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It has become almost a truism that parliamentary elections have become more personalized. However, evidence for this proposition among voters is relatively mixed and we lack a quantification of leader inspired voting. Using data from Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project and consistent measures of leader and party popularity across 86 parliamentary elections in 31 polities between 1996 and 2019, we break new ground in the study of behavioral personalization in several respects. First, we provide a consistent and longitudinal test of leader inclined voting, separate from party evaluations, in the form of a vote-leader/party favorite alignment index. Our results show 6% of voters align their vote with their favorite leader solely, and one in five voters align their vote primarily with their favorite leader. While significant, more voters align their vote with their favorite party. Second, we find that leader motivated voting is most prevalent among non-partisans, older voters, and in elections where ideological polarization is low. Third, we demonstrate that voters solely motivated by leaders are most likely to switch their votes between elections. Our results have implications for our understanding of leaders' impact on elections.

Given the fact that Ukraine declares a European path of development and considers itself a potential member of the European Union, the study mainly examines the relationship between trust and economic growth in Ukraine and other countries of the world, including post-Soviet countries. The hypothesis that general trust has a positive effect on economic growth in general is tested, and a comparative assessment of the level and factors of trust across the regions of Ukraine has been carried out. The results show an historical tradition of mistrust of the state and its institutions particular to Ukraine as the country where the state has been perceived as foreign by most of the population for over 70 years; exceptional weakness and corruption of state administration, even by the standard of third-world countries; availability of influential and consistent stereotypes, partially universal and partly specific to post-communist countries. It causes polarization in society and within certain social groups and governmental institutions. Ukrainian society is characterized by the waste of symbolic capital of confidence in authorities. Meanwhile, there is some symmetry between mistrust of the system and trust in entities created by people to meet their spiritual, social, psychological, and other needs.

Originally scheduled for 2020, the 10th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had to be deferred four times. It was not until August 2022 that the 191 NPT states finally met. At least since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, observers had expected that the delegates would be unable to agree on a Final Document. Surprisingly, differences over nuclear disarmament did not play a role in the failure of the conference, despite the growing polarization over this issue since the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) at the beginning of 2021. Russia alone was responsible for torpedoing the consensus. Conversely, all the non-nuclear NPT parties made major concessions in a bid to pre­vent the conference from failing. This shows that in a context of global tensions, nuclear disarmament is a lesser concern for the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) than they themselves have long been suggesting. That the stability of the NPT does not depend on progress towards disarmament is good news. For Germany's National Security Strategy (NSS), it means that greater concessions to advocates of the TPNW are not necessary to protect the NPT. (Autorenreferat)

The automation of human activity has been growing every year for the past ten years thanks to AI algorithms, increasing the amount of big data and computing power. Today, artificial intelligence technologies are used in everyday life, automating processes previously performed by humans. Moreover, it is believed that these technologies can reach human cognitive abilities and even surpass them at some point. In this regard, questions arise what the future of humanity will look like in conjunction with AI technologies. If earlier, most of the research was more technical, then in the last three to four years, there has been much scientific research in terms of disciplines in which the influence of artificial intelligence is possible. International relations are no exception. The purpose of the article is to review publications on how artificial intelligence technologies affect international relations? Within the framework of the article, six books and eight articles were considered. The author concludes that AI technologies seriously impact international relations in socio-economic and political terms. The socio-economic aspect includes the consequences of automated capitalism on world politics, the rise in unemployment, the emergence of a "hopeless" class, the polarization of society, and more. AI technologies influences strategic stability, nuclear deterrence, and cyber warfare.

AbstractBackgroundBehavioral responses to the COVID‐19 pandemic have become highly polarized, and public health initiatives often try to use different frames to influence behavior. If the polarization of behaviors is related to differences in responses to frames, then different health messages could be targeted to different groups to influence behavior.ObjectiveTo determine whether risk preferences and susceptibility to gain/loss frames have been affected by COVID‐19 and whether they differ along partisan lines.MethodsUsing repeated cross‐sectional data from a nationally representative dataset in the United States replicating the disease outbreak scenario collected before and after the onset of COVID‐19, we test whether responsiveness to the gain/loss frames has changed over time and whether the responsiveness varies by political affiliation.ResultsThe experimental results show that the risk preferences of the U.S. population is very susceptible to the framing of
choices, consistent with the literature finding risk loving preferences under the loss frame and risk aversion under the gain frame. However, the experience of COVID‐19 does not appear to have changed the responsiveness, nor are there
significant differences between conservatives/Republicans and liberals/Democrats.ConclusionTargeting different partisan groups with different risk‐related message frames is unlikely to be effective at altering behaviors.

Starting from the fact that pronounced differences in the level of development of regions within a particular country can have a serious and significant (negative) impact on its socio-political stability, as well as the performance of the national economy as a whole, it is very important to create conditions for ensuring balanced and sustainable regional development. Due to its pronounced multidimensional nature, the analysis of regional economic disparities is a very complex and statistically demanding task. In this paper, a multivariate methodological framework for the classification of districts in Serbia according to the achieved level of economic development, into internally-homogeneous / externally-heterogeneous groups, based primarily on the application of hierarchical agglomerative clustering procedure and examination of interdependencies between five selected relevant economic indicators, is presented. The statistical validity of the obtained "optimal" classification of districts is additionally tested and confirmed with the results of one-factor multivariate analysis of variance. The resulting categorization clearly and unequivocally confirms the presence of pronounced inequalities regarding the achieved level of economic development between NUTS 3 level territorial units in Serbia, and the existence of regional economic polarization, primarily in direction "developed north – undeveloped south".

AbstractThe article argues that the theory of plebiscitary leader democracy (PLD), originally developed by Max Weber, is in its somewhat rejuvenated version a helpful framework in interpreting longer-term and more recent empirical trends in contemporary democracies, such as the growing personalization of politics, the emergence of populist leaders, rising levels of polarization, and the growing importance of social media. However, to realize the potential of the theory, it should be detached from Jeffrey Green's most original, yet insufficiently realistic elaboration of plebiscitary democracy that he made a decade ago. The article argues that instead of a passive and unifiable entity, the citizenry should be thought of as reactive and deeply divided, a setting which can be characterized by the metaphor of the infamous Byzantine chariot races rather than that of the theater, implicit in Green's theory. Plebiscitary democracy should be thought of as representational, where popular control is manifested as the veto power of the popular voice. Additionally, despite its realist minimalism, the theory we propose may still have some critical potential, because it adopts the refurbished ideal of competition. The article closes by identifying further avenues of theoretization leading towards a more elaborate view of PLD.

Abstract
The situation generated by the pandemic has meant the acceleration of the ongoing hegemonic clash between the United States and China, as well as the intensification of the anti-China narrative and a deplorable wave of Sinophobia throughout the world. In this context, Taiwan has become a strategic hot spot for the development of the rhetoric of the enemy. This study analyses some of the direct consequences of the ensuing friend/foe discourses in the Taiwanese milieu. In the context of a new Cold War, certain groups of power and their media apparatuses have embarked into a race to discursively distance the country as quickly as possible from the despised global enemy, not to be dragged down by the proximity and commonalities shared with China. Moreover, social polarization within Taiwan and contempt for the internal "enemies" pose an added challenge both for the maintenance of liberal democracy and the preservation of peace and self-government on the island. These outcomes are facilitated by underlying populist and nationalist processes of identity construction and hegemonic struggle: distinct discourses re-articulating the Taiwanese identity as an underdog people and a victimized nation.

Within the continuing economic downturn, our society has been facing rapid dichotomization and bi-polarization between groups which reinforces social inequality. Young (2011) states that social inequality should be viewed as a concept of oppression, not by the distribution of resources, which has been considered as a general indicator of social inequality. Following her argument, she suggests exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence as sub-concepts of oppression. In this sense, this study uses the distribution of resources as an independent variable and the 'perceived oppression' presented by Young as a dependent variable to identify the role of social support as a factor that makes the difference between social-structural inequality and contextual inequality. Through hierarchical regression analyses and bootstrapping methods this paper looks at how the two different perspectives on inequality are related, and how the social support mediates the relationship between socio-economic position and perceived oppression. By shedding light on the meaning of socio-economic isolation of individuals, this study will contribute to the academia in searching for the alternatives to strengthen the stability of our society where the new paradigm of communication is being used to form network ties and corresponding sense of supports.

The post-Soviet period of Moldova's history was complex and ambiguous. It was characterized by a difficult socio-economic situation, important transformations of the foreign policy, malign influence of corruption, mass departure of the able-bodied population outside the republic. Recent years have not been an exception. The turbulent events of 2016‒2020, which are analyzed, became a new important stage in the life of Moldova, solidifying the trends of its development in the next decade. The authors analyze the key events of this period, of its domestic and foreign policy: the issues of the creation and functioning of a broad coalition in the summer of 2019, its collapse, the formation of a new coalition between socialists and democrats, the presidential elections in Moldova and their impact on the political situation. The authors note that the recent trends in the political development of Moldova and its foreign policy show that in the near future political instability in the republic will continue. The question is if, in the context of internal political polarization in the country, it will be possible to reach a geopolitical consensus around Moldova and prevent the acute political confrontation in the country from turning into a long-term political and institutional crisis.

It has become almost a truism that parliamentary elections have become more personalized. However, evidence for this proposition among voters is relatively mixed and we lack a quantification of leader inspired voting. Using data from Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project and consistent measures of leader and party popularity across 86 parliamentary elections in 31 polities between 1996 and 2019, we break new ground in the study of behavioral personalization in several respects. First, we provide a consistent and longitudinal test of leader inclined voting, separate from party evaluations, in the form of a vote-leader/party favorite alignment index. Our results show 6% of voters align their vote with their favorite leader solely, and one in five voters align their vote primarily with their favorite leader. While significant, more voters align their vote with their favorite party. Second, we find that leader motivated voting is most prevalent among non-partisans, older voters, and in elections where ideological polarization is low. Third, we demonstrate that voters solely motivated by leaders are most likely to switch their votes between elections. Our results have implications for our understanding of leaders' impact on elections.

AbstractI call for a globally informed sociology of comparative placemaking that integrates historical and contemporary processes and includes the ephemeral, institutional, and personal. By placemaking, I am referring to the explicit or tacit cooperation among people to create, maintain, and give meaning to places in space through bodily occupation given differential resources and constraints. I review select place, space, and community‐based literature about urban, Black, migrant, LGBTQ, and international populations to think about how we can build upon and integrate multiple theoretical, methodological, and epistemological insights to form an explicit placemaking research agenda. A US focus on neighborhoods contrasts with a comparative examination of global urban networks, social polarization, and transformation of the built environment in the interdisciplinary field of global urban studies (Ren, 2018). I argue for a placemaking research agenda that bridges insight from US Urban Sociology with Global Urban Studies to consider how various structures and actors constrain and facilitate place projects. With a globally reaching and comparatively informed sociology of placemaking, we can illuminate our multi‐structured story of place and agency in context. We can answer questions about how and why we co‐create and are simultaneously disciplined by the process of creation.

This article proposes the concept of nationness to explore the nuances and complexities that permeate the symbolic and material efforts to remember, imagine, and re-present the nation among the diasporic community of Venezuelan artists. Focusing on Deborah Castillo's exhibitionRAW(2015) and Violette Bule's installationREQUIEM200≤(2018), it analyzes how the two artists engage in a form of crafting that re-presents the nation as raw matter (wood, nails, clay) that never achieves a state of completeness or stability. I argue that this act of crafting is interactive and critical. It does not simply remember Venezuela and reproduce it as a spectacle to be passively consumed abroad; it provides the possibility to intervene in systems of power and representation that determine which bodies are visible and which are not, which bodies have power and which do not, which bodies are mourned and who should mourn them. In crafting what I call "Venezuelanness," the artists' work offers the space and the means to think (about) the country differently, beyond the spatial boundaries of its territory, beyond the icons that monopolize its collective imaginary, and beyond the extreme polarization of its politics.

AbstractThis paper examined whether Black women political candidates face double jeopardy in voter perceptions of electability due to Black women being perceived as having fewer traditional leader traits compared to White male, White female, and Black male candidates. Due to increasing political polarization in the United States, concerns over electability are at the forefront of many voters' minds when casting their ballots. Traditional conceptions of electability are built upon racialized and gendered notions of what traits connote an effective leader; thus, women and racial minority candidates are often perceived as less electable compared to White men. However, research has not adequately examined the intersectional aspect of electability bias. The current study proposed a double jeopardy effect: we expected that participants (n = 454) would perceive Black women, compared to White men, White women, and Black men, as lower in competence and leadership ability, which would lead to lower electability perceptions and voting intentions. Unexpectedly, there were mixed findings for the effects of race/gender on competence and leadership ability, and we did not find any evidence that candidate race/gender related to electability or voting intentions. We discuss potential explanations for these null findings and suggest avenues for future research.

AbstractRecent surveys in China, South Korea, Brazil, South Africa, Russia, Australia, Italy, the UK, Canada, France, Germany, the USA, Japan, Hungary, and Denmark indicate that citizens generally are positive toward state nudging. However, less is known about differences in the support for nudging across socio-demographics and political party preferences, a research gap recently identified in the literature. This article investigates the relationship between the support for nudging and trust in public institutions through a population-representative survey in Sweden. It also analyzes differences in the support for nudging across political party preferences in two ideological dimensions: the economic left-right and cultural GAL-TAN spectra. Data were collected in December 2017 through a custom web survey, using Reisch and Sunstein's (2016) questionnaire. The respondents (N = 1032) were representative of the adult population with regard to gender, age, education, job sector, household income, living region, and political party preference. Sweden was found to belong to the cautiously pronudge nations (along with Japan, Hungary, and Denmark), contrary to hypotheses in previous research. Differences in the support for nudging were found along the economic left-right and GAL-TAN spectra. Individual nudges' variation in support, polarization, and politicization are analyzed and discussed.