Suchergebnisse

Recent scholars have argued that feminism is the handmaiden of neoliberalism. This article suggests otherwise, offering a study of West German feminists in the 1980s. Responding to the advent of reproductive technologies, these feminists were pioneers in critically assessing the relationship between reproduction and neoliberalism. Radical feminists like Maria Mies argued that global capitalism allied with the state to coercively structure reproduction for its needs. For disability rights feminists like Theresia Degener, however, the state did not coerce; it produced citizens who willingly regulated their reproduction under a new eugenics from below. In analysing the marketisation of reproduction, German feminists developed a more sophisticated understanding of neoliberalism than critics today who simplistically theorise neoliberalism as the mere retraction of the state.

Die Geschichtsschreibung der Reparationen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg handelt bislang vor allem von Geld. Dieser Aufsatz plädiert dafür, auch die Sachlieferungen als einen wesentlichen Bestandteil des Versailler Vertrags zu interpretieren. Exemplarisch wird erprobt, wie sich theoretische Überlegungen zur sozialen Dimension von Dingen auf die Geschichte des Versailler Vertrags und seiner Folgen anwenden lassen. Anhand der zeitgenössischen Diskussionen über geplante Lieferungen von Baumaterial nach Nordfrankreich lässt sich nachvollziehen, dass man auf deutscher Seite mit diesen Reparationsleistungen durchaus Erwartungen verknüpfte: Aus Sicht der Politik sollten Sachlieferungen dazu beitragen, die Gesamtsumme der Reparationen zu mindern. Findige Unternehmen hofften schon 1919 auf einträgliche Geschäfte, etwa durch den Verkauf von Fertighäusern. Auch die Baugewerkschaften setzten auf neue Möglichkeiten für »deutsche Arbeiter und deutsches Material«. Selbst wenn die Lieferung in die Aufbaugebiete Nordfrankreichs in der Praxis begrenzt blieb, eröffnen die damit verbundenen Debatten neue Perspektiven auf die Geschichte des Nachkriegs. ; To date, the historiography of reparations after World War I has a predominant focus on cash. The article proposes considering non-cash contributions a constitutive part of the Treaty of Versailles and investigating their impact on the post-World War I order. Contemporary debates on the supply of building materials to northern France illustrate the expectations on the German side that were raised by the promise of such deliveries in kind: Policymakers hoped that deliveries in kind would reduce the overall sum of reparations; smart entrepreneurs hoped for lucrative business, for instance from the sale of prefabricated houses; and trade unions saw new prospects for German workers and German building materials. Though deliveries in kind to the areas undergoing reconstruction in northern France were in practice small, the related debates disclose new perspectives on the post-war history. This example serves as a case in point for the potential of applying theoretical considerations about the social dimension of materiality to the context of the Treaty of Versailles and its consequences.

Can Germany lead on security? This article aims to address this question by looking at recent German contributions to European defence cooperation. In 2013 Germany introduced the Framework Nations Concept (FNC) as a systematic and structured approach towards joint capability development. The concept relies on the idea that bigger nations take the overall responsibility for coordinating the contributions of smaller partners in a capability package. The framework nation model as such is not new but the initiative has been welcomed as a potential game changer in European defence cooperation and as confirmation of Germany's commitment to NATO. In light of the Ukraine crisis, measures to adapt NATO and to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance have become more urgent. Allies and partners increasingly want Germany to extend its role as Europe's dominant economic and financial power to matters of security and defence. The framework nation model allows Germany to take international responsibility, while avoiding debates about leadership and hegemony. Moreover, as a framework nation, Germany can advance flexible cooperation among a smaller number of allies without undermining its commitment to multilateralism. But the FNC initiative also raises further questions: what is the added value of the framework nation model compared to similar formats; what should be the place of smaller groupings in the evolving Euro-Atlantic security architecture; and how reliable is Germany in the role of a lead nation? (International Affairs (Oxford) / SWP)