Suchergebnisse

Cette présentation a comme objectif d'offrir un aperçu de la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice relative au Règlement 1393/2007

Cet ouvrage procède d'une prémisse bien connue : le droit pénal, s'il contribue au maintien des droits essentiels de chacun, implique en retour l'exercice d'un certain pouvoir de contrainte sur les individus, et constitue ainsi un danger à l'égard de ces mêmes droits et libertés. La justice pénale internationale n'est, pas plus que les tribunaux nationaux, épargnée par ce « paradoxe pénal ». C'est cette conviction qui a inspiré le présent ouvrage. Son ambition est de mettre l'action de la Cour pénale internationale à l'épreuve de l'exigence de liberté. Le droit et la pratique de la Cour pénale internationale y sont ainsi successivement confrontés à sept applications concrètes de cette garantie essentielle : le droit d'être informé des raisons de sa privation de liberté, le droit d'être présenté à un juge, le droit de contester le bien-fondé de sa privation de liberté, le droit à la liberté stricto sensu, le droit d'être libéré pour raisons humanitaires, le droit d'être jugé rapidement ou libéré au cours de la procédure et, enfin, le droit à une réparation appropriée.

This article examines President Clinton's decisions to launch military actions against Iraq in June 1993 and Kosovo in 1999. This study represents an attempt to test the descriptive accuracy and further developing the diversionary theory of war. Using a qualitative framework for diversionary use of force developed by another researcher, Ryan C. Hendrickson, this research examines and compares the two cases in order to determine whether or not these strikes appear to be diversionary in nature. This article generally suggests that empirical support for the diversionary argument in these cases is "mixed" but has more validity in the actions against Iraq. Two proposals to further develop qualitative tests for diversionary use of force are advanced.

Based on intensive fieldwork in a district in China, this article illustrates that "power–interest networks" (quanli liyi wangluo) work as pre-existing tools for social control, specifically to govern residents' behaviour when they engage in any protest against the state. The networks originated from an institutional setting in which local authorities have been the largest resource grabber and where personal ties have mainly determined resource allocation decisions. Residents who are capable of using networks to operate via the back door thus get rich, but their dependence on networks also poses constraints on their anti-demolition protests. By contrast, residents who are incapable of using networks tend to lag behind, but their marginalised status unexpectedly offers them greater autonomy to negotiate a better bargain with local authorities. The differences reveal a "half-open" state control through resources allocation, which seems to work for residents who have intensive interactions with local authorities but not for others who are self-sufficient. The existence of networks sheds light on the importance of local politics in determining Chinese protests and has not been amply discussed in recent years. Networks also reinforce the operational rationale of "relational repression", shaped not only by sanctions and sentiments but also by benefits. (China/GIGA)