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This article contributes to the debate about Russia's past and present-day imperialism by studying the portrayal of Central Asia in expert discourse mediated by the Russian state-affiliated tabloid newspaper Argumenty i fakty from a critical geopolitical perspective. It argues that there are two separate discourses on Central Asia: a foreign policy discourse on Central Asian states and a domestic policy discourse on the Central Asian region. While the former narrates Central Asian states as Russia's partners, the latter constructs Central Asia as an inherently problematic region for Russia. Moreover, the term "Middle Asia" (Sredniaia Aziia) functions as a marker of the xenophobic domestic policy discourse, which is why those sensitive to the current decolonization imperative are triggered by its application.

Contemporaneous wars are subjected to some profound changes regarding applied means and sometimes goals of the confronting parties. It is becoming clear with the cases of special operations, launched by Russia against its strategic rivalries and countries, which have been proclaimed by the latter sphere of Russia's geopolitical interests. Kremlin tries to undermine the electoral process and distort their results. They serve very important tools of Russia's actual policy. For instance, they aim at distortion of the election agenda settings, spreading fake news and false perception of main topics for a public discourse into targeted countries. USA, France, Great Britain seem to be only a few examples of those actions. Most of all, the vulnerability towards Russia's interference into democratic elections are attributed with Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and some other post-soviet counties. The article characterizes some cases of such intrusion and points out at the urgent necessity to set in forth counter-policy against this kind of the interference. ; Współczesne konflikty wojenne zmieniają charakter stosowanych środków i pod wieloma względami cele, do których dążą strony. Widać to na przykładzie operacji specjalnych, które współczesna Rosja podejmuje w celu zdestabilizowania strategicznych rywali i zwiększenia wpływów w krajach, które sama określiła jako sferę swoich interesów. Jednym z ważnych narzędzi realizacji korzystnej dla Kremla polityki są celowe, wywrotowe wysiłki zmierzające do zniekształcenia przebiegu i wyników demokratycznych wyborów. W szczególności poprzez wykorzystanie agentów wpływu, kształtowanie agendy przez poszczególne środki masowego przekazu, wprowadzanie destrukcyjnych tendencji do dyskursu publicznego. Nie będąc pionierem w tej dziedzinie, Rosja wielokrotnie interweniowała podczas wyborów w różnych krajach. Stany Zjednoczone, Wielka Brytania i Francja nie uniknęły tego losu. Ponadto rosyjska ingerencja jest widoczna w przestrzeni poradzieckiej, np. W Gruzji, Mołdawii, a szczególnie intensywnie na Ukrainie. Artykuł analizuje przykłady takich ingerencji w proces wyborczy i zwraca uwagę na konieczność opracowania i wdrożenia środków przeciwdziałających im. ; Современные войны меняют природу используемых средств, а во многом и преследуемых сторонами целей. Это просматривается на примере тех спецопераций, которые предпринимаются современной Россией для дестабилизации своих стратегических соперников и усиления влияния в тех странах, которые она сама провозгласила сферой своих интересов. Одним из важных инструментов осуществления выгодной для Кремля политики выступают ее целенаправленные подрывные усилия, направленные на искажение хода и результатов демократических выборов. В частности, путем использования агентов влияния, формирования повестки дня отдельными средствами массовой информации, внесения деструктивных тенденций в публичный дискурс. Не будучи первопроходцем в данной сфере, Россия неоднократно осуществляет вмешательство в ход выборов в различных странах. Этой судьбы не избежали США, Великобритания, Франция. Тем более российское вмешательство заметно на постсоветском пространстве, как-то в Грузии, Молдове, и особенно интенсивно в Украине. В статье рассматриваются отдельные примеры такого вмешательства в избирательный процесс и обращается внимание на необходимость разработки и осуществления мер по противодействию им.

The Russian food market has been a fascinating subject for researchers investigating food security risks and ways to mitigate them since the embargo was imposed in 2014. The Kaliningrad region, an exclave of Russia, responded more sensitively to the restrictions than any other territory of the country due to the heavy dependence of its food market on imported finished products and raw materials, as well as the transit from Russia via third countries. This study aims to explore how the consumer preferences of Kaliningraders changed in 2014-2021 under the food embargo. The research also investigates changes in the cross-­border mobility of the region's residents with regard to the practice of shopping for groceries in neighbouring countries. The principal method used in the study is survey research. A survey of 1,019 respondents was conducted in September 2021. Additionally, a comparative analysis of average food prices in the region and neighbouring countries from 2012 to 2019 was carried out based on data from Kaliningradstat and the national statistics services in Poland and Lithuania. The ways to obtain embargoed food were systematised using content analysis of social media, advertising and joint purchase services, travel agency websites, regional news portals and blogs. The study found that rising prices for commodity groups falling under the import ban were the most significant change in the regional food market. As a result, the share of Kaliningrad and Belarusian manufacturers in the regional market basket of consumer goods rose dramatically, as the volume and range of products increased and new manufacturers entered the market. At the same time, the dependence of purchases of "sanctioned" goods on non-material reasons (quality, personal preferences) determined Kaliningraders' continued commitment to the "old" strategies despite significant restrictions.

В статье путем сравнительного анализа рассмотрены особенности нациогенеза русских людей и украинцев в советский период, затем в РФ и современной Украине. Сравнивается также участие этих этносов в развитии советской государственности, а позже государственности российской и украинской. Русский этногенез показал высокий жизненный потенциал и адаптивность русского национального характера к внутригосударственным и международным переменам. В то же время современное украинское государство в процессе самостоятельного существования испытывает значительные трудности. Они обусловлены тем, что украинцы сложились как этнос, но не обрели черт политической нации. Рассмотрены факторы, ставящие под угрозу существование украинского государства и формирование политической нации в Украине.The article focuses on the comparative analysis of the features of national genesis of the Ukrainians and the Russians during the Soviet period and in contemporary Russia and Ukraine. The authors compared the participation of these ethnic groups in the development of the Soviet state, and of the Russian and Ukrainian statehood in the later period. Authors argue that during the Soviet period as Russian so Ukrainian ethnic groups were consolidated being complementary to each other in various spheres. After the collapse of the Soviet Union these nations have started the independent nation-building. So, the desire of the Crimea's inhabitants to be included into Russia as well as the choice of the citizens of the Ukrainian south-east regions to have the autonomous national development were supported by Russians. At the same time modern Ukrainian state is experiencing problems during the process of independent existence, that are determined by the fact that Ukrainians are developed as an ethnic group, but have not found the political nation. The authors consider the factors that threaten the existence of the Ukrainian state and the formation of a political nation in Ukraine.

The study explores the Turkish-British partnership. The author verifies the thesis, which gained popularity after the beginning of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war in the Russian expert and journalistic community, that the United Kingdom had a significant impact on Türkiye's foreign policy in order to destabilize the South Caucasus and oust Russia from the region. Some experts hypothesize that London is trying to implement the "Great Turan" project in the post-Soviet space through the hands of Ankara to the detriment of Russian interests. One of the main arguments that Türkiye's foreign policy is managed from London is the appointment of former ambassador R. Moore, who has close contacts with Turkish President R.T. Erdogan, to the post of head of British Foreign Intelligence, MI6. To test this hypothesis, the author of the article analyzes the trade, financial, political relations between Great Britain and Türkiye, as well as the degree of similarity in their positions regarding the conflicts in Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh. The author comes to the conclusion that Great Britain and Türkiye are indeed close allies. This is confirmed by the fact that the British government lobbied Türkiye to join the EU, refrained from interfering in internal affairs, supported R.T. Erdogan during the coup attempt in 2016, and did not criticize Ankara's pro-Azerbaijani position during the Karabakh conflict. At the same time, the lack of a high level of financial and economic interdependence, Türkiye's desire to play an independent role in the Middle East and Transcaucasia bypassing NATO, Ankara's close cooperation with London's geopolitical adversary Moscow, as well as differences in approaches to the Syrian conflict allow the author to refute the thesis that that Türkiye acts as a "conduit for the interests of Great Britain."

From 1995 to 2001 Russia witnessed an asset market boom, a deep financial crisis, and a surprisingly forceful recovery. An event study of this episode provides important insights for Emerging Market investment and Russia's medium-term prospects. The initial surge in bond and stock prices in 1995-97 owed to a highly ambitious monetary stabilization program, which compressed inflation much faster than other transition economies. Due to high dollarization, disinflation was based on the exchange rate. The program produced rapid real appreciation and a persistent need for capital inflows, while weak economic structures and lack of domestic political support prevented accompanying fiscal consolidation and foreign direct investment. The gap between stabilization ambition and structural reality made the currency increasingly vulnerable. Also, the program did not provide a politically viable "emergency exit" from the exchange rate target corridor. Devaluation was postponed through heavy international support. The ultimate crisis escalation in August 1998 resulted in a partial government default and steep devaluation. However, the economy responded from 1999 with relief to the real depreciation, entering a phase of sustained expansion. Also, the crisis escalation united the political spectrum around a new fundamental consensus on economic policy. Post-crisis governments prioritized fiscal consolidation over disinflation. The more stable political and economic environment spurred broader economic reform from 2000, particularly in the areas of public finances and investment conditions. Together with persistent commitment towards international integration this heralds a long-term convergence of Russia's economic structures with those in Central and Western Europe.

International audience ; Russia does not renounce to a power policy. After having undergone a strong erosion of its strategic positions, Vladimir Putin remains the strong man of Moscow and, as a good strategist, he has been able to maintain a significant nuclear power, equivalent to that of the United States, especially since the SORT Agreement, while renouncing the principle of "no first use" and committing himself to the option of pre-emptive strikes and the doctrine of a graduated response. It has engaged in conventional wars against Chechnya and Georgia, which it has won. However, the modernization of the army is hampered by financial constraints, and the modernization of conventional forces is part of a dissuasive approach, given the hypothetical nature of the threats from the major powers. Russia still remains a military superpower, probably the most determined to use it if necessary, given the gag order that has been placed on expressions of public opinion. ; La Russie, ne renonce pas à une politique de puissance. Après avoir subi une forte érosion de ses positions stratégiques, Vladimir Poutine reste l'homme fort de Moscou et, bon stratège, il a su maintenir une puissance nucléaire importante, équivalente à celle des Etats-Unis surtout depuis l'Accord SORT, tout en renonçant au principe du « no first use » et en s'engageant à la fois dans l'option des frappes préemptives et dans dans la doctrine de la réponse graduée. Il a engagé des guerres conventionnelles contre la Tchétchénie et la Georgie, qu'il a remporté. La modernisation de l'armée se heurte cependant aux contraintes financières et la modernisation des forces conventionnelles s'inscrit dans une démarche plutôt dissuasive, compte tenu du caractère hypothétique des menaces des grandes puissances. La Russie reste toujours une superpuissance militaire, sans doute la plus déterminée à l'utiliser si besoin était, compte tenu du baillon qui a été posée sur les expressions de l'opinion publique.

International audience ; Russia does not renounce to a power policy. After having undergone a strong erosion of its strategic positions, Vladimir Putin remains the strong man of Moscow and, as a good strategist, he has been able to maintain a significant nuclear power, equivalent to that of the United States, especially since the SORT Agreement, while renouncing the principle of "no first use" and committing himself to the option of pre-emptive strikes and the doctrine of a graduated response. It has engaged in conventional wars against Chechnya and Georgia, which it has won. However, the modernization of the army is hampered by financial constraints, and the modernization of conventional forces is part of a dissuasive approach, given the hypothetical nature of the threats from the major powers. Russia still remains a military superpower, probably the most determined to use it if necessary, given the gag order that has been placed on expressions of public opinion. ; La Russie, ne renonce pas à une politique de puissance. Après avoir subi une forte érosion de ses positions stratégiques, Vladimir Poutine reste l'homme fort de Moscou et, bon stratège, il a su maintenir une puissance nucléaire importante, équivalente à celle des Etats-Unis surtout depuis l'Accord SORT, tout en renonçant au principe du « no first use » et en s'engageant à la fois dans l'option des frappes préemptives et dans dans la doctrine de la réponse graduée. Il a engagé des guerres conventionnelles contre la Tchétchénie et la Georgie, qu'il a remporté. La modernisation de l'armée se heurte cependant aux contraintes financières et la modernisation des forces conventionnelles s'inscrit dans une démarche plutôt dissuasive, compte tenu du caractère hypothétique des menaces des grandes puissances. La Russie reste toujours une superpuissance militaire, sans doute la plus déterminée à l'utiliser si besoin était, compte tenu du baillon qui a été posée sur les expressions de l'opinion publique.

International audience ; Russia does not renounce to a power policy. After having undergone a strong erosion of its strategic positions, Vladimir Putin remains the strong man of Moscow and, as a good strategist, he has been able to maintain a significant nuclear power, equivalent to that of the United States, especially since the SORT Agreement, while renouncing the principle of "no first use" and committing himself to the option of pre-emptive strikes and the doctrine of a graduated response. It has engaged in conventional wars against Chechnya and Georgia, which it has won. However, the modernization of the army is hampered by financial constraints, and the modernization of conventional forces is part of a dissuasive approach, given the hypothetical nature of the threats from the major powers. Russia still remains a military superpower, probably the most determined to use it if necessary, given the gag order that has been placed on expressions of public opinion. ; La Russie, ne renonce pas à une politique de puissance. Après avoir subi une forte érosion de ses positions stratégiques, Vladimir Poutine reste l'homme fort de Moscou et, bon stratège, il a su maintenir une puissance nucléaire importante, équivalente à celle des Etats-Unis surtout depuis l'Accord SORT, tout en renonçant au principe du « no first use » et en s'engageant à la fois dans l'option des frappes préemptives et dans dans la doctrine de la réponse graduée. Il a engagé des guerres conventionnelles contre la Tchétchénie et la Georgie, qu'il a remporté. La modernisation de l'armée se heurte cependant aux contraintes financières et la modernisation des forces conventionnelles s'inscrit dans une démarche plutôt dissuasive, compte tenu du caractère hypothétique des menaces des grandes puissances. La Russie reste toujours une superpuissance militaire, sans doute la plus déterminée à l'utiliser si besoin était, compte tenu du baillon qui a été posée sur les expressions de l'opinion publique.

Explores Weberian historical sociology in international relations theory, considering the growing perception that the approach is inherently realist by laying out the basic approach in terms of six general principles or traits. Highlighted are recent developments in Weberian historical sociology's theory of state autonomy. Having addressed how this approach overlaps with the concerns of various international relations theorists, eg, Andrew Linklater (1980) & Fred Halliday (eg, 1994), examined is how the approach can take international relations beyond neorealism, by applying it to understanding (1) international economic change through a historical examination of 19th-century British tariff protectionism & free trade; (2) the international politics of states; (3) war & revolution in Russia; & (4) international systems change (ie, European industrialization). A historical sociology research agenda for the study of international relations is suggested. 158 References. J. W. Parker

Outstanding Thesis ; While war in the Arctic appears unlikely at present, this thesis analyzes why an escalation of territorial and resource disputes in the Arctic up to and including the use of force cannot and should not be ruled out. This thesis examines the political, economic, and military interests of the main Arctic powers: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States to set the scene for an assessment of the factors that could make for cooperation or conflict. Advocates of a Pax Arctica involving regional cooperation underrate the more pragmatic and competitive factors underlying international relations and the actual limits of international institutions and economic interdependence in restraining behavior in an anarchic system. The potential for U.S.-Russian maritime conflict in the region is genuine. Based on the methodology established for this analysis, it can be reasonably assessed that conflict in the Arctic is likely. No time horizon can be determined, however, because much depends on decisions made (or not made) by these same Arctic powers in the coming decades. ; http://archive.org/details/breakingicepoten1094527780 ; Outstanding Thesis ; Lieutenant, United States Navy ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.