Suchergebnisse

Why we hold a crying baby : attachment and exploration -- Why we talk about how the bunny feels : friendship and prosocial behavior -- Why we play Simon says : learning self-regulation -- Why we keep a pot of coffee : family-centered care and education -- Why we do what we do for children's social development : explaining your program practices in terms of state early learning standards

THE STUDY OF MILITARY REGIMES HAS BECOME A CENTRAL CONCERN, IN THE PAST YEARS, FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS. THIS IS NOT ONLY BECAUSE THE OMNIPRESENCE OF MILITARY REGIMES HAS LARGELY RELEGATED PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPINT COUNTRIES TO A SYSTEM OF THE PAST, BUT ALSO BECAUSE EVERY NEW THEORY WITH UNIVERSAL EXPLANATORY CLAIMS IN POLITICAL SCIENCEBE IT DEPENDANCY, DOMINO THEORIES, OR CORPORATIST, NEO-MARXIST MODELS-HAS HAD TO INCLUDE MILITARY GOVERNMENTS IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. THIS SUBMODEL INTEREST MAY PARADOXICALLY EXPLAIN THE FEELING OF DISSATISFACTION MANY POLITICAL SCIENTISTS SEEM TO HAVE AN REGARDS THE ACTUAL STATE OF THE STUDY OF MILITARY POLITICS, FOR IT RESEMBLES THE SITUATION IN THE ORIENTAL FABLE OF BLIND MEN EXAMINING DIFFERENT PARTS OF AN ELEPHANT. IN FACT, IN THE PAST TWO DECADES; WHILE COUPS D'ETAT HAVE ACCELERATED THEIR "MUSHROOMING"1 PACE QUITE DISCONCERTINGLY, THE SCHOLARLY EFFORTS THAT HAVE EXPANDED IN A PARALLEL WAY HAVE ACHIEVED LITTLE INCREASE IN OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE ENSUING REGIMES. THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE IS TWOFOLD. ONE IS TO REMEDY THE ORIENTAL FABLE BY ATTEMPTING TO GIVE A UNIFIED PICTURE OF THE VARIOUS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF MILITARY REGIMES; THE OTHER IS TO PROPOSE AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL WHICH AT BEST WOULD RELAUNCH THE DISCUSSION ON A SOMEWHAT FRESH BASIS AND AT WORST WOULD OFFER A REFINED VERSION OF CONCEPTS ACKWARDLY USED AT PRESENT.

AbstractWe develop a theory of state formation shedding light on the rise of the first stable state institutions in Bronze Age Mesopotamia. Our analysis suggests that the mix of adverse production conditions and unforeseen innovations pushed groups favored by old technologies to establish the state by granting political and property rights to powerless individuals endowed with new and complementary skills. Through these reforms, the elite convinced the nonelite that a sufficient part of the returns on joint investments would be shared via public spending and, thus, to cooperate and accumulate a culture of cooperation. Different from the main alternative theories, we stress that: (1) group formation is heavily shaped by unforeseen shocks to the returns on both risk-sharing and innovation; (2) complementarity in group-specific skills, and not violence, is key determinant of state formation; (3) military, merchant and, especially, religious ranks favored state formation and culture accumulation.

This important collection of essays, with contributions by scholars and Middle East Security and policy experts, explores the effects of a Palestinian State on regional security and its implications for American interests.

"January 1941." ; Submitted to the legislature under instructions of the Legislative Council. ; Mode of access: Internet.