Suchergebnisse

The George W. Bush administration has tried to fight the 'war on terror' with efforts ranging from aggressive intelligence and military campaigns to programmes to win over the youth of the Arab world. These efforts, however, are not part of an over-arching strategic framework: they are at best not integrated and at worst working against one another. This garbage-pail approach to counter-terrorism reflects a broader confusion on how to defeat al-Qaeda and its allies. Most elements of counter-terrorism strategy address one of two different goals: disrupting the group itself, and its operations; or changing the overall environment to defuse the group's anger or make it harder to raise money or attract recruits. Too many options are presented as cost free or as co-existing harmoniously with other strategies, when in fact they are risky and loaded with trade-offs. Making the best strategic choice depends on the ultimate definition of victory. The most effective approach recognises that allies are usually the key to successful counter-terrorism efforts. With allied help, terrorists can be contained and, in the long term, their many divisions will rise to the fore. (Survival / SWP)

France's opposition to the US intervention in Iraq triggered the most bitter crisis between the two countries since President Charles de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO's integrated structure in 1966. Since June 2004, the atmosphere has steadily improved. The relationship is now businesslike, making it possible for the two countries to achieve significant results on important and visible issues of common interest. To maintain their ability to work together in case of need, France and the United States must steer clear of the grand visions that they have often held as principal justifications for their foreign policies. When there is a mutual perception of common interests, the two nations work together extremely well. This pragmatism should be strengthened by the change of leadership that will take place in France in 2007. To be durable however, this change also needs to be paralleled in Washington. (Survival / SWP)

The United States has already achieved all that it is going to achieve in Iraq; staying in the country can only drive up the price of these gains in blood, treasure and strategic position. Washington should therefore make clear now to the Iraqi government that, as the results of the anticipated surge become apparent, the two sides will be negotiating a US military disengagement from Iraq. This would entail withdrawing the bulk of American forces from Iraq within 12-18 months; shifting the American focus to containment of the conflict and strengthening the US military position elsewhere in the region; and engaging Iraq's neighbours, including Iran and Syria, members of the UN Security Council and potential donors in an Iraq stabilisation plan. The civil war is unlikely to abate upon disengagement, but the lack of organisational capacity, broad communal consent, and heavy weapons on either side militates against a drastic increase in the casualty rate. The United States should act decisively and creatively across the wider Middle East to offset perceptions of American weakness triggered by the setback in Iraq. Full recovery from its misadventure in Iraq is likely to take the United States many years. (Survival / SWP)