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This dissertation is a study of the work of Michel de Nostredame (Nostradamus). Born in Provence, France in 1503, this true "Renaissance man" (astrologer, doctor of medicine and translator) achieved fame with the publication of his Centuries or "Prophecies". This work presents 10 centuries of quatrains – almost a thousand short poems of only four rhymed lines each. The first third was published in 1555, another third in 1557 and finally the ten Centuries all together, posthumously, in 1568. The present study concentrates on the first edition, consisting of the first 353 quatrains. The main purpose of this thesis is to explore and analyse the language, the style and the genre of the Centuries, aspects rather neglected by the critics hitherto. The large number of quatrains analysed in detail provides a solid basis for accurately characterizing the distinctive features of the text. The methods applied are mainly quantitative and comparative. Initially, a short presentation of Nostradamus' life and work sketches in the background for the creation of the Centuries. The analysis of the poetic form illustrates the stylistic as well as linguistic consequences of the use of the quatrain: it is argued that the poetical structure of the text influences its language as well as its oracular genre. The language of the Centuries is quantitatively examined, first at the sentence level and then at the phrase level. In order to define its specific nature, comparisons are made with the language of other texts from the same period, i.e. the Délie by Maurice Scève and the Pantagrueline Pronostication by François Rabelais. The results demonstrate that the most prominent differences concern what may be referred to as Nostradamus' strategy of omission, where the restrictive metrical form of the quatrain demands that he be sparing of words. Thereafter, the dissertation concludes that the number of textual themes and motives of the Centuries is quite limited (war, catastrophe, government), the prodigy being identified as the general poetic topic that contributes to the coherence of the text. A subsequent section thoroughly investigates stylistic elements such as enumeration, repetition and onomastics. The objective of the final section is to define the genre of the Centuries. The close connection between the concepts of poetry and prophecy during the French Renaissance is well documented. It is thus suggested that the enigmatic, dark oeuvre of Nostradamus inspired several of the Pléiade poets, whose group that in many ways explored the oracular genre in the 1550s and 1560s. It is furthermore demonstrated that the concept of oracular poetry is appropriate for defining the style and the genre of the Centuries. Together, the different results of our survey lead to a discussion of the poetic qualities of the Centuries. The present study promotes the conclusion that Nostradamus is to be considered much less a prophet than an author of oracular poetry.

The labor agreements contained in the Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America and Colombia, Ecuador and Perú (pre AFTA) are similar to those already signed with Jordan, Singapore and Chile and near replicas of those in the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) currently pending ratification by the U.S. Congress. This FTA model, however, differs clearly from the treaty signed more than a decade ago with Mexico and Canada (NAFTA), particularly in its notable reduction of the protective labor regulations that safeguard commerce. This article grew out of questions concerning the strength of our own labor legislation and practices in the face of a treaty which allows FTA counterparts to question them whenever they feel commerce is affected. The answer to this question is, in part, comforting —the Colombian legal system has withstood attacks throughout its 200-year old history and the equal footing ensured all treaty participants will allow us to defend this system— but we cannot ignore the risks inherent in a country where decisions are most often made underthe duress of poverty.This article highlights questions that emerged following the presentation of information to Colombian society by Colombian labor negotiators between August of 2004 and May of 2005. ; El capítulo laboral del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos de América del Norte, Colombia, Ecuador y Perú —futuro AFTA—, sigue la línea de los tratados de libre comercio ya firmados con Jordania, Singapur, Chile y es básicamente exacto al proyecto con Centroamérica —CAFTA—, en vía de ratificación por parte del Congreso de Estados Unidos de América. Este modelo presenta eso sí, claras diferencias con el suscrito hace más de una década con México y Canadá —NAFTA—, sobre todo porque reduce ostensiblemente los estándares laborales protegidos como salvaguarda del comercio. La génesis de este artículo se encuentra enmarcada en la pregunta de ¿hasta qué punto nuestra cultura laboral constituye una herramienta sólida para enfrentar el reto de un tratado que contiene los medios para ponerla en tela de juicio, cada vez que nuestra contraparte considere que afecta el comercio? Parte de la respuesta es tranquilizante, poseemos una trayectoria jurídica de más de 200 años capaz de enfrentar cualquier embate y estaríamos en condiciones de igualdad dentro del tratado para defenderla, pero aquí como siempre, ¿qué papel jugará nuestra endémica situación de país pobre? El artículo hace un seguimiento a los informes presentados a la sociedad civil por los negociadores o coordinadores de la mesa laboral del tratado desde el 11 de agosto de 2004 hasta el 11 de mayo de 2005, es decir, desde la primera a la segunda rondas de Lima y a partir de ellos, plantean una serie de inquietudes que invitan a la reflexión y a la actuación.

The Darwin Mounds, small mounded features colonised by deep-water coral species such as Lophelia pertusa and Madrepora oculata , are found in the Northern Rockall Trough, at water depths between 900 and 1100 m. They were discovered in 1998 during a TOBI (Towed Ocean Bottom Instrument) 30 kHz sidescan sonar survey, where they appeared as circular to oval high-backscatter features on a generally lowbackscatter background. A typical mound can be up to 75 m across and 5 m high, and may have a scoured 'tail' feature of moderate backscatter in the down-current direction. High-resolution sidescan sonar and video imagery confirmed the presence of deep-water corals, and their confinement to the mounds. However, it also illustrated damage caused by deep-water trawling activities. As a result of these findings, the European Commission adopted a regulation in March 2004 to permanently ban bottom trawling from the area, while the UK government has the intention to designate the province as Special Area of Conservation under the Habitats Directive.The specific setting in which the Darwin Mounds occur, just south of the Wyville Thomson Ridge (WTR), creates a particular oceanographic regime : while most of the Continental Slope Current of the eastern Rockall margin continues its northward course across the WTR, the lower parts (<500 m) of the current are deflected to the south-west. This resulted in the formation of a sediment drift complex in the area, including a broad sheeted drift upon which upstream flank the Darwin Mounds are located. Further to the southwest, on the down-stream flank, a large field of pockmarks has also been discovered. Piston and box cores indicate that the general sedimentary sequence in the area consists of a thin upper layer of Holocene contourite sands overlying glacigenic muds. Cores in the mounds however show several meters of homogeneous sands. Masson et al. (2003) therefore proposed that the mounds might have a genetic relationship to the pockmarks, suggesting that the mounds formed as a result of fluid escape and the eruption of sand on the seafloor. Their higher elevation above the seafloor would subsequently have attracted coral colonisation. Alternatively, it is often suggested that small coral mounds can be formed through the baffling of sand by the coral framework.Detailed grainsize and mineralogical analyses of the piston and box cores reveal the nature of the sands in the area, and show a sorting effect in the down-current (SW-ly) direction throughout the Darwin Mound Province. However, they are less effective in discriminating clearly between the on-mound and off-mound sands, or between the sands of different depths within the mounds themselves. New information from highresolution TOPAS profiles and from foraminifera studies gives more insight in the mound origin and in the position of the mounds/corals within the contourite system, including the change of current regime related to the last deglaciation.

Marc Blecher's magisterial text on China's political economy was first published in 1996. The tale of China's unfolding political economy after the 1949 Revolution has often been told, but Blecher did full justice to the subject, telling his story with aplomb, verve and no little eloquence. By focusing on politics and economics, he sensibly restricted the scope of his book, and by combining three narrative chapters with more analytical chapters on the state, inequality, as well as economics and politics, Blecher's reach extended well beyond that of any mere descriptive account.This book, the second edition, retains the essential structure of its predecessor, but updates the story to 2002. In addition, a significant body of new material has been included. For example, the Society chapter includes an up-to-date and apposite discussion of gender inequality, whilst that on political economy discusses the implications of WTO entry. And, in recognition of the increased blurring of the distinction between rural and urban China, the separate chapters on the rural and urban economics of the first edition have been amalgamated. A little more up-dating would have improved the text still further; for example, the chapter on pre-1949 China takes into account little by way of recent scholarship. That, however, is only a minor quibble.In its essentials, this is a textbook, and that is reflected in the balanced and judicious tone that permeates its pages. Nevertheless, Blecher's stands as a text apart. For one thing, it does proper justice to the complexities of Chinese political economy and (in a truly excellent discussion) its administrative system. Doubtless, some will complain that it is too sophisticated for its audience, but it is hard to condemn an author for refusing to pander to the mediocre. Secondly, this book is richly informed by Blecher's own research on the local Chinese state and economy, particularly that on Shulu county (Xinji city) in Hebei, conducted with Vivienne Shue. It is, therefore, the work of a practitioner, not an onlooker. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it focuses on the fundamentals of development, class, inequality and growth, and in so doing avoids fashionable ephemera. In a sense, its flavour is rather traditional. For example, the term "social formation" is used without either apology or irony, and the 1949 Revolution retains its (rightful) place as the fundamental climacteric in 20th-century Chinese history. Not all will share Blecher's approach to these matters. However, it is hard to see how one can understand an explicitly Marxist state armed only with a knowledge of missionaries and modernization theory, or a messianic faith in the capability of the multinational to render harmonious a fractured social landscape. If we are to comprehend post-1949 China, we need to understand its political and economic structures, as well as the forces and ideals which animated its leaders. Marc Blecher's book is the place to start.

This essay focuses on a particular expression of globalization and regionalization that entails social, political, cultural and economic dimensions: social movements. I argue that current social movements are not necessarily articulated only in terms of class struggle-as the major labor movements were for the last two centuries. Neither do they articulate their protests only in terms of identity and recognition-such as women's movements did in the 1960s. Social movements are now most commonly organized around a discourse that combines those two dimensions. Contemporary social movements are expanding from the structural economic and industrial system (and thus abandoning the form of traditional class struggles) to cultural and identity grounds. New social movements are now seen more and more as symbolic challengers, because power-that affects everyday life and tries to manipulate and give social meaning to things-is being contested by individuals in both the public and private spheres. Thus movements have a more symbolic function: they are a new kind of media, fighting for symbolic and cultural stakes, and for a different meaning and orientation of social action. However, constructing a collective identity within a social movement is not definitive. A movement's identity is constructed on an everyday basis, and within the process of globalization, the contact and social interaction with others -with the other, which allows the definition of one's own identity-is not only possible but also necessary. This paper considers the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas as an empirical approach to social movements expanding from regional, local mobilizations and discourse, to more global oriented contentious activities. I argue that the Zapatista movement's identity in 1994 was quite different from the one it has now: the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN, or Zapatista National Liberation Army) discourse has been transformed, from having an ethnic, communitarian point of view to a more global or transnational oriented vision. The Zapatistas' globally constructed image is now not only that of a particular, local revolution, but also reflects a pretended universalism in their political proposal: a reordering of the necessary and irreversible global structural transformation. The movements' demands are thus an aspect of the actual process of configuring an 'alternative revolution of global scale', as a rejection of the new political, social and economic order, both at the local and global levels. In the case of Zapatismo, the form of the movement has become a message, a symbolic challenge to the dominant global patterns that redefine the meaning of social action for the local society-namely, neoliberal policies. In other words, what is new--although not exclusive to Zapatismo as a social movement--is that what is at stake in its discourse is the production of humanity, related to the transnational nature and effects of globalization and the interdependence of the world system.

National audience ; The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the different stages of the institutional process which led to the structuring of cognitive sciences in France between 1985 and 2003. This research is based on reports written for the CNRS and the Research Ministry; it underlines the professional and disciplinary interests of the concerned participants. This study shows that two main orientations divide the researchers. For those who identify cognitive functions with logical operations, the computer constitute the model and thought is perceived like a system of symbols' handling ; whereas for those interested in neurophysiological mechanisms, the study of the mind belongs to neurosciences. The analysis of the institutional process shows that the cognitive sciences' frontiers are the results of negotiations between disciplines and that economic and political factors contribute to amend their contours. The comparison with United States indicates a gap of twenty years; the first American cognitive sciences centre was created in 1960. The development of artificial intelligence during the Cold War is one reason of the origin of this gap, depended also by the concentration of resources and most efficient computers available to the American pioneers of artificial intelligence. As for the neurosciences researchers, in France as well as in United States, one has to wait the middle of the 1980's to see a beginning of the process of institutionalisation in the field of the cognitive sciences, changing the original orientations. ; Cet article vise à reconstituer les différentes étapes du processus institutionnel qui ont conduit à la structuration des sciences cognitives en France entre 1985 et 2003. L'analyse des rapports produits pour le CNRS et le ministère de la recherche sert de support à cette étude qui met en évidence les intérêts disciplinaires des acteurs concernés. Les deux grandes orientations qui guident les chercheurs en sciences cognitives sont perceptibles tout au long de cette étude. Pour ceux qui assimilent les fonctions cognitives à des opérations logiques, l'ordinateur est un bon modèle et la pensée est perçue comme un système de manipulations de symboles ; tandis que pour ceux qui s'intéressent aux mécanismes neurophysiologiques, l'étude de l'esprit relève essentiellement des neurosciences. L'analyse du processus institutionnel montre que les frontières des sciences cognitives sont soumises à négociation entre disciplines et que des facteurs économiques et politiques contribuent à en modifier les contours. Une comparaison avec les Etats-Unis indique un décalage de vingt ans, le premier centre en science cognitive américain ayant été créé en 1960. Le développement de l'intelligence artificielle (IA) pendant la période de la guerre froide n'est pas étranger à ce décalage, une concentration des ressources et des ordinateurs les plus performants ayant bénéficié aux centres contrôlés par les pionniers américains de l'IA. Quant aux chercheurs en neurosciences, que ce soit en France ou aux Etats-Unis, ce n'est qu'au milieu des années 1980 qu'ils se sont s'impliqués activement dans le processus d'institutionnalisation des sciences cognitives en en modifiant les orientations premières.

The historiography of twentieth-century Latin America has neglected the years 1914-1918. Most of those who seek to define the century in terms of identifiable periods choose to concentrate less on the two world wars than on two turning points that mark a true break in continuity in the sub-continent's contemporary history: one consists of the social and political effects of the economic crisis that began in the United States in October 1929, the other is Fidel Castro's assumption of power in Havana in January 1959. The natural conclusion of this approach is that the Great War did not have the same formative role in Latin America that it is held to play in Europe. Yet this proposition does not mean that the First World War in Latin America remains a completely neglected topic. For example, within the framework of a traditional diplomatic history it is possible to analyse why certain nations sustained a prudent neutrality until November 1918, or why other states finally rallied to the Allied cause; it has also been possible to measure the impact of the war on the economy of certain countries, such as Argentina, Chile or Brazil, which profited from reduced agricultural production in Europe by seizing new markets and fundamentally modernising their structures. Yet the chronology of 1914-1918 has undoubtedly been very little studied to date, rather as if the absence of any collective memory of the Great War in Latin America condemned the period to complete oblivion. This paper does not claim to introduce a historiographical revolution and present the First World War as a major break in the specific chronology of Latin America. More modestly, it seeks to suggest some ways in which the impact of the years 1914-1918 across the Atlantic can be re-evaluated as part of a cultural and intellectual history. For although the Latin American nations did not experience warfare within their own territory, nor live through the suffering of war, they were the privileged spectators and ultimate new participating entrants in the cultural confrontation that engulfed the chief belligerent nations -- led by France and Germany. This was intensified by Latin America's nineteenth century, mostly lived with eyes fixed on European civilisation -- in all its many forms -- and with their identity as newly emancipated states constructed from it, frequently in mimetic style. Perceived as the death-agony of Belle Epoque Europe (as it was possible to imagine and dream of it across the Atlantic), the Great War helped to destroy images, to transform the imagination of the Latin American élites and to strengthen a questioning of identity that was already emerging in the earliest years of the century. Without being a true mould of the Latin American twentieth century, the war thus appears to have influenced some fundamental tendencies and to have acted to some extent as an accelerator.

Die Komplexität der Modelle zur Berechnung von Schadstoffemissionen aus dem Straßenverkehr hat in den letzten Jahren aufgrund der Verfügbarkeit wesentlich detaillierterer Eingangsdaten erheblich zugenommen. Über die Qualität der modellierten Emissionsdaten lagen bislang jedoch nur unzureichende Kenntnisse vor. Mit der vorliegenden Arbeit werden die Unsicherheiten der Modellierungen von gasförmigen Emissionen des Straßenver-kehrs für den deutschsprachigen Raum eingehend untersucht und quantifiziert. Grundlage der hier durchgeführten Fehlerbetrachtungen ist ein Emissionsmodell, wie es zur Erstellung von zeit-lich und räumlich hoch aufgelösten Emissionskatastern verwendet wird. Um Aussagen über Fehlerbandbreiten von modellierten Emissionsdaten treffen zu können, wurden durch geeignete Methoden statistische Vertrauensbe-reiche der Eingangsdaten ermittelt und diese über Sensitivitätsuntersuchungen und statistische Fehlerrechnung zu einem Gesamtfehler verknüpft. Aus den Ergebnissen der Unsicherheitsberechnungen wurden diejenigen Ein-gangsdaten ermittelt, deren Fehler am stärksten zum Fehler der Gesamtemissionen beitragen und deren Genauig-keit im Rahmen einer zukünftigen Modifizierung des Berechnungsmodells vorrangig verbessert werden sollten. Neben den statistischen Fehlerbetrachtungen wurden experimentelle Messungen von Emissionen unter realen Bedingungen aus der Literatur und unter eigener Beteiligung herangezogen, um durch Vergleiche mit modellier-ten Emissionsdaten Rückschlüsse auf die tatsächlichen Fehler - also die Differenzen zwischen den wahren und den modellierten Emissionen - zu ziehen. Die statistischen Betrachtungen des komplexen Emissionsmodells und die Auswertungen von verfügbaren expe-rimentellen Studien haben ergeben, dass bei Anwendung derzeit verfügbarer Verkehrsdaten und Emissionsfakto-ren selbst bei Modellierungen mit höchstem Differenzierungsgrad mit teilweise erheblichen statistischen und systematischen Fehlern zu rechnen ist. Bei der Ermittlung großräumiger Emissionsdaten des Straßenverkehrs (z.B. Jahresemissionen von Bundesländern) stellen die Emissionsfaktoren in allen Quellbereichen den größten Unsicherheitsfaktor dar. Mit zunehmender räumlicher und zeitlicher Disaggregierung der Emissionsdaten gewin-nen die Fehler von verkehrs- und straßenbezogenen Parametern (Aktivitäten) an Bedeutung. ; In the past years, the complexity of models for calculation of pollutant emissions from road transport increased strongly because of improved availability of much more detailed input data. Up to now, there had been only inadequate knowledge about quality of modelled emission data. With this work uncertainties of modelled gaseous emissions from road traffic for the area of the German-speaking countries will be investigated and quantified thoroughly. An emission model, how it is used to create temporal and spatial highly resolved emission inventories, serves as a bases for error estimations carried out in this work. Statistical confidence intervals of input data have been de-termined by suitable methods and combined to a total error by sensitivity studies and statistical error calculation. Interpreting the results of uncertainty calculations, those input parameters, whose errors contribute most to the error of total emissions, have been identified. These input parameters should be improved as a matter of priority in the framework of future modifications of calculation models. Besides the statistical error estimations, experimental measurements of emissions under real driving conditions from literature and from own participation have been evaluated. The real errors (that means differences between true and modelled emissions) have been quantified by comparisons between measured and modelled emission data. Statistical examinations of complex emission models and evaluations of available experimental studies have resulted in partially considerable statistical and systematic errors of emission data when using traffic data and emission factors available at present, even by modelling at the highest possible degree of differentiation. When determining spacious emission data (e.g. annual emission on state level), emission factors are representing the biggest factor of uncertainties for all road traffic source types. The errors of traffic und road concerned parame-ters (activities) gain in importance with increasing spatial and temporal degree of disaggregation.

Growing criticism of inefficient development aid demanded new planning instruments of donors, including international NGOs (INGOs). A reorientation from isolated project-planning towards holistic country concepts and the increasing rationality of a result-orientated planning process were seen as answer. However, whether these country concepts – newly introduced by major INGOs too - have increased the efficiency of development cooperation is open to question. Firstly, there have been counteracting external factors, like the globalization of the aid business, that demanded structural changes in the composition of INGO portfolios towards growing short-term humanitarian aid; this was hardly compatible with the requirements of medium-term country planning. Secondly, the underlying vision of rationality as a remedy for the major ills of development aid was in itself a fallacy. A major change in the methodology of planning, closely connected with a shift of emphasis in the approach to development cooperation, away from project planning and service delivery, towards supporting the socio-cultural and political environment of the recipient communities, demands a reorientation of aid management: The most urgent change needed is by donors, away from the blinkers of result-orientated planning towards participative organizational cultures of learning. ; Author's version. ; Les 'concepts de pays' et le piège de l'acteur rationnel - limites de la gestion stratégique des ONG internationales: Des critiques croissantes de l'aide au développement inefficace exigent de nouveaux instruments de planification des bailleurs de fonds, y compris les ONG internationales (ONGI). Une réorientation de la planification des projets isolés vers des concepts holistiques de la planification de l'aide par pays ainsi que la rationalité croissante d'un processus de planification orientée vers les résultats ont été considérés comme réponse. Toutefois, si ces concepts de pays - nouvellement introduites par les grandes OING eux aussi - ont augmenté l'efficacité de la coopération au développement est ouvert à la question. Tout d'abord, il y a eu l'impact des facteurs externes, comme la mondialisation de l'entreprise de l'aide, qui a exigé des changements structurels dans la composition des portefeuilles des OING vers la croissance de l'aide humanitaire à court terme. Cela était difficilement compatible avec les exigences de l'aménagement du territoire à moyen terme. Deuxièmement, la vision sous-jacente de la rationalité accrue de la planification, concentré sur les resultats, comme un remède pour les grands maux de l'aide au développement était en soi une erreur. Un changement majeur dans la méthodologie de la planification, étroitement liée à un changement d'orientation dans l'approche de la coopération au développement, qui n'est pas concentrer sur planification du projet et la prestation de services, mais qui soutienne l'environnement socio-culturel et politique des communautés bénéficiaires, exige une réorientation de la gestion de l'aide: Le changement le plus urgent est un changement par les donateurs eux-mêmes, qui devrait implanter des cultures de collaboration étroit avec les partenaires et la population locale.

The impact of the presence of a city park in a neighborhood is profound in several ways. A case in point is Barden Park in the South Side/Barden Park Neighborhood of St. Cloud, Minnesota. This paper will discuss the development of the park throughout history; the development of parks as an essential part of the American city such as Central Park in New York City, Central-Loring Park in Minneapolis, and Central-Barden Park in St. Cloud. Barden Park, originally named Central Park in 1855, is a prime example of the origination of public parks, first in the United States and later throughout the world. Urban planners of that time were beginning to see the benefit of recreation and green spaces for people who were living in the expanding urban environments of the United States. Central Park St. Cloud followed Central Park New York which was designated in 1853. Central Park New York was the first public park of its kind in the world. Vintage post card images of early central parks, found in the appendix of this paper, show central parks in all areas of the country. These images also show the characteristics that are common in central parks of the nineteenth century. The contemporary definition of park is a democratic notion. We believe that parks were a public good for the benefit and enjoyment of all members of society and not only for the elite. By 1885 Central Park Minneapolis was a reality, although St. Cloud Minnesota had its Central Park thirty years before. The name Central Park t. Cloud was changed to Barden Park in the spring of 1938 in honor of Charles Barden who was volunteer superintendent of St. Cloud parks. Central Park Minneapolis was also renamed Loring Park in honor of its superintendent. The following is a list and brief description of structures and monuments that have been part of the park's landscape: Wood Band Stand. Granite Band Stand. It was constructed of local granite. Fountains. There have been two fountains in the park. Cannon. It was removed for WWII scrap metal. Monument/Drinking Fountain. This monument is the water fountain that a 1925 park record indicates cost $50,000 and was "to be of granite." Plantings and Landscaping. The park is filled with mature oak trees and a circular flower garden. A neighborhood organization has been working in recent years to preserve and restore the South Side/Barden Park Neighborhood. Of all the events that have taken place in Barden "Central" Park over the years the annual St. Cloud City Band summer concerts have been the most anticipated and best attended. . In order to restore the park a historical survey of the park was compiled. St. Cloud Historic and Neighborhood Preservation Association raised the funds needed to hire a professional historian as a consultant, designated the park a local historic, and raised funds for a new fountain and qther restoration following the city's master plan for restoration of Barden Park.

The starting point in the paper is the relative concept of poverty. We will study how our picture of poverty will change if we accept a very relative concept of poverty. The first problem we encountered was the selection of the benchmark. A couple of alternative ways to conduct relativizations were selected. First, we applied the conventional poverty approach. The poor were those whose income remained below 60% of the national equivalent disposable income. Second, we collapsed European nations together into one data pool and calculated a common poverty line for the EU. This EU line was then applied in subsequent analyses. Thirdly, we decomposed nation states into smaller units representing the poorest and richest areas in respective countries. Data were compiled from the Luxembourg Income Study. If we apply the conventional nation-based ways of operationalizing poverty (poverty line 60% of median income) the poverty rate varies from 7,1% in Sweden to 20,5% in Italy. The shift to the common European poverty line will expand that gap. The variation is from 0,7% in Luxembourg to 43,1% in Spain. Numerically and methodologically the most interesting issues are revealed when we compare regional, national and EU level relativizations. Our exercise indicates that within-nation differences are sometimes more pronounced than differences between nations. Therefore, very often national means tend to obscure more than they reveal. The seriousness of the problem varies between groups of countries. In the egalitarian Nordic countries incomes between regions as well as between individuals are more evenly distributed and consequently, the national means are more representative for these countries. Moreover, the Scandinavian cluster is more or less robust against the mode of comparison. The low poverty rates in the Nordic countries do not essentially change even if we change from national to regional or cross-national poverty lines. The change in the method of relativization does not alter our understanding of Scandinavian poverty but it has a substantial impact upon our picture of the Mediterranean countries. The use of the European poverty line leads to two to three times higher poverty rates than analyses based on purely national data. Also, the regional variation in these countries is the widest. Therefore, conclusions based on national means may in some cases be severely misleading. The results also have some bearing for our use of purchasing power parities. In societies with large socio-economic and regional variation in income, and consequently in consumption capacities, purchasing power parities implicitly assuming homogenous consumption patterns over society may give a distorted picture of the price levels in a country in question. When it comes to the Central European countries, to some extent the same story as was told in the Scandinavian case is valid. The countries are not that sensitive to changes in the calibration of the measurement instruments. Also the results for the UK are pretty robust but the main difference between the UK and Central-Europe is that the poverty rate is about 10 percentage points higher in the former.

Stress and particularly coping is one of the most widely studied topics in military psychology. That is caused by two main reasons: 1. Military operational environment can be described as extremely stressful. One of the criteria of good military preparedness is the ability to perform in the stressful situations. 2. The price of stress effects on military performance can be very high.This article investigates peculiarities of conscript's experienced stress and coping according transactional stress model of R. S. Lazarus. Sample of 114 conscripts was participating in the main research. Two scales – "The Primary Appraisal of Military Service Scale" and "The Conscript's Experienced Stress Scale" – were specially constructed for this study. The secondary appraisal of military service was measured with four items proposed by R. S. Lazarus. Coping was assessed by D. Roger "Coping Style Questionnaire" which was modified by A. Elklit. V. Domanskaitė-Gota and D. Gailienė (Vilnius University) prepared the Lithuanian versijon of this "Coping Style Questionnaire." Military service performance was assessed using the evaluation of theoretical tests and general evaluation of physical test.Gathered data confirmed 6 sources of conscripts' stress. These are: 1) performance of military tasks; 2) tiredness and lack of time; 3) leaders' behaviour; 4) everyday routine and conflicts; 5) making great demands of conscripts; 6) difficult tasks. It appeared that the biggest stress is caused by everyday minor events (tiredness and lack of time, everyday routine and conflicts), the smallest level of stress is associated with leaders' behaviour and making great demands of conscripts. The stress level in the beginning of military service can be used for the anticipation of the stress level in the end of military service and also of the experienced stress in military service. Primary appraisal of different military service aspects was strongly related to experienced stress (p ≤ 0.01). Experienced stress was also significantly related to emotional and avoiding coping strategies (p ≤ 0.01). The significant correlation was also obtained while analysing results of military service performance and emotional coping strategy – those conscripts, who use emotional coping strategy more frequently, are worse evaluated for military service performance (p ≤ 0.05). The experienced stress was related to military service performance – those who had experienced small stress were evaluated better for military performance comparing with those conscripts who had experienced big stress. ; Šiame darbe, remiantis R. S. Lazaruso streso teorija, analizuojami karių patiriamo streso ir jo įveikos ypatumai. Parengus karinės tarnybos pirminio įvertinimo ir karių patiriamo streso skales buvo ištirta 114 privalomąją karinę tarnybą atliekančių karių. Gauti rezultatai rodo, kad didžiausią stresą kariams sukelia kasdieniai įvykiai arba situacijos. Nustatytas statistiškai reikšmingas ryšys tarp visų tarnybos aspektų pirminio įvertinimo, emocinės, taip pat vengimo streso įveikos strategijos, bazinio kario kurso rezultatų ir visu tirtu tarnybos laikotarpiu patiriamo streso. Remiantis tarnybos pradžioje išgyvenamos įtampos įverčiais galima prognozuoti tiek bazinio kario kurso pabaigoje, tiek visu tirtu tarnybos laikotarpiu karių patiriamą stresą.

During the last century, the number of African elephant (Loxodonta africana) declined dramatically as a result of over-hunting, poaching for ivory and, more recently, the loss of habitat area due to encroachment of the human population. In some areas, however, the trend to declining numbers was reversed after the elephant was placed on Appendix 1 of the Convention for International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and a worldwide ban was imposed on the sale of ivory. Unfortunately, the resulting recovery in elephant numbers within both National and privately owned game parks poses a threat to the survival of many other species. Indeed, when elephant numbers exceed the carrying capacity of a game park, the gradual destruction of vegetation and habitat is catastrophic and, if left unchecked, is only arrested when the elephants themselves begin to die of starvation. Over the last 30 years, it became generally accepted that the best way to prevent this boom-and-bust scenario and, in addition keep epidemic diseases under control, was to maintain elephant numbers below the carrying capacity by culling. During the 1990s, however, popular opinion turned against culling as a means of controlling elephant populations and the focus shifted instead to translocating animals from areas of high to areas of low population density. Self-evidently, while relocation may be a useful way to control elephant numbers in relatively small parks, it is unrealistic to expect to relocate thousands of animals per year to keep the population under control in the large parks, for example, in northern Botswana. Of course, the best method for controlling population growth depends critically on the size and rate of growth of that population and, in this respect, it has been proposed that contraception may offer an alternative to relocation or culling in relatively small parks with a limited number of elephants. However, while the first experiments to examine the efficacy of immune contraception in female elephants have offered promising results, and preliminary experiments to modulate the behaviour or fertility of bulls have also begun, there are as yet no agents proven to be reliable, effective in field conditions and without significant side effects. The aim of this workshop is to discuss the current policies for controlling elephant numbers and to assess the suitability of newer strategies being developed to address this problem. Given the increasing interest in pharmacological means of controlling population size, it is hoped that experiences with various compounds in other species may help to indicate the approaches most likely to be applicable to the African elephant. It is also hoped that this workshop will stimulate collaborative research projects to identify the best approach to population control in a given situation, and to develop the means to implement that plan safely and effectively. This information may come to provide a valuable source of support when the management decisions required to ensure the health and viability of a game park and its elephant population are complicated by politics.

Global Services Sourcing (GSS) is not an original concept. What is original about it is the media attention it seems to be getting. We have adopted the "then and now" philosophy in developing this report. We start by talking to the pioneers of global services sourcing, companies like General Electric, Nortel Networks and Citibank. The key learning from talking to these companies who have been sourcing their processes for more than a decade is that the long held view - "went for cost, stayed for quality" about moving processes outside the company (in some cases outside the country) is too simplistic. Rather we found that "went for cost and quality, stayed for continued quality at competitive costs" is more in line with the strategy that that these companies employed. Next, our in depth questionnaire tries to capture the "now" of the global services sourcing industry. Since the pioneers had shone the arc light on quality we developed specific quality related questions. The results validated the pioneers' views: 67% of the respondents said that actual cost savings from services sourcing have been anywhere from 5% - 50% (onshore and/or offshored). 82% of the respondents said that going into the global services sourcing arrangement they look for quality of processes to increase by 2 – 10% (onshore and/or offshored). 70% of the respondents said that the quality of outsourced business processes has increased (quality increase of 5% -10%) or increased significantly (quality increase of 10% - 25%). The top three drivers of outsourcing were: cost savings, increasing capacity, ability to take advantage of offshore labor (through captive centers). The most difficult phase of outsourcing was transition or handoff of business processes from the company to its outsourcing partner. The top risk factors in outsourcing were: loss of institutional knowledge, poor communication with vendor, mismatch of firm cultures. Of the companies that are engaged in services sourcing, 79% of respondents were using an offshore based provider. Perhaps in a sign of maturing of global services sourcing 62% chose to offshore their services to at least one country in addition to India, the current offshoring destination of choice. As far as country risk factors, legal risks (laws comparable to international standards - data security, intellectual property rights) followed by political risks were identified as the top areas of concern. The lesson for countries competing for offshored business and FDI inflows in services is that the robustness and fairness of the legal system is a major factor for companies especially in the face of concerns about loss of institutional knowledge. The overall satisfaction level with outsourcing was high at 68% but a sizeable chunk of respondents – 26% were either unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with their outsourcing arrangements. Almost all of these unsatisfied firms have been outsourcing for 12 months or less, reinforcing the literature about thinking of outsourcing being a long term investment rather than a short term win.

Say the words "gun registration" to many pro-gun Americans and you are likely to hear that one of the first things that Hitler did when he seized power was to impose strict gun registration requirements that enabled him to identify gun owners and then to confiscate all guns, effectively disarming his opponents and paving the way for the Holocaust. One of the more curious twists in the historical debate, though, is that the most vocal opponent of this argument is also pro-gun. It is the National Alliance, a white supremacist organization. According to them, "German Firearms legislation under Hitler, far from banning private ownership, actually facilitated the keeping and bearing of arms by German citizens by eliminating or ameliorating restrictive laws which had been enacted by the government preceding his." So which pro-gunner should we believe? Following Germany's defeat in World War I, the Weimar Republic passed very strict gun control laws in an attempt both to stabilize the country and to comply with the Versailles Treaty of 1919 – laws that in fact required the surrender of all guns to the government. These laws remained in effect until 1928, when the German parliament relaxed gun restrictions and put into effect a strict firearm-licensing scheme. These strict licensing regulations foreshadowed Hitler's rise to power. If you read the 1938 Nazi gun laws closely and compare them to earlier 1928 Weimar gun legislation – as a straightforward exercise of statutory interpretation – several conclusions become clear. First, with regard to possession and carrying of firearms, the Nazi regime relaxed the gun laws that were in place in Germany at the time the Nazis seized power. Second, the Nazi gun laws of 1938 specifically banned Jewish persons from obtaining a license to manufacture firearms or ammunition. Third, approximately eight months after enacting the 1938 Nazi gun laws, Hitler imposed regulations prohibiting Jewish persons from possessing any dangerous weapons, including firearms. The difficult question is how to characterize the Nazi treatment of the Jewish population for purposes of evaluating Hitler's position on gun control. Truth is, the question itself is absurd. The Nazis sought to disarm and kill the Jewish population. Their treatment of Jews is, in this sense, orthogonal to their gun-control views. Nevertheless, if forced to take a position, it seems that the Nazis aspired to a certain relaxation of gun registration laws for the "law-abiding German citizen" – for those who were not, in their minds, "enemies of the National Socialist state," in other words, Jews, Communists, etc. Here, then, is the best tentative and bizarre conclusion: Some of the pro-gunners are probably right, the Nazi-gun-registration argument is probably wrong. What is clear, though, is that the history of Weimar and Nazi gun laws has not received enough critical attention by historians. What we really need now is more historical research and reliable scholarship.