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Universal feeling seems to converge upon the postulate that after this war an International Government shall be formed to control war and peace of the world, and that the United States shall take full share in it. This dual demand is considered a fundamental platform on which all men of good-will can meet. There is a far-spread tendency, however, to postpone inquiries into its exact meaning and implications. This vagueness may have merits for winning popular support. It has none in preparing for final action. It may even defeat the movement's purpose, because little may come from the longing for International Government, unless details are well prepared in advance. Or, built with a marble façade on shaky foundations, International Government may lead to disaster rather than avert it.None of the United Nations—at least none of the "Big Four"—has thus far given up its sovereignty. For this very reason, no insurmountable difficulty may lie in the way of continuing their alliance to some good purpose after the war, and gradually extending it to other nations. That is still a far cry, however, from the establishment of an International Government which, distinct from the governments of its constituent members, should have the power to take consequential steps independently. If we stake our hopes on this latter type, we must answer the question of how shall the powers be divided between the International Government and the governments of the national states? In passing through the immense flood of discussions on International Government, it is amazing to see how scant are the contributions to this question.

It is right that post-war planning should be made the subject of popular discussion. It is, on the whole, a healthy sign that so many books and articles are devoted to the winning of the peace, although some of them indubitably create a smoke screen of confusion. The same applies to committees and other organizations for the same purpose. These committees and their statements have two things in common: innumerable and inconclusive quotations from democratic leaders and illustrations drawn from the "success" of, or "failure" of, the League of Nations.The "Four Freedoms," the "Atlantic Charter," the "Declaration of the United Nations," as well as other speeches, articles, and statements of all sorts are vague and all-comprising. They give ample scope for divergent interpretations. It should also be remembered that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, important though their utterances are, speak for themselves. They cannot bind Congress or Parliament, although it is true that the British Parliament feels a strong loyalty to the leader of the nation.These two characteristics of the declarations of program give great scope to the professors, diplomats, politicians, journalists, and other prophets who dream of the future. Those of the soberer cast of mind try not to indulge in the luxury of day dreams. They realize that the future must be built on the experience of the past. They ask searching questions about the League.

The future of South Eastern Asia and the Philippines is one of the most complicated problems with which the peace settlement will have to grapple. There is a certain broad similarity between the countries concerned which is likely to be a trap for the unwary. It seems so simple to set up free and democratic governments, to equip and train citizen armies to defend their independence, and to raise the standard of living. It also seems reasonable to assume that if the 145,000,000 people of South Eastern Asia and the Philippines could be federated, their combined resources would go a long way towards enabling them to maintain their independence.Unfortunately, deep-seated differences based on race, religion, and history are the dominating influences, and overshadow the similarities of strategic and economic weakness and lack of independence. Disunion bids fair to increase as a result of the nationalism which is beginning to appear. The Burmese regard themselves as a master race, and have an inflated sense of their own power and superiority because of their former conquests in Thailand and Assam. The Thais have something of the same feelings towards the Malays and the Cambodians of Indo-China. One reason why the Malays asked the British to establish a protectorate over the peninsula was to safeguard their independence against Thai ambitions. This fear and hostility have been strengthened by Thai annexation in 1943 of four of the nine Malay States, and a claim to most of the others. The Malays, Indonesians, and Filipinos come from the same racial stock, but so far as the latter are concerned, centuries of divergent development have made the differences more important than the similarity in racial characteristics which is noticeable among the three peoples.

The time has come to prepare in advance everything that can legitimately be prepared for the revival of international activities after the present catastrophe. Since there are too many unknown factors, it is impossible to envisage the international machinery of the future in all of its details. We cannot as yet foresee the shape that the agency or agencies eventually superseding the League of Nations will assume. The international organization-to-be will certainly assume a striking difference in character, dependent on whether the League is reconstructed or a different type of international agency is created. From an administrative point of view, however, the problems will not be so different from what they were before; it will therefore be fruitful to discuss some of these problems in the light of the Geneva experience.