Suchergebnisse

The number of premeditated murders in the world is constantly growing. Influential factors in this process are the following phenomena: economic crisis, unemployment, low level of legal awareness and legal culture, legal nihilism, contradictions in society, contradictions of normative legal acts, gaps in legislation, insufficiently effective activity of law enforcement agencies. Each country in its public policy is trying to resolve the issue under study, creating rules of law that correspond to today's reality. Section 71.2 contains an article providing for liability for "Murder of a member of the United Nations or a person associated with it". It states that "A person commits a crime if: a) his conduct results in the death of another person; b) if the other person is a member of the United Nations or a related person; (c) If the person is a member of a United Nations or a related person, participates in a United Nations operation; (d) The first-mentioned person intends to cause or recklessly causes the death of a member of the United Nations or a related person or any other person by such conduct. " Another article, which provides for liability for premeditated murder, is contained in section 115.1 and is entitled "Murder of an Australian citizen or resident". It states that; "(1) A person commits an offense if: (a) The person commits an act outside Australia (before or after 1 October 2002 or the date of entry into force of this Code); and b) the conduct results in the death of another person; and (c) the other person is an Australian citizen or resident of Australia; and (d) the first-mentioned person intends to cause or negligently causes the death of an Australian citizen or resident of Australia or any other person by such conduct. " Another provision related to the death of another person is contained in section 268.8, which deals with "Crime against humanity - murder". It states that "A person (offender) commits a crime if: a) the perpetrator causes the death of one or more persons; and (b) the ...

Argues that the passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), which incorporated the concept of the illegal enemy combatant into the law, resulted in the legalization of a new legal & political order in the US. Further, the idea of the illegal enemy combatant concerns the relation between the US state & its residents & the US & other countries, with the concept of the illegal enemy combatant situated at the intersections of military & criminal law & US & international law. It is contended that looking at the concept sheds light on various incarnations of US sovereignty & of the US state's international & domestic relations, allowing for a definition of the new for of the US state. The conceptual history of enemy combatant or illegal combatant is traced to the Bush administration's 13 November 2001 executive order; it first applied to foreigners, but was quickly applied to US citizens as well. It is asserted that while the (2004) Hamdi v. Rumsfeld decision seemed a victory for civil liberties, it offered the government the opportunity to ask Congress to custom build a new legal order & that such authority is reflected in the MCA, which provides a political character to the crime(s) of an illegal enemy combatant & legalizes special military tribunals established by the 2001 executive order. These tribunals are supposed to be reserved only for foreign enemy combatants, but the MCA is explicit in applying them to the whole population. Thus, the MCA is seen to transform the state organization via the ending of the formal separation of powers & creating a subjective law placed in the executive's hands, one that no longer respects international law while war becomes an ordinary police operation; US criminal law establishes a new definition of hostility that is globally applied, placing all populations at the mercy of US executive power. D. Edelman

The aim of study was to analyze the functioning the new model of criminal corporate responsibility in Poland. The need to introduce into the Polish legal system liability of corporate (collective entities) has resulted, among others, from the Polish Republic's international commitments, in particular related to membership in the European Union. The study showed that responsibility of collective entities under the Act has a criminal nature. The main question concerns the ability of the collective entity to be brought to guilt under criminal law sense. Polish criminal law knows only the responsibility of individual persons. So far, guilt as a personal feature of action, based on the ability of the offender to feel in his psyche, could be considered only in relation to the individual person, while the said Act destroyed this conviction. Guilt of collective entity must be proven under at least one of the three possible forms: the guilt in the selection or supervision and so called organizational guilt. In addition, research in article has resolved the issue how the principle of proportionality in relation to criminal measures in response of collective entities should be considered. It should be remembered that the legal subjectivity of collective entities, including their rights and freedoms, is an emanation of the rights and freedoms of individual persons which create collective entities and through these entities implement their rights and freedoms. The whole study was proved that the adopted Act largely reflects the international legal regulations but also contains the unknown and original legislative solutions.

This article confronts what has been described as the 'ongoing self-defence controversy' within the international military community over the legitimacy of commanders issuing orders that have the practical effect of restricting soldiers' use of force in self-defence. Within this controversy, some argue that soldier self-defence is legally sacrosanct, a right that must invariably take precedence over any command-imposed restrictions. This article explores whether there is any legal basis for this view. It finds that there is not, and that such an absolutist approach misconstrues the basic theoretical and legal origins of self-defence. What is more, the article forewarns that reasoning in such absolute terms might actually serve to devalue rather than promote soldiers' safety by failing to properly account for the longstanding military tradition of commands such as 'hold fire' orders, the central importance of these directives to the ordered application of military force and military effectiveness, and the interrelationship of the military and the state's responsibility for national security.

Cet article se penche sur la controverse qui entoure la légitime défense au sein de la communauté militaire internationale, quant à la légitimité du commandement de donner des ordres ayant pour effet, dans la pratique, de restreindre l'emploi de la force des soldats à des fins de légitime défense. Dans le cadre de cette controverse, certains soutiennent que la légitime défense des soldats est sacro-sainte d'un point de vue juridique et que ce droit doit toujours l'emporter sur toute restriction imposée par le commandement. Cet article cherche à déterminer si ce point de vue repose sur un fondement juridique. L'article conclut que non, et qu'une telle approche absolutiste dénature les origines théoriques et juridiques à la base de la légitime défense. Qui plus est, l'article met en garde qu'un raisonnement en de tels termes absolus pourrait en fait nuire à la sécurité des soldats, au lieu de l'améliorer, parce qu'il ne tient pas suffisamment compte de la longue tradition militaire d'ordres tels que «halte au feu», de l'importance de ces directives pour l'application ordonnée de la force militaire et pour l'efficacité militaire, et de l'interaction entre l'armée et la responsabilité de l'État pour la sécurité nationale.

Dit artikel gaat in op wat is omschreven als de 'voortdurende controverse over zelfverdediging' binnen de internationale militaire gemeenschap over de legitimiteit van commandanten die bevelen uitvaardigen waarbij het gebruik van geweld door soldaten uit zelfverdediging praktisch wordt beperkt. Binnen deze controverse betogen sommigen dat de zelfverdediging van soldaten wettelijk onaantastbaar is, een recht dat altijd voorrang moet hebben op alle beperkingen die door het commando worden opgelegd. Dit artikel gaat na of er een wettelijke basis is voor dit standpunt. De conclusie is dat die er niet is en dat een dergelijke absolutistische benadering de theoretische en juridische grondslagen van zelfverdediging miskent. Bovendien waarschuwt het artikel dat een redenering in dergelijke absolute termen de veiligheid van de soldaten eerder zou kunnen aantasten dan bevorderen, doordat niet naar behoren rekening wordt gehouden met de gevestigde militaire traditie van bevelen zoals 'staakt het vuren'-bevelen, het centrale belang van deze richtlijnen voor de bevolen toepassing van militair geweld en militaire doeltreffendheid, en de onderlinge relatie tussen het leger en de verantwoordelijkheid van de staat voor de nationale veiligheid.

Este artículo aborda lo que se ha venido a llamar la 'controversia existente en torno a la autodefensa' dentro de la comunidad militar internacional sobre la legitimidad de los comandantes que emiten órdenes que tienen el efecto práctico de restringir el uso de la fuerza en defensa propia por parte de los soldados. Dentro de esta controversia, algunos argumentan que la autodefensa de los soldados es legalmente sacrosanta, un derecho que invariablemente debe prevalecer sobre cualquier restricción impuesta por el mando. Este artículo explora si existe alguna base legal para este punto de vista. Se llega a la conclusión de que no existe base alguna y que tal enfoque absolutista malinterpreta los orígenes teóricos y legales básicos de la autodefensa. A mayor abundamiento, el artículo advierte que el razonamiento en términos tan absolutos podría servir para devaluar, en lugar de promover, la seguridad de los soldados al no tener en cuenta adecuadamente la tradición militar inmemorial de órdenes como las órdenes de 'mantener el fuego', la importancia central de estas directivas para la aplicación ordenada de la fuerza militar y la eficacia militar, y la interrelación de las fuerzas armadas y la responsabilidad del Estado por la seguridad nacional.

Questo articolo affronta quella che è stata descritta come la 'continua controversia di autodifesa' all'interno della comunità militare internazionale sulla legittimità dei comandanti che emettono ordini che hanno l'effetto pratico di limitare l'uso della forza da parte dei soldati nell'autodifesa. All'interno di questa controversia, alcuni sostengono che l'autodifesa dei soldati sia giuridicamente sacrosanta, un diritto che deve invariabilmente avere la precedenza su qualsiasi restrizione imposta dal comando. Questo articolo esamina se vi sia una base giuridica per questa interpretazione. Trova che non esiste, e che un tale approccio rigido fraintenda le origini teoriche e giuridiche di base di auto­difesa. Inoltre, l'articolo ammonisce che ragionare in termini così assoluti potrebbe effettivamente sminuire piuttosto che promuovere la sicurezza dei soldati, non riuscendo a tenere adeguatamente conto della lunga tradizione militare di comandi come 'non aprire il fuoco', dell'importanza centrale di queste direttive per l'ordinata applicazione della forza militare e dell'efficacia militare e l'interrelazione tra la responsabilità militare e quella dello Stato per la sicurezza nazionale.

Dieser Artikel befasst sich mit dem, was innerhalb der internationalen Militärgemeinschaft bezeichnet wird als 'andauernde Selbstverteidigungskontroverse' ('ongoing self-defence controversy') in Bezug auf die Legitimität von Befehlshabern, die Befehle erteilen, wobei die Gewaltanwendung aus Selbstverteidigung durch Soldaten praktisch beschränkt wird. Im Rahmen dieser Kontroverse argumentieren manche, dass die Selbstverteidigung von Soldaten rechtlich als sakrosankt gilt und dass dieses Recht immer vor jeder vom Kommando auferlegten Beschränkung Vorrang haben muss. Dieser Artikel prüft, ob es irgendeine gesetzliche Basis für diese Auffassung gibt. Der Autor stellt fest, dass dies nicht der Fall ist, und dass eine solche absolutistische Sichtweise die theoretischen und gesetzlichen Grundlagen der Selbstverteidigung verkennt. Darüber hinaus erteilt der Artikel eine Warnung, auf diese absolute Weise zu argumentieren könnte eigentlich dazu beitragen, die Sicherheit der Soldaten zu beeinträchtigen statt sie zu fördern, indem der althergebrachten militärischen Tradition von Befehlen, wie 'Feuer einstellen', der zentralen Bedeutung dieser Richtlinien für die geordnete Anwendung von Militärgewalt und für die Militäreffizienz sowie der Wechselbeziehung zwischen der Armee und der Verantwortung des Staates für die nationale Sicherheit nicht gebührendermaßen Rechnung getragen wird.