Suchergebnisse

The experiences of international agencies in Bosnia demonstrate many of the complications that typically arise for today's peacekeeping forces. The UN troops in Bosnia often found themselves in the position of being asked to perform duties better described as peace-enforcing rather than peacekeeping. This was true because of the extreme political volatility of the region along with the fact that the UN had declared the area as a protected zone. The attempt to use peacekeeping forces (which became peace-enforcement forces) to substitute for political consensus was a failure and provides a lesson for the future. Peacekeeping forces must not ever be put in the position to use their lightly armed forces to impose the vague ideals of the international community on belligerents through the use of force.

Existing research shows that peace after civil wars is more stable with peacekeepers present. Yet, violence persists in many postwar contexts, and although postwar violence is often strategic and closely linked to the faultlines of the preceding war, we know little about the impact of peacekeepers on such violence. What we know, moreover, focuses on the former combatants, while this study shows that the majority of deaths in postwar violence are inflicted by other armed actors. This is a challenge for peacekeepers who – for mandate or capacity reasons – usually focus on the warring parties. I argue that the impact of peacekeepers on postwar violence hinges on the extent to which they fill a public security gap after war, since responsibility for violence not covered by a mission's mandate lies with the often dysfunctional security agencies of the state. To test this I use a novel spatial approach to generate data that captures the manifold manifestations of violence across different postwar contexts. I find that only UN police – with their broader effect on public security – mitigate postwar violence generally. UN troops have some impact on civilian targeting by former combatants but no such effect could be identified for violence by other armed actors. The findings highlight the importance of peacekeeping police at a time when the modus operandi and capacity of UN police have been questioned, but also the importance of accounting for a multitude of violent actors when analysing the impact of international interventions more generally.

"This book examines the origins, evolution and future of proposals for a UN 'Legion'- a permanent military force recruited, trained and deployed by the UN. The idea has grown, re-emerged and evolved in direct connection with the development of UN international military forces. The proposed universal soldiers have been seen as the future representatives of a modern world constabulary, international police or humanitarian chivalry. They have also invariably evoked the idea of mercenaries and resurrected fears of supranational government and a 'world army'. Yet, the concretization, in one form or another, of the project of a UN 'Legion' may well be conditional on the viability of the original Utopia, and vice versa. The extreme polarization of the debate, reflecting a tendency to negate the inherent contradictions of reality, reminds us of the historical dimension of the building of international organization, a 'work in progress'."--Jacket

"The Women in Blue Helmets tells the story of the first all-female police unit deployed by India to the UN peacekeeping mission in Liberia in January 2007. Lesley J. Pruitt investigates how the unit was originated, developed, and implemented, offering an important historical record of this unique initiative. Examining precedents in policing in the troop-contributing country and recent developments in policing in the host country, the book offers contextually rich examination of all-female units, explores the potential benefits of and challenges to women's participation in peacekeeping, and illuminates broader questions about the relationship between gender, peace, and security."--Provided by publisher

AS FAR AS THE UN'S ROLE IN MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IS CONCERNED, ONE OF THE MAIN CRITICISMS OF THE UN HAS ALWAYS BEEN THAT IT NEEDED TOO MUCH TIME FOR THE ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT OF A FORCE IN THE THEATER, VARYING, IN SOME CASES, FROM THREE TO FIVE MONTHS. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE GENOCIDE OF TUTSI AND OPPOSITION HUTU IN RWANDA IN 1994, IT WAS WIDELY SUGGESTED THAT A RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE SLAUGHTER. MORE THAN EVER, PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY, EARLY WARNING AND RAPID DEPLOYMENT HAVE BECOME KEY CONCEPTS IN THE SEARCH FOR NEW POLICY INSTRUMENTS AIMED AT STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN CRISES. IN THIS CONTEXT, A NUMBER OF SUGGESTIONS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR WHAT, IN UN JARGON, HAS BEEN OFFICIALLY CALLED "A CAPACITY FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT." WITHOUT ENTERING INTO AN EXHAUSTIVE DISCUSSION OF RAPID DEPLOYMENT MODALITIES IT IS CLEAR FROM VARIOUS PROPOSALS THAT THERE IS AMBIGUITY ABOUT WHETHER SUCH A CAPACITY IS FOR ENFORCEMENT AS WELL AS PEACEKEEPING, THAT THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL PREFER STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS, AND THAT OTHER STATES HAVE BEEN MORE RADICAL IN DEVELOPING THE CONCEPT OF A RAPID REACTION FORCE, WITH ITS FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS.