The Dept for the Coordination of Equality Policy (DCE) is the most important Dutch government agency for women's policy. The DCE's 1978 establishment, organization, role in policy formation, & relations with Dutch women's movement are reviewed. Because of the influence of Dutch feminist ideology, the DCE is relatively informal & nonhierarchical in comparison to other agencies. Its ability to initiate new policies on its own is limited; it serves more of a coordinating role. The three-sided network envisioned by feminists -- the "iron triangle" composed of the DCE, the women's movement, & a strong government advisory body -- has never materialized, & the DCE itself is now weakening due to the policy of integration of agencies. M. Pflum
Economic policy, in general, produces disharmony with ecosystems. Drastic changes are needed when harmony is to be achieved, changes regarding the guiding principles, the goals, the instruments, and the institutions of economic policy. This paper presents some proposals of such possible changes and their implementation. (author's abstract)
AbstractCoordination of policies in different sectors and at multiple levels is a major task for governing the water-energy-food nexus. Nexus governance has to deal with plurality of policies that are in place (e.g., interaction of policies across levels). Based on an overview of governance challenges, this report provides insights into policy instruments and experiences in their application at the global, national, regional and local levels. Institutional innovation is needed to develop democratic and participatory approaches that address the water-energy-food nexus. Another requirement is the development and implementation of binding environmental targets (e.g. water quality standards, land use distribution) which should be set at national or supranational levels. However, context-specific pathways should be established for different regions to achieve those targets. Various examples are provided to illustrate challenges and solutions to the implementation of a nexus governance approach.
Objective We seek to determine if institutional changes designed to increase intraparty coordination influenced observed levels of party unity in the U.S. Senate. In particular, we test competing claims regarding the effects of establishing party policy committees following the adoption of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Methods First, we examine Congress at the vote level by looking at the overall proportion of votes that could be classified as 'party unity votes' before and after the establishment of the policy committees. Second, we employ a micro-level analysis by examining individual senators' procedural party support scores. Results We find that members of the majority party were more likely to have higher levels of procedural unity after the adoption of policy committees. Conclusion The establishment of party policy committees in the Senate played a role in helping party leaders coordinate activities, advance a legislative agenda, and maintain high levels of party unity on the floor by better structuring procedural votes. Adapted from the source document.
As cross-border transactions and economic integration among nations have increased, formerly neglected differences among the domestic economic policies of nations have become progressively exposed to international scrutiny. National governments trying to pursue autonomous polices have found their decisions more difficult and the consequences of their decisions more uncertain. These trends have in turn provoked debate about whether governments should cooperate more fully when making their policy decisions. In this book, part of the Integrating National Economies series, Ralph A. Bryant considers how much national governments might benefit from coordination of their macroeconomic stabilization polices, the circumstances in which they might cooperation; and how ambitious that cooperation should be. Bryant argues that the potential benefits of attempted coordination are often greater than the potential risks. When national decisionmakers take into account the cross-border spillovers of their actions, and especially if the are prepared to consider mutually beneficial adjustments of their policy instruments, each cooperating nation may be able to attain higher levels of welfare. Bryant discusses circumstances in which efforts to coordinate could prove counterproductive. On the whole, however, he contends that efforts to coordinate policies internationally typically deserve examination and, frequently, can be expected to advance the common interests of nations' citizens. Bryant identifies and analyzes different forms of intergovernmental cooperation for monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies. One of the contributors of the book compares and evaluates three different analytical perspectives: the traditional policy-optimization approach favored by economists, the rule analysis of international regime environments, and the institutional analysis
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Abstract Over the past two decades, economists have made significant advances in understanding how networks affect individual behaviour and shape aggregate outcomes. We argue that insights from network economics can play an important role in the design of economic policy. Focusing on six policy domains, we show that network economics not only deepens our understanding of existing policy concerns but also suggests a number of new policy questions. In each of these policy areas, we evaluate the availability of data and assess the suitability of the network economics toolkit for policy work. We conclude with a discussion of challenges to the adoption of network-based methods in economic policy along with strategies to overcome them.
The paper analyzes monetary and fiscal stabilization and coordination in a multi-sector stochastic new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) model. It first aims to assess the capacity of fiscal and monetary policy to reduce or eliminate the negative welfare effects of an unanticipated productivity shock affecting some or all of the sectors in each country. Second, it evaluates the possible gains from international monetary cooperation as well as the impact of active fiscal policy on the welfare performance of monetary policy. The setup also allows for international asymmetry concerning the uncertainty over the shocks. The results show that monetary and fiscal policies are efficient tools of stabilization and under several conditions they can replicate the flexible-price equilibrium. However, their welfare performance is not necessarily increased when both monetary and fiscal policies react to shocks at the national level. The existence of bilateral gains from monetary cooperation depends on the degree of asymmetry concerning the uncertainty over the shocks. Adapted from the source document.
