Suchergebnisse

Judges often give statutes strained interpretations. What makes an interpretation strained? What, if anything, justifies a strained interpretation? Is there always a point past which an interpretation would be too strained, or are there some interpretations which judges are entitled to adopt, whatever a statute says? I claim to answer all of these questions. Using the formula about conditional probability known as Bayes' theorem, I offer a precise definition of a strained interpretation, and identify two reasons for strained interpretations. I claim that the case for strained interpretations is often stronger than is realised, and illustrate that claim with a novel defence of the House of Lords' decision in Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission. Finally, I suggest that even if a legislature is sovereign, there may be meanings which a legislature is unable to enact into law. Thus, there may be limits on even a sovereign legislature's powers.

Abstract
The aim of this special issue of the Journal of Politeness Research is to show
what happens when different analytical frameworks are be applied to a single piece of data: a
short YouTube clip of a hearing in a USA courtroom. My specific aim in this paper is to show what
an indexical analysis of (im)politeness phenomena, that is informed by a relevance-theoretic
approach to communication, can bring to light about a short exchange between the judge and the
defendant, that would not be evident to most viewers of this clip, and which also would not come
to light through the application of the other methodologies demonstrated in this issue. Overall, I
show that an analytical framework that takes a pragmatically informed indexical approach to
(im)politeness phenomena, would predict and can explain variation between interpretations of an
utterance as well as similarities in interpretation. It can therefore be used to address a problem
that has always been present in (im)politeness analyses: how to identify and account for the social
meanings generated by the use of a linguistic form in context.

The purpose of this project is to provide a fresh and in-depth analysis of legal jurisprudence through the use of two of the most important legal theorists of our time, H. L. A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin. This project focuses on how Dworkin's position in his famous paper "Hard Cases", helps us understand an important Supreme Court case, Cohen v. California. Cohen will be the main focus of my project. The project will discuss the case and the possible ways of deciding the case. Then the project explains both Dworkin's and Hart's positions. Finally, the project will analyze how Dworkin's position, helps solve the case and problem of legal jurisprudence exemplified by Cohen. This project is one that I have spent both Fall 2019 and Spring 2020 researching and analyzing. I have always had a curiosity to understand what law is. In the Fall of 2019 I completed an independent study that allowed me to spend time reading Dworkin and working through the different ways to interpret legal statutes. The impact that Dworkin made on me was that there seems to be principles that help guide how judges interpret the law, but these principles are very rarely ever written down. This pushed me to go further and to research the history of why philosophers started to discuss legal interpretivist. The significance of this topic is that it is specific to my area of study. I am a philosophy major who intends to go to law school. In order to successful undertake such a task, I need to understand the reasons that guide judicial decision makers in interpreting laws in particular ways. I believe the position Dworkin espouses allows legal scholars to go deeper to understand what exactly goes into a judicial decision. By revealing how underlying normative principles of our legal system guide legal decisions.

I approach the identification of the principles of legal interpretation through a discussion of an important but largely forgotten strand in our legal heritage: the idea (and at some points in English law, the rule) that the interpretation of legislation is to be done by the lawmaker. The idea that authentic interpretation is interpretation by the lawmaker united the Roman emperors Constantine and Justinian with Bracton, Aquinas, King James I of England, Hobbes, and Bentham. Already in the early 17th century, a new modern approach was emerging in England. The modern approach separates the interpretive power from the legislative power, and allocates the interpretive power to an independent court. I argue that there are some cogent, general considerations in favour of the modern approach. But it is worth identifying the elements of good sense that made it seem that the interpretive power ought to be reserved for the lawmaker. And it is worth identifying the drawbacks in the modern approach; I argue that they are highly relevant to the complex question of how judges ought to interpret legislation.

Is all tourism dark? / John E. Tunbridge & Gregory J. Ashworth -- The long shadow : marketing Dachau / John Lennon & Dorothy Weber -- Prison tourism : exploring the spectacle of punishment in the UK / Sarah Hodgkinson & Diane Urquhart -- Patrimony, engineered remembrance and ancestral vampires : appraising thanatouristic resources in Ireland and Sicily / Tony Seaton -- Death camp tourism : interpretation and management / Gregory J. Ashworth & John E. Tunbridge -- Guilty landscapes and the selective reconstruction of the past : Dedham Vale and the murder in the red barn / Martin Spaul & Chris Wilbert -- A culturally constructed darkness : dark legacies and dark heritage in the Channel Islands / Gilly Carr -- A light in dark places? : analysing the impact of dark tourism experiences on everyday life / Ria Dunkley -- The undead and dark tourism : Dracula tourism in Romania / Duncan Light -- Genocide tourism in Rwanda : contesting the concept of the "dark tourist" / Richard Sharpley & Mona Friedrich -- Everyday darkness and catastrophic events : riding Nepal's buses through peace, war and an earthquake / Sharon Hepburn -- From living memory to social history : commemoration and interpretation of a contemporary dark event / Elspeth Frew -- Experiencing dark heritage live / Britta Timm Knudsen -- Dark tourism in the brightest of cities : Rio de Janeiro and the favela tour / Glenn Hooper

The current discourse of heritage interpretation, based on Tilden's
book Interpreting Our Heritage (1957), centres on ideas of education,
materiality of heritage, expert knowledge and conservation. As such,
it shares in the key characteristics of the Authorised Heritage Discourse
(Smith 2006) and is subject to the same challenges that stem
from definitions of heritage as immaterial, as a process and as a key
factor in creating futures. The inadequateness of the Interpretive
Authorised Heritage Discourse to respond to these challenges has
become more apparent due to the size and speed of recent migrations.
In response, I propose a new paradigm of heritage interpretation
that is based on Mouffe's (2013) concept of agonistics. Agonistic
interpretation seeks to make visible the representations, meanings
and emotions that underpin heritage, and to provide an infrastructure
that visitors to heritage sites and museums may use to continue
to build their identities and futures.

John Barnes's collection of essays covers a variety of topics in sociology and anthropology, including lineage systems, social networks, colonialism, underlying assumptions of social science, and the significance of time in social analysis. Together they identify the author's particular view of social science: he is primarily interested in 'what really happens'. Rather than revamp articles written with a distinctive set of assumptions to bring them into line with current intellectual fashion, Professor Barnes has chosen to let them stand as they are, products of identifiable theoretical stance and modes of exposition. But introductory notes to each chapter set out the context in which the piece was originally written and draw attention to later publications and events that bear on it. An introduction discusses in detail the author's view of social science as the construction of models rather than a search for social laws, while the final chapter presents a model of the modelling process itself