The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has arguably shifted its position towards social protection, understood as a set of public measu- res intended to protect individuals from social and economic distress in cases of income reduction or loss. Leadership in the IMF has affirmed that there has been a change from its much-criticized focus on structu- ral adjustments and austerity, to a "new" approach and interest in social issues through the lens of "macro-criticality." In this article, we survey the evolution and extent of this possible shift, given the important role of the IMF in social protection: the macro-economic recommendations the organization makes have a clear influence over countries' policy decisions related to social protection, through mechanisms including surveillance advice and expertise, conditionalities on lending, and its gatekeeping role for third-party lending. We examine the IMF's response to the economic crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic to assess the extent to which its policies have truly shifted. We show that, while there have been promising policy changes, including lowering or even elimina- ting some conditionalities and promoting healthcare spending, its focus on targeted measures to combat poverty, as opposed to universal social protection floors, and its continued focus on fiscal sustainability, lead to an ambiguous approach that hinders progress to make social protection universal, as committed by governments in ILO Recommendation 202 (2012). We find that a sharp contrast remains between efforts deployed to meet countries' financing needs and the content of the conditionali- ties imposed in the name of fiscal sustainability. The IMF must adopt a human rights-based approach towards social protection, going beyond targeting and towards universality, and not simply mitigate the effects of its programs on the vulnerable. Increasing cooperation with other international organizations, not only the World Bank, but UNICEF and the ILO as well, and joining ongoing efforts for the establishment of a Global Fund for Social Protection, would be a first step in this direction ; Se puede afirmar que el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) ha cambiado su postura sobre la protección social, entendida como el conjunto de medidas públicas destinadas a proteger a la población de los peligros sociales y económicos en caso de reducción o pérdida de ingresos. Desde los más altos cargos del FMI, se ha afirmado que se produjo un cambio en el foco de su atención: de una concentración excesiva en ajustes estructurales, con frecuencia muy criticada, a un "nuevo" abordaje e interés en las cuestiones sociales a través del prisma de la "macrocrítica". En el presente artículo, se estudia la evolución y el alcance de este aparente cambio, dada la importancia del papel del FMI en la protección social: las recomendaciones macroeconómicas del organismo tienen una influencia decisiva sobre las decisiones de políticas a nivel nacional en relación con la protección social, mediante mecanismos como las recomendaciones y experiencia de vigilancia, las condicionalidades sobre préstamos y el papel del FMI como facilitador ante préstamos a terceros. También se analiza la respuesta del FMI a la crisis económica originada por la pandemia de la COVID-19 a fin de evaluar hasta qué punto se han modificado sus políticas en la realidad. Mostramos que, si bien se han concretado algunos cambios promete- dores en las políticas, entre ellas, la reducción y hasta eliminación de algunas condicionalidades y la promoción de inversiones en el sector salud, la insistencia en medidas selectivas para combatir la pobreza, en lugar del fomento de pisos de protección social universales, así como el enfoque persistente en la sustentabilidad fiscal, condujeron a un abordaje ambiguo que menoscaba los avances en pos de hacer de la protección social un recurso universal, tal y como se comprometieron los gobiernos en la Recomendación 202 de la OIT (2012). Prevalece un marcado contraste entre, de un lado, los esfuerzos desplegados para satisfacer las necesidades de financiamiento de los países, y del otro, la imposición de condicionalidades en nombre de la sustentabilidad fiscal. El FMI debe adoptar un enfoque de la protección social basado en los derechos humanos, que supere su tradicional insistencia en medidas selectivas en pos de la universalidad, de manera que se logre avanzar más allá de la mitigación de los efectos de sus programas sobre secto- res vulnerables. Un primer paso en esta dirección sería incrementar la cooperación con otras organizaciones internacionales, no solo el Banco Mundial, sino también UNICEF y la OIT, así como incorporarse a los esfuerzos existentes para el establecimiento de un Fondo Global para la Protección Social.
Abstrak: Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui efektivitas Badan Amil Zakat Nasional (BAZNAS) dalam pengembangan usaha Masyarakat Miskin di Kabupaten Karanganyar, hambatan BAZNAS dalam pengembangan usaha masyarakat miskin serta solusi atas hambatan efektivitas BAZNAS dalam pengembangan usaha masyarakat miskin di Kabupaten Karanganyar. Pendekatan yang digunakan di dalam penelitian ini yaitu pendekatan deskriptif kualitatif. Penelitian ini dilakukan di Kabupaten Karanganyar yang meliputi kantor BAZNAS Karanganyar dan lokasi usaha masyarakat miskin penerima zakat produktif dengan subjek penelitian yaitu amil BAZNAS Kabupaten Karangnyar dan selaku informan yaitu masyarakat miskin penerima zakat produktif. Tekhnik pengujian keabsahan data yang digunakan yaitu tekhnik triangulasi dengan sumber.Selanjutnya analisis data dilakukan dengan cara reduksi data, penyajian data, dan penarikan kesimpulan. Hasil dari penelitian ini yaitu, 1) Efektivitas BAZNAS Kabupaten Karanganyar dalam pengembangan usaha masyarakat miskin di kabupaten Karanganyar belum maksimal; 2) Faktor penghambat efektivitas BAZNAS dalam pengembangan usaha masyarakat miskin yaitu lemahnya manajemen dan kurangnya tanggung jawab mustahiq dalam penggunaan dana zakat sesuai dengan maksud penyalurannya; 3) Solusi atas faktor penghambat BAZNAS dalam pengembangan usaha masyarakat miskin di Kabupaten Karanganyar adalah mengarahkan mustahiq yang modalnya tidak cukup dalam mengembangkan usaha untuk melakukan pinjaman pada Koperasi Agung Syariah dengan bunga lunak dan bersikap tegas kepada beberapa masyarakat yang kurang bertanggung jawab dalam penggunaan barang pinjaman dari BAZNAS Kabupaten Karanganyar. Kata kunci : Efektivitas, Zakat, BAZNAS, Kemiskinan, Pengembangan Usaha. Abstract: The purpose of this study is to determine the effectiveness of "Badan Amil Zakat Nasional" (BAZNAS) in the business development of the poor society in Karanganyar, the obstacle of BAZNAS in business development of poor society, and the solution of effectiveness BAZNAS to come over the obstacles in the business development of poor society in Karanganyar. The approach of this study is a qualitative descriptive approach. This research was conducted in Karanganyar which includes BAZNASKaranganyar office and business location for productive poor recipients with the subject of research BAZNAS Amil Karanganyar and as informants are poor society who receive productive zakat. The tecniques used to validate the data is triangulation techniques with some sources. Furthermore, the data analysis is done by data reduction, data presentation, and conclusion. The results of this study are, 1) The effectivenessof BAZNAS Karanganyar in the businessdevelopment of poor society in Karanganyar does not maximal; 2) The obstacles of BAZNAS effectiveness in the business development of poor societyare poor management and lack of "mustahiq" responsibility in the use of zakat funds for distribution purpose; 3) The Solutions of BAZNAS' obstacles in the business development of poor society in Karanganyar is "mustahiq" that the venture capital is not enough to develop the business for loans to the "Koperasi Agung Syariah" with the soft interest and to be firm for some people who are less responsible in the use of goods on loan from BAZNAS Karanganyar.Keywords: Effectivity, Zakat, BAZNAS, Poverty, BusinessDAFTAR PUSTAKAAflah, Noor. Arsitektur Zakat Indonesia.Jakarta : UI-Press. 2009Ahmad M. Saefuddin. Ekonomi dan Masyarakat dalam Perspektif Islam.ed.1 cet.1. Jakarta: CV Rajawali. 1987Al Markas al Islami. Modul Pelatihan fiqh dan Manajemen Zakat. Makassar: Institut Manajemen Zakat (IMZ), 2004Ali, Nuruddin. Zakat sebagai Instrumen Dalam Kebijakan Fiskal, Edisi. 1, Jakarta : PT. Raja Grafindo Persada, 2006Arikunto, Suharsimi. Prosedur Penelitian Suatu Pendekatan Praktik. Cet. IV; Jakarta : Rineka Cipta. 2002Arsyad, Azhar. Media pembelajaran. Bandung: Rajawali Press. 2010Ash- Shiddieqy, M Hasbi, Pedoman Zakat , Cetakan 3 ; Semarang. 2009Asnaini. Zakat Produktif Dalam Perspektif Hukum Islam. Bengkulu : Pustaka Pelajar Offset. 2008Az-Zuhaili, Wahbah. Fiqh Islam Wa adillatuhu, Cet. I; Jakarta : Gema Insani, 2011Departemen Agama RI, Al-Qur'an dan terjemahannya, Solo; PT. Tiga Serangkai Pustaka Mandiri. 2014Dwi, Sintha Wulansari dan Achmad Hendra Setiawan, SE.,Msi. Analisis Peranan Dana Zakat Produktif Terhadap Perkembangan Usaha Mikro Mustahik (Penerima Zakat) Studi Kasus Rumah Zakat Kota Semarang).2014Hafinuddin, Didin.Zakat dalam perekonomian modern.Cet. II, Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2002Inayah, Gazi. Teori Komprehensip Tentang Zakat dan Pajak.cet;1. Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana. 2003Kuncoro, Mudrajat. Masalah Kebijakan dan Politik ekonomika Pembangunan.Jakarta : Erlangga. 2010Margono.Metodologi penelitian pendidikan.Cet. IV; Jakarta: Rineka Cipta, 2004Moleong, Lexy J, Metode Penelitian Kualitatif, Penerbit PT. Remaja Rosdakarya, Bandung. 2006Muhammad dan Ridwan Mas'ud.Zakat dan Kemiskinan Instrumen Pemberdayaan Ekonomi Umat.Yogyakarta: UII Press. 2005Narbuko, Cholid dan Abu Achmadi.Metodologi Penelitian. Jakarta : PT. Bumi Aksara, 2009Nugraha, Garry Winoto.Pengaruh Dana Zakat Produktif Terhadap Keuntungan Usaha Mustahik Penerima Zakat (Studi Kasus BAZ Kota Semarang). Semarang: 2011Pawito. Penelitian Komunikasi Kualitatif. Yogyakarta: Pelangi Aksara Yogyakarta. 2007Republik Indonesia, Undang-Undang. No. 23 Tahun 2011, Tentang Pengelolaan Zakat.Rusli. Abu Bakar. sofyan Syahnur, Kuala Analisis Dampak Pemberian Modal Zakat Produktif Terhadap Pengentasan Kemiskinan di Kabupaten Aceh Utara (Aceh Utara: Jurnal Ilmu Ekonomi Pascasarjana Universitas Syiah Vol. 1, Februari 2013) Sartika, Mila. Pengaruh Pendayagunaan Zakat Produktif Terhadap Pemberdayaan Mustahiq Pada LAZ Yayasan Solo Peduli Surakarta. Jurnal Ekonomi Islam: Vol. II, No.1. 2008Sugiono. Metode Penelitian Kuantitatif Kualitatif Dan R&D. Bandung: Alfabeta. 2012Tajuddin, Lestari. Etika Berwirausaha Menurut Perspektif Islam ( Studi Kasus Di Toko An-Naba, 2013Pusat.baznas.go.id/berita-artikel/majelis-ulama-indonesia-dan-fatwa-pengelolaan-zakat/. Diakses pada tanggal 15 Oktober 2015.
This PhD thesis gives a numerical illustration of how a carbon tax affects South African GDP, employment, CO2 emissions and socio-economic inequality. It uses a "hybrid" computable general equilibrium model of an open economy in a one-step projection from 2005 to 2035. It models second-best economies, notably skill-related rigidities in the labour market and in production of electricity. Seven scenarios for recycling of carbon tax revenue are analysed, plus an option to invest a part of tax revenue in improvement of skills of labour.The analysis shows that under conventional assumptions about technological change, a carbon tax of around 100 ZAR2005 (18 USD2013) per tonne of CO2 will have little negative consequences for GDP and employment, when combined with the right type of tax revenue recycling: Labour subsidies and company profit tax reduction likely lead to the best macro-economic outcomes, though do not reduce inequality. Additional measures are needed to reduce "energy poverty". To achieve South Africa's NDC of the Paris Agreement, a carbon tax rate of around 300 ZAR2005 or 55 USD2013 per tonne of CO2 is necessary. However, this could have serious impacts on GDP growth. Also, without a change in the trend of increasing labour productivity, such lower GDP will lead to higher unemployment than in the reference case. An investment in skills of 7.5 billion ZAR2005 of annual Ctax revenue, with the objective of increasing access to high quality education and reducing the high skill labour shortage, if fond to have a very positive impact on GDP growth. However better calibration data is required.The findings of this PhD thesis furthermore call for thorough examination of what type of technological change could be expected for South Africa. Technological progress, consumer preferences and international circumstances limit the economy's capacity to restructure and decarbonise and therefore to reduce negative consequences of carbon taxation for GDP growth. Proper assessment of future technological change is relevant for all sectors and inputs. Examples are given which show that energy and materials efficiency have an important role for future GDP growth under carbon constraints, because they determine the economy's flexibility to reduce energy consumption and to substitute it, e.g. by labour. This finding normally holds not only for South Africa, but also for the rest of the world. These results also imply that international climate policy has to address technology transfer and the different potentials of national economies to decarbonise seriously. ; Cette thèse fournit une illustration numérique de la façon dont une taxe carbone pourrait affecter le PIB, l'emploi, les émissions de CO2 et les inégalités socio-économiques en Afrique du Sud. Elle utilise un modèle d'équilibre général calculable « hybride » en économie ouverte par projection en un seul pas de temps de 2005 à 2035. Le modèle représente des économies de second rang, notamment des rigidités sur le marché du travail liées aux niveaux de qualification et dans la production électrique. Sept scénarios basés sur des modalités différentes de recyclage de la taxe carbone sont analysés, plus une option d'investir une partie des revenus de la taxe dans l'amélioration des qualifications de la force de travail.L'analyse montre que sous hypothèse standard de changement technique, une taxe carbone de 100 ZAR par tonne de CO2 environ a peu d'impact négatif sur le PIB et l'emploi lorsqu'elle est associée à un mode de recyclage des revenus approprié : subventionner le facteur travail et réduire les taxes sur les profits des entreprises pourrait conduire aux meilleurs résultats macroéconomiques, mais ne réduit pas les inégalités. Des mesures supplémentaires sont nécessaires pour réduire la « pauvreté énergétique ». Pour atteindre le NDC d'Afrique du Sud au titre de l'Accord de Paris, un taux de taxe d'environ 300 ZAR ou 55 dollars par tonne de CO2 serait nécessaire. Toutefois, un tel taux pourrait avoir un impact significatif sur la croissance du PIB. En même temps, sans changement de la tendance de croissance de la productivité du travail, ce PIB plus faible conduirait à un chômage plus élevé que dans le cas de référence. Une politique d'investissement de 7.5 milliards de ZAR de revenus carbone dans les qualifications de la main d'œuvre, avec l'objectif d'augmenter l'accès à la formation de haut niveau et de réduire le manque de salariés très qualifiés, pourrait avoir un effet très positif sur la croissance du PIB.Le progrès technologique, les préférences des consommateurs et le contexte international, limitent la capacité de l'économie à se restructurer et se décarboner et incidemment à réduire les impacts négatifs de la taxe carbone sur la croissance du PIB. Une véritable évaluation du changement technologique futur serait pertinente pour tous les secteurs et facteurs de production. Ces résultats impliquent aussi que la politique climatique internationale doit traiter la question des transferts de technologie et celles des potentiels différents de décarbonation sérieuse à l'échelle nationale.
This PhD thesis gives a numerical illustration of how a carbon tax affects South African GDP, employment, CO2 emissions and socio-economic inequality. It uses a "hybrid" computable general equilibrium model of an open economy in a one-step projection from 2005 to 2035. It models second-best economies, notably skill-related rigidities in the labour market and in production of electricity. Seven scenarios for recycling of carbon tax revenue are analysed, plus an option to invest a part of tax revenue in improvement of skills of labour.The analysis shows that under conventional assumptions about technological change, a carbon tax of around 100 ZAR2005 (18 USD2013) per tonne of CO2 will have little negative consequences for GDP and employment, when combined with the right type of tax revenue recycling: Labour subsidies and company profit tax reduction likely lead to the best macro-economic outcomes, though do not reduce inequality. Additional measures are needed to reduce "energy poverty". To achieve South Africa's NDC of the Paris Agreement, a carbon tax rate of around 300 ZAR2005 or 55 USD2013 per tonne of CO2 is necessary. However, this could have serious impacts on GDP growth. Also, without a change in the trend of increasing labour productivity, such lower GDP will lead to higher unemployment than in the reference case. An investment in skills of 7.5 billion ZAR2005 of annual Ctax revenue, with the objective of increasing access to high quality education and reducing the high skill labour shortage, if fond to have a very positive impact on GDP growth. However better calibration data is required.The findings of this PhD thesis furthermore call for thorough examination of what type of technological change could be expected for South Africa. Technological progress, consumer preferences and international circumstances limit the economy's capacity to restructure and decarbonise and therefore to reduce negative consequences of carbon taxation for GDP growth. Proper assessment of future technological change is relevant for all sectors and inputs. Examples are given which show that energy and materials efficiency have an important role for future GDP growth under carbon constraints, because they determine the economy's flexibility to reduce energy consumption and to substitute it, e.g. by labour. This finding normally holds not only for South Africa, but also for the rest of the world. These results also imply that international climate policy has to address technology transfer and the different potentials of national economies to decarbonise seriously. ; Cette thèse fournit une illustration numérique de la façon dont une taxe carbone pourrait affecter le PIB, l'emploi, les émissions de CO2 et les inégalités socio-économiques en Afrique du Sud. Elle utilise un modèle d'équilibre général calculable « hybride » en économie ouverte par projection en un seul pas de temps de 2005 à 2035. Le modèle représente des économies de second rang, notamment des rigidités sur le marché du travail liées aux niveaux de qualification et dans la production électrique. Sept scénarios basés sur des modalités différentes de recyclage de la taxe carbone sont analysés, plus une option d'investir une partie des revenus de la taxe dans l'amélioration des qualifications de la force de travail.L'analyse montre que sous hypothèse standard de changement technique, une taxe carbone de 100 ZAR par tonne de CO2 environ a peu d'impact négatif sur le PIB et l'emploi lorsqu'elle est associée à un mode de recyclage des revenus approprié : subventionner le facteur travail et réduire les taxes sur les profits des entreprises pourrait conduire aux meilleurs résultats macroéconomiques, mais ne réduit pas les inégalités. Des mesures supplémentaires sont nécessaires pour réduire la « pauvreté énergétique ». Pour atteindre le NDC d'Afrique du Sud au titre de l'Accord de Paris, un taux de taxe d'environ 300 ZAR ou 55 dollars par tonne de CO2 serait nécessaire. Toutefois, un tel taux pourrait avoir un impact significatif sur la croissance du PIB. En même temps, sans changement de la tendance de croissance de la productivité du travail, ce PIB plus faible conduirait à un chômage plus élevé que dans le cas de référence. Une politique d'investissement de 7.5 milliards de ZAR de revenus carbone dans les qualifications de la main d'œuvre, avec l'objectif d'augmenter l'accès à la formation de haut niveau et de réduire le manque de salariés très qualifiés, pourrait avoir un effet très positif sur la croissance du PIB.Le progrès technologique, les préférences des consommateurs et le contexte international, limitent la capacité de l'économie à se restructurer et se décarboner et incidemment à réduire les impacts négatifs de la taxe carbone sur la croissance du PIB. Une véritable évaluation du changement technologique futur serait pertinente pour tous les secteurs et facteurs de production. Ces résultats impliquent aussi que la politique climatique internationale doit traiter la question des transferts de technologie et celles des potentiels différents de décarbonation sérieuse à l'échelle nationale.
This PhD thesis gives a numerical illustration of how a carbon tax affects South African GDP, employment, CO2 emissions and socio-economic inequality. It uses a "hybrid" computable general equilibrium model of an open economy in a one-step projection from 2005 to 2035. It models second-best economies, notably skill-related rigidities in the labour market and in production of electricity. Seven scenarios for recycling of carbon tax revenue are analysed, plus an option to invest a part of tax revenue in improvement of skills of labour.The analysis shows that under conventional assumptions about technological change, a carbon tax of around 100 ZAR2005 (18 USD2013) per tonne of CO2 will have little negative consequences for GDP and employment, when combined with the right type of tax revenue recycling: Labour subsidies and company profit tax reduction likely lead to the best macro-economic outcomes, though do not reduce inequality. Additional measures are needed to reduce "energy poverty". To achieve South Africa's NDC of the Paris Agreement, a carbon tax rate of around 300 ZAR2005 or 55 USD2013 per tonne of CO2 is necessary. However, this could have serious impacts on GDP growth. Also, without a change in the trend of increasing labour productivity, such lower GDP will lead to higher unemployment than in the reference case. An investment in skills of 7.5 billion ZAR2005 of annual Ctax revenue, with the objective of increasing access to high quality education and reducing the high skill labour shortage, if fond to have a very positive impact on GDP growth. However better calibration data is required.The findings of this PhD thesis furthermore call for thorough examination of what type of technological change could be expected for South Africa. Technological progress, consumer preferences and international circumstances limit the economy's capacity to restructure and decarbonise and therefore to reduce negative consequences of carbon taxation for GDP growth. Proper assessment of future technological change is relevant for all sectors and inputs. Examples are given which show that energy and materials efficiency have an important role for future GDP growth under carbon constraints, because they determine the economy's flexibility to reduce energy consumption and to substitute it, e.g. by labour. This finding normally holds not only for South Africa, but also for the rest of the world. These results also imply that international climate policy has to address technology transfer and the different potentials of national economies to decarbonise seriously. ; Cette thèse fournit une illustration numérique de la façon dont une taxe carbone pourrait affecter le PIB, l'emploi, les émissions de CO2 et les inégalités socio-économiques en Afrique du Sud. Elle utilise un modèle d'équilibre général calculable « hybride » en économie ouverte par projection en un seul pas de temps de 2005 à 2035. Le modèle représente des économies de second rang, notamment des rigidités sur le marché du travail liées aux niveaux de qualification et dans la production électrique. Sept scénarios basés sur des modalités différentes de recyclage de la taxe carbone sont analysés, plus une option d'investir une partie des revenus de la taxe dans l'amélioration des qualifications de la force de travail.L'analyse montre que sous hypothèse standard de changement technique, une taxe carbone de 100 ZAR par tonne de CO2 environ a peu d'impact négatif sur le PIB et l'emploi lorsqu'elle est associée à un mode de recyclage des revenus approprié : subventionner le facteur travail et réduire les taxes sur les profits des entreprises pourrait conduire aux meilleurs résultats macroéconomiques, mais ne réduit pas les inégalités. Des mesures supplémentaires sont nécessaires pour réduire la « pauvreté énergétique ». Pour atteindre le NDC d'Afrique du Sud au titre de l'Accord de Paris, un taux de taxe d'environ 300 ZAR ou 55 dollars par tonne de CO2 serait nécessaire. Toutefois, un tel taux pourrait avoir un impact significatif sur la croissance du PIB. En même temps, sans changement de la tendance de croissance de la productivité du travail, ce PIB plus faible conduirait à un chômage plus élevé que dans le cas de référence. Une politique d'investissement de 7.5 milliards de ZAR de revenus carbone dans les qualifications de la main d'œuvre, avec l'objectif d'augmenter l'accès à la formation de haut niveau et de réduire le manque de salariés très qualifiés, pourrait avoir un effet très positif sur la croissance du PIB.Le progrès technologique, les préférences des consommateurs et le contexte international, limitent la capacité de l'économie à se restructurer et se décarboner et incidemment à réduire les impacts négatifs de la taxe carbone sur la croissance du PIB. Une véritable évaluation du changement technologique futur serait pertinente pour tous les secteurs et facteurs de production. Ces résultats impliquent aussi que la politique climatique internationale doit traiter la question des transferts de technologie et celles des potentiels différents de décarbonation sérieuse à l'échelle nationale.
This PhD thesis gives a numerical illustration of how a carbon tax affects South African GDP, employment, CO2 emissions and socio-economic inequality. It uses a "hybrid" computable general equilibrium model of an open economy in a one-step projection from 2005 to 2035. It models second-best economies, notably skill-related rigidities in the labour market and in production of electricity. Seven scenarios for recycling of carbon tax revenue are analysed, plus an option to invest a part of tax revenue in improvement of skills of labour.The analysis shows that under conventional assumptions about technological change, a carbon tax of around 100 ZAR2005 (18 USD2013) per tonne of CO2 will have little negative consequences for GDP and employment, when combined with the right type of tax revenue recycling: Labour subsidies and company profit tax reduction likely lead to the best macro-economic outcomes, though do not reduce inequality. Additional measures are needed to reduce "energy poverty". To achieve South Africa's NDC of the Paris Agreement, a carbon tax rate of around 300 ZAR2005 or 55 USD2013 per tonne of CO2 is necessary. However, this could have serious impacts on GDP growth. Also, without a change in the trend of increasing labour productivity, such lower GDP will lead to higher unemployment than in the reference case. An investment in skills of 7.5 billion ZAR2005 of annual Ctax revenue, with the objective of increasing access to high quality education and reducing the high skill labour shortage, if fond to have a very positive impact on GDP growth. However better calibration data is required.The findings of this PhD thesis furthermore call for thorough examination of what type of technological change could be expected for South Africa. Technological progress, consumer preferences and international circumstances limit the economy's capacity to restructure and decarbonise and therefore to reduce negative consequences of carbon taxation for GDP growth. Proper assessment of future technological change is relevant for all sectors and inputs. Examples are given which show that energy and materials efficiency have an important role for future GDP growth under carbon constraints, because they determine the economy's flexibility to reduce energy consumption and to substitute it, e.g. by labour. This finding normally holds not only for South Africa, but also for the rest of the world. These results also imply that international climate policy has to address technology transfer and the different potentials of national economies to decarbonise seriously. ; Cette thèse fournit une illustration numérique de la façon dont une taxe carbone pourrait affecter le PIB, l'emploi, les émissions de CO2 et les inégalités socio-économiques en Afrique du Sud. Elle utilise un modèle d'équilibre général calculable « hybride » en économie ouverte par projection en un seul pas de temps de 2005 à 2035. Le modèle représente des économies de second rang, notamment des rigidités sur le marché du travail liées aux niveaux de qualification et dans la production électrique. Sept scénarios basés sur des modalités différentes de recyclage de la taxe carbone sont analysés, plus une option d'investir une partie des revenus de la taxe dans l'amélioration des qualifications de la force de travail.L'analyse montre que sous hypothèse standard de changement technique, une taxe carbone de 100 ZAR par tonne de CO2 environ a peu d'impact négatif sur le PIB et l'emploi lorsqu'elle est associée à un mode de recyclage des revenus approprié : subventionner le facteur travail et réduire les taxes sur les profits des entreprises pourrait conduire aux meilleurs résultats macroéconomiques, mais ne réduit pas les inégalités. Des mesures supplémentaires sont nécessaires pour réduire la « pauvreté énergétique ». Pour atteindre le NDC d'Afrique du Sud au titre de l'Accord de Paris, un taux de taxe d'environ 300 ZAR ou 55 dollars par tonne de CO2 serait nécessaire. Toutefois, un tel taux pourrait avoir un impact significatif sur la croissance du PIB. En même temps, sans changement de la tendance de croissance de la productivité du travail, ce PIB plus faible conduirait à un chômage plus élevé que dans le cas de référence. Une politique d'investissement de 7.5 milliards de ZAR de revenus carbone dans les qualifications de la main d'œuvre, avec l'objectif d'augmenter l'accès à la formation de haut niveau et de réduire le manque de salariés très qualifiés, pourrait avoir un effet très positif sur la croissance du PIB.Le progrès technologique, les préférences des consommateurs et le contexte international, limitent la capacité de l'économie à se restructurer et se décarboner et incidemment à réduire les impacts négatifs de la taxe carbone sur la croissance du PIB. Une véritable évaluation du changement technologique futur serait pertinente pour tous les secteurs et facteurs de production. Ces résultats impliquent aussi que la politique climatique internationale doit traiter la question des transferts de technologie et celles des potentiels différents de décarbonation sérieuse à l'échelle nationale.
Основные предпосылки научной работы. При переходе от централизованного государственного планирования к рыночной экономике Россия испытала беспрецедентный скачок смертности, главным образом среди работоспособного мужского населения. Беларуси в этот период удалось избежать подъема уровня смертности. Что могло послужить причиной подобного различия? Имеющиеся научные работы указывают на связь между приватизационны-ми реформами ранних 1990-х гг. и смертностью, главным образом из-за безработицы. Однако имеющаяся научная литература основывается на традиционных данных по смертности из регистров народонаселения, что не позволяет делать выводы о влиянии приватизации на смертность изолированно от других факторов. Методы. Основой анализа выступает уникальная база данных, собранная научно-исследовательским проектом PrivMort. Она содержит информацию о населенных пунктах, предприятиях и индивидуальных респондентах, а также об их живых и умерших родственниках. Исследование основывается на непараметрическом методе отбора подобного по коэффициенту склонности вероятности для сравнения смертности и ее детерминант среди моно- и мультииндустриальных городов с разной скоростью и типом приватизации в России, где массовая приватизация была предпринята в начале 1990-х гг., и в Беларуси, где экономика была либерализована без массовой приватизации при сохранении сильного государственного контроля. Использована регрессия Пуассона с возрастной стандартизацией и смещением переменной (времени) по количеству лет, которые субъект прожил в 1992–1998 гг. Результаты. Показано, что скорость приватизации оказала наиболее сильный эффект на смертность среди мужчин в возрасте 20–65 лет в моноиндустриальных городах России, которые, в отличие от Беларуси, прошли массовую приватизацию. Выявлен сильный предохраняющий от смертности эффект проживания в Беларуси вблизи с польской границей, а также эффект наличия высшего образования. Кроме того, продемонстрировано, что безработица в 1990-е гг., а также отсутствие семьи повысили вероятность мужской смертности. Интерпретация результатов. Политика массовой приватизации имела крайне негативное влияние на мужскую смертность, особенно среди мужчин работоспособного возраста. Россия, которая применила политику массовой приватизации, включая быструю продажу государственных акций и быструю либерализацию цен, значительно хуже справилась с социально-экономическими последствиями транзиций, чем Беларусь, где применялась политика постепенной либерализации. Присутствие в экономике сильного государственного контроля может существенно амортизировать эффект тотальных экономических изменений на структурном уровне, так как оно значительно снижает уровень смертности за счет меньшего урезания социального бюджета, сокращения индустриального производства, более низкого уровня безработицы и бедности, экономического неравенства. = Background. While right after the onset of economic and political reforms transforming central planning to free market economy Russia experienced an unprecedented rise in mortality primarily among the working-age male population, Belarus did not experience such a shock. What can the difference between the mortality rates in two post-Soviet Slavic states be attributed to? Previous studies have indicated a link between privatisation reforms and mortality mostly via unemployment. However, existing studies rely on conventional registry-based mortality data or cross-national data, which makes them unable to single out the effect of privatization on mortality. Methods. The study uses a novel dataset acquired by the PrivMort project, containing data on settlement- and enterprise levels as well as individual-level data on the respondents and their alive and dead relatives. The study using propensity score matching compares mortality and its determinants across mono- and multi-industrial settlements with different pace and style of privatization in Russia, where rapid mass-privatization policies were introduced in the early 1990s, and Belarus, which liberalised its economy maintaining a strong state. We used Poisson regressions with offset variable (time of exposure) as a number of years a person lived in the exposure period (1992–1998). Findings. Using an age-adjusted Poisson regression, we demonstrate that among men aged 20–65, the speed of privatization has the strongest effect on mortality in mono-industrial towns that have undergone rapid mass privatization. Since Belarus has not undergone mass privatisation, the effect is only observable in Russia. We also identify a strong protective effect of living close to the border with Poland among Belarusian men and a strong protective effect of academic higher education. Furthermore, we demonstrate that unemployment in the 1990s and marital status have a strong effect on mortality. Single men when compared to men in stable partnerships are significantly more likely to die. Interpretation. The policies of rapid mass privatization had a negative effect on mortality among working-age men. Russia, which implemented mass-privatisation policies including quick sale of state assets, rapid price liberalisation and stabilisation, fared significantly worse in terms of mortality levels than Belarus, which employed a slow liberalization strategy. The presence of strong state can significantly cushion the effect of large-scale economic crises as it a) directly affects mortality rates by less reduction in public spending; and b) indirectly affect mortality due to a smaller fall in output, smaller unemployment and poverty rates as well as by less income inequality.
El Centro Regional de Educación de Adultos y Alfabetización Funcional para América Latina (CREFAL), con sede en México, inició bajo los auspicios de la OEA, y en colaboración con otros países latinoamericanos, el Proyecto PREDI-MEXICO que pretende contribuir al desarrollo global de la zona de Pátzcuaro, estado de Michoacán (México) y más concretamente a la reducción de la situación de pobreza y marginación de los que allí viven. La zona referida se caracteriza, entre otros aspectos, por una gran desigualdad social, un elevado índice de analfabetismo, un escaso aprovechamiento de los recursos naturales, una falta de construcciones escolares, una salud pública deficiente y una producción agrícola muy precaria que obliga a los que a ella se dedican a buscar otras fuentes de trabajo como jornaleros agrícolas, pescadores o artesanos. El objetivo del Proyecto es apoyar un proceso autogestionario, auspiciado por el CREFAL, y que en último termino deberán asumir las comunidades locales. Para ello es imprescindible fomentar la participación de los sujetos implicados. Los elementos fundamentales en que se apoya el Proyecto para conseguir el desarrollo global de la zona son los siguientes: a) Planificación de base: hasta el momento se han hecho actividades que sirven para diagnosticar la situación de la zona y ver las necesidades y recursos con que cuenta. Además, se han realizado dos cursos experimentales de alfabetización y post-alfabetización, varios proyectos de incidencia socioeconómica y capacitación a diferentes sujetos sobre temas de interés para la comunidad b) Organización: se están potenciando las organizaciones de la comunidad para que puedan asumir la gestión de lo que allí se lleva a cabo. c) Investigación: está siendo asumida por la población y el Proyecto aporta la metodología y herramientas necesarias. Se está trabajando en un estudio sobre las necesidades de la zona. d) Comunicación: se resalta el valor motivacional que tiene el dar a conocer los resultados que se van obteniendo del Proyecto. e) Evaluación: servirá como método de análisis continuo de la situación. Entre los obstáculos más importantes que interfieren en el proceso se encuentran: - El sistema social de desigualdades vigente en la zona. - La falta de coordinación entre organismos gubernamentales y no oficiales. - La falta de práctica en las comunidades para resolver sus propios problemas. La valoración que se hace del Proyecto, hasta el momento, es positiva, dadas las diferentes dificultades con que se encuentra. ; The regional Center for Adult Education and Functional Literacy for Latin America (Centro Regional de Educación de Adultos y Alfabetización Funcional para America Latina - CREFAL) with Seat in Mexico, started under the auspices of the O.A.S., and in collaboration with other Latin American countries, the Project PREDI-MEXICO, pretends to contribute to the global development of the region of Pátzcuaro, state of Michoacán (Mexico) and more concretely to the reduction of the situation of poverty and margination of its inhabitants. The referred zone is characterized, among other aspects, by its great social difference, a high rate of illiteracy, scarce use of the natural resources, lack of school constructions, deficient public health, and a very precarious agricultural production, which oblige those who are dedicated in it to look for other sources of work such as agricultura1 workers, fishermen and craftsmen. The objective of the project is to support a self-managing process, under the auspices of CREFAL and which at the end will have to be managed by the local communities. For this, it is indispensable to promote the participation of the subjects concerned. The fundamental elements in which the Project is based to obtain the global development of the region are the following: a) Basic Planning: Unti1 now, activities are being carried out which serve to analyze the situation of the area and discover the necessities and resources which it disposes. Moreover, two experimental literacy and post-literacy courses have been realized as well as various projects of socio-economic incidence carried out and forming different subjects on utopics of interest to the community .b) Organization: The community organizations are being strengthened so that they could take care of the management of the activities of the community. c) Research: This is being taken cared of by the community and the Project furnishes the methodology and tools necessary. A study is being made on the needs of the region. d) Communication: The existing motivational value is highlighted by informing of the results which are being obtained by the Project. e) Evaluation: This will serve as a continous analysis method of the situation. Arnong the most important difficulties which interfere in the process are: The social system of present inequality in the region.The lack of coordination between government and non-oficial organizations.The lack of practice in the communities to solve their own problems. The evaluation made of the Project, unti1 now, is positive, underlining the various daculties with which it is confronted.
Die Inhalte der verlinkten Blogs und Blog Beiträge unterliegen in vielen Fällen keiner redaktionellen Kontrolle.
Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
Robert Wade on Zombie Ideas, Being inside the World Bank, and the Death of Ethics in Economics after the Marginal Revolution
The global economy is at the core of some of the main issues in contemporary International Relations. But how do we understand the global economy and what impact does that have on how we deal with the power politics around it? A fault line seems to have emerged between those who take economic theory seriously and those who denounce it for being part of the problem. Informed by his training as an anthropologist, Robert H. Wade—professor at the LSE—takes a different tack: he bases his engagement with the way in which Adam Smith has been appropriated to advocate for a dominant view of 'free markets' on real-world economics and in-depth accounts of insiders. In this Talk, Wade—among others—discusses experimentation in international economic regimes, why the International Financial Institutions don't fight economic crises, and the powers and perils of being inside the World Bank.
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
What is, according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current International Relations? What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?
If we'd reframe your question as being more broadly about global studies, I think that one of the really fundamental questions is how and why it is that the precepts of neoliberalism have penetrated into every nook and cranny of Western societies, and have penetrated to a very large extent many non-Western countries.
This has happened especially, but not only, through the agency of the IMF and the World bank, which have imbued these neoliberal principles; through the mechanism of graduate education: children of the elites in developing countries go out to American, British, other Western universities, and they learn that this is 'true' economics, or 'true' IPE, or 'true' Political Science, and then they come back and implement these same principles and make them a reality back home. But across the globe, this even holds for the Nordic countries. In Iceland and other Nordic countries, from the 1980s, networks of people sharing a belief in neo-liberal precepts, began to form and sort of place each other in key positions within the state, and in politics, and built a momentum in this direction. These precepts have become understood as just natural, as in Margaret Thatcher's 'there is no alternative'.
I live in the UK, and the great bulk of the British public really does believe that the government is just like a household writ large, and the same rules of budgeting that apply to the household should apply to the state. That when times are tough the household has to tighten its belt, cut back on spending, and it is only fair that the government does the same, and if the government does not, if the government runs a deficit in hard times, then the government is being irresponsible. And this is a completely mistaken and pre-Keynesian idea, but it is a 'zombie idea'—that is, however much arguments and evidence may be mounted against it, it just keeps coming up and up and up, and governments come to power riding on this zombie idea and a flotilla of related ideas.
The persistence of this zombie idea is all the more amazing as we just had a global financial crisis in 2007/8, which would prompt a rethinking of these ideas. But these neoliberal precepts have been, if anything, more strongly reinforced. In previous hard times—and obviously the 1930s depression is the exemplary case—there has been a stronger move towards, what you could call, social democratic precepts. But not this time! Indeed, even after the crisis, the whole of the European Union with 500 million people is even more thoroughly structured on the basis of these ideas. I am thinking of what is popularly known as the Fiscal Compact signed by the EU Member States in 2012, which commits all governments to balance budgets all the time—that is, first, the structural deficit may not rise above 0.5 percent of GDP. Second, the public debt may not rise above 60 percent of GDP. Third, automatic financial sanctions are levied on governments that exceed these two thresholds. Fourth, the whole procedure is supervised by the European Commission, and this is presented as in the name of sound budgeting. This package is presented as justified by the proposition that government is a household writ large. The most elementary principles of Keynesian macroeconomics show why this is not simply mistaken, but a disaster, and will keep generating recessionary pressures. It is sold as a kind of excuse for avoiding to put in place the essential conditions for the monetary union, namely, a common budget and a sizable transfer mechanism to the regions just as exists in the United States. But they do not want to do that, but still they call this agreement 'cooperation', which is all about not cooperation, but about writing these dictates around this zombie idea written into the very basic architecture of the EU. Beyond EU politics, it materializes all the way down to, I don't know, the function of the privatization of the Post Office, it goes all the way down to the sort of capillaries of how universities are run, and the incentive systems that have placed upon academics, and there is very little pushback. The one reason, why I am almost completely delighted about Jeremy Corbyn's election as the leader of the Labour party, is that this is one small case of where there seems to be some concerted pushback against these zombie ideas. The point being that the established Labour party basically bought into this whole set of neo-liberal ideas. It combined maintaining the overall structure of inequality in society with more emphasis on providing some help to the poor, but they had to be hardworking poor.
Yet, one knows that there can be dramatic changes in the prevailing zeitgeist of norms. One knows that there can be big changes in the space of a few decades and the question is can one imagine a scenario in which they might be a big change in norms back to a more kind of social-democratic direction. So where will this take place? Because of technological change in the labor market, there is a real big crisis of employment with many middle-class jobs cut out and polarization in the labor market. This might then induce a political movement to have a much bigger change in income distribution than anybody with power is now talking about. Talk of re-distribution these days is really almost entirely around redistribution through the state, but the point I would make is that if there is to be any significant reduction of inequality, especially inequality at the top, there has to be more attention to changes in market-income distribution.
Let me explain. The share of profits in national income has been going up and the share of labor income has been going down. So we should harness the shareholder structure of the market to affect a more equal income distribution by enabling a much wider section of the population to buy into the profit share. At the moment the profit share goes to senior executives and equity holders, but equity holders are highly concentrating at the top of the income and wealth distribution. If equity earners could be spread much more equally, then a much wider section of the population would get income, while they sleep so to speak. We could institute something like trusts, whose members could be the employees of a company, the customers, the neighbors of the company, and the trust would borrow on capital markets and take out insurance against the repayment of the lending of loan and then it would buy shares, it would use that borrowed money to buy shares in the company, and the company would pay out dividends on the shares and then that dividend income coming out of profits would be distributed to the members of the trust. That would be a way of getting the rising share of profits in national income distributed out to the population at large. I particularly like this metaphor of "earning income while you sleep", since at the moment it is only the rich people, who are earning income while they sleep. Somehow that facility of earning income while you sleep has to be made much more widely and available—by using the market against itself, so to speak.
How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about International Relations?
I suppose the starting point was really this; my father was a New Zealand diplomat, so we moved quite often. By that time I was twelve my parents were posted to Colombo, Ceylon as it was called then. After having lived just in Western countries, I suddenly encountered at this very formative age Colombo and Sri Lanka. I was just amazed by that experience; by the color, the taste, the exoticness, but I was also very struck by how the many boys at the same age as me, were walking around with no shoes. I particular remember this boy carrying a baby on his shoulder, the baby looked half-dead and covered in scabs, and I think it was then I got the idea of just how unequal the world was. Then at university I studied economics, but I also visited my parents in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and I got another sense of that great disparity in wealth and living standards. At this time I had come across Adam Smith and the wealth of nations question and that helped to encapsulate or to crystalize my interests. So I wanted to go the Institute of Development Studies in Sussex and got enrolled for a PhD in economics, but en route I spent several weeks in India and during that time I began to dwell upon just how boring and how useless everything I studied under the name of microeconomics. I kept thinking of these dreadfully dry textbooks of marginal cost curves and marginal revenue curves and utility function and difference curves etc., which I had forced myself to sit exams in. By this time I had done a little bit of fieldwork, living on Pitcairn Island in the middle of the Pacific.
When I got back to Sussex after fieldwork I announced that I wished to not do a PhD in economics, but to do one in anthropology thinking all the time, that this would actually be more use for understanding why for example India, where I had been, was so very poor. So that's what I did: a PhD in anthropology… In some ways I regard that as having been a mistake, because the sort of mainstream of anthropology is very far away from the Adam Smith questions. Having done the degree in anthropology, pretty soon I began to change direction and pay much more attention to the state, to the state bureaucracy. I went to India and I studied the Irrigation Department and other related departments. I went to South Korea and I studied state irrigation agencies and I went to Taiwan and I studied the state more broadly. So I was kind of moving up from my Italian village, moving kind of up the scale in terms of state agencies and then the state as a whole.
Then I went to work for the World Bank in the 1980s and my main reason for doing that was not to do the research the World Bank wanted me to do, but rather to study the World Bank from the inside as fieldwork. If in some ways switching to anthropology was a mistake, in other ways it was not, because I approached those kind of Wealth-of-Nations-questions in a way very different from how economists approached them. For example when I went to Taiwan and studied the trade regime, the first thing I did was to go and talk to people who operated through the trade regime, whereas I noticed that the published works by economists celebrating Taiwan's free trade regime was based on what the rules said and what certain government officials told them was the case. They had never actually talked to people who traded through the trade regime. If they would have, they would have learned about all the covert controls that went on such that there was quite a distinction between the liberal face of the trade regime and the reality of the trade regime. The reality was that the government was managing trade in line with industrial policy, but the government absolutely did not want the world to know that. So all this was kept hidden and I was really regarded as rather unwelcome visitor—and in fact to this day my book Governing the Market (1990, read the introduction here) is not well received in Taiwan. It says the government of Taiwan did a good job of managing the market, but they want the world to believe that Taiwan is a free trade country. So that is the kind of intellectual trajectory that I have been on.
So I think that the value of the anthropology PhD was that it really taught me, in practical terms, the meaning of the anthropological maxim, which is 'soaking and poking'. To put it another way—I love this—anthropologists are social scientists, who believe that the plural of anecdote is evidence. And indeed I place a lot of weight on anecdotes, on gossip, on the stories people tell, whereas economists would be much happier reducing, let us say, South Korea's trade regime to one data point in a matrix, and then compare that data point with, let us say, Malaysia's data point to see how the trade regimes are correlated with growth, or something like that, and that is really not my interest.
What would a student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?
Despite what I've just said, I do think that a graduate training in economics is very useful, provided one does not believe it. And that is really difficult, because the socialization pressures are intense: if you do not say the right things—which are neoliberal type things on the whole—then you will likely not get a high grade. But I have noticed that economists tend to know how to think, how to make arguments, they tend to understand the idea of causality, and that may seem an astonishing thing to say on my part, because it implies that students coming from other disciplines are often weak in understanding the very basic ideas of causality, but that is my experience. I had many students coming from, who knows, IR or Political Science or Sociology or Anthropology, who clearly do not have much idea of causality; they can describe things, but they find thinking in terms of cause and effect, in terms of independent and dependent variables, in terms of left and right side, they just find it difficult. So I do think that there is a lot to be said for studying economics, and mastering the maths, provided that the critical facility is not lost. That is point number one.
Point number two is that I think that there is a huge premium on doing fieldwork, and the field work maybe in developing countries, but when I say field work, I don't just mean going out to villages, going out to see poor people 'over there'. I am talking of fieldwork inside bureaucracies: to try and understand the culture, the incentive systems that people are working under—fieldwork at home so to speak, in the countries one comes from. From the students' point of view, it is clearly much easier to sit in the LSE library to do the research. So in my marking I give quite a premium to a student actually doing fieldwork, going out and interviewing, and having the experience of writing up and interpreting the interviews and somehow fitting it back into a larger argument—but really few students actually do that, and I think that that is a real, real big mistake. Mind you, the same risk holds for fieldwork in economics as it does for studying economics: I encourage students to work for (do fieldwork in, experience) the World Bank; and several have—but to the best of my knowledge almost none of them has kept their critical perspective. They really come to buy into it.
The relations between states are settled either through diplomacy or warfare. Why would we have to focus on economics to understand IR?
Because economics—such as for example balances of payment, surpluses and deficits—set the constraints and incentives on countries in terms of their relationships with each other. A great deal of diplomacy is driven by economic pressures: diplomacy to get other countries to for example open their markets, or to cut deals with countries—'if you do this, we will do that'—deals that may relate to areas that are rather different, for instance if you buy more of these of our exports, we will help you fight such and such country, because the manufactures are in my constituency.
So, in a way, the way you framed the question is part of the reason why I react against the discipline of IR: because it tends to treat diplomacy, war, and so on, as somehow rather separate from economic pressures, and I see these economic pressures as very powerful drivers of both of the other two things. As another example, one of the drivers of the Syrian conflict was that there was an acute drought (like Weizman observed in Theory Talk #69, red), which meant that many people were rendered destitute; rural areas flooded into the cities, and the Assad regime just was—understandably—unable to cope; and large numbers of young men, concentrated in cities, rootless and with no jobs, just were recruiting fodder for the Wahhabi sect. I have always thought of economics—not so much as in the making choices in conditions of scarcity, that is sort of Lionel Robin's definition—in the sense of Alfred Marshal, about how people make a living, as a very fundamental driver of a lot of what happens in International Relations.
Pikkety recently published Capital in the 21st Century, causing quite the stir. But why would inequality between people matter for IR?
Let me comment by invoking a very contemporary exhibit—the migration crisis in Europe now. Maybe a decade ago I looked at the figures and if you took the average income of the EU-15 prior to latest extensions and then expressed the average income of countries outside of the EU—including sub-Sahara Africa—as a percentage, then there was a really dramatic falling away of income levels relative to the EU, in countries all around the EU and whether you took market exchange rates or purchasing power parity. If you went round to sub-Sahara Africa and took the average, it was more like two percent in market exchange rates and seven percent in purchasing power parity; and the 'problem' is that there is certainly here a rather thin slither of sea between Africa and the promised land of Europe and to the east there are these great open planes, where armies can go up and down to the speed of light, so to speak, but people can also move pretty quickly across these planes.
So all one has to do—and this might just be only a bit of an exaggeration—if one is on the poor end of this poverty pyramid is hop across the border and you have a chance at least of getting a very appreciable increase in living conditions and income, with which you can then get savings to remit back to home. So the migrations pressures are just huge. So that is one reason for linking inequality to issues in International Relations—really fundamental issues, and very very difficult to dissolve.
You've done anthropological fieldwork inside the World Bank—an institution drawing a lot of criticism from its detractors in IR. Can you shed some kind of light about what kind of 'animal' the World Bank is?
First of all, let me say that at the micro-level—the level of the people you know and the people I know inside the World Bank—I agree that there are people doing a lot of good work. But if you look at the organization more generally—the World Bank and also the IMF—they are clearly instruments mainly of US foreign policy—and any number of US senators, members of the House, have basically said that. When they are defending the International Financial Institutions (they often criticize them), they do so by saying they are important for US foreign policy. And you have to look at the governance structures to see how it is that the US in particular—but Western states more generally—have from the beginning, through the very Articles of Agreement, created a structure which locks in their power, and has made it very difficult for other countries (including Japan) to significantly increase their shareholdings. The US has kept the presidency of the Bank and the much less recognized Number Two position of the IMF, and has used these positions to have a very strong influence.
Just to illustrate what the Bank and the Fund do: at the time of the East-Asian crisis—specifically the Korean crisis in 1997-1998—the IMF mission was in Seoul. The negotiations were in a hotel there. David Lipton from the US Treasury (and a former student of Larry Summers who was by then Deputy Secretary) was just down the corridor of where the negotiations took place, and every so often the IMF people would walk out of the negotiations and consult with David Lipton, then come back in and—as Paul Blustein reports in his book called The Chastening—often said something rather different from what they had been saying before they consulted with David Lipton.
Just to take another example, the US being able to appoint the president of the Bank—to appoint a person known personally to the Treasury Secretary or to the Secretary of the State, or both—is really of great value: when there is a 'trustful relationship'—or a relationship of dependency, the president being dependent on those who appointed him in the Administration—it is possible for those people in the Administration, or people close to them, to just ring up the president of the Bank, and talk in a very informal, confidential, trustful way about what is happening in Latin America, or what is happening in the Middle East, and what the US thinks the Bank should or should not be doing in those places. Larry Summers appointed a protégé of his to one of the regional development banks, and this person—who is very senior in the bank—told me that Larry would frequently ring him, while he is being driven home in the evening from the Treasury, just to have a chat about how things were going in her region, and to pass on suggestions about what the Bank should be doing there, and to get intelligence from her about what was happening in the region, and so on. The point is that, making these personal connections is of immense value, but at the same time, the US Congress, in particular, is very much against having a big Bank against allowing a capital increase for the World Bank—so that the bank could, as it should be doing, increase its lending for infrastructure investment ten times. It is just a complete scandal how little the Bank has been lending for the past 20 years or more for infrastructure, for roads and power stations and so on. The US does not want the Bank providing socialistic competition with the private sector: it says these things are for the private sector to do, and the Bank has to take care of poverty, because the private sector is not interested in poverty.
So the US wants to keep the presidency of the Bank, it wants to keep, secondly, its unique veto right on the big decisions, such as decisions on whether to increase the capital base—but provided those two things are met it does not care that much about the Bank. In the case of the Fund, the US is also very powerful, but of course the Europeans have a bit more relative power. Right now I think the world is in an even more dangerous sort if financial condition than might appear, because the IMF is acutely short of secure or guaranteed lending resources, so if there is to be another round of crisis—as I think is entirely likely within the next five years—the Fund depends upon borrowing short-term from member countries, like on six months terms, but member countries can say 'no', and that means that the Fund's ability to fight crises is quite constrained. The Fund should implement what was agreed in 2010 by all the member countries represented on the board of the IMF: to roughly double the quote of the guaranteed lending resources, that is, resources the countries actually hand over to the Fund, over which they actually give up country control. All the relevant capitals ratified it with one exception—the US—because Congress refused because the individual barons, who are not under that much party discipline, each said to the Treasury: 'look, the question of the IMF is of zero significance to my electorate, so if you want my vote on the IMF, you have to give me things that I want like projects in my constituency and so on'. The Treasury added up the demands of the people, whose vote had to be won, and it considered those demands were just way, way, way over the top. As long as a Democrat is in the presidency, while the House is controlled by Republicans the world is sort of held hostage to this. Beyond this example, this actually entails a structural problem: the US blocking or producing a gridlock in international organizations, because the Congress is hostile to international organizations, because Congress sees it to imply a loss of US sovereignty. The only way to end this gridlock is to end the US veto in the Fund and the Bank, but the problem is that the US can veto any measures.
One response of the big developing countries is to create bypass organizations—such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Banks, such as the new Development Bank, such as the Contingent Reserve arrangement the BRICs have established, and then a growing number of sort of regional development banks. And I think that that is a good thing, but it does raise questions about coordination, about who is looking after, if you will, the global interests, global issues such as climate change. In short, we need a genuine World Bank, rather than the American-Bank-in-the-World we have today.
You engage thoroughly with economics and economic theory. Now there seem to be two kinds of critical approaches to economics in IPE: one criticizes its rationality as flawed, and another buys into its rationality but attempts to point out where actual policy gets it wrong. Where do you stand in this?
If you take the example of how the EU attempted to impose fiscal rules on Greece, you see a notion of rationality which draws upon these very primitive notions that I referred to right at the beginning, where the government is just a household writ large, and the same set of rules that apply to the budgeting of the household must apply to the government as well. Here, the assumption is that any macroeconomic proposition must have microeconomic foundations, that it must be derivable from propositions about microeconomic agents acting in this sort of self-maximizing way, and if you cannot derive macroeconomic propositions from those micro foundations, then there is something unreliable, un-rigorous about your macroeconomics. So what are then the sources of these micro-economic assumptions?
This leads us to one fundamental and almost completely unaddressed weaknesses of economics can be traced back to the Marginal Revolution in the late 19th century. From that moment onwards, there has been an attempt to model economics on physics, and that was very explicit on the part of people like Pareto and Walras, and Jevons, early Marginalist thinkers. They even drew up tables with terms of physics, like velocity, on one side, and then corresponding terms in economics on the other. That had a huge benefit in terms of the 'science' of economics, because it cut economics loose from Adam Smith's and other classical economists' preoccupations with issues of morality and ethics. Adam Smith thought his most important book was not the Wealth of Nations but his Theory of Moral Sentiments, on which he was working, revising yet again, when he died. For Smith, economics and morals were never separate worlds, but intimately related. So for him, the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations were just twins. The point about the marginalist revolution, and the embrace of physics as the model, was that it cut economics free of all that sort of subjective stuff about values. So economics after the marginalist revolution set off with the assumption that not production, but the movement of individuals in markets engaged in trading with each other became the center of gravity of economics. Making the study of exchange rather than the study of production central was analogous to, say, Boyle's Law in physics. Boyle's Law in physics explained the movement of molecules in gasses, as a function of the pressure applied to the gas. So why did they make that analogy?
The point of likening of individuals in microeconomic actions with molecules in gasses was the following. Everybody knows that we do not apply any consideration of ethics or moral sentiments to the movement of the molecules in gas, so neither should we apply any notions of ethics or moral sentiments to the movements of individuals in market exchanges. And that was the way that all considerations of ethics, of morality were just removed from economics. I for instance asked the question to well-known American growth theorist, as we were walking down the street in Providence at Brown University: 'is it moral for people to freeride?' And he said, 'yes of course, provided they do not break the law'. So ethics and questions of morality have been almost completely expunged from economics in a way that would horrify classical economists including Smith; and a particular idea of rationality has been an important part of cleansing economics from those moral considerations. George DeMartino, editor of the Oxford Handbook of Professional Economics Ethics which just appeared has a wonderful phrase to capture this—'econogenic harm': the harm built into the way that economics, professional economists work.
Haven't specific fields, like development economics—a field you engage with yourself—advanced to overcome these weaknesses in economic theory?
Let me root my answer again in observations about the linkages between theory and practice, for it is in practice that economic theory really does its work and its politics becomes visible. It always amazes me we have had a development industry in place for roughly the past 70 years with vast numbers of people, organizations, money all orchestrated underneath this umbrella of development; yet if you go back and read what the early writers about development and economic growth said—I am thinking of people like Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Myrdal, Hirschman, Prebisch, but also Moses Abramovitz. If you go back and look at what they were saying, it seems to me that we have not advanced all that much. Sure, we have advanced a lot in terms of econometric techniques, but in terms of substance we have not. One conclusion I draw from that is that it is really important that international regimes—for example, World Bank and IMF loan conditions, but also WTO regimes—give room for experimentation, because it is really not the case that 'there is no alternative'. This Washington Consensus agenda has clearly not been effective in accelerating production, upgrading it, and production diversification, or export upgrading, or export diversification. So, there should be written into the regimes a lot of room for experimentation. But this isn't there because of the political origin of these regimes; because of what western countries want for the rest world, namely, to open the rest of the world to their markets.
In the 80s there were a lot of experts in industrial development in the World Bank and they did good work, promoting industrial growth and investment in productive infrastructure. But then Anne Krueger came in as chief economist, and brought in a whole lot of people with her—who, like here, were arch-neoliberals. The industrial growth people were invited to find employment elsewhere, or to rebrand themselves as experts in who knows what, environmental assessment, primary education, or good governance. There was no room for them. This also fitted well with some bad experiences the Bank had had with investing in infrastructure. It had gotten into a lot of trouble with large-scale infrastructural interventions such as roads and dams and the like from, especially, US NGOs mobilizing Congress—which then put pressure on the Treasury and so on. My lament throughout this whole conversation has been that we seem to have become just locked into this direction that was set in the 1980s, and it is very difficult to see what kind of economic catastrophe would be necessary to give a sufficient shock to reroute the global system of economic governance.
So after the 1980s, the Bank sort of backed off and began saying that development, economic development, was about poverty reduction—the slogan of the Bank became, 'our dream is a world free of poverty'. You can understand that shift partly in terms of pulling out of the concern with production to get into safe territory, but also because poverty reduction seemed to sort of take care of inequality, because you reduced inequality to poverty—to the poor 'over there', and we can feel good about helping them; but we do not want talk about inequality, which involves us, because then there is the question of justice of our income.
But then the most recent turn is that we're seeing a renewed push for infrastructure in the World Bank and western development agencies. I think that you can link this recent infrastructure push to uncertainty about the sources of economic growth. In the West there is a real question about sustaining economic growth without housing bubbles and stock market bubbles—in other words, without endogenously building financial instability. There may well be a similar sort of issue in terms of the growth of developing countries.
Last question. Adam Smith seems to be constantly present in your work as a critical interlocutor. How come?
I kind of engage in a critical debate with Adam Smith, but especially with people today, who believe his ideas. I often start to frame arguments in terms of his famous 40 word summary of the causes of the relative wealth of nations, which he actually wrote in 1755, which is to say long before the first edition of the Wealth of Nations. I will just tell you what these 40 words say, and then I will tell you the significance of them. He said:
'Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism than peace, easy taxes, and tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things.'
So I am struck by how today many economists say or imply that this is essentially right; you need some qualifications of course, but essentially that is the nub of it. You might have to translate peace, easy taxes, tolerable administration of justice into more modern terms, but that is the essence of it. For example, Gregory Mankiw—Professor of economics at Harvard, former chair of the National Council of Economic Advisers during the Bush administration, and author of a very popular textbook in economics—said in the Wall Street Journal in 2006: Adam Smith was right to say that – and then he gave the 40 word quote. The renowned economists Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson wrote Pillars of Prosperity, which also begins with Smith's 40 words, and they even see the book as a kind of elaboration, but in that same kind of spirit, of Smith's basic idea. So my point is that these ideas are still current; they are still the sort of front of a lot of neoliberal thinking. I am just astonished these ideas all these centuries later remain so powerful. I have had at the back of my mind the idea of organizing an international competition to provide a contemporary 40 word statement, which is sort of equivalent to Smith's, which would obviously have to be of a more global character, encompassing the globalized world economy.
Robert Hunter Wade worked at the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, 1972-95, World Bank, 1984-88, Princeton Woodrow Wilson School 1989/90, MIT Sloan School 1992, Brown University 1996-2000. Fellow of Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton 1992/93, Russell Sage Foundation 1997/98, Institute for Advanced Study, Berlin 2000/01. Fieldwork in Pitcairn Is., Italy, India, Korea, Taiwan. Research on World Bank 1995-continuing. Author of Irrigation and Politics in South Korea (1982), Village Republics: The Economic Conditions of Collective Action in India (1988, 1994), Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asia's Industrialization (1990, 2003). Latter won American Political Science Association's award of Best Book in Political Economy, 1992.
Related links
Faculty profile at LSE Read Wade's The Piketty phenomenon and the future of inequality (2014, real-world economics review) here (pdf) Read Wade's Capitalism and Democracy at Cross-Purposes (2013, Challenge) here (pdf) Read Wade's Rethinking Industrial Policy for Low Income Countries (2007 ADB Conference paper) here (pdf) Read Wade's Bringing the State Back In (2005, IPG) here (pdf) Read Wade's Is Globalization Reducing Poverty and Inequality? (2004, World Development) here (pdf) Read Wade's Creating Capitalisms (Introduction to 2003 book 'Governing the Market') here (pdf)
This publication aims to assist countries in understanding the specific challenges and opportunities posed by climate change in the agricultural sector in order to increase climate resilience and adapt to climate change. The report presents local-level priorities, informed by stakeholder input, to build agricultural resilience in both countries. The objectives of this study are threefold: 1) to improve the understanding of climate change projections and impacts on rural communities and livelihoods in selected regions of Jordan and Lebanon, specifically the Jordan River Valley and Lebanon's Bek
La Cuarta Conferencia Mundial de la Mujer (la "Conferencia de Beijing") fue un acontecimiento histórico desde el punto de vista de las políticas, pues en ella se estableció un marco mundial de políticas para hacer progresar la igualdad de género. Trascurridos 10 años desde la Conferencia de Beijing, en marzo de 2005, la Comisión de la Condición Jurídica y Social de la Mujer de las Naciones Unidas presidió una reunión intergubernamental que tuvo lugar en Nueva York para examinar los avances alcanzados en el cumplimiento de los compromisos adquiridos en virtud de la Declaración de Beijing y la Plataforma de Acción. Este acontecimiento, conocido como "Beijing +10", tuvo un perfil decididamente bajo. Su meta no era definir una agenda, sino confirmar la agenda existente; no se proponía formular políticas, sino afirmar las existentes. La pregunta que se hacen muchos movimientos femeninos internacionales es si este evento forma parte de un esfuerzo mundial en curso a favor de la igualdad de género o si señala el deterioro de este proceso. En el presente trabajo, que se alimenta de la investigación que se hiciera para el informe de UNRISD titulado Igualdad de género: La lucha por la justicia en un mundo desigual, se reflexiona sobre la historia ambivalente de los avances que han logrado las mujeres en las últimas décadas y se examina la forma en que el entorno de políticas ha cambiado durante todo el tiempo transcurrido desde que se celebrara el evento que ha constituido el punto culminante de los movimientos femeninos mundiales. A partir de una serie de indicadores utilizados comúnmente para medir el "avance de la mujer", el documento sostiene que el historial de logros en materia de igualdad de género es más ambivalente y las influencias causales más diversas y menos unidireccionales de lo que en ocasiones se supone. También se indica que las políticas de desarrollo tienen un importante papel que desempañar para garantizar la obtención de resultados y que la primera fase de las reformas estructurales (que datan desde principios de los años 80) fue en muchos sentidos negativa para la mujer. En los 10 años transcurridos desde la Conferencia de Beijing, se han dado algunos cambios importantes en la política de desarrollo internacional y una valoración cada vez mayor de la necesidad de formular políticas sensibles a la cuestión de género. Para finales de los años 80, el "fundamentalismo de mercado" y la terapia de choque habían perdido buena parte de su atractivo, abriendo así espacio para nuevas ideas y enfoques sobre políticas y prácticas de desarrollo. El creciente descontento con los efectos sociales de las reformas y las críticas que han formulado importantes economistas de las instituciones financieras internacionales (IFI) han generado un cambio de políticas que con frecuencia se denomina el "Consenso post-Washington". Las nuevas políticas han demostrado una disposición a brindar mayor atención a las inquietudes sociales y políticas, lo cual puede constatarse en conceptos como "capital social" y "buen gobierno". La política social y, en especial, la reducción de la pobreza lograron ascender en la escala de prioridades internacionales durante los años 90. No obstante, tras este aparente consenso que se forjase en torno al vocabulario compartido de "pobreza" y "protección social", existen interpretaciones encontradas de la política social en razón de las diferencias en cuanto a los valores, prioridades y visiones de la responsabilidad del Estado. Existen serias preocupaciones sobre si se está brindando o pueden brindarse opciones sostenibles para superar la pobreza en un contexto donde no existen medidas apropiadas de creación de empleos y de regeneración regional. Habida cuenta de que la mayor parte de la responsabilidad por el trabajo doméstico no remunerado recae sobre la mujer y que tiene menos acceso al dinero y a las oportunidades de generación de ingresos, es probable que la redefinición de la responsabilidad del Estado y el papel preponderante conferido a las fuerzas de mercado incidan negativamente sobre el tiempo y el acceso de la mujer a los beneficios sociales. El retiro del fundamentalismo de mercado ha permitido una rehabilitación parcial de la función del Estado como actor protagónico en el desarrollo, y se ha enfatizado el "buen gobierno" a través de la democracia, la participación, la descentralización y la integración de la sociedad. Una interpretación integral de la agenda del "buen gobierno" abarcaría la liberalización política, la participación, los derechos humanos y atender los problemas de desigualdad social como parte del compromiso fundamental con la democracia. Esta agenda comprendería cuestiones como la legitimidad del Estado y problemas de capacidad y rendición de cuentas que los movimientos sociales y los movimientos femeninos han confrontado durante décadas. Si bien las reformas de la gobernanza pueden y deben atender las cuestiones relativas a la legitimidad del gobierno y la participación pública de los grupos socialmente marginados, tales reformas se han visto frecuentemente dominadas por una preocupación más limitada. De allí que, si bien la reciente atención que han prestado los donantes al "buen gobierno" es un acontecimiento positivo, mucho depende de cómo se interprete tal hecho. Una buena parte depende de si, por un lado la democratización de la política y la participación de los grupos sociales marginados se entienden como parte integral de los objetivos de la reforma y se incorporan al cambio institucional y, por otro lado, si la reducción de las desigualdades sociales y de género figura entre los principios fundamentales que orientan el programa de transformación institucional del Estado. Existen algunos aspectos del actual clima político internacional que limitan las posibilidades de que esto se cristalice, a saber, el aumento del poder político de las fuerzas conservadoras en los Estados Unidos y otros países y los sucesos del 11 de septiembre. Aunque el primero de estos hechos ha llevado a la adopción, por parte de Estados Unidos y con el apoyo de las fuerzas religiosas, de políticas conservadoras en cuanto a los derechos reproductivos y sexuales de la mujer, el último ha llevado a que se preste más atención y se asigne más financiamiento a la "seguridad", en detrimento del desarrollo y los derechos humanos. En este trabajo se analizan la forma en que estos cambios en la política y el clima político internacionales en la última década han propulsado el surgimiento de nuevos problemas y desafíos para quienes participan en los movimientos femeninos mundiales. ; The 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women (the "Beijing conference") was a landmark in policy terms, setting a global policy framework to advance gender equality. Ten years after Beijing, in March 2005, the UN's Commission on the Status of Women presided over an intergovernmental meeting in New York to review the progress achieved on the commitments made in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. This "Plus Ten" event was decidedly low key. Its aim was not agenda setting but agenda confirming; not policy formulation, but policy affirmation. Whether it proves to be part of an ongoing worldwide movement in support of gender equality, or whether it marks the decline of that process, is a question that many in international women's movements are asking. This paper, drawing on research undertaken for the UNRISD report, Gender Equality: Striving for Justice in an Unequal World, reflects on the ambivalent record of progress achieved by women over the last decades and considers how the policy environment has changed over the period since the high point of the global women's movements. Drawing on a number of commonly employed indicators of "women's progress", the paper argues that the record of achievement regarding gender equality is more ambivalent, and the causal influences more diverse and less unidirectional than is sometimes assumed. It also argues that development policies have an important role to play in securing outcomes, and that the first phase of the structural reforms (dating from the early 1980s) was in many respects negative for women. In the ten years since the Beijing Conference there have been some significant shifts in international development policy along with a growing appreciation of the need to develop gender aware policies. By the end of the 1980s, "market fundamentalism" and shock therapy had lost much of their appeal, opening up a space for new ideas and approaches in development policy and practice. Growing discontent over the social effects of the reforms, as well as criticism from leading economists in the international financial institutions have brought about a policy shift, which is sometimes referred to as the "post- Washington Consensus". The new policies have shown a willingness to give social and political concerns greater attention, expressed under indicative headings such as "social capital" and "good governance". Social policy and, in particular, poverty relief moved up the scale of international priorities in the 1990s. But behind the apparent consensus forged by a shared vocabulary of "poverty reduction" and "social protection", there are conflicting understandings of social policy based on different values, priorities and understandings of state responsibility. There are serious concerns over whether sustainable routes out of poverty are being provided or can be provided in the absence of appropriate job creation measures and regional regeneration. Given women's greater share of responsibility for unpaid care work and their less advantageous access to cash and income-earning opportunities, the redefinition of state responsibility and the greater role given to market forces are likely to impact adversely on their time and their access to social benefits. The retreat from market fundamentalism has seen a partial rehabilitation of the state as a significant actor in development, and emphasis has been placed on "good governance" through democracy, participation, decentralization and community ownership. A broad understanding of a "good governance" agenda would embrace political liberalization, participation and human rights, and would address problems of social inequality as part of a fundamental commitment to democracy. Such an agenda would encompass the kinds of issues of state legitimacy, capacity and accountability that social movements and women's movements have confronted for decades. Although governance reforms can and should address issues of government legitimacy and the public participation of socially excluded groups, they have often been dominated by a much narrower preoccupation. Hence, while the recent donor attention to the question of "good governance" is to be welcomed, much depends on how it is interpreted. A great deal depends on whether the democratization of politics and the participation of marginalized social groups are seen as integral to reform objectives and are embraced in institutional change; and on whether reducing social and gender inequalities are among the core principles guiding the programme of state institutional transformation. There are aspects of the current international political climate that place limits on this occurring, namely the rise to political power of conservative forces in the United States and elsewhere, and the attacks of 11 September 2001. While the first has seen the adoption by the United States of conservative policies with respect to women's reproductive and sexual rights, supported by religious forces, the latter has focused more attention and funding on "security" at the expense of development and human rights. The Paper examines how this ensemble of changing international policy and political climate over the past decade has given rise to new issues and challenges for those active in global women's movements. ; La Quatrième Conférence mondiale sur les femmes (dite "Conférence de Beijing"), tenue en 1995, a marqué un tournant en définissant dans les grandes lignes les politiques à appliquer dans le monde pour progresser vers l'égalité des sexes. Dix ans après Beijing, en mars 2005, la Commission de la condition de la femme de l'ONU a présidé une reunion intergouvernementale à New York pour examiner dans quelle mesure les engagements pris dans la Déclaration et le Programme d'action de Beijing avaient été honorés. Cette réunion "Plus 10" s'est faite résolument discrète. Son but était non pas d'établir un programme mais de le confirmer, non pas de définir des politiques mais de les réaffirmer. S'inscrit-elle dans une évolution mondiale favorable à l'égalité des sexes ou marque-t-elle le déclin du processus? C'est une question que beaucoup se posent dans les mouvements féminins internationaux. Ce document, qui s'inspire de recherches effectuées pour le rapport de l'UNRISD, Egalité des sexes: En quête de justice dans un monde d'inégalités, revient sur le bilan contrasté qui a été dressé des progres accomplis par les femmes au cours des dernières décennies et étudie en quoi l'environnement politique a changé depuis ce moment fort dans la vie des mouvements féminins. Se fondant sur un certain nombre d'indicateurs couramment employés pour mesurer les "progrès des femmes", les auteurs font valoir que les réussites en matière d'égalité des sexes sont plus ambivalentes et les causes plus diverses et moins unidirectionnelles qu'on ne le suppose parfois. Elles montrent aussi que les politiques de développement contribuent largement aux résultats et que la première phase des réformes structurelles (qui remonte au début des années 80) a été, à bien des égards, néfaste pour les femmes. Au cours des dix ans qui se sont écoulés depuis la Conférence de Beijing, la politique internationale du développement a connu des revirements importants et l'on a pris conscience de la nécessité de définir des politiques prenant en compte le genre. A la fin des années 80, le "fondamentalisme marchand" et la thérapie de choc avaient perdu beaucoup de leur attrait, laissant place à des idées et approches nouvelles dans la politique et la pratique du développement. Le mécontentement croissant suscité par les répercussions sociales des réformes, ainsi que les critiques formulées par des économistes haut placés dans les institutions financières internationales (IFI) ont entraîné un changement de politique que l'on appelle souvent "l'après-Consensus de Washington". Les nouvelles politiques ont témoigné de la volonté d'accorder plus d'attention aux préoccupations sociales et politiques, qui s'est manifestée par l'emploi de titres révélateurs comme "capital social" et "bonne gouvernance". Dans les années 90, la politique sociale et, en particulier, la réduction de la pauvreté ont remonté dans l'échelle des priorités. Mais bien que l'emploi d'un vocabulaire commun, celui de la "pauvreté" et de la "protection sociale", donne l'apparence d'un consensus, la politique sociale fait l'objet de conceptions contradictoires qui reposent sur des valeurs, des priorités et des représentations différentes de la mission de l'Etat. Est-il possible d'arracher durablement des populations à la pauvreté en l'absence de mesures suffisantes de création d'emplois et de relance des régions? La question suscite de sérieuses préoccupations. Les femmes assumant une plus grand part des soins non rémunérés et ayant moins d'occasions d'être rétribuées en espèces et de percevoir un revenu, la redéfinition de la responsabilité de l'Etat et le rôle plus grand laissé au marché risquent de se traduire pour elles par une limitation de leur temps libre et un moindre accès aux avantages sociaux. Le recul du fondamentalisme marchand s'est accompagné d'une réhabilitation partielle de l'Etat comme acteur important du développement et l'accent a été mis sur une "bonne gouvernance", réalisable par la démocratie, la participation, la décentralisation et la réappropriation par la population. Un programme de "bonne gouvernance", compris au sens large, couvrirait la libéralisation politique, la participation et les droits de l'homme et amènerait à s'attaquer aux inégalités sociales comme engagement fondamental à la démocratie. Un tel programme engloberait aussi les questions de la légitimité de l'Etat, de sa capacité et de son obligation de rendre des comptes, ce que réclame les mouvements sociaux et féminins depuis des décennies. Bien que les réformes de la gouvernance puissent et doivent tenter de résoudre les questions de la légitimité gouvernementale et de la participation aux affaires publiques des groupes sociaux exclus, leur souci dominant a été souvent beaucoup moins noble. Ainsi, s'il faut se réjouir de l'attention que les donateurs accordent depuis peu à la "bonne gouvernance", encore faut-il savoir ce que l'on entend par là. La démocratisation politique et la participation des groupes sociaux marginalisés font-elles partie intégrante des objectifs de réforme et sont-elles inscrites au programme du changement des institutions? La réduction des inégalités sociales et entre les sexes figure-t-elle parmi les principes de base qui doivent guider la transformation des institutions de l'Etat? Certains aspects du climat politique international actuel, notamment l'arrivée au pouvoir de forces conservatrices aux Etats-Unis et ailleurs et les attentats du 11 septembre, freinent cette évolution. Si l'arrivée au pouvoir de forces conservatrices aux Etats-Unis a eu pour consequence l'adoption, avec l'appui de forces religieuses, de politiques conservatrices sur les questions des droits des femmes en matière de procréation et de sexualité, les attentats du 11 septembre ont focalisé l'attention et les crédits sur la "sécurité" au détriment du développement et des droits de l'homme. Les auteurs examinent comment ces différents facteurs, qui ont modifié la politique internationale et le climat politique depuis dix ans, ont été pour ceux qui militent dans les mouvements féminins à travers le monde à l'origine de nouvelles questions et difficultés.
Tourism sector growth continues to be robust in 2011, consolidating the strong rebound in real Gross Domestic Product, or GDP growth in 2010. Real GDP growth is estimated to be 8.3 percent in 2011, down from 9.9 percent in 2010. Fast growing tourism receipts are supporting higher than expected government revenue outcomes. Recently introduced tax reforms, particularly the tourism goods and services tax, will put medium term fiscal sustainability on a firmer footing. Nevertheless, fiscal consolidation remains the policy priority for the authorities. Discussions with the International Monetary Fund or IMF on a program of support will resume this quarter. to see if agreement can be reached on measures that ensures medium-term fiscal and debt sustainability Domestic financing of the unsustainable fiscal deficit and rising international commodities prices continue to put pressure on the demand for foreign currency. Consequently, foreign reserves have resumed their downward trend after the boost from one-off privatization receipts. Uncertainty related to the recent devaluation of the Rufiyaa has subsided, but it is still trading at the upper end of the band and there remains an approximately 10 percent parallel market premium. The inflationary effects of the devaluation are now being felt with consumer price inflation rising to double digits in recent months.
This paper summarizes a new database that sheds light on the impact of trade-related policy developments over the past half century on distortions to agricultural incentives and thus also to consumer prices for food in 75 countries spanning the per capita income spectrum. Price support policies of advanced economies hurt not only domestic consumers and exporters of other products but also foreign producers and traders of farm products, and they reduce national and global economic welfare. On the other hand, the governments of many developing countries have directly taxed their farmers over the past half-century, both directly (e.g., export taxes) and also indirectly via overvaluing their currency and restricting imports of manufactures. Thus the price incentives facing farmers in many developing countries have been depressed by both own-country and other countries' agricultural price and international trade policies. The authors summarize these and realted stylized facts that can be drawn from a new World Bank database that is worthy of the attention of political economy theorists, historians and econometricians. These indicators can be helpful in addressing such questions as the following: where is there still a policy bias against agricultural production? To what extent has there been overshooting in the sense that some developing-country food producers are now being protected from import competition along the lines of the examples of earlier-industrializing Europe and Japan? What are the political economy forces behind the more-successful reformers, and how do they compare with those in less-successful countries where major distortions in agricultural incentives remain? And what explains the pattern of distortions across not only countries but also industries and in the choice of support or tax instruments within the agricultural sector of each country?
Export diversification can lead to higher growth. Developing countries should diversify their exports since this can, for example, help them to overcome export instability or the negative impact of terms of trade in primary products. The process of economic development is typically a process of structural transformation where countries move from producing "poor-country goods" to "rich-country goods." Export diversification does play an important role in this process. The author also provides robust empirical evidence of a positive effect of export diversification on per capita income growth. This effect is potentially nonlinear with developing countries benefiting from diversifying their exports in contrast to the most advanced countries that perform better with export specialization.
This paper argues that cumulative causation processes are fundamental to understanding growth and development. Such processes derive from spatially concentrated increasing returns to scale including thick market effects, knowledge spillovers, sectoral and urban clustering, and self-reinforcing improvements in physical and social infrastructure. These sources of agglomeration have been extensively analyzed in the economic geography literature. They imply that spatial unevenness in economic activity and incomes is an equilibrium outcome. Growth tends to be 'lumpy,' with some sectors in some countries growing fast while other countries lag. The policy challenge is to lift potential new centers of economic activity to the point where they can reap the productivity and investment climate advantages of increasing returns and cumulative causation.
