Suchergebnisse

In this paper based on empirical microeconomic choices of households, we use the hedonic pricing method to define the urban form of Nantes Métropole. The number of Central Business Districts (CBDs) should guide the second generation of transport policies in agglomerations subject to the LAURE law (law on air and the rational use of energy). Thus, if improved accessibility is capitalized into residential property values close to public transport, then strengthening the current incentive policy in favor of public transport networks and clean modes seems appropriate to continue to limit the negative externalities generated by car trips in urban areas. Conversely, if improved accessibility is capitalized close to major roads, then a more coercive policy can take over in the form of an urban toll: this will generate revenue to subsequently improving the public transport network. In fact, the econometric Spatial Error Model (SEM) reveals that Nantes situation match neither the one nor the other of these patterns. In line with the theoretical background, acting on transportation costs would nevertheless lead to a higher demand for centrality by house purchasers. So the major component of the local environmental policy could be a prior land-use policy involving a better control of space consumption at any point of the city, coupled with the potential implementation of an urban toll. ; Dans cet article empirique fondé sur les choix micro-économiques des ménages, nous utilisons la méthode des prix hédoniques pour définir la forme urbaine de Nantes Métropole. Le nombre de centralités doit orienter la deuxième génération de politiques de déplacements des agglomérations soumises à la loi LAURE. Ainsi, si des gains d'accessibilité sont capitalisés dans les valeurs immobilières près des transports collectifs, alors le renforcement de l'actuelle politique incitative au bénéfice des réseaux collectifs et des modes doux paraît indiqué pour continuer à limiter les externalités négatives provoquées par les déplacements automobiles ...

In this paper based on empirical microeconomic choices of households, we use the hedonic pricing method to define the urban form of Nantes Métropole. The number of Central Business Districts (CBDs) should guide the second generation of transport policies in agglomerations subject to the LAURE law (law on air and the rational use of energy). Thus, if improved accessibility is capitalized into residential property values close to public transport, then strengthening the current incentive policy in favor of public transport networks and clean modes seems appropriate to continue to limit the negative externalities generated by car trips in urban areas. Conversely, if improved accessibility is capitalized close to major roads, then a more coercive policy can take over in the form of an urban toll: this will generate revenue to subsequently improving the public transport network. In fact, the econometric Spatial Error Model (SEM) reveals that Nantes situation match neither the one nor the other of these patterns. In line with the theoretical background, acting on transportation costs would nevertheless lead to a higher demand for centrality by house purchasers. So the major component of the local environmental policy could be a prior land-use policy involving a better control of space consumption at any point of the city, coupled with the potential implementation of an urban toll. ; Dans cet article empirique fondé sur les choix micro-économiques des ménages, nous utilisons la méthode des prix hédoniques pour définir la forme urbaine de Nantes Métropole. Le nombre de centralités doit orienter la deuxième génération de politiques de déplacements des agglomérations soumises à la loi LAURE. Ainsi, si des gains d'accessibilité sont capitalisés dans les valeurs immobilières près des transports collectifs, alors le renforcement de l'actuelle politique incitative au bénéfice des réseaux collectifs et des modes doux paraît indiqué pour continuer à limiter les externalités négatives provoquées par les déplacements automobiles ...

In this paper, I relate the degree of progressivity of the income tax scheme to the prevailing income inequality in the society. I find that, consistent with the data, more unequal societies implement more progressive income tax systems. I build a model of political coalition formation, where different income groups have to agree on a tax scheme to finance the public good. I show that, the greater income inequality is, i.e. the further away the rich are from the rest of the population, the less able they are to credibly commit to participating in a coalition. Therefore, as income inequality rises, the rich are increasingly excluded from the design of the income tax scheme. Consequently, the rich bear a larger fraction of the public good, and the tax system becomes more progressive.

In this empirical article based on micro economic choices of households, we use the hedonic price method to define the urban shape of Nantes Métropole. The number of centres should guide the second generation of transport policies for agglomerations subject to the Laure Law. Thus, if accessibility gains are capitalised in real estate values close to public transport, then the current incentive policy for collective networks and soft modes seems appropriate in order to continue to limit the negative externalities caused by urban car travel. On the other hand, if these accessibility gains are capitalised near the main roads, then a more stringent urban toll policy can take over: it will generate the necessary revenues for the further improvement of the collective transport network. In fact, the Spatial Error Econometric Model (SEM) shows that Nantes' situation does not appear to correspond to either of these situations. In line with theoretical literature, an action on travel costs would nevertheless lead to a higher demand for centrality by home buyers. It is therefore a prior policy of land management and land densification at all points in the city, coupled with an opportunity study on the introduction of an urban toll, which could be the major element of local environmental policy. ; In this paper based on empirical microeconomic choices of households, we use the hedonic pricing method to define the urban form of Nantes Métropole. The number of Central Business Districts (CBDs) should guide the second generation of transport policies in agglomerations subject to the LAURE law (law on air and the rational use of energy). Thus, if improved accessibility is capitalized into residential property values close to public transport, then strengthening the current incentive policy in favor of public transport networks and clean modes seems appropriate to continue to limit the negative externalities generated by car trips in urban areas. Conversely, if improved accessibility is capitalized close to major roads, then a ...

This paper provides a tool to build climate change scenarios to forecast Gross Domestic Product (GDP), modelling both GDP damage due to climate change and the GDP impact of mitigating measures. It adopts a supply-side, long-term view, with 2060 and 2100 horizons. It is a global projection tool (30 countries / regions), with assumptions and results both at the world and the country / regional level. Five different types of energy inputs are taken into account according to their CO2 emission factors. Full calibration is possible at each stage, with estimated or literature-based default parameters. In particular, Total Factor Productivity (TFP), which is a major source of uncertainty on future growth and hence on CO2 emissions, is endogenously determined, with a rich modeling encompassing energy prices, investment prices, education, structural reforms and decreasing return to the employment rate. We present four scenarios: Business As Usual (BAU), with stable energy prices relative to GDP price; Decrease of Renewable Energy relative Price (DREP), with the relative price of non CO2 emitting electricity decreasing by 2% a year; Low Carbon Tax (LCT) scenario with CO2 emitting energy relative prices increasing by 1% per year; High Carbon Tax (HCT) scenario with CO2 emitting energy relative prices increasing by 3% per year. At the 2100 horizon, global GDP incurs a loss of 12% in the BAU, 10% in the DREP, 8% in the Low Carbon Tax scenario and 7% in the High Carbon Tax scenario. This scenario exercise illustrates both the "tragedy of the horizon", as gains from avoided climate change damage net of damage from mitigating policies are negative in the medium-term and positive in the long-term, and the "tragedy of the commons", as climate change damage is widely dispersed and particularly severe in developing economies, while mitigating policies should be implemented in all countries, especially in advanced countries modestly affected by climate change but with large CO2 emission contributions.

This paper provides a tool to build climate change scenarios to forecast Gross Domestic Product (GDP), modelling both GDP damage due to climate change and the GDP impact of mitigating measures. It adopts a supply-side, long-term view, with 2060 and 2100 horizons. It is a global projection tool (30 countries / regions), with assumptions and results both at the world and the country / regional level. Five different types of energy inputs are taken into account according to their CO2 emission factors. Full calibration is possible at each stage, with estimated or literature-based default parameters. In particular, Total Factor Productivity (TFP), which is a major source of uncertainty on future growth and hence on CO2 emissions, is endogenously determined, with a rich modeling encompassing energy prices, investment prices, education, structural reforms and decreasing return to the employment rate. We present four scenarios: Business As Usual (BAU), with stable energy prices relative to GDP price; Decrease of Renewable Energy relative Price (DREP), with the relative price of non CO2 emitting electricity decreasing by 2% a year; Low Carbon Tax (LCT) scenario with CO2 emitting energy relative prices increasing by 1% per year; High Carbon Tax (HCT) scenario with CO2 emitting energy relative prices increasing by 3% per year. At the 2100 horizon, global GDP incurs a loss of 12% in the BAU, 10% in the DREP, 8% in the Low Carbon Tax scenario and 7% in the High Carbon Tax scenario. This scenario exercise illustrates both the "tragedy of the horizon", as gains from avoided climate change damage net of damage from mitigating policies are negative in the medium-term and positive in the long-term, and the "tragedy of the commons", as climate change damage is widely dispersed and particularly severe in developing economies, while mitigating policies should be implemented in all countries, especially in advanced countries modestly affected by climate change but with large CO2 emission contributions.

Georgia has an impressive growth record but social vulnerabilities persist. The current government has therefore made spending on social sectors and agriculture a high priority and has launched a decentralization reform to support regional inclusive growth. It remains a challenge to tackle social vulnerabilities within a sustained macroeconomic framework. The government has intensified its efforts to reduce social vulnerability, as evidenced by the increase in social spending from 7.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012, to 9.6 percent in 2014. As a result, the fiscal deficit widened from 2.8 percent of GDP in 2012 to 3.0 percent in 2014. This public expenditure review (PER) analyzes the impact of recent reforms including the social programs that were either introduced or scaled up in 2013. It gives an overview of the recent macroeconomic and fiscal developments, including the fiscal implications of the social programs in chapter one. As requested by the government, it addresses three questions in the rest of the report: (1) has the realignment of spending toward social sectors resulted in better distributional outcomes; (2) have the agriculture support programs been targeted at productivity growth to support real incomes in poor rural regions; and (3) what is the fiscal and equity impact of the ongoing decentralization process? The first question is addressed by combining micro household survey data with administrative fiscal data to analyze the distributional impact of both taxes and government spending on poverty and inequality in Georgia in chapter two. The second question is addressed by comparing the cost of new agriculture programs with their estimated impact on agricultural productivity in chapter three. Finally, the issue of regional inequalities is partially addressed in this report by discussing three different aspects of the current decentralization process: the expected fiscal impact of decentralization, the need to rationalize current capital grant programs to make public investment more effective, and the implications of introducing free preschool education administered at the local government level in chapter four.

Sudan has the potential to become a dynamic economy and a bread basket for the Arab world and East-Central Africa. However, resource endowment is not sufficient to bring about sustainable growth and prosperity. Sudans macroeconomic conditions remain weak since the secession of South Sudan in 2011, despite some improvements. The repercussions of the secession of South Sudan present enormous challenges for Sudan with respect to managing the macro-fiscal adjustment and promoting a structural re-orientation of the economy. The signing in March 2013 of the implementation matrix of the agreement between Sudan and South Sudan provides some fresh financial relief to Sudan and creates a great opportunity for further policy reforms to address the post-secession challenges. Sudans growth strategy should involve policies aimed at improving the investment climate and broadening private sector-led growth, and diversifying the economy toward non-oil sectors such as agriculture, industry, export, and local trade.

The New Political Economy1 is based on the postulate of homo politicus that Downs (1957) presents as the clone of homo oeconomicus, a rational agent mo- tivated by the maximisation of his material self-interest. Goodin and Roberts (1975) were the first to propose an alternative to the homo politicus postulate by introducing the notion of 'ethical voter' 2. The 'ethical voter' describes a rational agent who is not only motivated by the maximisation of his short term material self-interest but also by the promotion of what he considers as fair for the society as a whole. There have been so far only few attempts to model 'ethical voting'. Most of them liken 'ethical voting' to caring about the well-being of the worst-off when voting (see Snyder and Kramer (1988), Kranich (2001) and Galasso (2003)). Alesina and Angeletos (2005) constitute an exception. Following responsibility-based theories of justice, they assume that individuals share the conviction that one deserves the income on the basis of his skill and effort and that only luck creates unfair differences they are consequently willing to compensate. However, the 'responsibility cut' (Dworkin (1981)) used by Alesina and Angeletos (2005) lacks justification, should one consider the theoretical literature on fair redistribution or the empirical literature on individual opinions on distributive justice. I propose to analyze 'ethical voting' in a more comprehensive way. The thread of this work is a 'fair utility function'. More precisely, I specify in paper 1 a 'fair utility function' to model citizens' trade-off between their self-interest and some of their major concerns for fairness. Paper 2 and paper 3 rely on the 'fair utility function' to study voting behavior over the (re)distribution of economic surpluses in different contexts of democracy4. In paper 2, my coauthor and I compute the politico-economic equilibrium that emerges when citizens are endowed with the 'fair utility function'. We model the institutional setting of a typical Western democracy where political cleavages are mainly income-based. In paper 3, I estimate the 'fair utility function'. I base my estimation on survey data that I collected in an ethnically polarized democracy where political cleavages are mainly ethnic-based. Paper 1 investigates whether concerns for fairness influence the aggregate out- come in real life interactions so that economic analysis should complete the postulate of homo economicus with the postulate of homo ethicus. I conduct a three-step analysis addressing the following research questions: • Which are the main concerns for fairness that individuals are able to show? • Do these concerns for fairness influence the aggregate outcome in the eco- nomic field? • Do these concerns for fairness influence the aggregate outcome in the po- litical field? Based on experimental evidence, I identify three main concerns for fairness likely to influence individual behaviors besides self-interest: utilitarian altru- ism, 'Rawlsian' altruism and desert-sensitivity. Utilitarian altruism consists in maximizing the sum of all utilities. 'Rawlsian' altruism consists in maximizing the utility of the worst-off. Desert-sensitivity consists in weighting one's con- cerns for fairness towards others, should they be utilitarian altruistic concerns or 'Rawlsian' altruistic concerns, depending on these others' deservingness with respect to their responsibility characteristics. I find out that concerns for fairness have no impact on market aggregate out- comes, should I focus on markets involving complete contracts or on markets involving incomplete contracts. I provide evidence that concerns for fairness have a significant impact on po- litical aggregate outcomes. More particularly, concerns for fairness (utilitarian altruism, 'Rawlsian' altruism, and desert-sensitivity) seem to express through citizens' position on a liberalism/conservatism scale which ultimately impacts their voting behavior. However, evidence also shows that ethnic prejudice, an unambiguously unfair motivation, constitutes a serious challenger to individual concerns for fairness, even in the Western democratic context where political parties are officially divided along income-based, not ethnic-based, lines. My findings suggest that economic theory in general (and the New Political Economy in particular) should pay more attention to the modelling of ethical voting behaviors to improve its explanatory and predictive power. I propose a provisional 'fair utility function' to model citizens' trade-off between their self-interest and the three various concerns for fairness which are utilitarian altruism, 'Rawlsian' altruism and desert-sensitivity. • Which is the politico-economic equilibrium emerging in a society where individuals are endowed with the 'fair utility function'? We study a simple voting model where a unidimensional redistributive parame- ter is chosen by majority voting in a direct democracy where political cleavages are income-based. We allow for heterogeneities in productivities and preferences for consumption and leisure and incorporate the incentive effects of taxation. We show that in a society where altruistic preferences are desert-sensitive, (i) strictly lower levels of redistribution emerge in political equilibrium comparedto a society where altruistic preferences are not desert-sensitive and (ii) lower or equal levels of redistribution emerge in political equilibrium compared to a society where preferences for redistribution are purely egoistic. We then investigate the following research question: • Can our theoretical result help explain the differences between the Ameri- can and the European social contract? Using data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 1992 dataset, we provide empirical evidence that: (i) preferences for redistribution are not purely egoistic, (ii) desert-sensitivity induces lower support for redistribution and (iii) differences in desert-sensitivity hold between both continents, inducing lower support for redistribution among Americans compared to Europeans. We see two apparent explanations helping to understand why preferences for re- distribution are more desert-sensitive among individuals in the US than among individuals in Europe (see Alesina et al. (2001) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004) for an extensive discussion). First, the myth of the US being the 'land of op- portunity' greatly entrenched its customs. Meanwhile, European perceptions are influenced by the historical (from medieval times till the nineteenth cen- tury) division of society into classes, where birth and nobility were the main determinants of wealth and success. Second, the American belief of undeserv- ingness of the poor may reflect racial prejudice against the black minority. Poor white voters might reduce their support for redistribution when they believe that poor black citizens also benefit from redistribution (see Luttmer (2001) for strong empirical evidence). Roemer et al. (2007) find out that marginal income taxes would have been much higher when racial prejudice would have been absent. They believe that racial prejudice is the major underlying factor explaining why in the US, while the past twenty years were characterized by a sharp rise in inequality, the effective marginal income taxes have fallen. • In an ethnically polarized country, does aversion towards inter-ethnic in- equity induce citizens to vote for a party promoting an equitable allocation of national resources among ethnic groups?5 or, in other words, Could ethical voting help reduce risks of conflict in ethnically polarized countries? Relying on data collected among students from Addis Ababa University, my answer is threefold. First, I show that aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity significantly lowers university students' temptation to vote for their ethnic party. This finding is encouraging. Under my initial assumption that the degree of ethical concerns of university students constitute an upper bound of the degree of ethical concerns of the average citizen, this finding indeed suggests that ethical concerns could also influence his voting behavior. In other words, nationwide civic education programmes could be a promising conflict-reducing strategy in ethnically po- larized countries. Finkel (2002, 2003) provides evidence that civic education programs have a significant impact on participants' 'political tolerance', while his concept of 'political tolerance' is close to our notion of 'aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity'. Second, I find out that, though significant, the relative impact of ethical concerns is very small in comparison to the impact of ethnic group loyalty, an important determinant of ethnic voting. This finding is discouraging since it suggests that the relative impact of ethical concerns will be even lower across a more representative sample of the Ethiopian population. In other words, the 'return' on nationwide civic education programmes in terms of switch from ethnic voting to ethical voting is expected to be low. Third, I analyse the sociodemographic determinants of university students' aver- sion towards inter-ethnic inequity and ethnic group loyalty. I provide confirma- tion that some specific sociodemographic characteristics significantly (i) increase the degree of aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity and (ii) lower ethnic group loyalty. Those characteristics have in common that they reduce the 'psycholog- ical' distance between ethnic groups, like living in a cosmopolitan city and hav- ing parents belonging to different ethnic groups (see Atchade and Wantchekon (2006) for a first evidence). Besides, I find that ethnic group loyalty is par- ticularly strong among ethnic groups experiencing a severe level of grievance. Finally, evidence shows that aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity depends pos- itively on the income of the household in which the respondent grew up in. ; La politique de la Nouvelle Economy1 est basée sur le postulat de l'homo politicus qui Downs (1957) présente comme le clone de l'homo oeconomicus, un agent rationnel mo- tivé par la maximisation de son intérêt matériel. Goodin et Roberts (1975) ont été les premiers à proposer une alternative à l'homo politicus postulat en introduisant la notion de «électeur éthique» 2. Le «éthiques des électeurs »désigne un agent rationnel qui n'est pas seulement motivé par la maximisation de son matériel à court terme l'intérêt mais aussi par la promotion de ce qu'il considère comme équitable pour la société dans son ensemble. Il ya eu jusqu'ici que peu de tentatives pour le modèle «vote éthique». La plupart d'entre eux vote éthiques assimiler »pour veiller au bien-être des plus démunis au moment de voter (Voir Snyder et Kramer (1988), Kranich (2001) et Galasso (2003)). Alesina et Angeletos (2005) constituent une exception. À la suite de la responsabilité fondée sur théories de la justice, ils supposent que les individus partagent la conviction que l'on mérite le revenu, sur la base de ses compétences et de l'effort et que la chance ne crée différences injustes, ils sont donc prêts à compenser. Toutefois, le «Couper la responsabilité» (Dworkin (1981)) utilisé par Alesina et Angeletos (2005) n'a pas justification, doit-on considérer la littérature théorique sur la redistribution équitable ou la littérature empirique sur les opinions individuelles sur la justice distributive. Je me propose d'analyser «vote éthique» d'une manière plus globale. Le fil de ce travail est une «fonction d'utilité équitable». Plus précisément, je précise en papier 1 une «fonction d'utilité équitable» au modèle des citoyens compromis entre leur intérêt personnel et certaines de leurs préoccupations majeures pour l'équité. Livre 2 et document 3 compter sur la «fonction d'utilité équitable» pour étudier le comportement des électeurs au cours de la (re) distribution des excédents économiques dans différents contextes de democracy4. Dans le document 2, mon coauteur et je calculer l'équilibre politico-économique qui émerge quand les citoyens sont dotés de la «fonction d'utilité équitable». Nous modélisons les institutionnels création d'une démocratie occidentale typique où les clivages politiques sont principalement fondée sur le revenu. Dans le document 3, je estimer la «fonction d'utilité équitable». Je me base estimation des données d'enquête que j'ai pu recueillir dans une démocratie ethniquement polarisés où les clivages politiques sont principalement fondées sur l'ethnie. Document 1 cherche à savoir si les préoccupations d'équité pour l'influence sur l'ensemble- viennent dans les interactions réelles de sorte que l'analyse économique devrait compléter le postulat de l'homo economicus avec le postulat de l'homo ETHICUS. -Je effectuer une analyse en trois étapes l'étude des questions suivantes: • Quelles sont les principales préoccupations d'équité que les individus sont en mesure de spectacle? • Ne ces préoccupations pour l'équité influence le résultat global de l'éco- domaine économique? • Ne ces préoccupations pour l'équité influence le résultat global de la po- litical domaine? Sur la base de données expérimentales, je identifier trois principales préoccupations pour l'équité susceptibles d'influencer les comportements individuels en plus de l'intérêt: utilitaire ALTRU- ISM, «l'altruisme rawlsienne et désert sensibilité. l'altruisme utilitariste consiste à maximiser la somme de tous les services publics. «Altruisme rawlsienne» consiste à maximiser l'utilité des plus démunis. Desert sensibilité consiste en un coefficient de con- préoccupations d'équité envers les autres, devraient-ils être utilitaires préoccupations altruistes ou «préoccupations altruistes rawlsienne», selon le caractère méritoire de ces autres avec fonction de leurs caractéristiques responsabilité. Je trouve que les préoccupations d'équité n'ont pas d'impact sur le marché global hors vient, dois-je mettre l'accent sur les marchés portant sur des contrats complets ou sur les marchés impliquant des contrats incomplets. Je fournis des éléments de preuve que les préoccupations d'équité ont un impact significatif sur le Po- litical résultats globaux. Plus particulièrement, les préoccupations d'équité (utilitaires l'altruisme, «l'altruisme rawlsienne», et le désert de sensibilité) semblent exprimer à travers citoyens position sur une échelle de libéralisme conservatisme qui a un impact à terme leur comportement de vote. Toutefois, la preuve montre également que les préjugés ethniques, une ambiguïté déloyale motivation, constitue un concurrent sérieux aux préoccupations individuelles pour l'équité, même dans le contexte occidental de démocratie où les partis politiques sont officiellement répartis le long de revenus, pas à base ethnique, des lignes. Mes résultats suggèrent que la théorie économique en général (et les nouveaux enjeux politiques Économie en particulier) devrait accorder plus d'attention à la modélisation de l'éthique les comportements de vote pour améliorer sa capacité explicative et prédictive. Je propose à titre provisoire «fonction d'utilité équitable» au modèle des citoyens compromis entre leurs l'intérêt et les trois différentes préoccupations d'équité qui sont utilitaires l'altruisme, «l'altruisme rawlsienne et désert sensibilité. • Quel est l'équilibre politico-économique émergent dans une société où les individus sont dotés de la «fonction d'utilité équitable»? Nous étudions un modèle simple de vote où une redistribution unidimensionnelle para- ter est choisi par vote à la majorité dans une démocratie directe où les clivages politiques sont fondées sur le revenu. Nous tenons compte de l'hétérogénéité dans les préférences et les productivités à la consommation et de loisirs et d'intégrer les effets incitatifs de la fiscalité. Nous montrons que dans une société où les préférences altruistes sont désertiques sensibles, (i) strictement niveaux inférieurs de la redistribution émerger dans comparedto équilibre politique d'une société où les préférences ne sont pas altruistes désert sensibles et (ii) inférieur à ou des niveaux équivalents de redistribution émerger dans l'équilibre politique par rapport à un société où les préférences pour la redistribution sont purement égoïstes. Nous avons ensuite étudier la question de recherche suivante: • Peut notre résultat théorique aider à expliquer les différences entre les Améri- peut et du contrat social européen? En utilisant les données de l'International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 1992 dataset, nous fournir des preuves empiriques que: (i) les préférences pour la redistribution ne sont pas purement égoïste, (ii) du désert sensibilité induit support inférieur pour la redistribution et (iii) les différences dans le désert sensibilité tenir entre les deux continents, induisant support inférieur pour la redistribution entre les Américains contre les Européens. Nous voir deux explications apparentes aide à comprendre pourquoi les préférences pour les re- de distribution sont plus sensibles du désert entre les individus aux États-Unis que chez personnes en Europe (voir Alesina et al. (2001) et Alesina et Glaeser (2004) pour une discussion approfondie). Tout d'abord, le mythe des Etats-Unis étant le "pays de l'op- portunity «fortement enracinées ses coutumes. Pendant ce temps, les perceptions européennes sont influencés par les historiques (de l'époque médiévale jusqu'à la dix-neuvième de la CEN- siècle), une division de la société en classes, où la naissance et la noblesse ont été les principaux déterminants de la richesse et de succès. Deuxièmement, la croyance américaine de undeserv- disponibilité manifestée des pauvres peuvent refléter les préjugés raciaux contre la minorité noire. Pauvres électeurs blancs pourraient réduire leur soutien à la redistribution quand ils croient que les pauvres citoyens noirs aussi profiter de la redistribution (voir Luttmer (2001) pour de solides preuves empiriques). Roemer et al. (2007) constatent que marginal impôt sur le revenu aurait été beaucoup plus élevé lorsque les préjugés raciaux aurait été absent. Ils croient que les préjugés raciaux est le principal facteur qui sous-tendent expliquant pourquoi les États-Unis, tandis que les vingt dernières années ont été caractérisées par une forte hausse des inégalités, les impôts en vigueur du revenu marginal ont chuté. • Dans un pays ethniquement polarisés, ne aversion envers inter-ethniques en l'équité amener les citoyens à voter pour un parti de promouvoir une répartition équitable des ressources nationales entre les groupes ethniques? 5 ou, en d'autres termes, Pourriez vote éthiques aider à réduire les risques de conflit dans des environnements ethniquement polarisés pays? S'appuyant sur des données recueillies auprès des étudiants de l'Université d'Addis-Abeba, mon réponse est triple. Tout d'abord, je montre que l'aversion envers l'inégalité inter-ethniques réduit considérablement la tentation des étudiants universitaires à voter pour leur parti ethnique. Cette constatation est encourageant. Sous mon hypothèse de départ que le degré de préoccupations éthiques des étudiants constituent une limite supérieure du degré de préoccupations d'ordre éthique du citoyen moyen, cette constatation suggère en effet que les préoccupations éthiques pourraient également influer sur son comportement de vote. En d'autres termes, l'éducation civique à l'échelle nationale programmes pourraient être une stratégie prometteuse de réduction des conflits dans des environnements ethniquement po- tif pays. Finkel (2002, 2003) fournit la preuve que l'éducation civique programmes ont un impact significatif sur la tolérance des participants «politique», tandis que son concept de «tolérance politique» est proche de notre notion de «aversion envers l'inégalité inter-ethnique ». Deuxièmement, je trouve que, bien que significative, l'impact relatif des préoccupations d'ordre éthique est très faible par rapport à l'impact de la loyauté envers le groupe ethnique, un important facteur déterminant du vote ethnique. Ce résultat est décourageant, car elle suggère que l'impact relatif des préoccupations d'ordre éthique sera encore plus faible sur une plus échantillon représentatif de la population éthiopienne. En d'autres termes, le «retour» sur les programmes d'éducation civique à l'échelle nationale en termes de passage du vote ethnique au vote à l'éthique devrait être faible. Troisièmement, je analyser les déterminants socio-démographiques des étudiants de l'Université moyenne- sion vers l'inégalité inter-ethnique et loyauté envers le groupe ethnique. Je fournis des confir- tion que certaines caractéristiques socio-démographiques spécifiques de façon significative (i) augmenter le degré d'aversion pour l'inégalité inter-ethnique et (ii) inférieur à un groupe ethnique fidélité. Ces caractéristiques ont en commun qu'elles réduisent la «psycholo- iCal «distance entre les groupes ethniques, comme vivre dans une ville cosmopolite et HAV- ING parents appartenant à différents groupes ethniques (voir Atchade et Wantchekon (2006) pour une première preuve). D'ailleurs, je trouve que la fidélité groupe ethnique est par- particulièrement forte parmi les groupes ethniques connaît un niveau sévère de grief. Enfin, il est prouvé que l'aversion envers l'inégalité inter-ethnique dépend pos- itively sur le revenu du ménage dans lequel le répondant a grandi po