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Driven by their common perception that North Korea and China posed growing threats to their nations' security, U.S. President Joe Biden, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida agreed at last August's summit at Camp David to elevate trilateral military ties to an unprecedented level. They have been demonstrating this commitment everyday since, some say to the detriment of stabilizing relations with Pyongyang and Beijing.In recent years, North Korea has steadily expanded its nuclear arsenal and become more aggressive in its rhetoric and posturing. In light of Taiwan's deepening resistance to the idea of eventual unification with mainland China, an impatient Beijing appears to be relying increasingly on displays of its increasing military might, too, as a way to demonstrate its own determination to bring the territory under its control, raising concerns that it may yet resort to force to achieve unification in the coming years. Since the Camp David summit, Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo have worked to enhance their collective combat readiness, such as conducting regular joint naval and aerial maneuvers in regional maritime and air spaces, to strengthen deterrence and demonstrate their own opposition to North Korea and China. Policymakers in the three capitals may believe that continuous reinforcement of trilateral military cooperation and posturing will act as a deterrent to aggressive behavior by Pyongyang and Beijing. However, such optimism may prove unfounded. The evolving Japan-U.S.-South Korea trilateral partnership might pose considerable risks because their approach to deterrence overlooks security dilemmas faced by North Korea and China. In a new Quincy Institute report, Mike Mochizuki and I examine this issue and offer recommendations to address it. Insecurity about regime survival plays a decisive role in North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and its strategic calculations as to whether and when to use them. An effective strategy to deal with North Korea would therefore seek to deter North Korea but, at the same time, to avoid fueling its anxiety about foreign efforts to engineer regime change or collapse. Unfortunately, the current trilateral approach appears likely to exacerbate Pyongyang's worst fears and insecurities in this regard. In seeking to deter North Korea, Washington, Seoul, and increasingly Tokyo are relying on offensive military capabilities and doctrines to retaliate against possible North Korean aggression. Emphasizing offensive military functions can indeed bolster deterrence in many circumstances, but they may also overshadow their defensive intentions and thereby contribute to North Korea's conviction that only stronger nuclear capabilities and more offensive nuclear posture and strategy can guarantee regime protection and survival. As Pyongyang continues to make progress in its nuclear and missile development, U.S., South Korean, and Japanese policymakers may become tempted to respond with a more offensive collective military posture and bigger and more threatening joint exercises. Such a response, however, may exceed the basic requirements for deterrence and can thus fuel escalation dynamics, increasing the risks of actual conflict. In our report, we offer alternative suggestions to deter North Korea without undermining stability. Regarding the Taiwan issue, Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul have now adopted an implicit yet firm trilateral stance against possible Chinese use of force to achieve unification, stating in their joint communique their strong opposition to unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the region. While the unambiguous trilateral opposition to unification by force can benefit deterrence, it needs to be coupled with efforts to credibly reassure China that the trilateral partnership will not try to promote Taiwan's permanent separation. In terms of reassuring China on the Taiwan issue, all three capitals are falling short so far, as they appear to have become increasingly indifferent to, or even ambivalent about, the importance of reaffirming their respective One China policies in recent years.The ostensible U.S., Japanese, and South Korean reluctance to reaffirm their One China policies as clearly as they did in previous years risks feeding into Beijing's suspicion that Washington is orchestrating a containment coalition to pursue a "One China, One Taiwan" policy. Such an interpretation of the trilateral partnership's intent will likely be bolstered if Washington begins to accept the notion that Taiwan should be permanently kept separate from the mainland for the sake of U.S. regional military advantage. U.S. policymakers may be tempted to involve Japan and South Korea in joint combat operational planning for a Taiwan contingency, but moving in that direction can make escalation and conflict more likely by compounding Bejing's fears and fueling its resolve to reshape the status quo in its favor. To decrease the risk of conflict over Taiwan, we suggest that Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul devote more attention to stabilizing relations with China through credible reassurances on the Taiwan issue. They should also pursue a defensive-denial approach to Taiwan contingency planning, which we explain more in our report. The three countries should also be alert to the possibility that their transition into an overtly anti-China coalition may prompt Beijing to create a countervailing anti-U.S. military partnership with Russia and North Korea. China has so far maintained a relative distance from the tightening of military ties between Russia and North Korea that has taken place since the former's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Russia reportedly proposed China trilateral naval drills with North Korea last year. The fact that such drills have not yet taken place indicates that Beijing remains cautious about the idea of trilateral military cooperation with Moscow and Pyongyang. Indeed, China has an interest in constructive engagement with the United States, Japan, and South Korea and likely prefers not to further jeopardize it by pursuing an outright military bloc formation with Russia and North Korea. However, its calculation may change if it comes to believe that the Japan-U.S.-South Korea partnership poses too serious a threat to its core interests, such as Taiwan and economic development. The recent call between President Biden and Xi Jinping suggested that Beijing views U.S.-led economic and technological restrictions as second only to the Taiwan issue as an area of concern with the potential for conflict. With that in mind, Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul should tread carefully with their coordination of "de-risking" with China. U.S.-led "de-risking" risks going beyond simply seeking to reduce Chinese access to advanced technologies with clear military applications to the point of threatening China's economy. Even while working together to tackle genuine economic challenges posed by China, such as coordinating responses to China's economic coercion, the three countries should seek to promote inclusive economic and diplomatic engagement with Beijing to reassure it that they do not intend to create a broad exclusionary anti-China economic or technological bloc. We offer several ways to do this in our report. U.S. policymakers should also keep in mind that President Yoon's conservative policy preferences and philosophy have played a key role in enhancing trilateral military ties and cooperation. But what would happen if South Korean voters, in 2027, elect a liberal president who would be more sensitive to historical disputes with Japan and prefer a more congenial approach to North Korea and China? In such a case, trilateral cooperation centered on confronting North Korea and China may cease to be viable.For the trilateral partnership to be more sustainable and synergetic, it should be oriented around reducing tensions and mitigating risks of conflict with China and North Korea. Such an approach would better serve U.S. interests by enhancing regional stability and allowing safer and more productive competition with China. It is also more likely to garner broader public support in both South Korea and Japan beyond the current political alignment between the two countries.
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The latest addition to PBS's American Masters series — "The Incomparable William F. Buckley, Jr." — makes for engrossing viewing, which isn't surprising since Buckley himself was compulsively watchable (and readable).The story of Buckley's life and career has been well and often told, not least by the protagonist himself. A much anticipated biography two decades in the making by Sam Tanenhaus is expected early next year. A globe-trotting journalist, editor, author, television personality, friend of Ronald and Nancy Reagan (among many others), and founder of the conservative magazine National Review, Buckley was, in the estimation of the late Dartmouth professor and longtime National Review senior editor Jeffrey Hart, "the most important journalist since Walter Lippmann." "In fact," continued Hart, "Buckley's career was more impressive."Maybe so — after all, what started in 1955 as a niche magazine with 16,000 subscribers, transformed over the ensuing decades into a big business, which came to be known colloquially as Conservative Inc., replete with multi-million dollar think tanks, obscenely well compensated radio and TV personalities, and presidential candidates seeking its imprimatur. There is of course no question that Lippmann and Buckley's respective audiences were immense. But the comparison to Lippmann has its limits. Of the two, Lippmann had an embarrassingly better track record on U.S. foreign policy, for example, particularly when it came to the Vietnam War and the Cold War.National Review's coverage of the Cold War was colored, and not for the better, by a roster of ex-Communists and intellectuals with ties and sympathies that extended beyond the Iron Curtain, to what became known as the Captive Nations. The philosopher Hannah Arendt observed that the postwar brand of anti-Communism "was originally the brainchild of former Communists who needed a new ideology by which to explain and reliably foretell the course of history."One of the things the documentary does well is demonstrate why the Vietnam War was the principal reason the now-infamous televised "debate" between Buckley and the novelist and critic Gore Vidal turned so ugly so quickly. After all, as the documentary notes, "Buckley was absolutely convinced that Vietnam was a crucial battle in the Cold War against Communism."And within Conservative Inc., no myth has been as unassailable as the idea that the Cold War was not only "won" by the United States but that it was "won" by Buckley's hearty band of conservatives. The columnist (and former Washington editor of NR) George Will summed up the prevailing view this way:"…Without Bill Buckley, no National Review. Without National Review, no Goldwater nomination. Without the Goldwater nomination, no conservative takeover of the Republican Party. Without that, no Reagan. Without Reagan, no victory in the Cold War. Therefore, Bill Buckley won the Cold War."But Will's reasoning suffers, as Buckley himself might have put it, from the post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy.The triumphant reaction by NR to the end of the Cold War was noted with distaste by the great Hungarian-American historian John Lukacs in a letter to the man generally recognized as the "father" of containment, George F. Kennan, in September 1991,"Buckley gloats in the last number of his magazine: 'We won!" "We won!' He repeats that all over again, etc. etc."The idea that "We won, we won," was no doubt sincerely believed by Buckley and his followers, but it is, alas, an idea that is both ahistorical and dangerous — as we have come to see in the more than three decades since the end of the Cold War.***Once the Cold War ended, Buckley and his movement might have done well to reconsider the utility of continuing their alliance with the neoconservatives — after all, the rationale for so doing pretty much evaporated with the Soviet menace. By 1992, it was clear that a conservative alternative to the Cold War policy of global hegemony was emerging thanks to the insurgent candidacy of Patrick Buchanan. From the vantage point of 2024, it seems clear that for many conservatives, Buchanan's was the path not taken — tragically so. Instead of tending to our own garden after 1989, Washington, with the enthusiastic support of Conservative Inc., embarked on a frenetic campaign of ruinous overseas misadventures from which we have yet to disengage. For the conservative movement, the first post-Cold War decade saw fusionists continue their stranglehold on domestic policy, while the neocons grabbed the initiative on foreign policy. All the while, Buchanan became a prophet without honor in his own country.The American Conservative magazine co-founder Scott McConnell noted in a talk given in 2014 that as the Cold War was reaching its denouement, Buckley decided, thanks to the influence of the neocon power couple Norman Podhoretz and Midge Decter, "To allow neoconservatives to regulate the terms of Mideast discussion in his own magazine, National Review." The consequences for the magazine and the movement were profound. Thereafter, noted McConnell, "…The neoconservatives essentially won the right to supervise Israel-related discussions in National Review…Thereafter, any young Conservative knew the rules - you'd best be sufficiently pro-Israel to satisfy Midge and Norman if you wanted to advance."PBS ignores this history, making it seem as though the most interesting thing about Buckley in his final decade was his admission, made on the Charlie Rose Show, that he wanted to die. Whatever the (questionable) novelty of such sentiments by someone who had a) just lost his wife of 57 years and b) an advanced case of emphysema, Buckley's politics toward the end of his life became far more interesting than one might come to understand if they relied solely on PBS.Writing shortly after his death in 2008, Buckley biographer John Judis observed that, "Buckley chided conservatives or neoconservatives who refused to recognize that circumstances had changed — who invoked the old bogeymen or invented new ones." After visiting Cuba in 1998, Buckley even praised that great hero of foreign policy restrainers, John Quincy Adams, who, according to Buckley, "[r]eminded us that though we are friends of liberty everywhere, we are custodians only of our own."Indeed, thanks to the Iraq War and the mendacity of his old allies, the neocons who promoted it so ardently, the scales appeared to have fallen from Buckley's eyes. As Jeffrey Hart wrote in the American Conservative, "Buckley had expressed doubts about the Iraq War from the beginning ... During the last two years of his life, Bill Buckley understood the facts about Iraq and their implications." An exchange with with George Will on ABC in 2005 offered a sense of Buckley's thinking post-Iraq:Will: Today, we have a very different kind of foreign policy. It's called Wilsonian. And the premise of the Bush doctrine is that America must spread democracy, because our national security depends upon it. And America can spread democracy. It knows how. It can engage in national building. This is conservative or not?Buckley: It's not at all conservative. It's anything but conservative. It's not conservative at all, inasmuch as conservatism doesn't invite unnecessary challenges. It insists on coming to terms with the world as it is…The story of Buckley's tenacious engagement with the war and his break with the neocons is a fascinating one, though one that PBS either missed or left on the cutting room floor.As Tanenhaus recounted in The New Republic in 2007:"Buckley has faulted Bush for trying to go it alone in Iraq and chided neoconservatives who"simply overrate the reach of U.S. power and influence."….When I asked him recently if Iraq is the Republicans' Vietnam, he said, 'Absolutely.'"It is arguable that on matters of war and peace Buckley ended up holding positions closer to those held by his nemesis Gore Vidal than the Republican standard bearers in 2008 and 2012. Which is to say that by the end of his life, with regard to U.S. foreign policy, Buckley was getting it right.
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On Jan. 20, 2024, Iran's Revolutionary Guards successfully launched a three-stage rocket that put the Sorayya satellite into orbit, at an unprecedented 460 miles above the Earth's surface. It is alleged that Iran's space program is a cover for testing a nuclear weapons delivery system. What is a scientific victory for Iran could also be a strategic projection of the Islamic Republic's geo-spatial power. While this space launch was planned days in advance, it occurred on the same day that Israeli forces allegedly killed five Revolutionary Guards of the expeditionary Quds Force in Damascus, followed by an Iraqi militia affiliated with Iran firing ballistic missiles at a base housing American forces in Iraq. Just five days earlier, Iran launched salvos of ballistic missiles towards Syria, Iraq, and Pakistan against alleged terrorist bases.The recent satellite launch into space is connected to these political tensions on the ground. It sent a message to the U.S. and Israel that, despite sanctions or the assassination of its scientists, Iran can still develop the technology to fire a long-distance missile, whether into space or over a continent. If the sanctions and assassinations were meant to curtail such activities, Iran demonstrated they are not working.This points to an unexamined aspect of the conflict in the Middle East since Oct. 7, 2023: Outer space has become a conflict zone. When Iraqi Shi'a militias or Yemeni Houthis launch a drone or ballistic missile, these weapons either enter space or depend on satellites.What the latest Iranian launch has also demonstrated is that the conflicts of Earth — the current fighting in the Middle East in this case — have been projected into space, reminiscent of a trend that began with the Cold War superpowers.Militarizing spaceA ballistic missile burns up the fuel that propels it into the atmosphere until it enters space. Once the fuel is consumed, the missile's trajectory cannot be altered, following a path determined by gravity pulling it back toward the Earth's surface — and its eventual target. The German V-2 was the first ballistic missile. Fired on September 8, 1944, it was the first human-made object hurtled into space. As they invaded Germany, both the U.S. and Soviets sought out the German rocket scientists to develop their respective missile/space programs. The V-2's technology allowed the U.S. and Soviets to send satellites into space, even allowing astronauts to reach the moon itself.In October 1957, the Soviets launched the first satellite, Sputnik, into space, where it orbited the earth and delivered a prestigious victory for communism during the Cold War. According to historian Douglas Brinkley, "For a world locked in a Cold War rivalry between the Americans and the Soviets, space quickly became the new arena of battle." Space launchers and launches were a means of refining military technology discreetly, in the name of space exploration, while simultaneously broadcasting these advances to adversaries and allies. From an American national security perspective, if the USSR could launch a satellite into space, it could do the same with a nuclear warhead, putting American territory in danger. Furthermore, a missile/ rocket might carry a physical payload, such as a satellite or a warhead, but it also carries a political message intended to communicate to adversaries short of violence. That dynamic is what made the Cold War cold.The same threat perceptions explain why the U.S. feared Iran's satellite program well before the regional war escalated last October, pitting American forces against the Islamic Republic's allies in Yemen and Iraq.The American and Soviet space programs were also about prestige, and the most recent launch has been a matter of national prestige for Iran in the aftermath of the deadly terrorist blasts that occurred in the nation on Jan. 3.Middle East geopolitics and astropoliticsAs for the Middle East, historically, outer space was an area used to penetrate the region. During the Cold War, the U.S. and USSR deployed spy satellites above the Middle East, and later satellites were essential for the global positioning system (GPS) to guide American cruise missiles and drones used against Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War, and then against al-Qaida after 2001.In the 21st century, the Global South entered the space arena, led by China, India, and Iran. Space soon emerged as an arena for competition among Middle Eastern states. Among the Persian Gulf regimes, Qatar achieved asymmetric power in the 1990s against Saudi Arabia by broadcasting Al Jazeera to its much larger neighbor, as well as the entire region, via a news channel that depends on satellite technology. The United Arab Emirates is currently bolstering its credentials as a regional Sparta by embarking on a mission to Mars.Israel, however, had a monopoly on space technology and putting its own satellites into space. Iran's current space program serves as a means to challenge a regional rival as well as a superpower — the U.S. At the same time, Iran's allies in the "Axis of Resistance" have militarized space. Iran gave Houthis drone technology that can fly long distances to strike Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Houthi drone attacks are guided by satellite technology, as a drone flying at such a long range depends on a satellite data link for information to be sent back to the pilot in Yemen. As for Houthi drones, they are GPS-guided to their target before crashing into it to wreak havoc and damage. The Houthis have no known communications satellites and rely on commercially available satellite space. These attacks demonstrate a sophisticated level of coordination among the Houthis, who use 3D printing to build the drones and the components based on Iranian designs, while imagery analysts, uplink engineers, mechanics, and pilot crews work in unison to support the attacks. By 2022, Houthi strikes were one of the factors that pushed Saudi Arabia and the UAE to extricate themselves from the Yemen conflict, which also gave an advantage to Iran, the Gulf countries' regional adversary. The Houthis mastered both drone technology and ballistic missiles. The Soviets transformed the German V-2 into the Scud, the most widely proliferated ballistic missile in the Arab world. The Houthis inherited Scuds from the former government after the Arab Spring. In 2017, they fired them towards Saudi Arabia. In 2023, the Houthis launched both drones and ballistic missiles towards Israel's southern port of Eilat, in solidarity with Hamas. In 2017, the Houthis attacked King Salman air base in Saudi Arabia and as well as Riyadh with the Burkan 2-H, a ballistic Scud-type missile inherited from the old Yemeni arsenal, and engineered with a range of more than 500 miles to hit the Saudi capital. Unlike the Burkan, the missiles that were launched towards Eilat were most likely based on the Iranian Ghadr (or Qadr) a close relative of the North Korean Nodong, basically a larger missile based on the original Soviet Scud missile, with more than double the range at 1,200 miles. These Houthi ballistic missiles reached outer space, where Israel's Arrow defense system intercepted them in the stratosphere, marking the first instance of space combat in history.The Islamic Republic's most recent space launch has sent a message to Israel that Iran is catching up. The message to the U.S. is that Iran is in a stronger position after Trump's 2017 unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal. Afterwards, Iran had the excuse to advance its centrifuge nuclear technology, its nuclear stockpile, and now advance its space program.Meanwhile, the message to the Iranian people is that, while its economy is under sanctions and they endure terrorist attacks, at least they can take national pride in reaching space.
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Following Houthi missile attacks aimed at Israel and third-country-flagged vessels in the Red Sea, the Biden administration is reportedly considering targeting northern Yemen while creating a new international maritime alliance to try to ensure secure transit. As a result of the Houthi attacks, international merchant shipping is being rerouted with inflationary consequences for vital global supplies. Washington is weighing whether military strikes would either deter or incite further Houthi action and risk undermining desirable attempts by Saudi Arabia at ending its conflict with the Houthis following Yemen's stalled but unresolved civil war. The Houthis' Red Sea military intervention is attempting to combine ideologically-driven anger at Israel's military campaign in Gaza with leverage for funding the long-unpaid salaries of northern Yemenis under Houthi control. However, oil revenue, in part limited due to Houthi missile attacks on southern Yemeni oil and related facilities, is managed by the internationally recognized Yemen government based in Aden in southern Yemen. For the so-called "Legitimacy Government," or LG, to give the Houthi money to pay northern "civil servants" — who include armed fighters — U.S. pressure and Saudi and Emirati backing are needed. But this is highly unlikely. In southern Yemen, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), founded in 2017 with the backing of the UAE, is preparing to lead the formation of a new state by secession from what it considers a failed, and northern-dominated, Republic of Yemen, or RoY. The STC hopes to exploit what they see as the Houthis shooting themselves in the foot by destabilizing the Red Sea area. After all, the Houthis have, despite a 20-month formal ceasefire, been waging an economically motivated war against the south designed to deprive the LG of revenues and boost the appeal of the Red Sea port of Hodeidah. For the STC to reemphasize southern ports and oil facilities as an alternative to Houthi-controlled Hodeidah, it needs to somehow secure the whole southern Yemeni coast and to incentivize more inbound shipping. The Houthis' relationship to Iran makes it easy for the STC to label it a Tehran proxy. Despite membership in Iran's "Axis of Resistance," and Iran's aid in extending their missile technology's literal reach, the Houthis have their own motivations. The STC is seizing on the Houthi threat to Red Sea security to underline the prospective role of its own "shadow state" in boosting international maritime stability. In this context, this southern state-in-waiting is willing to uphold western security interests and is thus presenting itself as a proactive partner in securing the Red Sea's Bab Al-Mandab strait and the Gulf of Aden against Houthi attacks. The STC argues that the proven Houthi threat to Red Sea security is a cynical exploitation of popular Yemeni anger over Israel's actions against Gaza. A recent STC press conference, headed by the self-styled president of the south, Maj-Gen Aidaroos Zubaidi, called on those seeking to secure the area to beef up the STC's "naval forces."The STC, however, does not actually have its own navy or any regular armed forces. In fact, it is debatable if it has any armed units that can be properly described as under Zubaidi's command. Southern Yemen exists in an almost parallel universe. Zubaidi enjoys recognition, as does the STC he leads, by virtue of his position as vice-president of the Saudi-backed eight-man Presidential Leadership Council, or PLC, heading the version of the RoY that sits in Aden. The PLC includes Zubaidi's STC deputy, the former governor of the huge southern governorate of Hadramawt, Maj-Gen. Faraj Bahsani. Yet another military figure in a leading STC political role, Bahsani previously headed the RoY's 2nd Military Division.But neither Zubaidi nor Bahsani can offer an armed underpinning to the STC's claims to be an all-inclusive movement for southern independence. These men, like other LG members, enjoy their international recognition via the LG, a Yemeni government that is neither a state nor one in waiting. While the LG enjoys the loose loyalty of some RoY military remnants in the south and in some parts of the north, its armed capacity is uncoordinated and riven by unreliable tribal components. And the LG itself lacks popular political support. By contrast, the STC, based on much anecdotal evidence, enjoys some popular support in Aden and in the other southwestern governorates: Abyan, Lahej and Dhale, and in coastal Hadramawt. In the Wadi area of Hadramawt, however, local saadah (descendants of the Prophet Mohammed) and tribal leaders are more circumspect. What the STC lacks, even in its Aden base where leading STC figure Ahmed Lamlas is governor, is direct control of armed forces. The Emirati-trained and -backed "police," the Hizam Al Amni ("Security Belt") operating in Aden, are formally speaking STC-aligned but are not in practice directly controlled by Gen. Aidaroos, the nominal supreme commander of "the Southern Armed Forces." The Amaliqa ("Giants Brigade"), another Emirati-formed force which in 2022 played a decisive role in pushing Houthi fighters out of the energy-rich southern governorate of Shabwa, are only loosely connected to the STC. A rival, Emirati-founded army, the Nokba ("Elite Forces"), was in operation in Shabwa but was displaced by "Shabwa Defense," which is associated more closely with Saudi Arabia. In Aden, the STC is busy creating parallel bodies to those of the governorate. It does not see this as unnecessary duplication but rather as trying to fill the vacuum in services provision in a formal governorate structure that it ostensibly runs. The STC is intent on a similar "shadow state" project in Mahra (the governorate that borders Saudi Arabia to its north and Oman to its east). However, the STC is doing this in far less auspicious circumstances than in Aden. In Mahra, "northern" political and security influence, including that of Al-Islah (Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood) is profound, due in part to demographic realities created by the large numbers of people who have fled Houthi advances and security services that are seen by critics as RoY loyalists. The Mahran version of Amn Al-Watan ("National Security") struggles to communicate with its notional "National Security" partner in neighboring Hadramawt. Oil and other essentials carried by road from southwest to southeast Yemen are not protected for their safe arrival in Mahra by any coordination with supposed parallel security bodies in other southern governorates. To be a plausible partner state of the U.S. and the other western powers who are now moving to protect Israel and Red Sea shipping from the Houthis, the south needs a single unified form of control of the different military and security services that, at best, operate on a governorate basis only. But the south's main external sources of support, the Emiratis and the Saudis (the latter having formed separate "National Shield" forces in Aden and Hadramawt), are not interested in promoting an integrated southern security body. One reason is that these two Gulf states have competing interests in different parts of southern Yemen, and a common unwillingness to push for a sovereign southern stateSouthern Yemen under the STC's would-be leadership is seeking to burnish its western-friendly security and political credentials. However, southern Yemen remains a would-be nation made up of different countries only partly united in opposition to perceptibly northern rulers. For the time being, it looks as if the role of any southern Yemeni state in Arabian Peninsula security will remain rhetorical.
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The United States has cast a values veil over its multifaceted match of punishments and restrictions with China. When he dismisses Chinese leader Xi Jinping as a "dictator," the Cold War veteran is making a pointed value judgement that puts a moral spin on the relationship. According to many in Washington, there is a new "axis of evil" out there, and China is the fallen angel, supported by Russia, North Korea, and Iran.If global diplomacy was a morality play, there would surely be no actor more devoted to principles and the fight for good over evil than the Vatican, arguably the consummate values-driven state, despite its own cardinal sins in the human resources department. Of course, in the past, the Roman Catholic church has strayed from the straight and narrow and made soul-wrenching deals with the devil — consider Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, the juntas in Chile and Argentina, and the communist regimes of Eastern Europe. With China, the Holy See is not trying to drive the Communist "Satan" away or turn it into a paragon of religious freedom. The main mission has been to find ways to build trust and gain confidence. Religious affairs and China specialists have drawn parallels between the Vatican and the Chinese Communist Party in the way they are organized, function and exercise authority, leading some to consider the similarities a source of affinity if not mutual understanding. For example, the city-state's diplomatic efforts have remained consistent and persistent from one papal administration to the next, starting arguably with the progressive world-traveling Paul VI back in the 1970s and through the conservative reigns of John Paul II and Benedict XVI, to the liberal non-judgmental crowd-sourcing faith of Francis. Today, there may be no need to pray to Saint Jude for a papal visit to China. It could happen, although the incumbent shepherd, who requires a wheelchair to meet his flock, would seem physically unable to take on such a pilgrimage — there are some 20 cathedrals and basilicas in the mainland. In September, however, he came close, spending five days in neighboring Mongolia, which has only about 2,000 Catholics, compared to about 12 million in China. If, as many papal succession oddsmakers who try to divine the mysterious ways of the Holy Spirit believe, the next pope is from Asia, then hopes for a China trip will surge. And the momentum of goodwill and history could bring the bishop of the Eternal City to the Forbidden City.The Holy See's diplomatic agenda with China is less complicated than Washington's. The Vatican has simple objectives — to unify the Roman church so there is coherence in its management and in catechism and theology, and to protect Catholics everywhere so that they are free to worship in churches and practice their faith openly. The missionary work here is not as much of a priority, though in other parts of the world, the Church is battling to keep souls on pews and recruit priests.In 2018, the Vatican signed an agreement with Beijing on a process for appointing bishops in the patriotic Chinese church — the open part of the church that pays allegiance to the state. In the order of the mass in the patriotic church, the pope does get mentioned, along with the bishop of the diocese, while the state does not, exactly as is the practice in churches around the world. Catholics in China who are loyal to the pope have worshipped underground in secret, or at least discreet, locations. The Vatican-Beijing agreement on bishops, with the pope having the last word on Chinese-approved candidates, essentially recognizes the spiritual authority of the Holy Father, with the state nominally a regulator or monitor of religious affairs. The hopeful prayer is that if the selection process works smoothly, this would make it possible for underground Chinese Catholics to surface and eventually allow the Vatican to establish formal relations with Beijing. For now, the Holy See has diplomatic relations with and representation in Taiwan as the Republic of China, with a nunciature or embassy in Taipei. There has been no nuncio appointed since 1971; a chargé d'affaires is the highest-ranking resident official. Meanwhile, the Holy See maintains a "study mission" in Hong Kong — a de facto consulate — that is manned by a Vatican diplomat, typically a monsignor, or clergyman of stature.These diplomatic missions are by no means the only means of engagement. Two Chinese bishops, both of whom Pope Francis nominated from a list put forward by Beijing, participated in the October synod convened by the pope to discuss church issues and policy. After the Holy See complained that China had appointed a bishop earlier this year who had not received the papal imprimatur, no Chinese prelates were on the initial list of synod participants. But on the eve of the gathering, the two were included on the final roster. While they turned up, they left midway through the three-week conference. Francis has also reached out to Beijing in other ways. Hong Kong archbishop Stephen Chow, whom the pope recently made a cardinal, visited Beijing in the spring before receiving his red biretta. In November, the head of the Chinese Catholic church, Bishop Joseph Li Shan paid a return visit to Chow's archdiocese. When his plane entered Chinese airspace en route to Mongolia, Francis issued a message of greetings. "I ask Chinese Catholics to be good Christians and good citizens," he said days later to the congregation at a stadium mass in Ulaanbaatar, which Catholics from China and around the region attended. That same month, the Vatican sent its envoy on the Ukraine conflict to China. Cardinal Matteo Zuppi, who had been to Kyiv, Moscow and Washington prior to Beijing, was received by the special envoy for Eurasian affairs, the first-ever meeting in the Chinese capital between the Holy See and a senior Chinese official. This effort was reminiscent of the Holy See's behind-the-scenes efforts to reconcile the U.S. and Cuba. Contrary to its crusading past, the Vatican has been brokering peace among nations since even before the establishment of the city-state in 1929. It was involved in the negotiations to end both world wars and sought to mediate between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.China and the Vatican have engaged in high-level talks before. In 2020, at the Munich Security Conference, Archbishop Paul Gallagher, the Vatican secretary for relations with states, considered to be the Holy See's foreign minister, met Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi. The two discussed the agreement on bishops, which has been renewed twice despite disputes over certain appointments, increasing restrictions on religious freedom, and reports of the destruction of churches in parts of China. The pope, who, as his predecessors did, faces criticism, including from his own cardinals for engaging Beijing, acknowledged in a Reuters interview last year that the deal was "slow going," but stressed that the Church had to take a long view and that imperfect dialogue was better than nothing. The diplomacy lesson offered by the world's chief values-card player is that pragmatism, patience and consistency are the best tools for doing the godly work of peace and security building. With China, there will be setbacks to endure and sacrifices to make. A workable deal requires painstaking negotiation and may not be ironclad. But with faith and perseverance, an understanding can be reached — and eventually a miracle might happen.
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After seven years of severed diplomatic relations, the China-brokered renormalization deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia, signed on March 10, marked a major breakthrough in the Middle East's shift toward de-escalation between regional rivals. Nearly six months later, the Iranian-Saudi détente remains on track. Last month, Iran's chief diplomat, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, met with Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman, or MbS, in Jeddah and invited him to Tehran. Then on September 5, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to Iran, Abdullah Alanazi, who was previously the Kingdom's ambassador to Oman, arrived in Tehran. That same day, Iran's ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alireza Enayati, who previously served as the Islamic Republic's Kuwait envoy, arrived in Riyadh. Such developments speak to both sides' interest in further improving bilateral ties. As Ambassador Alanazi put it, Saudi officials recognize the "importance of strengthening ties, increasing engagement…and taking the [relationship] to broader horizons."Tehran and Riyadh did not sign the diplomatic agreement in Beijing after almost two years of Iraqi- and Omani-facilitated mediation out of mutual love. Instead, the deal resulted from their respective interests in détente at a particular time. Ultimately, hostilities between the two regional powers over the past decade were not serving either side. Rather than continuing down the path of steadily mounting tension, Tehran and Riyadh both saw a "cold peace" as their best option, albeit for different reasons.Motivations for détenteCentral to the Ebrahim Raisi administration's foreign policy is the "Neighbors First" doctrine. As relations between Iran and the West continue deteriorating, Tehran wants not only to cultivate closer ties with China and Russia, but also have better relationships with Islamic countries in its own neighborhood, including with the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Central Asian states and Pakistan. Iran hopes this will reap economic benefits while better positioning the Islamic Republic to circumvent U.S. sanctions and pressure.Riyadh understood that attracting sufficient foreign investment to make MbS's Vision 2030 succeed requires greater stability at home and throughout the region. This made de-escalating tensions with Iran necessary, especially given Tehran's influence over Yemen's Houthi insurgents, whose drone and missile attacks against Saudi infrastructure had caused considerable damage until the April 2022 truce's implementation."The decision to restore relations was made by both sides with cold calculation," Barbara Slavin, a distinguished fellow at the Washington-based Stimson Center, told RS. "Iran wants to prove it is not isolated regionally while Saudi Arabia wants an insurance policy against external attacks while it tries to realize its ambitious economic goals."Yet Tehran and Riyadh continue harboring suspicions of each other. From Iran's vantagepoint, Riyadh's partnership with Washington remains a major threat to Gulf security, while Saudi Arabia still sees Iran's regional conduct as destabilizing.Indeed, nearly six months in, the Iranian-Saudi diplomatic agreement has only gone so far. "It hasn't evolved into a real rapprochement, but that was always far-fetched as long as Iran is at daggers-drawn with Riyadh's key strategic ally: the United States," said the International Crisis Group's Ali Vaez in an interview with RS. "The long shadow of the nuclear standoff between Iran and the U.S. will prevent the reestablishment of economic ties between Tehran and Riyadh and could eventually flare up regional tensions that could once again spill over into the bilateral relationship."The recent deployment of 3,000 American sailors and Marines to waters near Iran has only resulted in more threats from Tehran to the U.S. This development could have major implications for Iranian-Saudi relations."Like all diplomatic deals, the Beijing-brokered Saudi-Iranian diplomatic effort, is—at best—a work in progress," Joseph A. Kechichian, a senior fellow at the King Faisal Centre in Riyadh, told RS. "While many hastened to conclude that the two countries, under close Chinese supervision, would rapidly embark on fresh initiatives, reality stepped in because Riyadh was and still is wary of Tehran's pledges to end its interferences in internal Arab affairs. (Almost) six months in, neither side seems ready to be blinded by lofty declarations, which often belie serious differences."Enter IsraelSaudi Arabia has thus far refused to follow in Abu Dhabi's footsteps and join the Abraham Accords. Riyadh stresses that normalization with Tel Aviv would require significant Israeli concessions to the Palestinians, and with Israel's far-right government that is currently in power, such concessions are unlikely to be offered. Nonetheless, trying to bring Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords is a top foreign policy priority for Team Biden. It is worth asking how this stands to impact the Iranian-Saudi détente.Depending on the degree to which there is convergence between Riyadh and Tel Aviv, there could be negative consequences for Iranian-Saudi relations. Ultimately, Tehran does not see diplomatic relations between GCC states and Israel as a threat per se. It is far more concerned with how the Abraham Accords could lead to a growing Israeli military footprint near Iranian territory."Iran will feel obliged to condemn Riyadh if it normalizes with Israel and will be on the alert for any military or intelligence component to such a deal. That it will not tolerate," explained Slavin."Iran is afraid of greater military and security convergence of the Persian Gulf Arabs with Israel in formats such as the joint air defense system," Javad Heiran-Nia, the director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran, told RS."Iran knows that by forming such a system, a 'balance deficit' will be detrimental to it. For this reason, Iran has announced the unveiling of hypersonic missiles capable of passing through any missile defense system. Iran sends the message to the Persian Gulf states that expanding their relations and forming a strong convergence in the region with Israel will not ensure their security," added Heiran-Nia.Signs of improved tiesLooking ahead, certain indicators can help assess the evolving state of Iranian-Saudi relations.As Iran and Saudi Arabia have previously enjoyed periods of détente, such as during the 1990s and early 2000s, Vaez told RS that "this one is unlikely to withstand the test of time unless it is institutionalized in the form of frequent high-level political engagement, standing bilateral committees that would proactively work to deepen ties between the two nations on multiple levels, and an inclusive regional security dialogue that starts thinking about a mutually tolerable and sustainable modus vivendi for all the key stakeholders."The main indicator of how Iranian-Saudi relations develop will not be the absence of conflict or disagreement, explained Aziz Alghashian, a fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. "Rather, it is how both Iran and Saudi react to these sensitive issues [such as the Dorra/Arash Gas Field dispute and unresolved tensions over Yemen], what kind of language will they use, and what kind of sentiments will they have in negotiating these sensitivities."Roughly six months after the diplomatic deal was announced in China, Slavin has somewhat low expectations for improved bilateral ties. "I would expect an improved atmosphere for Iranian pilgrims going on the hajj and a modest uptick in sports and other exchanges, plus limited trade in non-sanctioned goods." But she assesses that Iranian-Saudi reconciliation will be "very superficial."Nonetheless, as much as any optimism about a full rapprochement must be tempered, the current state of Iranian-Saudi relations is far more stable than the 2011-22 period. That is positive for the whole Middle East. The Gulf and the wider region stand to benefit, at least to some degree, from Tehran and Riyadh finding a way to "share the neighborhood," as former President Barack Obama once put it."A cold peace is…better than the alternative," said Slavin.
L'elaborato, dedicato agli strumenti di prevenzione e repressione della violenza in occasione di manifestazioni sportive, si propone di tracciare un quadro tendenzialmente completo del sistema che l'ordinamento italiano ha predisposto nel corso degli anni per contrastare il peculiare fenomeno della violenza negli stadi. La tesi, dopo una breve precisazione dell'ambito della ricerca, operata tramite la distinzione del concetto della violenza negli stadi (o teppismo calcistico) dalla violenza sportiva, si occupa inizialmente di fornire una ricostruzione storica del fenomeno in oggetto, per poi passare ad un esame di esso in chiave socio-criminologica, prendendo in considerazione sia l'elaborazione scientifica prodotta all'estero (in special modo nel Regno Unito, ma anche in altri Paesi europei), sia gli studi compiuti in Italia, che hanno evidenziato alcune caratteristiche del fenomeno tipiche del nostro Paese. L'elaborato, nella sua prima parte, prima di occuparsi degli aspetti prettamente penalistici (e processualpenalistici) della materia, tenta di offrire, in un'ottica interdisciplinare, una chiave di lettura al fenomeno, utile per individuare successivamente la proporzionalità e la ragionevolezza della risposta che l'ordinamento italiano offre. Successivamente, la tesi prende in considerazione le fonti sovranazionali – in particolare a livello europeo – che sono state emanate allo scopo di dare risposte comuni e armoniche ad un fenomeno non limitato dai confini delle singole nazioni. La strage dell'Heysel del 1985 rappresenta il tragico evento che ha per la prima volta posto all'attenzione sia della Comunità europea sia del Consiglio d'Europa i gravi pericoli che il teppismo calcistico può generare, specialmente in correlazione a grandi eventi; a partire da quel momento si è quindi assistito alla progressiva introduzione di un corpo normativo sovranazionale volto ad uniformare le legislazioni e le prassi dei Paesi europei maggiormente interessati dal fenomeno. Il riferimento a tali fonti è utile, nell'economia dell'elaborato, per verificare se le misure adottate dall'Italia siano effettivamente adeguate agli standard elaborati dall'Unione europea e dal Consiglio d'Europa. La tesi procede poi a descrivere, in modo analitico, la turbolenta evoluzione normativa che ha caratterizzato la legislazione nazionale di contrasto alla violenza in occasione di manifestazioni sportive, evidenziando sia il poderoso sviluppo della prevenzione personale in questo settore, sia l'introduzione di una serie di incriminazioni e disposizioni processuali "differenziate", finalizzate a completare la risposta repressiva al fenomeno; nel descrivere l'evoluzione normativa, sono state sottolineate le criticità che di volta in volta si sono proposte: in particolare, sono state analizzate le varie posizioni dottrinali sviluppatesi nel corso del tempo e sono stati evidenziati i tentativi compiuti dalla giurisprudenza (anche costituzionale) di offrire un'interpretazione della legislazione antiviolenza quanto più coerente e rispettosa dei diritti dell'individuo. L'ultimo capitolo, maggiormente concentrato sulle misure di prevenzione – sia atipiche (come il DASPO), che tipiche – rivolte ai soggetti a pericolosità sportiva, mira infine a far emergere le problematiche specifiche che si sono proposte con riguardo al sistema preventivo della violenza negli stadi, analizzando in particolare le caratteristiche e le criticità della categoria del "pericoloso sportivo", senza tralasciare alcuni dovuti accenni alle più ampie problematiche relative alla pericolosità per la sicurezza pubblica e, ancor più in generale, alla stessa legittimazione e compatibilità con il sistema costituzionale delle misure di prevenzione presenti nell'ordinamento italiano. Nella conclusione della tesi, sono presenti alcune riflessioni in merito all'inquadramento del sistema preventivo-repressivo di contrasto alla violenza dei tifosi all'interno del discusso paradigma del diritto penale del nemico, nonché alcune osservazioni in merito all'esportazione all'interno della realtà urbana (tramite il c.d. DASPO urbano) del modello efficacemente sperimentato nei confronti dei tifosi; vengono infine avanzate alcune proposte di miglioramento dell'attuale legislazione, in primo luogo, per rendere le misure vigenti più rispettose dei diritti dei soggetti che ne sono destinatari e, in secondo luogo, per introdurre un intervento su più livelli, che non trascuri gli aspetti sociali e culturali del fenomeno, e che non sia più sbilanciato sulla repressione e sulla prevenzione di polizia, con l'auspicio che il futuro legislatore non intervenga, ancora una volta, sotto la spinta dell'emergenza. ; The present thesis, dedicated to prevention and repression measures of violence at sporting events, aims to outline a generally complete picture of the system that the Italian legal system has prepared over the years to counter the peculiar phenomenon of fan violence during sporting events (football matches, in particular). The thesis, after a brief clarification of the scope of the research, made through the distinction of the concept of fan violence (or football hooliganism) from sporting violence, is initially concerned with providing a historical reconstruction of the phenomenon, and then moving on to an examination of it in a socio-criminological key, taking into consideration both the scientific elaboration produced abroad (especially in the United Kingdom, but also in other European countries), and the studies carried out in Italy, which have highlighted some characteristics of the typical phenomenon of our country. The paper, in its first part, before dealing with the purely criminal (and procedural criminal) aspects of the matter, attempts to offer, from an interdisciplinary perspective, a key to understanding the phenomenon, useful for subsequently identifying the proportionality and reasonableness of the answer that the Italian legal system offers. Subsequently, the thesis takes into consideration the supranational sources – especially at European level – that have been issued in order to give common and harmonious answers to a phenomenon not limited by the borders of the individual nations. The 1985 Heysel massacre represents the tragic event that for the first time brought to the attention of both the European Community and the Council of Europe the serious dangers that football hooliganism can generate, especially in connection with major events; from that moment on, there has therefore been the gradual introduction of a supranational regulatory body aimed at standardizing the laws and practices of the European countries most affected by the phenomenon. The reference to these sources is useful, in the economics of the report, to verify whether the measures adopted by Italy are actually adequate to the standards developed by the European Union and the Council of Europe. The thesis then proceeds to describe, in an analytical way, the turbulent regulatory evolution that has characterized the national legislation to fight violence at sporting events, highlighting both the powerful development of personal prevention in this sector, and the introduction of a series of "differentiated" indictments and procedural provisions, aimed at completing the repressive response to the phenomenon; in describing the regulatory evolution, the critical issues that were proposed from time to time were highlighted: in particular, the various doctrinal positions developed over time were analyzed and the attempts made by jurisprudence (including constitutional) to offer an interpretation of anti-violence legislation that is as coherent and respectful of the rights of the individual as possible. The last chapter, more focused on prevention measures - both atypical (such as DASPO) and typical - aimed at people with sporting dangers, finally aims to bring out the specific problems that have arisen with regard to the preventive system of violence in stadiums, analyzing in particular the characteristics and criticalities of the "dangerous fan" category, without neglecting some due hints to the broader problems relating to the danger to public safety and, even more generally, to the legitimacy and compatibility with the constitutional system of the prevention measures present in the Italian legal system. In the conclusion of the thesis, there are some reflections on the framing of the preventive-repressive system to combat fan violence within the controversial paradigm of the criminal law of the enemy, as well as some observations on exporting within urban context (through the so-called urban DASPO) of the model effectively tested in relation to fans; Finally, some proposals for improvement of the current legislation are made, firstly, to make the existing measures more respectful of the rights of the individuals that are addressed to them and, secondly, to introduce an intervention on several levels, which does not neglect the cultural and social aspects of the phenomenon, and that it is no longer unbalanced on police repression and prevention, with the hope that the future legislator does not intervene, once again, under the pressure of the emergency.
This paper offers a contrastive analysis of Indian captivity narratives and the Native American boarding-school experience. Indian captivity narratives describe the ordeals of white women and men, kidnapped by Indians, who were separated from their families and subsequently lived months or even years with Indian tribes. The Native American boarding-school experience, which began in the late nineteenth century, took thousands of Indian children from their parents for the purpose of "assimilation to civilization" to be facilitated through governmental schools, thereby creating a captivity of a different sort. Through an examination of these two different types of narratives, this paper reveals the themes of ethnocentrism and sexual abuse, drawing a contrast that erodes the Euro-American discourse of civilization that informs captivity narratives and the boarding-school, assimilationist experiment. ; Ewa Skał is a PhD student at the Institute of English, Opole University, Poland. 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South Dakota boarding school survivors detail sexual abuse. news-maven.io/indiancountrytoday/. https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/south-dakota-boarding-school-survivors-detail-sexual-abuse-QtChBLOde0-apnPNqWd3qw/ (22 Dec. 2018). ; Wounded Knee. history.com: The History Channel Website. https://www.history.com/topics/native-american-history/wounded-knee (27 May 2019). ; 27 (4/2019) ; 77 ; 89
La discusión sobre la declinación americana ha generado una profusa literatura. Por ejemplo, un libro clásico fue publicado por Paul Kennedy, historiador británico y profesor de la Universidad de Yale. En "TheRise and Fall of the Great Powers" (RamdonHouse, 1987) el autor hace hincapié en la dinámica de "over-expansión" en la que sistemáticamente han caído los imperios y grandes potencias. Por su parte, el notable economista americano MancurOlson escribió un trabajo titulado "TheRise and Decline of Nations: EconomicGrowth, Stagflation and Social Regidities" (Yale UniversityPress, 1982). Olson prosigue en parte su saga de "La lógica de la acción colectiva" (Harvard UniversityPress, 1965) para argumentar que la prosperidad genera sobre-demandas por parte de grupos de interés ineficientes cuyas ineficiencias son subestimadas (racionalmente) por el resto porque se encuentran en una economía que ha sido, y se percibe que seguirá siendo, lo suficientemente productiva como para tolerar esas ineficiencias. Sin embargo, hay un momento en que la suma de ineficiencias y privilegios no puede seguir siendo tolerada por el resto y, paulatinamente, ello comienza a hacer mella en la tasa de innovación y crecimiento. Por otro lado, es también suficientemente amplia la literatura que duda o descree abiertamente de la declinación americana. Por ejemplo, podemos citar a los Profesores Michael Cox y Josef Joffe. Cox ha escrito breves pero profundos artículos (que se encuentran online) como "Powershift and thedeath of thewest? notyet!o "Is United States in Decline-Again? An Essay?".En cuanto a Joffe, acaba de salirsulibro "The Myth of American Decline: Politics, Economics and a Half Century of False Prophecies" (Liveright, 2013). Aquí, es importante destacar que mientras Cox critica a los profetas de la declinación desde una concepción de izquierda o neo marxista, Joffe lo hace desde una concepción conservadora. En una corta y precisa reseña del libro de Joffe, el diario "TheWal Street Journal" sintetiza la visión del autor: "Theauthor's case isbolsteredbythelonghistory of past false alarms. After the 1957 launch of Sputnik, Americans had a full-blown panic attack that they would be buried by the Soviet Union, as Nikita Khrushchev had famously promised. The U.S. was suffering a "crisis in education" along with a "missile gap." Paul Samuelson, the future economics Nobelist, predicted that the Soviet economy would overtake America's sometime around 1984. "Only self-delusion can keep us from admitting our decline to ourselves," a Harvard professor named Henry Kissinger mused in a 1961 book. Similar warnings and premonitions of decline would sound with every passing decade, usually in tandem with the emergence of another contender to the American throne. In 1979, Ezra Vogel, also a Harvard Professor, published "Japan as Number One." It helped inaugurate a decade of awe and hysteria about the country that—according to common belief—would own the 21st century". Por su parte, podemos marcar una tercera línea donde se encuentran autores que remarcan los problemas que enfrenta EE.UU. en el corto-mediano plazo pero que perciben que ello puede ser modificado o, al menos, atenuado. Por ejemplo, desde una perspectiva más académica podemos mencionaral Profesor de Harvard NiallFerguson y su notable saga que va desde "Colossus, theRise and Fall of the American Empire" (Penguin,2004), pasando por "TheAscent of Money: A FinancialHistory of theWorld" (Pinguin, 2008) y "Civilization: Thewest and therest" (Pinguin, 2011) hasta llegar a "The Great Degeneration: HowInstitutionsDecay and Economies Die" (Pinguin, 2012). Los 3 primeros libros citados son notables trabajos. Desde una perspectiva menos académica podemos mencionar al influyente periodista del TheNew York Times, Thomas Friedman. En el libro"That Used to be Us: What Went Wrong with America and How it Can Come Back" (Hachette, 2011), Friedman y Michael Mandelbaummencionanque los 4 desafíoscontemporaneous de los EE.UU. son: "1) How to adapt to globalization, 2) how to adjust to the information technology, 3) how to cope with deficits and debts, 4) how to manage a world of both rising energy consumption and rising climates threats".Sin embargo, es claro que para los autores los EE.UU. están en condiciones de enfrentar esos desafíos. La comparación con el ascenso de Oriente, particularmente China, se encuentra presente, en mayor o menor medida, en todos los trabajos mencionados. La declinación asume el ascenso de uno y la caída relativa de otro. Como mencionamos, eso no es un problema en sí mismo. Sin embargo, lo destacable de este proceso que se ha acelerado en la última década es lo sorprendente del crecimiento chino y lo sorprendente de algunos aspectos de la decadencia americana. Es muy posible que ambas situaciones no permanezcan en el mediano plazo en semejante dimensión. Es decir, es posible que el ascenso chino sea menos vertiginoso en el mediano plazo y es posible que la decadencia americana sea menos vertiginosa de lo que es. Sin embargo, la pregunta es otra: ¿En qué medida lo acontecido ya no supone un cambio estructural en la relación de poder como para relativizar determinadas consecuencias? Así, la declinación como análisis comparado gana relevancia aún cuando la historia contemporánea de los EE.UU. tiene demasiados antecedentes de inminentes procesos de declinación que, como menciona Joffe, no se concretaron: el "momento Sputnik", la crisis del petróleo, el "milagro japonés" y ahora el milagro chino. En verdad, cuando analizamos la declinación americana y estudiamos los indicadores socio-económicos relevantes del desempeño de China y Oriente en los últimos 30 años, estamos principalmente sopesando los desafíos que enfrentan el liberalismo y la sociedad abierta. Es poco importante la salud financiera y empresarial de los EE.UU. y, en cambio, es demasiado importante los desafíos y amenazas que supondrán para los derechos individuales la aparición de un sistema capitalista autoritario que ha generado un inédito bienestar a amplios sectores populares en Oriente, particularmente en China.La declinación posee dos ámbitos geo-políticos (interno y externo). Dentro del ámbito o escenario interno, encontramos dos variables principales: la calidad de la política y la productividad de la economía. Ambas se encuentran, lógicamente, en el actor que supuestamente declina (EE.UU.) y en el o los actores que supuestamente ascienden (China). El éxito contemporáneo de los EE.UU. ha descansado en la interacción virtuosa de ambas variables. La calidad de la política (es decir, la vigencia de pesos y contrapesos) ha contribuido a la productividad de la economía. La posible declinación relativa descansa en la dificultad de mantener una economía altamente productiva frente a una política deficitaria. Por otro lado, la ascendencia china ha reflejado en esta nación una virtuosa interacción entre política y economía. A diferencia de la experiencia americana, el éxito chino ha descansado en una interacción que reflejaba una economía productiva porque había ausencia de pesos y contrapesos. El Politburó del Partido Comunista Chino (PCI) expresa lo opuesto al Shutdown acontecido Washington en las dos primeras semanas de octubre de 2013. Es decir, la eficiencia americana ha descansado en una relación virtuosa entre política y economía. Esta forma de relacionamiento se encuentra en crisis. En cambio, la relación virtuosa entre política y economía china ha alcanzado su apogeo. Sin embargo, una hipótesis es que tanto la dinámica del fracaso americano como la del éxito chino son de corto plazo. Es decir, el nuevo orden emergente (un orden bipolar) sería un orden esencialmente inestable. Por un lado, el propio proceso democrático americano debiese encontrar (aunque no sabemos cuándo) un mecanismo para generar una interacción algo más virtuosa entre política y economía. Por otro lado, el proceso chino se enfrentará (aunque no sabemos cuándo) a las tensiones propias de una economía altamente productiva frente a una política altamente represiva. Si bien hoy sabemos que eso no es inexorable (y que la teoría de la modernización ha quedado acotada) también sabemos que es un arreglo institucional en algún lado, en algún punto, inestable.Sobre el autorUniversidad ORT-Uruguay
Organisasi Kesehatan Dunia (World Health Organization-WHO) di dalam laporannya di tahun 2014 mencatat bahwa di tahun 2012 penyakit kanker telah menjadi penyebab kematian dari 8.2 juta orang. Angka ini kemungkinan jauh lebih rendah dari kenyataannya, mengingat pelayanan medis belum menjangkau sebagian besar penduduk dunia. Berjuta-juta kasus kemungkinan juga tidak terdata keberadaannya. WHO juga merekam adanya 14 juta penderita kanker di tahun yang sama. Jumlah ini diprediksi akan meningkat 70 persen dalam kurun waktu dua puluh tahun ke depan. Organisasi ini tidak bisa menggambarkan bagaimana berbahayanya penyakit ini. Kanker adalah salah satu penyakit yang kompleks yang diinisiasi oleh terjadinya kontak antara tubuh manusia dengan beragam wujud karsinogen (racun), yang mungkin saja terjadi secara alamiah, melalui makanan, atau karena kebiasaan yang menjadi pilihan seseorang secara pribadi, seperti misalnya merokok. Menurut WHO, kontak manusia dengan karsinogen bisa terjadi secara langsung maupun tidak langsung, dalam wujud interaksi fisik (sinar ultraviolet), kimia (zat kimia dalam asap rokok), dan biologis (virus). Walau kita tidak bisa menunjukan penyebab tunggal terjadinya kanker, kontak seseorang dengan bahan atau zat beracun berkaitan erat dengan kualitas lingkungan dimana yang bersangkutan tinggal. Ini menyiratkan bahwa lingkungan harus direncanakan serta dibangun berdasarkan strategi yang berorientasikan pada ide ''anti-kanker.' Sikap ini wajib diambil sebagai bagian penting dari keseluruhan perubahan yang seyogyanya dilaksanakan terhadap lingkungan binaan. Kebijakan dan parktek yang bernafaskan konsepsi ini harus dilaksanakan secara simultan dalam setiap kesempatan dan pada setiap elemen kota. Komponen spasial yang paling penting diperhatikan pada konteks ini termasuk lingkungan perumahan; ruang-ruang kecil dimana kita memarkir kendaraan; taman-taman kota dimana kita memanfaatkan waktu bersama keluarga di akhir pekan; jalan yang kita lewati dalam keseharian; infrastruktur sosial dimana kita berada untuk berbagai kepentingan; ruang publik dimana penduduk kota berinteraksi sebagai sebuah kesatuan komunitas.Bebargai bahaya akan muncul ketika pemanfaatan lingkungan binaan (baik yg ditata maupun tidak), bersama dengan pola tingkah laku warga masyarakat perkotaan, telah memaksa kita menghirup udara yang terpolusi; meminum air yang terkontaminasi; menderita karena taman-taman kota telah disusupi kendaraan bermotor yang menyebabkan terbuangnya gas finil hidrocarbon ke dalam taman. Ruang terbuka ini seharusnya terbebas dari segala wujud gas beracun; meminum air tanah yang dikontaminasi oleh polutan yang dibuang secara sembarangan oleh beragam industri. Kontaminasi ini juga telah merambah ke air yang dimanfaatkan untuk produksi bahan pangan yang kita konsumsi dalam keseharian.Namun, tidak bisa dipungkiri jika keberadaan penyakit kanker pada tubuh seseorang juga tergantung dari gaya hidup yang dijalaninya. Ini berkaitan dengan bagaimana dan kapan kita makan; bagaimana pola istirahat (tidur) yang dimiliki; bagaimana seseorang mengontrol kondisi kesehatan psikologisnya; bagaimana kita bergerak dari satu tempat ke tempat satunya, dan lain-lain. Tetapi ketika kita berkeinginan untuk menangani permasalahan ini secara benar dari kaca mata pengaturan lingkungan binaan, kita harus mempertanyakan "Bisakah perencanaan berkontribusi dalam menciptakan lingkungan yang sehat?" Jika jawabannya adalah "ya," maka metode analisis, kebijakan, cara implementasi dan pengendaliannya, juga harus ditetapkan, jika memang belum ada. Dalam teorinya perencanaan didedikasikan untuk kebaikan masyarakat yang diaturnya, termasuk status kesehatan mereka. Namun di dalam prakteknya, kita harus awas, karena perencanaan merupakan sebuah mekanisme kenegaraan yang kemunculannya seringkali merupakan hasil koalisi dengan para pemilik modal. Seperti diketahui bersama, bisnis (kepentingan ekonomi) lebih sering keluar sebagai pemenang dibanding kebutuhan orang banyak. Namun ketika lingkungan tercemari, bisa dipastikan jika perencanaan memiliki peran serta tanggung jawab yang mutlak. Atau secara gamblang bisa dinyatakan perencanaan tidak melakukan tugas yang seharusnya diembannya. Situasi ini bisa disebabkan oleh beragam alasan, misalnya kurangnya sumber daya finansial; praktek-praktek korupsi dalam proses pengeluaran ijin membangun ataupun ijin operasional lainnya; minimnya pengaturan serta pengendalian; absennya pengaturan densitas (kepadatan) di daerah; tata aturan zonasi yang selalu memberi peluang untuk negosiasi dan tawar-menawar; tidak tepatnya kebijakan yang diberlakukan; tidak adanya perhatian terhadap praktek-praktek perencanaan yang sudah dibuktikan keberhasilannya dan sudah diterapkan di level gobal. Perlu juga dipahami disini jika masyarakat bukan selalu objek pasif. Mereka memiliki pilihan dan bisa memilih. Apakah mereka memilih untuk mengekspose dirinya terhadap beragam polutan? Atau kemungkinan sebagian dari mereka memang tidak memiliki pilihan, selain menerima polusi lingkungan sebagai bagian dari kehidupan kesehariannya. Atau kelompok yang lain lagi memutuskan untuk membuat pilihan, bagaimana berhadapan dengan polutan serta menghindari interaksi dengan cara apapun. Berbagai kota di dunia telah memberi perhatian besar terhadap pembangunan lingkungan yang sehat. Sikap ini secara mendasar merupakan langkah yang tepat, termasuk juga jika dikaji dari perspektif bisnis (ekonomi). Transportasi yang bersih dan efisien serta perencanaan yang sudah mapan, selain berdampak positif terhadap elemen-elemen kota juga akan mendorong pertumbuhan ekonomi. Oleh karenanya, di negara-negara maju, pola pendekatan semacam ini telah diakomodasi sebagai elemen esensial dan diterima sebagai bagian dari kebijakan perencanaan, serta diprioritaskan sebelum pertimbangan-pertimbangan lainnya. Proses globalisasi yang telah menjadi motor kemunculan dari 'informational class of labour' (Castells) atau yang disebut sebagai the 'creative class' oleh Richard Florida, telah secara jelas mengindikasikan ke kita bahwa kota-kota yang memberi perhatian terhadap lingkungan dan pelestarian kebudayaan menunjukan kesusksesan dalam pembangunannya, sedangkan yang tidak melakukannya berada pada posisi yang sebaliknya. Tidak ada satupun orang di muka bumi ini yang berkeinginan bekerja di lingkungan yang kotor dan terpolusi. Jika sebuah satuan kedaerahan mencanangkan untuk mengundang para pekerja yang berkulitas, rencana ini akan sangat tergantung dari tersedianya lingkungan yang berkualitas, selain adanya proses branding yang menjadi bagian penting dalam berkompetisi di dunia global. Dalam hal ini, beragam pertimbangan penting yang akan berpengaruh, seperti misalnya: dimanakah funsi-fungsi industri akan ditempatkan sehingga karsinogen yang diproduksi akan diserap secara internal dan tidak dibuang ke tanah, udara, dan air yang menjadi sumber kehidupan bagi kita semua?; dimanakah rumah masa dpean akan dilokasikan?; dimana infrastruktur sosial: rumah sakit, sekolah, kantor-kantor publik, dan lain-lain akan direncanakan?; Kapankah pengaturan dan pengendalian kendaraan bermotor akan diimplementasikan, seperti halnya yang sudah diterapkan di berbagai kota di dunia?; Kapankah tata aturan di jalan raya, pemanfaatan jalan raya oleh para pengendara dengan cara yang seolah-olah tidak ada aturan, parkir yang tidak terkontrol, serta pelanggaran-pelanggaran lainnya akan dikendalikan seperti halnya proses pengecekan surat ijin mengemudi? Jawaban atas pertanyaan-pertanyaan di atas tidak hanya berkenaan dengan pembangunan serta penataan keruangan fisik semata, tetapi membutuhkan perencanaan yang inklusif yang juga secara bersamaan merangkul pendekatan tingkah laku. Konsepsi terakhir ini sangatlah penting karena kualitas sebuah tempat tidak bisa dipisahkan, baik dari gaya hidup masyarakat lokal yang diakmodasinya maupun komunitas internasional yang menjadi salah satu faktor penentu, khususnya dalam peran mereka sebagai penyedia sumber daya finansial dan investasi. Selain itu, perencanaan semacam ini tidak bisa jika hanya difokuskan pada usaha pengimplementasian pemerintahan kota yang ketat, tetapi juga perlu diatur secara hukum. Dengan kata lain, mekanismenya harus dilengkapi dengan sanksi-sanksi yang jelas, bagaiman pelanggaran yang kemungkinan terjadi akan ditindak. Semua proposisi yang diajukan disini bersifat nyata dan sangat memungkinkan untuk dilaksanakan, dan bukan sesuatu yang hanya bisa digambarkan sebagai angan-angan semata. Dalam edisi Jurnal Ruang-Space ini, dipublikasi 7 artikel. Artikel pertama oleh Wahyudi Arimbawa, yang membicarakan tentang peranan yang berpotensi untuk diampu oleh desa adat dalam mengendalikan pemanfaatan lahan di Desa Jatiluwih. Tujuan akhir studi adalah membangun sistem pengelolaan tataguna lahan untuk desa ini. Artikel kedua ditulis oleh Anak Agung Gde Sutrisna, yang mengevaluasi bagaimana bhisama kesucian pura - kebijakan lokal yang mengatur pembangunan di zona lindung di sekitar pura - telah dilanggar, khususnya dalam kasus Pura Dang Kahyangan di area pariwisata Kuta Selatan, Kabupaten Badung-Bali. Artikel ini juga menginvestigasi dampak positif dan negatif dari beragam pelanggaran yang terjadi. Artikel ketiga disusun oleh Anak Agung Aritama, yang mendiskusikan keberadaan media penanda yang tidak terkendalikan dan telah merusak image kota, seperti yang terjadi di sepanjang Koridor Jalan Hayam Wuruk, Kota Denpasar. Artikel ini fokus pada pemahaman faktor-faktor yang berkontribusi dalam pemunculan permasalahan ini.Artikel keempat disusun oleh Agus Dharmaputra, yang berjalan beriringan dengan ide pengaturan pembangunan fungsi komersial di kota. Sebagai langkah awal, artikel ini menstudi beragam pertimbangan yang diterapkan sebelum lokasi sebuah minimarket (studi kasus yang diambil)- bisa difinalisasi oleh pelaku bisnis, dan juga sebelum berkas ijin mendirikan bangunan diajukan ke pemerintah. Artikel kelima ditulis oleh Doddy Kastamayasa, sebuah studi tentang layout keruangan Banjar Ujung, sebuah kampung nelayan yang terletak di Kabupaten Karangasem, bagian timur Bali, pasca diterpanya komunitas ini oleh beragam bencana alam. Permukiman ini telah mengalami kerusakan, dampak dari meletusnya Gunung Agung di tahun 1963, dan bencana erosi serta abrasi dalam kurun waktu tiga tahun, dari tahun 1997 sampai dengan 1999. Artikel keenam ditulis oleh Anak Agung Mahendra berkenaan dengan konservasi ruang publik, salah satu potensi pengembangan industri kepariwisataan di Desa Kendran, Kabupaten Gianyar. Desa ini ditunjuk sebagai salah satu destinasi wisata desa, proposisi yang disambut dengan antusiasme tinggi oleh Kabupaten Gianyar. Artikel terakhir disusun oleh Ngakan Juliastika, yang mendiskusikan tentang permasalahan terkait pembangunan perumahan oleh para pengembang, dengan memprioritaskan keuntungan ekonomi di atas konformansi terhadap tata aturan yang ada. Beranjak dari situasi ini, penulis merangkum tujuh set strategi penting yang telah diterapkan oleh para pengembang, dan diimplementasikan dalam tujuh kasus pembangunan perumahan yang berbeda. In its 2014 report, the World Health Organisation (WHO) stated that cancers had been responsible for the death of 8.2 million people in 2012. This is probably a massive underestimation, since poverty and medical services are not available to a multitude of people. Millions of cases therefore are likely to go unrecorded. There were 14 million new cases encountered in the same year. This United Nations Agency cannot see this figure reducing any time soon. The number is instead forecast to climb by 70% in twenty years time. While this agency cannot sufficiently stress how life threathening cancer is, nonetheless it is a complex medical condition whose origin can be traced to human exposure to carcinogens, some environmental, some dietary, and some self inflicted such as smoking. In its report, the WHO states that cancer is a result of an excessive exposure to three forms of poisons, both directly and indirectly, including physical, chemical and biological carcinogens. While one cannot determine a singular cause, human contact with those carcinogens is undoubtedly associated with the quality of the environment people inhabit. This implies at least in part, that any environmentally generated cancers must be addressed and overcome by incorporating anti-cancer strategies. These represent essential practice as part of the totality of existing and planned changes to the built environment. Both policies and practices should be rigorously implemented at all scales and urban forms. This of course includes most importantly the immediate environment of housing –the ancillary spaces where we park our cars; spend our family time over the weekend; the roads we commute on daily, the social infrastructures we inhabit for various reasons, and the public spaces where we interact with other members of the community. The danger begins when the organisation of this living environment, together with the patterns of individual behaviour associated with it, forces us to breath polluted air; to drink contaminated water; to suffer the encroachment into public parks by vehicles contributing cancerous phenyl-hydrocarbons into the very spaces people go to avoid them; having to drink groundwater contaminated by the pollution of the earth by industry, and hence the very water deployed in the processes of food production. There is no doubt that cancer is to a large extent dependent upon the life style we choose. How and when we eat, how we sleep, how we manage our psychological state, how we move around etc. But in order to address the problem correctly from an environmental standpoint, we must consider the question "can planning contribute to the creation of a healthy living environment?'' If so, what methods of analysis, policy, implementation, and policing should be set in place, if these are not in place already? In theory, planning works for the good of the people, including preserving their health. In practice we must retain a healthy dose of suspicion, since planning is a servo mechanism of the state, and in most instances the state works for private capital. So business usually triumphs in the face of the popular demands of the people. But when the environment becomes polluted it is unquestionable that planning plays a significant role by default. Bluntly stated it is not doing what it is supposed to do. This situation has many causes – lack of funding, corrupt practices that are always associated with development permissions, inadequate legislation, the absence of appropriate density controls, negotiable zoning regulation, improper policing, or simply ignorance of contemporary planning practices and global best practice. Nevertheless, people are not always passive victims. They also make choices as to whether or not they expose themselves to pollutants. Some may have no other option but to accept environmental pollution as part of their daily life. Others however may make choices as to how to deal with it, and avoid exposure at all cost. Many cities have placed a great stress on the creation of a healthy living environment. Paradoxically, this is also good for business since clean and efficient transport and a highly regulated planning system are good for everyone. The idea is now adopted as an essential and accepted part of planning policies and given priority over many other considerations in the developed world. The processes of globalisation and the rise of an 'informational class of labour' (Castells) or what Richard Florida calls 'the Ceative Class' has demonstrated without a doubt that those cities that stress environment and cultural services succeed where others fail. Nobody wants to work in a polluted and filthy environment. So attracting high quality workers is highly dependent on the production of a high quality environment and the branding process now essential to urban competition. In this context many concerns come to the force, such as: where are all types of industry to be located in order to guarantee that the carcinogens they produce will be internally absorbed and not dumped into the land, air or water that nourish us? Where are future homes to be located ? Where should the social infrastructure: schools, hospitals, public offices, etc be planned? How should existing planning standards be upgraded to accommodate new open spaces and to compenstate for the incredible current lack of provision for the populace? When will the proper policing and management of motor vehicles be implemented as it is in countless other cities? When will the implementation of road rules, reckless driving, uncontrolled parking and other offences be given equal status to checking driving licenses? The answer however is not merely a matter of establishing a sound physical and spatial plan, but rather an inclusive one embracing human behavioural approaches all together. The latter is of paramount importance as the quality of a place cannot be disconnected either from the lifestyles of the community it accommodates or the international community it depends on for finance and investment. How such necessary planning should be imposed not only implies more rigorous urban governance, but the proper and extensive application of the laws that exist today. None of the above is imaginary. In this issue of Ruang-Space Journal 7 articles are published. The first one is by Wahyudi Arimbawa. It talks about the potential roled played by the desa adat institution in controlling land utilization in Jatiluwih Village. The final objective of this study is to develop a system of land use management for this village. The second article is written by Anak Agung Gde Sutrisna. This research evaluates how the bhisama kesucian pura - local guidelines for development within the protective zone surrounding a temple - has been violated, especially in the case of Dang Kahyangan temples located in a touristy area of South Kuta District, Badung Regency-Bali. This article also investigates the impacts such violations have, both negatively and positively. The third article is authored by Anak Agung Aritama. It discusses the uncontrolled presence of urban signage to a level that ruins the image of a town, as is observed when one walks along the Hayam Wuruk Corridor of Denpasar Kota. The article focuses on the comprehension of factors leading to the overall lack of control that generates such chaotic effects. The fourth article is by Agus Dharmaputra. It supports the idea of regulating the development of commercial functions in an urban area. This article offers a preliminary study of considerations used before the location for any minimarket - the commercial functions taken as case studies - is finalized by owners, prior to building permit application to the government. The fifth article is authored by Doddy Kastamayasa. This is a study of a post natural disaster fishing settlement of Ujung Neighborhood in Karangasem Regency on the eastern coast of Bali Island. This settlement was badly hit by the eruption of Mount Agung in 1963. It was then also eroded by significant storms and resultant erosion abrasions over three years from 1997 up to 1999. The sixth article is documented by Anak Agung Mahendra, which is about the conservation of public spaces of Kendran Village in Gianyar Regency. This study is necessary as the village is denoted as the mext rural tourism destination , a proposition which has been accepted with enthusiasm by Gianyar Regency. The last article is written by Ngakan Juliastika. It discusses problems associated with developers decision to focus more on generating profits rather than conforming to the housing development guidelines and policies that have been established. Taking this situation as a point of departure, this paper suggests seven sets of strategies implemented by various developers at seven different housing developments.
From the introduction: The last two years mark a turning point in public perception of human-induced climate change as a problem of global importance. The widespread acceptance that 'most of the observed increase in globally-averaged temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas [GHG] concentrations' has increased political pressure on governments to reduce GHG emissions. At the same time, rising oil prices have made the reduction of dependence on energy imports and diversification of the energy mix strategic imperatives for many countries around the world. While governments worldwide are confronted with this dual challenge, it is of special relevance to China. On the one hand, China has recently become the world's largest emitter of CO2, accounting for 24% of global annual CO2 emissions. China is therefore one of the most important players to effectively mitigate global warming and pressure from governments around the world on China to join emission reductions efforts is mounting. On the other hand, energy demand is growing exponentially and China is increasingly relying on energy imports to satisfy energy needs. Worried that growing dependency on energy imports may be accompanied by foreign-policy and economic pressures that might threaten national security as well as social and political stability, China has implemented a number of policies to address this issue ranging from policies to save energy and reduce energy intensity, to the diversification of oil supply sources and routes, the support of equity oil overseas acquisitions and the build up of strategic oil reserves to the diversification of the energy portfolio. In line with the objective to diversify the composition of the energy mix, China's leadership is increasingly realizing the need to reduce emissions and support renewable energy development. At a recently held Politburo study session, President Hu Jintao exclaimed: 'Our task is tough, and our time is limited. Party organisations and governments at all levels must give priority to emission reduction and bring the idea deep into people's hearts". To address the issue of energy security, the Chinese government has adapted a two-pronged approach. While measures to promote energy savings and efficiency curb the increase in energy demand, the support of renewable and nuclear energy reduces dependency on energy imports and contributes to the broadening of the foundation of energy supply. This study focuses on China's renewable energy policy and the development of wind energy in China in particular. Commitment by the highest levels of government and a host of favourable policies have triggered a boom in renewable energy in China, especially in the wind power sector. A major step in the development of renewable energy in China has been the Renewable Energy Law that came into effect in January 2006. In addition, the government has set ambitious targets for energy intensity reduction, and share of renewable energy of primary energy consumption. China is on the way to become the world leader in renewable energies. In 2007, investment in renewable energies in China amounted to approximately US$ 12 billion, second only to Germany. In terms of installed renewable energy capacity, China leads the world with 151 GW of installed capacity, largely due to the widespread utilization of hydropower for electricity generation. According to a report by the United Nations Environmental Programme, China is the world's leading manufacturer of solar cells, with an estimated annual production capacity of 3.000 MW. China's wind power market was the third biggest worldwide in 2007 and growth rates continue to exceed expectations. In 2009, China is expected to take the lead as the largest manufacturer of wind turbines. Hydro power represents the most important source of renewable energy in China and plays an important part in the power generation portfolio, most notably since the construction of the Three Gorges Dam. Hydro capacity is expected to double to 290 GW until 2020, but concerns about the social and environmental impact of large-scale hydro power are becoming stronger. Although China is the world's leading solar manufacturer, installed solar photovoltaic power capacity amounts to a mere 0.01% of total power generation capacity (80 MW, approx. 50% of which are off-grid). Solar power equipment is produced almost exclusively for export. Considering China's enormous energy demand and the pace of its growth, deployment of solar photovoltaic power is not viewed as a first-rate solution to satisfy China's energy needs, since it features high costs and low efficiencies compared to other renewables like hydro or wind power. While China does not have significant amounts of solar PV capacity, it is the biggest market for solar thermal systems for heating and hot water supply with 64,5% of global capacity, amounting to 68 GW. Biomass covers 13% of primary energy demand, mostly used in rural households for heating and cooking. In 2007, only 0,28% of power generation capacity were fuelled by biomass. The government plans to expand biomass capacity from 2 to 30 GW by 2020. Despite the impressive progress of recent years, renewable energies - excluding hydro - only contribute less than 1% to China's electricity supply and the skies above China's urban areas continue to be shrouded by smog. Since coal-fired power generation accounts for 82,9% of total electricity supply, it is no surprise that half of China's emissions are attributable to power generation. With electricity demand growing rapidly alongside the economy, dependency on coal as the major source for power generation is likely to persist. However, as the most important source of renewable energy next to hydro, and growth of installed capacity constantly accelerating, peaking at about 130% in 2007, wind power is one of – if not the – most promising option on China's path towards diversification of the energy mix. In recent years wind power has become a mainstream source of renewable energy excelling with mature technology and power generation costs almost competitive with conventional power sources, providing a viable alternative to coal as a source of electricity generation. In 2005, just before the development of wind power started to pick up pace, the China Wind Power Training and Research Project (CWPP) of the German Development Cooperation (GTZ) saw its inception, with the aim of improving the conditions for sustained development of wind power in China. Primary objective of CWPP is the support of sustained long-term wind power development in China. To attain this goal CWPP supports the improvement of technical capabilities of private and government institutions and organizations through activities in the fields of wind power training, technical support and research. The project's engagement ranges from training of technicians in charge of operation and maintenance (OM) at wind farms to the introduction and localisation of software vital to wind resource assessment. These capacity building activities are complemented by wind power information services as well as policy advice to relevant government institutions. The CWPP activities and the indicators measuring its success are based on an analysis of framework conditions in 2003/2004. However, since then the general conditions for wind power in China have changed drastically due to policy changes inducing exponential growth of the industry. While from 2000 to 2005 total installed capacity grew at an average rate of 31%, it more than doubled in the last two years. Newly installed capacity increased at an even faster rate averaging 156% annual growth from 2005 till 2007. In light of the boom in the Chinese wind power sector, it is imperative to realign project activities with actual market conditions on the basis of an up-to-date assessment of the current situation and future outlook. This analysis of the wind power sector in China in 2008 will serve as a basis for the review of current CWPP activities with the aim of developing recommendations for adaptations where deemed necessary. Content Methodology: The study is divided into seven chapters. Subsequent to the introduction, the global development of wind power, its major drivers and trends are discussed briefly serving as a backdrop to the study. The third chapter introduces CWPP and its activities along with the current status of project implementation. The fourth and fifth chapter form the main body of this study. Beginning with the current picture of energy supply and demand, the fourth chapter goes on to introduce the relevant government authorities in charge of Chinese renewable energy policy. Since the basis for wind power development is government support, a detailed examination of renewable energy policy in China is given. The policies governing the wind power sector are reviewed in order to explore the origins of the current boom of the wind power industry. The fifth chapter offers an in-depth discussion of wind power in China, including wind power potential, current status of the market and future development as well as the situation with regards to wind power equipment manufacturers and project developers. In the sixth chapter, major determinants that have the potential to negatively affect the perspectives of wind power development in China are identified and discussed. As a conclusion, chapter seven offers recommendations for the realignment of CWPP activities according to the actual needs of the market. A series of expert interviews was conducted within the scope of the study. The experts interviewed included representatives of relevant government authorities, foreign and domestic wind turbine manufacturers, component suppliers, project developers, industry associations, universities, research institutes, consultancies, CDM agencies and environmental organizations. These interviews serve as a supplement to the evaluation of secondary literature and online sources so as to guarantee the timeliness and validity of information in the study. In cooperation with the China Electric Power Research Institute (CEPRI) and the Chinese Wind Energy Association (CWEA) the need for wind power-specific training and education for wind power equipment manufacturers and power generation companies was assessed through two separate surveys. In addition, two polls were conducted among wind turbine and component manufacturers at the China Wind Energy Exhibition 2008 in Shanghai and the Wind Power Asia 2008 in Beijing. These polls helped to identify the major challenges for the wind sector's future development in China and contributed to the assessment of the current situation with regard to human resources and qualification.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Contents: 1.INTRODUCTION7 1.1BACKGROUND7 1.2CONTENT METHODOLOGY9 2.THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT OF WIND POWER10 2.1DEVELOPMENT OF THE GLOBAL WIND POWER MARKET10 2.2DRIVERS AND TRENDS OF WIND POWER DEVELOPMENT12 3.THE GTZ CHINA WIND POWER PROJECT17 4.ENERGY POLICY IN CHINA19 4.1ENERGY SUPPLY AND DEMAND19 4.2RELEVANT PLAYERS IN ENERGY POLICY MAKING22 4.3RENEWABLE ENERGY AND WIND POWER POLICY25 4.3.1THE CONCESSION PROGRAMME AND ORIGINS OF WIND POWER PRICING25 4.3.2THE RENEWABLE ENERGY LAW29 4.3.3INVESTMENT CONDITIONS FINANCIAL INCENTIVES33 5.WIND POWER IN CHINA39 5.1WIND ENERGY RESOURCE CHARACTERISTICS AND DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL39 5.2CURRENT STATUS OF DEVELOPMENT42 5.3MARKET FORECAST45 5.4WIND TURBINE MANUFACTURERS47 5.5WIND TURBINE COMPONENT SUPPLIERS55 5.6PROJECT DEVELOPERS55 5.7PROJECT ECONOMICS56 6.POTENTIAL PITFALLS FOR WIND POWER DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA58 6.1POLICY59 6.2HUMAN RESOURCES60 6.3WIND FARM PERFORMANCE LACK OF TRANSPARENCY63 6.4GRID INTEGRATION64 7.RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE GTZ CHINA WIND POWER PROJECT67 7.1WIND POWER EDUCATION TRAINING68 7.2RD AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPACITY BUILDING70 7.3INFORMATION SERVICES71 7.4FINAL REMARKS73 Bibliography72Textprobe:Text Sample: Chapter 6.1, Potential Pitfalls for Wind Power Development in China: Wind power in China faces a series of adverse outer influences at present. Most of these are not expected to constitute insurmountable barriers to wind power development, but will impact the pace of development nonetheless. The financial crisis on Wall Street that has spread to financial markets around the world, spurs serious worries of a global economic downturn. The renewable energy sector is hit particularly hard by a deterioration of investor confidence, since many observers assume that renewable energy development same as environmental concerns will be shelved until the economies show signs of recovery. The wind industry in China will not be exempt from negative effects of the crisis. Since raising capital will prove difficult in this situation, planned IPOs will be moved back and investments may be deferred. The fall in oil prices in fear of a recession contributes to increase the discrepancy in profitability between conventional power and renewable energy projects (decrease the relative competitiveness of renewables). The rise in coal prices and the credit squeeze further draws liquidity from the market for project development. Rising prices in raw materials drive the increase in wind turbine prices. However, wind power development in China also faces a series of challenges of intrinsic nature. The tremendous pace at which the Chinese wind power sector has been evolving entails an inherent risk of undesirable developments. Reports of wind turbines not performing as expected or even collapsing, lack of due diligence in planning of wind farms, serial production errors in turbines, the counterfeiting of components. These incidents are often portrayed as isolated, but may be representative of greater erroneous trends in the industry. Government regulation will be essential in addressing the issues at stake and preventing them from becoming fundamental barriers to future wind power development. Policy: As mentioned before, government renewable energy and wind power policy have been the single most important driver for wind power development around the world. This is also true for China. A combination of wind power development targets, mandatory market share requirements, economic incentives and protective policies have created a burgeoning wind power market and a thriving domestic industry. Nevertheless, in order to prevent a bust from following the boom, a few adjustments of the policy framework are necessary in order to provide for sustained wind power development. Restrictive government policies, particularly with regard to wind power pricing and foreign investment, pose a serious barrier to the exploitation of a diverse set of investment sources for wind power development in China. Obstructive regulations for FDI, especially with regard to debt financing and CDM project ownership, serve as deterrents for foreign investors. Modes for participation in the regulatory process are unclear, as are rights to appeal regulatory decisions. The lack of a clear pricing policy guaranteeing secure and attractive profit margins for wind power projects has kept many potential investors at bay. Limited access to proper financing and insurance further discourages private and foreign investors. The development of a competitive power sector is also impeded by the dominance of state-owned power generators, who retain strong and often opaque links to state funds, while their levels of profit, subsidies and cross-subsidisation are undisclosed. The government has largely recognized the challenge to open up the market to private and foreign investors. Movement towards further improvement of the policy framework governing wind power is visible. Recently, the government has been addressing many of the most important barriers impeding wind power development. Wind power pricing policy has been slowly moving towards a more predictable and lucrative system of fixed feed-in tariffs. Government action has been taken to alleviate deficiencies regarding reliable wind resource data and the innovation capability of the domestic industry. According to some observers, CDM regulations are expected to be loosened in favour of foreign investors. Still, a number of challenges remain to be addressed, demanding government guidance in order to facilitate sustained, long-term development of wind power in China: - Enforce efforts to provide adequate wind power education and training programmes to ease the human resource deficit. - Establish strong mandatory wind turbine certification standards and support capacity building in the field of turbine testing, in order to ensure turbine quality/reliability and in the long-run improve global competitiveness of the domestic wind industry. - Facilitate smooth grid integration of wind power by: - strengthening the national power grid and interregional transmission capacity, taking into consideration the integration of wind power in the design of grid expansion plans by establishing management regulations and technical specifications to integrate wind power into grid planning; - mapping out comprehensive wind power development plans on national and provincial level in consultation with the grid companies, taking into account construction of other power generation capacity, (interregional) transmission capacity as well as the specific requirements of wind power grid integration; - redoubling research efforts with regard to the analysis of the influence of extensive deployment of wind power on the operation and management of the power grid, intensifying studies on accurate wind power forecasting to allow for effective dispatch of power and establishing a national grid code for wind turbines to ensure maximum electricity output of wind farms. - Tweak FDI, CDM and wind power policies to allow for more diversity in investment and enhance the efficiency of the power sector by creating a fair and open market. Clarify wind power pricing policies and facilitate access to government subsidized bank loans. - Increase transparency within the wind industry and power sector, e.g. with regard to information on wind farm energy output and turbine availability, in order to facilitate competition and intra-industry learning processes, enable timely identification of challenges and build investor confidence. Information transparency is also necessary to improve energy demand and (wind power) supply forecasts and thus provide for proper dispatch of power plants.
This guide accompanies the following article: Doreen Anderson‐Facile and Shyanne Ledford, 'Basic Challenges to Prisoner Reentry', Sociology Compass 3/2 (2009): 183–195, 10.1111/j.1751‐9020.2009.00198.xAuthor's IntroductionCrime, incarceration and prisoner reintegration are pressing issues facing the United States today. As the prison population grows at record rates so, in turn, does the reentry of prisoners into society. The transition from prison to the outside world is often difficult for post‐release prisoners, their families, their communities and the larger society. Many formally incarcerated individuals do not have the skills or support to succeed outside prison walls. Unfortunately, when post‐release prisoners are not successfully reintegrated, they are often returned to prison and begin the cycle of incarceration.The following is a course designed around the basic challenges prisoners face upon reentry. The literature suggests that success depends in part on support and overcoming several barriers, such as homelessness and under/unemployment. This course begins with an examination of reentry barriers facing post‐release prisoners followed by an exploration of the relationship between prisoner reentry, race, gender, family, and employment and concludes with an assessment of ongoing research and public policy.Author RecommendsAnderson‐Facile, Doreen. (2009). 'Basic Challenges to Prisoner Reentry'. Sociology Compass, 3(2): 183–95.Anderson‐Facile's review of current research on prisoner reentry yields interesting results. Her article examines prisoner reentry as it relates to the barriers preventing successful reintegration. Anderson‐Facile begins with a look at incarceration and recidivism statistics leading readers through the barriers preventing reentry success. Barriers such as housing, family and community support, employment, and the stigma of a prison record make successful reentry difficult. Anderson‐Facile concludes with a look at current reentry programs. Anderson‐Facile highlights literature suggesting post‐release success begins with rehabilitation and ends with community support. The author notes that many successful programs are faith or character‐based. These programs focus on the individual and assist in substance abuse issues, vocational training, and transitional living arrangements. Finally, Anderson‐Facile notes that programs that work in one community may not show success in other communities, therefore concluding that matching programs with communities is a critical component for assuring post‐release success.Dhami, Mandeep K., David R. Mandel, George Loewesnstein, and Peter Ayton. (2006). 'Prisoners' Positive Illusions of Their Post‐Release Success'. Law and Human Behavior30: 631–47.Dhami et al. examine prisoners' forecasts of reentry success as this may have implications for how prisoners respond to imprisonment, release, and parole decisions. The authors examine sentenced US and UK prisoners' predictions for personal recidivism. The authors also asked UK prisoners how successful they will be compared to the average prisoner. Overall, both samples yielded overly optimistic, unrealistic beliefs about personal reentry success when compared to official data. The UK participants demonstrated a self‐enhancement bias by expressing that they would fair far better than the average prisoner. The authors conclude their article by discussing the implications of their findings and suggest future research possibilities.Holzer, Harry J., Steven Raphael, and Michael A. Stoll. (2002). 'Can Employers Play a More Positive Role in Prisoner Reentry? Urban Institute's Reentry Roundtable'.The authors report that in the early 21st century over 600 000 prisoners were released each year from prison and three million or more ex‐prisoners were in the general population. Holzer et al. indicate that one of the greatest hurdles for a newly released prisoner is finding employment because, as applicants, they are faced with an aversion on the employers part to hiring ex‐offenders. Holzer et al. explore the extent and nature of this aversion. Holzer et al. maintain that interventions by other agencies can help mediate employer aversions to hiring post‐release prisoners.La Vigne, Nancy G., Diana Brazzell, and Kevonne M. Small. (2007). 'Evaluation of Florida's Faith‐ and Character‐Based Institutions'. The Urban Institute.La Vigne et al. produced a summary of the findings from a 'process and impact' evaluation of two of Florida's faith and character‐based programs, also known as FCBIs. The authors' note that FCBIs are founded on principles of self‐betterment and faith development and are often ran by volunteers. The authors gathered data in the following ways: one on one interviews, semi structured interviews with staff members at all levels, focus groups with inmates, administrative data/official documents, and telephone and email communications with state corrections personnel. The authors noted that at six months, male FCBI housed participants were more successful than post‐released prisoners housed in Federal Department of Corrections (FDOC) facilities.La Vigne, Nancy G., Rebecca L. Naser, Lisa E. Brooks, and Jennifer L. Castro. (2005). 'Examining the Effect of Incarceration and In‐Prison Family Contact on Prisoners' Family Relationships'. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice21(4): 314–35.In this article, La Vigne, Naser, Brooks and Castro look at the role of the family in recidivism rates. Specifically, they examine the role of in‐prison contact with family members on released prisoner success. This article first defines family and then looks at the quality of familial bonds at imprisonment and during incarceration. Next, they examine the inter‐personal bonds in relationships, i.e., parent–child vs. husband‐wife of these post‐released prisoners. The authors' findings were inconsistent. For example, in some situations in‐prison contact was detrimental on family relationships and ties, wherein other cases the same contact served to strengthen the family and create a tighter network of family support for the newly released prisoner. These findings suggest further research is necessary.Pager, D. (2003). 'The Mark of a Criminal Record'. The American Journal of Sociology108(5): 937–75.Pager examined the relationship between prior incarceration and race on employment on two teams of subjects. One team consisted of two 23‐year‐old, white men and the other team was two 23‐year‐old, African‐American men. The two teams were nearly identical in personality, appearance, skills and employment history. The variables were race and criminal record. The findings suggest that race and employment history are important factors on post‐released employment. Thirty‐four percent of white applicants without criminal backgrounds received a call back while only 14 percent of black applicants without criminal backgrounds got called back. Seventeen percent of white applicants with criminal records received call backs while only 5 percent of black applicants with criminal records received call backs. These findings indicate that race and not prison record is a greater determinant of employment.Parsons, Mickey L. and Carmen Warner‐Robbins. (2002). 'Factors That Support Women's Successful Transition to the Community Following Jail/ Prison'. Health Care for Women International23: 6–18.Parson and Warner‐Robbins simply state the purpose of their article is to describe the factors that support the successful reentry of post‐release women into the community. The authors look at a specific program called Welcome Home Ministries (WHM), a community‐based program. The authors examine the demographics of the population, the rising incarceration rates, issues that lead to incarceration, and support for post‐release mothers. Through qualitative interviews with women who were participating in WHM programs upon release many themes emerged. The authors argue that these themes lead to implications about what future programs need to support women who are transitioning from prisoner to general public.Seiter, Richard P. and Karen R. Kadela. (2003) 'Prisoner Reentry: What Works, What Does Not, and What is Promising'. Crime and Delinquency49(3): 360–88.Seiter and Kadela examine the nature of the reentry issue and explore which reentry programs show success in reducing recidivism. The authors note a swing from modified sentencing to determinate sentencing which increases length of incarceration as an additional factor in successful reentry. Seiter and Kadela define reentry, categorize programs for prisoner reentry, and use the Maryland Scale of Scientific Method to determine program effectiveness. The authors find that programs that emphasized vocational training and employment development yield the most success.Travis, Jeremy and Joan Petersilia. (2001). 'Reentry Reconsidered: A New Look at an Old Question'. Crime and Delinquency47(3): 291–313.Travis and Petersilia drive prison reform by providing research‐based implications for revamping the current system of prisoner management. While prisoners have always been arrested and released, the authors point out that the numbers of both are increasing. They believe this is a call to action. Travis and Petersilia look at changing sentencing policies, changes in parole supervision, and how the removal and return of prisoners influence communities. The authors highlight the astronomical increase of prisoners at a time when sentencing policies are changing and are often inconsistent. They examine parole, the demographics of transitioning inmates, and the links between reentry and five social policies. The findings provide guidance for development of reentry policies.Wacquant, Loic. (2002). 'Deadly Symbiosis: Rethinking Race and Imprisonment in Twenty‐ First‐Century America'. Boston Review27(2): 22–31.Waquant begins his article with three abrupt facts about racial inequality and imprisonment in the United States all of which point to a 'blackening' of the nations prisons. The author points out that the high percentage of black people incarcerated in the United States is a direct result of four institutions; slavery, the Jim Crow System, the organizational structure of urban ghettos and the growing prison system. One of the main findings, according to Waquant, is that when laws and social reform restricted segregation (technically ended), the prisons picked up where society left off. Essentially he argues that, as evidenced by the ghettos and increasing numbers of African‐Americans behind bars, the prison serves to reaffirm racial inequality.Online MaterialsDepartment of Justice http://www.usdoj.gov/Urban Institute http://www.urban.org/California Departmen of Corrections and Rehabilitation http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Bureau of Justice Statistics http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjsLloyd Sealy Library at John Jay College http://www.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/Pew Center http://www.pewresearch.org/Sample Syllabus Week 1: Introduction to Prisoner Reentry Anderson‐Facile, Doreen. (2009). 'Basic Challenges to Prisoner Reentry'. Sociology Compass 3/2: 183–95.Visher, Christy A. and Jeremy Travis. (2003). 'Transitions from Prison to Community: Understanding Individual Pathways'. Annual Review of Sociology29: 89–113. Week 2: Introduction to Prisoner Reentry Continued Travis, Jeremy and Joan Petersilia. (2001). 'Reentry Reconsidered: A New Look at an Old Question.'Crime and Delinquency 47/3: 291–313.The Urban Institute. 'Beyond the Prison Gates: The State of Parole in America. A First Tuesday Forum.'http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=900567, November 5, 2002. Week 3: Incarceration, Reentry, and Race Pettit, Becky, and Bruce Western. (2004). 'Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and Class Inequality in US Incarceration.'American Sociological Review69: 151–169.Wacquant, Loic. (2002). 'Deadly Symbiosis: Rethinking race and Imprisonment in twenty‐first‐century America'. Boston Review 27/2 (April/May): 22–31.Marbley, Aretha Faye and Ralph Ferguson. (2005). 'Responding to Prisoner Reentry, Recidivism, and Incarceration of Inmates of Color: A Call to the Communities'. Journal of Black Studies 35/5(May): 633–49. Week 4: Incarceration, Reentry, and Gender O'Brien, Patricia. (2007). 'Maximizing Success for Drug‐Affected Women after Release from Prison: Examining Access to and Use of Social Services During Reentry'. Women & Criminal Justice 17/2&3: 95–113.Severance, Theresa A. (2004). 'Concerns and Coping Strategies of Women Inmates Concerning Release: 'It's Going to Take Somebody in My Corner"'. Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 38/4: 73–97.Parsons, Mickey L. and Carmen Warner‐Robbins. (2002). 'Factors that Support Women's Successful Transition to the Community Following Jail/ Prison.'Health Care for Women International23: 6–18. Week 5: Incarceration, Reentry, and Family/ Home La Vigne, Nancy G., Rebecca L. Naser, Lisa E. Brooks, and Jennifer L. Castro. (2005). 'Examining the Effect of Incarceration and In‐Prison Family Contact on Prisoners' Family Relationships'. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 21/4 (November): 314–35.Pearson, Jessica and Lanae Davis. (2003). 'Serving Fathers Who Leave Prison'. Family Court Review 41/3(July): 307–20.Roman, Caterina Gouvis and Jeremy Travis. (2004). 'Taking Stock: Housing, Homelessness, and Prisoner Reentry,'The Urban Institute.http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=411096, March 8, 2004. Week 6: Incarceration, Reentry, and Employment Pager, Devah. (2003). 'The Mark of a Criminal Record,'American Journal of Sociology 108/5 (March): 937–75.Solomon, Amy L., Kelly Dedel Johnson, Jeremy Travis, and Elizabeth C. McBride. (2004). 'From Prison to Work: The Employment Dimensions of Prisoner Reentry'. Urban Institute Justice Policy Center. October 2004, pp. 1–32. Week 7: Incarceration, Reentry, and Employment Continued Holzer, Harry J., Steven Raphael, and Michael A. Stoll. (2002). 'Can Employers Play a More Positive Role in Prisoner Reentry? A Roundtable Paper'. The Urban Institute, March 20–21, 2002, pp. 1–16.Harrison, Byron, and Robert Carl Schehr. (2004). 'Offenders and Post‐Release Jobs: Variables Influencing Success and Failure'. Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 39/3: 35–68. Week 8: Prisoner Reentry: What Works? MacKenzie, Doris Layton. (2000). 'Evidence‐Based Corrections: Identifying What Works'. Crime and Delinquency46: 457–71.Petersilia, Joan. (2004). 'What Works in Prisoner Reentry? Reviewing and Questioning Evidence'. Federal Probation 68/2 (September): 4–8.Seiter, Richard P. and Karen R. Kadela. (2003). 'Prisoner Reentry: What Works, What Does Not, and What is Promising,'Crime and Delinquency 49/3 (July): 360–88. Week 9: Incarceration, Reentry, Research and Public Policy Lynch, James P. (2006). 'Prisoner Reentry: Beyond Program Evaluations.'Criminology and Public Policy 5/2: 401–12.Pager, Devah. (2006). 'Evidence‐Based Policy for Successful Prisoner Reentry'. Criminology and Public Policy 5/3: 505–14.La Vigne, Nancy G. Diana Brazzell, and Kevonne M. Small. (2007). 'Evaluation of Florida's Faith‐ and Character‐Based Institutions'. The Urban Institute http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=411561, October 1, 2007.Jacobson, Michael. (2006). 'Reversing the Punitive Turn: The Limits and Promise of Current Research'. Criminology and Public Policy 5/2: 277–84. Week 10: Incarceration, Reentry, and Outcomes Dhami, Mandeep K., David R. Mandel, George Loewenstein, and Peter Ayton. (2006). 'Prisoners Positive Illusions of Their Post‐Release Success'. Law and Human Behavior30: 631–47.Richards, Stephen C., James Austin, and Richard S. Jones. (2004). 'Kentucky's Perpetual Prisoner Machine: It's About Money'. The Review of Policy Research 21/1: 93–106.Suggested ReadingsEvans, Donald G. (2005). 'The Case for Inmate Reentry'. Corrections Today pp. 28–9.Lynch, James P. and William J. Sabol. (2001). 'Prisoner Reentry in Perspective'. Crime Policy Report3: 1–25.'One in 100: Behind Bars in America 2008'. The Pew: Center on the States 2008, pp. 1–35.Petersilia, Joan. (1999). Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, The University of Chicago.Petersilia, Joan (2003). When Prisoners Come Home: Parole and Prisoner Reentry. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0‐19‐516086‐x.Travis, Jeremy, Amy L. Solomon, and Michelle Waul. (2001). 'From Prison to Home: The Dimensions and Consequences of Prisoner Reentry'. The Urban Institute.Young, D. Vernetta and Rebecca Reviere (2006). Women Behind Bars. London: Lynn Rienner Publishers. ISBN 1‐58826‐371‐1.Focus Questions
Think about the kind of crimes for which people are imprisoned. What types of crimes do you think the majority of the prisoners commit? What precursors would lead to someone being arrested and eventually imprisoned for these types of crimes? What is the likelihood that these factors remain upon release? Do you think prison should be rehabilitative or punitive? Do you think prison is always the best option for criminal behavior (in other words, is the old adage 'if you do the crime you need to do the time' valid?). Why are incarceration and recidivism rates different across race and class? How do you explain the disparities in incarceration rates for people of color? What kind of programs, if any, do you feel should be incorporated into a prison sentence (i.e. job training, counseling, AA, NA, religious opportunities, etc.). Suggested Culminating Activity: Students are to design a pilot program to assist prisoners successfully reenter into the community. Students must have the following parts in their report/ presentation: Prison/Community Summary (what population and community do you want to serve), Program Summary and Justification (what is the program – how does it work and why do you think it is a valuable program), Requirements for Participation in Program, Barriers to Success, Assessment/ Measurement of Success/ Failure, and Conclusion. Students must briefly site articles from this course to support their methodologies and indicate the problems they suspect they will face as they try to determine the success or failure of their program. Budgets and money are a non‐issue. In the 'real' world budgets are always an issue but for the purpose of this assignment they are not. However, when designing your program you should consider whether your design is financially feasible.. The goal of such an assignment is for students to recognize the barriers prisoners face to successful reentry, the evidence and research that goes into creating prisoner policies, and that a program must be multi‐faceted and comprehensive in order to provide a platform for former inmate success.
This sample syllabus above is modeled after a 10 week term. It is recommended for longer terms, that the following book be utilized:Irwin, John. (2005). The Warehouse Prison. California: Roxbury Publishing Company.ISBN: 1‐931719‐35‐7.John Irwin derived his data from a prison in Solano County, California. Irwin watched as incarceration rates doubled between 1980 and 2000 despite crime levels staying relatively stable. Irwin notes that most of the prisoners in his study were incarcerated for 'unserious' crimes and were often treated in unethical ways. Irwin begins by examining incarceration rates, the demographics of the prison population, problems prisoners faced while incarcerated, post‐release difficulties and hurdles, and the societal costs of the prison super‐structure. Irwin offers a thorough examination of why prisoners are incarcerated, what they face while inside prison walls, what challenges they face once released, and the financial implications of imprisoning people.
Vol. 1: Protest and hope, 1882-1934 / Sheridan Johns (III). - 2nd pr. - 1978. - XXI,378 S. : Lit. S. 356-357. - (... ; 89). - ISBN 0-8179-1891-4; Vol. 2: Hope and challenge, 1935-1952 / Thomas Karis. - 1973. - XVIII,536 S. : Lit. S. 516-518. - (... ; 122). - ISBN 0-8179-1221-5; Vol. 3: Challenge and violence, 1953-1964 / Thomas Karis ; Gail M. Gerhart. - 1977. - XX,825 S. : Lit. S. 807-810. - (... ; 123) . - ISBN 0-8179-6231-X; Vol. 4: Political profiles, 1882-1964 / Gail M. Gerhart ; Thomas Karis. - 1977. - XXIII,178 S. : zahlr. Ill., Lit. S. 169-172. - (... ; 161). - ISBN 0-8179-6611-2; Vol. 5: Nadir and resurgence, 1964-1979 / Thomas G. Karis ; Gail M. Gerhart. - 1997. - XXIX,805 S. : 2 Kt., Lit.Hinw., Lit. S. 774-790. - ISBN 0-253-33231-1; Vol. 6: Challenge and victory, 1980-1990 / Gail M. Gerhart & Clive L. Glaser. - 2010. - XXXIV,778 S. : Ill. Kt., Lit. S. 737-754. - ISBN 978-0-253-35422-8
Der Sammelband fußt auf Arbeitskreisen der Hessischen Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, durchgeführt zwischen September 2002 und Januar 2003. Fachleute unterschiedlichster Richtungen befassen sich wissenschaftlich mit den vielfältigsten Nuancen der gegenwärtigen Irakkrise. Die Situation Iraks und der beteiligten Staaten wird reflektiert, der Kontext der Irakpolitik der USA, die Rolle der UNO und Europas und die Stellung Deutschlands. Einen breiten Raum nehmen Überlegungen über die Situation nach einem möglichen Krieg ein. Der Band macht deutlich, wie komplex wirtschaftliche, regionalpolitische und weltpolitische Interessen gerade in diesem Raum sind. Obwohl die hier abgebildete Situation bald überholt sein dürfte, bietet das Buch doch eine Fülle von methodischen Beispielen für die Analyse internationaler Konflikte. (3) (Klaus Hohlfeld)
