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In order to enable more coordination between these various initiatives, FSG and the Smallholder Coalition have catalogued and analyzed $12 billion in funding from 29 donors representing more than 1,700 smallholder-focused projects active from 2009 onwards. Our intention with this analysis is to provide the community of donors, corporations, networks, NGOs, and governments involved with smallholder development with a first-of-its-kind snapshot of the state of smallholder funding flow trends.

The paper focuses on organisations and the conditions for working parents in terms of combining work and care and how those conditions are set up and negotiated in organisations. The research draws on three case studies comparing pairs of companies active in the Czech Republic and in one of the following countries – Germany, France, and Sweden – in the field of engineering. The goal is to explore in depth the conditions that Czech working parents are faced with and that derive from the organisational processes and means and dynamics of negotiating conditions for working parents, and to compare them with the conditions in other countries and identify the sources of variability of these conditions. Important differences between a company's family-friendly practices in its home country and in its Czech branches are primarily determined by the differences in the way in which welfare regimes are set up in individual countries. In addition, the authors identify the following five main interlinked factors explaining the variability of family-friendly policies and practices in organisations: parental (maternity) ideologies, the organisational culture of non-discrimination and equal opportunities, the actors' activity in work relations, the role of trade unions in negotiations, and the given organisation's experience with employees-parents.

We consider two Cournot firms, one located in the home country and the other in the foreign country, producing substitute goods for consumption in a third country. We suppose that neither the home government nor the foreign firm know the costs of the home firm, while the foreign firm cost is common knowledge. We determine the separating sequential equilibrium outputs.