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Current account imbalances and systemic risk within a monetary union
In: Journal of economic behavior & organization, Band 83, Heft 3, S. 647-656
ISSN: 1879-1751, 0167-2681
The European Monetary Union: were there alternatives to the ECB?
In: Journal of policy modeling: JPMOD ; a social science forum of world issues, Band 23, Heft 7, S. 775-806
ISSN: 0161-8938
BOOK REVIEWS - After Maastricht: A Guide to European Monetary Union
In: Science & society: a journal of Marxist thought and analysis, Band 63, Heft 2, S. 262-264
ISSN: 0036-8237
An Evaluation of Progress Toward European Monetary Union Using Fuzzy Analysis
In: Journal of policy modeling: JPMOD ; a social science forum of world issues, Band 20, Heft 6, S. 741-765
ISSN: 0161-8938
An Evaluation of Progress Toward European Monetary Union Using Fuzzy Analysis
In: Journal of policy modeling: JPMOD ; a social science forum of world issues, Band 20, Heft 6, S. 741-766
ISSN: 0161-8938
Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro-founded model of a monetary union
In: Journal of international economics, Band 67, Heft 2, S. 320-352
ISSN: 0022-1996
European Monetary Union reform preferences of French and German parliamentarians
In: Discussion paper 17-059
In: Public finance and corporate taxation
This study analyzes results from an original survey of members of the French and German parliaments (Assemblée Nationale, Sénat and Bundestag) on economic policies and institutions of the Eurozone. We find that French politicians are significantly more supportive of Eurobonds, a European unemployment insurance scheme, and an active monetary policy by the ECB than German politicians. At the same time, there are significant differences along party lines, which are often quantitatively more important than differences in nationality. Left-leaning members of parliaments are in favor of new policy instruments at the European or Eurozone level, but are skeptical about the fiscal constraints of the Fiscal Compact. There is widespread consensus across parties and countries that more investment at national levels is warranted.
Potential Output and Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union under Asymmetric Information
We analyze fiscal rules within a Monetary Union in the presence of (i) asymmetric information about member states' potential output and, therefore, output gap and (ii) bail-out among member states. In our framework, bail-out lowers the scope for signalling (discrimination) by member states (lenders). In the presence of asymmetric information, bail-out and national governments' shortsightedness make the first-best fiscal rule non-implementable as member states are tempted to run excessively high deficits. The Monetary Union designs a mechanism such that member states with high output gap (i.e., in a recession) run higher budget deficits by making an ex-post transfer to the Union. We find that the first-best deficit is contingent on the cycle – i.e., on the member state's output gap – and, all else equal, can be implemented provided the member states' ability to repay its own debt upon the realization of a bad shock is sufficiently high. A downward distortion in the deficit run by a member state during an expansion is otherwise introduced. Finally, the Monetary Union cannot discriminate among types of borrowers when national governments are excessively shortsighted.
BASE
Potential Output and Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union under Asymmetric Information
We analyze fiscal rules within a Monetary Union in the presence of (i) asymmetric information about member states' potential output and, therefore, output gap and (ii) bail-out among member states. In our framework, bail-out lowers the scope for signalling (discrimination) by member states (lenders). In the presence of asymmetric information, bail-out and national governments' shortsightedness make the first-best fiscal rule non-implementable as member states are tempted to run excessively high deficits. The Monetary Union designs a mechanism such that member states with high output gap (i.e., in a recession) run higher budget deficits by making an ex-post transfer to the Union. We find that the first-best deficit is contingent on the cycle – i.e., on the member state's output gap – and, all else equal, can be implemented provided the member states' ability to repay its own debt upon the realization of a bad shock is sufficiently high. A downward distortion in the deficit run by a member state during an expansion is otherwise introduced. Finally, the Monetary Union cannot discriminate among types of borrowers when national governments are excessively shortsighted.
BASE
Monetary Union, Even Higher Integration, or Back to National Currencies?
In: CESifo economic studies: a joint initiative of the University of Munich's Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute, Band 62, Heft 2, S. 232-255
ISSN: 1612-7501
To be or not to be in monetary union: A synthesis
In: Journal of international economics, Band 83, Heft 2, S. 154-167
ISSN: 0022-1996
Financial Integration, International Portfolio Choice and the European Monetary Union
In: ECB Working Paper No. 626
SSRN
Monetary Union, institutions and financial market integration: Italy, 1862–1905
In: Explorations in economic history: EEH, Band 40, Heft 4, S. 443-461
ISSN: 0014-4983