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In his recent address concerning the wars in Gaza and Ukraine and U.S. involvement in both, President Biden quoted the famous line by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, that America is "the indispensable nation." This is indeed the belief by which the U.S. foreign and security establishment lives and works. As Biden's speech reflected, it is one way in which the establishment justifies to American citizens the sacrifices that they are called on to make for the sake of U.S. primacy. It is also how members of the Blob pardon themselves for participation in U.S. crimes and errors. For however ghastly their activities and mistakes may be, they can be excused if they take place as part of America's "indispensable" mission to lead the world towards "freedom" and "democracy."It is therefore necessary to ask: Indispensable for what? Empty claims about the "Rules-Based Order" cannot answer this question. In the Greater Middle East, the answer should be obvious. I suppose that a different hegemon might have made an even bigger mess of the region at even greater cost to itself than the United States has succeeded in doing over the past 30 years, but it would have had to put some really serious effort into the task. Nor is it clear that the absence of a superpower hegemon could have made things any worse.In this time, not one beneficial U.S. effort at peace in the region has succeeded; few were even seriously attempted. And more than this, the U.S. has not even fulfilled the core positive role of any hegemon, that of providing stability. Instead, it has all too often acted a force of disorder: by invading Iraq and thereby enabling an explosion of Sunni Islamist extremism that went on to play a dreadful role in Syria as well; by pursuing through 20 years a megalomaniac strategy of externally-driven state-building in Afghanistan, in defiance of every lesson of Afghan history; by destroying the Libyan state, and thereby plunging the country into unending civil war, destabilizing much of northern Africa, and enabling a flood of migrants to Europe; by repeatedly wrecking or abandoning possibilities of a reasonable deal with Iran; and most gravely of all, by refusing to take an even remotely equitable approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict, and failing through the greater part of the past thirty years to make any serious effort to promote a settlement.Over the past generation, successive U.S. administrations turned a blind eye, not merely while the Likud governments slowly killed the "two-state solution" and stoked Palestinian and Arab rage through its settlement policy, but while Prime Minister Netanyahu deliberately helped build up Hamas as a force against the Palestine Liberation Organization, so as not to have to negotiate seriously with the latter. This strategy has now proved catastrophic for Israel itself. It was also carried out with no regard whatsoever to the interests of the United States or its European allies in the face of Islamist terrorism.And what have the American people themselves gained from this? Nothing at all, is the answer; while the losses can be precisely calculated: More than 15,000 soldiers and contractors killed in Afghanistan and Iraq; more than 50,000 wounded, and often disabled for life; more than 30,000 veteran suicides; 2,996 civilian dead on 9/11, an attack claimed by al-Qaida as a reprisal for U.S. Middle East policy; some $8 trillion subsequently expended in the "Global War on Terror."Elsewhere in the world, the U.S. record has not been so disastrous, but nor has it remotely justified claims to the necessity of U.S. primacy. The only area where this has been broadly true is in Europe. In World War II and the Cold War, the United States liberated western Europe and defended democracy there; while in the rest of the world, all too often it stepped into the shoes of European colonialism. After the Cold War, populations in eastern Europe genuinely welcomed U.S. protection — though Biden's claim that if not stopped in Ukraine, Putin will invade Poland is baseless. Russia has neither the will nor the capacity to do so; and in any case, if NATO membership is not a sufficient deterrent, what was the point of offering NATO membership to Ukraine?Outside Europe, the only region where the United States can truly be said to have played a largely positive role to date is East Asia (the Vietnam War obviously excepted), and for the same reason: that Japan and South Korea welcome alliance with the United States. And while other states, like the Philippines, wish to balance between America and China, they do not wish America to leave. This role however requires U.S. presence, not U.S. primacy. Since China cannot invade Japan and South Korea — let alone Australia — the United States can perfectly well stand on the defensive behind its existing alliance systems, while sharing influence elsewhere with Beijing.As to Africa, countries there do not have conflicts with each other that America has to control or mediate. Africa's problems are internal, and the U.S. has done very little since 9/11 and the Global War on Terror to help. The recent increase of U.S. interest in Africa is mainly a reaction to Russia's and China's growing commercial stake there.Strangest and most striking of all is the U.S. role in its own backyard, in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, whose problems really do affect the population of the United States. As in Africa, the United States does not need to suppress local conflicts between states, for these have long since ceased. Once again, the threats are internal, but are also driven to a very great extent by the demand for illegal drugs in the United States. One result of the internal decay of these countries is the huge flow of migrants to the United States, which is causing blowback and political discord in America itself.Faced with this threat, and concerned with the interests of U.S. citizens, it might be assumed that the regional hegemon would prioritize this region and devote serious resources to its development. This would also be in tune with the "foreign policy for the middle class" that Biden promised in his election campaign.In fact, the comparative figures for U.S. aid are positively grotesque. Total U.S. development aid to Mexico and all of Central America since 2001 comes to $12.21 billion. This compares to $64.8 billion to Israel and $32.8 billion to Egypt. Even Georgia has received almost twice as much aid as Mexico ($3.9 billion to $2.1 billion) — and Georgia is 6,000 miles from the shores of the United States with a population less than one thirtieth that of Mexico. Faced with problems from Mexico spilling over into the United States, some leading Republican politicians are now calling not for more assistance, but for the U.S. military to be deployed in Mexico to fight drug traffickers — an insane idea that reveals the moral and practical bankruptcy of U.S. primacy on its own continent.The neglect of America's neighbors to the south reveals something else about U.S. primacy: that whatever a region's problems, the U.S. only becomes engaged if it sees a real or alleged danger that a rival power is taking an interest. This could be called the approach of the dog in a manger elevated to a basic strategic principle. It is well summed up in an article by Suzanne Maloney of the Brookings Institution about the previous — and disastrous — attempt of the Biden administration partially to pull back from the Middle East without solving the basic problems there:"The White House devised a creative exit strategy, attempting to broker a new balance of power in the Middle East that would allow Washington to downsize its presence and attention while also ensuring that Beijing did not fill the void."If the U.S. really wants to pull back from the Middle East, it should welcome other states trying to play a positive role — as China has done by promoting détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia.The pursuit of global primacy is also intellectually and morally corrupting for Americans themselves. To justify its costs and sacrifices to ordinary Americans requires on the one hand vastly overblown claims to the promotion of democracy, on the other a colossal exaggeration of both the threat and the evil of other states. The result is a public discourse that all too often resembles baby food spiked with cyanide — the pap being the language of America spreading freedom, and the poison being that of mistrust for other countries and their peoples. Even if a successful — if not "indispensable" — U.S. global primacy were possible, it could not be based on a foundation as corruptive as this.

The ongoing conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is a pivotal event in the modern history of Sudan. With hundreds, possibly thousands of civilians killed in the conflict, there has been a deep sense of horror particularly in Sudan's capital Khartoum, resulting in 2.5 million residents of the city fleeing to nearby regions of Sudan, or neighboring countries Chad and Egypt.For those remaining in Khartoum, fear and anxiety are constant, as gunfire, heavy artillery, and smoke rise above the city, fighter jets fly at low altitude over residential areas. The current war will have a devastating mental health impact, in addition to its many fatalities and physical injuries. Children in particular are more likely to suffer severe depression, flashback and post-traumatic events as a result of exposure to the horrific violence and abuses.Exacerbating these anxieties is the use by both the SAF and RSF of psychological warfare. Through social media, both sides have shared graphic content from the battlefield, intended to intimidate their opponents and influence public opinion in their favor. Much of this content has been impossible to verify independently. The SAF has struggled to gain legitimacy with the public, discredited for being part of the former regime of Omar al-Bashir, Sudan's long-time former dictator. The SAF leadership claims to be fighting for stability in Sudan, despite allowing the proliferation of former regime-backed militias since the ousting of Bashir in 2019.Meanwhile, the RSF leadership has used media outlets to claim they are fighting against the SAF for being part of the former regime. Their stated intention is to restart the process of handing power from the military to civilian politicians in the framework agreement signed with the Forces of Freedom and Change, which came to an end with the military takeover in October, 2021. However, the RSF's claim is grossly misleading, as the RSF has been accused of committing genocide in Darfur since 2003.In both cases, the message is clear. Each side wishes to give the perception that it is winning the war on the ground. But, neither has been strong enough to achieve outright control of Khartoum. Hence, they merely seek to mislead people who are not residents of the city.The current war in Sudan arguably represents a long power struggle between the RSF, currently led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo or "Hemedti," and remnants of the Bashir regime that dominate the SAF, headed by Lieutenant-General Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan. Since the Bashir regime was toppled, its supporters have used the transition period to organize.The SAF has targeted activists, members of resistance committees and politicians with arbitrary arrests and accusing them of backing the RSF. Over the last four years, they have waged a war against Sudan's demand for democracy. Effectively blocking all political efforts to ensure a smooth post-2019 transition, they have sought to prevent the outcome of a credible civilian democratic government. They have instigated violence, attacked civilians, and portrayed the revolution as a project planned in the West to divide Sudan.Furthermore, the SAF's leadership has made use of Sudan's lucrative black market to sabotage any economic progress. They have done so through raising the foreign currency rate against the Sudanese pound and creating shortages in the country, prompting the Sudanese people to feel economic pressure and protest against the civilians in power, providing justification for the military counterparts to launch their takeover. The emergence of numerous militias was encouraged, and the security forces that once maintained the Bashir regime's security turned a blind eye to crimes such as robbery, burglary, and aggravated bodily harm.Historically, the SAF is the oldest security institution of the state, and civilian political parties have used it to capture power in 1958, 1969 and 1989. After al-Bashir's coup in 1989, the Sudanese Islamists Movement, precursor of the National Congress Party (NCP), stacked senior officer positions in the SAF with their supporters.Simultaneously, the regime created various security institutions and militias to counterbalance the threat of a further coup, and to crush rebellions in outlying areas of Sudan. One of these security forces was the RSF, which originated in the early 2000s as the Janjaweed, Arab militiamen used by Bashir to defeat insurgencies in Darfur. Most Janjaweed fighters were of the Rizigat tribe, which includes the Mahria branch of which Hemedti is a member. In 2017, Sudan's parliament passed the Rapid Support Forces Act legitimating the militia. When Bashir felt threatened by his competitors within the NCP, he summoned the RSF to Khartoum to protect him; ultimately, it was the RSF's desertion of Bashir which sealed his regime's fate.After Bashir was toppled in 2019, Burhan became the president of Sudan, appointing Hemedti as his deputy in August 2019. Burhan's focus was on staying in power and preventing the transition to civilian rule. Burhan feared that out of power, he may be prosecuted for his claimed role in the Darfur genocide alongside Hemedti. To reduce any possibility of being ousted, he empowered Hemedti by abolishing article 5 of the RSF Act, allowing the RSF to act independently of the SAF command structure, while establishing loose ties to Burhan. Hemedti was able to increase the number of his forces from 20,000 to over 100,000, most being trained in SAF camps in Khartoum. The RSF was tasked with protecting strategic sites in Khartoum, including the presidential palace, general command, Khartoum airport, and the building of Sudan's Television and Broadcast Corporation. Burhan also retired several SAF generals who had criticized the expansion and new roles of the RSF.Ironically, Burhan's focus on staying in power resulted in his clash with Hemedti, who had his own presidential ambitions. Over time, Burhan and Hemedti started to compete with one another, regionally and internationally. Hemedti cemented his ties with Russia through the Wagner Group, a relationship with its origins in Bashir's request for Russia's help in protecting his regime in 2017. In 2018, it emerged that Wagner was contracted to train the regime's security forces, including the RSF, in riot control.Hemedti's relationship with Wagner expanded through gold smuggling operations that helped Russia offset the sanctions for its invasion of Ukraine, and the RSF's support and Hemedti's influence for Wagner's extraction of resources in the Central African Republic (CAR). In January 2023, Hemedti used his forces to close the Sudanese-CAR border, to prevent CAR opposition forces from using Sudanese territory. Wagner has supplied the RSF with anti-aircraft missiles that have deterred the SAF from attacking its positions in Khartoum in the current conflict.The RSF-Wagner relationship has deepened as a result of both paramilitary groups' relationship with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE is a key destination of Sudan's mineral resources, for example receiving 40 percent of Sudan's gold exports. Geopolitically, Wagner, Hemedti and the UAE are all backers of Libya's Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar. Hemedti sent 1000 RSF fighters to support Haftar's attempt to take over Libya's capital Tripoli in 2019, when Egypt refused to send ground forces to support Haftar despite also being an ally. There are indications that, in return, the UAE has been supporting Hemedti and the RSF in Sudan's current conflict.Burhan has also developed close regional alliances. Burhan received military training in Egypt, and the Egyptian Armed Forces today sees the SAF as the only institution that can hold Sudan together, and represent Egypt's own interests in the country. The Egyptian leadership deeply distrusts Hemedti and the RSF, who they view as a mercenary group with no loyalty to the state. Egypt has accordingly provided the SAF with covert air defence aid in its current conflict with the RSF.Burhan also uses his position as the president of Sudan, and commander of the SAF, to win the backing of Saudi Arabia. Strategically, Saudi Arabia needs to ensure the security of its Red Sea investments that are part of its Vision 2030. Saudi Arabia has also proven to be interested in investing in and deepening trade relations with Sudan, putting it in competition with the UAE's influence represented in Hemedti and the RSF.The current conflict has militarily incapacitated the forces of both Burhan and Hemedti, with Khartoum becoming a graveyard for their soldiers. The fighting has shown that both sides are just interested in cementing their own regimes in a post-conflict scenario. It remains to be seen how civilians will be able to resist whichever party, with its regional backers, emerges victorious from the violence, and continue Sudan's long journey towards democracy.

The events of recent days are unprecedented. The last time units of Jewish and Palestinian fighters — military or paramilitary — went to battle on such a broad front in Israel-Palestine was in 1948. There have, of course, been various battles over the years in Gaza as well as West Bank cities like Jenin, and Israeli and Palestinian units fought one another in Lebanon in 1982. But there is no parallel to the scope of what has taken place here since Saturday morning, and not since 1948 have Palestinian fighters occupied Jewish communities on this scale.This fact is not just a historical anecdote; it has a direct political meaning. This murderous and inhumane attack by Hamas arrived just as it seemed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was about to complete his masterpiece: peace with the Arab world while completely ignoring the Palestinians. This attack has reminded Israelis and the world, for better or for worse, that the Palestinians are still here, and that the century-old conflict here involves them, not the Emiratis or the Saudis.In his speech at the UN General Assembly two weeks ago, Netanyahu presented a map of "The New Middle East," depicting the State of Israel stretching from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea and building a "corridor of peace and prosperity" with its neighbors across the region, including Saudi Arabia. A Palestinian state, or even the collection of shrunken enclaves that the Palestinian Authority ostensibly controls, does not appear on the map.Since he was first elected prime minister in 1996, Netanyahu has tried to avoid any negotiations with the Palestinian leadership, instead choosing to bypass it and push it aside. Israel does not need peace with the Palestinians to prosper, Netanyahu repeatedly claimed; its military, economic, and political strength is sufficient without it. The fact that during the years of his rule, especially between 2009 and 2019, Israel experienced economic prosperity and its international status improved, was, in his eyes, proof that he is following the right path.The Abraham Accords signed with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, and later also Sudan and Morocco, reinforced this belief conclusively. "For the past 25 years, we have been told repeatedly that peace with other Arab countries will only come after we resolve the conflict with the Palestinians," Netanyahu wrote in an article in Haaretz before the last election. "Contrary to the prevailing position," he continued, "I believe that the road to peace does not go through Ramallah, but bypasses it: instead of the Palestinian tail wagging the Arab world, I argued that peace should begin with Arab countries, which would isolate Palestinian obstinacy." A peace agreement with Saudi Arabia was supposed to be the icing on the "peace for peace" cake that Netanyahu has spent years preparing.Netanyahu did not invent the policy of separation between Gaza and the West Bank, nor the use of Hamas as a tool to weaken the Palestine Liberation Organization and its national ambitions to establish a Palestinian state. Then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's 2005 "disengagement" plan from Gaza was built on this logic. "This whole package called the Palestinian state has fallen off the agenda for an indefinite period of time," said Dov Weissglas, Sharon's advisor, explaining the political goal of disengagement at the time. "The plan provides the amount of formaldehyde required so that there will be no political process with the Palestinians."Netanyahu not only adopted this way of thinking, he also added to it the preservation of Hamas rule in Gaza as a tool for strengthening the separation between the strip and the West Bank. In 2018, for example, he agreed that Qatar would transfer millions of dollars a year to finance the Hamas government in Gaza, embodying the comments made in 2015 by Bezalel Smotrich (then a marginal Knesset member, and today the finance minister and de facto West Bank overlord) that "the Palestinian Authority is a burden and Hamas is an asset.""Netanyahu wants Hamas on its feet and is ready to pay an almost unimaginable price for it: half the country paralyzed, children and parents traumatized, houses bombed, people killed," Israel's current information minister, Galit Distel Atbaryan, wrote in May 2019, when she was yet to enter politics but was known as a prominent Netanyahu supporter. "And Netanyahu, in a kind of outrageous, almost unimaginable restraint, does not do the easiest thing: getting the IDF to overthrow the organization."The question is, why?" Distel Atbaryan continued, before explaining: "If Hamas collapses, Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas] may control the strip. If he controls it, there will be voices from the left that will encourage negotiations and a political solution and a Palestinian state, also in Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] … This is the real reason why Netanyahu does not eliminate the Hamas leader, everything else is bullshit."Indeed, Netanyahu himself had effectively admitted as much a couple of months before Distel Atbaryan made her comments, when he declared in a Likud meeting that "anyone who wants to thwart the establishment of a Palestinian state needs to support strengthening Hamas. This is part of our strategy, to isolate Palestinians in Gaza from Palestinians in Judea and Samaria."Strengthening the Gaza fence became another aspect of Netanyahu's strategy. "The barrier will prevent terrorists from infiltrating our territory," Netanyahu explained when he announced the start of work in 2019 to add an underground barrier that would end up costing more than NIS 3 billion. Two years later, Israeli journalist Ron Ben-Yishai wrote in Ynet that the ultimate goal of the fence, which was considered to be an impenetrable barrier for terrorists, is to "prevent a connection between Hamas in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria."On Saturday morning, that fence was torn down, and with it the broader Netanyahu doctrine — adopted by the Americans and many Arab states — that it is possible to make peace in the Middle East without the Palestinians. As hundreds of militants crossed the border unhindered on their way to occupy army posts and infiltrate dozens of Israeli communities as far as 18 miles away, Hamas declared in the most clear, painful, and murderous way possible that the conflict that threatens Israelis' lives is the conflict with the Palestinians, and the idea that they can be bypassed via Riyadh or Abu Dhabi, or that the 2 million Palestinians imprisoned in Gaza will disappear if Israel builds a sufficiently elaborate fence, is an illusion that is now being shattered at a terrible human cost.This is not necessarily good news. It is impossible not to define the actions of Hamas as war crimes: the massacre of civilians, the murder of entire families in their homes, the kidnapping of civilians including the elderly and children into captivity in Gaza — all of these violate the laws of war, and if the International Criminal Court does exercise its jurisdiction over Israel-Palestine, then those responsible for these actions will have to be prosecuted. In other words, Hamas' "declaration" that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still exists came at the price of the blood of hundreds of innocent people.It is also not necessarily good news because it seems that the conclusion Israel is currently drawing from the understanding that the conflict is here in Israel-Palestine, and not in Saudi Arabia, is to "overthrow Hamas" or "flatten Gaza." Likud MK Ariel Kellner and right-wing journalist Yinon Magal likely represent a significant portion of the Israeli public — and certainly the government — when they call for the response to be another Nakba.And yet, beyond the moral judgments, the attack by Hamas has brought all of us — especially the Israelis — back to reality, reminding us that the conflict began here, in 1948, and that no magic cure can make it disappear. And since Hamas, as strong and capable of surprises as it may be, cannot murder 7 million Jews, and since Israel — I believe — is not capable of carrying out another Nakba (or even recapturing Gaza), it is possible that from the trauma of the past few days will grow the idea that the conflict must be resolved on the basis of freedom, national and civic equality, and the end of the siege and the occupation.After the trauma of the 1973 war, which many are comparing to what is happening today, it dawned on Israelis that peace could come at the expense of withdrawing from the Egyptian territory it had occupied. The same realization can happen after the trauma of 2023.This article has been republished with permission from +972 Magazine. It originally appeared in Hebrew in Local Call.

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It has been a very exciting year for social protection! In 2019, my weekly social protection links newsletter reviewed 1042 materials in 43 editions. So here is a personal selection of papers articulated around 10 major themes. Enjoy!

1. Economic and other long-term effects

Daidone et al have a great article summarizing and explaining the economic effects of cash transfers in 7 African countries. Egger et al add another precious data point on the multiplier effects of cash transfers (I counted 12 such points for the moment): in Kenya, every $ injected generates $2.6 in the local economy.

Blattman et al show that after 5 years, a one-off cash grants in Ethiopia has fading effects. Similarly, in Malawi Baird et al estimate that the impact on reduced fertility of an unconditional cash transfers on adolescent girls rapidly vanished.

In Mexico, after 20 years of operations cash transfers ex-beneficiaries showed higher ownership of durable assets (Aguilar et al); 49.2% of them experienced upward mobility (Yaschine et al); they grew 2.8-4.1cm taller and have 5.3-5.7 more years of schooling than their parents (Gutierrez et al), with enrollment in secondary school increasing by 5-10 percentage points over grades 7-12 (Behrman et al). A 10-country review by Millan et al found that the evidence is strong on school completion, more mixed on learning, and limited on employment. Another paper by Millan et al estimate that 13 years after its inception, transfers in Honduras increased secondary education completion by 50%, but also rose the chance of migration by 3-7 percentage points.

2. Health, nutrition and education

Klein et al show that cash transfer participants in Buenos Aires showed higher success rates against tuberculosis (TB); yet Rudgard et al estimate that making transfers "TB-sensitive" would require an additional budget between $165M and $298M per country. Choko et al showed that in Malawi cash plus HIV self-test kits increased HIV anti-retroviral therapy compared to other solutions. Palermo et al find that in Ghana, combining cash and health measures increased enrolment in health insurance in the treatment group from an average of 37.4% to 46.6%.

In Ecuador, Moncayo et al show that a 1% increase in the coverage of cash transfers decreases mortality from malnutrition by about 3%. In Nigeria, Okeke and Abubakar estimate that cash reduced mortality of children in utero by at least 20%. Celhay et al found that cash increased the survival rates of birth cohorts exposed to the program by up to 14.7%. and Dow et al find that in the US, a 10% increase in the Earned Income Tax Credit or in the minimum wage reduces suicides between 3.6 and 5.5%.

In Ghana, Gelli et al found that the national school meals program improved stunting among children of 5-8 years (effect size: 0.12 standard deviations). Neufeld et al on the history of nutrition evidence on cash transfers in Mexico. And a paper by Evans and Yuan shows that girl-targeted versus general interventions in education seem to deliver similar gains, including featuring cash transfers both at the top and bottom among the most effective interventions.

3. Gender

Peterman et al summarize the impacts of safety nets on gender in Africa: safety nets perform well in reducing physical violence as well as improving psychological well-being, dietary diversity and savings. But changes in labor force participation are minimal. In terms of toolkits, FAO produced great guidelines on gender-sensitive cash transfers and public works.

A review of evidence on social assistance and intimate partner violence (IPV) by Hidrobo and Roy shows reductions in physical violence between 25-41% in Bangladesh, Ecuador, and Mali. Another brief by Heise summarizes results from 22 studies across 13 countries.

4. Crime

Tuttle shows that banning convicted drug felons from SNAP food stamps in the United States makes them more likely to return to jail. Sviatschi estimates that in Peru, cash transfers reduced drug production. And in Brazil, Machado et al find that Bolsa reduced homicide rate and hospitalizations due to violence by 8-25%.

5. Crises

Barca and Beazley estimate that it takes between 2 weeks to 14 months to scale up social protection in response to natural disasters. Bruck et al show that a new generation of 7 high-quality evaluations sheds light on social protection in fragile and displacement settings. Cherrier et al produced an excellent compendium on humanitarian-social protection linkages, while Seyfert et examine the trade-offs of integrating refugees into national safety nets.

6. Universality and targeting

A new book by Gentilini et al offers a framework to navigate the analytics, evidence and practices on universal basic income (UBI), while Banerjee et al discuss how UBI may address barriers like lack of credit, insurance or psychological factors among low-income people. Jolliffe et al show that SNAP, the American "floor for the poorest", has been sinking over the past 30 years.

ILO and UNICEF have an overview note on "universal" child grants present in 21 countries, while Kidd and Athias offer a critique of proxy means testing. In Indonesia, Tohari et al estimates that the poverty-based unified database of beneficiaries improved the chance of participating in 3 core programs by 117%, while Bah et al estimate that if all households were included in such database undercoverage would be reduced by one-third. Bonus: Ndiaye et al trace the evolution of the national social registry in Senegal.

7. Insurance and labor markets

Packard et al examines how social protection could be adapted to the changing nature of work, while Jorgensen and Siegel unveil social risk management 2.0. Guven shows that in Africa only 10.6% of Africa's working-age population contributes to pension schemes. The ILO has a fascinating "living document" laying out a number of options disaggregated by occupation.

A review of minimum wages in high-income countries by Dube finds "… muted effect of minimum wages on employment, while significantly increasing the earnings of low paid workers". However, a new compilation of evidence on minimum wage in low and middle-income countries by Neumark and Corella finds that "… when minimum wages are binding and enforced, and when they apply to vulnerable workers, the disemployment effects are most apparent".

8. Tech and financial inclusion

Gelb and Mukherjee take stock of lessons from India's biometric ID (Aadhaar) in providing inclusive services; Masino and Nino-Zarazua show that transitioning to electronic cash payments in Mexico increased households' access to formal financial services. In South Africa, however, Torkelson documents abuses in using cash transfers as loan collateral by a financial company delivering cash itself.

9. Political economy

Hickey et al have an amazing open-access book on the political economy of cash transfers in Africa. Mosec and Mo found that in Pakistan those receiving BISP cash transfers increased support for their political leaders and institutions, while in typhoon-hit Fiji Rios et al show that people receiving cash transfers are up to 20% more likely to be very satisfied with the government than non-recipients. In Brazil and Turkey, Zucco et al show that conditional transfers are only marginally more popular than similar unconditional transfers. Ciminelli et al find that reforms generating large short-term adverse distributional effects are associated with electoral costs for politicians. In Mexico, Cantu documents that cash-vouchers to be used in local supermarkets were provided in exchange for electoral support.

10. Cash plus and cash versus….

In Bihar, Khemani et al asked whether people prefer cash or other services: only 13% chose cash instead of spending on public health and nutrition; in contrast, if cash came in lieu of improving roads, preference for cash rose to 35% (see counter views). In Mozambique, De Walque and Valente compare the effects of a conditional cash transfer program with the sole provision of information to parents on school attendance: information provision is as large as 75% of the effect of the CCT.

Two papers – one on Ghana by Banerjee et al and another on Uganda by Sedlmayr et al – points to the power of combining cash transfers with assets and complementary measures (as opposed to individual components). Also, Carneiro et al evaluate an integrated cash program for 3,600 mothers in Northern Nigeria: after 2-4 years, the program reduced stunting by 8%. Bonus: Bedoya et al show that a package of transfers and assets in Afghanistan increased consumption by 30% and poverty fell from 82 to 62%.

















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Ugo Gentilini
Global Lead for Social Assistance, World Bank
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Abstract
This long Voluntaristics Review2 (VR 3.5–6) article and book focuses on the deviant form of Nonprofit Groups (NPGs), mainly volunteer-based associations, but occasionally paid-staff-based nonprofit agencies. A Deviant Nonprofit Group (DNG) is defined as "a Nonprofit group that deviates significantly from certain moral norms of the society" (Smith, Stebbins, & Dover, 2006, p. 68). The aim is to develop and present an empirically grounded theory with eighty-three hypotheses about many of the key analytical features or operational characteristics of DNGs, usually voluntary associations with memberships and often run by volunteers, not nonprofit agencies without memberships and usually run by paid staff (Smith, 2017a).
The total theory may be termed a Grounded General Theory of DNG Operation-Structure. The document is based on an extensive review and qualitative content analysis of about 260 published research documents representing twenty-five common-language purposive-goal types of DNGs (vs. analytical-theoretical types, which do not exist in detail). Moral norms are the broad, emotionally charged directives concerning what is customarily right and wrong, by which members of a community or society implement their institutionalized solutions to problems significantly affecting their valued normal way of life (see Stebbins, 1996, pp. 2–3). These norms indicate in a general way what the community (it may be local, regional, national, or international) expects by sociocultural custom of its members in particular areas of social life and what it considers rejections of those expectations. Thus, moral norms stand apart from other kinds of expectations such as ordinances, regulations, customs, and folkways in general.
Deviating (near synonym: deviance) is defined as rule-breaking, and sometimes is a crime in a specific society at a specific time in its history, but not always. Such deviation, deviance, or rule-breaking of specific actions by a DNG (or any individual or group) is highly variable both through historical time in a given society and also across societies or nations at a given historical time (Smith, 2017b). Deviance or rule-breaking is present in the nonprofit sector (NPS), just as in all other sectors of human society (Smith, 2017a), although less frequently studied in the NPS than for other societal sectors (Smith, 2011).
Essentially, this present document attempts to bring some systematic theoretical order to the disorder-chaos of a highly varied set of Deviant Nonprofit Groups/DNGs that heretofore has been seen as composed of disparate, unrelated types of groups—a jumble or chaos. All these DNGs are rather consistently alleged (at least initially) by many or even most people in their societies of origin, when known to non-members-outsiders, to be different, strange, deviant, crazy, insane, mad, dangerous, sick, selfish, cruel, stupid, weird, wild, evil, ungodly, sinful, unnatural, treacherous, subversive, seditious, criminal, bad, evil, immoral, and so on. Summarizing briefly the most stigmatizing epithets for nearly all DNG types studied here, DNGs and their leaders and members generally are often accused of madness-treason-immorality, because their perceived deviance is emotionally troubling to conventional adults in the society.
As such, in the eyes of their own society, DNGs are often stigmatized and labeled very negatively by many, often most, people in a given society who are DNG outsiders-non-members at a given time (e.g., a period of at least ten years from the DNG's de facto origin date, if the DNG existed for that long, sometimes for much longer). A wide range of negative terms (epithets) may be used to describe a DNG, summarized here as mad (crazy)-treacherous-immoral, as well as various other negative traits or factors being alleged regarding the DNG and its leaders and/or members.
Yet there is often little systematic evidence for these stigmatizing epithets or negative traits alleged about DNGs, except for a few DNG types (e.g., Revolutionary DNGs, Terrorist DNGs, Guerrilla DNGs, Coup d'État DNGs). This common lack of concrete evidence for stigmatizing statements about any given DNG suggests that the allegations are mainly emotional statements, rather than factual statements, based mainly on fast-thinking (see Kahneman, 2011). By definition, DNGs and their leaders and members believe in and take actions that involve serious rule-breaking in their own society (i.e., violating current moral norms and rules). However, the stigmatizing of these beliefs and actions by non-members, including the general public and the government, is often much exaggerated, or even simply false. Over time, especially decades, the deviant actions may (and often do) tend to seem less and less serious in the given society, as societal-consensual definitions of social deviance can change and have done so markedly over historical time (e.g., Smith, 2018b; Winck, 1991).
However, the foregoing should not be taken to mean that all DNGs are innocuous. As suggested above, some DNG types can be immensely harmful to people and property, such as the revolutionary DNGs, terrorist DNGs, guerrilla DNGs, and coup d'etat DNGs noted. Yet other types of DNGs also sometimes do substantial harm, such as the rest of the broader DNG analytical category, Deviant Political Resistance & Liberation Groups, including also WWII Underground Nazi-Resistance Groups, Vigilante Groups, Citizen Militias/Paramilitary Groups, and Political Parties (Deviant). Similarly, the broader DNG analytical category, Deviant Anger & Violence Groups, includes DNG types that often cause serious harm—Hate Groups, Motorcycle Outlaw Gangs, and Delinquent Youth Gangs. Even some DNGs in the broader DNG analytical category of Deviant Religion & Worldview Groups, can do substantial harm—obviously, Massacre/Mass Suicide Groups, but also medieval Heresy Groups (Christian) subject to the Catholic Church's Inquisitions, as well as some Cults/New Religions (Deviant), Deviant Science DNGs, and some Sects (Deviant).
The author is doing something analogous to what the first systematic, theoretical botanist did when s/he went into the jungle/forest and tried to see commonalities among the great variety of apparently different forms of plants present there. Here, the equivalents of plants are the many different DNG types, and the commonalities discovered are now expressed in the many empirically grounded hypotheses formulated by the author over the course of this research effort, with the first fifty-one hypotheses formulated much earlier, in 1994, but not investigated regarding empirical support by qualitative content analysis until done here (Smith, 1996b).
These source documents were chosen as typical examples of a newly constructed set of twenty-five purposive or goal types of DNGs, described here. As the reader will see, the present grounded theory review and content analysis seeks the empirical operating methods and structures of these twenty-five DNG types—the method in their alleged madness-treason-immorality, or other stigmatizing epithets. The terms mad and madness are not meant as clinical or psychiatric terms; similarly, the terms treason and treachery are also used loosely, as with immorality or bad/evil. Instead, these are vague and imprecise, common language (vernacular) terms expressing negative emotion, bandied about carelessly and loosely when English-speakers really dislike and are disturbed by the beliefs and especially by the alleged or actual actions or a person or group. Such terms are ways that other people strongly disfavor and stigmatize certain beliefs, values, actions, or inactions by specific persons or groups.
In this content analysis process of much published research on DNGs, the author is seeking two useful scholarly outcomes:

Develop and derive meaningful generalizations as empirically grounded hypotheses for future more careful, systematic, and, if feasible, quantitative testing with a better sample of DNGs so as to build a body of valid grounded theory about DNGs.


Assess whether each such grounded theory hypothesis finds any empirical support in a fairly comprehensive but haphazard sample of at least 100 specific DNGs of twenty-five common-language purposive or goal types.



All of the grounded hypotheses developed and reported here in this review were supported by empirical evidence for at least one (often two) of the two or three specific DNGs of 25 DNG types studied, as described in source documents that were content analyzed. Indeed, all such hypotheses were supported by most of the twenty-five DNG
types studied, giving significant qualitative validity to the author's Grounded General Theory of DNG Operation-Structure. Such empirical support suggests that these hypotheses are valid at least sometimes for many DNG types and deserve further investigation, hopefully in more quantitative studies with better sampling of DNGs, countries, and historical time periods. Taken collectively, the many empirically grounded (supported) hypotheses of the present theory can be seen as a new theoretical paradigm for studying NPGs that helps bring analytical order to a previously chaotic realm of dark side or deviant NPS phenomena.

MusicWorksist eine gemeinnützige Organisationmit Sitz in Kapstadt, Südafrikaund bietetJugendlichen ausRandbezirkenpsychosoziale Unterstützung durch Musik. In Südafrika ebneten300Jahre Kolonialismus den Weg für die Apartheid,welche ein zweifelhaftes Erbe ausVerschwendung, Vetternwirtschaft, Korruption undderUnterdrückung der Mehrheit der Bürger unseres Landeshinterließ. Ihre Auswirkungen sind heute noch sichtbar und die Folgen vergangener und aktueller politischer, sozialer und wirtschaftlicher Herausforderungen haben zu einer sich selbst aufrecht erhaltenden Struktur ausArmut,Gangsterismus1, Arbeitslosigkeit undhäuslicherGewalt geführt, die inGemeindenwieLavenderHill, wo sichdasMusicWorks-Projekt befindet,typischsind. DieFörderungund Stärkungvon Resilienz vonJugendlichen dieser Gemeindekann sienicht nur dazu befähigendiesen Kreislauf zu durchbrechen, sondern auch Teil der Lösung zu sein,indemsie zu Mitgliedern ihrerGemeindeund der Gesellschaft insgesamt werden.Ebersöhns(2012)generative Theorie derdurchBeziehungenentstehendenResilienzschlägt vor, dasswennIndividuen, Beziehungen alsMittelnutzen, umsichRessourcen zu erschließen,siezu verknüpfen und zu mobilisieren, einförderndes Umfeld geschaffen werden kann, welches eine positive Anpassung an eine gefährdende Umwelt fördert.Ausgehend von diesem Verständnisvon Resilienz skizziert dieser Artikeldas ProjektMusicWorksinLavenderHill und diskutiert Fallvignettenzu musikbasierter ArbeitmiteinzelnenJugendlichen undgrößeren Gruppen im Schulkontext.Ziel dieses Projektes ist es gemeinsam musikalische Räume zu schaffen, in denen Jugendliche und ihre Umgebung Zugang zudurchBeziehungenentstehenderResilienzhaben. (Übersetzung: Josephine Geipel) ; MusicWorksè un'organizzazione senza scopo di lucro con sede a Città del Capo, in Sudafrica, e offre supporto psicosociale attraverso la musica ai giovani che crescono in comunità emarginate.In Sudafrica trecento anni di colonialismo hanno aperto la strada all'Apartheid,la qualeha lasciato un'eredità di rifiuti, nepotismo, corruzione e oppressionenella maggioranza dei cittadini del nostroPaese.Oggi il suo impatto ètuttoravisibile e le conseguenze delle passate e attuali sfide politiche, sociali ed economiche,hanno portato a modelli perpetuati di povertà, gangsterismo, disoccupazione e violenza familiare, i quali sonoendemicia comunità comeLavenderHill, dove si trova questo progettoMusicWorks.Incoraggiare e rafforzare laresilienzadei giovani all'interno di questa comunità può consentir loro non solo di rompere questo ciclo, ma anche di essere parte della soluzione in quanto diventano membri contribuenti della loro comunità, nonchédella società in generale.LaTeoria Generativadella resilienzabasata su relazioniformulata daEbersöhn(2012),propone che quando gli individui usano le relazioni come modo per accedere, collegare e mobilitare risorse, si forma un'ecologia abilitante che possa favorire un aggiustamento positivo in un ambiente a rischio.Attingendo a questa comprensione socio-ecologica della resilienza, questoarticolodelinea il progettoMusicWorksinLavenderHill e discute lecasistichedel lavoro musicalesiacoi giovanicheconla comunità scolastica più ampia.Lo scopo del progetto è quello di co-creare spazi musicali in cui i giovani e coloro che li circondano possano accedere a relazioni con risorse.(Traduzione di Claudio Cominardi) ; MusicWorks is a non-profit organisation based in Cape Town, South Africa, and offers psycho-social support through music to young people growing up in marginalised communities. In South Africa three hundred years of colonialism paved the way for Apartheid which left a legacy of waste, nepotism, corruption and the oppression of the majority of our country's citizens. Its impact is still visible today and the consequences of past and current political, social and economic challenges has led to perpetuated patterns of poverty, gangsterism[1], unemployment, and family violence that are endemic to communities such as Lavender Hill where this MusicWorks project is situated. Encouraging and strengthening the resilience of young people within this community can empower them to not only break this cycle but also be part of the solution as they become contributing members of their community and society at large. Ebersöhn's (2012) generative theory of relationship resourced resilience proposes that when individuals use relationships as a way to access, link, and mobilise resources, an enabling ecology is shaped that can foster positive adjustment in a largely at-risk environment. Drawing on this social-ecological understanding of resilience, this paper outlines the MusicWorks project in Lavender Hill and discusses case vignettes of music work with young people and the broader school community. The aim of the project is to co-create musical spaces where young people and those around them can access resourced relationships. For the purpose of this paper the use of the term "gangsterism" is located firmly within the South African context, were terminology around "gangs" and "gangsterism" refers to a specific grouping of people who are involved in highly structured gangs whose criminal activity revolve mainly around illicit drug trade, with links to local and international organized crime networks ( Chetty, 2015; Goga, 2014; Shaw and Skywalker, 2016; Goga, 2014; Wegner et al., 2018). Several authors have linked the proliferation of gangs, specifically in Cape Town, to the forced removals of people during 1960 to 1980 as part of the Apartheid government's Group Areas Act ( Chetty, 2015; Goga, 2014; Kinnes, 2017; Steinberg, 2004). ; ミュージックワークスは南アフリカ、ケープタウンに拠点を置くNPO法人で、阻害されたコミュニティで育つ若者に音楽を通じた社会心理的支援を提供している。南アフリカでは、300年に渡る植民地主義によって、国民の大多数に浪費、ネポティズム(縁故主義)、腐敗、抑圧といった遺産が残され、アパルトヘイトへの道が開かれた。その影響は今もなお目に見える形で残り、現在および過去の政治的、社会的、経済的困難の結果、このミュージックワークスのプロジェクトが行われるラベンダーヒルのようなコミュニティに特有の、貧困、暴力団化、失業、家庭内暴力というパターンが延々と引き起こされた。こうしたコミュニティの若者のレジリエンスを促進し強化することは、この連鎖を打破するためだけでなく、コミュニティや社会全体に貢献するメンバーになり解決の一翼を担うようになるという意味でも、彼らを力づける。Ebersöhn's (2012)のレジリエンスを資源とするレジリエンス生成理論によれば、個人が資源にアクセスし、つながり、集める方法として関係性を利用する時、リスクにさらされている状況の中でも有益な適応を促す可能性を持った環境(エコロジー)が形成される。 レジリエンスの社会生態学的(ソーシャル・エコロジカル)知見に基づき、本稿はラベンダーヒルでのミュージックワークスプロジェクトを概観し、若者や広範囲のスクールコミュニティーとの音楽活動の事例について考察する。このプロジェクトは、若者と彼らを取り巻く人々が、資源となる関係性を利用できるような音楽スペースを共同で創ることを目的としている。 ; MusicWorks est une organisation à but non lucratif basée à Cape Town, en Afrique du Sud, qui offre un soutien psychosocial par le biais de la musique aux jeunes qui grandissent dans des communautés marginalisées. En Afrique du Sud, trois siècles de colonialisme ont ouvert la voie à l'apartheid qui a laissé un héritage de gaspillage, de népotisme, de corruption et d'oppression de la majorité des citoyens de notre pays. Son impact est encore visible aujourd'hui et les conséquences des défis politiques, sociaux et économiques passés et actuels ont conduit à la persistance de schémas de pauvreté, de gangstérisme, de chômage et de violence familiale endémiques dans des communautés telles que Lavender Hill, où se situe ce projet MusicWorks. Encourager et renforcer la résilience des jeunes au sein de cette communauté peut leur permettre non seulement de briser ce cycle, mais également de faire partie de la solution à mesure qu'ils deviennent des membres actifs de leur communauté et de la société en général. La théorie générative de Ebersöhn (2012) sur la résilience fondée sur les ressources des relations propose que, lorsque les individus utilisent les relations comme un moyen d'accéder aux ressources, de les lier et de les mobiliser, une écologie propice se dessine de manière à favoriser un ajustement positif dans un environnement largement exposé. S'appuyant sur cette compréhension socio-écologique de la résilience, cet article décrit le projet MusicWorks à Lavender Hill et examine des cas concrets de travail musical avec les jeunes et la communauté scolaire en général. L'objectif du projet est de co-créer des espaces musicaux où les jeunes et leur entourage peuvent accéder à des relations privilégiées.

En el Perú no hay ninguna ley de reconocimiento de relaciones homoafectivas y mucho menos un reconocimiento de su derecho al matrimonio o a la unión hecho. Es real que hay un histórico desinterés del Estado por atender a lesbianas, gays, bisexuales, transexuales e intersexuales y reconocerles sus derechos. Podemos continuar siendo un Estado que discrimina o uno que apuesta a mejorar la vida de todos y todas sus ciudadanas garantizando el derecho a la igualdad en la diversidad, a través de acciones de no discriminación y de reconocimiento de derechos. Recordemos que, en un acto discriminatorio, el gobierno de Ollanta Humala retiró el capítulo de protección de derechos LGTB del Plan Nacional de Derechos Humanos 2012-2016. Otro episodio es cuando la Ministra de la cartera de Justicia y Derechos Humanos Marisol Pérez Tello, en el gobierno de Pedro Pablo Kuczynsky, anunció que se estaba trabajando intensamente en la elaboración del Plan Nacional de DD.HH. 2017. Mediante el Decreto Legislativo 1323 el cual agravaba las penas para los crímenes de odio y la violencia de género que fue propuesto el año 2016 y que incluiría a las personas LGTBI, que comprendía a la comunidad de lesbianas, gays, transexuales, bisexuales e intersexuales (LGTBI) del país. Sostuvo aquella vez la titular del portafolio de Justicia "no había una línea de base, no se incorporaba a la comunidad LGTBI, que es vulnerable y que hay que atender. Hay que preocuparnos por la perspectiva de los derechos humanos", indicó. Sin embargo, dicha norma, que modificaba el Código Penal para elevar el rango de las penas por estas causales de violencia, agravando las penas por homicidios que tengan "móviles de intolerancia o discriminación, tales como el origen, la raza, religión, sexo, orientación sexual, identidad de género, factor genético, filiación, edad, discapacidad, idioma, identidad étnica y cultural", que planteaba nueve modificaciones en el Código Penal respecto a los delitos de feminicidio, discriminación y faltas contra la persona y que explícitamente modificaba el literal 'd' del artículo 46 y en el artículo 323 del código e incluían la tipificación de delitos por 'orientación sexual' e 'identidad de género, el 4 de abril de 2017, en la Comisión de Constitución, presidida por el congresista fujimorista Miguel Ángel Torres, se votó en contra de la propuesta del ejecutivo, por 10 votos frente a 6 a favor. En su reemplazo aprobó ese mismo día la redacción de un texto sustitutorio, en el cual se recomendó la derogación de las modificaciones mencionadas. El congresista Alberto de Belaunde, fue entonces uno de los más críticos ante esta derogatoria, que seguía afectando los derechos de la comunidad L.G.T.B.I. y lo manifestó de la siguiente manera: "El D.L. 1323 pudo ser el avance más importante en materia de derechos L.G.T.B.I. en la historia del país". En el reciente caso de Óscar Ugarteche y su pareja, quienes no podían inscribir su matrimonio realizado en el extranjero en los registros civiles peruanos porque R.E.N.I.E.C. señaló que el Código Civil peruano sólo permite el matrimonio entre un hombre y una mujer ; así como el caso de Darling Delfín y Jenny Trujillo, una pareja de lesbianas que pidió, también a R.E.N.I.E.C., que el D.N.I. de su hijo reconozca la relación filial de ambas como madres, sin obtener respuesta favorable alguna; son algunos de los casos que dan cuenta del contexto de desprotección jurídica, de orden personal y patrimonial, de las relaciones de pareja y familiares de las personas L.G.B.T.I en el país. Sobre el particular, la Defensoría del Pueblo remarcó que las familias constituidas por parejas no heterosexuales "(.) no tienen un marco normativo para el ejercicio y salvaguarda de sus derechos. Si deciden (.) adquirir bienes y luego se produce la muerte de uno de sus integrantes, la otra persona quedará desprotegida (.), pues el Código Civil establece un orden de prelación en materia sucesoria que no los considera. (.) tampoco pueden contar con el seguro de salud ni acceder a una pensión y (.) enfrentan dificultades para visitar a su compañero/a en hospitales o clínicas, principalmente debido a la oposición de sus padres o familiares". A lo cual se suma la desprotección y negación de las relaciones filiales que puedan construir afectando también los derechos de sus hijos/as. Dicha desprotección desconoce o niega a estas familias como tales, bajo prejuicios de género que pretenden ser mantenidos en el ordenamiento jurídico para obligar a las personas a actuar conforme a patrones heterosexuales dominantes en la sociedad. De esta forma se estaría negando el mandato constitucional de protección de las familias y lo señalado por el Tribunal Constitucional y la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, cuya jurisprudencia señala que en la Convención Americana no se encuentra determinado un concepto cerrado de familia, ni mucho menos se protege sólo un modelo "tradicional" de la misma . Ello debido a que la exclusión de otras conformaciones familiares refleja una percepción limitada y estereotipada del concepto de familia que no tiene base en la Convención por ser una práctica, principalmente, discriminatoria. Entonces diremos que las relaciones homosexuales siempre han existido. En el Perú las personas con diferente identidad sexual no tienen derecho al matrimonio ni al reconocimiento de la unión de hecho o convivencia. El Derecho no puede permanecer ajeno a este hecho social que, en algunos sistemas legales, como el nuestro, aún no están protegidos bajo un amparo normativo. Por regla general, el hecho social precede a la ley. "Si se observa la realidad son situaciones que existen y han sido reconocidas por países democráticos constitucionales que reivindican los derechos de los homosexuales, basados en derechos constitucionales, sustentados a su vez en el irrestricto respeto a los derechos humanos". En un Estado Democrático como el nuestro, el sistema jurídico podría reconocer las nuevas formas de familia y relaciones afectivas ya que se tiene el modo de poder hacerlo y acogerlos en la legislación, en coherencia con un régimen democrático defensor de los derechos humanos que no permita la discriminación arbitraria por razón de sexo o por orientación sexual. Entonces, las uniones homoafectivas forman un núcleo familiar en la realidad social que hace necesario amparar el derecho. El Poder Judicial, a falta de normatividad reguladora, no puede seguir emitiendo sentencias muertas para realidades vivas sin hacer caso a la realidad social emergente. El texto constitucional de cada país debe ser el medio por el cual el sistema jurídico ampare los principios de dignidad, libertad e igualdad para reconocer que las relaciones homosexuales exigen una tutela igual a las heterosexuales. Es una obligación del Estado la protección de las personas con distinta opción sexual a la de los heterosexuales. El Tribunal Constitucional ha sostenido que "la democracia implica el consenso de las mayorías, con pleno respeto frente al disenso de la minoría. Aunque el gobierno democrático es un gobierno de mayorías, este pierde sustento constitucional si no se encuentran plenamente garantizados los derechos fundamentales de las minorías. De ahí la necesidad de establecer distintos mecanismos de control al gobierno que, inevitablemente, se presentan como vías, por así decirlo, "contra mayoritarias". Sólo así se encuentra plenamente asegurada la libertad (en igualdad) de todas las personas al interior del Estado social y democrático de derecho". Lo que puede deducirse de esta última afirmación del Tribunal Constitucional es que existe la posibilidad de que los grupos de personas, por mucho tiempo vulnerables, pueden lograr una adecuada tutela de sus derechos. El Tribunal Constitucional ha otorgado especiales medidas de protección que debían ser implementadas por parte del Estado y que se relacionaban con el amparo a aquellos grupos que sufrían una situación especial. Estos relacionados a lo contenido en el Art. 2 Inc. 2 de la Constitución que determinan la obligación del Estado de respetar y asegurar que las personas no sean discriminadas en razón de su origen, raza, sexo, idioma, religión, opinión o condición económica. Algunos casos son los se recogen en la STC 02437-2013-PA/TC,02362 PA/TC referido a las personas con discapacidad, sobre la protección de los adultos mayores STC 03515-2010- PA/TC, referido a los niños 04058-2012- PA/TC, 02079-2009-HC-TC, las mujeres 05652-2007- PA/TC, 05527-2008-HC o de los pueblos indígenas 0033-2010-AI/TC, 00906-2009-AA/TC, entre otros. De esta forma también podría ampararse el derecho de las personas de distinta identidad sexual, llámese homosexuales, para que también gocen del derecho al reconocimiento del matrimonio. ; Tesis

Background and Objective: To resource allocating at national levels as results of productivity, cost calculation helps to determine the size of the problem and revealed cost benefits of injury prevention and it can also ensure the better resource using and cost benefit assessment. This study was conducted to determine the method of calculating road traffic injuries cost. Materials and Methods: In a literature review study using internet searching and library resources' all references related to health cost determination was derived. Then among all the methods, methods of road traffic injury cost estimation were studied and a result with component of the two common methods is presented here. Results: Findings showed that road traffic cost methods including: life insurance approach, court award(compensation), compensation method, the method of implicit public sector valuation, gross output method, using GDP(human capital) method, value change risk or willingness to pay. Mentioned methods have been used based on each section policies, but each method faced to its limitation and may be accompanied with under reporting. Conclusion: Among the stated methods willingness to pay is more accurate, but because of the complexity of the method, human capital method according to available resources and capacity to perform the higher permeability is recommended for low and middle income countries. REFERENCES1- UNAIDS. Status report on road safety in the world: it is time for action: World Health Organization, 2009.2- Mathers CD, Loncar D. Projections of global mortality and burden of disease from 2002 to 2030. PLoS medicine. 2006;3(11):e442.3- Üstün T, Ayuso-Mateos JL, Chatterji S, Mathers C, Murray CJ. Global burden of depressive disorders in the year 2000.The British Journal of Psychiatry. 2004;184(5):386-92.4- Toroyan T. Global status report on road safety: time for action2009.5- Pareto V. Coursd'economiepolitique: LibrairieDroz; 1964.6- Lorenz D. 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Proceedings of the Eastern Asia Society for Transportation Studies; 2005.20- Agnew N. Conservation of Ancient Sites on the Silk Road: Proceedings of the Second International Conference on the Conservation of Grotto Sites, Mogao Grottoes, Dunhuang, People's Republic of China, June 28-July 3, 2004: Getty Publications; 2010.21- Jacobs G, Aeron-Thomas A, Astrop A, Britain G. Estimating global road fatalities: Transport Research Laboratory Crowthorne; 2000.22- Antulya VM, Reich MR. The neglected epidemic: road traffic injuries in developing countries. BMJ: British Medical Journal. 2002;324(7346):1139.23- Alsop J, Langley J. Under-reporting of motor vehicle traffic crash victims in New Zealand. Accident Analysis & Prevention. 2001;33(3):353-9.24- Ayati E, Young W. Estimation of the cost of rural road crashes in a developing country. Traffic Engineering and Control. 2002;43(2):56-60.25- Brand S, Price R, Britain G. The economic and social costs of crime: Home Office London; 2000.26- Broughton J, Keigan M, James F. Linkage of hospital trauma data and road accident data. TRL REPORT 518. 2001.27- Miller TR, Finkelstein AE, Zaloshnja E, Hendrie D. The cost of child and adolescent injuries and the savings from prevention. Injury Prevention for Children and Adolescents: Research, Practice and Advocacy. 2006:15-65.28- Blincoe LJ, Seay A, Zaloshnja E, Miller T, Romano E, Luchter S, et al. The economic impact of motor vehicle crashes, 2000: US Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Washington, DC2002.29- Guria J, Leung J, Jones-Lee M, Loomes G. The willingness to accept value of statistical life relative to the willingness to pay value: evidence and policy implications. Environmental and Resource Economics. 2005;32(1):113-27.30- Peden M, Hyder A. Road traffic injuries are a global public health problem. Bmj. 2002;324(7346):1153-.31- Dandona R, Kumar GA, Raj T, Dandona L. Patterns of road traffic injuries in a vulnerable population in Hyderabad, India. Injury prevention. 2006;12(3):183-8.32- Roberts I, Mohan D, Abbasi K. War on the roads. Bmj. 2002;324(7346):1107-8.33- Schutte I. An estimate of the unit cost of road traffic collisions in South Africa for 1998: National Department of Transport 2000.34- Ayati E. The cost of traffic accidents in Iran (Publication No. 345).Ferdowsi University of Mashhad. 2001.35- Ayati E, Ghadirian F, Ahadi M R.Estimation of cost of vehicle damage in Iran roads injuries in 2003. Journal of Transportation Research. 2008;5(1):1-13.36- Ayati E.Accident cost ( theory and application). Transport research center. Ministry of transportation. 2012. 37- Ghorbani A R, Nabavifard H, Hossieni S H. Costs imposed on the effects of mortality do to road traffic injuries(case study: Sabzevar city). Traffic Management Studies. 2011;6(20):49-58.38- Karimzadegan H. External costs of transport( identification and investigation), Ministry of road and transportation. Transportation research center. 2010.39- Ministry of road and transportation. Iranian national road safety strategy(second edition). Creator Ministry of road and transportation, the state secretrate of the road safety commission, publisher: office of safety and technology studies. 2011:1-70.40- Trawén A, Maraste P, Persson U. International comparison of costs of a fatal casualty of road accidents in 1990 and 1999. Accident Analysis & Prevention. 2002;34(3):323-32.41- Connelly LB, Supangan R. The economic costs of road traffic crashes: Australia, states and territories. Accident Analysis & Prevention. 2006;38(6):1087-93.42- Downing A, editor. Accident Costs in Indonesia: A Review. International Conference on Road Safety, Andhra University, Visakhapatnam, India; 1997.43- Krupnick A, Alberini A, Cropper M, Simon N, O'Brien B, Goeree R, et al. Age, health and the willingness to pay for mortality risk reductions: a contingent valuation survey of Ontario residents. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 2002;24(2):161-86.44- Al-Masaeid HR, Al-Mashakbeh AA, Qudah AM. Economic costs of traffic accidents in Jordan. Accident Analysis & Prevention. 1999;31(4):347-57.45- Peden M, Scurfield R, Sleet D, Mohan D, Hyder AA, Jarawan E, et al. World report on road traffic injury prevention. World Health Organization Geneva; 2004.46- Jenkins RR, Owens N, Wiggins LB. Valuing reduced risks to children: the case of bicycle safety helmets. Contemporary Economic Policy. 2008;19(4):397-40847- Sundaram K. Employment and Poverty in India, 2000-2005. Economic and Political Weekly. 2007:3121-31.48- Ortúzar JD, Cifuentes LA, Williams HCL. Application of willingness-to-pay methods to value transport externalities in less developed countries. Environment and Planning A. 2000;32:2007-18.49- Persson U, Norinder A, Hjalte K, Gralén K. The value of a statistical life in transport: findings from a new contingent valuation study in Sweden. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 2001;23(2):121-34.50- Vassanadumrongdee S, Matsuoka S. Risk perceptions and value of a statistical life for air pollution and traffic accidents: evidence from Bangkok, Thailand. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 2005;30(3):261-87.

Durante las primeras décadas del siglo XX, la sociedad uruguaya completó su primer modelo de configuración nacional, y el imaginario integrador que lo hizo posible alcanzó entonces su máximo despliegue. La relación de primacía de lo público sobre lo privado fue, entre otros, uno de sus elementos constitutivos. Así lo explica el historiador Gerardo Caetano en su artículo Lo privado desde lo público. Ciudadanía, nación y vida privada en el Centenario.1En tal sentido, Caetano expresa que la mayoría de los líderes partidarios de la época "participó de un consenso tácito respecto a que su vida privada debía quedar fuera de las controversias políticas, haciendo de ello poco a poco un 'código' no escrito de la convivencia de la llamada 'clase política'". No obstante, como indica el autor, ese acuerdo tácito no siempre se cumplió.El caso que nos ocupa en este artículo es un ejemplo de ello; ocurrió en 1904, en Montevideo, y trascendió hasta nuestros días como "la tragedia del Prado".En la noche del 26 de diciembre de 1904, en el Hotel del Prado, el militar Adolfo Latorre mató de dos balazos a su esposa, Celia Rodríguez Larreta. El motivo estuvo claro desde un principio: ella le era infiel.El aristocrático matrimonio Latorre - Rodríguez Larreta estaba tramitando una separación legal de cuerpo y bienes, de acuerdo a la normativa de la época. Según el historiador José Pedro Barrán, había sido la propia Celia quien, víctima de maltrato por parte de su esposo, había solicitado la aplicación de dicha figura jurídica.2 En tal sentido, es preciso recordar que en Uruguay el divorcio absoluto fue aprobado en 1907, casi tres años después de la muerte de Celia.La historiadora Ana Ribeiro, en su libro Historias sin importancia3, relata que la relación de Celia y su amante era un secreto a voces. La identidad del amante también rodaba de boca en boca, y fue ese dato, tal vez, lo que convirtió aquel amorío en un escándalo. Es que quien había deslumbrado a Celia era el doctor Luis Alberto de Herrera.El veterano abogado Teófilo Díaz -que conocía a los protagonistas de esta historia- intervino con el propósito de recomponer la relación conyugal. Como resultado de aquella mediación, el matrimonio decidió pasar la noche del 26 de diciembre en el Hotel del Prado. Pero lo que en principio pareció ser una reconciliación, terminó en una tragedia, y Celia Rodríguez Larreta encontró la muerte a manos de su esposo.Enterado de lo sucedido, el abogado Díaz fue uno de los primeros en llegar al hotel. "La indignación de Teófilo Díaz fue grande: él había llevado a Celia Rodríguez Larreta a esa situación de supuesta reconciliación, él la había entregado a las manos del marido"4, relata Ribeiro. Tanto fue así que, en un arrebato, él también empuñó un arma y mató de un balazo al asesino, Adolfo Latorre.A Teófilo Díaz lo declararon loco. A Celia la velaron en casa de sus padres. Por si al caso le faltara algún tinte escandaloso, durante el velorio irrumpió el dandy Roberto de las Carreras y declamó su "Oración pagana", una prédica a favor del amor libre y de la cual se transcribe un fragmento al comienzo de este artículo.Los principales diarios del momento, El Día y El Siglo, dedicaron páginas enteras a la noticia del doble crimen. Los periodistas se embarcaron en la difícil tarea de dar a conocer la historia, evitando aludir directamente al adulterio y, sobre todo, soslayando revelar la identidad del amante.El historiador José Pedro Barrán se ocupó de "la tragedia del Prado" en su libro Intimidad, divorcio y nueva moral en el Uruguay del novecientos5. Al referirse a la forma en que la prensa de la época abordó el tema, Barrán sostiene que aquellas actitudes periodísticas revelan que ya comenzaba a perfilarse el derecho al secreto de lo íntimo, y comenzaban a quedar al descubierto los conflictos entre lo público y lo privado.Así como la cobertura de los diarios fue elocuente en el sentido que señala Barrán, lo que ocurrió dos años después, en 1906, constituye un ejemplo de cómo lo privado invadió la esfera de la vida pública de un dirigente político de la época, incumpliendo el acuerdo tácito al que se refiere Caetano.El 22 de abril de 1906, el periódico nacionalista La Democracia publicó un suelto titulado "Paseo sensacional. El presidente por la calle. Un séquito de policías y pesquisas. ¿Quién dijo miedo?". El artículo acusaba al presidente de la República, José Batlle y Ordóñez, de tener miedo de caminar por la calle sin la compañía de policías, soldados y vigilantes.Batlle y Ordóñez respondió desde las páginas de El Día. En su réplica, a la que tituló "¿Quién dijo miedo?", Batlle aludía en forma explícita al romance que Luis Alberto de Herrera había mantenido con Celia Rodríguez Larreta y, más aún, revelaba la identidad del amante, algo que hasta el momento la prensa no se había atrevido a hacer.Ofendido, Herrera retó a duelo al presidente. Pero éste, aduciendo que su cargo se lo impedía, no aceptó.La tragedia del Prado -y sus coletazos- conmocionó a la sociedad uruguaya de principios del siglo XX. Las consecuencias del caso, además, fueron usadas como argumento en las múltiples discusiones que tuvieron lugar en ocasión de la aprobación de la ley de divorcio en 1907. No en vano, en un artículo publicado por el semanario Brecha cuando se cumplieron 100 años de la sanción de dicha normativa, Barrán manifestó: "Asimismo he sospechado que el asesinato de Celia Rodríguez Larreta por Adolfo Latorre, su marido, en 1904, pudo promover un estado de opinión favorable al divorcio. Celia, que tenía por amante a Luis Alberto de Herrera, era con toda seguridad maltratada por Latorre. Ella había pedido la separación de cuerpos precisamente por ese motivo"6.El caso constituye también un buen pretexto para reflexionar acerca de los conceptos desarrollados por John B. Thompson en cuanto a los medios de comunicación y su efecto sobre la visibilidad.En esa dirección, el sociólogo norteamericano sostiene que el surgimiento de los medios masivos de comunicación generó una modificación gradual de lo público y de las formas en que los individuos y los acontecimientos se hacen visibles a los otros.Los medios permitieron a los dirigentes políticos llegar a audiencias cada vez más numerosas y lejanas. Pero para el autor, esta nueva visibilidad trajo aparejados nuevos peligros. Así, plantea que "los líderes políticos (…) están más expuestos al riesgo de que sus acciones y declaraciones, y las acciones y declaraciones de otros, sean develadas de manera que choquen con las imágenes que ellos desean proyectar"7.La identidad del amante de Celia Rodríguez Larreta circulaba, como rumor, de boca en boca. Pero sólo se tornó explícita cuando José Batlle y Ordóñez la reveló en las páginas de El Día.Aludiendo a Thompson, un evento de la vida privada de un referente político de nuestra historia se tornó visible a raíz de su aparición en la prensa. En esa ocasión, Luis Alberto de Herrera se vio expuesto a los riesgos de la nueva forma de visibilidad generada por los medios masivos de comunicación.De todos modos, como señala Ribeiro en Historias sin importancia, "el tiempo hizo cosas distintas con los amantes. A él lo convirtió en caudillo de hombres. (…) A Celia el tiempo la ocultó"8. Lo que resulta más peculiar, no obstante, es que como bien dice la historiadora, los nombres de los amantes no suelen aparecer juntos: "Cuando se recuerda la "Oración pagana" rara vez se nombra a los dos amantes: o se nombra a Herrera y se vela a Celia o se nombra a Celia y se oculta a Herrera. Juntos, no"9.1 Caetano, Gerardo (2000). Lo privado desde lo público. Ciudadanía, nación y vida privada en el Centenario. Sociohistórica Nº 7http://www.memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar/art_revistas/pr.2819/pr.2819.pdf2 Neves, Salvador. El divorcio cumple 100 años. Las apóstatas de la fe. Publicado en el semanario Brecha y disponible en: http://www.semanario-alternativas.info/archivos/2008/1)enero/1__4.01.2008/PDF/portada/divorcio.pdf3 Ribeiro, Ana (2007). Historias sin importancia. Editorial Planeta4 Ribeiro, Ana. Op. cit., p.1575 Barrán, José Pedro (2008). Intimidad, divorcio y nueva moral en el Uruguay del novecientos. Ediciones de la Banda Oriental6 Neves, Salvador. Op. cit.7 Thompson, J. (2008). Por una teoría interrelacional de los medios. La nueva visibilidad. Revista Telos: Cuadernos de comunicación e innovación, Nº 74, marzo 2008, pp. 85-91.8 Ribeiro, Ana. Op. cit., pp. 161, 1629 Ribeiro, Ana. Op. cit. p. 162

Entre el 11 y el 19 de marzo pasado Mohamed Merah, un criminal autoidentificado como un jihadista vinculado con Al Qaeda asesinó a 3 militares y 4 miembros de una escuela judía en Francia, tres de ellos niños. Conociendo las dificultades que supone el análisis de un acto que a prori podría ser calificado de irracional, intentaremos abordar a partir de este hecho algunos conceptos inherentes al estudio de una de las amenazas a la seguridad más importantes de nuestra época: el terrorismo. A pesar de que los actos terroristas suelen ser fácilmente identificables y podríamos citar rápidamente muchas organizaciones que practican o practicaron el terrorismo, su definición puede suponer un desafío y existe poco consenso en la academia en este sentido: Schmid y Jongman (1) identificaron 22 conceptos diferentes que son incluidos por analistas en diferentes proporciones en sus definiciones de terrorismo. Según Rapin (2), el hecho de calificar al terrorismo como "aquello que produce terror" además de ser tautológico supone dos problemas fundamentales. En primer lugar, la falta de evidencia empírica que demuestre que los actos calificados como terroristas han causado terror en sus espectadores: de hecho, estudios indican que el terrorismo causa desórdenes psicológicos en una proporción mínima de las poblaciones afectadas y en formas que distan de poder ser calificados de "terror" (según lo define la psicología), y la resiliencia (la capacidad de superar estos acontecimientos sin secuelas importantes) ha sido mucho más frecuentes (3). En segundo lugar, es necesario notar que los actos terroristas no buscan crear terror en los tomadores de decisiones sino que, por el contrario, buscan que estos respondan de forma racional ante sus amenazas, midiendo los costos y beneficios que pueden suponer sus decisiones. La siguiente definición mínima de terrorismo, a pesar de haber recibido críticas por su ambigüedad y por la posibilidad de englobar en ella otros crímenes no terroristas, pueda sernos útil para introducirnos en una conceptualización un poco más exacta del tema, a través del análisis de sus componentes: "Terrorism is a politically motivatedtactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicityplays a significant role" (4) Lo primero que se desprende de estadefinición, y que no es un detalle menor, es que el terrorismo es un táctica, es decir, un medio utilizado para alcanza ciertos fines: "Groups who want to dramatize a cause, to demoralize the government, to gain popular support, to provoke regime violence, to inspire followers, or to dominate a wider resistance movement, who are weak vis-a-vis the regime, and who are impatient to act, often find terrorism a reasonable choice". (5) Es importante entender esto para no cometer el error de creer que existen organizaciones o personas inherentemente terroristas: el terrorismo es una táctica que algunas agrupaciones consideran efectivas para el logro de sus objetivos, no es un fin en sí mismo. Entender esto será también esencial para combatirlo. El siguiente punto que analizaremos será la naturaleza política del fenómeno en cuestión. A pesar de que a partir de los años noventa y principalmente luego de los atentados del 11 de setiembre muchos autores comenzaron a hablar acerca de un "nuevo terrorismo", que sería identificable entre otras cosas por la persecución de fines religiosos, muchos trabajos concluyen que esto no es tan exacto y puede que la religión tenga un uso principalmente instrumental por parte algunos grupos que utilizan el terrorismo buscado cohesionar a sus miembros y obtener cierta legitimidad. (6) Con respecto a Al Qaeda, es revelador notar que a pesar de que la organización suele ser identificada como una agrupación terrorista de tipo religiosa, sus diferentes facciones ubicadas en distintas partes del mundo tienen objetivos políticos específicos para sus zonas. Por último, es menester mencionar al papel fundamental que juega la propaganda en la estrategia terrorista. El papel que juega la propaganda puede ser rápidamente comprendido a partir del esquema que utiliza Rapin para definir al terrorismo. Según el autor, el terrorismo puede ser caracterizado por la utilización de la violencia contra un objetivo (direct target), con el fin de enviar un mensaje hacia otro actor (indirect target), que puede ser las autoridades públicas o la población civil: "terrorism is a means of communication, albeit a cruel one, and its medium (violence) transmits messages intended to pressure its addressee" (7) Para ser efectivos, lo actos de terrorismo necesitan de su difusión: no resulta nada extraño que Merah haya grabado sus atentados con el fin de difundirlos luego en Internet: sus víctimas jugarían el rol de palomas mensajeras. Uno de los asuntos más controversiales con respecto al terrorismo y que suele salir a flote cada vez que un acontecimiento como éste vuelve a ser noticia son las "causas del terrorismo". Durante mucho tiempo, se creyó que era posible encontrar condiciones que facilitaban la aparición del fenómeno, con la esperanza de una vez identificadas dichas raíces estructurales, poder atacarlas directamente para así evitar la germinación de nuevos terroristas. Seguramente, los factores más frecuentemente asociados con el terrorismo han sido la pobreza y la falta de educación. Sin embargo, numerosos estudios han demostrado que dicho correlación no se sostiene en la realidad y la frecuente asociación entre pobreza y falta de educación con el terrorismo está fundamentada en el sentido común más que en estudios científicos. (8) De hecho, debido a la diversidad de escenarios y contextos en los que han surgido organizaciones terroristas, parece ser difícil que la cuestión de las "causas del terrorismo" pueda tener una respuesta integradora. En cambio, las últimas investigaciones han virado hacia el entendimiento de los procesos de radicalización violenta, una perspectiva que pretende ya no intentar contestar la pregunta"¿cuáles son las causas del terrorismo?" sino "¿Cómo es el proceso que lleva a un grupo o individuo a adoptar la violencia?". Uno de las explicaciones más difundidas (entre otras cosas porque fue desarrollado para el FBI) es el modelo de 4 etapas de Borum. (9) Según el autor, el proceso de radicalización violenta comienza con la identificación de una situación que no está bien, que luego es caracterizada de injusta. El tercer paso consiste en la atribución de la culpa de dicha injusticia a un grupo en particular que será, en última instancia, identificado como "el mal", deshumanizándolo y dando lugar a la reacción violenta. (10) A pesar de que la mayoría de los analistas consideran que Al Qaeda se encuentra sumamente debilitada como organización, la posibilidad de que desde el seno de las ciudadanías occidentales surjan amenazas a la seguridad parecen no haber cedido. La posibilidad de que aparezcan lobos solitarios (individuos auto-radicalizados y que actúan por fuera de cualquier organización aunque se sientan identificados con alguna de ellas) parece ser hoy una de las mayores amenazas latentes. Es posible que un aumento de la seguridad a través de un mayor involucramiento de los servicios secretos en asuntos privados, en detrimento de la libertad, sea un procesoal que Francia se esté enfrentando actualmente. Indudablemente, no será sencillo ni para Francia, ni para Europa ni para el resto del mundo deshacerse del terrorismo. Queda mucho por hacer. (1) Schmid andJongman (1988).Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Databases, and Literature. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.(2) Ami‐Jacques Rapin (2011).What is terrorism?Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression Vol. 3, Iss. 3, 2011(3) Rubin, G.J., Amlot, R., Page, L., &Wessely, S. (2008). Methodological challenges in assessing general population reactions in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack.International Journal of Methods in Psychiatric Research, 17, 29–35.(4) Weinberg, L., A. Pedahzur and S. Hirsch-Hoefler (2004) 'The challenges of conceptualising terrorism', in Terrorism and Political violence, vol. 16, no. 4,pp. 777-794.(5) M. Crenshaw (1981),The Causes of Terrorism, Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 389. Program in Political Science of the City, University of New York(6) I. Duyvesteyn (2004), How New Is New Terrorism?, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 27, Number 5, September-October 2004 , pp. 439-454(7) Rapin (2011)(8) A. Krueger and J.Maleckova (2003). Education, Poverty And Terrorism: Is There A Causal Connection?, Journal of Economic Perspectives, v17(4,Fall), 119-144.(9) Borum, R. (2003). Understanding the Terrorist Mind-Set. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin72 (July), 7-10. Disponible enhttps://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/201462.pdf(10) Idem. P. 9*Estudiante de la Licenciatura en Estudios Internacionales. FACS, Universidad ORT Uruguay

Si hablamos de la faceta ensayística de Voltaire (es decir, dejando atrás sus igualmente válidas facetas como divulgador científico, historiador, dramaturgo o narrador), deberíamos considerar de vigencia -incluso en nuestros días- su Traité sur la tolérance (1763). Escrito con motivo del sumarísimo juicio de Jean Calas, injustamente acusado y ejecutado por la muerte de su hijo (y donde la religión calvinista del acusado serviría de excusa para tan fatídica sentencia, contigua a la del exilio de su otro hijo y el internamiento de sus hijas), el Tratado se dedica a analizar de forma breve pero elegante, el papel que debe jugar la tolerancia religiosa en las sociedades [1].Sobra decir que Voltaire nunca fue muy amigo de las religiones. Se lo ha acusado de llevar una guerra constante contra el catolicismo, lo que es completamente cierto. Pero debe recordarse que no dudaba en atacar y burlarse a/de otros cultos, desde el protestantismo hasta el islamismo, desde el druidismo a las religiones orientales: en todo caso podría decirse que fue ecuánime [2].Estas críticas a la religión deben verse a través de una mirada estrictamente terrenal, dado que Voltaire contemplaba el ateísmo como algo insostenible: la existencia del universo supone un Dios, del mismo modo que la existencia de un reloj exige la de un relojero. Tan conocida analogía es de su propia autoría.El conflicto entre la religión y Voltaire son pues consecuencias de un tiempo donde el clero gozaba de privilegios que no eran acordes con el contractualismo iluminista en boga y era ampliamente extendida la corrupción en su seno; donde estaba presente el recuerdo de las brutales guerras de religión, fruto del fanatismo; donde la teología aún no había intentado conciliarse con el avance de la razón y la ciencia. Si Voltaire no era religioso, igualmente señalaba que los cultos eran un elemento forzoso en la sociedad, algo así como un "mal necesario". Progresivamente escéptico en cuanto a la bondad humana (recuérdese su célebre discusión con Rousseau en cuanto a la noción del "buen salvaje"), veía la creencia en una justicia divina como un excelente método disuasorio: "Las leyes rigen para los delitos conocidos y la religión para los delitos secretos" [3]. En el momento de escribir su Tratado de la Tolerancia, el tema no le era ajeno en absoluto. La admiración que le provocaba la relativa convivencia pacífica de una multitud de cultos cristianos en Inglaterra ya había sido explorada treinta años antes en sus Lettres philosophiques (1734): "Este es el país de las sectas. Un inglés, como hombre libre, va al Cielo por el camino que más le acomoda" (…) "Si no hubiese en Inglaterra más que una religión, sería de temer el despotismo; si hubiese dos, se cortarían mutuamente el cuello; pero como hay treinta, viven en paz y felices" [4].Lo de cortarse el cuello mutuamente no era algo exótico para los franceses, que en el pasado habían sufrido en carne propia el cruento enfrentamiento entre católicos y hugonotes, y que parecía revivir un siglo después con el caso Calas, más allá de los avances obtenidos en las décadas anteriores. Voltaire, que con su pluma siempre había abogado por los ideales de la civilización y el progreso, no podía más que horrorizarse: "Parecería que el fanatismo, indignado por los éxitos de la razón, se empecina contra ella con más odio que nunca"[5] Frase que, por cierto, podría aplicarse a varios hechos del mundo contemporáneo.Del acontecimiento puntual, descripto dantescamente en las primeras páginas, el pensador francés pasa a explorar los aspectos de la tolerancia: sus bondades, sus requisitos, sus riesgos. El estudio de Voltaire no es para nada sistémico, estilo que consideraba como "la tentación y perdición de los grandes pensadores" (palabras que Nietzsche rescataría un siglo después), e incluso a menudo cae en lo anecdótico, pero puede extraerse la validez atemporal de muchas de sus reflexiones, que han moldeado, al fin y al cabo, buena parte de las democracias liberales actuales en lo que respecta al tema.Como primera idea fundamental, señala que pueden convivir cuantas religiones se quiera, siempre y cuando haya un Estado que impida que alguna se abalance sobre la otra o aspire a monopolizar o imponer su culto de forma violenta. En referencia a esto se habla de la expulsión de los jesuitas de Japón y China, cuyas misiones evangelizadoras tuvieron como resultado significativas matanzas fratricidas en naciones donde era común la tolerancia religiosa al punto de llegar eventualmente al sincretismo (fenómeno que Voltaire también celebra en las antiguas culturas mediterráneas, considerándolo tal vez como un paso hacia el deísmo masificado) [6].Como segundo eje, que el propio derecho divino (es decir, las verdades reveladasy sus posteriores interpretaciones "más sensatas") reflejan en realidad el camino de la convivencia, que persiste consuetudinariamente; cuestión que -según el autor – se daba a inicios del cristianismo y en el judaísmo antiguo con sus respectivas sectas, pero que se pierde fundamentalmente con las guerras de religión europeas, donde curiosamente los cristianos llegan a actuar más brutalmente entre ellos que contra los paganos. Esto es producto de la superstición, es decir, de cuando el culto como tal comienza a difuminarse en barbarie y violencia a través de la ignorancia. En otros términos: ser verdaderamente religioso no quita ser racional o razonable; más bien lo contrario.En tercer y último lugar, el absurdo de pretender gozar de la verdad absoluta o del favor absoluto en base a disputas esotéricas por distintas religiones o distintas interpretaciones de la misma, y no en base a una moral universal basada en el sentido de justicia inherente a todo culto: aquí Voltaire muestra su desprecio por lo banal de cualquier discusión metafísica, característica recurrente en su obra. Recalcando nuevamente su espíritu deísta, en el capítulo vigésimo tercero hace un "Ruego a Dios", pidiendo perdón por los crímenes de la humanidad realizados en su nombre.Se pregunta Voltaire: "¿Puede permitirse que cada ciudadano crea sólo en su razón y piense lo que le dicta esa razón lúcida y engañosa? Sí, así debe ser, siempre y cuando no perturbe el orden, porque no depende del hombre creer o no creer, pero sí respetar las costumbres de su patria" [7].Esta división tan elemental entre Estado, Derecho y Religión, teóricamente ya alcanzada en Occidente, en la práctica se ve sometida a nuevas presiones. Lareafirmación de la identidad en nuestras sociedades parece hacernos ingresar nuevamente en el camino de la intolerancia, por más que –paradójicamente- cada vez haya menos creyentes: y es que el odio por creencia ha dejado paso a la diferenciación por nación o por etnia.Se dan, pues, situaciones tan absurdas como potencialmente violentas. En Europa cualquier excusa (unas caricaturas, un helado con chocolate de cobertura que parece decir "Allah") es válida para que una minoría dentro de la minoría musulmana estalle en ira y exija represalias contra las naciones que los cobijan. Y estas últimas, en contrapartida, reaccionan con más intolerancia. ¿Cómo explicar que Holanda, otrora paraíso de las libertades individuales, haya tomado como héroes a políticos tan manifiestamente islamófobos como Pim Fortuyn o Geert Wilders? ¿O que recién ahora se le dé al gobierno francés por prohibir los símbolos religiosos en las aulas? Se da, en este caso, una peculiar intolerancia "laica" exigida por las masas de manera democrática [8], fenómeno evidentemente no previsto por Voltaire. Está claro que debe existir un Estado laico que evite cualquier exceso de índole religioso, ¿pero cómo evitar pasar esa delgada línea que separa prevención de represión?*Estudiante de la Licenciatura en Estudios InternacionalesFACS-ORT-Uruguay[1] Salpicado con el sarcasmo habitual de Voltaire, a veces relativo al tema, otras veces simplemente gratuito.[2] Algo que puede verse notoriamente en su Diccionario Filosófico (1764) o en elEnsayo sobre las Costumbres (1756).[3] Tratado de la Tolerancia. Capítulo vigésimo.[4] Carta sobre la Religión Anglicana.[5] Tratado de la Tolerancia. Capítulo primero.[6] El Imperio Chino es particularmente admirado por Voltaire, señalando en elEnsayo sobre las costumbres (capítulo noveno) que, de todas las civilizaciones, es la única que aparentemente lograra evitar un período "teocrático".[7] Tratado de la Tolerancia. Capítulo Decimoprimero.[8] Y no de forma calculada por una minoría supuestamente ilustrada, como cuando los excesos de la Revolución Francesa o las distintas revoluciones socialistas, etc.

Brasil fue, durante muchos años, y en muchos sentidos, una historia de éxito esperando acontecer. Su vastísimo territorio de dimensiones continentales, su enorme población, llena de ímpetu progresista y ganas de crecer, y sus riquísimos recursos naturales sentaban las bases de un futuro auspicioso. Sin embargo, ese futuro con el que los brasileños soñaban nunca acaba de materializarse. Una clase política aquejada por la corrupción, conjugada con un sistema de partidos débil que exigía la conformación de alianzas a veces un tanto oscuras para llegar al poder, frenaba el desarrollo y la prosperidad. El populoso sureste brasilero, dinámico y pujante, contrastaba con las carencias que padecían los brasileros del norte, fragmentando al país y empujando a una población empobrecida hacia las grandes urbes que, buscando un futuro mejor, a menudo no tenía más remedio que asentarse en las periféricas favelas, tierras sin ley ni esperanza, que pronto fueron reclamadas por narcotraficantes y bandas de crimen organizado, caracterizadas por un enorme desdén hacia las instituciones que tan poco hacían por mejorar su nivel de vida. La economía, desordenada, proveía pocas soluciones en el marco de un paradigma desarrollista de corte cepalino, que a menudo derivaba en una exacerbada inflación que golpeaba a la población más humilde.En este contexto, sobrevino el golpe militar de 1964. La dictadura, que duró más de 20 años, si bien tuvo elementos represivos, fue un tanto más benévola que otras dictaduras de la región. Pero quizá lo más rescatable fue el cierto grado de industrialización que se generó en el país a raíz de las reformas, donde se consolidaron empresas que más tarde jugarían un rol fundamental en el ascenso de Brasil. Pero si bien se logró cierto desarrollo industrial, los salarios a menudo permanecieron congelados, lo que impidió la consolidación de una clase media fuerte, elemento esencial para la multiplicación de la riqueza y mejora de la calidad de vida.Así, Brasil volvió a la democracia en 1985, pero todavía acusando el impacto de una economía y un sistema político que no actuaban en función de su ciudadanía. Fue por esa época en que el mundo cambió, y lentamente se empezaron a abandonar los preceptos desarrollistas para dar lugar a una nueva acepción de la economía de corte más liberal, conocida como el Consenso de Washington. En este marco, se pusieron en marcha una serie de reformas que tenían como cometido la liberalización de la economía, la privatización del sector público, y el incentivo a la inversión. Estos primeros intentos, sin embargo, quedaron truncos a raíz de una burocracia vetusta y un sistema político todavía fundamentalmente corrupto, que culminó con la caída del presidente Fernando Collor de Melo en 1992, envuelto en una niebla de escándalos de corrupción. No fue hasta la asunción de Fernando Henrique Cardoso que Brasil empezaría a recorrer un genuino camino reformista.Los lustros liderados por Henrique Cardoso supusieron un enorme desafío. El país, crónicamente afectado por la inflación, debía sanear su economía y sentar las bases para la creación de un país serio, que atrajera a la inversión extranjera y ganara el favor de los organismos internacionales e instituciones financieras. La introducción del plan real en 1994 hizo maravillas por la estabilización del país, y las experiencias con las privatizaciones han sido sumamente buenas en muchos casos.Empresas como Vale – compañía minera –, Embraer – productora de aviones – y Petrobras – petrolera – suponen excelentes ejemplos de ello. Vale, una empresa que nació como privada pero que fue nacionalizada durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, acabó siendo privatizada en los años 90. Hoy está presente en cinco continentes y es una de las más eficientes empresas mineras del mundo. Algo parecido se puede decir de Embraer, empresa que fabrica aviones, y que gracias a la colaboración privada fue capaz de convertirse en una de las principales productoras de aviones de mediano rango. Un poco diferente es la situación de Petrobras, que si bien en los papeles sigue siendo una compañía del Estado, sus acciones se comercian libremente y hay una activa participación de los privados en el desarrollo de la empresa.Pero si bien la economía se había saneado, y Brasil empezaba a experimentar elevados niveles de inversión extranjera, el grueso de la población todavía no recibía los frutos de la expansión económica. Así fue que en el 2002 llegó Lula al poder, con la promesa de trabajar en pos de una sociedad más igualitaria. Más allá de la preocupación inicial de la comunidad internacional acerca de qué tan brusco sería el viraje hacia la izquierda, Lula mantuvo los lineamientos económicos de su predecesor. Quizá este es el mayor logro del actual presidente: una exitosa mezcla de continuismo en las políticas macroeconómicas con la aplicación de novedosas políticas sociales, que propiciaron la conformación de una nueva clase media en un Brasil que hoy tiene más de 20 millones de pobres menos que hace una década.La creación de programas de inclusión social como la Bolsa Familia – que asigna una determinada cantidad de efectivo a las familias más carenciadas, demandando a su vez ciertas contrapartidas, como la obligación de los niños de ir a la escuela y de hacerse chequeos médicos regulares – y demás proyectos, como por ejemplo programas de subsidios a la hora de obtener acceso a una vivienda digna, o proyectos que apuntan a disminuir la inequidad de ingresos que históricamente había aquejado al país, catapultaron la popularidad del presidente a niveles inéditos.Pero tal vez lo más interesante es la transformación que ha sufrido Brasil en términos de su relevancia en el plano internacional. La política exterior llevada adelante por Lula ha devenido en la consolidación del liderazgo brasilero en la región. Instituciones como Unasur o el Consejo de Defensa Sudamericano son solamente un par de ejemplos que demuestran la gran apuesta que ha hecho Brasil en América del Sur. Pero incluso fuera de la región se pueden observar ejemplos de la creciente importancia del país en el plano global. La mediación con Irán y Turquía en el asunto del enriquecimiento de uranio es una clara prueba de que Brasil tiene su propia agenda internacional, y los medios para posicionarse como un global player. Su obstinada carrera en pos de un asiento permanente en el Consejo de Seguridad, así como su activa participación en los foros internacionales, dan cuenta de que Brasil tiene una clara línea estratégica que privilegia el ámbito multilateral, que es donde se hace más fuerte.La comunidad internacional, a su vez, también ha dado cuenta de la creciente importancia de Brasil. Dicho reconocimiento se tradujo en la adjudicación de la organización del próximo mundial de fútbol, en 2014, y los Juegos Olímpicos de 2016. Que Brasil sea el encargado de organizar estos dos grandes eventos expresa la confianza que tiene el mundo en la capacidad de dicho país de reducir la inseguridad y la pobreza, así como la habilidad de crear una nueva y moderna infraestructura para hacer frente a los nuevos tiempos.Sin embargo, no todo es color de rosa en Brasil. De cara a las próximas elecciones de octubre, el país está aquejando el creciente costo político que supone el estrechamiento de relaciones con controvertidos líderes de izquierda, como Chávez o los hermanos Castro. Asimismo, la burocracia brasilera sigue siendo excesivamente pesada, y sus leyes permiten que políticos corruptos sean reelectos, dificultando la renovación y entorpeciendo la búsqueda de credibilidad que se le quiere dar al sistema político. La economía, a pesar de tener algunos sectores industriales sumamente dinámicos, sigue dependiendo en buena parte del precio de los commodities, lo que todavía supone una gran vulnerabilidad para el país. Pero a pesar de la falta de infraestructura, de las altas tasas de interés, y de la corrupción en el aparato estatal, algo ha cambiado en Brasil. La diferencia es el optimismo que se respira en cuanto al destino de la nación: una economía en franca expansión, un renovado liderazgo internacional, y una emergente clase media con ansias de consumir. ¿Quién duda hoy de la historia de éxito brasilera?* Estudiante de la Licenciatura en Estudios Internacionales. Depto de Estudios Internacionales. FACS - ORT Uruguay.

Suena la alarma en la izquierda populista latinoamericana. Alarma no por los excesos que los regímenes que de tal ideología han cometido, sino porque un ex obispo que, adhiriendo a dicha corriente ideológica, ha cometido faltas en contra de su posición religiosa. ¿Es tan grave? Hagamos cuentas.Más allá de las obvias diferencias que caracterizan a distintos países y situaciones, si en algo concuerdan los movimientos "izquierdistas" y populistas latinoamericanos es en una pretendida (y pretenciosa) imagen sacrosanta con la que procuran dotarse de un halo de honestidad e incorruptibilidad intachable.En efecto, muchos de los actuales presidentes del continente llegaron con un discurso en el que se hacía hincapié en la honestidad del candidato y su partido en abierta y explícita contraposición con el desempeño de los pretéritos políticos y partidos tradicionales, en una suerte de moralizante determinismo a la inversa:nosotros venimos a rescatar al país, pues todo tiempo pasado fue peor.Ahora que "de veras" el pueblo eligió a los honestos, las cosas cambiarían radicalmente. Honestidad en el manejo de las cuentas, nada de corrupción o clientelismo, nada de nombramientos en el gobierno, no más abusos tributarios, no más acuerdos con el FMI ni a los bancos del Consenso de Washington. ¡Basta de cipayos! Transparencia y honestidad para con el pueblo: los más necesitados serán quienes más reciban, no como bajo el reinado del malévolo "neoliberalismo", (desde entonces la peor "mala palabra" que podría pronunciarse dentro de la "impoluta" izquierda latinoamericana). Justicia y honestidad en el campo de los Derechos Humanos: los crímenes de Estado del pasado serán investigados y traeremos justicia a las víctimas. Los verdaderos criminales, los represores, no el que delinque y mata por necesidad social, el que mata por razones políticas. Los demás sólo son víctimas de una sociedad que los obliga a ello.Encontramos como adalid de esta nueva escala de valores a la Venezuela chavista, centro de admiración de muchos desinformados con veleidades de "intelectualidad", o "intelectuales" con pretensiones de novedad.El resto de la América populista no es mejor. Para desconsuelo de los socialistas sensatos (que sí existen) y algarabía de los saltimbanquis de turno, muchas naciones latinoamericanas han acabado en la "bendición" de su izquierda y sus "benditos" enviados.Comencemos por Bolivia, donde el Presidente Evo Morales logró la presidencia gracias al apoyo unificado de las mayorías indígenas del Altiplano. Todo esto está muy bien, con la excepción de que más de un tercio de la población boliviana no es ni altiplánica ni aymara, y que ha votado en contra suya de forma sistemática al punto de que sus pueblos ya reclaman autonomía y sigilosamente hablan de independencia. Todos estos departamentos han proclamado, mediante las urnas, su autonomía, cosa denegada por el gobierno de La Paz. El colmo había llegado meses antes cuando, exigiéndose para una nueva Constitución una mayoría de tres cuartos de votos, la mayoría oficialista la impuso por sobre la mitad, arrojando literalmente a asambleístas opositores de las gradas, con no pocos heridos de gravedad por unos pocos votos.Mientras tanto, tenemos en Ecuador a un doctor en Economía con un historial académico admirable. Pero todo su atractivo se desvanece en cuanto toma políticas más favorables a Venezuela que a su propio país y luego, en un gesto de imprudencia, casi genera una guerra con Colombia. En cualquier caso, entre todos los "salvadores", el recién re-electo Correa parece el más capaz, el más susceptible a engendrar algo parecido a una democracia liberal seria, y el más cercano a escapar en cuanto el circo se desmorone.Caso radicalmente distinto el de Nicaragua. Los sandinistas, que habían resuelto confiar su dominio en elecciones democráticas propias de un régimen liberal, han regresado con un Daniel Ortega apagado, opaco, casi siniestro. A las acusaciones que tiene de abuso sexual por parte de su propia hijastra, hay que agregarle su espíritu errático y combativo en las conferencias internacionales. Y encima con denuncias bastante fundamentadas en cuanto a la validez de las pasadas elecciones municipales en el país centroamericano.Finalizando contamos al señor Kirchner y a su señora. Si en la era Menem teníamos escándalos, con la pareja "K" estos se multiplican exponencialmente. Valijas con millones de dólares provenientes del gobierno venezolano que no se sabe a dónde van. Inversiones en proyectos jamás realizados; piquetes proyectados, piquetes reprimidos, piquetes permitidos. Censura de periodistas. Incluso existe -algo nunca visto- una secretaría oficial que dibuja los índices económicos a discreción: "hoy bajamos la inflación, hoy subimos el salario real, bajamos la canasta básica, menos pobres y todos contentos".Pero vayamos al tema de cuestión, a Fernando Lugo. El "santo" que había renunciado a la diócesis de San Pedro en Paraguay, y que luego renunciara a su calidad de sacerdote con tal de obtener la candidatura a la presidencia, sabía a lo que quedaba expuesto.Vencedor en las elecciones paraguayas de abril del 2008. Apoyándolo, se agrupaba una variopinta y en cierto modo improvisada coalición de partidos políticos y otros grupos sociales y sindicales, considerados en el Paraguay de "izquierda", frente a los conservadores del Partido Colorado paraguayo que, de una forma u otra, y escándalo tras otro, habían monopolizado el gobierno desde hacía décadas.Lugo, quien ejerciera el obispado y luego el sacerdocio hasta su proclamación oficial como candidato a la presidencia, fue visto por toda la izquierda latinoamericana (y por qué no, también por parte de la derecha) como un símbolo de esperanza para la nación guaraní. Su imagen de hombre de Dios al servicio de los pobres conmovió a propios y extraños, y su carisma capaz de reunir a todo un pueblo detrás de él lo entronizó –probablemente sin que él lo quisiera- de forma exagerada y, a la postre, contraproducente.Fue cuestión de esperar a que el ex-obispo se hiciera con una oposición articulada, tanto fuera como dentro de su fuerza política, y dispuesta a "jugar duro", para que los actuales escándalos de hijos no reconocidos (no se sabe con certeza el número, dado que cada día surgen nuevos casos que o han sido aceptados o bien no han sido desmentidos) y estupro (es decir, sexo con menores) salieran a la luz, dando de bruces contra el suelo la popularidad del presidente.Éticamente, la actitud es reprobable. En su religión se supone que es un pecado (o varios), pero puesto que el Papa actual condena tranquilamente a los profilácticos en África (un continente plagado por el sida) y pide a los cameruneses que se abstengan de la codicia (dado que es una nación muy rica y ostentosa) para recuperar al mundo de su crisis, no hay que tomar semejantes preceptos más en serio que las diatribas de un Chávez o un Ortega. En todo caso, si a ellos adhirió de por vida Lugo, lo esperable es que los cumpla.Lo relevante es que, más allá de su condición de antiguo sacerdote que no reconoce sus propios hijos, cabría preguntarse: ¿no fue Lugo lo suficientemente precavido como para vaticinar lo que le ocurriría siendo una figura pública? ¿No tuvo tiempo para informarlo al pueblo paraguayo a la par que solicitaba a la Iglesia su condición de laico, antes de ser candidato? En un país inmensamente católico, y donde uno de cada cuatro niños no es reconocido por su padre, el caso es grave.El resultado es que una nueva figura "santa" del populismo se desvanece, constituyendo un nuevo golpe a la supuesta "ética superior" auto atribuida por la mencionada corriente ideológica.El affaire de Fernando Lugo tendrá indudablemente consecuencias políticas, si bien desde su presidencia se encargan en desmentirlo de forma sistemática. El mayor beneficiado será probablemente el vicepresidente, el liberal Federico Franco, quien ya había manifestado varios desencuentros con el primer mandatario, y que como político es mucho más temido por la oposición. Si bien Lugo ha descartado su renuncia, no sería extraño que Franco peleara por la misma.Por otra parte, el mayor damnificado es el pueblo paraguayo, que toma con comprensible tristeza el acontecer de los hechos. En conclusión: una nueva decepción para cierta forma latinoamericana de hacer política que, cegada por su propia naturaleza idólatra, olvida que vota a seres humanos, y no a dioses o santos.¿Es grande el pecado de Lugo? Puede que lo sea, pero en verdad queda pequeño frente a las barbaridades y atropellos que padecen varias naciones latinoamericanas por obra y gracia de sus propios "iluminados" y "honestos" "curas" de turno. Faltas por la que deberán pagar durante décadas. * Estudiante de la Licenciatura en Estudios Internacionales. FACS - ORT- Uruguay.

Research problem. One of the ways to ensure public order is to impose sanctions for breach of law. Administrative sanctions as a remedy of administrative liability have a special place among the remedies of legal constraint. There is a need of effective and quick reaction to tackle great number of administrative offences and to ensure adequate prevention of administrative offences as well as criminal acts. Although the state responds to offence by implementing the jurisdictional function, which in a state governed under democratic principles is carried out by the court (one of the three constituent elements of governance), social reality testifies that the role of executive institutions in resolving the issues of legal liability for offence is increasing. Under currently effective provisions of the Administrative Code of the Republic of Lithuania authorization to impose sanctions for administrative offence is granted to a few tens of public administration institutions. Does such a situation correspond to the principle of separation of powers and what is the basis of such legal regulation? In fact, Lithuanian, and not only, science of Administrative Law often raises the problem of administrative offence as well as the problem of legitimacy of administrative sanctions which is closely related with the justice implementation function of administrative institutions. Actually, the administrative institution while imposing sanctions for administrative offence becomes a quasi-court involved in jurisdictional activities. This problem roots from the inconsistence of modern public administration system with Article 109 of the Republic of Lithuania Constitution, which reads that justice shall be executed solely by court. Execution of justice means determination of the case circumstances, finding a person guilty and imposing a fair instrument of action. According to the Constitution the right to find a person guilty and to impose a fair instrument of action is vested to the court and the judge. Meanwhile, up to now the executive institutions are empowered to implement these functions of justice. Therefore, public administration institutions, in addition to administration, implement the function of justice and therefore contradict the principle of separation of powers. This idea, expressed by many authors, has been still ignored by legislators not only in Lithuania, but in foreign states as well. Conversely, a tendency to make a social impact by implementing administrative sanctions imposed in a simpler and prompter manner is observed much more frequently and in wider areas of public life. On the other hand, the affer to leave the examination of all cases of administrative offence to courts would be difficult to implement and perhaps unnecessary. Finally, we may see that neither the constitutional jurisprudence nor the European Court of Human Rights requires for that. Nevertheless, the statutory regime necessary for the implementation of administrative sanctions has to be identified and defined. Meanwhile, authoritative entities of judiciary law, basing themselves on the similarities in the nature of administrative and criminal sanctions, categorically maintain that the principles of criminal justice should be applied to administrative justice. Such a requirement is paradoxical though. Presumably, if a person charged with administrative offence is given the same guarantees as a criminal offender and legal proceedings are of the same type as criminal proceedings, the administrative liability as independent type of legal liability and institution of administrative law would lose its identity. Therefore there is a search for compromise in many different legal systems, which shows that principles of criminal jurisdiction, when transferred into the area of administrative sanctions, become inverted from the point of view of subject matter. Considering all this problematic aspects of implementing lawfulness (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege), non-retroactivity of law (lex retro non agit) and prohibition to institute a legal action twice for the same cause (non bis in idem) in judicial activities of quasi judiciary institutions shall be resolved . The issue of guilt as a subjective element of administrative punishment remains of great importance. Topicality of the dissertation research. Administrative Code, being the key act of law aimed at regulating legal relationship of administrative liability, was adopted during the soviet times. Obviously, significant changes have taken place in political, social and economic life and these changes are reflected in modified legal regulation. After the protection of human rights became the main objective of the state and the guiding values cardinally shifted from the primacy of state over the citizen towards the primacy of citizen over the state, the legal regulation of administrative liability had to be changed. Attempts to adopt a new law complying with the spirit of democratic states still remain fruitless. We may assume that the legislator has not decided yet which model of administrative liability regulations should be the most acceptable. Such assumption is confirmed by unsuccessful attempts criticized by many authors to automatically translate general provisions of criminal liability to the Administrative Code draft now being worked on. Thus, when legislation problems in the area of administrative liability are being solved the issue of the body executing the liability has remained the most acute. Discussions often reveal an opinion that implementation of sanctions by administrative institutions should be more an exception than a rule while cases of administrative offence should be settled in courts. Unfortunately, this idea is confirmed neither by Lithuanian nor foreign practice; on the contrary, opinions supporting the development and expansion of administrative jurisdiction prevail. In that case the problem of legitimacy of exercising jurisdiction by administrative institutions from the point of view of separation of powers laid down in the Constitution remains unsolved and thus retains its topicality. Finally, the scope of the principles of administrative liability in Lithuania is still unclear and undefined thus leading to incompliance of statutory regulation with legal practice. Dissertation research object. This doctoral thesis focuses on social relationship created in the light of administrative sanctions imposed by quasi-judicial institutions and statutory regulation of such relationship. Dissertation research goal is to analyze in a systematic manner and evaluate the legal basis of jurisdictional activities of quasi-judicial institutions in different countries, the principles applied in jurisdictional activities of these institutions and to propose guidelines for improving the institution of administrative liability in Lithuania. The following objectives were set to this end: 1. Introduce the notion of jurisdictional activity and reveal its relationship with administrative jurisdiction. 2. Disclose the notion of administrative sanction and examine the administrative sanction doctrines in different states pointing out the fundamental features of administrative sanction. 3. Analyze the models of quasi-judicial institutions implementing administrative sanctions and assess their jurisdictional activity from the point of view of constitutional legitimacy. 4. Evaluate statutory regulation of administrative jurisdiction and problems of executing it in Lithuania in 1918-1990. 5. Reveal the basic principles and the scope of jurisdictional activity of quasi-judicial institutions. Scientific novelty and practicality of dissertation research. This thesis is an attempt to have a deeper insight to the problems of statutory regulation and execution of administrative liability. Although sufficient attention is paid to this issue in the science of Lithuanian Law witnessed by scholar discussions on one or another aspect of the problem, the present thesis is the first attempt to give a doctrinal and systematic review of quasi-judicial institutions in exercising the powers of administrative sanctioning and the basis of jurisdictional activity. The thesis analyses in great detail doctrines of administrative sanctions of different democratic states (e.g. France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Italy etc.) and attempts to determine and distinguish essential features of administrative sanctions with the aim to develop guidelines for modelling the institution of administrative liability in Lithuania. The research work is not limited to a mere analysis of legal norms but gives an assessment of legal regulation exercised through jurisdictional activities of quasi-judicial institution from the point of view of constitutional and administrative jurisprudence, thus enabling to determine the dysfunctions of legal regulation and potential solutions. The novelty of the thesis lies in the attempt to define the basic principles of quasi-judicial institutions' jurisdictional activity by revealing their scope and problems of implementation. As Lithuanian legislators are currently working on the drafts of Administrative Code and legislative act aimed at regulating the administrative proceedings, this research thesis revealing the problems of administrative liability legal regulation and guidelines for potential improvement also has a practical value. Assertions defended in the dissertation. Administrative sanctions implemented by quasi-judicial institutions represent the institute performing a potentially effective role of social regulator and jurisdictional activity carried out by those institutions is acceptable for the legal system of a democratic state from the point of view of constitutional legitimacy. Activities of quasi-judicial institutions executing jurisdictional authorizations are subject to the principles of criminal jurisdiction, however with certain exclusions that w

Research problem. One of the ways to ensure public order is to impose sanctions for breach of law. Administrative sanctions as a remedy of administrative liability have a special place among the remedies of legal constraint. There is a need of effective and quick reaction to tackle great number of administrative offences and to ensure adequate prevention of administrative offences as well as criminal acts. Although the state responds to offence by implementing the jurisdictional function, which in a state governed under democratic principles is carried out by the court (one of the three constituent elements of governance), social reality testifies that the role of executive institutions in resolving the issues of legal liability for offence is increasing. Under currently effective provisions of the Administrative Code of the Republic of Lithuania authorization to impose sanctions for administrative offence is granted to a few tens of public administration institutions. Does such a situation correspond to the principle of separation of powers and what is the basis of such legal regulation? In fact, Lithuanian, and not only, science of Administrative Law often raises the problem of administrative offence as well as the problem of legitimacy of administrative sanctions which is closely related with the justice implementation function of administrative institutions. Actually, the administrative institution while imposing sanctions for administrative offence becomes a quasi-court involved in jurisdictional activities. This problem roots from the inconsistence of modern public administration system with Article 109 of the Republic of Lithuania Constitution, which reads that justice shall be executed solely by court. Execution of justice means determination of the case circumstances, finding a person guilty and imposing a fair instrument of action. According to the Constitution the right to find a person guilty and to impose a fair instrument of action is vested to the court and the judge. Meanwhile, up to now the executive institutions are empowered to implement these functions of justice. Therefore, public administration institutions, in addition to administration, implement the function of justice and therefore contradict the principle of separation of powers. This idea, expressed by many authors, has been still ignored by legislators not only in Lithuania, but in foreign states as well. Conversely, a tendency to make a social impact by implementing administrative sanctions imposed in a simpler and prompter manner is observed much more frequently and in wider areas of public life. On the other hand, the affer to leave the examination of all cases of administrative offence to courts would be difficult to implement and perhaps unnecessary. Finally, we may see that neither the constitutional jurisprudence nor the European Court of Human Rights requires for that. Nevertheless, the statutory regime necessary for the implementation of administrative sanctions has to be identified and defined. Meanwhile, authoritative entities of judiciary law, basing themselves on the similarities in the nature of administrative and criminal sanctions, categorically maintain that the principles of criminal justice should be applied to administrative justice. Such a requirement is paradoxical though. Presumably, if a person charged with administrative offence is given the same guarantees as a criminal offender and legal proceedings are of the same type as criminal proceedings, the administrative liability as independent type of legal liability and institution of administrative law would lose its identity. Therefore there is a search for compromise in many different legal systems, which shows that principles of criminal jurisdiction, when transferred into the area of administrative sanctions, become inverted from the point of view of subject matter. Considering all this problematic aspects of implementing lawfulness (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege), non-retroactivity of law (lex retro non agit) and prohibition to institute a legal action twice for the same cause (non bis in idem) in judicial activities of quasi judiciary institutions shall be resolved . The issue of guilt as a subjective element of administrative punishment remains of great importance. Topicality of the dissertation research. Administrative Code, being the key act of law aimed at regulating legal relationship of administrative liability, was adopted during the soviet times. Obviously, significant changes have taken place in political, social and economic life and these changes are reflected in modified legal regulation. After the protection of human rights became the main objective of the state and the guiding values cardinally shifted from the primacy of state over the citizen towards the primacy of citizen over the state, the legal regulation of administrative liability had to be changed. Attempts to adopt a new law complying with the spirit of democratic states still remain fruitless. We may assume that the legislator has not decided yet which model of administrative liability regulations should be the most acceptable. Such assumption is confirmed by unsuccessful attempts criticized by many authors to automatically translate general provisions of criminal liability to the Administrative Code draft now being worked on. Thus, when legislation problems in the area of administrative liability are being solved the issue of the body executing the liability has remained the most acute. Discussions often reveal an opinion that implementation of sanctions by administrative institutions should be more an exception than a rule while cases of administrative offence should be settled in courts. Unfortunately, this idea is confirmed neither by Lithuanian nor foreign practice; on the contrary, opinions supporting the development and expansion of administrative jurisdiction prevail. In that case the problem of legitimacy of exercising jurisdiction by administrative institutions from the point of view of separation of powers laid down in the Constitution remains unsolved and thus retains its topicality. Finally, the scope of the principles of administrative liability in Lithuania is still unclear and undefined thus leading to incompliance of statutory regulation with legal practice. Dissertation research object. This doctoral thesis focuses on social relationship created in the light of administrative sanctions imposed by quasi-judicial institutions and statutory regulation of such relationship. Dissertation research goal is to analyze in a systematic manner and evaluate the legal basis of jurisdictional activities of quasi-judicial institutions in different countries, the principles applied in jurisdictional activities of these institutions and to propose guidelines for improving the institution of administrative liability in Lithuania. The following objectives were set to this end: 1. Introduce the notion of jurisdictional activity and reveal its relationship with administrative jurisdiction. 2. Disclose the notion of administrative sanction and examine the administrative sanction doctrines in different states pointing out the fundamental features of administrative sanction. 3. Analyze the models of quasi-judicial institutions implementing administrative sanctions and assess their jurisdictional activity from the point of view of constitutional legitimacy. 4. Evaluate statutory regulation of administrative jurisdiction and problems of executing it in Lithuania in 1918-1990. 5. Reveal the basic principles and the scope of jurisdictional activity of quasi-judicial institutions. Scientific novelty and practicality of dissertation research. This thesis is an attempt to have a deeper insight to the problems of statutory regulation and execution of administrative liability. Although sufficient attention is paid to this issue in the science of Lithuanian Law witnessed by scholar discussions on one or another aspect of the problem, the present thesis is the first attempt to give a doctrinal and systematic review of quasi-judicial institutions in exercising the powers of administrative sanctioning and the basis of jurisdictional activity. The thesis analyses in great detail doctrines of administrative sanctions of different democratic states (e.g. France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Italy etc.) and attempts to determine and distinguish essential features of administrative sanctions with the aim to develop guidelines for modelling the institution of administrative liability in Lithuania. The research work is not limited to a mere analysis of legal norms but gives an assessment of legal regulation exercised through jurisdictional activities of quasi-judicial institution from the point of view of constitutional and administrative jurisprudence, thus enabling to determine the dysfunctions of legal regulation and potential solutions. The novelty of the thesis lies in the attempt to define the basic principles of quasi-judicial institutions' jurisdictional activity by revealing their scope and problems of implementation. As Lithuanian legislators are currently working on the drafts of Administrative Code and legislative act aimed at regulating the administrative proceedings, this research thesis revealing the problems of administrative liability legal regulation and guidelines for potential improvement also has a practical value. Assertions defended in the dissertation. Administrative sanctions implemented by quasi-judicial institutions represent the institute performing a potentially effective role of social regulator and jurisdictional activity carried out by those institutions is acceptable for the legal system of a democratic state from the point of view of constitutional legitimacy. Activities of quasi-judicial institutions executing jurisdictional authorizations are subject to the principles of criminal jurisdiction, however with certain exclusions that w