Suchergebnisse

In Hurst v. Florida, the Supreme Court held Florida's death penalty scheme violated the Sixth Amendment because judges, rather than juries, found sentencing facts necessary to impose death. That Sixth Amendment ruling has implications for Florida's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Under the Eighth Amendment rule of Caldwell v. Mississippi, capital juries must appreciate their responsibility for death sentencing. Yet, Florida has instructed juries that their fact-findings merely support sentencing recommendations, while leaving the ultimate sentencing decision to a judge. Because Hurst clarifies that the Sixth Amendment requires juries to find the operative set of facts on which sentences are actually determined, Florida must revisit whether its capital juries have felt the full weight of their proper constitutional role. Under the Eighth Amendment rule of Clemons v. Mississippi, appellate courts may reweigh sentencing facts and conduct harmless error analyses after finding an invalid aggravating factor was used at sentencing. Florida has permitted Clemons review on judge-found facts. After Hurst, Florida must revisit whether such review required sentencing facts found by juries. Florida's pre-Hurst death penalty scheme was held to satisfy the Eighth Amendment in Proffitt v. Florida. That holding relied on the involvement of juries in finding sentencing facts and automatic review by the Florida Supreme Court. Hurst makes clear that Florida juries had no involvement in finding sentencing facts, and appellate review was based on facts improperly found by judges. Hurst, therefore, requires that Florida revisit Proffitt. Repairs to Florida's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should be made in the immediate aftermath of Hurst, while the finality of pre-Hurst death sentences already must be disturbed to satisfy the Sixth. In other words, Florida can repair today at little expense Eighth Amendment problems that may prove catastrophic tomorrow. And Florida, full as it is of able sailors, should know not to spoil the ship for a halfpennyworth of tar.

The Constitutional Court's Sentence 55/2018, of 24 May, partially upheld the appeal of unconstitutionality filed by the Government of Catalonia against various provisions of Law 39/2015, of 1 October, on Common Administrative Procedure of the Public Administrations. The decision affects legal provisions substantially related to the discipline of regulatory production and electronic administration. This paper critically examines the doctrine affirmed in relation to the first of the above aspects. The Constitutional Court has had to face great difficulties in resolving the appeal of unconstitutionality on this point, fundamentally due to the almost total lack of previous case-law in the matter. Nevertheless the Court has been able to render a decision which can be seen as well-founded, though there are some aspects which could have been more deeply analyzed in order to get to develop a sounder argumentation. ; La Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional 55/2018, de 24 de mayo, ha estimado parcialmente el recurso de inconstitucionalidad interpuesto por el Gobierno de Cataluña frente a diversos preceptos de la Ley 39/2015, de 1 de octubre, del Procedimiento Administrativo Común de las Administraciones Públicas. El pronunciamiento afecta a previsiones legales sustancialmente relacionadas con la disciplina de producción normativa y con la Administración electrónica. En el presente trabajo se estudia críticamente la doctrina afirmada en relación con el primero de los aspectos aludidos. Las dificultades a las que se ha debido enfrentar el juez de las leyes para la resolución del recurso de inconstitucionalidad en este punto, debidas fundamentalmente a la falta casi total de jurisprudencia previa en la materia, no le han impedido dictar una Sentencia que en líneas generales se encuentra, en nuestra opinión, correctamente fundamentada, si bien resulta posible identificar en ella algunos extremos en los que se echa en falta una mayor profundidad en el análisis.

Translated from Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo, no. 8, 1975.

Shepard examines how subpoenas for newsgathering information have raised both old and new legal and ethical problems for journalists seeking to protect confidential sources. He explores the ethical and legal evolution of journalistic privilege drawing on cases from the 19th century, the First Amendment principle that emerged in the middle of the 20th century, the public policy implications debated in congressional hearings in the 1970s, and the rise and fall of common law protections in the federal courts between 1972 and 2003. He also interviews key journalists and media lawyers in recent privilege cases. In tracing the development of the journalist's privilege from colonial times to the present, Shepard finds a dynamic interaction among journalism ethics, free-press theory, and legal jurisprudence that supports qualified legal protections for journalists.