Suchergebnisse

The relationship between economic or social or political activity and risk is widely recognised at a societal level, a market level and a business level, and equally widely discussed. The relationship between governance and risk at all of these levels is equally widely recognised but much less widely discussed. But the consequences of poor governance in this arena have been exposed to all in the recent financial and economic crisis as financial institutions and even countries have collapsed or come close to collapsing. The relationship between governance and risk is particularly important in the global environment in which we operate and needs to be more fully discussed and theorised. This book is designed to address important aspects of this topic and set it within the context of the global business and societal environment.

While it is generally accepted that both governance and corporate social responsibility are concerned with the way that an organisation manages its relations with its stakeholders, the actual relationships are not simple. The stakeholders who are considered to be dominant and most powerful can change dramatically over time. This is particularly so when governance or CSR is considered in the context of non-commercial forms of organisation. This book re-examines these relationships and the way in which they are changing and developing. The various contributions to the book address different aspects of these relationships from a wide international and interdisciplinary perspective.

Covers the period, 1992-2003

This study exhibits a departure from the existing "traditional" collaborative research agenda which emphasises rationalisation and efficiency by looking at the dynamics of collaborative governance hinged on shared governance, public accountability and stakeholders' interests. Participants were drawn from different groups and sub-groups in communities where PPP infrastructural projects are located using both probabilistic and non-probabilistic techniques. Data were gathered and analysed through a blend of qualitative and quantitative methods. Based on the analysis, there were theoretical propositions that emerged from this study: (1) Community engagement is sacrosanct to the survival of any project located within the territorial space of the local community (2.) There was no evidence to suggest that the conventional public participation mechanisms had any positive impact on community groups' suspicions and lack of trust in the handlers of a project. Hence, the study found a parasitic relationship between the host communities, project owners and project handlers. The study, therefore, recommends that policymakers in developing countries should entrench an endearing stakeholders' policy that recognises and empowers the host communities for effective engagement in government's collaborative arrangements with the private sector for infrastructural development in line with what is obtainable in the developed nations. Keywords: Collaborative Governance, Community Stake-holding, Community Exclusion, Public-private Partnership (PPP)

Global Governance Futures addresses the crucial importance of thinking through the future of global governance arrangements. It considers the prospects for the governance of world order approaching the middle of the twenty-first century by exploring today's most pressing and enduring health, social, ecological, economic, and political challenges. Each of the expert contributors considers the drivers of continuity and change within systems of governance and how actors, agents, mechanisms, and resources are and could be mobilized. The aim is not merely to understand state, intergovernmental, and non-state actors. It is also to draw attention to those underappreciated aspects of global governance that push understanding beyond strictures of traditional conceptualizations and offer better insights into the future of world order.The book's three parts enable readers to appreciate better the sum of forces likely to shape world order in the near and not-so-near future: "Planetary" encompasses changes wrought by continuing human domination of the earth; war; current and future geopolitical, civilizational, and regional contestations; and life in and between urban and non-urban environments. "Divides" includes threats to human rights gains; the plight of migrants; those who have and those who do not; persistent racial, gender, religious, and sexualorientation-based discrimination; and those who govern and those who are governed. "Challenges" involves food and health insecurities; ongoing environmental degradation and species loss; the current and future politics of international assistance and data; and the wrong turns taken in the control of illicit drugs and crime. Designed to engage advanced undergraduate and graduate students in international relations, organization, law, and political economy as well as a general audience, this book invites readers to adopt both a backward- and forward-looking view of global governance. It will spark discussion and debate as to how dystopic futures might be avoided and change agents mobilized.

Introduction -- Sport governance: Infrastructure and reform -- Understanding sport governance -- Administration and sport governance -- Legal and regulatory aspects of sport governance -- Stakeholding in sport governance -- Performance in sport governance -- Good governance -- Compliance in sport governance -- Governance challenges in the next decade

How should we study government? How do we know what we know about British government? What is governance? Governance in Britain has changed enormously from the market-led Thatcher years to Blair's 'joined up government'. The authors provide a radical challenge to conventional analyses of the subject.

AbstractScholars disagree whether local decision making is inherently more democratic and sustainable than centralized governance structures. While some maintain it is, due to the incorporation of local knowledge, citizen decision makers' closeness to the issues, and the benefits of participatory democracy, others find it as susceptible to issues of corruption and poor implementation as any other scale. We argue that with wetlands, a natural resource with critical local benefits, it is imperative to incorporate local governance, using the U.S. state of Connecticut as an example. Despite the American policy of No Net Loss, the local benefits of wetland resources cannot be aggregated on a national scale. Each local ecosystem needs wetland resources to ensure local ecological benefits such as flood control and pollution remission, as well as the substantial economic benefits of recreation. We illustrate the benefits of local control of wetlands with data from the American state of Connecticut, which consistently surpasses the federal wetland goal of No Net Loss due, we argue, to the governance structure of town‐level wetlands commissions. A national policy such as No Net Loss, where wetlands are saved or created in designated areas and destroyed in others, is insufficient when it ignores critical benefits for localities. The Connecticut system using local volunteers and unpaid appointees is a successful method for governing common‐pool wetland systems. In the case of Connecticut, we find that local decision making is not a "trap," but instead an effective model of sustainable, democratic local governance.

In dieser Dissertation wird die Hedgefonds-Industrie erstmals aus einer umfassenden Governanceperspektive betrachtet. Das Anreizgeflecht zwischen Hedgefonds und ihren wichtigsten Stakeholdern wird analysiert, um darzustellen, welche Interessenskonflikte zwischen Hedgefonds und ihren Stakeholdern, aber auch innerhalb der Stakeholdern-Society der Industrie existieren. Einige dieser Konflikte können das operative Risiko und somit die Kreditrisiken einzelner Fonds erhöhen und strahlen durch die verbreitete Intransparenz und die zunehmenden Ansteckungsgefahren innerhalb der Hedgefonds-Industrie auf weite Teile der Industrie ab. Diese Arbeit ergänzt die wissenschaftliche Literatur, indem erstmals die grundlegenden Interessenskonflikte der Hedgefonds-Industrie gegenüber ihren wichtigsten Stakeholdern (Investoren, Gläubigern & Gesellschaft) identifiziert, umfassend dargestellt und Lösungsansätze diskutiert werden. Zur Identifizierung und Analyse dieser grundlegenden Anreizprobleme und der daraus resultierenden Interessenskonflikte wird sich eines Datensatzes bedient, der bisher noch keine Behandlung in der wissenschaftlichen Literatur über Hedgefonds gefunden hat: Den Hedgefonds-Anklagen der U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) zwischen den Jahren 2000 und 2011. Der Blick aus der Stakeholderperspektive ermöglicht es, die Anreize, denen ein Fondsmanager oder verschiedene Stakeholder ausgesetzt sein können, besser zu verstehen, zentrale Anreizprobleme der Industrie zu identifizieren und potenzielle Lösungsansätze vor dem Hintergrund der Governancetheorie zu diskutieren. Zudem wird der Zusammenhang zwischen den Governanceproblemen und den systemischen Risiken der Hedgefonds-Industrie hergestellt. Es wird gezeigt, dass verbesserte Governancestrukturen, die transparenzerhöhend und anreizangleichend wirken, nicht ausschließlich Investoren und Gläubigern, sondern auch der Gesellschaft als zentraler Stakeholder der Industrie einen Mehrwert bringen können. Denn die Governanceprobleme, die noch immer Teile der Hedgefonds-Industrie prägen, wie immer neue und größere Betrugsskandale andeuten, zeigen auch, dass sie aus einer Governance- beziehungsweise operativen Perspektive für ihre wachsende Rolle im Finanzsystem noch nicht gerüstet zu sein scheint. Diese operativen Risiken können die Kreditrisiken vieler Fonds erhöhen und negative Auswirkungen auf systemrelevante Gläubiger haben, die im Brokerage/Depotgeschäft den Risiken einer Vielzahl von Hedgefonds ausgesetzt sein können. Im Lauf der vergangenen Dekade hat zusätzlich noch die Vernetzung innerhalb der Hedgefonds-Industrie und mit systemrelevanten Institutionen zugenommen. Daher sind nicht mehr nur die Kreditrisiken großer Fonds, sondern durch potenzielle Ansteckungsgefahren innerhalb der Industrie werden auch die Kreditrisiken kleinerer Fonds relevant, wenn diese korreliert ausfallen. So können Governanceprobleme in der Hedgefonds-Industrie durch die Erhöhung des operativen und des Kreditrisikos die systemischen Risiken der Industrie beeinflussen. Daher können durch geeignete Governancemechanismen den einzelnen Stakeholdern, der Wissenschaft sowie der Politik grundlegende Informationen und Steuerungsinstrumente zugänglich gemacht werden, die die Mess- und Steuerbarkeit von operativen Risiken erhöhen, potenzieller Überregulierung besser vorbeugen und Kredit- und systemische Risiken abschwächen.