Groups in Rational Turnout Models
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 35, Heft 3, S. 758-776
ISSN: 0092-5853
A model of the strategic calculus of voting that incorporates the behavior of groups is presented. If candidates choose different positions, positive turnout is possible in (partial) equilibrium & is generally larger than that without group rationality. Nevertheless, if candidates are probability maximizers & a unique (general) equilibrium exists, the candidates will choose equivalent positions & turnout will be zero, even with group rationality. However, if candidates care about both policy & winning, they will choose different positions & cause positive turnout, which will be larger than would occur without group rationality. Group rationality, alone, cannot explain positive turnout in a (general) equilibrium theory of elections; it does imply larger turnout in conjunction with policy-oriented candidates than would be predicted solely by individualistic rational behavior. 5 Figures, 33 References. Adapted from the source document.