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This paper attempts to develop a critical analysis on the concept of social entrepreneurship (SE) in Indonesia in comparison to that in the Global North. Departing from Karl Polanyi's theorization of market society, this paper asserts that the concept of SE embodies a 'double movement'. It embodies a tension between the 'dis-embedding movement' (attempts to organize society according to market rationality) and the 're-embedding movement' (attempts to ensure that the market works to serve society's interests), that is, between a formal and a substantive approach to the economy. The rise of SE, therefore, is always situated within a particular politico-economic context. Using Indonesia's experience as a case study, this paper argues that the emergence of SE is strongly influenced by Widodo's economic nationalism ideology. In this regard, SE is largely a part of Widodo's strategy for bolstering economic growth, particularly by stimulating the rise of local entrepreneurs. Within such a framework, the nature of SE as a tool for addressing social problems is insufficiently recognized. SE in Indonesia therefore embodies tensions between the dis-embedding and re-embedding movements. The dis-embedding movement, however, prevails in Indonesia.

We analyse a model in which families may either be "traditional" single-earner with caring for the child at home or "modern" double-earner households using market child care. Family policies may favour either the one or the other group, like market care subsidies vs. cash for care. Policies are determined by probabilistic voting, where allocative and distributional impacts matter, both within and across groups. Due to its impact on intragroup distribution, both types of households are likely to receive subsidies. In early stages of development where most households are traditional, implemented policies favour them, though to a small extent. Net subsidies to traditional households are highest in some intermediate stage, which may explain the implementation of cash for care policies. Such policies will be tightened again in late stages of development, where the vast majority of voters come from modern households. Finally, in an environment in which many traditional households are not entitled to vote (immigrants who have not yet obtained citizenship), redistribution toward them may be abolished and in extreme cases even replaced by net transfers to modern households.