Suchergebnisse

for almost 25 years of European accounting harmonisation has been achieved through the adoption of directives. In the mid-1990s, the European Commission announced that it was abandoning this form of accounting harmonisation for listed companies publishing consolidated accounts in order to opt for an international standard accounting process under the auspices of the then IASC. Much work has already been published on the reasons for this change of strategy. In this research, we would like to understand why the European Commission's criticisms of the directives have been so violent. On the basis of the archives available around the negotiation of the Seventh Directive and building on the work of Diggle and Nobes (1994) and Van Hulle and Van der Tas (1995), we highlight the stigma left by the negotiation of the Seventh European Directive, the challenge to the effectiveness of the options inherent in the directives and the influence of the International Organisation of Values Commissions, encouraging rapprochement with the international standard setting body. This article thus contributes to a better understanding of developments in accounting regulation methods. ; International audience For nearly twenty-five years the European accounting harmonization is reflected in the adoption of directives. In the mid 1990s, the European Commission announced that it was abandoning this accounting harmonization mode for listed companies publishing consolidated accounts. It opted for a more international accounting standardization process under the aegis of the International Accounting Standards Committee. The reasons for this change in strategy have already been analyzed in several studies. The present research aims to understand why the criticism of the European Commission against the directives were so violent. From the archives available around the negotiation of the Seventh Directive and relying on the work of Diggle and Nobes (1994) and those of Van Hulle and Van der Tas (1995) we highlight the scars left by negotiation ...

In order to limit the risk of extinction of the most endangered species, the establishment of protected areas is one of the means of action for biodiversity conservation policies. These protected areas make it possible, on the one hand, to remove natural habitats home to these endangered species from the various pressures leading to land take, and on the other hand to implement precautionary management measures, the role of which is to contribute to maintaining natural habitats and wild species at a favourable conservation status. The objective of this indicator is to assess the inclusion of endangered florist species through policies for the creation of protected areas. The species considered threatened are Critical Endangered Species (CR) and Endangered Species (EN) from the Ile-de-France Regional Red List of Plant Species. The locations of endangered species have been geographically crossed with the protection zones in order to determine: — the proportion of CR and EN species which are not protected by regulation and in essence, which are protected only in principle, only by regulation, or both; — the proportion of CR and EN species stations, which are not protected by regulation and in substance, which are protected only in real terms, only by way of regulation, or both. A mapping of CR and EN non-protected, protected and/or inherently protected stations was produced as a decision aid in the development of new protection zones. CR species are less well taken into account than EN species. The protection effort through the creation of new areas or the redefinition of existing perimeters should therefore in the future focus primarily on CR species on the Red List, with a clear priority on species not yet included in a protected area. ; Fiche indicateur CBNBP-R-001-IdF : ; In order to limit the risk of extinction of the most endangered species, the establishment of protected areas is one of the means of action for biodiversity conservation policies. These protected areas make it possible, on the one hand, to ...

Članek pregledno predstavi vlogo in nekatere poglavitne značilnosti ustne in pisne literature v Afriki ter njuno razmerje. Pri tem izhaja iz splošne ugotovitve, da med tema dvema načinoma predajanja vednosti obstaja kontinuiteta, da so tudi ljudstva, katerih kultura temelji na pisavi, šla skozi ustno fazo, prehod pa je zaznaven denimo v antični in biblični literaturi, ter opozarja na njune različne funkcije. Ustnost defi nira kot ustno predajanje vednosti, nakopičenih v določeni skupnosti, in sicer na specifi čen način in s pomočjo specifi čnih tehnik pomnjenja; je literarna in estetska manifestacija nezapisanega jezika. V tradicionalnih afriških družbah je večji del jezikovnih izmenjav potekal po tej poti in ustno izročilo je najboljše pričevanje Afrike o svoji lastni preteklosti, načinu življenja, mišljenju in čutenju. Pisava nasprotno olajšuje ohranjanje izročila in vednosti. Nekatere pisave so v Afriko prišle od zunaj, druge so avtohtone; iz različnih razlogov, povezanih z ohranjanjem kulturne samobitnosti, pa se njihova raba ni zelo razširila.
Predstavitev ustne literature, ki se v Afriki razvija skoraj izključno v afriških jezikih, se začne z razmislekom o terminih »ustna« in »tradicionalna« literatura ter o vprašanju klasifi kacije ustne literature. V zvezi s tem avtor opozori, da znotraj nje vsi afriški jeziki razločujejo med različnimi zvrstmi – glede na naravo in strukturo besedil ter pogoje njihovega izvajanja in recepcije –, in na kratko predstavi klasifi kacijo C. Maalu-Bungija na pripovedne (miti, legende, pravljice) in pesniške zvrsti (od uganke in pregovora do epa).
Mit je prozna pripoved o bogovih, kulturnih junakih itd., postavljena v daljno preteklost, ki v družbi, v kateri se pripoveduje, velja za resnično. Avtor povzema kategorizacijo mitov po Maalu-Bungiju in jih deli na mite o stvarjenju, teogonične mite ter razlagalne mite; sklene, da miti vedno govorijo o vprašanjih, ki se zastavljajo v družbah, v katerih so nastali, in da so neposredno povezani z njihovo religiozno in družbeno strukturo. Tudi legendo (tri poglavitne kategorije so legende o selitvah, družinske ali klanske legende ter lokalne ali etiološke legende) imajo tako pripovedovalec kot poslušalci za resnično pripoved, vendar pa je postavljena v zgodovinsko manj oddaljeno dobo kot mit, v svet, ki je že enak sodobnemu. V ustnih kulturah na splošno igra enako vlogo kot zgodovinopisje v pisnih. Za razliko od mita in legende pravljice v družbi, kjer se pripovedujejo, veljajo za fi kcijo in so postavljene v domišljijski svet.
Pregovor je pomembno komunikacijsko orodje. V Afriki ta izraz označuje tako pregovor kot tudi sorodne žanre; po mnenju strokovnjakov namreč njihova kategorizacija, ki velja na Zahodu, afriški ustni literaturi ne ustreza. Kaj je pregovor, v Afriki pogosto razložijo s pregovorom (»pregovori so konji pogovora«, »pregovori so palmovo olje, s katerim se jedo besede«). Kar ga defi nira, je njegova raba: obstaja le znotraj določenega kulturnega okolja, v katerem mu je odkazana posebna pragmatična in etična vloga. Prav v tej avtor vidi specifi ko afriškega pregovora v primerjavi z zahodnim. Kot jedrnat izraz modrosti vsega ljudstva, ki se naslanja na zgodovinske dogodke in njegovo vizijo sveta, ima lahko retorično, didaktično ali tudi juridično funkcijo.
Ep je v afriški ustni tradiciji dolga verzna ali prozna pripoved, ki ponuja legendarno reinterpretacijo zgodovinskih dogodkov in v kateri je pogosto mogoče najti kompleksno razmerje med resničnim in čudežnim. Strokovnjaki pripominjajo, da ga kot zvrst najmočneje določata njegova funkcija (ideološka, politična) in smoter. V središču epa ali junaške pripovedi je izjemna oseba, katere rojstvo je bilo naznanjeno in ki izpelje nadčloveške podvige. Pripoveduje se ga lahko več dni, in to pred veliko množico ljudi, ki ji pripovedovalec ponuja vzore ravnanja, jo spodbuja k raznim krepostim itd. Ep ima torej pomembno didaktično vlogo, krepi povezanost družbe in občutje pripadnosti.
Prvi del članka se sklene z ugotovitvijo, da je ustna književnost pomemben vidik ustne kulture in afriških tradicij, ki so še vedno žive in dinamične, ter med drugim pomemben vir za pisno afriško literaturo v evropskih jezikih, tako estetsko kot tematsko. Drugi del predstavi pisno književnost v Afriki. Ta se je rodila iz stikov med arabsko, zahodno in afriško civilizacijo in nastaja tako v evropskih kot v afriških jezikih. Prva je danes bolj razvita in bolj znana tako v Afriki kot drugod. Tisto v afriških jezikih delimo na izvirna literarna besedila ter prevode ustne književnosti. Članek pa se omejuje na predstavitev nastanka in razvoja frankofonske afriške književnosti, ki jo glede na teme in slog deli na štiri poglavitna obdobja.
Obdobje do neodvisnosti traja od leta 1920 do 1960 in ga zaznamujeta ozaveščanje pisateljev ter kritika kolonizacije. V prozi govorimo o obdobju kolonialnega romana; prvi (redki) avtorji so namreč pod močnim vplivom kolonialne ideologije in kanona kolonialne francoske literature. V ospredju so kulturna vprašanja, ki naj bi se razrešila z dialogom med Zahodom in Afriko, tradicijo in modernostjo – od tod prevladujoče etnografska usmeritev teh besedil. Poezijo zaznamuje gibanje négritude (L. S. Senghor, A. Césaire, L. Damas idr.) in njegovo vračanje h koreninam; poglavitne teme so preteklost Afrike, prizadevanje za harmonijo s svetom ter upor. Na področju dramatike ima velik vpliv misijonarsko gledališče, ki pomeni prehod od tradicionalnega k modernemu gledališču. V ospredju je predstavljanje folklore, po drugi strani pa se s ciljem kulturne asimilacije igra klasične evropske avtorje. Gledališka dejavnost se razvija predvsem v šoli Williama Pontyja na Goréeju, kjer ima prevladujoče didaktično in moralno vlogo.
Po letu 1950 so romanopisci že številnejši in afriška književnost se uveljavlja kot avtonomen literarni pojav. Po drugi svetovni vojni in konferenci v Bandungu ob starejših piscih nastopi nova generacija (E. Boto, F. Oyono, O. Sembène), ki v romanih socialnega realizma odkrito kritizira kolonialno izkoriščanje. V poeziji (B. Dadié, D. Diop, T. U Tam'si, B. Diop), ki pogosto nastaja zunaj Afrike, srečamo zanosno rehabilitacijo ponižane rase, medtem ko pridejo obtoževanje, upor itd. zaradi ostre cenzure težje do izraza. Gledališče se še vedno ukvarja s konfl ikti akulturacije, ker pa je namenjeno zabavi in moralni presoji kolonialne družbe, v ospredje stopajo tudi družbeni problemi.
Čas osamosvajanja, od 1960 do 1970, je čas precejšnjega razcveta romana.
Prevladuje realizem; pisatelji se kot v prejšnjem obdobju še naprej ukvarjajo s temo kolonizacije ter konfl ikta med tradicijo in modernostjo v kontekstu potrjevanja afriške identitete, temu pa se pridruži še poosamosvojitvena problematika: revščina, nerazvitost, obtožba novih režimov in njihove kolonialne dediščine ter izgradnja nove Afrike (A. Kourouma, Y. Ouologuem, C. Hamidou Kane). Poezija še naprej razvija tematiko négritude, pa tudi drugih oblik boja. V dramatiki se razvije več usmeritev, kar je povezano z ideološko-politično delitvijo na »progresistično«, socialistično usmerjeno ter t. i. zmerno Afriko, ki je še navezana na vrednote négritude: ob zgodovinski (J. Pliya, B. Dadié) in družbeni (G. Menga, G. O. Mbiya) se razvija tudi politična, angažirana drama (A. Ndao, C. Nokan).
Obdobje od 1970 do 1990 avtor imenuje obdobje Afrike narodov. Roman in dramatika se vedno bolj ukvarjata s problemi posameznih držav. Poleg tega književnost doživi velik razcvet. Ob dovolj obsežnih in koherentnih korpusih objavljenih besedil, ki izhajajo iz skupnih kulturnih izročil in zgodovinske izkušnje, je odslej mogoče govoriti o nacionalnih književnostih. Poleg tega to obdobje zaznamuje pojav »nove pisave« in »ženske pisave«. Zlasti v romanu se pojavijo številne tematske, slogovne in estetske inovacije (A. Kourouma, S. Labou Tansi, H. Lopes, B. B. Diop, T. Monenembo, W. Sassine). Zaradi političnih razmer v novih afriških državah velik del afriške književnosti tega obdobja nastaja v izgnanstvu.
Končno se od konca osemdesetih let uveljavljajo novi frankofonski pisatelji, ki objavljajo v Franciji in tematizirajo življenje Afričanov na Zahodu. Gre za izročilo, ki sega k pripovedim kolonialnih vojakov, udeleženih v prvi svetovni vojni (B. Diallo, O. Socé). Med sodobnimi pisatelji imigracije so C. Beyala, D. Biyaoula, S. Tchak, F. Diome in A. Mabanckou. Od začetka devetdesetih let ta literatura uživa veliko kritiško pozornost, v afriško literaturo pa vnaša nova vprašanja, zlasti problematiko položaja izseljenega pisatelja, katerega ustvarjanje pogosto ostaja povezano z deželo izvora, naj gre za tesno zavezanost kot pri négritude ali za konfl ikten odnos kot pri C. Beyala. Avtor argumentira, da izseljenska literatura v Franciji v tem trenutku ne pomeni ločenega literarnega prostora, avtonomnega glede na literarno polje frankofonske Afrike.
Članek se sklene z ugotovitvijo, da je afriška književnost bogata in raznolika. Ustna književnost se še naprej razvija, čeprav jo ogrožajo pisava in avdio-vizualni mediji; po drugi strani od drugod prinesene pisave pomenijo obogatitev, saj so spodbudile razvoj novih oblik književnosti. Oboje skupaj sestavlja obsežno polje vednosti in literatur, ki so od afriškosti prešle v transkulturnost. Afrika torej ni več le skoraj neizčrpen rezervoar surovin, ampak tudi celina, kjer nastajajo kulturni spomeniki.

this article analyses the use of a set of composite indicators as a measure of competitiveness. Based on the rank tests of Spearman and Kendall (1938), we show that the rankings induced by these different competitiveness indices are very closely correlated. Moreover, on the basis of a critical analysis of these indicators, we prove that they cannot be used as a measure of countries' competitiveness. Indeed, the lack of theoretical and empirical basis in the choice of variables and their weights leads to problems of interpretation in terms of economic policy. The "scores" obtained for these various indicators should therefore be interpreted with caution and composite indices should rather be used as indicator or benchmark variables for the competitiveness resulting from side tables. ; This article investigates the use of a series of composite indicators as a measure of global competitiveness. Using Spearman and Kendall (1938) rank correlation tests, we show that rankings resulting from those competitiveness indices are highly correlated. Furthermore, a critical analysis of these indicators indicates that they cannot be used as an empirical measure of countries competitiveness. Indeed, the lack of theoretical and empirical basis for the choice of variables and weights inside the indices brings some interpretations problems in terms of economic policy. "Scores" obtained using these indicators have to be taken with caution. These indices have to be rather used as indicatory variables or competitiveness benchmarks resulting in dashboard. ; this article analyses the use of a set of composite indicators as a measure of competitiveness. Based on the rank tests of Spearman and Kendall (1938), we show that the rankings induced by these different competitiveness indices are very closely correlated. Moreover, on the basis of a critical analysis of these indicators, we prove that they cannot be used as a measure of countries' competitiveness. Indeed, the lack of theoretical and empirical basis in the choice of variables and ...

Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastala je u početcima otvorene velikosrpske agresije na Hrvatsku, ali i usred krize strateško-obrambene koncepcije. Tuđmanova politika čekanja i kupovanja vremena te izbjegavanja frontalnog i općeg sukoba s JNA, doveli su do javnog kritiziranja njegove obrambene politike od strane oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. U okolnostima sveobuhvatne agresije i, prema nekim navodima, očekivanja raskola u hrvatskoj politici, sredinom srpnja počela je rekonstrukcija postojeće Vlade. Novi mandatar Franjo Gregurić okupljao je kadrove za sastavljanje Vlade, a u tom razdoblju javila se ideja o potrebi proširenja Vlade i nekim nestranačkim kandidatima pa i predstavnicima oporbe. U samo dva-tri dana pregovora postignut je nacionalni konsenzus i potpisan Sporazum saborskih stranaka, čime je stvorena Vlada demokratskog jedinstva. Vlada se sastojala od devet parlamentarnih stranaka, od kojih je osam imalo svoje predstavnike u Vladi. Unatoč činjenici da je 1990-ih godina u Hrvatskoj na snazi bio polupredsjednički sustav koji je predsjedniku Republike davao prilično široke ovlasti, Vlada je na području obrambene i vanjske politike pokazivala određeni stupanj samostalnosti. Prema nekim tvrdnjama Vrhovno državno vijeće je ograničavalo slobodu djelovanja Vlade tako da se za svog jednogodišnjeg mandata Vlada trebala često boriti za veću samostalnost i slobodu djelovanja. S druge strane, Vlada je imala potpunu slobodu u unutarnjim poslovima, primjerice u njezinoj politici prema prognanicima i izbjeglicama, kao i u gospodarskoj politici. Unatoč tvrdnjama o "nestanku" oporbe u vrijeme te višestranačke vlade, s obzirom na to da su potpisivanjem Sporazuma o Vladi demokratskog jedinstva saborske stranke od oporbenih formalno postale koalicijske, dostupni izvori navode na drukčiji zaključak. Naime, predstavnici pojedinih oporbenih i ujedno koalicijskih stranaka od listopada 1991. godine često su kritizirali neke odluke vlasti, koje su se posebno odnosile na vanjsku politiku. Predmet njihovih kritika bile su ujedno Vladine i Tuđmanove uredbe sa zakonskom snagom. Vlada je posljednjih šest mjeseci svog mandata bila izložena pritiscima oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. Međunarodno priznanje Hrvatske i priprema za nove parlamentarne i predsjedničke izbore uzrokovali su pritiske na Vladu demokratskog jedinstva, što se prije svega očitovalo u odlascima određenih nestranačkih i oporbenih ministara, a kasnije dovelo i do velike travanjske rekonstrukcije Vlade u kojoj je u znatnoj mjeri promijenjen njezin sastav u korist HDZ-a. Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastavila je djelovati do kolovoza, kad je nakon novih parlamentarnih izbora formirana nova, jednostranačka HDZ-ova vlada. ; After the democratic elections in Croatia in the spring of 1990 and the victory of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the new Croatian Government faced the Serbian insurgency which expressed approval for the Milošević's Greater-Serbian policy. The insurgency was supported by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) that had disarmed Croatia just after the elections in May 1990. In the summer of 1991, the Yugoslav crisis aggravated. Previous occasional and sporadic conflicts between Croatian police forces and the Serbian insurgents escalated into the open aggression of Serbia, Montenegro and JNA against Croatia. In such conditions, Croatian leadership was conflicted about the defense policy. The disagreement caused the appearance of some fractions in the parliament parties, especially in HDZ. Some participants of Croatian politics in the early 1990s today assert that there were at least two main fractions in HDZ – the "moderate" one that supported Tuđman's policy based on avoiding head-on conflict with JNA, and the "radical" one that wanted to declare JNA and Serbia the aggressors on Croatia and to fight back. Some claim that the "radical" fraction even wanted to bring down Tuđman and replace him with someone else. There isn't enough evidence to verify such statements. It probably was the case of dissatisfaction with the situation on the battlefield. Some write about wide discontent and criticism of Tuđman regarding his defense policy, which was evident at the meetings of the main Board of HDZ in the middle of July, Supreme State Council in the end of July and parliamentary session in the beginning of August 1991. Regarding the attitude towards Tuđman, there is a widespread and simplified opinion that his party turned its back on him and that the opposition expressed him support. Exactly the opposite, the opposition, especially heads of the parties Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSLS), Croatian democratic party (HDS), and Croatian People's party (HNS) expressed equal, or even more severe, criticism of Tuđman's defense policy. In that kind of atmosphere, the reconstruction of the Government resulted in the national consensus – Democratic Unity Government was formed. It was the third democratic Government and the first multiparty Government after the democratic elections. It is an example of a Grand coalition formed during the war in many countries. The main goal of the new Government was to create more effective defense policy that would gather all the necessary political and military structures and establish the unified command structure. That resulted in entering of the Crisis Staff into the Government and forming of the General Staff of the Croatian Army. In the first two months of its mandate, the Government proposed and adopted measures for emergency readiness in order to organize life in the crisis areas. One of those measures included the blockade of the JNA barracks which Tuđman approved September 13 1991. With the blockade, the previous measured and careful attitude of the Croatian leadership towards JNA shifted from passive to active. One part of the research discussed the role of the Government in defense of the cities of Vukovar and Dubrovnik. Regarding Vukovar, there are some controversies embodied in widespread claims that Croatian leadership "betrayed" and "sacrificed" Vukovar by not sending enough weaponry and ammunition. However, available sources, primarily transcripts and records of the Government sessions, suggest that Vukovar was the priority in the supply of weaponry and ammunition. Furthermore, some members of the Government and other representatives of the Croatian leadership visited Vukovar and Eastern-Slavonian battlefield. In the context of all the crisis areas on the Croatian battlefield, Vukovar was the most dominant topic at the Government sessions. At the session held November 17, the Government adopted a series of decisions pertaining to the protection of Vukovar civilians. In the appeals to the international organizations, Vukovar and Dubrovnik were the two most mentioned cities. As was the case with Vukovar, the Government sent weaponry and other military equipment, transported humanitarian aid to Dubrovnik and appealed for help. It is worth mentioning convoy "Libertas" which supplied humanitarian aid to the surrounded Dubrovnik and broke the naval blockade. Also, some Government members came by the convoy to Dubrovnik to show their support. At the end of November 1991, Government sent three of its ministers to Dubrovnik where they had to represent the Government and facilitate its operation in Southern Dalmatia, maintain contacts with the international organizations, negotiate with the JNA representatives and maintain communication with the Croatian Army. The three ministers Davorin Rudolf, Petar Kriste and Ivan Cifrić were situated in Dubrovnik during its heaviest attack and the day after they agreed to a truce with the JNA representatives. The Government supported the negotiations between the city military and civil representatives and JNA because it wanted to procrastinate with the attacks and buy some time to strengthen the military and international position of Croatia. On the other hand, the Government and Tuđman strongly opposed to intentions of "demilitarization" of Dubrovnik which would surrender its arms to the JNA under the supervision of representatives of the international community, i.e. surrender of the city to the aggressor. Second most important task of the Government was the struggle for international recognition. The establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed all the problems of the political structures that young democratic state had to face. Such problems refer to lack of experience as well as technical and financial resources. The Government cooperated with the European Community and the United Nations. Although, Tuđman was the designer of the Forreign Affairs and the Government often had to put into action his decisions, during the Conference of peace in Hague it showed some differentiation, such as declaring it would abort the attending of the Conference unless JNA left Croatia. After the arms embargo in September 1991, the Croatian Government deprived of the right of representation of Croatia in the UN Budimir Lončar and Darko Šilović, due to their role in instigating the decision of the UN regarding embargo. The Government Memorandum, addressed to ministerial Council of the EC in November 22, stated that economic sanctions of the Roman declaration of November 8 would affect mostly Croatia. Such view showed a certain degree of independence of the Democratic Unity Government. The Government accepted the Vance plan but argued the methods of its implementation. The activity of the Government in Forreign Affairs reflects in numerous official and unofficial meetings and encounters with various politicians and statesmen. The main task of the Government members was to appeal to stop the war and recognize Croatia, but they also had to struggle against Serbian propaganda which spread lies about rehabilitation of Ustasha and Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and portrayed president Tuđman and the Croatian Government as anti-Semitic. In that context, some think that the Croatian Government and leadership in general, provided insufficient to the international public. In this research, I also analyzed social politics of the Democratic Unity Government, that is, politics towards Croatian displaced persons and refugees as well as Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees during 1991 and 1992. At the very beginning of the aggression against Croatia, new Croatian Government had to face refugee crisis. Forcible relocations of the Croatian civilians, among which some moved into safe areas in Croatia, while others left the country, induced Government to, with the term "refugee", which refers to those persons who had to emigrate their own country, introduce another one – "displaced persons", which referred to those civilians who hadn't left Croatia, only were displaced to some other territory within the country. Government also adopted some measures to secure accommodation for the displaced persons and refugees by emptying hotels and resorts and founding of the Office for the displaced persons and refugees in November 1991. Funds for the displaced persons and refugees Government secured mostly from the state budget, while all requests for financial help from the international community were unsuccessful. Consequently, in that period Croatia funded also Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees from its budget, while the international community helped only with humanitarian help. In this chapter the Government activity in prevention of persecution of the civilian population was discussed through several examples. In that aspect, its activities were mostly limited to addressing the international community. In the case of Ilok, from where in October 1991 approximately 10.000 people were banished, Government founded the Commission of the Parliament and Government to try to stop the persecution, but it failed to achieve its goal, since the persecution had already begun. After the fall and occupation of Vukovar in November 1991, the Government organized evacuation of approximately 15.000 people, but it was carried out only partially. The Government didn't have control over the war zone, which means that its opportunities for safe and efficient evacuation were highly limited. One of the main plans for the displaced persons and refugees was Government's Return Program, which began its realization only after the end of the war and peaceful reintegration of Podunavlje in 1998. Economic politics of the Democratic Unity Government was reflected in its independence from Serbia. Following measures and decisions of the previous Croatian Government, on the day of its establishment, Democratic Unity Government broke off economic relations with Serbia, however only partially. Those companies with strong business ties with some companies in Serbia, had liberty to continue their cooperation. The export to Serbia and Montenegro was limited only to some "strategic" raw materials and products, such as petroleum. The Government also introduced its own currency, hrvatski dinar (HRD). One of the main achievements of the Government was that it avoided the transit to "war economy", in spite of the increased military spending. Since priority of the Croatian Government was determined by war, its activities gravitated towards repair of the enormous war damage in transport, utility and residential infrastructure. In the end of 1991 the Government established the Ministry of Reconstruction, while in the first half of 1992 the Government composed the Reconstruction Program and its Financial Plan that was adopted by the Croatian Parliament in June 1992. Nevertheless, because of the status quo imposed by the UNPROFOR, located on the occupied territories in Croatia, the reconstruction of the country began after the war had ended in 1995. Analyzed activities of the Government in the Defense policy, Foreign Affairs, as well as its Social and Economic policy raise the question of the Government's independence regarding Tuđman and Croatian Parliament. Considering the semi-presidential system, the Government was the executive authority of the president of the Republic and Croatian Parliament. Government also had legislative powers authorized by the Parliament, because in the wartime a great number of important decisions had to be made in a very short amount of time. The Government was not only the executive body of the President, but it also functioned as his close associate. That manifests mostly through the measures for emergency readiness in August and September 1991. Sometimes, the Government had to step out of its Constitutional powers if developments on the battlefield required it to, for example regarding the decisions about Vukovar, November 17 1991. Regarding activities of the Government in the researched areas, it can be concluded that Democratic Unity Government had a high level of autonomy, taking into account the existing semi-presidential system. Nevertheless, the powers of the Government were limited in the Defense policy and Forregin Affairs, while on the other hand, it had complete autonomy in Internal Affairs, in this case, in its Social and Economic politics. An issue that requires special consideration in this research regards the opposition in Croatia during the mandate of the Democratic Unity Government. Some claim that with forming of the multiparty Government, the opposition in Croatia "disappeared". The remark is understandable considering that all the parliament parties signed the Agreement of Democratic Unity Government, which marked their transition from the opposition to coalition partners. But, did the opposition really "disappeared" form Croatian political life? Numerous public appearances of various representatives of opposition parties and parties in general, indicate otherwise. Activity of the opposition at the Parliament sessions from October 1991 to May and June 1992 shows agility of the opposition life in Croatia. From the beginning of the Democratic Unity Government in August till October, the opposition parties didn't raise any questions in public about some decisions of the Croatian leadership, but from October began severe criticism towards Tuđman and the Government. Discontent was expressed primarily to the acceptance of the Carrington's arrangement in Hague. Criticism of Foreign Affairs arose also after the acceptance of the Vance plan. In the last six months of its mandate, the Government was exposed to various pressures from the opposition and from one part of the HDZ, which reinforced especially after the international recognition at the beginning of 1992. Some opposition and nonpartisan ministers left the Government, whereas in April 1992 there was the reconstruction of the Government which changed significantly the personnel composition of the Government, resulting in the increase of the HDZ members. It was obvious that it was not the exact same Government from the beginning of August 1991 and that its end was near. In the new elections held August 2 1992, the HDZ defeated its opponents and ten days later, new, One-party Government was formed. Establishment and presented activities of the Democratic Unity Government is the proof of the democratic system in Republic of Croatia at the beginning of 1990s and counter-argument for theses about Tuđman's authoritarian style of rule. A multiparty Government, whose prominent members were opposition representatives, couldn't have been formed in an undemocratic or authoritarian system. Forming of the Grand Coalition merely one year after HDZ had won the elections, provides a valuable contribution to the study of Tuđman's policy, shows larger picture of the Croatian leadership and opens the door for further research of Croatian political life in the early 1990s.