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This paper argues that the growth and legalization of Political Islamism in Tunisia will naturally hinder the contemporary influence of violent extremism, leading to partnership and inclusion within a Democratic government. The basis for this claim rests on the idea that the condemnation and repression of Political Islamism in Tunisia historically backfired and led to the further underground radicalization of Tunisians, along with scores of human rights abuses by authorities. Specifically, this essay will focus on the moderate Islamist party Ennahda, the Salafist party Ansar al-Sharia, and their complex relationship to each other as well as to domestic and regional politics at large. Furthermore, this essay will examine the wide continuum of Political Islamism at present, including the Tunisian government's most recent agenda regarding its response to violent extremism, terrorism and acts of vigilante violence. This essay advocates for the Tunisian government to continue to allow the participation of Islamist groups within the political arena while maintaining security, transparency, and accountability for the state and its citizens.

The Senate voted overwhelmingly Thursday to reject a bill that would have mandated the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Niger, where a coup has left the country in crisis since July.The 11-86 vote followed a heated floor debate in which Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) made an impassioned speech in favor of bringing U.S. soldiers home from the country."Does it make sense to station over 1000 troops in a country ruled by a military junta?" Paul asked. "We're in the middle of a potential war with 1100 troops in Niger where the democratically elected president has been deposed, and they're being ruled by a military junta and still our troops are there."Sen. James Risch (R-Idaho), who voted against the bill, argued on the floor that "a swift withdrawal from Niger, as proposed in this resolution, would weaken our regional reconnaissance efforts" and open the door to Russian influence in the country. Sen Ben Cardin (D-Mary.) also argued against the measure, contending that U.S. troops are not engaged in active hostilities and that American soldiers are there with the permission of local authorities.Paul led the bill alongside co-sponsors Sens. Mike Lee (R-Utah) and Roger Marshall (R-Kan.). Sens. Ed Markey (D-Mass.), Tim Kaine (D-Va.), Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), Peter Welch (D-Vt.), Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), John Kennedy (R-La.), J.D. Vance (R-Ohio), and Mike Braun (R-Ind.) also voted in favor of a floor vote on the bill.The proposal was endorsed by Just Foreign Policy, the Friends Committee for National Legislation, the Heritage Foundation's advocacy arm, and the Quincy Institute, which publishes RS.The news comes amid growing pressure to reevaluate America's war on terror, which has quietly hummed along in places like Somalia, Niger, and Syria in recent years with little attention from the U.S. public. Most deployments are justified under the broad authorization for the use of military force passed by Congress just days after the September 11, 2001, attacks."Using an AUMF from 22 years ago, an authorization to get the people who attacked us on 9/11, to justify a war in Niger is a ridiculous notion and should be rejected out of hand," Paul argued.While these operations are largely confined to training and intelligence gathering, American soldiers have been involved in recent skirmishes in Somalia, and Islamic State fighters killed four U.S. servicemen in Niger in 2017. The father of one of those soldiers recently pleaded with lawmakers to reconsider America's presence in the country."If a conflict is not worth the death of your own son or daughter, if you are not willing to send your own son or daughter to death's door to return home in a flag-draped coffin, don't send ours," he wrote.Observers initially speculated that the coup in Niger could make it more challenging for the U.S. military to operate, especially given the junta's decision to expel French troops from the country. But U.S. officials reportedly struck a deal with coup leaders that has allowed the 1,100 American soldiers deployed in the country to return to their regular intelligence and surveillance work.Further complicating the issue is the State Department's decision earlier this month to officially designate the takeover as a coup, restricting the extent to which U.S. forces can provide security assistance to and coordinate with the Nigerien government. It is unclear whether the U.S. military continues to arm and train the Nigerien military.Paul has previously raised questions about the secretive nature of the U.S. presence in Niger. As he noted in a recent letter to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, it remains unclear what authority underpins the operations, which must be authorized legally by an act of Congress.Recent presidents have largely justified such operations using the broad authorization for the use of force passed in the days after 9/11. But legal experts have recently raised doubts as to whether that law remains applicable after more than two decades of global war.New threat assessments "raise the question of whether the United States has passed the 'tipping point' such that U.S. counterterrorism efforts are no longer considered an armed conflict," noted Brian Finucane of the International Crisis Group and Heather Brandon-Smith of the FCNL.In the case of Niger — a country that, by all accounts, had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks — Paul argues that operations "circumvent our constitution, which was designed to ensure that the decision to engage in hostilities would be made only after serious deliberation in the legislature."

Perkembangan pergerakan buruh dan senario hubungan industri di Malaysia telah bermula sejak tahun 1920-an lagi yang turut dipengaruhi oleh dasar pentadbiran British di Tanah Melayu. Sejak detik itu, kesatuan sekerja terus berkembang di Tanah Melayu dan mengalami proses perubahan kesan tindakan kawalan dan pelbagai sekatan termasuklah pengenalan Undang-undang Darurat pada Tahun 1948.Dasar kawalan dan sekatan tersebut terus diamalkan sehingga negara mencapai kemerdekaan pada tahun 1957. Berdasarkan tinjauan terhadap sorotan literatur, terdapat berbagai perubahan tertentu mengenai dasar perburuhan mengikut kepimpinan tertinggi negara iaitu Perdana Menteri yang turut mempengaruhi sistem hubungan industri di Malaysia. Sejak kemerdekaan dicapai, pemimpin atau Perdana Menteri Pertama di Malaysia iaitu Tunku Abdul Rahman telah mencorakkan sistem hubungan industri yang berubah dari sistem voluntary kepada corak compulsory arbitration melalui penguatkuasaan Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan, 1967. Manakala perubahan telah berlaku pada zaman pemerintahan Perdana Menteri kedua, iaitu Tun Abdul Razak yang telah memperkenalkan sistem akomodatif antara kesatuan sekerja dan majikan. Perubahan seterusnya berlaku pada tahun 1976 apabila Tun Hussien Onn telah menggubal dasar perburuhan yang lebih ketat ke atas pergerakan kesatuan sekerja. Perubahan terus berlaku melalui kepimpinan baru pada tahun 1981 di bawah pentadbiran Tun Dr. Mahathir Muhammad yang telah memperkenalkan pelbagai dasar bagi menyokong proses perindustrian negara. Antaranya ialah Dasar Pandang ke Timur yang telah menggalakkan kewujudan kesatuan sekerja dalaman. Selain itu, penggunaan Akta Keselamatan Dalam Negeri (ISA) turut diperluaskan bagi mengawal pemimpin kesatuan yang cenderung bersifat konfliktual. Perubahan seterusnya berlaku pada era pentadbiran Tun Abdullah yang memperkenalkan corak pentadbiran Islamik melalui amalan Islam Hadari sejak tahun 2003. Peringkat seterusnya adalah di bawah pentadbiran Datuk Seri Mohd. Najib Tun Abdul Razak yang memperkenalkan program transformasi negara dan konsep 1 Malaysia sejak tahun 2009. Peringkat terkahir ialah pada era Malaysia Baharu di bawah Pentadbiran Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohammad setelah kemenangan Pakatan Harapan dalam Pilihanraya Umum ke-14 pada tahun 2018. Berdasarkan senario tersebut, kertas kerja ini menjelaskan perubahan dasar kerajaan serta tahap penerimaan pergerakan kesatuan sekerja sepanjang era pemerintahan keenam-enam Perdana Menteri Malaysia. Akhirnya, analisis perubahan tersebut dibincangkan berkaitan implikasinya terhadap kelangsungan kesatuan sekerja yang turut mempengaruhi corak hubungan industri di Malaysia. The development of the labour movement and the industry relations scenario in Malaysia began in the 1920s, which were influenced by the British administration policies in Malaya. Since then, the trade unions continued to grow in Malaya and experienced a process of change because of the control measures and various restrictions including the Emergency Law in 1948. The policies and controls were practiced until the country gained independence in 1957. Based on the literature review, there are certain changes in the labour policy based on the country's highest leadership, the Prime Minister, which also affects the industrial relations system in Malaysia. Since independence, the leader or the first Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman had shaped the industrial relations system from a voluntary system to a compulsory arbitration through the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act, 1967. Meanwhile, changes have taken place during the reign of the second Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, who introduced the accommodation system between the trade union and the employers. The next change occurred in 1976 when Tun Hussein Onn drafted a more stringent labour policy on the trade union movement. Change continued through the new leadership in 1981 under the administration of Tun Dr. Mahathir Muhammad who introduced various policies to support the country's industrial process. Among them is the Look East policy that promotes the existence of internal trade unions. In addition, the use of the Internal Security Act (ISA) has also been extended to control union leaders who tend to be conflicted. The next change occurred in the era of Tun Abdullah's administration, which introduced the Islamic administration pattern through Islam Hadari practices since 2003. The next stage is under the administration of Datuk Seri Mohd Najib Tun Razak, who had introduced national transformation and the 1 Malaysia concept. The final stage is in the New Malaysia era under the leadership of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohammad after Pakatan Harapan's 2018 victory in the 14th general election. Based on these scenarios, this paper aims to explain the changes in the government policies, and the level of acceptance of the trade unions during the reign of all the six Prime Ministers. Finally, the analysis of these changes will be discussed in terms of their implications on the sustainability of trade unions that influences the pattern of industrial relations in Malaysia.

This paper provides an analysis of the ontological foundations of culture as the highest value of life, observed that culture - is historically certain level of society and man, expressed in the types and forms of life and activity of people and they create material and spiritual values, reveals the essence of global cultural transformations that are at the service of subjective economic globalization. The purpose of the article: the paradigm of culture as a form of general civilization and transhistorical phenomenon, emerging in the global transformation of humanity and establish its conceptual and categorical apparatus. Distinguishes three most stable and the most common types of political culture: conformist; particular, civic, as general civilized factor and trans-cultural phenomenon singled out freedom, which is a social archetypes and the collective unconscious, aimed at self development man as an integrated being.In the context of the logical-epistemological and ontological combination of two opposing concepts - objective and subjective - introduces the concept of "mesoreality" that helps identify both objectivity and pure subjectivity. Mesoreality transcends fragments objective reality, which reveals the ontological conditions of existence, and subjective reality which produces conditions for the existence of the individual. Genesis - that is all that really exists is material phenomena and social processes, creative acts that occur in the mind. It is noted that the present culture becomes a key issue, an integral part of globalization. Globalized space is constantly expanding and is a conglomerate of different, specialized centers. These centers, for example, are: religious centers - Vatican (Catholicism), Mecca (Islamic world), the U.S. (science, technology, popular culture). Cultural globalization is developing in the following areas: 1) hybridization civilized cultural values based on equal dialogue, mutual influence, the formation of cultural homogeneity, 2) the script "cultural dump" spread of western culture of poor quality.The aim of globalization of culture lies in the formation of "economic man", "world citizen" instead of spiritual identity and patriot of his country. The main goal of political ontology - to rehabilitate the world of politics, its existential status, which it lost in the Marxist doctrine. Humanize politics - so rehabilitate the principle of plurality of subjects, recognize the legitimacy of the interests of all social groups, strata and classes. Indeed, pluralism, which is the basis of civil society and the rule of law gives everyone free choice of ways to self-realization. Portrait reveals inner freedom, which describes the purpose and the highest value of a person that are relevant semantic factors being. As the inherent nature of man, freedom is the highest spiritual value and a necessary condition for the nation's health, which focuses on his independent of personality. Freedom - is primordial and universal factor of social, economic, political and spiritual progress ontological condition for creative and advanced individuals. Portrait of inner freedom - a psychological condition of human existence, the inner spiritual life, it plays an active relationship of the individual to the world and identify its place in the world, it is a problem of ekzistentsiyi, active and activity-process for denial of slave needed. The main methods of study values is national culture, consciousness, national idea, a national revival of spiritual values. Determined by analysis of that national culture - is essential universality, which returns the real life process of the ideals that were made during the entire previous history of humanity, and even the ability to be versatile destination culture method expression, the implementation and creation of meaning. ; В статье дается анализ онтологических основани й культуры как высшей ценности бытия; отмечается, что культура – это исторически определенный уровень развития общества и человека, который выражается в типах и формах организации жизни и деятельности людей, а также созданных ими материальных и духовних ценностей; раскрывается сущность глобальных культурных трансформаций, которые поставлены на службу субъективной экономической глобализации; выделяются три наиболее стойких и самых распространенных типов политической культуры: конформистский; партикулярный; гражданский; как общецивилизационный фактор и траскультурный феномен выделяется свобода, которая есть социальным архетипом и коллективным несознательным, нацеленным на становление личности как целостного существа. ; В статті дається аналіз онтологічних засад культури як найвищої цінності буття; відмічається, що культура – це історично певний рівень розвитку суспільства і людини, що виражається в типах і формах організації життя і діяльності людей, а також створених ними матеріальних і духовних цінностей; розкривається сутність глобальних культурних трансформацій, які поставлені на службу суб'єктивній економічній глобалізації; виокремлюються три найбільш стійких і самих розповсюджених типів політичної культури: конформістський; партикулярний; громадянський; як загальноцивілізаційний фактор і транскультурний феномен виокремлюється свобода, яка є соціальним архетипом і колективним несвідомим, націленим на самостановлення людини як цілісної істоти.

Central Asia is currently a hot item on the global agenda. It is not every decade that the world finds itself embracing a new region with the alluring appeal of mass hydrocarbon production and export, large investments, and promising cooperation in the military sphere. What is more, other phenomena adding to Central Asia's renown are intensifying the glow of the geopolitical theme. They include the local governments' opposition to the extremist movements, the West's accusations of authoritarianism and violations of democratic rights and freedoms, the Islamic renaissance, the Color Revolutions, and so on. In addition, it is obvious that the West is keeping a sharp eye on the region's republics, which is shown by its immediate reaction to the events going on in Central Asia, whereby this attention continues to increase all the time. Emissaries not only from Western, but also from many other large countries are actively working in the region. There must obviously be extremely good reasons why even the most distant centers of power are showing such an intense interest in Central Asia. And the answers lie deeper than they appear to at first glance. The domestic sociopolitical evolution of the Central Asian states is of little interest to most foreign observers. As paradoxical as it may seem, the problem of drug trafficking, which is pertinent to the Central Asian Region (CAR) and urgent for the whole world, is being studied even less. In this case, the priority topics for political analysis—apart from big business issues (read: the production of natural resources)—are the Big Game being waged among the leading present-day nations over the region, Russia's strategy in Central Asia, and the spread of China's influence there, which are all closely associated with CAR. In short, we are talking about geopolitical rivalry in the region. It is clear to many that oil and gas cannot be the only reason for this excitement. For as long as hydrocarbons are being produced and are in demand, they will always reach their consumer, whereby these resources will be transported via profitable, and not politically advantageous, routes—this is a law of economics, the violation of which is fraught with serious consequences, primarily for the exporter state. It stands to reason that it is not Kazakhstan that needs new pipelines, but other states that need guaranteed oil deliveries. The Central Asian Region was and largely remains dependent on Russia—essentially 100% of the strategic hydrocarbon resources produced here are transported through the Russian Federation. Only Kazakhstan, which is also linked to Moscow by a pipeline system, retains relative independence over its energy policy. It is likely that the development of the southern and trans-Caspian vectors of energy resource deliveries from Central Asia may indeed prove more profitable compared with the existing ones. However, this will not happen in the foreseeable future while chaos reigns in Afghanistan, Pakistan is being shaken from the inside, and the Caucasus is under permanent threat due to the absence of a normal dialog between Iran and the West. What is more, the current level of scientific developments will not permit putting the Caspian ecosystem at risk. Even if they are implemented soon, the numerous new transportation projects—those already carried out and only just being developed (West Kazakhstan-China, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Turkmenistan-China, Uzbekistan-China, Nabucco)—will nevertheless be incapable of radically changing the situation in the mid term with respect to energy deliveries from the region. In all likelihood, the insistent attempts to diversify energy export from Central Asia are simply aimed at undermining Russia's domination in the region. Possible annual deliveries of energy resources in amounts of up to several tens of thousands of tons or millions of cubic meters bypassing the Russian Federation may be detrimental not so much to Russia's economic, as to its strategic interests. On the whole, the questions relating to the production and transportation of energy resources are only partially raising the veil to reveal what is hidden behind the geopolitical game in Central Asia, what its rules are, and what prize the winner will receive. In our opinion, raising of the problem of international regionalization could provide a more in-depth explanation of the current situation in Central Asia.

Historically, the global society has viewed females as naturally weak, powerless and dependent on males. False medical myths such as development of masculine and unfeminine bodies, harmful effects on the menstrual cycle and prejudice about women who participate in sport activities have been spread which have discouraged active participation of females in different parts of the world, especially in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries1. In this paper, a Scenario Analysis methodology recommended by Spaniol and Rowland2 was used; a process of analysing possible future events by considering alternative possible outcomes from the society. The UAE Vision 2021 was developed to make the nation among the best countries in the world by the Golden Jubilee of the union. This vision was utilised to provide references to the analysis and application of the methods CATWOE, PESTLE and SWOT; also used to complement the scenario description. The discussion revolved around the overall engagement of women representing the Muslim community in the sports sector with a heavy focus on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) sporting scene. In addition, the outlook of the UAE government on women in sports and the various strategies and reforms adopted by the local government to promote women participation in sports was discussed. The conclusion reflects on the possibilities of a behavioural change in the contemporary local society which could lead to more opportunities for women in sports even after the imposition of barriers. References 1 Myths surrounding gender and sports [Internet]. Kentucky: Northern Kentucky University [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.nku.edu/~lipping/PHE125/ Myths%20Surrounding%20Gender%20and%20S ports.doc. 2 Rowland NJ, Spaniol MJ, Public understanding of futures & foresight science: A reply to Chermack's response. 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Available from https://www.dubaisportsworld.ae/Pages/News/High-Five. 47 Koora Dome [Internet]. United Arab Emirates: Koora Dome; 2018 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from http://www.kooradome.com/. 48 About Dubai Fitness Challenge 2018 [Internet]. United Arab Emirates: Department of Tourism and Commerce Marketing; 2019 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://dubaifitnesschallenge.com/about. 49 Download Dubai Fitness App [Internet]. United Arab Emirates: Department of Tourism and Commerce Marketing; 2019 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://dubaifitnesschallenge.com/download-dubai-fitness-app. 50 National Media Council (NMC). UAE Annual Book 2016 [Internet]. United Arab Emirates: National Media Council (NMC) [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from http://nmc.gov.ae/en-us/E- Participation/Lists/Publications/Attachments/1/E-Printing%20English%20Inside.pdf. 51 Ministry of State for Federal National Council Affairs. Women in the United Arab Emirates: A portrait of progress [Internet]. United Arab Emirates: Ministry of State for Federal National Council Affairs [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.uae- embassy.org/sites/default/files/Women_in_the_UAE_Eng.pdf. 52 International Conference of Sports For Women 2017 (ICSW) [Internet]. United Arab Emirates: Ladies Sports Academy; 2019 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://fbma.ae/en/events/events-list/international-conference-of-sports-for-women-2017- icsw/. 53 Gomes A. Empowering women through sports [Internet]. Gulf News; 2018 Aug 10 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://gulfnews.com/sport/uae- sport/empowering-women-through-sports-1.2264261. 54 Sports [Internet]. United Arab Emirates: Government.ae; 2018 Nov 11 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.government.ae/en/about-the-uae/strategies- initiatives-and-awards/awards/Sports. 55 Rizvi A. Rio 2016: History of Emirati female participation at the Olympic Games [Internet]. The National; 2016 July 31 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.thenational.ae/sport/rio-2016-history-of-emirati-female-participation-at-the- olympic-games-1.166001. 56 International Olympic Committee (IOC). Ahmed almaktoum claims UAE's first Olymoic medal [Internet]. International Olympic Committee (IOC); 2019 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.olympic.org/videos/ahmed-almaktoum-claims-uae-s-first-olympic-medal. 57 Kumar A. 2016 Olympics: Toma feels proud on winning medal for UAE [Internet]. Khaleej Times; 2016 Aug 22 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.khaleejtimes.com/2016-olympics-toma-feels-proud-on-winning-medal-for- uae 58 Bridge S. UAE's paralympian team secures sponsorship deal until 2021 [Internet]. United Arab Emirates: ITP Digital Media Inc., Arabian Business; 2018 Aug 8 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.arabianbusiness.com/sport/402474-uae-paralympian- team-secures-sponsorship-deal-until-2021. 59 International Paralympic Committee (IPC). IPC Historical Results Archive [Internet]. International Paralympic Committee (IPC); 2019 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.paralympic.org/sdms4/hira/web?npc=UAE&gender=all&medal=all&sport= all&games=all. 60 McFarlane N. Sheikh Mohammed welcomes home UAE Paralympic athletes [Internet]. United Arab Emirates: Motivate Media Group, What's On Dubai; 2016 Sep 21 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://whatson.ae/dubai/2016/09/sheikh-mohammed- welcomes-home-uae-paralympic-athletes/. 61 Community Engagement [Internet]. Special Olympics World Games Abu Dhabi 2019; 2019 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.abudhabi2019.org/beyond-sports/community-engagement. 62 SO United Arab Emirates [Internet]. Special Olympics World Games Abu Dhabi 2019; 2019 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.abudhabi2019.org/delegation/so-united-arab-emirates#. 63 Lau E. Watch: UAE coach Houriya Al Taheri on raising the profile of women's football in the Gulf region [Internet]. The National; 2019 Jun 9 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.thenational.ae/lifestyle/watch-uae-coach-houriya-al- taheri-on-raising-the-profile-of-women-s-football-in-the-gulf-region-1.872234. 64 Andrews F. Watch: UAE figure skater Zahra Lari on changing history on the ice [Internet]. The National; 2019 May 15 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.thenational.ae/lifestyle/watch-uae-figure-skater-zahra-lari-on-changing- history-on-the-ice-1.861837. 65 FBMA development program. United Arab Emirates: Ladies Sports Academy; 2019 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://fbma.ae/en/programs/fbma- development-program/. 66 Al Nowais S. Emirati women make great strides in sports participation [Internet]. The National; 2017 Nov 6 [cited 2019 Jun 20. Available from https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/emirati-women-make-great-strides-in-sports- participation-1.673540. 67 FBMA group fitness certification [Internet]. United Arab Emirates: Ladies Sports Academy; 2019 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.fbma.ae/education/certified-programs/fbma-group-fitness-certification/. 68 Dajani H. Rugby too 'rough' and girls should instead study cooking, says UAE council member [Internet]. The National; 2018 Nov 20 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.thenational.ae/uae/education/rugby-too-rough-and-girls- should-instead-study-cooking-says-uae-council-member-1.793919. @_dawrena [Internet]. United Arab Emirates: Instagram; 2018 Dec 17 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.instagram.com/p/BrejAUwn0rF/?igshid=1lbvl1uwbqv7wa. 70 International Olympic Committee (IOC). Olympic Agenda 2020 [Internet]. International Olympic Committee; 2014 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://stillmed.olympic.org/ Documents/Olympic_Agenda_2020/Olympic_Agenda_2020-20-20_Recommendations-ENG.pdf. 71 Lauper C. Cyndi Lauper - Girls just want to have fun (Official Video) [Internet]. YouTube; 2009 Oct 25 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PIb6AZdTr-A. ; La sociedad global ha visto a las mujeres como naturalmente débiles, impotentes y dependientes de los hombres durante muchos años. Históricamente, falsos mitos médicos, tales como el desarrollo de cuerpos masculinos y no femeninos, efectos nocivos sobre el ciclo menstrual y el perjuicio del embarazo de mujeres que participan en actividades deportivas, se esparcieron y desalentaron la participación del género femenino en todas partes del mundo y de manera muy impactante, en los países del Golfo1. En este artículo, se utilizó la metodología de Análisis de Escenario recomendada por Spaniol y Rowland2, que se define como el análisis del proceso en un escenario futuro considerando otros posibles resultados de la sociedad en el presente. La Visión 2021 de los Emiratos Ãrabes Unidos (EAU) fue desarrollada para convertir a la nación entre los mejores países del mundo por el Jubileo de Oro desde su origen. Esta visión fue utilizada para desarrollar análisis con los métodos PESTLE, SWOT y CATWOE para complementar la descripción del escenario. La discusión giró en torno al compromiso general de mujeres representando a la comunidad musulmana en el sector deportivo, con gran foco en la escena deportiva de los EAU. Además, se discutieron las perspectivas del gobierno de los Emiratos Ãrabes Unidos sobre las mujeres en los deportes y las diferentes estrategias y reformas adoptadas por el gobierno local para promover la participación de las mujeres en el deporte. Como conclusión, es posible encontrar un cambio de comportamiento en la sociedad contemporánea local que refleja en más oportunidades futuras para las mujeres en el deporte, aunque existen muchas barreras y preconceptos. Referencias 1 Myths surrounding gender and sports [Internet]. Kentucky: Northern Kentucky University [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.nku.edu/~lipping/PHE125/ Myths%20Surrounding%20Gender%20and%20S ports.doc. 2 Rowland NJ, Spaniol MJ, Public understanding of futures & foresight science: A reply to Chermack's response. Futures & Foresight Science. 2019; 1(2): 1-3. 3 International Olympic Committee (IOC). Statistic [Internet]. International Olympic Committee; 2019 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.olympic.org/women-in-sport/background/statistics. 4 International Olympic Committee (IOC). Promotion of women in sport through time [Internet]. International Olympic Committee (IOC); 2019 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. 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Available from https://dubaifitnesschallenge.com/download-dubai-fitness-app. 50 National Media Council (NMC). UAE Annual Book 2016 [Internet]. United Arab Emirates: National Media Council (NMC) [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from http://nmc.gov.ae/en-us/E- Participation/Lists/Publications/Attachments/1/E-Printing%20English%20Inside.pdf. 51 Ministry of State for Federal National Council Affairs. Women in the United Arab Emirates: A portrait of progress [Internet]. United Arab Emirates: Ministry of State for Federal National Council Affairs [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.uae- embassy.org/sites/default/files/Women_in_the_UAE_Eng.pdf. 52 International Conference of Sports For Women 2017 (ICSW) [Internet]. United Arab Emirates: Ladies Sports Academy; 2019 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://fbma.ae/en/events/events-list/international-conference-of-sports-for-women-2017- icsw/. 53 Gomes A. Empowering women through sports [Internet]. Gulf News; 2018 Aug 10 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://gulfnews.com/sport/uae- sport/empowering-women-through-sports-1.2264261. 54 Sports [Internet]. United Arab Emirates: Government.ae; 2018 Nov 11 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.government.ae/en/about-the-uae/strategies- initiatives-and-awards/awards/Sports. 55 Rizvi A. Rio 2016: History of Emirati female participation at the Olympic Games [Internet]. The National; 2016 July 31 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.thenational.ae/sport/rio-2016-history-of-emirati-female-participation-at-the- olympic-games-1.166001. 56 International Olympic Committee (IOC). Ahmed almaktoum claims UAE's first Olymoic medal [Internet]. International Olympic Committee (IOC); 2019 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.olympic.org/videos/ahmed-almaktoum-claims-uae-s-first-olympic-medal. 57 Kumar A. 2016 Olympics: Toma feels proud on winning medal for UAE [Internet]. Khaleej Times; 2016 Aug 22 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.khaleejtimes.com/2016-olympics-toma-feels-proud-on-winning-medal-for- uae 58 Bridge S. UAE's paralympian team secures sponsorship deal until 2021 [Internet]. United Arab Emirates: ITP Digital Media Inc., Arabian Business; 2018 Aug 8 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.arabianbusiness.com/sport/402474-uae-paralympian- team-secures-sponsorship-deal-until-2021. 59 International Paralympic Committee (IPC). IPC Historical Results Archive [Internet]. International Paralympic Committee (IPC); 2019 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.paralympic.org/sdms4/hira/web?npc=UAE&gender=all&medal=all&sport= all&games=all. 60 McFarlane N. Sheikh Mohammed welcomes home UAE Paralympic athletes [Internet]. United Arab Emirates: Motivate Media Group, What's On Dubai; 2016 Sep 21 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://whatson.ae/dubai/2016/09/sheikh-mohammed- welcomes-home-uae-paralympic-athletes/. 61 Community Engagement [Internet]. Special Olympics World Games Abu Dhabi 2019; 2019 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.abudhabi2019.org/beyond-sports/community-engagement. 62 SO United Arab Emirates [Internet]. Special Olympics World Games Abu Dhabi 2019; 2019 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.abudhabi2019.org/delegation/so-united-arab-emirates#. 63 Lau E. Watch: UAE coach Houriya Al Taheri on raising the profile of women's football in the Gulf region [Internet]. The National; 2019 Jun 9 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.thenational.ae/lifestyle/watch-uae-coach-houriya-al- taheri-on-raising-the-profile-of-women-s-football-in-the-gulf-region-1.872234. 64 Andrews F. Watch: UAE figure skater Zahra Lari on changing history on the ice [Internet]. The National; 2019 May 15 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.thenational.ae/lifestyle/watch-uae-figure-skater-zahra-lari-on-changing- history-on-the-ice-1.861837. 65 FBMA development program. United Arab Emirates: Ladies Sports Academy; 2019 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://fbma.ae/en/programs/fbma- development-program/. 66 Al Nowais S. Emirati women make great strides in sports participation [Internet]. The National; 2017 Nov 6 [cited 2019 Jun 20. Available from https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/emirati-women-make-great-strides-in-sports- participation-1.673540. 67 FBMA group fitness certification [Internet]. United Arab Emirates: Ladies Sports Academy; 2019 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.fbma.ae/education/certified-programs/fbma-group-fitness-certification/. 68 Dajani H. Rugby too 'rough' and girls should instead study cooking, says UAE council member [Internet]. The National; 2018 Nov 20 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.thenational.ae/uae/education/rugby-too-rough-and-girls- should-instead-study-cooking-says-uae-council-member-1.793919. @_dawrena [Internet]. United Arab Emirates: Instagram; 2018 Dec 17 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.instagram.com/p/BrejAUwn0rF/?igshid=1lbvl1uwbqv7wa. 70 International Olympic Committee (IOC). Olympic Agenda 2020 [Internet]. International Olympic Committee; 2014 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://stillmed.olympic.org/ Documents/Olympic_Agenda_2020/Olympic_Agenda_2020-20-20_Recommendations-ENG.pdf. 71 Lauper C. Cyndi Lauper - Girls just want to have fun (Official Video) [Internet]. YouTube; 2009 Oct 25 [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PIb6AZdTr-A. ; A sociedade global enxergou as mulheres como naturalmente fracas, impotentes e dependentes dos homens durante muitos anos. Historicamente, falsos mitos médicos, tais como o desenvolvimento de corpos masculinos e não femininos, efeitos nocivos sobre o ciclo menstrual e o prejuízo da gravidez de mulheres que participam de atividades esportivas, se espalharam e desencorajaram a participação ativa do gênero feminino em todas as partes do mundo e de maneira bem impactante, nos países do Golfo1. Neste artigo, utilizou-se a metodologia de Análise de Cenário recomendada por Spaniol e Rowland2, que se define como a análise do processo em um cenário futuro considerando outros possíveis resultados da sociedade no presente. A Visão 2021 dos Emirados Ãrabes Unidos (EAU) foi desenvolvida para converter a nação entre os melhores países do mundo em seu Jubileu de Ouro. Esta visão foi utilizada para realizar as análises com os métodos PESTLE, SWOT e CATWOE para complementar a descrição do cenário. A discussão girou em torno do engajamento geral de mulheres representando a comunidade muçulmana no setor esportivo, com grande foco na cena esportiva dos EAU. Além disso, foram discutidas as perspectivas do governo dos Emirados Ãrabes Unidos sobre as mulheres nos esportes e as diferentes estratégias e reformas adotadas pelas autoridades locais para promover a participação das mulheres no esporte. Como conclusão, é possível encontrar uma mudança de comportamento na sociedade contemporânea local que reflete em mais oportunidades no futuro para as mulheres no esporte, ainda que existam muitas barreiras e pré-conceitos. Referências 1 Myths surrounding gender and sports [Internet]. Kentucky: Northern Kentucky University [cited 2019 Jun 20]. Available from https://www.nku.edu/~lipping/PHE125/ Myths%20Surrounding%20Gender%20and%20S ports.doc. 2 Rowland NJ, Spaniol MJ, Public understanding of futures & foresight science: A reply to Chermack's response. 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This article suggests adding a "craftsman" at lower ranks to steer private-sector projects through the Third Offset Strategy. This strategy was established by experienced leadership at the Pentagon to increase military acquisitions of automation and artificial intelligence technology.

The wave of Arab Spring that started in Tunisia and Egypt arrived to Morocco in 2011 paving the way to unprecedented organized mass-protests all over the country. Among the demands raised by the 20 February Movement protesters was the demand for free and independent media outlets, especially the press. King Mohammed VI, the Commander of the Faithful and the highest authority in Morocco, promised in a televised speech on March 9th to introduce "radical" and "genuine" constitutional reforms that would democratize the country. In fact, King Mohammed VI has so far succeeded in calming down and co-opting the demonstrations, but journalists and political activists still get fined if they trespass the Hudud[1]. In my short article, I will briefly contextualize the Moroccan independent press and discuss its status after the "Moroccan Spring" with an attempt to show, through cases of imprisoned journalists, the contradictions associated with the liberalization of speech in Morocco. One of the main arguments of my article is that the democratization of the press could never be achieved as long as the public discourse that brings monarchical powers and actions into question is illegal.

"If there was ever a doubt about just how American Mr. Obama is, Sunday's raid eliminates it better than any long-form birth certificate. This was his finest hour." Bret Stephens, the Wall Street Journal Late at night on Sunday May 1st President Obama announced to the nation that Osama Bin Laden had been found and killed by a US Navy Special Operations team. The Navy SEAL team Six, as it is known here, landed two helicopters inside a walled three-story compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, where years of painstakingly gathered intelligence had led authorities to believe there was a high chance the Al Qaeda leader may be hiding. This may well have been the largest, most successful intelligence operation in US history; the President acted boldly and decisively and for that he received accolades from both sides of the political divide. Coming as it did just a month after the President launched his re-election campaign, this victory immediately boosted his approval rate by eleven points, according to surveys.Even if the strategic defeat of Al Qaeda has not yet been accomplished, this was a huge milestone and the closing of a chapter that started ten years ago when the hunt for Osama Bin Laden was launched by the Bush administration. Last week's operation resulted in the largest trove of data ever found on Al Qaeda, including information on immediate threats being planned, location and structure of its leadership, and scores of data that will help piece together a deeper understanding of their long-term tactics, techniques and procedures.Disposing of such a reviled figure who, for over ten years had ordered the killing of innocent civilians around the world, is undoubtedly a great blow both symbolic and real, to Al Qaeda, a decentralized movement whose members are tied together mainly by feelings, emotions and mythology. But does it sound the death knell for the organization? What are its short and long term implications? Al Qaeda has proven to be quite resilient, but is it still spreading and growing? More importantly, how relevant is it in the face of the Arab Spring moving throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa?All these questions need to be pondered carefully, since they have deep implications for US foreign policy in the region, for the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for its difficult and troubled relation with Pakistan. This unexpected win will lead to a comprehensive reassessment of US military presence in the area, its strategies of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and its alliance with Pakistan.American reaction to Osama Bin Laden's death was one of noisy, overt celebration in New York and DC, and of relief and jubilation in the rest of the country. It was indeed the reverse of the deep shock, terror and bereavement of 9-11, but both instances had one common denominator: there was a sense of collective emotion, of a long-forgotten and now recovered national unity. However, this did not last long as incipient criticism and second-guessing started 24 hours later over Bin Laden's burial at sea and the decision by the administration not to show pictures of his death. It came from both sides of the ideological spectrum and, in some cases, it was bolstered by strong arguments. For example Alan Dershowitz, the Harvard Law professor, considered the burial at sea a "willful destruction of evidence that may arise suspicions that there was something to hide." Others used the occasion to stir up doubts and demanded pictures to certify Bin Laden's death, but then again, these are not to be taken seriously sine they were the same groups that had to be shown a long version of the President's birth certificate as evidence he was American. A second criticism coming mainly from some Neo-conservatives, was the administration's failure to recognize publicly that the intelligence gathering that led to the finding and killing of Bin Laden was a vindication of the "enhanced interrogation techniques" (read: water boarding) used by the Bush administration in foreign detention centers and at Guantánamo, which Obama had consistently and very publicly condemned during the 2008 campaign and into his years in office.To the first, members of the administration responded that the point was to dispose of his body in a respectful manner, not because he deserved it but to deny a source of friction with other Muslims and to deprive his followers with a shrine and an opportunity to exploit him as an iconic martyr. A similar argument was used to explain the decision not to release the pictures: the President wants to avoid ostentatious displays of triumphalism that may come back to haunt him. His sobriety and restraint further reinforce the boldness of his decision and his steadfast determination to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat" Al Qaeda and not be distracted from his goal by premature claims of "mission accomplished".To the second claim, the White House responded that the success of the operation is far from a vindication of such unconstitutional techniques, since it was the result of the hard work of professionals over time and across two administrations, who integrated thousands of small pieces of intelligence gathering coming from human and technological sources into one gigantic puzzle, and that no one single piece led the US to Bin Laden. It took all the resources only the US can muster, from military bases to networks of human intelligence, to electronic eavesdropping, to specially trained forces, to locate and kill one hidden individual in a foreign country, and then match his DNA in an aircraft carrier before disposing of the corpse. But it also took a courageous American president to make such a risky call, namely, authorizing a covert operation deep into Pakistani territory based on circumstantial evidence at best, and without alerting the Pakistani authorities about it. Fortunately, wide recognition was given to the President's courage and many on the Right called it "Obama's Finest Hour". Both former President Bush and his prickly vice-president Cheney congratulated Obama and gave him full credit.A more productive conversation that has already started in academic and diplomatic circles is how relevant Bin Laden's death is for the Arab world. If he had died eight years ago, says one French scholar, he would have instantaneously become a martyr in the Arab street, an icon of anti-Western sentiment. However, in 2011, he had receded into the back of the consciousness of young Arabs for several reasons. First, because he had been in hiding for so long that his presence in the media had been noticeably diminished: out of sight, out of mind. Time spent out of the limelight erases mystiques and cools down emotions. Secondly because many saw him as the culprit for bringing the United States into Iraq and Afghanistan, which in turn gave an excuse for authoritarian regimes in the region to become even more repressive and extend their time in power. In Iraq, local Sunnis blame Al Qaeda for bringing the Shiites to power and expanding the influence of Iran in their country. Also, Bin Laden and Al Qaeda had increasingly lost the allegiance of many Muslims around the world for their indiscriminate bombings of hospitals, mosques and shrines and the killings of non-combatant Muslims in Baghdad, Basra and Amman (even if many were Shiite, the slaughter of innocent women and children caused revulsion in these populations).More importantly, the wave of pluralistic revolutions sweeping the Middle East and North Africa has rendered Al Qaeda irrelevant. There is an emerging sense of strong national identities, whereby the masses are thinking of themselves first as Egyptians, Tunisians or Libyans, with ethnicity and religion taking a secondary role. Indeed, Nasser's Pan-Arabism died the 1960sm, and the dream of a Caliphate "extending Islamic rule from Indonesia to Spain", which Bin Laden proposed as Al Qaeda's ultimate goal is no longer an interesting proposition to the extremely young populations of the region, many of whom have access to the new social media in the Internet, and who crave freedom and modernity more than anything else. The "Arab Spring" may spell the end of Al Qaeda's political aspirations for the region: the Turkish model of a secular, modern state with an overwhelmingly Islamic population and a pluralistic party system is far more appealing than the pan-Islamic caliphate of the Prophet's era. In the words of Professor Fouad Ajami, "It is risky to say, but Arabs appear to have wearied of violence…It was Bin Laden's deserved fate to be struck down when an entirely different Arab world was struggling to be born."Time and treasure spent in a ten-year war have also changed perspectives in America, especially for the younger generations. There is an on-going unofficial revision of the Bush doctrine of invading whole countries "that harbor, train or fund terrorists" in favor of narrower, more focused actions against the terrorists themselves. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken their toll on the American military as far as recruitment and resources. The main concern of voters is the American economy, especially unemployment and the ever-expanding national debt. A hundred and forty thousand American and NATO troops are involved in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, with no endgame in sight. Killings of Americans by despondent Afghan soldiers and other groups whose "hearts and minds" the US is supposed to win, occupy the headlines daily. Counter-terrorism increasingly seems to be a much more appealing and productive strategy. Expressing this widely-held sentiment, Senator Kerry recently declared: "There is no possible victory to be had in Afghanistan".Even though President Obama called it a war of necessity and has invested deeply in it, this is no longer a popular war: two-thirds of the American electorate is against it. Therefore, there will be pressure on President Obama to accelerate the phased withdrawal from Afghanistan, and complete it before the set deadline of 2014. He is a rational decision-maker who does not easily cave under pressure, but the 2012 election is likely to enter into his calculations. As a champion of counter-terrorism and opposing counter-insurgency from early on, Vice-president Biden might still be vindicated in his wisdom. When Obama opted for the surge in Afghanistan two years ago, he overruled Biden and sided with the military. Will he change his mind and speed up the withdrawal now? The killing of Bin Laden certainly gives him an opening to change his initial timetable. "Al Qaeda is no longer there, and the Taliban must be beaten by Afghans themselves", says Leslie Gelb, president emeritus of the Council of Foreign Relations.Finally, the fact that Pakistan has proved to be an unreliable partner in the war against terrorism is also putting pressure on the President to review his Afghan policy. The alliance is frayed; Pakistan is giving sanctuary to violent militants of all sorts, and another high Al Qaeda operative now in American custody, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, was also found in Pakistan (Rawalpindi). Indeed, by the rationale of the Bush doctrine, the US should be invading Pakistan next. The White House says they have no evidence that there was any "foreknowledge" by the Pakistani leadership that Bin Laden was holed up in a one-million-dollar compound, in a military town, only 30 miles away from Islamabad. Pakistan will conduct its "own investigation" and will have to prove itself a worthy ally, for example, by sharing information gleaned from Bin Laden's three wives and several children now held under Pakistani custody. On the other hand, veteran security experts retort, more terrorists have been arrested by the Pakistani authorities since 2001 than anywhere else in the world. In this case, was it incompetence or complicity? Pakistan is a very complex country, where the military are an autonomous force above civilian rule, and they also control the Intelligence Services (ISI). It is a house divided against itself. It harbors numerous militant groups, and goes after some but not others. It hedges its bets this way so as not to lose influence and power in the region, for example by supporting the Taliban and Haqqani networks fighting to seize power in Afghanistan, and the Lashkar-e-Taiba organization against India in Kashmir. Pakistan's foreign and national security policy is built around its obsession with India, its most vilified enemy and against which it has fought several wars. It is clear now that ISI gave sophisticated support to the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2009. Pakistan needs a friendly government in Afghanistan so that it can maintain its "strategic depth" vis à vis India. Armed with over a hundred nuclear weapons and with some control over this wide array of militant groups, Pakistan is pivotal in the stability of South Asia. Those are the two main reasons why the US-Pakistani relationship survived after the Cold War ended. Because of the weakness and corruption of civilian governments, past and present, the US has preferred to engage with the military, who control the nuclear arsenal, and has made them the recipient of most US aid (indeed, by the end of this year alone the Pakistani military will have received $3 billion from the US). But this may be about to change if Pakistan rejects the US request to be in charge of the internal investigation on whether Bin Laden was given sanctuary, and if so, by whom.Now that its main leader has been killed, and in spite of its virtual irrelevance, Al Qaeda is likely to undergo an internal struggle to determine its future. The mystique of its international role has already somewhat dissipated and the different groups in the network are shifting their focus to their national agendas. Indeed, this has already been the case in Egypt, where after days of ominous silence on the Tahrir Square Revolution, Al Qaeda's second in command, Egyptian-born Al-Zwahiri injected himself in the process by supporting the leader of an Islamist party that wants post-Mubarak Egypt to adopt Sharia law. But his attempt did not resonate with the young revolutionaries, most of which want a pluralistic society and are much more concerned with jobs and government accountability than with religious utopia. However, revolutions are just the beginning of a long process, transition periods are by definition unstable, and post-revolutionary regimes have historically been highjacked by extremists. So one can only be cautiously optimistic about what will come next, but it appears as if the Middle East and the Arab world are moving on and beginning to spell the end of Al Qaeda's aspirations. Bin Laden's demise is the appropriate end of this chapter in the region's history.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

The gulf between the United States and the rest of the world — in particular the Global South — on the Israel-Palestine conflict remains sharp and wide. This was demonstrated yet again at The Hague last week, where the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is hearing a case triggered by a U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) resolution in December 2022 seeking an advisory opinion on the "legal consequences" of the Israeli occupation of Palestine.The case has taken on even greater significance in the current context of Israel's military action in Gaza and the West Bank. The Israeli assault (in response to Hamas's October 7 attack) has led to around 30,000 Palestinian deaths and widespread destruction of homes, mosques, churches, hospitals, and community centers with seemingly no end in sight. A BBC investigation at the end of January found that between 50% and 61% of the Gaza Strip's buildings had been destroyed or damaged in the war, while over 80% of the population had been displaced.This case also comes on the heels of last month's ICJ hearing in a separate case brought by South Africa alleging serious violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention by Israel in its current assault on Gaza. In that case, the ICJ issued a provisional order that Israel's actions in the current war against the Palestinians could plausibly be considered genocide. Other Global South states have initiated measures at the International Criminal Court. Overall, states representing close to 60% of the Global South's population have either directly or indirectly backed international legal action on Palestine, as our previous analysis showed.Last week's proceedings were the early stage of the UNGA-triggered case, in which the oral arguments focused on whether the court has jurisdiction over the matter. Of the 49 countries and three international organizations (the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the African Union) that argued before the court's judges — the most of any case in the ICJ's history — only four argued that the court lacked jurisdiction and should therefore not render an opinion: the United States, the United Kingdom, Hungary, and Fiji.Although this round of argumentation centered around the question of the court's jurisdiction, the representatives who spoke on behalf of their respective countries presented their view of Israel's occupation as well as current and past military activity in Palestine. Cuba went as far as to explicitly argue that Israel's military aggression in the current war amounts to a "genocide." Several others, including Bolivia and Chile, argued that the occupation violates international law, and should therefore end.The extent to which this issue resonates across the Global South is evident in the fact that Indonesia, the world's fourth-most populous country and a U.S. partner, so strongly supports the Palestinian cause that the country's foreign minister, Retno Marsudi, left the G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Brazil to personally present Indonesia's argument before the court. She argued that Israel's "unlawful occupation and its atrocities must stop and should not be normalized or recognized." Indonesia sees Palestine as the last unresolved issue of decolonization, which it is mandated to oppose according to its constitution. Bangladesh spoke of violations of three basic tenets of international law: the right to self-determination; the prohibition to acquire territory by force; and the prohibition of racial discrimination and apartheid. Namibia also cited apartheid in its arguments, while The Maldives spoke of appropriation of water resources for Palestine, among other things. The African Union, collectively representing 54 African states, described "an asymmetrical situation in which an oppressed people is confronted with an occupying power."Other Global South states arguing in favor of the ICJ's jurisdiction in this case even called out the United States by name. Guyana, for example, said that the U.S.'s argument fails because the U.S. wrongly claims that there is an ongoing peace negotiation between Israel and Palestine, therefore leaving no legal authority for the ICJ to deliver an opinion on this issue.Algeria also explicitly said that this case not only stains Israel's image, but also hurts that of the United States, as the U.S. government continues to support Israel despite its continued violation of international law.Fiji was the only Global South state in the hearings to broadly align with Israel and the United States in its arguments. It argued that a two-state solution could only come about when (Palestinian) terrorism ended. It also stated that Israel had not agreed to the case, the ICJ approach circumvents the Oslo process, and the information available to the court was one-sided. Additionally, Zambia struck a cautious tone, supporting a two-state solution but also saying that a solution should not "squarely blame one party."The deep opposition to U.S. and Israeli positions was not just confined to the Global South. Most core U.S. allies in the Global North were also opposed. For example, France argued that Israel's settlements in Palestine are illegal. France also asked the court to render an opinion on the extent to which the Palestinians have suffered damages, and asked that the court consider how much restitution or compensation is appropriate for the damages suffered by Palestinians under Israeli occupation.Even the United Kingdom — the lone core U.S. ally aligned with American and Israeli positions in the case — called out Israel's occupation. The country's representative stated that although the UK opposes ICJ jurisdiction in this case, in part because the scope of a fact-finding mission would be too broad in the context of an ongoing conflict, Israel's continued and expanding occupation of Palestine is illegal under international law.China and Russia, the two great power rivals of the United States, both supported the majority opinion, arguing in favor of the ICJ's jurisdiction in the case and against Israel's occupation of Palestine.This comes as growing security, economic, and political ties are being formed by the Chinese and Russians with states across the Global South. The Russian mercenary group known as the Wagner Group — recently rebranded as Africa Corps — has tapped into strong anti-Western sentiment to form military and security ties with states across central and west Africa, largely replacing unpopular and outdated U.S. and French security projects in the area. Meanwhile, China continues to promote its Belt and Road Initiative globally, connecting with countries across the world, claiming to meet their economic demands and support development projects. China and Russia's positions against the Israeli occupation of Palestine have only hardened in recent months.Both China and Russia are also leading members of BRICS, in which they are in a de facto coalition with leading middle powers of the Global South looking to plug existing and major gaps in the current international system as well as prominently project their voice on the global stage.Washington's isolation on Palestine may not have mattered much if we were still in a unipolar world. But with relative power slowly diffusing away from Washington, the United States may benefit from shifting its policies and bridging its position with the rest of the world on the highly emotive issue of Palestine that is causing enormous human suffering and already beginning to destabilize the wider region.

International audience ; Demography is the study of two different movements: natural movement, that is, the evolution of births and deaths, and migratory movements, although in reality these movements are In part interdependent. Let us examine in turn their characteristics and their evolution in Europe, which will make it possible to show the relevance of the study of their impact.] ; La démographie est l'étude de deux mouvements différents : le mouve-ment naturel, c'est-à-dire l'évolution des naissances et des décès, et le mou-vement migratoire, même si, en réalité, ces deux mouvements sont en partie interdépendants. Examinons successivement leurs caractéristiques et leurs évolutions en Europe, ce qui permettra de montrer la pertinence de l'étude de leur impact.

The Israeli military has employed an artificial intelligence-driven "kill list" to select over 30,000 targets in Gaza with minimal human input, fueling civilian casualties in the war-torn strip, according to an explosive new investigation from +972 Magazine.Especially in the early days of the Gaza war, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) personnel ignored the AI's 10% false positive rate and intentionally targeted alleged militants in their homes with unguided "dumb bombs" despite an increased likelihood of civilian harm, according to IDF sources who spoke with +972 Magazine.The investigation sheds light on the myriad ways in which cutting-edge AI tech, combined with lax rules of engagement from IDF commanders on the ground, has fueled staggering rates of civilian harm in Gaza. At least 33,000 Palestinians have died due to Israel's campaign, which followed a Hamas attack that killed 1,200 Israelis last October.The AI targeting software, known as "Lavender," reportedly relies on sprawling surveillance networks and assigns a 1-100 score to every Gazan that estimates the likelihood that they are a Hamas militant. Soldiers then input this information into software known as "Where's Daddy," which uses AI to warn when an alleged militant has returned to their home.Previous reporting from +972 Magazine revealed the existence of a similar AI system for targeting houses used by militants, called "The Gospel." In both cases, the IDF said +972 Magazine exaggerated the role and impact of these high-tech tools."The doomsday scenario of killer algorithms is already unfolding in Gaza," argues Brianna Rosen, a senior fellow at Just Security and the University of Oxford who previously worked at the National Security Council during the Obama administration. RS spoke with Rosen to get her take on the latest revelations about Israel's use of AI in Gaza, how AI is changing war, and what U.S. policymakers should do to regulate military tech. The following conversation has been edited for length and clarity.RS: What does this new reporting from +972 Magazine tell us about how Israel has used AI in Gaza?Rosen: The first thing that I want to stress is that it's not just +972 Magazine. The IDF itself has actually commented on these systems as well. A lot of people claimed that the report overstates some of the claims about AI systems, but Israel itself has made a number of comments that support some of these facts. The report substantiates a trend that we've seen since December with Israel's use of AI in Gaza, which is that AI is increasing the pace of targeting in war and expanding the scope of war. As the IDF itself has acknowledged, it's using AI to accelerate targeting, and the facts are bearing this out. In the first two months of the conflict, Israel attacked roughly 25,000 targets — more than four times as many as previous wars in Gaza. And they're actioning more targets than they ever have in the past. At the same time that the pace of targeting is accelerating, AI is also expanding the scope of war, or the pool of potential targets that are actioned for elimination. They're targeting more junior operatives than they ever have before. In previous campaigns, Israel would run out of known combatants or legitimate military objectives. But this latest reporting [shows] that's not seemingly a barrier to killing anymore. AI is acting, in Israel's own words, as a force multiplier, meaning that it's removing the resource constraints that in the past would prevent the IDF from identifying enough targets. Now they're able to go after significantly lower targets with tenuous or no connections at all to Hamas even though, normally, they wouldn't pursue those targets because of the minimal impact of their death on military objectives.In short, AI is increasing the tempo of operations and expanding the pool of targets, which makes target verification and other precautionary obligations required under international law much harder to fulfill. All of this increases the risk that civilians will be misidentified and mistakenly targeted, contributing to the enormous civilian harm that we've seen thus far.RS: How does this relate to the idea of having a human "in the loop" for AI-driven decisions?Rosen: This is what is so concerning. The debate on military AI has been for so long focused on the wrong question. It's been focused on banning lethal autonomous weapons systems, or "killer robots," without recognizing that AI has already become a pervasive feature of war. Israel and other states, including the United States, are already integrating AI into military operations. They're saying that they're doing it in a responsible way with humans fully "in the loop." But the fear that I have, and which I think we're seeing play out here in Gaza, is that even with a human fully in the loop, there's significant civilian harm because the human reviews of machine decisions are essentially perfunctory.With this report that was released today, there's a claim that there is human verification of the outputs that the AI systems are generating but that the human verification was done in only 20 seconds, just long enough to see whether the target was male or female before authorizing the bombings. Regardless of whether that particular claim is actually borne out, there have been numerous academic studies about the risk of automation bias with AI, which I think is clearly at play here. Because the machine is so smart and has all of these data streams and intelligence streams being fed into it, there's a risk that humans don't sufficiently question its output. This risk of automation bias means that even if humans are approving the targets, they could be simply rubber stamping the decision to use force rather than thoroughly looking at the data that the machine has produced and going back and vetting the targets very carefully. That's just not being done, and it might not even be possible given the problems with explainability and traceability for humans to really understand how AI systems are generating these outputs. This is one of the questions that I asked, by the way, in my article in Just Security in December. Policymakers and the public need to press Israel on this question: What does the human review process really look like for these operations? Is this just rubber stamping the decision to use force, or is there serious review?RS: In this case, it seems like the impact of AI was amplified by the IDF's use of loose rules of engagement. Can you tell me a little bit more about the relationship between emerging tech and practical policy decisions about how to use it?Rosen: That's the other problem here. First of all, you have the problem of Israel's interpretation of international law, which is, in some ways, much more permissive than how other states interpret basic principles like proportionality. On top of that, there are inevitably going to be errors made with AI systems, which contributes to civilian harm. This latest report claims that the Lavender system, for example, was wrong 10% of the time. That margin of error could, in fact, be much greater depending on how Israel is classifying individuals as Hamas militants. The AI systems are trained on data, and Israel has identified certain characteristics of people who they claim are Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives, and then they feed that data into the machine. But what if the features that they are identifying are overly broad — such as carrying a weapon, being in a WhatsApp group with someone linked to Hamas, or even just moving house a lot, which everyone, of course, is doing now because it's a whole country of refugees. If these characteristics are fed into AI systems to identify militants, then that's a big concern because the system is going to take that data and misidentify civilians a great part of the time.Israel can say that it's following international law and that there's human review of all of these decisions, and all of that can be true. But again, it's Israel's interpretation of international law. And it's how they're defining who counts as the combatant in this war and how that data is fed into the AI systems. All of that compounds in a way that can create really serious harm. I also want to point out that all the well-documented problems with AI in the domestic context — from underlying biases in the algorithms to the problem of hallucination — are certainly going to persist in war, and it's going to be compounded because of the pace of decision making. None of this is going to be reviewed in a very careful way. For example, we know that Israel has a massive surveillance system in the Gaza Strip and that all of this data is being fed into the AI systems to contribute to these targeting outputs. Any underlying biases in those systems will feed into and compound into errors in the final targeting output. If human review is perfunctory, then the result will be significant civilian harm, which is what we have seen.RS: The U.S. is interested in AI for lots of military applications, including automated swarms of lethal drones. What does Israel's experience tell us about how American policymakers should approach this tech?Rosen: It tells us that U.S. policymakers have to be extremely circumspect about the use of AI in both intelligence and military operations. The White House and the Department of Defense and other agencies have put forth a number of statements about responsible AI, particularly in a military context. But these have all been very much at the level of principles. Everything depends on how these broad principles for the responsible use of military AI are operationalized in practice, and, of course, we haven't really had a case yet where we've seen the U.S. in a public way relying on these tools in their conflicts. But that's definitely coming, and the U.S. should use this time now to not only learn all the lessons of what's happening in Gaza, but to be very proactive in operationalizing those broad principles for responsible use of military AI, socializing them among other states, and really leading the world in signing on to these principles for military AI. They have to a certain extent, but the progress has been very, very slow. That's what's desperately needed right now.

The dissertation Compounds of Modernity aimed at moving beyond meta-narratives and theoretical frameworks of neoliberalism and globalization to analyze the contemporary gated communities and spaces of exclusion. Instead of analyzing enclaves as products of neoliberalism and global culture, the dissertation looks at them as "processes of urban explosion" embedded in the history of power and control. Building new housing settlements on the periphery is not anew. The state technocrats, architects, and urban planners had always used these projects as instruments towards controlling population, hygienic development, and citizen formation. By looking at how the design of these compounds had changed with time, I generate a set of narratives concerning power, spatial governance, dealing with hygiene as a thing to control, the othering of citizens, and modernizing the nation-state. The changing rhetoric and underlying logic to manipulate the erection of these new compounds reveals how the state categorizes its citizens and invents the "other." The construction of the "risk society" is a mere political and social construct in Egypt's modern history. In the countryside during late colonial Egypt and early post-colonial time (1940s and 1950s), the humans and non-humans were objects of governance and control in the architectures of Hassan Fathy (New Gourna Village) and Sayyid Karim (the Manor). The inferior fellah and dirty animal were the infectious species to produce national crises of malaria, typhoid, and Bilharzia. Modernizing species and standardizing the built environment was part of building the state and maintaining national order. Later in the early 1950s, a housing initiative called the "Cordon-and-resettling" led to walling out old unhygienic communities and relocating villagers to the modern "Village of Tomorrow," which included military training centers and new university villages. Under the social welfare state of Nasser, the housing mission in the city was to make new citizens, educate them through the state's secular curricula, alleviate social class antagonism, build the "happy family," and curb internal political struggles after the transition from monarchy to the Republic. The citizen and [his] experience was the main object of governance in the Villages of Tomorrow, such as Tahrir Province.In Cairo, a similar hygienic revolution occurred under the "Connect-fill-and-expand" housing initiative. One spatial outcome was the new compound on the periphery of Cairo, the "City of Tomorrow" experiment of Madinet Nasr or Nasr City (late 1950s and 1960s). In the new settlement of Nasr City, Sayyid Karim and Mohamed Riyad designed residential quarters, governmental buildings, Islamic university campus of Al-Azhar, wide roads for army parades and military zones were erected side by side. The notion of a "disciplined society" was emphasized through zoning and land use. A hierarchy of state institutions and power characterized Nasr City with high visibility. The production of a disciplined society was further emphasized with the state's full control over the construction of housing after the rent control law that discouraged private real-estate developers from building new housing. The centralization of housing led to controlling the means of modernizing space, housing, and society. With Infitah or the open door economy developed under Sadat in the 1970s till the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) of Mubarak in the 1990s, the object of governance and control became economic growth and desert land development. Technocrats experimented a set of new towns in the desert, which failed to attract population at the beginning until the erection of gated communities with new mechanisms and technologies of governance in the desert. Security and hygiene were used as underlying frameworks to attract residents as manifested in the gated community of "Al-Rehab City" in New Cairo. Using walls, gates, checkpoints, privatized security training, and the mapping of surveillance, together with private amenities and functioning infrastructure, gated communities started to attract residents. Turning those spaces into "zones of control" and surveillance became the new modern governing technology than simply enforcing citizens and disciplining them like the era of Nasser. The state security apparatus, however, still has its influence inside gated communities through partnerships and collaborations with the privatized security. The transformation of the society from a "disciplined society" in the Foucaultian sense to a "controlled society" in Nikolas Rose's sense is parallel to the change in political economy from social welfare to the free market mechanisms. The disciplined society depends on a central agency such as the panopticon to watch, monitor, and correct the behavior of citizens is fundamentally transformed into decentralized nucleated agencies (private sector) working laterally with the state to maintain order. The decentralization of security and non-hierarchical forms of domination characterizes the "controlled society" and housing projects that is made possible under the free market economy. The decentralization of the design process also takes place. Architects and urban planners of gated communities such as Mahmoud Yousry of Al-Rehab, design together with marketing sales team, Hisham Talaat (developer), and the security design element is covered by retired military generals. By understanding the interactions of local forces, spatial growth, how these spaces are realized in reality, and society construction through history, I theorize the contemporary gated communities moving beyond meta-narratives and grand theories of globalization.

In recent years, sustainable economic development has been an increasingly higher priority for all, both well and less developed, states. The global economic crisis that broke out in 2008 showed that the steadily high growth rates demonstrated by many countries throughout the pre-crisis years, even giving some of them the honorary titles like, for instance, "Celtic tiger," in actual fact do not always testify to sustainable development. There are economic and social "diseases" that can disrupt, or at least slow down, growth no matter how sustainable it previously seemed. Whereby these diseases can be both internal, that is, determined by trends governing the country's development, and external, that is, brought in from the outside world, making sustainable economic development not at all what it seemed to be before the crisis. Economic development can be considered fully sustainable if it meets the following three conditions: (a) the economy increases at a stable rate that is sufficiently high for its size and for the given time; (b) it is able to efficiently resist external negative impacts; and (c) it is not oriented toward exclusively current tasks, but leaves sufficiently broad opportunities for the future-including with respect to resource distribution. In other words, economic development is sustainable if it is stable, tenable, and long-term. Practical achievement of this sustainability is complicated by the fact that it depends not only on economic factors as such, but also on other components of social development. Conceptually, balanced and harmonious development of the different components of social progress is a mandatory condition of its sustainability as a whole, on the one hand, and of each of these components separately, on the other, whereby in terms of all three parameters of sustainability. We should proceed from the fact that the development curves of different spheres of public life, including the economy, politics, religion, science, education, public health, and culture, wind around the common trunk of social development that forms as their integral result. Should one of these curves ultimately break away from the main trunk (over the span of a hundred years, say), it will be unable to survive independently. Each sphere of social life draws other spheres toward it and tries to bring them to its level of development (higher or lower), which is what causes all the curves to gravitate toward the common trunk. Which curve proves the strongest and is able to attract the others to it depends on a multitude of factors, including its "weight and strength" at a particular historical stage in social development and on how socially important the functions it performs are in public life. The development of the world's countries and regions abounds in examples that confirm this governing law. We know that in Western Europe, the capitalist economy that came to life in the womb of feudalism eventually gave rise to so-called bourgeois revolutions that raised the political system to the economic level. In the U.S., on the contrary, constitutionally enforced political rights opened the way to economic and then cultural development. A splendid illustration, although of an entirely different nature, is the experience of the Arab world. In the pre-Islamic period, Arab tribes were disunited and extremely backward communities.Girls were killed at birth, burying them alive in the desert sand. Along with polygamy, about which much has been said, there was also polyandry, when several (up to ten) men pooled their money to pay for an "extremely expensive" bride and then went into her tent in turn, leaving their staffs propped up outside the door to let the other husbands know that their common wife was currently occupied. The forms of government had only some remote resemblance to statehood. The new religion that emerged proved to be an immeasurably more progressive component of public life than all the rest and drew them along behind it. State- and nation-building essentially began under the auspices of Islam. In historically short time spans, an army (along the lines of a war ministry), integrated financial system (a prototype of the ministry of finance), communication service, and navy were created, while the newly conquered territories were divided into regions (administrative-territorial reform), and so on. Then the Golden Age of the Muslim East, related primarily with the Seljuk Turks, dawned. Along with intensive development of the economy, it was marked by tempestuous scientific progress in mathematics, geography, mineralogy, philosophy, comparative theology and ethics, astronomy, physics and chemistry, psychology, and even political science. Medicine (particularly physiology and pharmacology), practical engineering, and art (poetry, music, architecture, and painting) underwent unprecedented development, not only in the East, but also throughout the world. These and many other achievements of the Golden Age are described in detail in a magnificent article by Professor S. Frederick Starr. In the contemporary world, the different spheres of public life interact somewhat differently, possibly less directly and in more complex ways, although this in no way disaffirms the general patterns that govern them. There is a special case when for some reason, particularly if there is a surplus of resources, the economic prosperity of a state and the wellbeing of society as such race far ahead of other spheres. This is precisely what is happening at present, as we shall see, in Azerbaijan.