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The article analyzes the significance of Eurasian ideology for modern economic integration, the reasons for its limited use in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and the possibilities and prospects of adapting Eurasianism for the purposes of economic development and integration. Many international economic integration associations (e.g., the EU, USMCA, ASEAN) have a common or similar ideological and value-based foundation, which ensures stronger integration. The EAEU was initially established without a common, integrating ideological basis, although the first president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, suggested using Eurasianism as the ideology of integration. Sergey Glazyev also wrote about the importance of integrative ideology for the development of the EAEU. However, these attempts to introduce Eurasian ideology for a stronger integration were not supported by the rest of the EAEU countries. This was largely because most EAEU members, including Russia, were driven by short-term economic interests, forgetting about more important long-term, strategic goals. Moreover, there are important ideological divisions in society and in the political elites of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan - primarily the division between adherents of the ideology and practices of Western liberalism, oriented toward EU integration, and supporters of an ideology close to Eurasianism and defense of traditional values, oriented toward the development of integration in the Eurasian space. The reproduction of such divisions in the EAEU countries, as well as the absence or weak development of an integrative ideology, largely determines the inconsistent and not always effective integration in the EAEU. Eurasianism can become an integrative ideology, which, if developed and adapted to modern realities, can ensure a stronger economic integration. This requires overcoming illusions about the possibility of integration of Russia and other post-Soviet countries into the EU, pursuing an active information policy in the Eurasian countries, showing the commonality of geopolitical and economic interests of EAEU countries and the opposition of these interests to those of the USA. Eurasianism can effectively counter the threat of ethnic nationalism in the EAEU countries by emphasizing Eurasian integration as a necessary condition for preserving the sovereignty of Eurasian countries, their traditional values, and the combination of tradition and innovation.

Eurasianism, in its various interpretations, from ideology to the implementation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) programs, is regarded as one of the strategies of creating a multipolar world order. This article analyzes the views and assessments of foreign authors regarding the relationship between Eurasianism and the EAEU amid the changing international context. The authors present both critical and positive opinions on Eurasianism, Eurasian integration and its political and economic interlinkages with other countries and associations (China, Vietnam, the European Union (EU), Latin America). Thus, we identify three main lines of assessments on Eurasianism and Eurasian integration. The first includes negative assessments ranging from characterizing Eurasianism and the EAEU as a threat to the EU, the US, and the West in general to deliberate misinformation about the Eurasian ideology, for instance, denoting Eurasianism as parafascism. The second comprises more pragmatic and balanced views, with an emphasis on economic cooperation, which may imply cooperation with the EAEU and acceptance of the Eurasian integration if specific conditions are met, or cessation of such cooperation. The third group includes positive assessments and emphasizes the need for more intensive interaction between the EAEU and the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Such views are generally held by Russian and Chinese authors. Non-Russian conceptions of Eurasianism that gained popularity in Turkey or Kazakhstan are ideologically close to the classic Eurasianism and the EAEU, although these conceptions take a distinctive national shape. The article provides some examples of interregional cooperation promoted by the EAEU within the BRICS under the outreach model, i.e., adding new dimensions to existing cooperation formats. The authors arrive at a conclusion that most often the assessments of Eurasian integration and cooperation proposals by foreign experts are tied to Russian foreign policy (or experts opinion of it). They often find interconnections between EAEU, Eurasianism and Russian policy, which emphasize Russian identity as a marker of distinctive civilization. The article also notes comments of Russian authors on the EAEU - EU relations. The research is based on comparative analysis of analytical and research publications on the subject.

This conceptual article calls for the integration of new approaches to the study of visual populist communication, arguing that it will play a critical part in a new era of radical right mainstreaming. Extant scholarship on the mainstreaming of the radical right has focused on party politics and rhetoric, neglecting the visual self-presentation and emotional strategies of radical right leaders on platforms like Instagram and TikTok. The article proposes the novel concept of 'visual de-demonisation' to capture these dynamics, articulating it as a three-fold strategy that emphasises the legitimacy, good character and ample policy platform of radical right leaders on visual social media. The article also argues that visual platforms provide the radical right with the ideal setting to present itself in a renewed and more positive light, hence serving its strategic interest in de-demonising. This poses a key challenge for the future, potentially contributing to its increased normalisation.

AbstractThe presence of an elite group in civil society elicits a discursive friction between the long-standing normative understanding of civil society, acting as a check on government overreach and autocratic tendencies, and elite theories. Robert Michels's iron law of oligarchy posits that as individuals rise in the ranks to become organizational leaders, they begin to take on elite attributes, and their priorities align with those of other elites and away from those of their constituents. Michels's argument echoes with today's populist anti-elitist rhetoric and the way populism rejects any intermediary bodies between the people and the political leaders, including interest organizations in civil society. As an attempt to empirically probe this theoretical tension, this paper explores satisfaction with the way democracy is working among the top-level leaders of the most well-resourced national-level civil society organizations in Sweden and in the UK, drawing on a survey study conducted in 2020–21.

AbstractWithin nonprofit organizational studies, there has been a long-standing interest in democratic governance as ways of building political participation, civic skills and fostering inclusion. While established approaches to democratic governance have many benefits, existing research points to numerous challenges, including apathy and oligarchization. This paper explores an alternative form of democratic governance, sociocracy. Sociocracy, sometimes called dynamic governance, is organized around four key elements: circular hierarchy, consent-based decision-making, double linking, and practices to foster inclusivity and voice, a unique blend which distinguishes it from other forms of democratic governance. This article explores the implications on workplace democracy that a nonprofit organization experienced when limiting it. We find that sociocracy offers many benefits, including empowering members and reducing the risk of domination, and also highlights the many challenges that can accompany the implementation of sociocracy, particularly how four forms of inequality contribute to those challenges.

Pacifism and anarchism share some territory and have cross-pollinated across historical contexts, but are also distinct traditions and movements, with voices in each holding serious reservations and criticisms of the other. Identifying and critically discussing these reservations helps correct widespread misunderstandings in the scholarship and the wider public, thereby also presenting arguments for those outside either tradition to reevaluate their own assumptions and analyses. Anarchist qualms about pacifism and nonviolence include: disputes about the effectiveness of nonviolence; a distrust of the origins and compromises of pacifism and nonviolence; and complaints about the censoring effects of nonviolence in social movements. Pacifist qualms about anarchism include: its support for violence; and its radicality. Each accusation is nuanced or countered with arguments grounded in the indicted tradition. Shared concerns and mutually resonating themes that emerge in the process include: critiques of state violence, militarism and structural violence; and arguments about means as ends-in-the-making.

Peace processes require societies to break with animosity and violence. Scholars and practitioners have traditionally focused on institutional and structural mechanisms. Recent contributions have stressed the need to address the emotional legacies of destructive conflicts and how they influence peace processes. We build on these contributions by engaging current debates on decolonisation. We advance a three-part argument that places decolonising emotion at the core of peace and conflict studies. First, prevailing concepts and practices of peace rely on collective emotions that are western and colonial in origin. Emotions are central to the power dynamics that sustain colonial legacies and the practices of exclusion and injustice that ensue from them. Second, decolonising emotion requires an openness to different feelings which, in turn, can open up possibilities for creative ways of thinking about and practising peace. Third, these realms – colonial legacies and resistant ways of being and feeling – do not exist in isolation. Potentials for peace-making emerge from complex 'interfaces' between them, which we examine through two cases: the emotion of Han (한/恨) in Korean traditions of conflict resolution; and links between mourning and conflict management in the Maluilgal First Nation of the Torres Strait in far northern Australia.

AbstractVirtual reality (VR) can boost charitable attitudes and behavior. In an experiment with 100 participants viewing the content in VR vs. desktop computer, the VR group exhibited significantly higher levels of spatial presence (MD = 1.24, p < .001), attention allocation (MD = . 58, p < .001), spatial situation model building (MD = .47, p = .01), and empathy (MD = .46, p = .049). Donation behavior did not differ between the two groups (p = .36). Both computer and VR viewers shared similar emotions, but VR users felt greater immersion and emotional intensity, perceiving themselves as active participants, while computer viewers took a more passive role. This study generated insights for nonprofits considering VR in their marketing strategies, shedding light on the potential of VR storytelling and its effects on charitable giving.

AbstractAlthough co-production between the government and society can improve service outcomes, the two parties may lack the willingness and the capacity to cooperate. Can nonprofit organizations play an active role in facilitating government–citizen co-production? If so, how? The role of nonprofits in social services co-production has received increasing attention, but studies on developing countries are limited. Therefore, this study conducts an in-depth case study of a rural social work institute in Z village, Beijing, China. Using on-site observations, semi-structured interviews, and secondhand materials, we found that social workers adopted four strategies to engage community officials and rural residents in service co-production. They established trustworthy relationships, facilitated effective communication, fostered shared motivation, and built co-productive capacity. The results showed that nonprofit organizations use third-party roles and professional skills to shape government-citizen interactions through service co-production. These findings can improve rural service provision in developing countries.

Amid growing strategic competition, regional powers have intensified their engagement with Pacific Island Countries. This article examines Australia's 'Pacific Step-up', a signature foreign policy initiative of the Scott Morrison government (2018–2022), from a signalling perspective. Through the Step-up, Australia sought to affirm its resolve to be partner of choice for Pacific Island Countries. This was not cheap talk but led Canberra to invest substantially in its ties with the region. Despite this and significant prior Australian engagement leading to a bilateral security pact, Solomon Islands' government signed an additional security agreement with China in 2022. How can we explain this sender–receiver gap? I argue that close attention to the agency of domestic actors on the receiver side and the context in which such agency occurs – in this case, an extended history of insecurity in the Pacific country – provides us with analytical leverage when examining concrete instances of signalling.

This article examines the gendered appearance management ambassadors do to properly represent states. Drawing on feminist sociologist theorizations of labor, and attentive to intersections with sexuality, class, and Western standards, the study shows the unequal extraction of time and effort from men and women as they manage their appearance in diplomacy. Theoretically, I argue that the gendered management of dress, hair, and adornments are better conceived of as labor than as habitus or capital. Empirically, the study focuses on appearance management among ambassadors posted to Washington D.C. 2018–2020. Relying on a wealth of data—an original time survey, ambassador interviews, and observations—the study makes three empirical claims about the diplomatic embodiment of states: (a) diplomatic appearance standards are largely gender binary, with male uniformity and female variation; (b) more time and effort is demanded from female than male ambassadors; and (c) diplomatic appearance standards demand gender labor that is inextricably linked with the management of sexuality, upper class conventions, and Western physical appearance norms for representing states. In short, individuals presenting as men or women (although apparently not nonbinary) may now represent states as ambassadors, but more labor is extracted from women in doing so.