Suchergebnisse

Government speech creates a paradox at the heart of the First Amendment. To satisfy traditional First Amendment tests, the government must show that it is not discriminating against a viewpoint. And yet if the government shows that it is condemning or supporting a viewpoint, it may be able to invoke the government speech defense and thereby avoid constitutional scrutiny altogether. Government speech doctrine therefore rewards what the rest of the First Amendment forbids: viewpoint discrimination against private speech. This is both a theoretical puzzle and an increasingly important practical problem. In cases like Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, the city's disagreement with a private message was the heart of its successful government speech argument. Why is viewpoint discrimination flatly forbidden in one area of First Amendment law and entirely exempt from scrutiny in another? This Article explores that question and why it matters, and suggests ways to reconcile these apparently incompatible principles.

This article considers the role of the state authorities in perpetrating extreme speech and the processes by which state power is used in normalizing hateful expressions against minoritized communities. Drawing attention to Myanmar's 2017 Rohingya crisis, a human rights and humanitarian catastrophe, the article examines how the state media publication, the Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper, has actively produced anti-Rohingya speech in its editions and influenced violent narratives about the Rohingya Muslims circulating on social media. It shows how official media contributed to a political environment where anti-Rohingya speech was made acceptable and where rights abuses against the group were excused. While regulators often consider the role of social media platforms like Facebook as conduits for the spread of extreme speech, this case study shows that extreme speech by state actors using state media ought to be similarly considered a major concern for scholarship and policy.

Bibliography: leaves 197-204. ; As part of the process of South Africa's transition to democracy, the government, the media, and other institutions have recognized the need to understand and recover African Traditional Religion as the indigenous religion of this country. Much remains to be done to entrench this recognition. There is a growing demand for literature that will document and analyse African Traditional Religion not only as an indigenous religious heritage but also as a contemporary living religion in South Africa. This thesis seeks to address the need for recognition, documentation and analysis of African Traditional Religion with specific focus on the role of ritual speech in AmaXhosa religious practice way of religious practice. Written from the perspective of an academic and a practitioner, the thesis attempts to further a clearer understanding of amaXhosa practice of African Traditional Religion as well provide a useful resource for students of African Traditional Religion. In historical, anthropological, and other academic literature on African Traditional Religion in South Africa, scholars have tended to focus on one aspect of religion, such as sacrifice, the divination techniques of sangomas, or the veneration of ancestors in rituals dealing with death. This thesis argues, however, that a more comprehensive perspective on African Traditional Religion can be gained by focusing on the meaning, power, and performance of ritual speech that runs through all of these religious practices. Ukuthetha, or, ritual speaking which produces ukuvuma, ritual acceptance, agreement, or consensus, lies at the heart of amaXhosa religion. Distinguished from ordinary speech by its heightened intensity and its performance which occurs within a sacred time and place, ukuthetha, or ritual speech, is the medium linking the physical and spiritual world within the amaXhosa worldview. As this thesis focuses on the analysis of amaXhosa ritual speech, chapters on ukuthetha which occur during ritual performances associated with sacrifice, divination, and funerals provide a profile of different types of speech acts within the framework of African Traditional Religion. These speech acts are examined against the background of two theoretical perspectives. One theory, associated with Maurice Bloch, argues that ritual speech is a form of social control, limiting what can be said. The other theory, associated with Stanley Tambiah, maintains that ritual speech is creative performance, expanding the scope of what can be said. The thesis tests these theoretical perspectives against the evidence of amaXhosa ritual speech, finding aspects of both social control and creative performance in African Traditional Religion. Although the analysis of amaXhosa ritual speech in this thesis focuses primarily on religion in the traditional rural context, a chapter on tradition and change considers new challenges for ritual speech in sacrifice, divination, and funerals within urban environments. Adapting to new contexts, the signifying practices of ukuthetha maintain the integrity of amaXhosa religion. By focusing on the meaning and power of ritual speech in different ritual settings and social contexts, this thesis hopes to contribute to our understanding of the continuity and coherence of African Traditional Religion in South Africa.

Freedom of speech long has been regarded as one of the
"preferred freedoms" in the United States: one of the
freedoms the U.S. Supreme Court deems "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty." However, what freedom of speech does—and
should—mean is a highly charged question in American
constitutional law. I will explore this question by examining how
several prominent constitutional theorists have proposed particular
approaches to free speech law in order to further their political
objectives. I will examine the free speech theories of the
nation's leading feminist legal theorist (regarding pornography),
critical race theorists (regarding hate speech), libertarian (regarding
commercial speech), and legal republican (regarding deliberative
democracy). I also will discuss the principal criticisms of each of
these theories, whether the courts have been influenced by any of them,
and, in conclusion, whether it is possible to advance a nonpolitical
(i.e., a purely law-based or value-free) theory of free speech.

This study investigates speech acts of insult in speeches made by members of Provincial Assembly of Sindh, Pakistan using Austin's (1962) and Searle's (1969) Speech Acts Theory. This theory implies that language is used to perform acts, such as commanding, requesting, complaining, admiring, apologizing, insulting, and many others. However, in this research, researchers explore why speech acts of insult are performed by the members of Provincial Assembly of Sindh belonging to different political parties. Qualitative analysis of purposively sampled data collected from eleven participants' speeches, has been conducted to demonstrate how politicians enact speech acts of insult against each other. Findings reveal that the politicians performed speech acts of insult (expressive) when issues related to administration of Sindh and management of its resources (water distribution) were discussed. It is argued that members of the assembly are people's representatives, and they should behave in a civilized manner and perform civic, polite speech acts.

"Rochester, New York, 1852: A young boy listens to Frederick Douglass deliver his speech, and begins to question the meaning of Independence Day. Aligned with curriculum standards, these narrative-nonfiction books also highlight key 21st Century content: Global Awareness, Media Literacy, and Civic Literacy. Thought-provoking content and hands-on activities encourage critical thinking. Book includes a table of contents, glossary of key words, index, author biography, sidebars, and timeline"--

Abstract
While autonomy arguments provide a compelling foundation for free speech, they also support individual privacy rights. Considering how speech and privacy may be justified, I will argue that the speech necessary for self-government does not need to include details that would violate privacy rights. Additionally, I will argue that if viewed as a kind of intangible property right, informational privacy should limit speech and expression in a range of cases. In a world where we have an overabundance of content to consume, much of which could be called "information pollution," and where there are numerous platforms to broadcast one's expressions, it is increasingly difficult to maintain that speech should trump privacy.