Suchergebnisse

It is time to retire the phrase "military-industrial complex."President Dwight Eisenhower coined this immortal phrase during his January 17, 1961 farewell address to warn Americans against the "acquisition of unwarranted influence" by the conjunction of "an immense military establishment and a large arms industry."As a five-star general, Ike knew, perhaps better than anyone, the self-serving and mutually beneficial relationship between the defense industry and the military. But he neglected to mention Congress's role in the arrangement, nor could he necessarily have foreseen the ways in which corporate interests would intertwine themselves with the various bureaucracies that keep the Pentagon's coffers flowing.While the phrase "military-industrial-congressional-information complex" would be more accurate, it doesn't exactly roll off the tongue. And like Eisenhower's snappier appellation, it still suggests an element of conspiracy. But, of course, none of this is theoretical. The Pentagon, Congress, the defense industry, think tanks, lobbyists, and industry-sponsored media outlets are all very real. When combined, they make up what is better termed the "National Security Establishment," which Americans see in action all the time.We see it when a retired general goes on television to explain exactly how the Ukrainian army can defeat the Russians — but only if Congress passes the latest billion-dollar aid package. No mention is made of the rather relevant fact that the general's think tank is funded by defense contractors who stand to benefit from the aid package he is calling for.We see it when another general retires from his post as the head of his service branch and turns up six months later on the board of a major defense contractor. Coincidentally, it's the same defense contractor that celebrated a year earlier when that general announced the company had won the $21.4 billion contract to build a fleet of bombers.We see it when a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee proposes the U.S. spend 5% of the gross domestic product every year on the military — a $55 billion increase to the current Pentagon budget. Predictably, he fails to mention that the majority of this money would go to defense contracts awarded to the same organizations that have given him more than $530,000 in campaign money since 2019. He fails to acknowledge how flush Pentagon budgets over the past 25 years created the sorry state of the military today.We even see it when we least expect to, as when the country's largest defense contractor runs advertisements during the Oscars and posts an interactive map on the company's website touting the economic benefits of a weapon program. The company wants everyone to know how many jobs could be lost if Congress votes to disrupt the program in any way.The American people also see the impact of these actions by the National Security Establishment.We see tens of billions spent on a fighter jet that can only be reliably ready for combat a third of the time. We also see more than $60 billion spent designing and building warships that were so flawed Navy officials apparently can't get rid of them fast enough. The Navy decommissioned one of these ships less than 5 years after its commissioning ceremony, roughly two decades ahead of the ship's planned lifespan. Starting in 2003, the Army spent at least $8 billion, and some sources say the better part of $20 billion, developing the Future Combat System, a family of armored vehicles to replace Cold War-era tanks, personnel carriers, and artillery vehicles. The Pentagon then canceled the program in 2009 with little to show for the effort and expense.There are plenty of other examples of failed acquisition efforts from the past 25 years which partially explain why annual defense spending is now a whopping 48% higher than it was in 2000. Compounding these efforts is the Pentagon's reliance on contractors to perform many roles once performed by uniformed service members at a much lower financial rate. The Department of Defense itself analyzed one case where hiring a group of contractors cost 316% more than the government employees tasked with similar work.In a city where partisanship and political rancor impacts nearly every debate, wasteful and ineffective defense policies are a conspicuous exception. That is because the National Security Establishment is party-agnostic. Military contractors donate money to candidates and lobbyists on both sides of the aisle, those candidates vote for Pentagon budget increases and fund weapons programs long after their failures are widely known, and lobbyists and corporate-sponsored media groups generate public support for those programs. Without massive structural changes, this pattern is all but certain to continue into future generations. Today's National Security Establishment has launched several major weapons programs in recent years that, if allowed to continue on their current trajectories, will drive the annual Pentagon budget to truly unprecedented levels.As programs like the B-21, Constellation-class frigate, Next Generation Air Dominance fighter jet, Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, several ground vehicle programs, the Sentinel nuclear missile, and myriad space and cyber systems mature and enter full-rate production in the coming decades, the Pentagon budget will expand to cover the costs. But this doesn't have to be the case, if Congress actually does its oversight job. Several of these programs are already behind schedule and over budget. Costs for the Sentinel missile program have increased 81% to $140.9 billion from the original $77.7 billion estimate and it will still be several years before the first missile is installed in its silo. Yet, given the massive financial influence, even these egregious failures are all but glossed over, a simple footnote for most, and then prepared for a rubber stamp.The services and their bureaucracies, the defense industry, members of Congress, and the paid mouthpieces promoting their interests in the media and during lobbying visits all comprise the all-too-real National Security Establishment. Identifying this network is the first step to avoid saddling future generations with the crushing debt associated with unsustainable U.S. military policies today.While it is long-past time to update the name, Eisenhower's warning is still more real than ever. Americans must remain vigilant and guard against the self-serving nature of this apparatus that is more intent on lining its own pockets than it is actually keeping Americans and our allies safe.-

An open letter released Wednesday signed by more than 100 veterans of the George W. Bush and Donald Trump administrations, ex-military officers, and former Republican lawmakers and activists called for fellow conservatives and congressional Republicans to support increased military aid to Ukraine and criticized President Biden for "seem[ing] more concerned about the prospects of a Russian defeat than of a Russian victory."The letter, initiated by the "nonpartisan" Vandenberg Coalition, a "network" of hawkish foreign policy think tankers and former officials convened by long-time neo-conservative Elliott Abrams, was directed primarily at "conservative" lawmakers and their constituents who have appeared increasingly resistant to providing more aid to Kyiv."Abandoning America's friends while they are falling victim to aggression is a pattern associated with the American left, from Vietnam to Afghanistan," according to the letter."Conservatives should not be rushing to lock arms with progressive isolationists. The security of Asia and of Europe are linked, which is why the elected leaders of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia have all sent aid to Ukraine. We support urgent, robust additional American aid to Ukraine," it concluded.Published in The National Review, the letter comes in the immediate aftermath of "the House GOP's decision not to include further funding to support Kyiv and its war effort" in the stopgap government funding bill that was passed last weekend and the ouster of House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, who had allegedly quietly agreed with the Biden administration to push for additional funding for Ukraine in the coming weeks.According to a September 7-18 poll released Tuesday by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll, about 50% of self-identified Republicans nationwide support continued military aid to Ukraine, while 45% or Republican respondents said the aid to date "has not been worth the cost." Overall, Republican respondents were significantly more skeptical of U.S. support for Ukraine than self-identified Democrats or independents.The Vandenberg Coalition was created by Abrams — who served as "special representative" for both Venezuela and Iran under Trump and deputy national security adviser with particular responsibility for Middle East policy under Bush — in April, 2021 with the evident intention of reuniting predominantly neoconservative "Never Trumpers" with other hawkish Republicans who had served under or otherwise supported the former president behind a policy of confrontation with Russia, China, Iran, and other perceived U.S. adversaries. The initiative took its name from Sen. Arthur Vandenberg, a conservative Michigan Republican who, as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, worked with the Truman administration to gain congressional backing for the Marshall Plan and NATO after World War II.The Coalition appears to model itself in part on the Project for the New American Century (1997-2006) and its successor, the Foreign Policy Initiative (2009-2017), as a mainly neoconservative network for hawks of various ideological backgrounds, including primacists, aggressive nationalists, such as Trump's former national security adviser John Bolton and prominent leaders of the Christian Right, to exchange information and analysis and publish "open letters" signed by dozens of former senior national security officials, retired military brass, Republican lawmakers, and analysts from various think tanks.In the run-up to the Iraq invasion, PNAC's letters and their signatories based in key think tanks — notably the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Hudson Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Foundation for Defending of Democracies (FDD), and the Center for Security Policy — played key roles in building public and elite support for the Bush administration's "war on terror," especially in the Middle East.The new Vandenberg letter appears to follow that playbook, although it is directed more at "conservatives" and Republicans rather than a more general audience.Among the more than 100 signatories, many of whom were identified by their former official positions in the Bush and Trump administrations rather than their past or current non-governmental affiliations, a number of individuals based at several of the same think tanks that played such a prominent role in promoting the Iraq war, including Danielle Pletka, Gary Schmitt, and Michael Rubin at AEI; Clifford May and at FDD, and Kenneth Weinstein at Hudson, not to mention Abrams himself, who is currently based at the Council on Foreign Relations, stood out.Remarkably, the list also included Randy Scheunemann, who directed the high-powered White House-sponsored Committee for the Liberation of Iraq in the run-up to the war at the same time that he headed a public relations and lobbying firm that promoted Ahmad Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress, a major source of fabricated intelligence and disinformation that the Bush administration used to rally public opinion in favor of the invasion.In the letter, its signatories stressed the likelihood of disastrous outcomes across the world if Ukraine did not receive more U.S. military assistance and stressed that Kyiv is "not asking for American troops, only American weapons and equipment.""Efforts to stop our aid to Ukraine could lead to a Russian battlefield victory, with catastrophic effects for American security," it warned. "Putin would eye the next stage of the Russian empire's restoration, and China would have a green light to take Taiwan."The Coalition has published two other letters signed by multiple individuals. In February 2022, it published an open letter signed by more than three dozen mainly neoconservative former Bush administration officials and think tankers that called a major Amnesty International report that concluded that Israel was practicing a form of apartheid in its treatment of Palestinians "untruthful, deceptive, and antisemitic."In January, it published a letter directed to the "editors, authors, and contributors to major scientific, medical and journalistic publications worldwide" that called for "accountability for those scientific and news publications that actively sought to censor voices investigating the origins of COVID-19."The Coalition's most recent letter and its focus on "conservative" reservations about supporting Ukraine recalls to some extent a 1996 Foreign Affairs article, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," by leading neoconservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan who were concerned that conservatives would be unable to "resist the combined assault of [then-presidential candidate Pat] Buchanan's 'isolationism of the heart" and the Republican budget hawks on Capitol Hill." The article argued in favor of a U.S. foreign policy designed to maintain a "benevolent global hegemony."One year later, the two authors jointly founded PNAC with a Statement of Principles signed by, among others, key architects of the Iraq invasion and its aftermath, including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Abrams.

Children today consume more energy than they expend, the increasing sedentary nature of our lives is exacerbated by the increasing numbers of 'time poor' parents and by the availability of convenience foods, high in saturated fats and sugar. In devising initiatives for children, it must be understood that they develop their attitudes toward lifestyle in a number of settings. They are members of a family, students at school, peers among their friends and in the eyes of the media they are consumers. Thus, messages about healthy lifestyles can easily be undermined if one setting contradicts the others. At the Federal level the promotion of physical activity has been greatly advanced. The implementation of a required minimum linked to the latest funding legislation, coupled with a vast increase in funding for physical activity outside school hours, has worked to place physical education as a high priority within the school environment. In relation to nutrition and healthy eating, real action has occurred within the state sphere of influence. New South Wales was the first to implement a government endorsed approach to creating healthy school canteens. The Fresh Tastes initiative operates throughout the State's school canteens and works to restrict the sale of foods high in sugar and saturated fats. Queensland is in the process of phasing this policy in and the Australian Capital Territory is seriously considering its implementation. However, at this point a national policy fails to exist and as a result school canteens in other states operate according to voluntary guidelines. While schools are a great place to educate children as to nutrition and an active lifestyle, these programs must advance their message into the wider community and into the homes of children. The launch of the national advertising campaign, Go for 2 Fruit & 5 Veg, seeks to carry this message to the wider community. However, practical training for parents and children may also be an idea, as there's no point buying fresh produce if you don't know what to do with it. In terms of non-government programs and initiatives, development has been commendable. Although, difficult to assess in terms of effectiveness, as many of the initiatives are in their infancy. The SmartStart initiative is one of great promise as this works to alert children and their parents as to their fitness, bringing the severity of this problem home. While it is not recommended that we adopt a program as severe as the Trim and Fit program in Singapore, it would seem essential that action is taken, however this action must be both caring and compassionate. The implementation of such a program on a national level would allow more accurate assessment as to the effectiveness of the initiatives in place and would provide much needed empirical evidence. It is believed in a number of circles that it is essential that such a program is adopted and rolled out across the nation, taking its place beside literacy and numeracy tests. Progress has been made in the area of food labelling, with companies like McDonald's coming to the party and devising more healthy menus. The extension of the Heart Foundation's Tick Food Information Program to the food service industry is also a great initiative. It will help both children and parents ascertain whether their choice of restaurant or fast food outlet is a healthy choice. Initiatives such as the Kitchen Garden Project, headed by Stephanie Alexander in Australia and that of the Cooking Bus in the UK, illustrate the need to expose children to practical cookery and nutrition. The consensus from such programs is that children benefit greatly from these experiences and become increasingly receptive to different foods. Recently, the calls for a restriction on advertising during times when children predominate the audience have increased in their ferocity. The Coalition on Food Advertising to Children has been lobbying for such a restriction, however, as yet their call has not been acted upon. While parents ultimately have the responsibility to care for their children and determine what goes into their mouths, as consumers the 'pester power' of a child caught in the grips of the latest advertising fad is an almighty force. Thus, a restriction during certain hours could only be an advantage to our children. In terms of the restriction of unhealthy foods, California has become the first State in the United States of America to legislate on the topic. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger has set nutritional standards for all state school cafeterias, has funded the school meals program to the tune of $18.2 million to enable the inclusion of more fruits and vegetables, and has placed a ban on the sale of soft drink in all state middle and high schools. From a survey of this obesity epidemic on a global level, it appears that all nations are battling with the implementation of programs and initiatives to combat childhood obesity. The divide between state and federal responsibility in Australia makes the effectives of the different initiatives more difficult to asses. This lack of cohesion in policy terms acts as the greatest inhibitor to the promotion of healthy lifestyles, as one-off pilot initiatives in one state fail to give complete coverage to all obese children. Although a number of programs and initiatives exist, the majority are in the process of being implemented and in many cases it will take years for full implementation to occur. As a nation we have acknowledged childhood obesity as a serious health issue, however, we are still ideologically tom between viewing obesity as a disorder of individual responsibility and as a disease of our community. Ultimately, obesity needs to be recognised as a chronic disease and thus attract the funding of Medicare. The first step to facing this epidemic as a community is to bring together stakeholders from all spheres of influence in the vein of the Oxford Health Alliance. While the school is a great place to start, our overweight and obese children need support from all sectors of this nation. They suffer from a disease that cannot be completely rectified by the promotion of healthy lifestyles. However, their temptation can be reduced by the restriction of some foods in the school canteen and through a restriction on specifically targeted advertising.

Immigrant Workers Centers (IWCs) are community-based organizations that have been developed in the United States to promote and protect workers' rights through support, services, advocacy, and organizing initiatives. The purpose of this research study was to examine how IWCs in the Eastern part of the state of Massachusetts are structured along twelve dimensions of organizational development and community organizing. Qualitative research methods were used to identify shared themes within the six IWCs and three immigrant support organizations, as well as their organizational responses to the current anti-immigrant environment. IWCs constituted a convenience sample which enabled the researchers to gather data utilizing a case study methodology. In-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted between the months of July and September of 2009 to answer the following research questions: 1)What are the shared themes for the development of Immigrant Workers Centers?, and 2) How do Immigrant Workers Centers respond to current anti-immigrant sentiment, intolerant immigration policies, and increased exploitation in this troubled economy? Shared themes among the IWCs include prioritizing community organizing for workers' rights and collective empowerment. Sub-modalities such as education, training and leadership development area common feature. While some individual support is provided, and in some cases, programming, it always is offered within a context that emphasizes the need for collective action to overcome injustice. Issues addressed include health/safety, sexual harassment, discrimination, and various problems associated with wages (underpayment, missed payments, collecting back wages, and lack of overtime pay). IWCs respond to antiimmigrant policies and practices by supporting larger efforts for immigration reformat the municipal, state, and federal levels. Coalitions of IWCS and their allies attempt to make state wide and federal policy changes by using a variety of organizing tactics, including legislative lobbying, media events, rallies, marches, vigils and a variety of direct actions. The community organizing principles and methods employed by IWC s are consistent with the theoretical tenets of social pedagogy, and given the increasing number of immigrant workers experiencing growing hostility and deteriorating working conditions in Europe, the applicability of this new model should be considered by both scholars and practitioners. ; Este trabajo de investigación tuvo como propósito examinar cómo los Centros de Trabajadores Inmigrantes (CTI), localizados en la parte Este del Estado de Massachusetts (EU), están estructurados en torno a doce dimensiones de desarrollo organizativo y organización comunitaria. Métodos cualitativos de investigación fueron utilizados en este estudio para identificar temas comunes entre los seis CTI y las tres organizaciones de apoyo a inmigrantes, así como sus respuestas organizativas en el actual ambiente anti-inmigrante. Los CTI constituyen una muestra de conveniencia, lo que permitió a los investigadores recopilar datos usando la metodología de estudio de caso. Entrevistas semi-estructuradas en profundidad se realizaron entre los meses de Julio y Septiembre de 2009 para responder a las siguientes preguntas de investigación: 1) ¿Cuáles son los temas comunes para el desarrollo de los CTI?, y 2) ¿Cómo responden los CTI al actual sentimiento anti-inmigrante, las políticas de migración intolerantes, y a la creciente explotación en esta economía en problemas? Los temas comunes entre los CTI incluyen dar prioridad a la organización comunitaria para defender los derechos de los trabajadores y el empoderamiento colectivo. Sub-modalidades como la educación, la formación y el desarrollo de liderazgo son una característica común. Se proporciona apoyo individual, y en algunos casos la programación, siempre en un contexto que hace hincapié en la necesidad de la acción colectiva para superar la injusticia. Los temas tratados incluyen la salud / seguridad, el acoso sexual, discriminación, y varios problemas asociados con los salarios (insuficiente, pagos atrasados, salarios caídos, y la falta de pago de horas extras). Los CTI responden a las políticas y prácticas anti-inmigrantes mediante el apoyo a esfuerzos más amplios para lograr una reforma migratoria a nivel municipal, estatal y federal. Las coaliciones de CTI y sus aliados intentan realizar cambios en las políticas a nivel estatal y federal mediante el uso de una variedad de tácticas organizativas, incluyendo el cabildeo legislativo, eventos de prensa, mítines, marchas, vigilias y una variedad de acciones directas. ; Objetivo deste estudo foi analisar como os centros de trabalhadores imigrantes (CTI) na parte leste do estado de Massachusetts são estruturados ao longo de doze dimensões do desenvolvimento organizacional e organização comunitária. Métodos de pesquisa qualitativa foram utilizados para identificar temas comuns dentro dos seis CTI e três organizações de apoio de imigrantes, bem como suas respostas organizacionais ao ambiente anti-imigrante atual. CTI constituíram uma amostra de conveniência que permitiu aos pesquisadores para coletar dados, utilizando uma metodologia de estudo de caso. Em profundidade entrevistas semi-estruturadas foram realizadas entre os meses de julho e setembro de 2009 para responder às seguintes perguntas de pesquisa: 1)Quais são os temas comuns para o desenvolvimento de Centros de trabalhadores imigrantes, e 2)Como responde os centros de trabalhadores imigrantes ao sentimento anti-imigrante atual, as políticas de imigração intolerantes, e uma maior exploração nessa economia em apuros? Temas compartilhados entre os CTI incluem comunidade priorizando a organização pelos direitos dos trabalhadores e de empoderamento coletivo. Sub-modalidades como o desenvolvimento da educação, formação e liderança são uma característica comum. Enquanto alguns o apoio individual é fornecido, e, em alguns casos, a programação, ele sempre é oferecido dentro de um contexto que enfatiza a necessidade de ação coletiva para superar a injustiça. As questões abordadas incluem saúde/segurança, assédio sexual, discriminação e vários problemas associados com salários (pagamento a menor, falta de pagamentos, recolhendo de volta salários e falta de pagamento de horas extras). Os assuntos abordados incluem saúde/segurança, assédio sexual, discriminação e vários problemas associados com o salário (recolhimento a menor, os pagamentos não atendidas, de coleta de volta salários e falta de pagamento de horas extras). CTI responden a anti-imigrantes políticas e práticas, apoiando os esforços maiores para a reforma da imigração no municipal, estadual e federal.Coligações de CTI e seus aliados tentam fazer mudanças nas políticas estaduais e federais, utilizando uma variedade de táticas de organização, incluindo lobby legislativo, eventos de mídia, comícios,marchas, vigílias,e uma variedade de ações diretas.

• Tobacco control in Arizona flourished from 1997-2007, thanks to public support at the ballot box and the hard work of Arizonan tobacco control activists. • Arizona's state-run Tobacco Education and Prevention Program (TEPP), created by Proposition 200 in 1994 from 23% of a 40 cent tobacco tax increase, provided a key component in Arizona tobacco control, spending between $15 and $36 million annually. • Tobacco control advocacy between 1997 and 2007 resulted in more than tripling tobacco excise taxes from 58 cents to $2.00, enacting comprehensive local clean indoor air ordinances, defeating tobacco industry counter-initiatives, and passing Smoke-Free Arizona, Arizona's statewide comprehensive clean indoor air law. • Arizona tobacco control advocates instituted 18 local clean indoor air ordinances between 1997 and 2007. The tobacco industry has never won at the ballot box in Arizona, locally or statewide. • On November 7, 2006, Arizona became the 16th state to pass a comprehensive clean indoor air act. The law went into effect on May 1, 2007. The Arizona Department of Health Services enforces the law with revenues from a 2 cent tobacco excise tax included in the Smoke-Free Arizona initiative. Any tax funds not used to enforce clean indoor air go to Arizona's tobacco control program TEPP. • Tobacco taxes were raised to 58 cents per pack by Arizona voters in 1994. In 2002, voters raised tobacco taxes 60 cents to $1.18 per pack, with the revenue going to the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System (AHCCCS). Tobacco taxes were raised again by voters in 2006 to $2.00 per pack with 80 cents paying for early childhood care. • Deciding how to spend Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) money was contentious and politically difficult, as illustrated by an unwillingness to compromise among the Legislature, Governor, and County Health Departments. Ultimately voters decided in November 2000 to allocate all of the MSA funds to AHCCCS to expand Arizona's medicare program to 100% the federal poverty level. No MSA money goes to tobacco control. • The Tempe smokefree ordinance, passed by initiative in May 2002, became Arizona's first 100% clean indoor air act including bars. Dr. Leland Fairbanks led the Arizona tobacco control organization Arizonans Concerned About Smoking (ACAS) to spearhead the successful effort and defended Tempe's smokefree ordinance against the ensuing legal challenges and attempted referendum by pro-tobacco groups. • Local efforts to pass other clean indoor air ordinances in Arizona often led to compromises that routinely exempted bars. Also, elected officials in Phoenix resisted adopting a smokefree ordinance despite tobacco control leaders' concerted efforts. Tempe's successful comprehensive clean indoor air act in 2002, however, paved the way with Guadalupe (2002) for Prescott (2003), Coconino County (2003), Flagstaff (2005), and Sedona (2006), to successfully pass comprehensive clean indoor air acts of their own. • In FY2002 Governor Jane Hull and the Legislature, looking for available funds during a recession period, diverted $60 million from the Health Education and Research Accounts, which fund TEPP and research on tobacco-related disease. These funds were never recovered. • To prevent further seizures of TEPP funds, in November 2002 voters passed the referendum Proposition 303 which increased the tobacco tax 60 cents (two per cent of which went to tobacco control) and re-enacted the original 1994 Proposition 200 tobacco control measure bringing TEPP under voter protection, preventing it from further legislative tampering. Voluntary health organizations now turned their attention from protecting TEPP funds to translating their electoral success into a comprehensive statewide smokefree campaign. • While TEPP expenditures exceeded the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) minimum recommended levels for state tobacco control expenditures (at the time, $27.8 million) from FY1999 through FY2001, in October 2007 the CDC increased its Best Practices estimate for Arizona to $68.1 million annually, a figure Arizona has not yet approached in its tobacco control spending. • In 2004, prompted by citizens (but not the ALA, AHA, or ACS), Arizona Legislator Linda Lopez (D-Tucson) introduced a statewide clean indoor air bill including bars into the Republican-controlled House. The bill, however, was assigned to three committees, denied a hearing, and died in the Commerce Committee. • In Arizona, the tobacco industry spent a total of $16,201 in direct campaign contributions between 1997 and 2006 on legislators, constitutional officers, and political parties. Tobacco industry lobbyists spent $25,367 on legislators during this period. Republicans received more than 5 times the tobacco companies' contributions as Democrats. • In the 2006 election cycle RJ Reynolds mounted an $8.8 million counter-initiative (Proposition 206, the Non-Smoker Protection Act) in an attempt to confuse voters and preempt local tobacco control. The campaign concentrated much of its resources attacking Proposition 201, the health group-driven Smoke-Free Arizona initiative. Despite Reynolds' superior resources and negative campaigning, 57.3% of voters rejected Reynolds' initiative, while 54.8% of voters approved Smoke-Free Arizona. • TEPP's media campaigns with Riester-Robb from 1996-2001 enjoyed commendations nationally. The TEPP-contracted ad agency sold over 2 million units of merchandise with the media campaign's tagline Tobacco: Tumor causing, teeth staining, smelly puking habit. In July 2001 the Arizona Department of Health Services (ADHS), which manages TEPP, did not renew the media contract with Riester-Robb, instead favoring the E.B. Lane agency. This rough transition from one agency to the next occurred just as the Legislature appropriated TEPP's funds, throwing TEPP into disarray, resulting in a dead year (approximately Fall 2001-Fall 2002) under the E.B. Lane contract when tobacco control media came to a virtual halt. E.B. Lane provided TEPP's lower intensity media campaigns from 2002 through 2005. From 2005 to 2007, TEPP did not coordinate media through a contracted ad agency, instead working on a more fragmented ad hoc basis. In late 2007, TEPP contracted again with the Riester firm, though with a smaller budget. • TEPP suffered from a lack of leadership since the program's inception, with a revolving-door Office Chief position, inconsistent directives from the ADHS, and overcautiousness concerning crossing the lobbying-advocacy/advocacy-education line. Between 2005 and 2007 every TEPP employee left, leaving the agency without many employees having any prior experience in tobacco control. As a result, many tobacco control advocates perceived TEPP as an ineffective program, not making best use of its resources. While TEPP leadership in 2007 painted an optimistic vision of TEPP's future, concrete programmatic action that reflects current best practices remains to be demonstrated.

Tobacco industry money has not been successful in recent years in buying support from lawmakers in Hawai'i. Since 2001, major legislation on clean indoor air, tobacco tax increases and a tobacco tax stamp measure have passed by comfortable margins. In 1994, the City Council of Honolulu passed smokefree workplaces ordinances that exempted bars and nightclubs. Mayor Jeremy Harris vetoed the bill because it covered restaurants. In 1997, Honolulu made all workplaces smokefree except restaurants and bars, which Mayor Harris signed because of the restaurant exemption. In December 2001, county government leaders of Honolulu, Kaua'i and Maui Counties announced they would be introducing legislation that would end restaurant smoking because of the state Legislature's inaction. Honolulu passed Hawai'i's first smokefree restaurant law in 2002. The State Department of Health media campaign that started June 1, 2001 focusing on the health impact of secondhand smoke on restaurant workers may have contributed to the polling data released in January, 2002 that showed strong support for a smokefree restaurant law. In the end, it was the persistence of the tobacco control advocates that carried the day. Honolulu's law set the stage for the Kaua'i and Maui ordinances that would follow shortly. During 2002 and 2003, each county in Hawai'i passed a smokefree restaurant or workplace law. By February 1, 2004, well over 80% of Hawai'i workplaces were smokefree and smoking was prohibited in virtually all restaurants. This status would set the tone for the passage of a sweeping statewide smokefree law. Polling data released in December, 2005 showed very strong public support for a statewide smokefree law. The statewide clean indoor air measure passed in 2006 with virtually no amendments from introduction to final passage, and with only three Nays in the Senate (out of 25) and three Nays in the House (out of 51). In 2007, a group of bar owners tried to undo the new statewide smokefree law in the Legislature and through a lawsuit claiming the law was unconstitutional. Tobacco control advocates prevailed in killing all of the bills that would have exempted some or all bars and restaurants with smoking rooms and the court dismissed the lawsuit. The Department of Health, however, as of July 1, 2008, had still failed to take any effective enforcement action against repeat violators of the smokefree law, to get local law enforcement agencies to act, or to issue the administrative rules required by the state law that went into effect November 16, 2006. There has been no sustained public education campaign about the public's power for enforcement. This failure made proactive implementation of the law all but impossible and created a situation that invites pro-tobacco forces to undermine the law's long-term effectiveness. Hawai'i has taken modest steps to control illegal sales of tobacco products to minors. Cigarette vending machines are restricted to venues in which minors under the age of 18 are not permitted, mobile food vendors (lunch wagons) are prohibited from selling or distributing cigarettes within 1,000 feet of any school, and the sale or distribution of single cigarettes or packs of cigarettes containing fewer than 20 cigarettes is prohibited. In 1998, the fines levied against individuals who sell or distribute tobacco products to minors were raised to $500 for the first offense and $2,000 for subsequent offenses. However, the law does not penalize the business owner for illegal sales to minors, which probably accounts for the large number of violations found in sting operations. In 1993, the tobacco industry was successful in replacing the Hawai'i ad valorem tax on cigarettes (40% of the wholesale price) with an excise tax, but this plan to reduce the size of the cigarette tax by switching to a per unit tax backfired. The per unit taxes established by state legislation between 1997 and 2007 exceeded the rates that cigarettes would have been taxed if the 40 percent ad valorem tax had remained in place. In 2006, the cigarette tax was increased by $.20 per pack per year over six years to $2.60. However, there were lost opportunities to add some of the new revenue from the increased cigarette taxes to tobacco control programs. In 2001, Hawai'i became one of the last states to require a tax stamp on cigarette packages to reduce smuggling and improve tax collections. The tax stamp was credited in a Department of Health report with reducing the number of smuggled cigarettes sold in Hawai'i and for increasing the tax revenues by $20 million annually. When the Legislature in 1999 split MSA funds into two accounts for tobacco control, one for the Department of Health and one in a Trust Fund, tobacco control advocates did achieve one goal of protecting funding from administrative diversion to programs other than tobacco control by putting the money in a nongovernmental organization. What they were not able to protect was the amount of funding that went into that Trust Fund, which was cut from 25% of MSA monies to 12.5% in 2002. Heavy lobbying by the University of Hawai'i to raid the MSA funds to build medical school facilities robbed tobacco control programs of vital resources. The 25% of the MSA funds that goes to the Department of Health is to be spent for a variety of health promotion and disease prevention programs, but the Department allocates relatively little to tobacco control. While Hawai'i has slowly improved its spending on tobacco control, it has never reached the 1999 CDC Best Practices recommendation of $10.8 to $23.4 million per year (reduced by CDC to $9.6 to $19.6 million per year in 2007. The closest it has come was 2006 when the Department of Health and the Trust Fund spent a total of $8.2 million on tobacco control. Despite these issues, there have been continuing declines in adult and youth smoking prevalence, though per capita cigarette consumption is not showing the steady decline we see nationally. When the Trust Fund was created from MSA monies, the legislation established an independent source of tobacco control funding, with its own Advisory Board, separate from the Department of Health which had its own MSA monies and its own tobacco control advisory group. Without any apparent statutory authority, the Department of Health has substantially interfered with that independence by effectively controlling how the Trust Fund spends its money on tobacco control by disapproving or requiring modifications of Trust Fund Advisory Board recommendations on funding, budgets and tobacco control programs.

The tobacco industry is a major political and legal force in Florida through campaign contributions, public relations efforts, lobbying and litigation, which at least from the late 1970s, has had a centralized political organization in Florida that defends and promotes its political and economic interests at the local and state levels of government. Although the industry has operated in the open in some political campaigns, it has also operated quietly behind the scenes, often through front groups, in various other state and local political campaigns. In Dade County in 1979, GASP of Miami ran a clean indoor air initiative without the active support of the local affiliates of the American Cancer Society, American Lung Association, and American Heart Association. Despite being outspent by the tobacco industry 90 to 1, GASP only lost by 820 votes. Had the health groups provided public and political support, the initiative may well have won, substantially increasing the momentum for clean indoor air ordinances in Florida and elsewhere. Prior to 1985, there were numerous ongoing local efforts to pass and enact a wide variety of local clean indoor ordinances. These efforts subsided considerably after the passage of the preemption clause in the weak Florida Clean Indoor Air Act (FCIAA) of 1985 which, at first, was supported by the American Cancer Society, American Lung Association, and American Heart Association. Since the passage of FCIAA, the tobacco industry has been able to stop all efforts by the three health groups and sympathetic politicians to repeal the preemption clause. After the passage of campaign contribution limit laws in 1991 in Florida, tobacco industry campaign contributions have been redirected away from individual candidates and to the two major political parties. In the 1993-1994 election cycle, the industry gave the largest amount of contributions with $475,000 given to the parties compared to $95,856 to political candidates. The largest contribution to a political party came from Philip Morris, which gave $382,500 to the Republican Party. These contributions in conjunction with others has reinvigorated the two major parties as political power brokers who provide their candidates with advertising, technical assistance, and paid staff. During the 1997-1998 electoral cycle, the tobacco industry's total campaign contributions were $398,194, with $310,250 given to the two major political parties in comparison to $84,194 for legislators. The Republican Party received $227,250 compared to the Democratic Party which received $82,500. The largest contribution to a political party came from Philip Morris, which contributed $125,000 to the Republican Party. In August 1997, Florida and the industry settled a Medicaid fraud lawsuit. Under the terms of the settlement, the industry agreed to pay Florida $11.3 billion, end outdoor billboards, pay for public anti-tobacco campaigns, remove vending machines from places accessible to children, end tobacco advertising on buses and trains, complete an anti-tobacco youth campaign within two years of the settlement, and not name the industry in anti-tobacco ads. Due to further negotiations with the industry, on September 11, 1998, the amount paid to Florida was increased to $13 billion and restrictions on the two year time limit regarding the youth anti-smoking campaign and specifically naming the industry in anti-tobacco advertisements were lifted. After February 1998, Florida began an effort to establish a $200 million youth anti-smoking campaign called the Tobacco Pilot Program in an effort to meet the two year deadline. The Tobacco Pilot Program has engaged in an extensive media campaign known as the "Truth Campaign" which began in late April 1998 and included tough in-your-face print, billboard, and media advertisements which ran throughout Florida. The major theme of this campaign is that Florida youth should choose "Truth" rather than use tobacco and be targets of industry advertising manipulation in the use of tobacco. A report released on March 17, 1999 by the Florida Department of Health, Office of Tobacco Control regarding the progress of the Tobacco Pilot Program indicated that the Tobacco Pilot Program and its anti-tobacco media advertising campaign, in less than a year, had a substantial impact on influencing a significant number of Florida teens not to smoke. From February 1998 to 1999, the number of teens who were current smokers (smoked in the last 30 days) dropped from 23.3% to 20.9%. This represented 31,000 fewer Florida teenagers who were current smokers. These results represent the best results ever obtained in a large scale primary prevention program. Although new Republican Governor Jeb Bush publicly called for the continuation of the Tobacco Pilot Program and the Truth Campaign, the program's funding was reduced from $70.5 million to $45.2 million (-36%) for the 1999-2000 Fiscal Year due to legislative votes by Republican colleagues in the House and the Senate to substantially reduce the funding of the program. These cuts were made despite public opinion polls showing that 49% of the public supported the program without any cuts and 30% supported the program with the $8.5 million cut proposed by Governor Bush. Two projects of the Tobacco Pilot Program which are crucial to maintaining the viability of the program including the Truth Campaign and administrative support for the Students Working Against Tobacco (SWAT) also received large budgetary reductions. While the Tobacco Pilot Program received substantial funding cuts in the 1999 Legislative Session, funding for the American Heart Association's Youth Fitness Program of $3 million and $1 million for the Just The Facts program which was derived from the $45.2 million Tobacco Pilot Program budget, would have reduced the amount of funding for projects directly oriented towards tobacco control efforts to $41.2 million for 1999-2000. On May 27, 1999, Governor Bush vetoed these two diversionary projects, as well as the $2.5 million Sports for Life project which was related to tobacco control, further reducing the program's funding of projects directly related to tobacco control efforts from $70.5 million to $38.7 million (-45.1%). For the past twenty years, a consistent pattern has emerged with respect to the American Cancer Society, the American Heart Association, and the American Lung Association missing key political opportunities that would have significantly advanced anti-tobacco efforts and public health in Florida. These lost opportunities included failing to support GASP of Miami in its 1979 Dade County clean indoor air initiative, supporting the preemption clause in the Florida Clean Indoor Air Act of 1985 which essentially quashed a blossoming grassroots anti-tobacco movement, and failing to forcefully advocate for the Tobacco Pilot Program by holding specific legislators directly and publicly accountable for the substantial funding cuts that occurred in the 1999 Legislative Session.

International audience ; This paper empirically examines which type of fiscal levies are environmental taxes, by analyzing how governments actually use them. The theoretical literature is polarized between two alternative interpretations of environmental taxes: the Pigouvian and the Leviathan hypotheses, each leading to alternative testable hypotheses. We test them on a sample where the analysts' discretionary evaluations are minimal, the EU-28 countries that committed themselves to correcting a negative environmental externality, the greenhouse gas emissions, by 2020. The estimates lend support to the strict Pigouvian hypothesis, while the Leviathan hypothesis appears less consistent with the data.

International audience ; This paper empirically examines which type of fiscal levies are environmental taxes, by analyzing how governments actually use them. The theoretical literature is polarized between two alternative interpretations of environmental taxes: the Pigouvian and the Leviathan hypotheses, each leading to alternative testable hypotheses. We test them on a sample where the analysts' discretionary evaluations are minimal, the EU-28 countries that committed themselves to correcting a negative environmental externality, the greenhouse gas emissions, by 2020. The estimates lend support to the strict Pigouvian hypothesis, while the Leviathan hypothesis appears less consistent with the data.

International audience ; This paper empirically examines which type of fiscal levies are environmental taxes, by analyzing how governments actually use them. The theoretical literature is polarized between two alternative interpretations of environmental taxes: the Pigouvian and the Leviathan hypotheses, each leading to alternative testable hypotheses. We test them on a sample where the analysts' discretionary evaluations are minimal, the EU-28 countries that committed themselves to correcting a negative environmental externality, the greenhouse gas emissions, by 2020. The estimates lend support to the strict Pigouvian hypothesis, while the Leviathan hypothesis appears less consistent with the data.

This last decade has seen the emergence of a new field of research in development economics: randomised control trials. This paper explores the contrast between the (many) limitations and (verynarrow) real scope of these methods and their success in sheer number and media coverage. Our analysis suggests that the paradox is due to a particular economic and political mix driven by the innovative strategies used by this new school's researchers and by specific interests and preferences in the academic world and the donor community. ; La dernière décennie a vu l'émergence d'un nouveau champ de recherche en économie du développement : les méthodes expérimentales d'évaluation d'impacts par assignation aléatoire. Cetarticle explore le contraste entre d'une part les limites (nombreuses) et la circonscription (très étroite)du champ réel d'application de ces méthodes et d'autre part leur succès, attesté à la fois par leur nombre et leur forte médiatisation. L'analyse suggère que ce contraste est le fruit d'une conjonctionéconomique et politique particulière, émanant de stratégies novatrices de la part des chercheurs decette nouvelle école, et d'intérêts et de préférences spécifiques provenant à la fois du monde académique et de la communauté des donateurs.

This last decade has seen the emergence of a new field of research in development economics: randomised control trials. This paper explores the contrast between the (many) limitations and (verynarrow) real scope of these methods and their success in sheer number and media coverage. Our analysis suggests that the paradox is due to a particular economic and political mix driven by the innovative strategies used by this new school's researchers and by specific interests and preferences in the academic world and the donor community. ; La dernière décennie a vu l'émergence d'un nouveau champ de recherche en économie du développement : les méthodes expérimentales d'évaluation d'impacts par assignation aléatoire. Cetarticle explore le contraste entre d'une part les limites (nombreuses) et la circonscription (très étroite)du champ réel d'application de ces méthodes et d'autre part leur succès, attesté à la fois par leur nombre et leur forte médiatisation. L'analyse suggère que ce contraste est le fruit d'une conjonctionéconomique et politique particulière, émanant de stratégies novatrices de la part des chercheurs decette nouvelle école, et d'intérêts et de préférences spécifiques provenant à la fois du monde académique et de la communauté des donateurs.

La violencia en las guerras civiles no ocurre de forma espontánea y desordenada, tiene lógicas y está unida al uso de variadas estrategias, incluso transformando el comportamiento electoral de los votantes. Este artículo buscará abordar este impacto partiendo de un evento histórico particular, la zona de distensión del Caguán para resolver un problema empírico. La intención de esta aproximación es observar el comportamiento electoral en una zona de control hegemónico insurgente y explorar los cambios de corto y largo plazo que tiene ante el control armado. Los resultados muestran el parcial congelamiento de la política local, el aumento de la hegemonía electoral y su efecto en el presente, la enquistada división partidista en la política subnacional. Estos resultados están en línea con los hallazgos de la literatura sobre la baja participación y la concentración del poder local ; Violence in civil wars is not haphazard, it has logics and is related to the use of different policial strategies, including changing voter composition and behavior. This paper uses a particular historic event in Colombian civil war, the Caguán peace talks in 1996, to assess the long and short time effects of armed actor hegemonic control on political composition of subnational governments. The results shows that under insurgent hegemonic control, elections have more strong winners. This is in line with literature that characterizes Colombia party system as weak and with a low turnout resulting from a besieged democracy.

The decisions made by one government a¤ect the tax revenue that can be collected by the decisionmakers belonging to the same tier of government or by stacked jurisdictions : externalities arise, the existence and the magnitude of which are closely related to the nature of the tax, to the mobility of the base and to the distribution of tax competence among decisionmakers. Indeed, when same authorities belonging to a same level of government derive their receipts from a mobile tax base, a competition mechanism takes place among them that triggers externalities. Likewise, when di¤erent layers of decision-makers exert their taxing power upon a common base, the choices made by one tier a¤ect the receipts that the other governments can collect. As a by-product, this paper proposes a model where both horizontal and vertical interactions are tackled, first successively then simultaneously. Uncertainty concerning the base, that is, the amount of capital likely to be invested, is introduced and a generalization of taxation schemes is provided. The analysis shows that horizontal and vertical externalities point towards opposite directions : while horizontal competition leads to inefficiently low rates, the common pool problem arising from the stacking of decisionmakers taxing a same base gives rise to a phenomenon of over-taxation. Besides, the combination of both externalities yields to an intermediary tax rate : the outcome is brought closer to the social optimum.

The decisions made by one government a¤ect the tax revenue that can be collected by the decisionmakers belonging to the same tier of government or by stacked jurisdictions : externalities arise, the existence and the magnitude of which are closely related to the nature of the tax, to the mobility of the base and to the distribution of tax competence among decisionmakers. Indeed, when same authorities belonging to a same level of government derive their receipts from a mobile tax base, a competition mechanism takes place among them that triggers externalities. Likewise, when di¤erent layers of decision-makers exert their taxing power upon a common base, the choices made by one tier a¤ect the receipts that the other governments can collect. As a by-product, this paper proposes a model where both horizontal and vertical interactions are tackled, first successively then simultaneously. Uncertainty concerning the base, that is, the amount of capital likely to be invested, is introduced and a generalization of taxation schemes is provided. The analysis shows that horizontal and vertical externalities point towards opposite directions : while horizontal competition leads to inefficiently low rates, the common pool problem arising from the stacking of decisionmakers taxing a same base gives rise to a phenomenon of over-taxation. Besides, the combination of both externalities yields to an intermediary tax rate : the outcome is brought closer to the social optimum.