence among the parties involved, alleviate the humanitarian situation and promote ongoing initiatives aimed at finding a peaceful political solution. The process must take place on the basis of the various initiatives taken and meetings held at different levels. We therefore underscore once again the commitments made at the Syrian National Dialogue Congress, held in Sochi on 30 January, with a focus on strengthening the United Nations-led political process in the framework of the road map set out in resolution 2254 (2015), in particular through the drafting of a new constitution and the establishment of a constitutional committee, which we believe must be representative and impartial. We hope that the work of that committee, in Geneva, should start as soon as possible and should be active and dynamic and include the participation of all parties to the conflict.We welcome the good offices and mediation of the Secretary-General and his close collaboration with the members of the Security Council in the quest for a peaceful solution to the crisis in Syria.To conclude, we reject any attempt to divide or fragment Syria along ethnic lines or to foster sectarianism there. It is the Syrian people themselves who must freely decide their future and their political leadership, in the framework of their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, without any external pressure or interference.We reiterate that the only way to resolve the conflict in Syria is through a Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process that is inclusive and based on consultation and dialogue and that will allow for a peaceful solution to be reached among all the parties involved.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I had not intended to speak today in the Chamber, but I wanted to respond to some of the things that we have just heard. I will therefore take this opportunity to thank Staffan de Mistura and his team for all their work, which is not proving as fast or as productive as all of us would like, but I think that we are very grateful to Staffan for all his efforts. I was also interested to hear the Chinese account of the work of their envoy.We all know what needs to be done. We have had very many discussions in this Chamber and in the Consultations Room about Syria. I think that what we struggle with is how to get it done and how to take the next step, so I hope that when we leave the Chamber and go next door into closed consultations, we can actually have a proper discussion, without polemics, about what it will take to get the constitutional committee up and running; what are the concrete steps that need to be taken and how we as the Council can best facilitate and support that; and what it takes to get Idlib protected. Lots of speakers today have referred to Idlib; I think that we all know its importance, scale and significance. I would urge those Astana progenitors to do what they can to ensure that on the ground, people in Idlib are safe and that we avert a humanitarian catastrophe there. But I would like to have a proper discussion next door about how the Council can actually support that.I wanted to turn to the issue of the Syrian Government engaging with the United Nations. The Russian representative referred to backsliding from a political settlement and entrenching Syrian unwillingness for a negotiated solution. I think that those two statements are very damning, but they are not damning about us; they are damning about the Syrian regime. We really need all those with influence on Syria, including Russia and Iran, to encourage it to set aside a military strategy as a way to resolve the conflict and to engage with the United Nations across the board, so that we can get back to Geneva and to a political settlement. It is not we in the West who are stopping 16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 11/12 that happening. The onus is truly on Syria to follow the will of the Security Council and its resolutions and to allow the United Nations to do its work to help the people of Syria. Those are the main things I wanted to say, but I would like to touch on three more points as well, if I may.We support what the Special Envoy said about bringing women in, which I think is long overdue, and he can count on the United Kingdom's full support for that. I would also like to refer to Iran and the strikes on Israel from Syrian territory, on which we are in full agreement with the United States representative's comments and have been very vocal about in public. I also want to comment on the Russian representative's remarks about the air strikes. I will not rehearse why France, the United States and the United Kingdom took the action we did, except to say that we did it to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, and in doing so we helped to protect civilians on the ground, deterred and degraded Syria's ability to use chemical weapons and thereby upheld the global prohibition on weapons of mass destruction.While I think those things remain very important, they should not be used by anyone on the Council as a reason to let the Syrian Government off the hook where engaging with the United Nations on the political process is concerned. The political process has been essential since 2012, when the Geneva talks were started. It has been increasingly essential since then, and it continues to be essential now. I therefore hope that when we go next door we can have a very detailed discussion about how we as the Council can get back to the spirit of Sweden and actually help Staffan de Mistura and his team do something concrete to achieve that, and have no more mud-slinging.The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting.I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.Mr. Mounzer (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): To begin with, the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom have tried to promote false claims justifying their aggression against sovereign States, particularly my country, Syria, with the aim of concealing their direct involvement in terrorism and their part in the responsibility for the bloodshed in Syria. I would like to say to them that the testimony, as cited in the media, of the thousands of Syrians who have escaped the blockades of armed terrorist groups in eastern Ghouta, has proved that those countries have been involved in making those citizens suffer through their support of those terrorist groups. Through their positions, their malicious acts and their illegal occupation of various areas of Syria, they have shown that, contrary to their claims, they cannot let go of their history of greed, occupation and imperialism. When speaking in the Council, they claim falsely that they are trying to find a political solution to the situation in Syria, but let me point out, briefly, that we have been able to defeat their agenda in Aleppo and eastern Ghouta, and we will be able to ensure that they cannot win in any part of my country.For the past seven years, since the beginning of the terrorist war in Syria, the United States, Britain and France have been working relentlessly to support and help conduct that war. They have also used the United Nations as a political tool to put pressure on the Syrian Government to implement their hegemonic agenda, interfere in our internal affairs and destabilize my country. They have not used the United Nations to fight terrorism and its sponsors or to help Syria overcome the suffering inflicted on it by armed terrorist groups, which should have been the goal.The Special Envoy devoted part of his statement to discussing the humanitarian situation. In that regard, I want to reiterate that the Syrian Government gives priority to providing every kind of humanitarian assistance to all Syrians in need, wherever they are in Syria. That is our duty, and we are doing our duty. The legal and constitutional obligations established under international decisions and Security Council resolutions on combating terrorism obliged my Government to undertake military operations in eastern Ghouta in order to rescue civilians from the armed terrorist groups holding them hostage and using them for years as human shields. In that regard, I want to state that contrary to some false narratives, the successful military operations conducted by the Syrian Arab Army and its allies against the armed terrorist groups controlling a number of areas that the United Nations has classified as besieged or hard to reach — along with the settlement and reconciliation agreements — have all mitigated civilians' suffering, reduced the numbers of those areas and facilitated humanitarian access to them, including eastern Ghouta.S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 12/12 18-14999 We deplore the fact that the United States speaks of its eagerness to reach a political agreement while it has been committing acts of aggression against my country based on lies, simply because it is working to give support to the armed groups because they have suffered losses in eastern Ghouta. It was the United States that supported Israel's aggression on 9 May when Israel was unable to protect its own proxy terrorist groups and implement its conspiracy against my country's unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Israel has continued its dangerous acts of aggression, which would not have been possible without the continuing unstinting support of the United States Government, because it enjoys impunity as a result of the support it has from the United States in the Security Council, enabling Israel to continue its terrorist acts threatening international peace and security in the region and the world. The Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms that through its military and armed forces it is able and ready to fend off all acts of aggression against its sovereignty and independence. However, we want to reiterate that any attempts to support this failing terrorism will not work. Such flagrant violations will not present obstacles to us in combating terrorism throughout Syrian territory.Yesterday we concluded round nine of the Astana process, and we are pleased with the results. We thank the delegations of Russia, Iran and the host country, Kazakhstan, for making the Astana process a success with regard to combating terrorism. The outcome document of the meeting stresses the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic against any external entities that attempt to violate them.In cooperation with our friends and allies, the Syrian army has succeeded in liberating eastern Ghouta and the southern area of Damascus, making the capital and its surrounding areas safe. With the cooperation of our friends and brothers, we have also expelled the terrorists from the northern area of Homs and the southern area of Hama. Today we reaffirm that we will continue to fight terrorism and to work to liberate each and every part of our territory from terrorism and from countries that seek to undermine our sovereignty.In conclusion, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic will spare no effort to support all genuine efforts to arrive at a political solution whereby Syrians, and only Syrians, will decide their future and make choices aimed at safeguarding Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity.The President: The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor to make a further statement.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I just wanted to comment on the Syrian representative's last statement, in which he said that the Syrian Arab Republic will spare no effort to arrive at a political solution. That is obviously a welcome statement. I would like to ask him if he could tell the Council, or is willing to say today, that Syria will put the same amount of effort into engaging with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria and with the Council in order to take concrete steps to get the Geneva process to work and to get a constitutional committee off the ground. If Syria were able to make that commitment today in the Chamber, I believe that would unlock a lot of things for the Council.The President: The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic has asked for the floor to make a further statement. I now give him the floor.Mr. Mounzer (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): We have said time and again that we are working with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria. A delegation from the Syrian Arab Republic is working directly with him. We are eager, as we have said repeatedly, to find a peaceful, Syrian-led solution to the Syrian crisis.The President: There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.
The Situation In The Middle East This Record Contains The Text Of Speeches Delivered In English And Of The Translation Of Speeches Delivered In Other Languages. ; United Nations S/PV.8260 Security Council Seventy-third year 8260th meeting Wednesday, 16 May 2018, 10 a.m. New York Provisional President: Ms. Wronecka. . (Poland) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Djédjé Equatorial Guinea. . M. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Russian Federation. . Mr. Polyanskiy Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Ms. Eckels-Currie Agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-14999 (E) *1814999* S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 2/12 18-14999 The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East The President: In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary- General for Syria, to participate in this meeting. Mr. De Mistura is joining today's meeting via video-teleconference from Geneva. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I give the floor to Mr. De Mistura. Mr. De Mistura: When I last briefed the Security Council on 9 April, it was at an emergency meeting (see S/PV.8225). On that occasion, I warned of the threats to regional and international peace and security arising from developments in or related to Syria. I know that today it is not an emergency meeting. However, the circumstances of an emergency very much remain. I do not need to remind members that tensions are high and regional and international confrontations have occurred several times. Allow me to highlight some recent events since 9 April. On 13 April, the United States, France and the United Kingdom conducted missile strikes in response to the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in eastern Ghouta. Those countries say that the strikes targeted three research and production facilities near Damascus and Homs. On 29 April, strikes were reported on Syrian Government military facilities in Hamah and Aleppo. Some media outlets attributed those strikes to Israel, alleging that those killed included Iranian personnel. Neither Israel nor Iran responded to those claims. On 8 May, strikes were reported just south of Damascus. Syrian State media attributed those strikes to Israel. Israel did not confirm that claim. Israel then said that it had detected "irregular Iranian activity" in the occupied Golan, which it put on high alert. Between 9 and 10 May, Israel carried out dozens of strikes against presumed Iranian and Syrian Government military targets across southern Syria. The Israeli authorities claim that they were responding to Iranian forces firing rockets from Syrian territory at Israeli military targets in the occupied Syrian Golan. Iran condemned the Israeli strikes and denied those claims. We are not is a position to independently verify every aspect of those incidents. However, even an incomplete picture shows the troubling trajectory of the increasingly frequent and ever more intense international confrontations over Syria, unprecedented since 1973. As the Security Council knows, the Secretary- General has followed those developments with great concern and called for restraint by all parties in order to avoid any acts that could escalate the situation and worsen the suffering of the Syrian people. The Secretary-General stressed that the United Nations has a "duty to remind Member States that there is an obligation, particularly when dealing with matters of peace and security, to act consistently with the Charter of the United Nations, and with international law in general." (S/PV.8233, p. 2) On the issue of chemical weapons, let me again echo the Secretary-General's call for the Security Council to "agree on a dedicated mechanism for ensuring effective accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria" (ibid.). As the Council well knows, as of now, we await the results of the ongoing investigation by the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons following its visit to Douma, with a report to be issued to States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, we have also seen worrying developments elsewhere in Syria. Evacuations from eastern Ghouta were similarly repeated in the eastern Qalamoun area, southern Damascus and northern rural Homs. First, on the military escalation, the pattern has been one of incoming air strikes and artillery and outgoing mortars and rockets towards Damascus. Then there was a negotiation, followed by an agreement for the evacuation of those civilians and fighters unwilling to remain under Syrian Government control or Russian Federation protection guarantees. We have also seen similar evacuation agreements 16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 3/12 being discussed in Idlib province but in a completely different format — the reverse format. This time we are talking about civilians and fighters in Government-controlled areas, namely, Kafraya and Fo'ah, while considering evacuations — beginning with medical evacuations — following the three-year siege and intermittent attacks from armed groups surrounding that area.Let me share with the Council a recurrent concern that I know that all members have. If civilians and fighters are simply funnelled into northern Syria — mostly into Idlib — then that might only postpone another conflict affecting many additional people, which I will discuss later. Therefore, it is important to keep close watch on future developments in Idlib province. Meanwhile, civilians continue to pay a terrible price. To be precise, 110,000 people have been evacuated to north-western Syria and Operation Euphrates Shield areas in the past two months. Many of them are reportedly traumatized and in urgent need of assistance and protection. Humanitarian partners are overwhelmed and stretched quite thin by the scale of those evacuations, but continue to do their utmost to respond to the growing needs, with the Council's assistance.Returning to the topic of Idlib, if a Ghouta scenario were to play out there, the situation could be six times worse, affecting 2.3 million people, half of whom are already internally displaced and would have nowhere else to go. But that is not purely a question of the Syrians' suffering. We fear that any substantial escalation in Idlib, Dar'a or in the north-east might also result in risks not only to Syrian civilians, but also for international peace and security. As we know, many of those areas contain external and international forces. Conflict there might entail confrontations with those forces, thereby leading us down a slippery slope towards regional or potential international conflict. Therefore, discussions at the international level on how to prevent that and on de-escalation are needed, and, although they are taking place, they also need to be very intensive.I was therefore very encouraged to see concrete discussions on de-escalation when I attended the ninth high-level Astana meeting yesterday, which covered the issue of Idlib in particular, as the three guarantors have a say and the means to avoid it. That round of discussions in Astana saw constructive discussions on how that might be achieved. While fully stressing the need to respect Syria's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, we saw at first-hand the parties engage actively on how to avoid a worst-case scenario in Idlib. Moreover, the working group, of which the United Nations is a member and a proactive supporter — as hundreds of thousands of people in Syria expect of us — held its second meeting on the release of detainees, abductees and bodies, and on the identification of missing persons. The members of the working group held constructive discussions on practical and concrete steps to address that key humanitarian issue. The guarantors informed us that they have secured the parties' support — which, if confirmed, is good news — for the activities taking place under the auspices of the working group, which is a positive development. As it is a matter of preliminary discussions, I hope that we will see progress with regard to that complex issue at the working group's next meeting, which we understand will be held in Ankara.De-escalation is indispensable, as the Syrians themselves are telling us, but it is only one of the ingredients necessary to move forward the political process. We also need to overcome concrete challenges to meaningfully follow through with the Geneva process so as to implement resolution 2254 (2015). As instructed by the Secretary-General, I have consulted with a broad spectrum of relevant stakeholders and proactively identified options for a meaningful relaunch of the United Nations-facilitated Geneva process. Over a period of two weeks, I conducted an exhaustive tour of consultations with members of the League of Arab States; representatives of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq; the European Union (EU) High Representative; representatives of several key European countries, Turkey, the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran; and all members of the Council, during what I believe was a very productive and useful retreat in Sweden; United States authorities during my visit to meet with them in Washington, D.C., several days ago; and also the Syrian Government and the opposition, with whom I had constructive discussions on the sidelines of the Astana meeting over the past two days. My deputy, Mr. Ramzy, was also in the region this past weekend in continuous political contact with regional stakeholders, and my chief of political affairs, Mr. Robert Dann, is visting China as we speak to exchange views with officials of that important member of the Security Council.What did I learn from that long tour? Not surprisingly, I returned to Geneva with a mixed picture. S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 4/12 18-14999 Clearly, significant differences remain, but there is also much common ground and interest on the need, first, to de-escalate, secondly, to form a constitutional committee under the auspices of the United Nations, thirdly, to facilitate the establishment of a safe, calm and neutral environment — leading to our shared goals in the political process — and, fourthly, to respect Syria's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. However, those commonalities risk getting glossed over, especially in the absence of serious international dialogue. I will say more on that later. During my tour, my message to all was the need — now more than ever — for robust, strong, proactive and urgent dialogue and consensus at the international level to create the minimum conditions necessary for a realistic and credible political process. As we know, much water has flowed under the bridge and much has happened since resolution 2254 (2015) was adopted. We are therefore becoming increasingly realistic and know that we need a credible political process that takes into account the current situation and does not forget resolution 2254 (2015).As the Secretariat, we are not sitting idle in that regard. We are assessing a number of creative options to update, revive and advance the Geneva-based political process. Let me state for the record that the United Nations remains ever-mobilized and -ready to work on the formation of a constitutional committee in accordance with the final statement of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi. I therefore welcome the intention of the Astana guarantors to actively and regularly engage with the United Nations in Geneva so as to see through a concrete follow-up to the statement since its adoption three and a half months ago.I was also pleased to see a significant number of Member States reaffirm the primacy of the United Nations-led Geneva process, in general, and the need for a constitutional committee working under United Nations auspices, when I was at the EU-United Nations Brussels conference from 24 to 25 April. Those at the conference nearly unanimously reiterated the message that the only solution to the crisis will be political and that only such a political solution will pave the way for reconstruction efforts. Also in Brussels, we saw the entire United Nations system highlight the increasing needs of millions of Syrians, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and neighbouring countries hosting refugees.Let me also note the important contribution of Syrian civil society in Brussels, in particular during a side event organized by the EU and my own Office. Those present did not shy away from debating with one another constructively and intensively on complex issues, such as transitional justice and sanctions. They all demanded the release of all detainees, abductees and missing persons. They all affirmed that any political solution must protect the right of refugees and IDPs. Despite their differences, Syrians — Syrian civil society — displayed a genuine commitment to dialogue and a spirit of negotiation that I hope can be replicated in the formal negotiations.In Brussels I also met with a group of Syrian women activists who stressed that not enough has been done to secure the direct participation of Syrian women in the political process. I committed to translating our collective commitment to that inclusion into concrete measures, and I will count on the Council's support to keep that promise. For instance, in future intra-Syrian talks, I will insist that the relevant number of seats be reserved exclusively for Syrian women. When I am criticized, I hope that the Council will support me. I know it will not be popular, but it needs to be done.Let me briefly touch on an issue that was raised by the civil society in Brussels and by many Syrians elsewhere who have been writing to us, that is, the possible implications of the newly adopted Law No. 10. We are quite aware of the concerns surrounding that law. We, as well as other United Nations partners, are seeking clarifications on the law's goals and repercussions, especially for refugees and IDPs who do not have access to legal documentation.Let me conclude with two bottom lines.First, de-escalation is critical between the Syrian and international stakeholders, both regional and global. We hope that the relevant players can re-establish some overarching rules of the road in that regard. We stand ready to facilitate such a discussion, with focused support from the Council and key countries for the good offices of the Secretary-General and myself.Secondly, we must revive the political process in terms of the constitutional committee, as well as in terms of some initial steps towards the establishment of a safe, calm and neutral environment. We stand ready to facilitate discussions on both. Let me stress that a critical component of either aspect of the political process is active, continuous and positive United 16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 5/12 Nations engagement with the Syrian parties. I repeat once again that we stand ready, today as always, to engage with the Syrian Government in Damascus. We will also continue our contacts with the opposition and Syrian civil society.To unlock and lock those two aspects, careful diplomacy is required more than ever — careful, but proactive diplomacy, including at a high level. Hence, we look with interest to the forthcoming visits to Moscow and meetings of Chancellor Merkel and, later on, President Macron with President Putin, which undoubtedly will not avoid the issue of a political process in Syria. The United Nations believes that there is an urgent need for high-level diplomacy to support de-escalation, avoid any miscalculation and ensure a genuine communication system about a sustainable end to the conflict. With the support of the Secretary-General, we will increase our own efforts to contribute to that endeavour, including by offering further ideas and —if required, which we hope it will be — bridging proposals.The President: I thank Mr. De Mistura for his briefing.I shall now give the floor to the members of the Security Council who wish to make statements.Ms. Eckels-Currie (United States of America): Since this is my first opportunity to congratulate you upon assuming the presidency, Madam President, I would like to do so at this time. I also thank Staffan for his briefing.Last week the world witnessed a new and extremely dangerous escalation in Syria. It should not surprise anyone on the Security Council that Iran was responsible. Iranian forces operating from Syrian territory launched a rocket attack against Israeli citizens — citizens of a sovereign State Member of the United Nations. The United States strongly supports Israel's right to act in self-defence. Iran's reckless and provocative acts last week prove what we have been saying: wherever Iran shows up in the Middle East, chaos follows. Last week's rocket attack against Israel is the latest in a pattern of destabilizing behaviour that is a dire threat to the region's stability.Iran's rocket attack against Israel shows something else too. It puts to bed any myths about why Iran is present in Syria, or what its true objectives might be. The fact is that Iran has installed offensive rocket and missile systems in Syria aimed at Israel. Iran has introduced those threats that were not present in Syria before the conflict; they are now. Iran, together with Hizbullah and other militias, is taking advantage of Syrian territory to establish bases and training camps. They are moving ever closer to Israel. The United States calls on Iran, Hizbullah and their other proxies to take no further provocative steps. If they do, Iran will bear full responsibility for its actions.It is also important to emphasize that Iran's actions do not serve the interests of the Iranian or the Syrian people. The Syrian people get no say in whether Iran threatens war against Syria's neighbours, but it is they who have to live with the consequences.All of us on the Security Council have an important choice to make: we can stay quiet and watch as Iran builds up the infrastructure to create another Hizbullah in Syria, or we can speak up and take steps to put real pressure on Iran to stop. For our part, the United States refuses to stay quiet. Russia in particular has a special responsibility here. Its troops are on the ground, sometimes alongside Iran's. Russia must know that Iran's provocative actions do nothing to help resolve the war in Syria. Russia must know that Iran's actions do just the opposite. They only inflame, prolong and widen the conflict.We heard once again from Staffan today that there has been very little progress on the political track. There has been no progress at all in Geneva, or following Russia's own conferences in Astana and Sochi. Since January, the United Nations was supposed assemble a new constitution drafting committee that would help kick off a new round of talks. The United Nations was supposed to have the ability to choose which people would serve on the committee, and the United Nations was supposed to be empowered to facilitate those talks. Instead, the Al-Assad regime has backtracked, stalled and then refused to cooperate.At the same time, the Syrian regime escalated its brutal military campaign. It seized eastern Ghouta, at the cost of thousands of lives and tens of thousands displaced. It used chemical weapons in Douma. Just yesterday, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission released a report determining that chlorine was used during attacks on 4 February in Saraqib.As reported by the Fact-finding Mission, the facts of that chemical-weapons attack bear the hallmarks S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 6/12 18-14999 of similar attacks conducted by the Al-Assad regime. As we have said before, the United States assesses that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons well over 50 times since the start of the civil war. The Al-Assad regime, with Iran's and Russia's full support, is choosing to pursue a military solution instead of a political solution, and that goes against everything we should stand for as the Security Council.In the aftermath of eastern Ghouta, the need for a real ceasefire could not be more obvious. Already, we see the Al-Assad regime launching new attacks in Idlib and the south-west. As Staffan noted, a Ghouta scenario in Idlib would be six times worse than the horror we saw in recent months in Ghouta. Air strikes in the south-west have tripled in the last month, even though that area is part of a de-escalation zone. Russia is supposed to be a sponsor of that zone. It must urgently meet its commitments to prevent the regime from carrying out attacks and stop Iranian militias from expanding their foothold in the south.Members of the Security Council — all of us — must push the political process forward. There is Council unity behind that goal. There is a clear blueprint for a political solution in resolution 2254 (2015), which we adopted unanimously. We have to send a clear message to the Al-Assad regime and its backers: the end of the conflict can be reached only via the United Nations-led political process. There must be constitutional reform and free and fair elections under United Nations supervision. If the Al-Assad regime does not comply, we need to be prepared to impose real costs on it for its years of defiance and the devastation it has wrought in Syria. If we take those steps, we can start to change the calculus of the Al-Assad regime and its allies in Syria. We can show them that further conflict is not in their interests and that it is time for them to genuinely commit to a political solution. But as we saw last week, the longer we wait, the greater the risk of confrontation. Now is the time to act to reduce tensions and address Iran's designs in Syria. That is how we can prevent further escalation and even worse suffering. There is no time to waste.Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. De Mistura for his briefing. We can see that his personal participation in the meeting on Syria in Astana enabled him to make it a substantive one. We appreciated his call for active diplomacy, which Russia has advocated for from the very beginning. We continue to make significant efforts to facilitate a political settlement in Syria despite the undermining effects of the aggressive action by the United States, the United Kingdom and France in April against a number of civilian structures in Syria. I discerned no sympathy about what happened there in the statement by my United States colleague, despite the fact that it was a blatant breach of international law and did absolutely nothing to advance any kind of a settlement. Furthermore, her statement had an odd, confrontational tone that I felt certainly did not correspond to the message that Mr. De Mistura wanted to convey to all of us today, which is that it will be important for diplomacy to function if the peace that the Syrians have awaited for so long is to finally be established on the ground.Unlike some Security Council member States, which prefer taking unilateral measures to finding ways to solve problems, Russia is focusing on steps to genuinely improve the situation on the ground and advance the prospects for a political settlement. As Mr. De Mistura already noted, the ninth meeting of the participants in the Astana process concluded yesterday in the capital of Kazakhstan, and the guarantors adopted a joint statement. We are grateful to the leadership of Kazakhstan for its steadfast support. The meeting in Astana considered concrete measures for resolving a number of political and humanitarian issues and analysed the situation in the de-escalation zones, which play a key role in maintaining the ceasefire regime, reducing the level of violence and generally stabilizing the situation in Syria. The importance was noted of increasing efforts to help all Syrians and restore normal civilian life and, to that end, of providing fast, safe and unhindered humanitarian access and essential humanitarian and medical assistance, and creating the conditions needed to enable the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes, as well as people's freedom of movement.A second meeting was held of the working group on the liberation of detainees and hostages to discuss the handover of the bodies of the dead and the search for missing persons, with the participation of experts from the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The importance of continuing joint efforts with the aim of building trust among the conflicting parties in Syria was emphasized. The Syrian Government declared its willingness to engage with the working group and decided to appoint a special representative on issues related to its work.16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 7/12 In line with the provisions of resolution 2254 (2015), the meeting affirmed its determination to continuing to promote a political settlement by helping to implement the recommendations of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress held in Sochi. The consultations with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General and the Syrian parties will continue, with a view to establishing the conditions conducive to starting the work of a constitutional committee in Geneva as soon as possible, whose parameters will have to be agreed on by the Syrians themselves. We will get nowhere without their consensus, so there is no point in proposing artificial frameworks for the process, especially if they are based on provisional plans of some kind. Thanks to the Astana process, we have succeeded in generating momentum for a political process based on intra-Syrian talks under the auspices of the United Nations, although, as we have noted, the triple alliance's aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic has significantly limited the room for manoeuvre in that regard.Concerted efforts by the guarantor countries are bringing us steadily closer to eliminating the presence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Jabhat Al-Nusra and other terrorist groups altogether. The recent situation in Syria has continued to be difficult. The guarantor countries' efforts are certainly not being helped by provocative initiatives from external actors, which merely strengthen radical sentiments among groups opposing the legitimate Government and fuel their reluctance to work for negotiated solutions.In Damascus, the operation to liberate the southern regions and suburbs of the capital from ISIL-affiliated groups continues, but Yalda, Babila and Bayt Saham are now fully under the Syrian authorities' control and civilian life there is returning. Russian specialists are helping the Syrian authorities to restore civilian infrastructure. Mines are being cleared, socially significant facilities are being rebuilt and electricity and water services are being restored. In eastern Ghouta, some 65,000 residents previously evacuated from the area have returned to their homes. However, in some other regions where the Syrian Government lacks access, the situation has continued to deteriorate. That is especially true of the Rukban and Al-Tuwaihina refugee camps, as well as the former ISIL capital, Raqqa, where the humanitarian situation is disastrous. Measures must be taken to rectify it without delay. The solution is simple — restore Damascus's sovereignty over those territories as soon as possible.Government forces and Palestinian volunteers, with aerial and artillery support, have continued to combat fierce resistance from terrorist detachments in the Palestinian refugee camp in Yarmouk. The militias wounded several dozen civilians in mortar strikes on residential areas in the north-east area of the camp. In the past week, the territory held by the illegal armed groups in Yarmouk has been significantly reduced.The Syrian army's assault on ISIL positions in Deir ez-Zor province has also been ramped up. ISIL's adherents have incurred considerable losses in manpower and equipment and have been driven out of an area of about 1,500 square kilometres. A large-scale operation to eliminate ISIL is being conducted in the eastern part of Syria with the aim of completely defeating the terrorists based in hard-to-reach desert areas, who have been increasing their attacks on Government forces in the Euphrates region and Homs province.We will continue the difficult work of restoring peace in Syria. Frankly, we are disturbed by some international and regional actors' disrespectful attitude to the issue of Syrian sovereignty, of which we have recently seen alarming manifestations. It is important to understand that this will not help to normalize the situation in Syria or the region as a whole. It fuels the conflict and reduces the prospects for a political settlement. For example, how can we be sure that reckless and illegal actions similar to those that occurred a month ago will not be repeated on some other trumped-up pretext? The reckless conduct of a number of international and regional players who claim to have common sense has considerably slowed progress regarding a settlement of the situation in Syria. If they cannot or will not help us with that, they should at least not interfere.In conclusion, I would like to touch briefly on the remarks by my American colleague. Basically, more than half of her statement was about Iran, not Syria, and Syria is the item on our agenda today, after all. I would also like to ask the Americans some questions we have about that. Before they blame Russia or Iran, I would like to ask what the reason is for the presence of United States forces in Syria and what their real objective is. The territories under their control have become grey areas where extremists of various stripes and real terrorists roam freely. In particular, what is going on with the several hundred ISIL followers who are being held by forces loyal to the United States under United States oversight in the region beyond the S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 8/12 18-14999 Euphrates? They are not being investigated, and nor are they being returned to their countries of origin. We are worried that ISIL will re-emerge in those areas when the United States withdraws from them, which it must do sooner or later.In conclusion, I would like to once again assure the Council of Russia's willingness to support any diplomatic efforts that can bring an end to the miseries of the Syrian people and peace to that long-suffering land.Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): I would like to begin by thanking Mr. De Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, for his briefing. I appreciate his tireless efforts to find a political solution to the conflict.In recent weeks various members of the international community have made tremendous efforts to restore momentum in the political process. China welcomes the latest round of Astana talks and its joint communiqué, and salutes Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkey and Iran for their efforts. We hope that this dialogue will continue to play a positive role in helping to maintain a ceasefire in Syria and advance the Geneva negotiations.China has always maintained that a political solution is the only possible option where the issue of Syria is concerned, and that achieving that goal will require efforts on the international, regional and national fronts. First, the international community should continue to give its support to the United Nations, as the main channel for mediation, and to Mr. De Mistura's efforts to relaunch the Geneva negotiations as soon as possible, on a basis of full respect for Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity and with a view to helping the conflicting parties to engage in negotiations on political governance, the Constitution, elections and counter-terrorism. The Council should remain united in moving the Syrian political process forward.Secondly, the countries involved in the region should take the country's long-term interests and stability into consideration and play a constructive role in helping to find a political solution. China notes that there have been attacks on targets inside Syria. We hope that the parties concerned will remain calm, show restraint and work together to maintain regional peace and stability.Thirdly, both the Syrian Government and the opposition, based on concern for the future of their country and the fundamental interests of their people, should proceed to participate in the Geneva negotiations without preconditions, in accordance with the principle of a dialogue that is Syrian-owned and -led, and on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015), with a view to actively engaging in gradual efforts to reach a settlement that is acceptable to all the parties.For its part, China has been working relentlessly to find a solution. On 13 and 14 May, in the first instance of such an event being held on Syria in China, we hosted an international symposium in Shanghai on the prospects for a political settlement to the Syrian issue. It was attended by Xie Xiaoyan, China's Special Envoy for Syria, a representative of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, and the Special Envoys of the United Kingdom and France for Syria, as well as experts and scholars from many countries. Participants held in-depth discussions on the prospects for a solution, the factors bearing on a political settlement and the role of the international community. Our Special Envoy remains in close contact with the parties concerned in his continuing efforts to help reach a solution. Together with the rest of the international community, China stands ready to continue to play a positive and constructive role in finding a political solution to the issue.Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): We thank the Special Envoy for Syria, Mr. De Mistura, for his update, and we were glad to hear some encouraging notes of optimism in his briefing.Despite the numerous problems on the humanitarian and political fronts in Syria, Kazakhstan believes that it is imperative to continue to promote a settlement of the crisis while implementing resolution 2254 (2015). We are glad that at their meetings held on 14 and 15 May in Astana, the representatives of Syria's Government and opposition, along with those of the guarantor States, unanimously confirmed the importance of continuing the process. Among other issues, they addressed the importance of increasing efforts to ensure compliance with the various agreements reached during the previous eight rounds of the Astana talks. On the other hand, they also agreed that Geneva should remain the main international platform from which to seek and implement a political settlement of the Syrian crisis. It will also be important to continue to support the aims of the Astana talks and further Geneva negotiations, while ultimately merging those important platforms with the aim of achieving positive results.16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 9/12 We thank the Special Envoy for his consultations with various Foreign Ministers at the recent summit of the League of Arab States, as well as with Ms. Federica Mogherini, the European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. His high-level meetings in Moscow, Tehran, Riyadh and Ankara, as well as his consultations with several European ministers and senior representatives of the United States, are also commendable. We are encouraged by his summary today of his meetings and the outcomes of the Astana process, and we note his hopes for progress and his readiness to increase his own efforts and those of several of the principal stakeholders to revive the political process.We can all see that de-confliction and the precautionary measures to safeguard protected sites under humanitarian law are working. So far this year, 500 additional sites have been de-conflicted, as the process is known. Their coordinates have been voluntarily submitted through the United Nations, and today the total number of sites stands at 661.We are hearing a number of continuing questions and concerns about the outlook for Idlib, which should certainly be our top priority, simply because it has such a large population of vulnerable ordinary citizens. We agree with Mr. De Mistura that since Idlib is six times larger than eastern Ghouta, and therefore has six times more civilian residents, it is in an extremely vulnerable position. We cannot afford a war in Idlib and we therefore call on the main stakeholders with an influence on the conflicting parties to hold negotiations at the national and local levels and in the wider region in order to mitigate the potential tensions.We are impressed by the courageous stance of and the sacrifices made by the United Nations, the Red Crescent, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Norwegian Refugee Council, which are serving under the most challenging circumstances.To conclude, we also hope that the Brussels Conference, held on 24 and 25 April, will help to generate conditions conducive to the peaceful resolution of the Syrian crisis.Finally, we emphasize once again that the most important condition for the settlement of the Syrian crisis is a political process, through direct dialogue and the use of confidence-building measures among the parties, without which there can be no lasting results. We should not forget that it is the Syrians themselves who should begin to shape the future political system of the Syrian State, with the necessary legislative reforms, its territorial and administrative structure, and presidential and parliamentary elections, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015).Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We express our gratitude for the briefing that we heard from Mr. Staffan de Mistura, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, to whom we reiterate our support in the discharge of his duties.Once again we cannot but express our sorrow at the fact that this conflict has gone on for six years now and we are still witnessing the ongoing siege and violence suffered by the Syrian people, mainly children, who, in addition to living with the psychological aftermath of the situation, are also in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. We deplore any act of violence that puts human lives at risk and therefore call for an end to the violence and urge the parties to refrain from any hostile, provocative or unilateral actions, in order to prevent any further suffering of the Syrian people and any further destabilization of the region.We welcome the holding of the summit of the three ceasefire guarantors in Ankara, Turkey, in March. We will be focusing closely on the next summit, which will be sponsored by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Likewise, we welcome the recent Astana meeting. We deem its outcome positive, as were the agreements reached one year ago exactly, when the important de-escalation zones were established. We believe that that international initiative has served to reduce the level of violence and has facilitated, and will continue to facilitate, the path to peace and stability in Syria.We therefore call for greater coordination among the local authorities within the de-escalation zones, humanitarian agencies and the Syrian Government, which will make it possible to improve the living conditions of the local population, with a view to contributing to international efforts to end the conflict in Syria.We call once again for efforts to continue with respect to the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), so as to ensure safe, sustained and unhindered humanitarian access to all those who require it. The protection of the civilian population and civilian infrastructure must also be a priority within the S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 10/12 18-14999 framework of respect for international law and international humanitarian law.We deem imperative the voluntary return of internally displaced persons in a safe and dignified manner, as soon as the situation permits. For that to happen, demining will be vital in those areas where it is necessary. We would urge that the political dialogue agenda continue to focus on the release of detainees and abductees, as well as on the identification of missing or deceased persons.We stress the efforts made towards the voluntary return of thousands of people to eastern Ghouta and other cities north and south of Damascus and their subsequent full return. My delegation would draw the attention of the Security Council to the need to protect thousands of innocent civilians, including children and the elderly, and move them to Idlib. It is urgent and pressing that peace be maintained and any escalation of violence avoided in that area, as the aftermath could be tragic.We believe that measures must continue to be taken to reduce the level of violence on the ground, promote confidence among the parties involved, alleviate the humanitarian situation and promote ongoing initiatives aimed at finding a peaceful political solution. The process must take place on the basis of the various initiatives taken and meetings held at different levels. We therefore underscore once again the commitments made at the Syrian National Dialogue Congress, held in Sochi on 30 January, with a focus on strengthening the United Nations-led political process in the framework of the road map set out in resolution 2254 (2015), in particular through the drafting of a new constitution and the establishment of a constitutional committee, which we believe must be representative and impartial. We hope that the work of that committee, in Geneva, should start as soon as possible and should be active and dynamic and include the participation of all parties to the conflict.We welcome the good offices and mediation of the Secretary-General and his close collaboration with the members of the Security Council in the quest for a peaceful solution to the crisis in Syria.To conclude, we reject any attempt to divide or fragment Syria along ethnic lines or to foster sectarianism there. It is the Syrian people themselves who must freely decide their future and their political leadership, in the framework of their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, without any external pressure or interference.We reiterate that the only way to resolve the conflict in Syria is through a Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process that is inclusive and based on consultation and dialogue and that will allow for a peaceful solution to be reached among all the parties involved.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I had not intended to speak today in the Chamber, but I wanted to respond to some of the things that we have just heard. I will therefore take this opportunity to thank Staffan de Mistura and his team for all their work, which is not proving as fast or as productive as all of us would like, but I think that we are very grateful to Staffan for all his efforts. I was also interested to hear the Chinese account of the work of their envoy.We all know what needs to be done. We have had very many discussions in this Chamber and in the Consultations Room about Syria. I think that what we struggle with is how to get it done and how to take the next step, so I hope that when we leave the Chamber and go next door into closed consultations, we can actually have a proper discussion, without polemics, about what it will take to get the constitutional committee up and running; what are the concrete steps that need to be taken and how we as the Council can best facilitate and support that; and what it takes to get Idlib protected. Lots of speakers today have referred to Idlib; I think that we all know its importance, scale and significance. I would urge those Astana progenitors to do what they can to ensure that on the ground, people in Idlib are safe and that we avert a humanitarian catastrophe there. But I would like to have a proper discussion next door about how the Council can actually support that.I wanted to turn to the issue of the Syrian Government engaging with the United Nations. The Russian representative referred to backsliding from a political settlement and entrenching Syrian unwillingness for a negotiated solution. I think that those two statements are very damning, but they are not damning about us; they are damning about the Syrian regime. We really need all those with influence on Syria, including Russia and Iran, to encourage it to set aside a military strategy as a way to resolve the conflict and to engage with the United Nations across the board, so that we can get back to Geneva and to a political settlement. It is not we in the West who are stopping 16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 11/12 that happening. The onus is truly on Syria to follow the will of the Security Council and its resolutions and to allow the United Nations to do its work to help the people of Syria. Those are the main things I wanted to say, but I would like to touch on three more points as well, if I may.We support what the Special Envoy said about bringing women in, which I think is long overdue, and he can count on the United Kingdom's full support for that. I would also like to refer to Iran and the strikes on Israel from Syrian territory, on which we are in full agreement with the United States representative's comments and have been very vocal about in public. I also want to comment on the Russian representative's remarks about the air strikes. I will not rehearse why France, the United States and the United Kingdom took the action we did, except to say that we did it to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, and in doing so we helped to protect civilians on the ground, deterred and degraded Syria's ability to use chemical weapons and thereby upheld the global prohibition on weapons of mass destruction.While I think those things remain very important, they should not be used by anyone on the Council as a reason to let the Syrian Government off the hook where engaging with the United Nations on the political process is concerned. The political process has been essential since 2012, when the Geneva talks were started. It has been increasingly essential since then, and it continues to be essential now. I therefore hope that when we go next door we can have a very detailed discussion about how we as the Council can get back to the spirit of Sweden and actually help Staffan de Mistura and his team do something concrete to achieve that, and have no more mud-slinging.The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting.I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.Mr. Mounzer (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): To begin with, the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom have tried to promote false claims justifying their aggression against sovereign States, particularly my country, Syria, with the aim of concealing their direct involvement in terrorism and their part in the responsibility for the bloodshed in Syria. I would like to say to them that the testimony, as cited in the media, of the thousands of Syrians who have escaped the blockades of armed terrorist groups in eastern Ghouta, has proved that those countries have been involved in making those citizens suffer through their support of those terrorist groups. Through their positions, their malicious acts and their illegal occupation of various areas of Syria, they have shown that, contrary to their claims, they cannot let go of their history of greed, occupation and imperialism. When speaking in the Council, they claim falsely that they are trying to find a political solution to the situation in Syria, but let me point out, briefly, that we have been able to defeat their agenda in Aleppo and eastern Ghouta, and we will be able to ensure that they cannot win in any part of my country.For the past seven years, since the beginning of the terrorist war in Syria, the United States, Britain and France have been working relentlessly to support and help conduct that war. They have also used the United Nations as a political tool to put pressure on the Syrian Government to implement their hegemonic agenda, interfere in our internal affairs and destabilize my country. They have not used the United Nations to fight terrorism and its sponsors or to help Syria overcome the suffering inflicted on it by armed terrorist groups, which should have been the goal.The Special Envoy devoted part of his statement to discussing the humanitarian situation. In that regard, I want to reiterate that the Syrian Government gives priority to providing every kind of humanitarian assistance to all Syrians in need, wherever they are in Syria. That is our duty, and we are doing our duty. The legal and constitutional obligations established under international decisions and Security Council resolutions on combating terrorism obliged my Government to undertake military operations in eastern Ghouta in order to rescue civilians from the armed terrorist groups holding them hostage and using them for years as human shields. In that regard, I want to state that contrary to some false narratives, the successful military operations conducted by the Syrian Arab Army and its allies against the armed terrorist groups controlling a number of areas that the United Nations has classified as besieged or hard to reach — along with the settlement and reconciliation agreements — have all mitigated civilians' suffering, reduced the numbers of those areas and facilitated humanitarian access to them, including eastern Ghouta.S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 12/12 18-14999 We deplore the fact that the United States speaks of its eagerness to reach a political agreement while it has been committing acts of aggression against my country based on lies, simply because it is working to give support to the armed groups because they have suffered losses in eastern Ghouta. It was the United States that supported Israel's aggression on 9 May when Israel was unable to protect its own proxy terrorist groups and implement its conspiracy against my country's unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Israel has continued its dangerous acts of aggression, which would not have been possible without the continuing unstinting support of the United States Government, because it enjoys impunity as a result of the support it has from the United States in the Security Council, enabling Israel to continue its terrorist acts threatening international peace and security in the region and the world. The Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms that through its military and armed forces it is able and ready to fend off all acts of aggression against its sovereignty and independence. However, we want to reiterate that any attempts to support this failing terrorism will not work. Such flagrant violations will not present obstacles to us in combating terrorism throughout Syrian territory.Yesterday we concluded round nine of the Astana process, and we are pleased with the results. We thank the delegations of Russia, Iran and the host country, Kazakhstan, for making the Astana process a success with regard to combating terrorism. The outcome document of the meeting stresses the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic against any external entities that attempt to violate them.In cooperation with our friends and allies, the Syrian army has succeeded in liberating eastern Ghouta and the southern area of Damascus, making the capital and its surrounding areas safe. With the cooperation of our friends and brothers, we have also expelled the terrorists from the northern area of Homs and the southern area of Hama. Today we reaffirm that we will continue to fight terrorism and to work to liberate each and every part of our territory from terrorism and from countries that seek to undermine our sovereignty.In conclusion, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic will spare no effort to support all genuine efforts to arrive at a political solution whereby Syrians, and only Syrians, will decide their future and make choices aimed at safeguarding Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity.The President: The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor to make a further statement.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I just wanted to comment on the Syrian representative's last statement, in which he said that the Syrian Arab Republic will spare no effort to arrive at a political solution. That is obviously a welcome statement. I would like to ask him if he could tell the Council, or is willing to say today, that Syria will put the same amount of effort into engaging with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria and with the Council in order to take concrete steps to get the Geneva process to work and to get a constitutional committee off the ground. If Syria were able to make that commitment today in the Chamber, I believe that would unlock a lot of things for the Council.The President: The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic has asked for the floor to make a further statement. I now give him the floor.Mr. Mounzer (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): We have said time and again that we are working with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria. A delegation from the Syrian Arab Republic is working directly with him. We are eager, as we have said repeatedly, to find a peaceful, Syrian-led solution to the Syrian crisis.The President: There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.
Falta palabras clave. ; La presente tesis doctoral -titulada El Museo Vacío- parte de la convicción que, en vista de que los museos son instituciones culturales que han alcanzado una increíble notoriedad y popularidad desde el último tercio del siglo XX, fenómeno este sin precedentes, atrás quedó el museo como simple caja contenedora donde acoger numerosos objetos, reducto para unos cuantos instruidos, a transformarse en atractivos lugares, donde ofrecer al visitante nuevas experiencias, no sólo en la recepción del Arte y la Historia. Es decir, de instituciones cerradas e impenetrables para el gran público, se ha pasado a recintos abiertos (para las masas), con un papel renovado frente a la sociedad, llegando a ser consideradas las insignias de la Postmodernidad. En el contexto de la sociedad postindustrial, la cultura y el conocimiento toman protagonismo, del mismo modo que la memoria y su recuperación se han convertido en una obsesión global. El concepto de patrimonio cultural ha crecido sin cesar en los últimos tiempos con la aparente intención de dar satisfacción tanto a una sociedad postfordista que demanda "un mayor conocimiento" como a una insistente mirada hacia el pasado. Como resultado, cada vez ha sido más habitual la creación y ampliación de nuevos espacios culturales para albergar un determinado patrimonio (material e inmaterial). Incesantemente se han fundado múltiples y distintos tipos de museos, extensiones o renovaciones de antiguos edificios como centros culturales, nuevos espacios con carácter museístico y/o conmemorativos, múltiples (macro) exposiciones, nuevos proyectos artísticos y culturales de digitalización (gracias especialmente a los nuevos mecanismos de producción de imagen, a las nuevas tecnologías de la información y la comunicación -TIC-, así como a la democratización informativa de la redes mediáticas), y a diversos modelos museológicos y museográficos que plantean un nueva concepción de museo que poco tiene que ver con el tradicional museo-almacén. Este "efecto museo" y proliferación memorística se ha dado desde la década de los setenta, pero se ha intensificado a partir de los años ochenta, cuando se afianzó la cultura posmoderna del entretenimiento y la "Industria Cultural" de la sociedad postindustrial, coincidiendo a su vez con las estrategias revisionistas de la institución artística y con un crecimiento económico. En especial con el Centro Georges Pompidou de París (1977), pionero en lo que a público masivo se refiere y el que marcará el punto final de los museos del Movimiento Moderno y de partida de la Postmodernidad, cuando se dé con mayor impulso el fenómeno de un considerado aumento de nuevos museos y centros de arte contemporáneo, tanto de nueva planta como de edificios reutilizados para tal fin. Aquellas formulaciones de nihilismo museal y del arte institucionalizado levantadas sobre todo en los años sesenta y setenta por parte de distintos artistas y pensadores (ceñidos al debate sobre la muerte de Dios, el Ser y el Arte), paradójicamente desembocó en una progresiva expansión museística, cobrando el museo todo su protagonismo y su monopolio en el discurso artístico dominante y en la difusión del arte en una vitalidad nunca vista hasta ahora, al igual que la exitosa proliferación de centros artísticos, galerías de arte y (macro) exposiciones pensados en función del arte contemporáneo. Este fenómeno, desde las dos últimas décadas del siglo XX y principios del siglo XXI, ha adquirido tal dimensión que merece cierta reflexión o comprensión y un deseo de interpretación que, en "nuestro" caso, parte del asombro que despertó el macroespectáculo de la museomanía arquitectónica que se ha estado rivalizando principalmente entre los museos y centros de arte contemporáneo. El espectáculo de la arquitectura (museística) como imán de sustanciales audiencias, junto con las pautas que promueven el negocio del ocio y el turismo, pasó a convertir estos espacios culturales en parques temáticos de atracción turística: museos-espectáculo (con firma Pritzker), donde las masas han sido atraídas sobre todo por el marketing de la arquitectura-icono, restándole valía al tradicional significado del museo (que es de proteger, coleccionar y exponer), adquiriendo el contenedor todo su protagonismo como auténtica pieza artística en sí misma. Siendo esta una de las particularidades del museo posmoderno (definido como la nueva catedral del S. XXI), la cual realza nuestra cultura globalizadora, en la que impera el consumo de masa y la cultura de la imagen, incentivando al público la peregrinación al edificio el déjà vu. En las tres últimas décadas, el Museo ha pasado de ser un contenedor "neutro" a un objeto artístico destacado de la exposición; transformándose, estas "nuevas catedrales" de nuestro tiempo, en uno de los espacios más relevantes de promoción urbana, de peregrinación del turismo y en lugar de atracción para el consumo de masa. De manera que hemos pasado del modelo de museo-almacén, al museo fábrica (o laboratorio) y en los últimos años al tipo de museo seductor y espectacular. No obstante, la crisis actual del museo (de arte contemporáneo), envuelta por el espectáculo turístico que rodea a estas instituciones, está íntimamente ligada a esa sobresaturación a modo de ¿efecto Guggenheim¿ en la que, en tiempos de bonanza económica, se ha visto sumergida toda comunidad y ciudad, convirtiéndose la creación de museos y centros culturales en un instrumento de status político y de rentabilidad económica, más que de difusión artística y cultural. Dando paso a un modelo de museo altamente vacío (en su contenido), falto de debate crítico, de discusión y sobre todo de didáctica, valorándose el continente por encima del contenido. Así que hemos pasado de aquel vacío que ha dejado el museo moderno en torno a las prácticas artísticas, sobre pedagogías críticas e inclusivas, a la vacuidad de aquel que responde a la cultura del espectáculo; una cultura del "todo vale", de lo banal y superficial como la nuestra, tan efímera y tan post en tantos aspectos y sentidos. Y en definitiva, se observan unos vacíos (en la museología y en la historia del arte) que aparentan ser completados a través del espectáculo de la moda, el consumo y el diseño, atendiendo a una expansión sin límites del museo nunca vista hasta ahora. En una época donde la obra de arte contemporánea se produce y se expande tanto en espacios cerrados como en espacios naturales, urbanos o en red. De ahí también el título de la presente investigación, pues esta idea de museo vacío pretende con ello expresar la metáfora de un museo (expandido) fuera de lugar, infinito e imaginario, pudiendo trasladarse hasta los no espacios del museo virtual. Es de obligación en cualquier asunto de investigación plantearse cuestiones epistemológicas, en el que a partir de la corriente postmoderna, está cayendo toda una serie de valores (morales, éticos, educativos y culturales) a favor de la vacuidad del espectáculo, el consumo y la banalización. Además en un contexto donde predominan las imágenes, hoy más que nunca se necesita de la palabra. Consideramos que todo artista debe confrontarse con este tipo de cuestiones trascendentales de su tiempo en la tarea de investigación y creación artística, a favor de un pensamiento crítico con respecto a los fundamentos esenciales de su trabajo. De modo que este interés por el museo nace de una serie de preguntas que, como artista y consumidora (de arte) interesada, como es lógico, en el hecho expositivo, se hace [la autora] acerca de las prácticas de exhibición dentro y fuera de los museos y en torno a los espacios de discusión sobre las prácticas artísticas e institucionales. Más aún en un momento donde, paradójicamente, la madre institucional museística una vez más se encuentra en plena crisis de identidad -en un contexto de profunda crisis económica, política y social-, en busca de una necesaria reformulación de su concepción desde su uso, según su finalidad, acorde a los nuevos tiempos. El objetivo principal de este estudio teórico (de análisis y reflexión crítica) es reflexionar y debatir sobre múltiples interrogantes que plantea el fenómeno de los museos actuales, especialmente de los museos y centros de arte contemporáneo. Con el deseo, por un lado, de reflexionar -desde una perspectiva crítica- sobre el concepto mismo de museo, su rol-función en el mundo contemporáneo. Y, por otro lado, profundizar en el conocimiento de nuevos planteamientos y usos del museo, a través de distintos períodos y ejemplos nacionales e internacionales, muy distintos en relación con aquellas que ha ido asumiendo el museo tradicional desde sus orígenes: pasando de ser simples almacenes, contenedores de tesoros merecedores de fervor, a reivindicarles una dinámica viva, mudable y renovadora. Con el fin de descifrar las claves de los incipientes caminos del Museo Contemporáneo (tanto en su perspectiva socio cultural, artística y conceptual), y plantear un análisis y debate crítico sobre el estado del arte contemporáneo y su mediación, logrando una mayor conciencia y juicio personal con respecto a dicho fenómeno. No sólo se analiza de qué manera la creación de los nuevos museos plantea nuevos conceptos y trazados estéticos, culturales y filosóficos. Un tema, obsesivamente evocado por numerosos autores, mediadores, artistas, arquitectos, críticos de arte, filósofos, historiadores de arte, sociólogos, etc. Para ello también se tendrá en cuenta, entre otros asuntos, la presentación expositiva -como formato estrella- del arte contemporáneo, ya que la exposición entendida como dispositivo de presentación artística es uno de los elementos primordiales de la articulación discursiva del museo. Esbozando cuáles son algunos de los mecanismos y relaciones de poder y control de las instituciones museísticas, donde se revisan algunas de las propuestas e ideas que plantean distintos autores desde la teoría crítica (frankfurtiana y postmoderna), hasta la teoría artística contemporánea y la crítica institucional, donde se encuentran muchas preguntas, que más que responder, nos interesa plantear. De este modo, la tesis invita a reflexionar sobre el nuevo cambio de paradigma que rodea a la institución museística y a partir de ello identificar una serie de problemáticas que aún persisten en los museos, con el fin de ver sus límites y contradicciones, y generar una reflexión para proponer nuevos retos para el siglo XXI. Nunca como hasta este momento había sido tan cuestionado el papel del museo como institución cultural, hasta el punto que en numerosas ocasiones se ha hablado de una ¿muerte del museo¿, en concreto de los museos de arte contemporáneo. Pero a pesar de que el museo es una ¿institución en crisis¿ tampoco antes había despertado tanto interés como también demuestra la reciente numerosa producción bibliográfica museística a la vez que se ha convertido en un centro de mira de numerosos historiadores, teóricos y artistas, como paradigma de la cultura contemporánea, deslizando a la obra de arte a un segundo plano. De hecho, la relevancia de este trabajo pone también en cuestión el antecedente que originó la inquietud por uno de los problemas que se desea analizar: la posición artística del edificio-museo, pues como ya se ha dicho, el interés por crear un diseño espectacular ha supuesto el riesgo de que la arquitectura museística arrebate la importancia a las obras exhibidas. Tal y como puso de moda el Guggenheim de Bilbao, inaugurado con rotundo éxito en 1997, como paradigma de la cultura convertida en instrumento de consumo pero también de revitalización urbana y económica. Cuestión que, interrogada en multitud de ocasiones (especialmente en foros, conferencias y publicaciones especializadas), es pertinente analizar ya que está profundamente relacionado con la crisis de estas instituciones culturales. Pese a que, por otro lado, los museos se han convertido a finales del siglo pasado en uno de los principales referentes culturales, tendencia que mueve a miles de turistas todos los años, aunque esta nueva situación no está exenta de una serie de problemas que trataremos también de prestarle atención y que empezaron a examinarse en el S. XX. Sin embargo, tras pasar en los últimos años del fenómeno "efecto museo", acrecentado en pleno boom económico, nos situamos en nuevos tiempos de incertidumbre; donde contribuiremos -a modo de reflexión- a la discusión introduciendo ciertas cuestiones sobre el tema: cómo el reciente impacto de la crisis financiera pone en peligro tanto la supervivencia de muchos museos y centros culturales, como la divulgación, educación e investigación del arte y cultural. Poniendo igualmente énfasis en cómo la crisis económica obliga favorecer una reconfiguración de las instituciones culturales y nuevos modos de comportamientos de sus protocolos internos. Nuevos caminos que se abren en un periodo de transformación radical como el actual y el consecuente cambio de paradigma económico, social, político y cultural que se está produciendo, que está impulsando nuevos espacios de producción y colaboración, nuevas maneras de financiación, producción y distribución para las artes, así como redes de colaboración e intercambio -en torno a los bienes comunes y la gestión colectiva-, que abren igualmente nuevos modos de producción, distribución y recepción del pensamiento crítico, donde se toma como punto de salida y de lo común el contexto actual de crisis, que está a su vez marcando un cambio político y social. De modo que igualmente importante son las transformaciones que se están dando a raíz de los cambios producidos con la aparición de las nuevas tecnologías de la información y la comunicación (TIC), sobre todo con Internet, ya que están produciendo grandes cambios en nuestra actual sociedad que necesariamente afectan al mundo del arte. Todo ello se presta a un significativo análisis y valoración, en el que adoptaremos una metodología de trabajo de carácter reflexiva y crítica, desde una sensibilización con el asunto a partir de la observación y experiencia en la visita a estos y otros espacios expositivos, enriquecida con la teoría y la crítica institucional, con la consulta de fuentes bibliográficas en materia museística y publicaciones de revistas especializadas, investigaciones, monografías, ensayos, páginas web, prensa, etc. De esta manera, con la ayuda de dichas herramientas de trabajo, la metodología principal consistirá en recopilar ideas, pensamientos, teorías, fenómenos, nuevos paradigmas, recontextualizarlas y sacarlas a colación, evidenciando y revisando, asimismo, aquellos sistemas (visibles e invisibles) de poder que se manifiestan en todo ámbito de entretenimiento, del lenguaje y la política. La presente investigación encuentra fundamentado su marco teórico en distintos autores de diferentes áreas de conocimiento que rodean al ámbito museístico, básicamente: historia del arte; arquitectura; filosofía; estética; museología; sociología; arte contemporáneo. Si bien, existe una extensa y heterogénea literatura sobre el tema de investigación, la presente tesis pretende cubrir la carencia de estudio y análisis del objeto del museo en el área de Bellas Artes; ahondar sobre temas de actualidad en el mundo del arte y analizar una serie de paradigmas que rodea al ámbito museístico y al mundo del arte contemporáneo, planteando reflexiones y preguntas claves sobre la validez, alcance y naturaleza de ello; de este tema vigente de existente discusión, para que este tesis teórica -de corte crítico- no constituya un punto final de este trabajo, sino una puerta abierta hacia la prolongación de este estudio u otro. Y aunque será un tanto difícil plantear unas conclusiones finales en un asunto como es el museo y el mundo del arte que está en continua transformación, observamos que hay un vacío, un problema, si no, no se habría generado tanta crítica al museo, sobre todo a partir de la segunda mitad del siglo XX, y por supuesto ni tan ingente cantidad de investigaciones y literatura teórica sobre el mismo, que ha conducido, además, en las tres últimas décadas a un debate sobre la especificidad del museo, de los espacios expositivos, del arte y, en consecuencia, a nuevas definiciones del mismo acto creativo. Pero lo cierto es que, según los datos que nos ofrece la historia del arte, el museo se ve avocado a una crisis y renovación permanente. Si no desea morir, a seguir cambiando y evolucionando, según las tendencias artísticas y las necesidades sociales. Así que para una mayor comprensión y conciencia de dicha realidad, en la presente tesis, intentaremos dar cuanta de cuáles han sido los cambios más drásticos que ha sufrido el museo a lo largo de la historia, sin dejar las formas de los edificios inalterables. Especialmente desde que nace el museo como institución pública, a finales del siglo XVIII y principios del siglo XIX, como consecuencia, del paso definitivo de la colección y exhibición del arte privado al dominio público, tras la Revolución Francesa; el nacimiento y desarrollo del museo de arte moderno hasta aquellos proyectos de museos generados por el Movimiento Moderno en la primera mitad del Siglo XX y, por otro lado, su conversión en centros de arte contemporáneos en la segunda mitad del siglo pasado; para posteriormente situar el presente trabajo en dicha evolución histórica, ubicando el museo en nuestra época de la información/comunicación, post-moderna y globalizada, y extraer una serie de consecuencias prácticas para la investigación. De este modo, el analizar cómo ha ido cambiando a lo largo de la historia la forma y la función del museo, nos permitirá a su vez plantear una serie de reflexiones (críticas) en torno a la crisis inherente que ha perseguido al propio museo desde sus orígenes. Con respecto a la estructura de la tesis, ésta se presenta en tres grandes bloques que comprende un total de diez capítulos pensados, por un lado, en base a los objetivos propuestos y, por otro, a las etapas o ciclos más significativos en el origen y desarrollo del Museo, en aquellos acontecimientos y fenómenos más relevantes (de un pasado lejano y cercano) que han devenido en un cambio de paradigma, así como a distintas posiciones que se consideran predominantes en las formas de los museos contemporáneos. Pese a que se ha intentado delimitar en todo lo posible la investigación, el tema en cuestión es un poco rizomático, porque en cuanto se replantea un asunto en torno al museo aparecen otros que nos llevan también a otras cuestiones. Es por ello que en el desarrollo de la investigación se han abordado simultáneamente casi todos los puntos bajo la influencia recíproca de las diferentes observaciones y conceptualizaciones. Con un tono sencillo, aunque un tanto filosófico, se profundiza en las diversas cuestiones planteadas, en las dos primeras partes del estudio se hace un recorrido histórico por la construcción de estos espacios destinados al arte y como una especie de registro (de evaluación) de los movimientos (arquitectónicos) dominantes que han envuelto la concepción del museo a lo largo de la historia, con la intención de profundizar asimismo en la transformación de dicha institución. Además de analizar las diversas tipologías museísticas que se han venido dando a lo largo de la historia, veremos de este modo que la relación que se establece entre la obra y el marco espacial en el que se inserta suele generar numerosas tensiones, como por ejemplo al interactuar con una arquitectura museística como la actual que tiene una fuerte carga narcisista. Precisamente, daremos cuenta que las cuestiones y conflictos en torno a estos contenedores de arte se han estado dando desde la creación de los museos, razón demás por lo que nos situamos en diferentes períodos, con el fin de dar cuenta si el museo es un espacio ecuánime, capacitado y autosuficiente para acoger tanto la obra de arte contemporánea como al espectador. Del mismo modo, que en la 3ª parte examinamos si el formato tradicional de la exposición (física) sigue siendo el más apropiado para acoger aquellas novedosas propuestas y prácticas artísticas que se originan fuera del marco institucional. Pues llegados a la Postmodernidad, en esta última parte, daremos cuenta de los nuevos paradigmas de representación que envuelven al museo desde el inicio del postmodernismo hasta la actualidad (y que, en definitiva, transgreden la misión tradicional del museo y sus límites). La primera parte comprende el "Concepto de Museo y su Expresión Arquitectónica". Distribuida en los tres primeros capítulos de la tesis, se definen las nociones más importantes de la presente investigación. Analizamos en primer lugar la definición y la formación histórica del concepto de museo, su origen en la historia y su significado en la Antigüedad; la gestación del Museo desde hace ya casi tres siglos y las primeras dicotomías de la obra de arte con el espacio que la contiene; se analiza el descubrimiento de las formas de exponer y su expresión espacial en las tipologías básicas, y como se desarrolla su lenta y complicada transformación en los prototipos arquitectónicos del primer tercio del siglo XIX. Para ello le prestamos atención a la evolución de las primeras arquitecturas (palaciales) de uso exclusivamente museísticos (a partir del Siglo XVI), hasta aquellos primeros contenedores de tesoros artísticos que pasaron a materializarse partiendo de "arquitecturas dibujadas". Por otro lado, las causas y el origen del museo público a finales del Siglo XVIII, su gestación como institución estatal pública y patrimonial, y el auge de las exposiciones temporales en el siglo XIX (primero con la creación de los museos de artistas vivos y, por otra parte, con el fenómeno de las exposiciones universales); reflexionando al final del mismo sobre la noción de "museo efímero" frente a los límites del museo almacén, junto a otros fenómenos socio-culturales y prototipos de museos contemporáneos que transgreden la concepción del Museo (tradicional). En la segunda parte: "Antecedentes Artísticos del Museo Postmoderno (la nueva estética de la Modernidad)", a lo largo del capítulo 4, 5 y 6 daremos cuenta de las transformaciones socio-culturales y de los cambios e innovaciones en el arte y en la arquitectura del siglo XX. Se analiza las aportaciones del arte y la arquitectura de vanguardia en la concepción del Museo de Arte Moderno -MOMA- de Nueva York (a través de una nueva enunciación estética y conceptual que irá imponiéndose a lo largo del siglo XX sobre el no estimado palacio o templo de las artes), junto con las aportaciones de los maestros del Movimientos Moderno (Le Corbusier, M. van der Rohe, F. Lloyd Wright) en el desarrollo y evolución del mismo, así como las contribuciones de críticos, teóricos, artistas, sociólogos y filósofos que han cuestionado mordazmente el museo desde distintas perspectivas, hasta los inicios de la Postmodernidad; cerrando esta 2ª parte con aquellos antecedentes más próximos del museo posmoderno: el espectacular Museo Guggenheim de Nueva York, con su espacio expositivo de movimiento continuo, y el espacio flexible e interdisciplinar del Beaubourg de París, entre otras propuestas de museos no edificables pero de enorme repercusión. Situarnos en la era pompidou llevará establecer un nuevo vínculo del museo con las neo-vanguardias, el cual nos permitirá hablar de la ruptura con la cultura oficial de la Modernidad. Además del análisis arquitectónico y conceptual de aquellos proyectos que han marcado un cambio de paradigma, nos introducimos en algunos aspectos del museo visto tanto por arquitectos e historiadores del arte como por filósofos y artistas, de esta manera ampliamos las distintas visiones y aportaciones que han influido en la configuración y la constante evolución de esta institución socio-cultural. Sin obviar, por tanto, aquellos aspectos tanto sociales, económicos y políticos como aquellos vinculados al público. En la tercera parte, estructurada en los últimos cuatro capítulos de la tesis, bajo el título "Transgrediendo los límites del museo: nuevos paradigmas representacionales; nuevas prácticas artísticas y curatoriales", se examina la situación actual que atraviesan los museos y centros de arte contemporáneo, abarcando distintos asuntos ligados a la Posmodernidad, sus efectos y excesos sobre el museo como institución cultural. Si bien, el detonante de la presente investigación, la arquitectura (museística) contemporánea y su artisticidad (avivado por el protagonismo que se le ha dado a estos brillantes contenedores de arte y por la museomanía en la que nos hemos visto envueltos en las tres últimas décadas), nos ha permitido también reflexionar sobre los fundamentos del arte contemporáneo. De este modo, nos introducimos en esta última parte en el tema más amplio, de cómo se han transgredido los límites del museo, con el fin de analizar el museo como un espacio que por sí mismo ejerce una influencia o una política en la sociedad, y, por otro lado, las contradicciones y límites que presenta como institución cultural. Para ello se analizan aquellas prácticas artísticas y curatoriales que desplazan el lugar de la obra de arte y dislocan la autoridad del museo. En este punto se incluyen distintos asuntos sobre las conexiones entre la estética y la política. De modo que, en esta última parte, empezaremos dando cuenta de nuevos discursos y actitudes críticas frente al Museo en los inicios de la Postmodernidad; la crítica feminista; la crítica institucional de los años 60/70 (teniendo en cuenta el precedente crítico de las vanguardias históricas radicales); las nuevas formas de representación que trae consigo la Postmodernidad que exigen a su vez nuevas formas de exhibición, nuevos espacios (públicos) de producción y distribución artística. Por otra parte, se analizan distintos modelos de museos contemporáneos con dinámicas muy distintas, nuevos espacios artísticos y culturales -físicos y virtuales- que rompen con el concepto clásico de museo. Nos situaremos en el contexto actual de crisis que viven estos espacios legitimadores (museos, centros de arte contemporáneo, galerías,.), en un momento de profunda crisis económica, política y social. Y, por otra parte, examinaremos el impacto de las tecnologías digitales en la producción, distribución y recepción del arte contemporáneo; las nuevas formas de participación e interactividad en el arte (arte público, arte contextual, arte relacional) y la importancia de las teorías de la recepción en la configuración de las diferentes orientaciones conceptuales que trazan cuál debe ser el objetivo del museo en el siglo XXI. En definitiva, entre otros asuntos, intentaremos ver en esta última parte cuál es la situación actual del museo (su rol en el contexto socio-cultural, artístico y conceptual), y los retos a los que se enfrenta hoy día esta institución en el actual panorama de crisis globalizada. Analizando aquellas transformaciones a las que se ve avocado el museo para acomodarse en los cambios sociales en consonancia con la sociedad -de la información y mediática- contemporánea. Pues uno de los objetivos principales de esta tesis es precisamente debatir sobre el impacto de esas transformaciones, analizando aquellos paradigmas que han impulsado los cambios más drásticos en el museo a lo largo de su historia, a la vez que exponemos distintos ejemplos de intervención artística que han transgredido los límites del museo y han posibilitado el desarrollo de dispositivos críticos. Conjuntamente, en las tres partes se analizarán algunas de las críticas más destacadas al museo desde que nace como institución cultural hasta la actualidad por parte de filósofos, artistas, historiadores del arte e intelectuales. Así que la presente investigación ha devenido en pensamiento y reflexión crítica en torno al arte contemporáneo, la cultura contemporánea y la sociedad, en torno a las prácticas artísticas y su relación con los espacios expositivos de distribución, instituciones como centros de arte y de producción, galerías y museos, lo cual nos ha permitido adentrarnos en un análisis previo sobre la arquitectura de estos espacios -de ficción y consumo- como reclamo mediático y espectacular. Por último, un apartado con las conclusiones finales de los diferentes temas abordados, donde se recogen las principales reflexiones (críticas) que se derivan de este estudio, que nos ha servido sobre todo para reflexionar en torno al arte y cuestionar lo establecido. ; La présente thèse doctorale -intitulée «Le Musée Vide» (El Museo Vacío)- est animée par la conviction selon laquelle le musée a cessé d'être une simple caisse où conserver de nombreux objets, des bastions de quelques instruits, pour incarner des lieux fascinants conférant au visiteur des expériences novatrices allant au-delà de l'enseignement de l'Art et de l'Histoire. Autrefois fermés et impénétrables au grand public, les musées constituent désormais des enceintes ouvertes aux masses et jouent un rôle nouveau dans la société en tant que symbole de la Postmodernité. Si la culture et la connaissance occupent une place à part entière dans la société postindustrielle, la mémoire et sa récupération sont également devenues une obsession généralisée. Le concept de patrimoine culturel n'a pas cessé de grandir au cours de ces derniers temps avec l'intention apparente de satisfaire aussi bien une société postfordiste aspirant à «une plus grande connaissance» que le regard inflexible jeté sur le passé. Ainsi, la création et l'ampliation de nouveaux espaces culturels pour accueillir un patrimoine concret (matériel ou immatériel) sont devenues monnaie courante. Dès lors, de nombreux musées, aussi différents les uns que les autres, ont vu le jour, en ayant parfois eu recours à l'agrandissement ou la rénovation d'anciens bâtiments, pour donner place à des centres culturels ou de nouveaux espaces muséaux ou commémoratifs, expositions multiples, des nouveaux projets artistiques et culturels de numérisation (notamment grâce aux nouveaux mécanismes de production de l'image, aux nouvelles technologies de l'information et de la communication — TIC —, mais aussi grâce à la démocratisation informative des réseaux médiatiques) et aux nouveaux modèles muséologiques et muséographiques proposant une vision novatrice du musée n'ayant guère de rapport avec le musée-entrepôt classique. Les années 1970 ont été marquées par l'émergence de cet «effet musée» et la prolifération de la mémoire. Ce phénomène s'est par la suite intensifié à partir des années 1980, lors de la consolidation de la culture postmoderne du divertissement et de «l'Industrie Culturelle» de la société postindustrielle, coïncidant, ainsi, avec les stratégies révisionnistes de l'institution artistique et une croissance économique. Ceci est particulièrement spécial le cas du Centre Georges Pompidou de Paris (1977), précurseur dans l'avènement du public de masse, qui va annoncer la fin des musées du Mouvement Moderne et le début de la Postmodernité, au moment où l'on constatera le phénomène d'une augmentation considérable du nombre de musées et de centres d'art contemporain nouvellement fondés, qu'ils procèdent de nouvelles édifications ou de reconversions de bâtiments prévus à cet effet. Le musée assume déjà toute l'importance et a récupéré son monopole dans le discours artistique et dans la diffusion de l'art avec une vitalité encore jamais vue, et également la prolifération des centres artistiques, les galeries d'art et (macro)expositions pensés surtout en fonction de l'art contemporain. Ce phénomène a acquis une telle dimension qu'il invite à la réflexion, voire à la compréhension, et provoque, en ce qui «nous» concerne, un désir d'interprétation né de l'émerveillement suscité par le spectacle de l'architecture (muséale) se retrouvant principalement dans les musées et les centres d'art contemporain et agissant en tant qu'aimant d'audiences considérables. Ainsi, ces «musées-spectacles» (avec la signature Pritzker) font des contenants de véritables œuvres artistiques en soi. Étant celle-ci une des particularités du musée postmoderne (défini comme la nouvelle cathédrale du XXIe siècle), laquelle remarque notre culture globale dont la consommation de masse et la culture de l'image prévaut, encourageant le public au pèlerinage du bâtiment le déjà vu. Pendant les trois dernières décennies, le Musée en tant que contenant «neutre» est devenu un objet artistique du domaine de l'exposition en tout point remarquable et a donné lieu à des «nouvelles cathédrales» de notre temps, des espaces de promotion urbaine figurant parmi les plus influents, des lieux de pèlerinage touristique et d'attraction pour la consommation de masse. De ce fait, on est passé du modèle de musée-entrepôt au musée-usine (ou laboratoire) et, au cours des dernières années, au musée spectaculaire et captivant. Néanmoins, la crise actuelle du musée (d'art contemporain) enveloppée par le spectacle touristique entourant ces institutions, est profondément liée à une sursaturation à titre «d'effet Guggenheim» dans laquelle toute la communauté et la ville s'y plongent pendant la période de prospérité économique, plutôt que la diffusion artistique et culturelle. Laissant du coup la place à un modèle de musée particulièrement vide (dans son contenu), sans débats critiques, de discussion, et surtout de didactique, en valorisant davantage le contenant que le contenu. De cette manière, on abandonne cette idée de vide laissé par le musée moderne –autour des pratiques artistiques sur pédagogies critiques et inclusives - pour arriver à la vacuité de celui qui répond à la culture du spectacle. Il faut observer des vides (auprès de la muséologie et l'histoire de l'art) qui simulent être complétés à travers le spectacle de la mode, la consommation et la conception compte tenu de l'expansion sans limites du musée jamais réalisée jusqu'à présent. À une époque où l'œuvre d'art contemporain se produit et s'étend aussi dans les espaces fermés comme dans les espaces naturels, urbains et sur Internet. D'où aussi le titre de la présente recherche, car avec cette idée de musée vide on essaie d'exprimer la métaphore d'un musée (étendu) déplacé, infini et imaginaire, pour après se rendre jusqu'aux non-espaces du musée virtuel. De sorte que cet intérêt pour le musée est né d'une série de questions qui, en tant qu'artiste et consommatrice (d'art) intéressée, évidemment par le fait expositif, résulte des questions posées sur les pratiques d'exhibition hors et dehors des musées et autour des espaces de discussion à propos des pratiques artistiques et institutionnelles. Notamment dans un moment où paradoxalement la mère institutionnelle muséale se trouve encore une fois en pleine crise d'identité –à l'égard d'un contexte de profonde crise économique, sociale et politique-, à la recherche d'une reformulation nécessaire de sa conception depuis son usage, selon sa finalité en accord avec les nouveaux temps. Le but principal de cette recherche théorique est celui de réfléchir et de débattre sur les différentes interrogations que le phénomène des musées actuels pose, particulièrement des musées et des centres d'art contemporain. D'une part, avec le désir de réfléchir – après une perspective critique - en ce qui concerne le concept de musée en soi, son rôle/fonction dans monde contemporain. Et d'autre part, approfondir la connaissance des nouvelles approches et les usages du musée dans le cadre de ses différentes périodes et exemples nationaux et internationaux, aussi dissemblables en relation avec celles que le musée traditionnel a assumé depuis ses origines: au début ils étaient de simples entrepôts, des contenants de trésors dignes d'être admirés, pour finalement exiger d'eux une dynamique vivante, changeante et rénovatrice. Afin de déchiffrer les clés des voies naissantes du Musée Contemporain (dans une perspective socioculturelle, artistique et conceptuelle) et de débattre à propos de l'impact de ses transformations, alors qu'on est en train d'analyser les paradigmes qui ont stimulé les changements les plus drastiques auprès du musée tout au long de son histoire, en même temps que l'on présente différents exemples d'intervention artistique qui ont transgressé les limites du musée et ont permis le développement des dispositifs critiques. De cette façon il y a aussi une analyse et un débat critique concernant l'état de l'art contemporain ainsi que sa médiation. Non seulement faut-il analyser la manière dont la création des nouveaux musées propose de nouveaux concepts et des tracés esthétiques, culturels et philosophiques, mais il faut aussi tenir compte, entre autre, de la présentation d'exposition – en tant que format étoile- de l'art contemporain étant donné que l'exposition comprise comme dispositif de présentation artistique est l'un des éléments primordiaux de l'articulation discursive du musée. Les mécanismes et les relations de pouvoir et de contrôle des institutions muséales où les propositions et les idées formulées par les différents auteurs se formulent, depuis la théorie critique (de l'école de Francfort et postmoderne), jusqu'à la théorie artistique contemporaine et la critique institutionnelle où se trouvent beaucoup de demandes, qui, plutôt que d'y répondre, nous tient à cœur de les poser. Par la suite, la thèse invite à réfléchir sur le nouveau changement du paradigme qui entoure l'institution muséale et à partir de là, identifier la série de problématiques qui continuent à exister dans les musées afin de voir ses limites ou contradictions et créer une réflexion pour proposer de nouveaux défis pour le XXIe siècle. Jusqu'à nos jours, le rôle du musée comme institution culturelle n'a jamais été autant remis en question à tel point que de nombreuses fois on entend parler d'une «mort du musée», concrètement des musées d'art contemporain. Mais malgré le fait que le musée est une «institution en crise» cela n'avait pas non plus éveillé l'intérêt comme le démontre la récente et nombreuse production bibliographique muséale en même temps qu'il est devenu le centre de repère de plusieurs historiens, théoriques et artistes, comme paradigme de la culture contemporaine, reléguant l'œuvre d'art en arrière-plan. De fait, la pertinence de ce travail remet en cause aussi le précèdent qui a conduit à la préoccupation à propos de l'une des questions à analyser: la position artistique du bâtiment-musée, car comme on avait déjà mentionné auparavant, l'intérêt de créer une conception spectaculaire a signifié le risque de l'architecture du musée minimise l'importance aux œuvres exposées. Tel que le Guggenheim de Bilbao revenu à la mode, inauguré avec succès en 1997, comme un paradigme de la culture transformé en un instrument de la consommation, mais aussi de la revitalisation urbaine et économique. Cette question posée des centaines de fois (en particulier sur les forums, lors de conférences et dans des publications spécialisées) reste pertinente à analyser puisqu'elle se rapporte entièrement à la crise de ces institutions culturelles. Pourtant, après avoir passé les dernières années du phénomène «effet musée», en augmentant en plein boom économique, nous nous situons dans des nouveaux temps d'incertitude, où nous contribuerons (en guise de réflexion) à la discussion en introduisant quelques sujets sur la question: comment le récent impact de la crise financière met en danger soit la survie de beaucoup de musées et centres culturels comme la divulgation, éducation et recherche sur l'art et le culturel. On y souligne également comment la crise économique oblige à favoriser une reconfiguration des institutions culturelles et les nouvelles manières de comportement de ses protocoles internes. Les nouveaux chemins qui s'ouvrent dans une période de transformation radicale comme l'actuel et le conséquent changement de paradigme économique, social, politique et culturel qui se produit de nos jours, favorisent de nouveaux espaces de production et de collaboration, de nouvelles manières de financement, de production et de distribution pour les arts, ainsi que les réseaux de collaboration et échanges -autour des biens communs et de la gestion collective- qui ouvrent également de nouveaux modes de production, distribution, réception de la pensée critique, où le point de départ et du commun –et celui qui marque un changement politique et social- est le contexte actuel de crise. De sorte que pareillement incontournables sont les transformations qui apparaissent à la lumière des changements produits avec l'apparition de nouvelles technologies de l'information et de la communication (TIC), surtout avec Internet, puisqu'ils sont en train de modifier la société actuelle qui affecte directement le monde de l'art. Tout cela offre une analyse essentielle, celle d'adopter une méthodologie de travail réflexive et critique, d'après une sensibilisation avec le sujet à partir de l'observation et expérience dans la visite de ceux et d'autres espaces d'exposition enrichie avec la théorie et des critiques institutionnelles, à une consultation de sources bibliographiques en matière muséale et dans des publications de revues spécialisées, investigations, monographies, essaies, pages web, la presse, etc. La présente recherche trouve sa marque théorique étayé chez divers auteurs de différents secteurs de la connaissance qui principalement entourent le domaine muséal: l'histoire de l'art, l'architecture, la philosophie, l'esthétique, la muséologie, la sociologie, l'art contemporain. Malgré le fait qu'il existe une large et grande variété littéraire sur le thème de recherche, cette thèse vise à couvrir le manque d'études et d'analyses de l'objet du musée dans le domaine des Beaux-arts; approfondir sur les enjeux actuels dans le monde de l'art et ainsi analyser un certain nombre de paradigmes entourant le monde des musées et le monde de l'art contemporain, soulevant des questions et réflexions clés concernant la validité, la portée et sa nature. De ce sujet en vigueur et en discussion, pour que cette thèse théorique -de typologie critique- ne constitue pas un point final de ce travail, mais une porte ouverte sur l'approfondissement de ce cas d'étude ou d'un autre. Et même s'il sera légèrement difficile de tirer des conclusions définitives sur une question telle que le musée et le monde de l'art qui est en transformation constante, nous constatons qu'il y a un vide, un problème, autrement il ne se serait pas généré autant de critiques du musée, en particulier à partir de la seconde moitié du XXe siècle, et non plus l'énorme quantité de la recherche et de la littérature théorique sur celui-ci, qui a également conduit dans les trois dernières décennies à un débat sur la spécificité du musée et des espaces d'exposition, l'art et, par conséquent, de nouvelles définitions du même acte créateur. Par contre, il est certain que, après les données que l'histoire de l'art nous a offert, le musée s'est vu obligé dans une crise de renouvellement permanente. S'il préfère ne pas mourir à changer en continuation et évoluer selon les tendances artistiques et les besoins sociaux. Donc, pour une meilleure compréhension et prise de conscience de cette réalité, nous essaierons de rendre compte des changements les plus spectaculaires subis par le musée à travers l'histoire, laissant indéfectibles les formes des bâtiments. Surtout depuis la naissance du musée en tant qu'institution publique à la fin du XVIIIe et au début du XIXe siècle, en conséquence du pas définitif de la collection et la présentation de l'art privé dans le domaine public, après la Révolution française; la naissance et le développement du musée d'art moderne jusqu'aux projets de musée générés par le Mouvement Moderne dans la première moitié du XXe siècle et, d'autre part, sa conversion en centres d'art contemporain dans la deuxième moitié du dernier siècle; pour ensuite mettre ce travail dans ce développement historique, plaçant le musée dans notre ère de l'information/communication, post-moderne et mondialisée, et d'en tirer un certain nombre de conséquences pratiques pour la recherche. De cette manière, analyser comment la forme et la fonction du musée a changé au cours de l'histoire va nous permettre de nous livrer à des réflexions (critiques) autour de la crise inhérente ayant poursuivi le musée depuis ses origines. Par rapport à la structure de la thèse, elle se présente en trois grands blocs comprenant un total de dix chapitres, plus les conclusions finales, destinées, d'une part, sur la base des objectifs proposés et, d'autre part, aux étapes les plus importantes de l'origine et le développement du musée, dans ces événements et phénomènes pertinents (à partir d'un passé lointain et récent) qui sont devenus un changement de paradigme, ainsi que les différentes positions qui sont considérées dominantes auprès des formes des musées contemporains. Bien qu'il ait tout essayé pour délimiter le plus possible la recherche, le sujet en question nous rappelle au rhizome car dès que le sujet autour du musée se relance, d'autres sujets apparaissent conduisant également à la formulation de nouvelles questions. Voilà pourquoi, dans le cadre de la recherche ont été simultanément traités presque tous les points sous l'influence réciproque des diverses observations et conceptualisations. Avec un ton simple, bien que légèrement philosophique, on se penche sur les diverses questions soulevées dans les deux premières parties de l'étude un voyage historique est fait dans la construction de ces espaces destinés à l'art et comme une sorte de registre (évaluation) des mouvements (architecturales) dominants qui ont enveloppé la conception du musée à travers l'histoire, avec l'intention d'approfondir sur la transformation de l'institution. En plus d'analyser les diverses typologies muséales qui ont été mises en place tout au long de l'histoire, on verra de cette manière que le rapport établi entre l'œuvre et le cadre de l'espace, auquel il est insert, tient à générer plusieurs tensions, comme par exemple lors de l'interaction avec une «architecture muséale» comme l'actuelle d'une très forte charge narcissiste. Justement, nous rendrons compte des questions et des conflits autour de ces contenants d'art qui ont été présents depuis la création des musées, une raison de plus pour qu'on se situe aux différentes périodes afin de rendre compte si le musée est un espace équitable, qualifié et autonome pour accueillir l'œuvre d'art contemporain et le spectateur. De même, dans la troisième partie on va examiner si le format traditionnel de l'exposition (physique) est toujours le plus approprié pour héberger les propositions novatrices et les pratiques artistiques qui naissent hors du cadre institutionnel. Donc, dans cette dernière partie, à la Postmodernité, on décrit les nouveaux paradigmes de représentation impliquant le musée depuis le début du postmodernisme jusqu'à ce jour (et en somme, ils transgressent la mission traditionnelle du musée et ses limites). La première partie comporte «le concept de musée et son expression architectural» (el Concepto de Museo y su Expresión Arquitectónica), distribuée sur les trois premiers chapitres de la thèse où se définissent les notions les plus importantes de cette recherche. On examine en premier lieu la définition et la formation historique du concept de musée, son origine dans l'histoire et sa signification dans l'Antiquité, la gestation du Musée depuis déjà près de trois siècles, et les premières dichotomies de l'œuvre d'art avec l'espace qui y contient. On analyse la découverte de façons d'exposer et son expression spatiale dans les typologies basiques, et étant donné le développement de ses transformations à la fois lentes et complexes aux prototypes architecturaux du premier tiers du XIXe siècle. Pour ce faire, nous prêtons attention à l'évolution des premières architectures (palatiales) de l'utilisation purement muséales (du XVIe siècle), aux premiers contenants de trésors d'art après s'être matérialisé à partir des «architectures dessinées». D'un autre côté, les causes et l'origine du musée public à la fin du XVIIIe siècle, sa gestation en tant qu'institution d'État public et du patrimoine, et l'essor des expositions temporaires au XIXe siècle (premièrement avec la création des musées d'artistes vivants et, d'autre part, avec le phénomène des expositions universelles); pour à la fin réfléchir sur la notion de «musée éphémère» face aux limites du muséeentrepôt, à côté des autres phénomènes socioculturels et les prototypes de musées contemporains qui transgressent la conception de Musée (traditionnel). Dans la seconde partie: «Les précédents artistiques du musée postmoderne» (Antecedentes Artísticos del Museo Postmoderno). Tout au long des chapitres 4, 5 et 6 on expliquera les transformations socioculturelles, et les changements et les innovations dans l'art et l'architecture du XXe siècle. Seront analysées les contributions de l'art et l'architecture d'avant-garde dans la conception du Musée d'Art Moderne - MOMA- de New York (à travers une nouvelle énonciation esthétique et conceptuelle qui va s'imposer tout au long du XXe siècle sur le non apprécié palais ou temple des arts), avec les contributions des enseignants du Mouvement Moderne (Le Corbusier, Mies van der Rohe, Frank Lloyd Wright) dans le développement et l'évolution de celuici. Ainsi que les contributions des critiques, théoriciens, artistes, sociologues et philosophes qui ont durement interrogé le musée à partir de différents points de vue, jusqu'aux débuts de la Postmodernité. Pour finir cette deuxième partie avec ces antécédents plus proches du musée postmoderne: le spectaculaire Musée Guggenheim de New York, avec son espace d'exposition de mouvement continu, et l'espace flexible et interdisciplinaire Beaubourg à Paris, entre autres propositions de musées inconstructibles mais d'un impact considérable. Nous situer dans l'ère Pompidou signifie établir un nouveau lien entre le musée et les néo-avant-gardes, lequel nous permettra de parler d'une rupture avec la culture officielle de la Modernité. Outre l'analyse architectonique et conceptuelle de ces projets qui ont marqué un changement de paradigme, nous nous introduisons dans quelques aspects du musée vus soit par des architectes, historiens de l'art soit par des philosophes et des artistes. De cette manière les différentes visions et apports qui ont influencé la configuration et l'évolution constante de cette institution socioculturelle s'étendent et, par conséquent, seront prises en considération. Il ne faudrait pas oublier, donc, tous les aspects aussi sociaux, économiques et politiques comme ceux liés au public. Dans la troisième partie, structurée dans les quatre derniers chapitres de la thèse, intitulée: «Transgresser les limites du musée: nouveaux paradigmes de représentation; nouvelles pratiques artistiques et curatoriales» (Transgrediendo los Límites del Museo: nuevos paradigmas representacionales; nuevas prácticas artísticas y curatoriales), on examine la situation actuelle que les musées et centres d'art contemporain traversent, englobant diverses questions liées à la Postmodernité, ses effets et les excès sur le musée en tant qu'institution culturelle. Alors que le déclencheur de la présente recherche, l'architecture (muséale) contemporaine et son artisticité (alimentée par l'importance accordée aux magnifiques contenants d'art et par la 'muséomanie' dans laquelle nous nous sommes vu impliqués les trois dernières décennies), cela nous a permis aussi de méditer sur les fondements de l'art contemporain. De cette manière, on introduit dans cette dernière partie le sujet plus large, de comment les limites du musée ont été dépassées afin d'analyser le musée comme un espace qui par lui-même exerce une influence ou une politique dans la société, et, d'autre part, les contradictions et limites qu'il présente en tant qu'institution culturelle. À cet effet, cette pratiques artistiques et curatoriales qui détachent la place de l'œuvre d'art et disloquent l'autorité du musée sont également analysées. À cet égard différents points y sont inclus sur les connexions entre l'esthétique et la politique. De la sorte, dans cette dernière partie, on va commencer par expliquer les nouveaux discours et les attitudes critiques face au Musée aux débuts de la Postmodernité; la critique féministe; la critique institutionnelle des années 1960-1970 (compte tenu la précédante critique des avant-gardes historiques radicales); les nouvelles formes de représentation qui entrainent la Postmodernité en exigeant des nouvelle formes d'exhibition, des nouveaux espaces (publiques) de production et distribution artistique. D'autre part, les différents modèles de musées contemporaines sont analysés avec des dynamiques assez divergents, nouveaux espaces artistiques et culturels -physiques et virtuels- qui finissent avec la notion classique de musée. On se situe alors dans le contexte actuel de crise que vivent ces espaces légitimateurs (musées, centres d'art contemporain, les galléries, etc.) dans un moment de profonde crise économique, politique et sociale. En outre, nous devons examiner l'impact des technologies digitales dans la production, distribution et réception de l'art contemporain; les nouvelles formes de participation et d'interactivité dans l'art (art public, art contextuel, art relationnel) et l'importance des théories de la réception dans la configuration de différentes orientations conceptuelles qui tracent le principal but du musée au XXIe siècle. En définitif, entre questions diverses, on va essayer de constater dans cette dernière partie, quelle est la situation actuelle du musée (son rôle dans un contexte socio-culturel, artistique et conceptuel) et les défis auxquels cette institution doit faire face de nos jours dans une situation de crise globalisée. En étudiant les transformations que le musée a subies pour s'installer aux changements en accord avec la société -de l'information et médiatique- contemporaine. Ensemble, les trois partis vont analyser certaines des critiques les plus remarquables du musée depuis sa naissance comme une institution culturelle jusqu'à présent de la part de philosophes, artistes, historiens de l'art et intellectuels. Donc, cette recherche est devenue critique dans la pensée et la réflexion autour de l'art contemporain, la culture contemporaine et de la société autour des pratiques artistiques et sa relation avec les espaces d'exposition de distribution, des institutions comme des centres d'art et de production, galeries et musées, qui nous a permis d'entrer dans une analyse précédente de l'architecture de ces espaces -de fiction et de la consommation- comme réclame médiatique et spectaculaire. Enfin, une section avec les conclusions finales des différents sujets abordés, où les principales réflexions (critiques) issues de cette étude apparaissent, qui nous a permis surtout à réfléchir sur l'art et à remettre en cause tout ce qui est établi. ; Premio Extraordinario de Doctorado US
1. IntroductionOver the last decade, increased attention has been paid to terrorism, particularly to the new wave of terrorist groups, fundamentalist movements, and extremist organisations such as Al‐Qaeda. September 11 marked the beginning of a turbulent phase in which states face a new kind of threat made up of a complex network of insidious revolutionary and nationalist forces. Such transformations have given rise to an unprecedented number of publications. However, both political violence and terrorism remain sources of endless disputes and controversies because of their political implications. At the same time, in the scientific community, terrorism studies lack conceptual and methodological uniformity. In his article, Domenico Tosini synthesises and discusses some major findings from this research. Courses using such a review will be confronted with the four major topics that any analysis of terrorism, to be comprehensive, should take into account: the definition of terrorism; its history and classification; its explanations; and an assessment of the consequences of counterterrorism policies.2. Literature recommendations Bjørgo, Tore (ed.) 2005. Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward. London, UK: Routledge.In this book, based on the analysis of numerous case studies (e.g. Palestinian armed groups, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, right‐wing extremists, state terrorism and state‐sponsored terrorism), experts in political violence examine the preconditions for the emergence of different types of terrorist organisations and the main factors that sustain terrorist campaigns. Cole, David 2003. Enemy Aliens: Double Standard and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism. New York, NY: The New Press.Thanks to its analysis and evaluation of the consequences of counter‐terrorism measures, David Cole's Enemy Aliens is one of the most rigorous discussions of how states (like the United States since 2001) often combat terrorism by adopting emergency powers (such as the special detention at Guantanamo Bay), which, in turn, risk undermining civil liberties. della Porta, Donatella 1995. Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Based on empirical research that compares the origins and development of left‐wing terrorism in Italy and Germany between the 1960s and the 1990s, della Porta offers a middle‐range theory of political violence that combines an analysis of the political opportunities and ideological frames exploited by armed groups, a profile of their organisational structures, and an investigation of the typical patterns underlying their recruitment processes. Gambetta, Diego (ed.) 2006. Making Sense of Suicide Missions. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.In this book, a number of distinguished social scientists, while examining the use of suicide missions by political and religious groups (such as the Japanese Kamikaze, the Tamil Tigers, Palestinian organisations, and Al‐Qaeda), specify and discuss the most important methodological questions associated with definitions, data collection, and explanations concerning this form of political struggle. Hoffman, Bruce 2006. Inside Terrorism. New York, NY: Colombia University Press.The book introduces the most important issues of terrorism studies: the controversial problem of the definition of terrorism; a history of terrorism, from anti‐colonial struggles to international terrorism; an examination and explanation of the most recent waves of religious extremists and suicide terrorism; an analysis of the ways terrorist groups exploit old and new media such as the Internet; and, finally, an overview of the strategies, tactics, and organisational aspects of modern and contemporary terrorism. Horgan, John 2005. The Psychology of Terrorism. London, UK: Routledge.Horgan presents a critical analysis of our understanding of terrorist psychology; many shortcomings emerge, particularly the limitations of personality theories in attempting to explain militancy. Based on interviews with terrorists, the book considers the most relevant psychological and social factors underlying involvement and engagement in political violence, and the process of leaving terrorist organisations. Kalyvas, Stathis 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Scholars generally distinguish between terrorism and other forms of violence against civilians – tactics of guerrilla warfare or insurgency in civil wars, for example. However, this work makes a relevant contribution to terrorism studies. Kalyvas clarifies the rationality and micro‐processes of interactions during armed conflicts that account for indiscriminate and selective uses of violence against civilian populations by political actors. Kushner, Harvey W. 2003. Encyclopedia of Terrorism. London, UK: Sage.One of the most accurate and exhaustive dictionaries focusing on terrorism, with more than 300 entries concerning terrorist groups, key events, people, terms, and statistics, as well as biographical, historical, and geographical information. Free access is available at the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) (http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/eBooks.asp). Laqueur, Walter 2002. A History of Terrorism. London, UK: Transaction Publishers.Along with Laqueur's Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study (London: Transaction Publishers, 1998), this constitutes a pioneering history of armed organisations, from nineteenth century Europe, to the anarchists of the 1880s and 1890s, to the left‐wing clashes during the 20th century, and up to the most recent terrorist groups. Pape, Robert A. 2005. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York, NY: Random House.Over the last decade, suicide terrorism has become an alarming political threat and a crucial challenge for social scientists. In his work, which compares a number of organisations responsible for suicide attacks, Pape rejects the explanation of suicide terrorism based on religious fundamentalism. He argues for a correlation between the use of this tactic and specific kinds of groups engaged in separatist campaigns or in struggles for liberation from foreign occupiers. Ranstorp, Magnus (ed.) 2007. Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Directions. London, UK: Routledge.In this book, distinguished scholars of terrorism studies discuss state‐of‐the‐art field research. In exploring new trends in this area – the most important questions about the explanation of recent terrorist organisations such as Al‐Qaeda, and about counterterrorism – these essays shed light on the strengths and weaknesses of our current knowledge of political violence. Reich, Walter (ed.) 1998. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.This is another seminal work on terrorism, bringing together some of the most well known experts in political violence. The variety of approaches used in the explanations of terrorist organisations and in the analysis of counterterrorism paves the way for a real interdisciplinary setting, which is absolutely crucial once the multi‐faceted nature of terrorism is clear. Sageman, Marc 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.Based on the analysis of biographical data for nearly 200 members of global Islamist extremism (of which Al‐Qaeda is a part), Sageman accounts for the origins and developments of this movement and specifies the crucial role played by social networks in the recruitment of individuals as Islamist militants. Wilkinson, Paul 2006. Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London, UK: Routledge.Wilkinson examines major trends in international terrorism and liberal democratic responses. On the one hand, the book introduces the specificity of terrorism and offers a classification and explanation of the most important types of armed groups. On the other, in approaching how states deal with terrorist threats, this work discusses forms of counterterrorism, by taking into account their impact on the rule of law and on the protection of civil liberties.3. Online materials Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Interna (AISI) (Agency for Internal Information and Security)(http://www.aisi.gov.it)The Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Interna (AISI) is the branch of Italian Intelligence tasked with collecting and analysing information about any criminal and terrorist threat to security. Among other activities, the AISI distributes its own periodical, Gnosis, online, where a chronology of international as well as domestic terrorist attacks since 2004 (currently updated through 2007) is available. Counterterrorism Blog (http://counterterrorismblog.org)The Counterterrorism Blog is a multi‐expert blog devoted to providing a one‐stop gateway to the counterterrorism community. It offers, among other things, overnight and breaking news, with real time commentary by experts; reports on terrorist organisations; discussions of long‐term trends in counterterrorism; and summaries of and discussions about US and international law. Center for Constitutional Rights
(CCR) (http://ccrjustice.org)Founded in 1966 by attorneys who represented civil rights organisations, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) is a non‐profit legal and educational organisation dedicated to protecting the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also offers information about important issues related to counterterrorism (e.g., the prolonged battle in defence of civil liberties associated with the special detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba). Global Terrorism Database (GTD)(http://www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd)The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open‐source database on terrorist incidents around the world since 1970 (currently updated through 2004). It includes systematic data on international as well as domestic terrorist attacks. For each GTD incident, information is available on the date and location of the attack, the weapons used and nature of the target, the number of casualties, and (when possible) the identity of the perpetrator. Another important database, the Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) at the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) (http://www.mipt.org/TKB.asp), has recently ceased operations and elements of the system have been merged with the GTD. Information on terrorist groups is now available at the Terrorist Organization Profiles (http://www.start.umd.edu/data/tops). Human Security Report Project
(HSRP) (http://www.hsrgroup.org)The HSRP conducts research on global and regional trends in political violence, exploring their causes and consequences, and then making this research accessible to the policy and research communities, the media, educators, and the interested public. The HSRP's publications include the Human Security Report, the Human Security Brief series, and the Human Security Gateway. The recent Human Security Brief 2007, online, makes a relevant contribution in discussing the methodological issues associated with collecting data on terrorism and offers a comprehensive overview of terrorist incidents in the last decade. Middle East Media Research Institute
(MEMRI) (http://www.memri.org)The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) explores the Middle East through the region's media with respect to a variety of topics including terrorism. MEMRI provides translations of Arabic, Persian, and Turkish media, as well as analysis of political, ideological, intellectual, social, cultural, and religious tendencies in the Middle East. A new section, the MEMRI's Islamist Websites Monitor Project, was launched in 2006 as part of the Jihad & Terrorism Studies project. Its aim is to keep Western audiences informed about the phenomenon of jihadist sites on the Internet, which are used by terrorist groups and their sympathisers to spread their extremist messages, to raise funds, and to recruit activists. Uppsala Conflict Data Project
(UCDP) (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP)The Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) collects data on armed conflicts around the world. A global conflict database is now available online. Data are useful for systematic studies of conflict origins, dynamics, and resolution. Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS)(http://wits.nctc.gov)The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) is the National Counterterrorism Center's (NCTC) database of terrorist incidents. NCTC serves as the primary organisation in the United States government for integrating and analysing all intelligence pertaining to terrorism and, at the same time, as the central and shared knowledge bank on terrorism information. Based on WITS, the NCTC provides an annual report and statistical information about terrorist incidents. Additional Online Resources Scores of additional organisations and centres (too many to list) conduct and disseminate research on issues related to armed conflicts, terrorism, terrorist groups, security, and counterterrorism. What follows is a list of some other key organisations and centres, with links to their websites:Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)(http://www.aspi.org.au)Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS)(http://www.fhs.se/en/Research/Centers‐and‐Research‐Programmes/CATS)Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)(http://www.csis.org)Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV)(http://www.st‐andrews.ac.uk/~wwwir/research/cstpv)IntelCenter(http://intelcenter.com)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)(http://www.pvtr.org)International Crisis Group (ICG)(http://www.crisisgroup.org)International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)(http://www.iiss.org)International Policy Institute for Counter‐Terrorism (ICT)(http://www.ict.org.il)Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT)(http://www.mipt.org)Saban Center at the Brookings Institution(http://www.brookings.edu/saban.aspx)Senlis Council(http://www.senliscouncil.net)Southern Poverty Law Center(http://www.splcenter.org)Terrorism and Homeland Security at RAND Corporation(http://www.rand.org/research_areas/terrorism)Terrorism Research Center (TRC)(http://www.terrorism.org)Transnational Radical Islamism Project at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment(http://www.mil.no/felles/ffi/english/start/research/Analysis_Division/_TERRA)United States Institute of Peace(http://www.usip.org/index.html)4. Sample syllabus Course Title: A Sociological Analysis of Terrorism and Counterterrorism Course Description In this course, we will explore the most relevant issues around terrorism and counterterrorism policies. Although we will largely approach this topic from a sociological perspective, this study is quite interdisciplinary. Consequently, we will be reading works from other academic disciplines, including history, psychology, political science, and economics. There are four major areas that any analysis of terrorism, to be comprehensive, should take into account: the definition of terrorism; its history and classification; its explanations; and an assessment of consequences related to counterterrorism. After an introduction to terrorism research (part 1), we will discuss the controversies related to the definition of terrorism (part 2) and to data collection (part 3), both necessary for an understanding of tendencies concerning terrorist incidents. A historical overview (part 4) will give us some preliminary information about the variety of terrorist campaigns – information that prepares us for the next exercise (part 5): grouping terrorist organisations by different types. Looking in more depth at the evolution of terrorism in the last decade, we will examine the case of Al‐Qaeda (part 6), and how this and other organisations exploit old and new media, especially the Internet (part 7). The next chapter will be the explanation of terrorism, that is, the specification of the main psychological, political, cultural, and religious factors underlying the emergence of a terrorist organisation and the unfolding of a terrorist campaign. Suicide terrorism will be used as a case study. More specifically, we will approach terrorism by examining the motivations and rationality of terrorist organisations (part 8), of the communities that support them (part 9), and of those who join them (part 10). We end the course by focusing on both the legal (part 11) and strategic (part 12) implications of counterterrorism measures adopted since 2001. Course outline and reading assignments Part 1. Terrorism Research An overview of the most important approaches to the study of terrorism and of the strengths and weaknesses of available analyses. Bjørgo, Tore 2005. 'Introduction' (pp. 1–15) and 'Conclusions' (pp. 256–264) in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward, edited by Tore Bjørgo. London, UK: Routledge. Crenshaw, Martha 2000. 'The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century.'Political Psychology 21 (2): 405–420 (Doi: 10.1111/0162-895X.00195). Ranstorp, Magnus 2007. 'Introduction: Mapping Terrorism Research – Challenges and Priorities.' Pp. 1–28 in Mapping Terrorism Research, edited by Magnus Ranstorp. London, UK: Routledge. Silke, Andrew 2004. 'An Introduction to Terrorism Research.' Pp. 1–29 in Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures, edited by Andrew Silke. London, UK: Frank Cass. Sinai, Joshua 2007. 'New Trends in Terrorism Studies: Strengths and Weaknesses.' Pp. 31–50 in Mapping Terrorism Research, edited by Magnus Ranstorp. London, UK: Routledge. Turk, Austin T. 2004. 'Sociology of Terrorism.'Annual Review of Sociology 30: 271–286 (Doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110510). Wilkinson, Paul 2007. 'Research into Terrorism Studies: Achievements and Failures.' Pp. 316–328 in Mapping Terrorism Research, edited by Magnus Ranstorp. London, UK: Routledge. Part 2. What is Terrorism? A discussion of one of the most controversial issues, the definition of terrorism, focusing on its political and methodological implications. Aly, Waleed 2008. 'The Axiom of Evil.'The Guardian, 8 July, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/08/nelsonmandela.terrorism (last accessed: 8 July 2008). Hoffman, Bruce 2006. Chapter 1 (pp. 1–42). Inside Terrorism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. della Porta, Donatella 2004. 'Terror Against the State.' Pp. 208–16 in The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, edited by Kate Nash and Alan Scott. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing. Schmid, Alexander P. 2004. 'Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism.'Terrorism and Political Violence 16 (2): 197–221 (Doi: 10.1080/09546550490483134). Tilly, Charles 2004. 'Terror, Terrorism, Terrorist.'Sociological Theory 22 (1): 5–16 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9558.2004.00200.x). Tosini, Domenico 2007. 'Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat', Sociology Compass 1 (2), 664–681 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00035.x). Wilkinson, Paul 2006. Chapter 1 (pp. 1–19). Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London, UK: Routledge. Part 3. Collecting Data on Terrorism Incidents An introduction to the challenges and solutions to the collection of terrorism data, a preliminary and crucial aspect of any scientific analysis. Buchalter, Alice R. and Glenn E. Curtis 2003. Inventory and Assessment of Databases Relevant for Social Science Research on Terrorism. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division Library of Congress, http://lcweb.loc.gov/rr/frd (last accessed 10 June 2008). Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler 2006. Chapter 3 (pp. 52–83). The Political Economy of Terrorism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Lafree, Gary 2007. 'Introducing the Global Terrorism Database.'Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (2): 181–204 (Doi: 10.1080/09546550701246817). HSP 2008. Human Security Brief 2007. Dying to Lose: Explaining the Decline in Global Terrorism. Simon Fraser University, Canada: Human Security Report Project, http://www.humansecuritybrief.info/HSRP_Brief_2007.pdf (last accessed 15 June 2008). Part 4. Waves of Terror: The Evolution of Terrorism A look at terrorism from a historical perspective in an attempt to identify continuities and discontinuities in the use of political violence. Abrahms, Max 2006. 'Why Terrorism Does Not Work.'International Security 31 (2): 42–78 (Doi: 10.1162/isec.2006.31.2.42). Duyvesteyn, Isabelle 2004. 'How New Is the New Terrorism?'Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (5): 439–454 (Doi: 10.1080/10576100490483750). Hoffman, Bruce 2006. Chapters 2–4 (pp. 43–130). Inside Terrorism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Jenkins, Brian 1975. International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict. Research Paper n. 48, California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy. Kaplan, Jeffrey 2007. 'The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism?'Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (4): 545–570 (Doi: 10.1080/09546550701606564). Laqueur, Walter 2002. Chapters 1–2 (pp. 3–78). A History of Terrorism. London, UK: Transaction Publishers. Münkler, Herfried 2005. Chapter 5 (pp. 99–116). The New Wars. Cambridge, UK: Polity. Rapoport, David C. 2004. 'Modern Terror: The Four Waves.' Pp. 46–73 in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Great Strategy, edited by Audrey Cronin and J. Ludes. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Reed, Donald J. 2008. 'Beyond the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict.'Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31 (8): 684–722 (Doi: 10.1080/10576100802206533). Part 5. Typologies of Terrorist Movements An overview of the complex task of classifying terrorist organisations on the basis of characteristics such as political objectives, ideological frames, and the cleavages between them and their enemies. Goodwin, Jeff 2006. 'A Theory of the Categorical Terrorism.'Social Forces 84 (4): 2027–2046. Gunaratna, Rohan and Graeme C. S. Steven 2004. Chapter 1 (pp. 1–98). Counterterrorism. Santa Barbara, CA: Abc Clio. Schmid, Alexander P. and Albert J. Jongman 1988. Chapter 2 (in collaboration with M. Stohl and P. A. Fleming, pp. 39–60). Political Terrorism. London, UK: Transaction Publishers. Tosini, Domenico 2007. 'Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat.'Sociology Compass 1 (2), 664–681 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00035.x). Wilkinson, Paul 2006. Chapter 2 (pp. 20–38). Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London, UK: Routledge. Part 6. Al‐Qaeda and its Affiliates: Ideologies, Strategies, Structures A sociological look at the ideological, strategic, and organisational aspects of Al‐Qaeda's terrorism from the 1980s to its most recent campaign in Iraq. Al‐Zayyat, Montasser 2004. The Road to Al‐Qaeda. London, UK: Pluto Press. Gunaratna, Rohan 2002. Chapters 1–2 (pp. 21–126). Inside Al‐Qaeda. New York, NY: Berkley Books. Pape, Robert A. 2005. Chapter 7 (pp. 102–125). Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York, NY: Random House. Sageman, Marc 2004. Chapters 1‐2 (pp. 1‐60). Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Hafez, Mohammed M. 2007. Chapters 1–5 (pp. 35–162). Suicide Bombers in Iraq. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Part 7. Terrorism and the Media An exploration of the ways that terrorist organisations exploit old and new media, especially the Internet, as communicative channels (for staging their attacks, threats, demands, and propaganda) and as instrumental tools (for fund raising, coordination, and recruitment). Hoffman, Bruce 2006. Chapters 6–7 (pp. 173–228). Inside Terrorism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. ICG 2006. In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency. International Crisis Group: Middle East Report No 50, 15 February, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3953&l=1 (last accessed 5 February 2008). Rogan, Hanna 2006. Jihadism Online: A Study of How Al‐Qaeda and Radical Islamist Groups Use Internet for Terrorist Purposes. Norwegian Defence Research Establishment: FFI/RAPPORT‐2006/00915, http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2006/00915.pdf (last accessed 5 June 2008). Sageman, Marc 2008. Chapter 6 (pp. 109–123). Leaderless Jihad. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Weimann, Gabriel 2006. Chapters 3–4 (pp. 49–145). Terror on the Internet. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Part 8. Terrorist Organisations and Their Logic An examination of the political objectives and ideologies of terrorist organisations and an overview of the rationality and strategies underlying their decision‐making in relation to the political opportunities and military events shaping their environment. Boyns, David and James David Ballard 2004. 'Developing a Sociological Theory for the Empirical Understanding of Terrorism.'American Sociologist 35 (2): 5–26 (Doi: 10.1007/BF02692394). Crenshaw, Martha 1998. 'The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Strategic Choice.' Pp. 7–24 in Origins of Terrorism, edited by Walter Reich. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Gambetta, Diego 2006. 'Can We Make Sense of Suicide Missions?' Pp. 259–299 in Making Sense of Suicide Missions, edited by Diego Gambetta. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Hafez, Mohammed and Quintan Wiktorowicz 2004. 'Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement.' Pp. 61–88 in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, edited Quintan Wiktorowicz. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press. Kalyvas, Stathis 2006. Chapters 6–7 (pp. 147–208). The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Kramer, Martin 1998. 'The Moral Logic of Hezbollah.' Pp. 131–157 in Origins of Terrorism, edited by Walter Reich. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Pape, Robert A. 2005. Chapters 3–5 (pp. 27–60). Dying to Win. New York, NY: Random House. Tosini, Domenico 2009. 'A Sociological Understanding of Suicide Attacks.'Theory, Culture & Society (Forthcoming). Part 9. Mechanisms of Social Support A discussion of the economic, cultural, and political conditions which make possible the support for, and collaboration with, terrorist organisations by members of certain communities. Cook, David and Olivia Allison 2007. Chapters 1–5 (pp. 1–85). Understanding and Addressing Suicide Attacks: The Faith and Politics of Martyrdom Operations. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International. Chernick, Marc 2007. 'FARC‐EP: From Liberal Guerrillas to Marxist Rebels to Post‐Cold War Insurgency.' Pp. 51–120 in Terror, Insurgency, and the State, edited by Marianne Heiberg et al. Philadelphia, PA: University Pennsylvania Press. Hashim, Ahmed S. 2006. Chapter 2 (pp. 59–124). Insurgency and Counter‐Insurgency in Iraq. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kalyvas, Stathis 2006. Chapter 4 (pp. 87–110). The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Merari, Ariel 2005. 'Social, Organizational and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism.' Pp. 70–86 in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward, edited by Tore Bjørgo. London, UK: Routledge. Pape, Robert A. 2005. Chapters 6–8 (pp. 79–167). Dying to Win. New York, NY: Random House. Part 10. Social Networks and Recruitment An analysis of the motivations behind the process of joining terrorist organisations and of the role played by group dynamics and social networks. della Porta, Donatella 1995. Chapter 7 (pp. 165–186). Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Sageman, Marc 2004. Chapters 4–5 (pp. 99–173). Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University Pennsylvania Press. Horgan, John 2005. Chapter 3 (pp. 47–79). The Psychology of Terrorism. London, UK: Routledge. Khosrokhavar, Fahad 2005. Chapter 3 (pp. 149–224). Suicide Bombers. London, UK: Pluto Press. Pedahzur, Ami 2005. Chapters 6–7 (pp. 118–181). Suicide Terrorism. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Stern, Jessica 2003. Chapter 9 (pp. 237–280). Terror in the Name of God. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publisher. Wintrobe, Ronald 2006. Chapters 5–6 (pp. 108–157). Rational Extremism: The Political Economy of Radicalism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Part 11. Counterterrorism I: Legal Implications An overview of the emergency powers of antiterrorism legislations and 'special measures', and an analysis of their legal impact on the protection of human rights. Cole, David 2003. Chapters 1–5 (pp. 17–82). Enemy Aliens. New York, NY: The Free Press. Haubrich, Dirk 2003. 'September 11, Anti‐Terror Laws and Civil Liberties: Britain, France and Germany Compared.'Government and Opposition 38 (1): 3–29 (Doi: 10.1111/1477-7053.00002). Parker, Tom 2005. 'Counterterrorism Policies in the United Kingdom.' Pp. 119–148 in Protecting Liberty in an Age of Terror, edited by Philip B. Heymann and Juliette N. Kayyem. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Tosini, Domenico 2007. 'Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat', Sociology Compass 1 (2): 664–681 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00035.x). Part 12. Counterterrorism II: Strategic Limitations An examination of the most important counterterrorism policies adopted since 2001, with special reference to the occupation of Iraq, and an assessment of their advantages and risks for combating and preventing terrorism. Nesser, Peter 2006. 'Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe.'Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29 (4): 323–342 (Doi: 10.1080/10576100600641899). Pape, Robert A. 2005. Chapter 12 (pp. 237–250). Dying to Win. New York, NY: Random House. Silke, Andrew 2005. 'Fire of Iolaus: The Role of State Countermeasures in Causing Terrorism and What Needs to Be Done.' Pp. 241–255 in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward, edited by Tore Bjørgo. London, UK: Routledge. Smelser, Neil J. 2007. Chapter 6 (pp. 160–199). The Faces of Terrorism: Social and Psychological Dimensions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tosini, Domenico 2007. 'Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat', Sociology Compass 1 (2): 664–681 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00035.x). Wilkinson, Paul 2006. Chapters 5–6 (pp. 61–102). Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London, UK: Routledge.5. Films and videos Al‐Qaeda Film on the First Anniversary of the London Bombings. 2006 (17 min)(http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/215/1186.htm)Excerpts from a message from 2005 London bomber Shehzad Tanweer and statements by Al‐Qaeda leaders Ayman Al‐Zawahiri and Adam Gadahn, posted on http://www.tajdeed.net.tc on 8 July 2006. A typical example of the communicative use of the Internet by Islamists in their attempt to frame terrorist attacks as legitimate acts of martyrdom, committed by courageous Muslims in defence of their brothers and sisters in occupied Muslim lands (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine). Al‐Qaeda Leader in Iraq Abu Musab Al‐Zarqawi's First Televised Interview. 2006 (17 min)(http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/344/1118.htm)A video posted by the Islamist web forum http://www.alsaha.com on 25 April 2006, in which the Al‐Qaeda commander in Iraq Abu Musab Al‐Zarqawi (killed by an airstrike on 7 June 2006) outlines all the typical condemnations (by Islamist extremists) of the Iraq occupation by the US‐led coalition, and calls for a jihad against its forces and allies. Propagandising the military capabilities of Al‐Qaeda, the video culminates in footage of Al‐Zarqawi with masked fighters, firing an automatic weapon, and 'new missiles' developed by 'the brothers'. Al‐Arabiya TV Special on the Culture of Martyrdom and Suicide Bombers. 2005 (7 min)(http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/215/807.htm)Excerpts from a show about the culture of martyrdom, aired on Al‐Arabiya TV on 22 July 2005. The documentary investigates some of the most relevant religious and political justifications and symbolic representations among Islamist extremists in favour of suicide attacks. In particular, it looks at the Palestinian organisations Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and at the Lebanese Hezbollah. The film includes an interview with Maha Ghandour, the wife of Salah Ghandour, who was responsible for a suicide attack carried out in 1995 on behalf of Hezbollah against an Israeli military convoy. Battle For Haditha. 2007 (93 min)(http://www.nickbroomfield.com/haditha.html)In this film, the director Nick Broomfield looks at the dramatic events surrounding an incident that occurred in Haditha, Iraq, when 24 Iraqis were allegedly massacred by US Marines, following the death of a Marine in a bombing perpetrated by Iraqi insurgents. The harsh reality of the war is viewed from three perspectives: that of the US troops, the insurgents who committed the attacks, and a civilian Iraqi family. Iranian Animated Film for Children Promotes Suicide Bombings. 2005 (10 min)(http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/215/906.htm)Including excerpts from an Iranian animated movie for children, aired on IRIB 3 TV on 28 October 2005, this film is an example of the mechanisms of de‐humanization of the enemy (the Israelis), based on a tale of the ferocious murder of innocent people by Israeli soldiers. This incident is followed by a bomb attack framed as an act of martyrdom by young militants in revenge of the previous assassination. Paradise Now. 2005 (91 min)In his film, the director Hany Abu‐Assad focuses on the final days of two Palestinian militants as they prepare to carry out a suicide attack in Tel Aviv. Once childhood friends Said (Kais Nashef) and Khaled (Ali Suliman) are offered such an attack, they feel a sense of purpose in serving their people's cause, whereas a young Palestinian woman, after learning of their plan, tries to dissuade them from carrying out their missions. Paradise Now has been viewed as a controversial attempt to examine the motivations of suicide bombers. The Reach of War: Sectarian War in Iraq. 2006 (7 min)(http://www.nytimes.com/packages/khtml/2006/12/28/world/20061228_SECTARIAN_FEATURE.html)The New York Times journalist Marc Santora reports on some of the most violent and bloody effects of the sectarian violence perpetrated in Iraq during the civil war between Sunnis and Shiites, which has followed the occupation by the US‐led coalition. The Road to Guantanamo. 2006 (92 min)(http://www.roadtoguantanamomovie.com)Directed by Michael Winterbottom, the film tells the story of four friends beginning a holiday in Pakistan. Through a series of interviews and news footage, the film shows how they end up in Afghanistan, where are then captured by American forces and kept in harsh conditions at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for over 2 years. The Role of Foreign Fighters in the Iraqi Jihad. 2006 (9 min)(http://www1.nefafoundation.org/multimedia‐original.html)In this video, NEFA Foundation expert Evan Kohlmann documents the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Iraq and their role within the Sunni insurgency. The video includes footage of senior figures from Abu Musab al‐Zarqawi's terrorist group (including Lebanese, Saudi, and Kuwaiti nationals) and scenes from Al‐Qaida training camps in Iraq. The Suicide Bomber. 2005 (12 min)(http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/july‐dec05/bombers_11‐14.html)In this debate aired on PBS on 14 November 2005, three experts (Mia Bloom, Mohammed M. Hafez, and Robert A. Pape) discuss what motivates suicide bombers and their terrorist organisations, with special reference to the 2005 hotel bombings in Amman, Jordan, where a female militant joining these attacks was found alive after her bomb failed to detonate. The Terrorist Propaganda (three videos): Indexing Al‐Qaeda Online. 2005 (6 min)(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/custom/2005/08/05/CU2005080501141.html?whichDay=1) Without the Video, It's Just an Attack. 2007 (5 min)(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/video/2007/09/28/VI2007092800608.html) Al‐Qaeda's Growing Online Offensive. 2008 (14 min)(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2008/06/23/AR2008062302135.html)Over the last decade, terrorist propaganda on the Internet has increased dramatically. In these videos, experts discuss how insurgent groups, in particular Islamist extremists in Iraq and Afghanistan, are using new media to spread their messages worldwide, to chronicle their operations (including the assembly and emplacement of roadside bombs targeting US forces), to recruit, and to raise money.6. Focus questions
What challenges do researchers interested in terrorism studies face and why? What are the most important theoretical and methodological weaknesses in current terrorism research? How can we define terrorism? What political controversies affect the definition of terrorism? When comparing different terrorism data sets, what kinds of diagnoses can we make on the tendencies of terrorist incidents in the last decade? How has terrorism changed in history? Based on the literature concerning Al‐Qaeda's ideology, strategies, and structures, what continuities and discontinuities can we identify with respect to previous forms of terrorism? When dealing with the explanation of terrorism, what are the most significant factors to be taken into account? How can we learn from the current literature on suicide terrorism in order to build a comprehensive model for its explanation? Given the legislative and military responses to September 11 and subsequent attacks (e.g. the 2005 London bombings), what have been the legal consequences affecting our societies and the strategic implications for combating and preventing terrorist violence?
7. SeminarsParticipants will be divided into small groups of about three persons. Each group will be asked to make a contribution to a sociological analysis (either written or presented) of a specific armed organisation, such as:Al‐Gama'a Al‐IslamiyyaAl‐QaedaAl‐Qaeda in IraqAl‐Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly Salafist Group for Call and Combat)Ansar Al‐SunnahAnsar Al‐IslamArmed Islamic Groups (GIA)Army of GodAum ShinrikyoChechen separatistsEgyptian Islamic JihadEuskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)HamasHezbollahIrgun Zvai LeumiIrish Republican Army (IRA)Islamic Movement of UzbekistanJemaah IslamiyahKashmiri separatistsKu Klux Klan (KKK)Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)Lashkar‐e‐JhangviLibyan Islamic Fighting GroupPalestinian Islamic JihadPalestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO)Red Army Faction (RAF)Red Brigades (BR)Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)Taliban.For each armed organisation, each group will examine the following aspects:
data on its attacks – including information that justifies the label of 'terrorist organisation'; a historical account of its origins and developments; an analysis of the strategy underlying its terrorist campaigns; a clarification of its social support and collaboration (if any); a profile of its militants and patterns of recruitment; a discussion of the counterterrorism policies adopted by states and their impact on the terrorist organisation.
Note * Correspondence address: Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology and Social Research, Piazza Venezia 41 – 38100 Trento, Italy, +39 0461 881324; +39 0461 881348 (fax); +39 347 2329219 (mobile); Email: domenico.tosini@soc.unitn.it http://portale.unitn.it/dpt/dsrs/docenti/tosini.htm