Suchergebnisse

Current article takes a closer look at the dialogue between the Strasbourg and the Luxembourg courts on the interpretation of the ne bis in idem principle and analyses how it influenced the (non)acceptance of the possibility to conduct both, criminal and administrative penal proceedings, against the same person for the same acts. It starts with the pre-Zolotukhin jurisprudence of the European Court for Human Rights and analyses how the Luxembourg interpretation of Article 54 CISA had a major influence on the change in the way the Strasbourg court perceived the possibility to conduct both, criminal and administrative penal proceedings, against the same person for the same acts. It further explores how the Luxembourg court followed the way indicated by Zolotukhin and accepted the stance of the Strasbourg court on the possibility of duplication of criminal and administrative penal proceedings against the same person for the same acts under the ne bis in idem protection afforded to individuals by Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Finally, it analyses whether the recent shift in the Strasbourg court's jurisprudence, which was also followed by the Luxembourg court, means that the ne bis in idem principle in European criminal law has, on the question of the duplication of criminal and administrative penal proceedings, basically come to the positions which were dominant in the pre-Zolotukhin jurisprudence.

»Proceedings ›in absentia‹ in comparative and international criminal law« finds a normative approach to the question whether trial ›in absentia‹ is suitable for International Criminal Tribunals by applying classical sources of international criminal law and combining institutional aspects of the procedural theory, specifically the goals of the international criminal trial, with the individual frameworks of fundamental rights, namely the right to be present. Through a critical analysis of concepts presented as models for trial ›in absentia‹ it introduces a new concept for trials ›in absentia‹ which considers both the defendant's right and duty to be present. The book thereby establishes a connection between legal theory, international criminal procedural law, international human rights law and comparative law on the one hand and – considering the high number of accused of International Criminal Tribunals at large – a highly relevant procedural question on the other hand. / »Proceedings ›in absentia‹ in comparative and international criminal law« finds a normative approach to the question whether trial ›in absentia‹ is suitable for International Criminal Tribunals by applying classical sources of international criminal law and combining institutional aspects of the procedural theory, specifically the goals of the international criminal trial, with the individual frameworks of fundamental rights, namely the right to be present. Through a critical analysis of concepts presented as models for trial ›in absentia‹ it introduces a new concept for trials ›in absentia‹ which considers both the defendant's right and duty to be present. The book thereby establishes a connection between legal theory, international criminal procedural law, international human rights law and comparative law on the one hand and – considering the high number of accused of International Criminal Tribunals at large – a highly relevant procedural question on the other hand.

Philip Pettit has made central to modern republican theory a distinctive account of freedom—republican freedom. On this account, I am not free solely because I can make choices without interference. I am truly free, only if that non-interference does not itself depend on another's forbearance (what Pettit calls 'formal' freedom). Pettit believes that the principal justification for the traditional focus of the criminal law is that it constitutes a bulwark against domination. I will, in part, be considering the merits of this claim. Is the importance of the orthodox realm of the criminal law solely or mainly explained by the wish to protect people from domination? In short, the answer is that it is not. Across the board, the criminal law rightly protects us equally from threats to what Pettit calls 'effective,' as opposed to formal, republican freedom. I will develop my critique of Pettit's account of criminal law, in part to raise questions about the role of 'domination' in political theory, and about whether it poses a significant challenge to liberal accounts of criminal law.

Article 83(2) TFEU, introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, confers a power on the EU to harmonise Member States' legislation to define criminal offences and criminal sanctions. Nonetheless, uncertainty persists as to whether this provision exhaustively determines the EU's power to adopt criminal law to enforce its policies. The article outlines the core case for viewing art.83(2) TFEU as a lex specialis. It argues that the post-Lisbon constitutional design, alongside principled and teleological considerations, support a Member State centred approach for criminal law competence. This is particularly the case with regard to the adoption of harmonisation measures.

Link collection site; with case note by Il Ho Lee