Suchergebnisse

Many scholars have argued that mistrust can prevent cooperation. These arguments often fail to adequately address the possibility that states can take steps to reassure each other, build trust, and thereby avoid conflict. I present a rational choice theory of reassurance focusing on costly signals and identify the conditions under which players can use costly signals to reassure the other side. The central result is that reassurance will be possible between trustworthy players in equilibrium if trustworthy actors are more willing to take risks to attain mutual cooperation than untrustworthy actors. I discuss the implications of the model in the context of the reassurance strategies pursued by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of the Cold War.

In February 1950 the annual report of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation was presented to the United States Economic Cooperation Administration. The report stated that future progress of European recovery would depend to a large extent upon the level of economic activity in the United States, upon United States tariff policy; and upon international investments made by the United States. The forecasts of European trade were based on the assumption that United States business activity would remain at least as high as in the second and third quarter of 1949; it was pointed out that even small setbacks in the United States economy would have disproportionately large consequences for western Europe whose reserves were not great enough to stand much strain. The report insisted that what remained to be done to solve the dollar problem was not a task for Europe alone but was rather a "joint problem." Western Europe's dollar deficit could not be eliminated unless its exports to the United States amounted to 75 percent of its imports in value. It was necessary that the emphasis shift from the expansion of total production to the development of dollar earning and dollar saving types of production, as well as a reduction in costs. Inflationary pressure had been greatly relieved but nearly all the Marshall Plan countries were still suffering from some inflationary pressure which tended to reduce their exports and increase their imports. This pressure was likely to continue unless a world depression developed.

Voluntary welfare associations (VWAs) act both as pressure groups trans mitting demands from citizens to state and as functional groups cooperating with government in the formulation and implementation of public policies. Pressure is employed within the pluralist configuration, in which VWAs retain their autonomy vis-à-vis the state. Concerted action and partnership between state and associations occur under corporatism. In each model, a certain cost-benefit balance emerges. Under corporatism, the state devolves power in order to obtain legitimacy; associations forfeit their autonomy in order to gain integrated participation. Under pluralism, the state trades power for legitimacy; associations retain their autonomy at the expense of participation in decision making. This article examines the relevance of these ideas to the Israeli context. The corporatist relationship was expected to prevail when VWAs performed primary functions. When they fulfilled complementary roles, the relationship should tend to be pluralistic. These expectations were examined on eight VWAs, divided equally between the health (primary) and the handicapped (complementary) domains.

The article examines the main directions of activity and forms of interaction between the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the Belarusian SSR in the UN and its specialized institutions during the years of perestroika (1985 - 1991). To disclose the topic, materials from the journal "International Affair" were used (reviews of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the foreign policy of the USSR, articles by the foreign ministers of the Union republics, primarily Ukraine and Belarus), book and journal publications of Union / Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian scientists, documents of the United Nations and foreign policy of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the Belarusian SSR. The author's conscious emphasis on the union level reflects the real situation in relations between the Union Center and the republics in the Soviet federation during the perestroika period, when these relations rapidly evolved from the foreign policy dictate of the Center to greater autonomy of the republics in the international arena, which ultimately has led to the collapse of the USSR and the proclamation of independence all union republics. The article analyzes such issues as the new approach of the Soviet Union to the UN in the years of perestroika, the formation of new relations between the Union republics and the Center, diplomatic cooperation of Soviet delegations and representatives of socialist countries in the UN, Belarusian initiatives at the 45th session of the UN General Assembly (1990). During the years of perestroika, the Soviet leadership and the union Foreign Ministry did a tremendous job of clearing the rubble of the Cold War, developing broad international cooperation and integration the USSR into the world economy. The Belarusian and Ukrainian diplomatic services have made a significant contribution to this activity within the framework of the UN and its specialized agencies and have received much broader opportunities for realizing the national interests and needs of their peoples within the framework of radically renewed relations between the Union Center and the republics. The article is one of the first attempts in post-Soviet historiography to investigate the activities of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR in the UN and its specialized institutions during the period of perestroika

Die GCC-Staaten zeichnen sich durch ein weltweit einmaliges Muster internationaler Arbeitsmigration aus. Die Zuwanderung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte setzte bereits in den späten 1940er Jahren ein, nahm aber nach dem Ölboom im Oktober 1973 eine neue Dimension an: Ausländer/-innen stellen seither nicht nur eine Mehrheit in der Erwerbsbevölkerung der GCC-Staaten (mit Ausnahme von Oman). In Katar, den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten und Kuwait übersteigt ihre Zahl auch diejenige der einheimischen Bevölkerung insgesamt. Zwar bemühen sich die Regierungen der GCC-Staaten darum, die ausländischen Arbeitskräfte nach und nach durch einheimische Arbeitskräfte zu ersetzen. Diese Strategie schlägt aber bislang vor allem in der Privatwirtschaft fehl.