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We study the choice between source-based and destination-based corporate taxes in a two country model, allowing multinational _rms to use transfer pricing to allocate pro_ts across tax jurisdictions. We show that source-based taxation is a Nash equilibrium for tax revenue maximizing jurisdictions if domestic and foreign _rms generate large revenues. We also show that destinationbased taxes are a Nash equilibrium when _rms generate low revenues, which implies the presence of multiple equilibria. Both the source and the destination principle coexist in equilibrium when domestic and foreign corporate revenues are intermediate. However, the source principle always tax-dominates the destination principle.

We study the choice between source-based and destination-based corporate taxes in a twocountry model, allowing multinational firms to use transfer pricing to allocate profits across tax jurisdictions. We show that source-based taxation is a Nash equilibrium for tax revenue maximizing jurisdictions if domestic and/or foreign firms generate large revenues. We also show that destination-based taxes are a Nash equilibrium when firms generate low revenues, which implies the presence of multiple equilibria. Both the source and the destination principle coexist in equilibrium when domestic and foreign corporate revenues are average. However, the source principle always Pareto-dominates the destination principle.

We study the choice between source-based and destination-based corporate taxes in a two country model, allowing multinational _rms to use transfer pricing to allocate pro_ts across tax jurisdictions. We show that source-based taxation is a Nash equilibrium for tax revenue maximizing jurisdictions if domestic and foreign _rms generate large revenues. We also show that destinationbased taxes are a Nash equilibrium when _rms generate low revenues, which implies the presence of multiple equilibria. Both the source and the destination principle coexist in equilibrium when domestic and foreign corporate revenues are intermediate. However, the source principle always tax-dominates the destination principle.

We study the choice between source-based and destination-based corporate taxes in a two country model, allowing multinational _rms to use transfer pricing to allocate pro_ts across tax jurisdictions. We show that source-based taxation is a Nash equilibrium for tax revenue maximizing jurisdictions if domestic and foreign _rms generate large revenues. We also show that destinationbased taxes are a Nash equilibrium when _rms generate low revenues, which implies the presence of multiple equilibria. Both the source and the destination principle coexist in equilibrium when domestic and foreign corporate revenues are intermediate. However, the source principle always tax-dominates the destination principle.

In the modern era, revolutions have been central to the structure and dynamics of international affairs. They have always been international events: international in origin, ideology, process and effect, supercharging the rhythms and logics of any given international system. Yet, within the discipline of International Relations, the study of revolutions has remained something of a secondary subject. Not only have there been relatively few studies theoretically engaging with revolution and international relations, but the dominant theoretical frameworks in International Relations have largely bracketed out revolutions from their conceptions of international politics. Yet, if revolutions have been, in part, international in both cause and effect, thereby transcending the confines of 'second-' and 'third-image' conceptions of international relations, we require theoretical tools capable of capturing the sociological and geopolitical dimensions of these Janus-faced events without reducing one dimension to the other. Drawing on the theory of uneven and combined development, this article provides such a conception, organically uniting both 'sociological' and 'geopolitical' modes of explanation. It does so, in particular, by re-examining two of the key 'classical' bourgeois revolutions of the early-modern epoch: the English and French revolutions.

Reprinted from Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, v. LV, no. 4, 1916. ; I. Outline. John Bassett Moore -- II. Judicial aspect of international law -- Arbitration. Charlemagne Tower -- III. Legislative aspects. George Grafton Wilson -- IV. International administration. Philip Marshall Brown -- V. World organization. David Jayne Hill. ; Mode of access: Internet.