Suchergebnisse

Author's introductionBy reflecting on violence in its many manifestations this course is intended to problematize youth's relationship to violence. Not only will it underscore how and why violence is perpetrated by young people, but, perhaps more important, how young people are affected. Students will reflect on how violence impacts and enters their own lives – sometimes in very inauspicious ways. Much of what counts as entertainment is laden with, and centres on, violence. For example, Grand Theft Auto is a popular video game wherein game players assume the role of a wannabe gangster whose rise though the criminal underworld is predicated upon his thieving and murderous efficiency. Similarly, the movie Never Back Down follows a young male as he attempts to fight his way into the vaunted inner circle of his high school's 'in' group. Marred by and revered for his reputation as a 'tough guy', the protagonist is forced, in a contradiction that only makes coherent sense in the context of the pervasive violent masculinity which buoys the film, to fight his way clear of this foul reputation.Human intersections with violence are undeniably and unexpectedly complicated. We are fascinated and our lives are directly affected by violence regardless of proximity. Significantly, violence – both the Hollywood version and that which is 'real'– affects each and all. Fears of violence, whether they are informed by official statistics, crime‐based dramas, the 6 o'clock news or reality television, contour our existence in very definite ways. Our temporal and spatial movement through urban space, our understandings of law and governance strategies, our relations with 'others'– significant and otherwise – are conditioned by tangential, lived, experienced and witnessed violence. It alters our way of being, where we choose to live, and how we conduct, protect and entertain ourselves. No one is immune. Human experience is contoured irrevocably by violence.At issue is our inconsistent and contradictory relationship to youth violence. Parents applaud young people's violence – especially their sons'– as they 'duke it out' on the football field and in the hockey arena and urge them to 'get' or 'kill' the other team. At the same time, young people are overrepresented as victims of violence – especially our daughters. This course provides an opportunity to explore and analyze how youth [and] violence is braided into the fabric of Western culture.Starting points/learning objectives1What follows are issues students should consider and meditate on throughout the term. I encourage readers to introduce them at the beginning of the semester and return to them several times throughout. They may also be used to frame study questions and as a course summary.

What is violence?
Why is there such growing concern about youth violence?
What role does the media play in our understanding of youth violence?
How are youth gangs perceived?
What is the relationship between youth and violence?
What is the connection between masculinity(ies) and violence?
How does Western culture champion and, at the same time, abhor youth violence?
What are 'solutions' to youth violence?
What role can youth play in this process?

Author recommendationsHannah Arendt, 1970, On Violence. New York, NY: Harcourt Brace.Following her tumultuous experiences of living through the Second World War and student protests of the 1960s, Hannah Arendt penned her reflections on violence. She famously writes that, 'Violence can always destroy power; out of the barrel of a gun grows the most effective command, resulting in the most instant and perfect obedience. What never can grow out of it is power' (53). She maintains that even though power and violence may hold phenomological elements in common, they are in fact opposites: 'where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power's disappearance' (56). Arendt develops this line of argument later in the book and concludes that, 'Every decrease in power is an open invitation to violence – if only because those who hold power and feel it slipping from their hands ... have always found it difficult to resist the temptation to substitute violence for it' (87). For Arendt, worlds (both individual and global) become irrevocably altered through incidences of violence. She writes, 'the practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world' (80). Arendt's reflections occasion an opportunity to reflect not only on interpersonal violence, but perhaps more important, state violence.Fearnley, Fran (ed.). 2004. I wrote on all Four Walls: Teens Speak Out on Violence. Toronto, Canada: Annick.How do youth experience violence? This collection contains the captivating stories of nine affected youth whose voices narrate experiences of being victims and instigators of violence. Their stories evidence the complexities of violence. They demonstrate how a great deal of slippage exists between the categories of victim and offender. Instead of being clear cut, the spellbinding tales evidence how the line separating the violent and the victim is often blurred. Most striking about this collection is the demand that adults listen to youth's voices. Tragically, youth are too often the objects of social regulation and academic discourse without being its authors. This collection forces the reader to consider what role, if any, youth voices may play in the amelioration of violence.Loeber, Rolf and David P. Farrington (eds.). 1998. Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders: Risk Factors and Successful Interventions. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Co‐edited by Rolf Loeber and David Farrington, this impressive collection offers innovative and insightful essays centring on the aetiology and trajectory of violent youth. This report of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention's focus group on serious and violent offenders asks the reader to reflect on well‐worn assumptions. Instead of attending to single and static causal explanations of youth violence, the authors identify significant risk and resiliency factors. Collectively, the 17 chapters argue for more proactive responses to youth violence that attend to the complexity of juvenile development. The authors maintain that effective reforms and interventions can be implemented only when predictable assemblages of risk and protective factors are isolated. This volume of essays is impressive for the surfeit of data on risk and resiliency.Messerschmidt, James. 2000. Nine Lives: Adolescent Masculinities, The Body and Violence. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.No list of recommended readings on violence would be complete without at least one of James Messerschmidt's splendid books. In addition to Nine Lives, his Masculinities and Crime and Flesh and Blood are equally impressive. Tying these works together is the author's insistence that masculinities are at the centre of any coherent understanding of violence. Equally important to Messershmidt's work in Nine Lives is his use of the 'life history method'; which involves 'appreciating how adolescent male violent offenders construct and make sense of their particular world, and to comprehend the ways in which they interpret their own lives and the world around them' (5). For Messerschmidt, the world of boys is saturated with violent images that provide a rather limited cultural script through which to define manhood and manliness. Instead of prizing sensitivity and empathy, this hegemonic masculinity rewards (among other destructive qualities) toughness. The significance of this book lies in how Messerschmidt underscores the gendered meaning of violence in the world of nine boys.Sheridan, Sam. 2007. A Fighter's Heart: One Man's Journey Through the World of Fighting. New York, NY: Grove.A scarred man dripping in blood emblazons the cover of Sam Sheridan's book. Taken after one of his professional fights, the image captures the gaze while it repulses the mind. Sheridan's work takes the reader through the preparation and training of the violent body. The interested are catapulted into the world of fighting for sport and the intense and somewhat bizarre physical and, perhaps more important, psychological preparations fighters undertake to do violence to an other. In this book, Sheridan takes the reader on a journey through the life of a professional fighter and along the way provides insight into the corporeality of violence. Sheridan writes, 'Fighting is not just a manhood test; that is the surface. The depths are about knowledge and self knowledge, a method of examining one's own life and motives. For most people who take it seriously, fighting is much more about the self than the other' (337). While the other books I have recommended seek to stand at a distance from violence and describe the physical, psychological and spiritual construction of the violent body from a safe vantage, Sheridan's book dives head first into the masculine phenomenon.Zimring, Franklin. 1998. American Youth Violence. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.With fantastic media claims of a looming youth violence crisis and equally unreasonable governmental policy responses as the backdrop, Franklin Zimring's book offers a sober(ing) reflection. While the author finds media representations of juvenile violence particularly troubling, he considers the aggressive governmental response exceedingly incongruent with the scope of the problem. Wild media depictions of marauding youth criminals and equally pugnacious governmental responses has contributed to an ethos of intolerance manifest in an increasingly punitive juvenile court. After a systematic and careful analysis of juvenile court data and existing state policy, Zimring concludes that youth violence is a problem that requires a more level‐headed approach than is evidenced in escalating incarceration rates and reactionist policy.Zizek, Slavoj. 2008. Violence. New York, NY: Picador.Like Arendt, Slavoj Zizek implores the reader to think more critically and widely about the meanings of violence. Enjoining his characteristic psychoanalytic cunning bolstered by Marxist sagicity, Zizek maintains that violence embodies three overlapping and bouying configurations: subjective, objective and systemic. Through the lens of popular and not‐so‐popular movies and jokes, he suggests that our myopic preoccupation with subjective violence (interpersonal) obscures more insidious forms of systemic violence (committed by capital as intrinsic to the cost of doing business). Engrossment in subjective violence not only allows the systemic forms to go on (relatively) undetected, but to fester. Zizek's book demands that the reader assume a more panoramic stance when posing questions about violence.Course assignmentAdvertising campaign to end violenceIn groups or individually, students act as the creative marketing team for the mayor who is intent on curbing violent youth crime.Instructions

Select a category of violent youth crime for which you would like to create an advertising campaign (e.g. gang violence; dating violence; assault; sexual assault/rape & etc).
For your selected issue, create an advertisement in any media (i.e. poster; newspaper/magazine spot; radio ad (60 sec.); television spot (90 sec.); Public Service Advertisement (PSA, 20 min.); Youtube message (2 min.); newspaper insert; billboard & etc.). You must describe the location/place where the campaign will be found (i.e. which newspaper? During what television show(s)?, etc.).
In addition to your advertisement, you are required to submit a 7 to 10‐page paper that provides the theoretical and intellectual background to your advertising campaign (drawing on at least seven sources). The paper will outline the nature of the selected violent crime problem and explain how the campaign will manage or curb its incidence. Elements of your paper will include: clear introduction and conclusion; clear identification of the major factors involved in the issue; familiarity with the relevant literature; clear organization of the material and arguments; and critical analysis (i.e. What are the limitations of your approach).
You will be given 10 minutes during a town‐hall meeting held during the last week of classes to pitch your campaign to the mayor and alderpersons (aka the class). You must explain why your approach will prove effective and ultimately receive the mayor's endorsement.
Effective Advertising campaigns will be attractive, memorable, clear and creative. A useful example can be found at: http://www.gov.ab.ca/acn/200706/216833FE9BEF6‐0ECF‐81D6‐01A4883EC4C04B71.html
Supporting media: http://www.aglc.gov.ab.ca/pdf/social_responsibility/cage_poster_one_stepped_toe.pdf http://www.aglc.gov.ab.ca/pdf/social_responsibility/cage_poster_five_asked_dance.pdf
You must submit and justify the budget for your campaign. The price tag must be in‐line with potential return.

Recommended films and videosA number of outstanding videos on the topic of youth violence now exist, and I use a number of these throughout the course. In addition to films, I use a variety of additional media forms (i.e. websites, newspaper articles and television news) and guest speakers (i.e. Former gang members, juvenile justice professionals, street kids) that encourage critical thinking. Three films that I find particular useful are: Tough Guise–http://www.mediaed.org/videos/MediaGenderAndDiversity/ToughGuiseTeaching guide: http://mediaed.org/videos/MediaGenderAndDiversity/ToughGuise/studyguide/html Gang Aftermath–http://www.nfb.ca/collection/films/fiche/?id=54450 A Clockwork Orange–http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0066921/Useful websitesFight Violence.net –http://www.fightviolence.net/Ihuman –http://www.ihuman.org/Jackson Katz – 10 Things Men Can do to Prevent Gender Violence –http://www.jacksonkatz.com/wmcd.htmlPromoting Relationships and Eliminating Violence (PREVnet) –http://prevnet.ca/Public Health Agency of Canada – Dating Violence –http://www.phac‐aspc.gc.ca/ncfv‐cnivf/familyviolence/html/femdatfreq_e.htmlThe Youth Restorative Action Project –http://yrap.org/Youth Violence: A Report of the Surgeon General –http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/youthviolence/Sample course outlineSection 1 –Introduction to the courseThe first class(es) are intended to provide students with an overview of the course. The starting points/learning objectives outlined above provide a useful entry.Section 2 –What is violence?Providing conceptual clarification of the main concept under consideration is essential before proceeding too far into course content. This section reflects on how violence is defined (and left undefined) in philosophy, law, and criminology. Students will be asked to meditate on the limitations of each approach and to query whether violence can ever be justified and, if so, how.Section 3 –How much violence?Citizens are concerned about violent crime and are impressed by what crime statistics reveal. However, official statistics reveal only those cases which come to police attention or, more specifically, where police arrest a suspect for committing what the criminal code determines to be a violent offence. Understandably, not all violent crime is reported to police. Criminologists refer to the remainder as the dark figure of crime. It follows that crime scholars and statisticians can never be certain they have captured all the crime – violent or otherwise – that is committed in a particular society. When official statistics and media reports are the sole means employed to construct the public face of violence, victimization remains obscured. 'Not on the public's radar in the ethos of school shootings and high profile stabbings is that youth are the most likely victims of violence. Indeed, when the focus of the public's ire is set against a (perceived) rise in violent crime';2 victimization (i.e. bullying, dating violence, and, but not limited to, sexual assault) becomes an almost irrelevant aside to statistics. This section of the course provides an opportunity to shift the locus of debate from sensational media accounts to the complexities involved in youth violence.Section 4 –Understanding Violence and the Violent Offender?For what reasons do youth act violently? Since expert opinion varies widely, the answer you receive to this question will depend greatly on to whom it is posed. With particular attention paid to gender (especially masculinity), this section surveys various explanations of violent youth behaviour.Section 5 –Violent VictimizationYouth are typically overrepresented as victims of violent crime. This section of the course considers why this seems to be the case. It also surveys different forms of violent victimization including: racial violence, bullying, dating violence and sexual assault. Students will be asked to consider the most likely perpetrators of these crimes.Section 6 –The Culture of ViolenceViolence pervades Western culture. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the mass media. Movies, video games, sports, music videos and television programmes all contain heavy doses of violence. This section of the course confronts the violent images many take for granted. An attempt is made to juxtapose simulated violence with 'real‐life' violence and ponder what renders the former (more) acceptable while the latter is (almost) universally condemned. Through an examination of violence in media (movies, video games, etc.) and sport (hockey, football and mixed martial arts) students consider what our relative acceptance of these forms of violence reveals about Western society.Section 7 –Regulating and Managing ViolenceFear of violence has prompted individuals to respond in very direct ways to the prospect of victimization (i.e. buying pepper spray, purchasing burglar alarms, avoiding a particular area of town after dark). They have also demanded that their governments impose the most austere punishments on violent offenders and enact increasingly intrusive legislation. Bootcamps, chain gangs, the strap and, of course, incarceration have been advanced in the fight against violence. Canada's ruling Conservative party has recently pressured the Senate to speed up their deliberations over their proposed Tackling Violent Crime Act; which boasts a number of measures intended to satiate demand from a fearful public.Questions to consider in this section of the course include: Why has state intervention proven relatively ineffective? What innovative programs exist 'outside' of the state? To what extent does the amelioration of violence depend on the creation and widespread acceptance of a more tolerant and less aggressive masculine ethic? What role can youth play in preventing violence?Section 8 –ConclusionThe final section provides an opportunity to reflect on course themes by returning to the learning objectives and starting points outlined above. It is also an opportunity to move forward. If all agree that youth violence is indeed a problem, we must ask what we (each and all) are willing to do toward its amelioration. In the meantime we need to ask difficult and uncomfortable questions while assembling creative means of positively improving the situation many young people face. This means going beyond interventions that replicate the status quo to considering what a more just and humane world would look like.Notes
* Correspondence address: Department of Sociology, University of Alberta, 5‐21 H.M. Tory Building, Edmonton, AB T6G 2H4, Canada. Email: bryan.hogeveen@ualberta.ca.

1 Starting Points are adapted from Minaker and Hogeveen, Youth, Crime and Society: Issues of Power and Justice.

2 Hogeveen, Bryan. 2007. 'Youth (and) Violence.' Sociology Compass. ½: 463–484. ReferencesHogeveen, Bryan 2007. 'Youth (and) Violence.' Sociology Compass ½: 463–84.Minaker, Joanne C. and Bryan Hogeveen 2008. Youth, Crime and Society: Issues of Power and Justice. Toronto, Canada: Pearson.

Public Sector Economics Master's final thesis topic is of interest because we consider the Lithuanian state pension system. Pension system - is one of the elements of social protection. Social security is the basic institution which protects the national market economy. Five years ago Lithuania was launched in the state social insurance pension system reform. This reform is part of the state social insurance pension system privatization. This step and the context of criticism and support. Lithuanian scientists perform calculations and statistical analysis is very critical and critical carried out the reform. According to the reformed pension system is not fair, they will suffer most from the current retirees and older workers today, outside the system (Gylys, 2002). Studies have shown that the state social insurance pension system creates greater social security or private pension systems (Bitinas, 2008). By the way Lithuania private pension system developed state social insurance pension account. The implementation of pension reform should address the question of the social impact of the pension system will in the future. Pension system should be managed in the interest of social justice. Free Market Institute, experts agree the privatization of the pension system, they argue that in order to save people's pensions, rather than the current Social Security system needs radical reform, with the ultimate aim of the mandatory state social insurance waiver. However, the social insurance welfare state development rate under the responsibility of the state. Pension Scheme, together with health care is generally considered the heart of the welfare state. Therefore, public retirement systems management efficiency can be increased by the introduction of new management methods. Member image depends on how it can take care of older and disabled people nationally. Recently, public pensions through industrialized countries have already rightly equated old age poverty. The working generation supports the contributions of its pension scheme. Funded pension system will undoubtedly have been associated with positive intentions. However, this system there is still a lot of problems. These systems benefit in the long term it is extremely difficult to predict. Prior to the pension system reform, and it was done by the start of an aggressive and irresponsible advertising campaign, which has information about the underlying luxurious old age, participation in the choice of pension reform in the second stage. However, it was completely silent on the possible effects of pension reform. The author's view, cumulative pension system and the effectiveness of optimistic results of Lithuania allow the question and an incomplete legal framework in this area. There is no defined risk management and liability transferred to the State Social Insurance Fund contributions. Does not provide for the mandatory pension funds and the profitability of their specific commitments and guarantees the pension fund participant. There is no doubt, and the pension system's objectives are achieved. Pension system of the Lithuanian Republic consists of a state pension and social assistance benefits paid from the state budget and the state social insurance pensions, paid from the State Social Insurance Fund budget. State pensions are paid for certain services rendered to the state or certain professions. The state pension coverage tends to increase, in addition to a systematic increase in state pension base. State pensions offer unreasonable benefits to their recipients in violation of social justice, finally, is compounded by the burden of state, increasing the State budget. Pay-as-you-go today as a government social security fund system in line with European standards and has its own advantages. This system provides a sound social security, the contributions of persons liable for the financial sustainability of this system is responsible for the State. This system is simple and versatile, collected contributions from the immediate allocation of benefits. For this reason, the management of the system is cheap. This system is stable, it is immune to investment risk and inflation, the system constantly monitors the state because it is \"public.\" The social security pension system creates greater social security. The main advantage of this system fosters solidarity. This feature of the welfare state, showing the state of social maturity and respect for its citizens. A state social insurance pension system in the pay and benefits approach, the main problem is the state social insurance budget formation. As shown by the State Social Insurance Fund budget analysis, a one-year budget is not stable. It depends on the country's economic situation. By the way, one-year budget is very difficult to provide balanced. Today the country's economy is global, depends not only on their country's economic indicators, but also from all over the world of global events. This is a direct effect on State Social Insurance Fund budget. There must be a reserve fund, which went State Social Insurance Fund budget surplus in order to cover the projected future costs. Another proposal of the state social insurance to ensure financial sustainability would be that a pension should increase their funding base, part of a pension, for example, the main part of the financing from the state budget; by the way the State has more sources in the collection of taxes. This would help to increase the state social insurance contributions and increase the competitiveness of companies in ensuring the State Social Insurance Fund budget for the financial sustainability. Five years ago started a partial state social insurance pension privatization. This reform was made subject to certain objectives. The paper addresses the following broad objectives and their implementation. One of the goals was to balance the budget of the State Social Insurance fund. As shown by the work of analysis, State Social Insurance Fund budget depends on the economy: in good times - the budget surplus, during periods of economic downturn - the budget deficit. Since the creation of private pensions is the DHS pension account balance the budget solely State Social Insurance Fund this budget is difficult, especially in the economic downturn. Another objective of introducing the reform was to change the pension system so that individuals receive a higher pension than without reform. The paper's calculations show that the 2004 - 2008 the average pension growth rate of 18.05, while the second-tier funds transferred funds only 3.57. This means that the funds transferred to the pension funds did not increase faster than the increase in the State Social Insurance Fund pension, the past five years their presence was detrimental. The ongoing pension reform was to abandon privileged pensions. The paper analysis showed that the current number of persons receiving two or more pensions waived privileged pensions, low to consistently and systematically increase the basic state pension level. To prepare for the pension reform was considered investing in private pension funds thanks to spur economic growth. But, since a large part of the capital invested abroad, our country's economy does not receive the investment and can contribute to economic growth. Pension reform is ongoing in many foreign countries. Pension system was reformed in several directions. That's raising the retirement age, and the introduction of private funded pensions, the supplementary voluntary pension insurance promotion Pensions Reserve Fund, the promotion of older people to remain in the labor market early and partial retirement. Foreign countries have a wide variety of pension, is a different experience in the development of private pension funds. Developed European countries set up additional reserves. In good economic situation in the accumulation of assets that, if necessary, to cover the increased costs of default. The largest funds are pension reserve funds have been generated in Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Luxembourg.

Public Sector Economics Master's final thesis topic is of interest because we consider the Lithuanian state pension system. Pension system - is one of the elements of social protection. Social security is the basic institution which protects the national market economy. Five years ago Lithuania was launched in the state social insurance pension system reform. This reform is part of the state social insurance pension system privatization. This step and the context of criticism and support. Lithuanian scientists perform calculations and statistical analysis is very critical and critical carried out the reform. According to the reformed pension system is not fair, they will suffer most from the current retirees and older workers today, outside the system (Gylys, 2002). Studies have shown that the state social insurance pension system creates greater social security or private pension systems (Bitinas, 2008). By the way Lithuania private pension system developed state social insurance pension account. The implementation of pension reform should address the question of the social impact of the pension system will in the future. Pension system should be managed in the interest of social justice. Free Market Institute, experts agree the privatization of the pension system, they argue that in order to save people's pensions, rather than the current Social Security system needs radical reform, with the ultimate aim of the mandatory state social insurance waiver. However, the social insurance welfare state development rate under the responsibility of the state. Pension Scheme, together with health care is generally considered the heart of the welfare state. Therefore, public retirement systems management efficiency can be increased by the introduction of new management methods. Member image depends on how it can take care of older and disabled people nationally. Recently, public pensions through industrialized countries have already rightly equated old age poverty. The working generation supports the contributions of its pension scheme. Funded pension system will undoubtedly have been associated with positive intentions. However, this system there is still a lot of problems. These systems benefit in the long term it is extremely difficult to predict. Prior to the pension system reform, and it was done by the start of an aggressive and irresponsible advertising campaign, which has information about the underlying luxurious old age, participation in the choice of pension reform in the second stage. However, it was completely silent on the possible effects of pension reform. The author's view, cumulative pension system and the effectiveness of optimistic results of Lithuania allow the question and an incomplete legal framework in this area. There is no defined risk management and liability transferred to the State Social Insurance Fund contributions. Does not provide for the mandatory pension funds and the profitability of their specific commitments and guarantees the pension fund participant. There is no doubt, and the pension system's objectives are achieved. Pension system of the Lithuanian Republic consists of a state pension and social assistance benefits paid from the state budget and the state social insurance pensions, paid from the State Social Insurance Fund budget. State pensions are paid for certain services rendered to the state or certain professions. The state pension coverage tends to increase, in addition to a systematic increase in state pension base. State pensions offer unreasonable benefits to their recipients in violation of social justice, finally, is compounded by the burden of state, increasing the State budget. Pay-as-you-go today as a government social security fund system in line with European standards and has its own advantages. This system provides a sound social security, the contributions of persons liable for the financial sustainability of this system is responsible for the State. This system is simple and versatile, collected contributions from the immediate allocation of benefits. For this reason, the management of the system is cheap. This system is stable, it is immune to investment risk and inflation, the system constantly monitors the state because it is \"public.\" The social security pension system creates greater social security. The main advantage of this system fosters solidarity. This feature of the welfare state, showing the state of social maturity and respect for its citizens. A state social insurance pension system in the pay and benefits approach, the main problem is the state social insurance budget formation. As shown by the State Social Insurance Fund budget analysis, a one-year budget is not stable. It depends on the country's economic situation. By the way, one-year budget is very difficult to provide balanced. Today the country's economy is global, depends not only on their country's economic indicators, but also from all over the world of global events. This is a direct effect on State Social Insurance Fund budget. There must be a reserve fund, which went State Social Insurance Fund budget surplus in order to cover the projected future costs. Another proposal of the state social insurance to ensure financial sustainability would be that a pension should increase their funding base, part of a pension, for example, the main part of the financing from the state budget; by the way the State has more sources in the collection of taxes. This would help to increase the state social insurance contributions and increase the competitiveness of companies in ensuring the State Social Insurance Fund budget for the financial sustainability. Five years ago started a partial state social insurance pension privatization. This reform was made subject to certain objectives. The paper addresses the following broad objectives and their implementation. One of the goals was to balance the budget of the State Social Insurance fund. As shown by the work of analysis, State Social Insurance Fund budget depends on the economy: in good times - the budget surplus, during periods of economic downturn - the budget deficit. Since the creation of private pensions is the DHS pension account balance the budget solely State Social Insurance Fund this budget is difficult, especially in the economic downturn. Another objective of introducing the reform was to change the pension system so that individuals receive a higher pension than without reform. The paper's calculations show that the 2004 - 2008 the average pension growth rate of 18.05, while the second-tier funds transferred funds only 3.57. This means that the funds transferred to the pension funds did not increase faster than the increase in the State Social Insurance Fund pension, the past five years their presence was detrimental. The ongoing pension reform was to abandon privileged pensions. The paper analysis showed that the current number of persons receiving two or more pensions waived privileged pensions, low to consistently and systematically increase the basic state pension level. To prepare for the pension reform was considered investing in private pension funds thanks to spur economic growth. But, since a large part of the capital invested abroad, our country's economy does not receive the investment and can contribute to economic growth. Pension reform is ongoing in many foreign countries. Pension system was reformed in several directions. That's raising the retirement age, and the introduction of private funded pensions, the supplementary voluntary pension insurance promotion Pensions Reserve Fund, the promotion of older people to remain in the labor market early and partial retirement. Foreign countries have a wide variety of pension, is a different experience in the development of private pension funds. Developed European countries set up additional reserves. In good economic situation in the accumulation of assets that, if necessary, to cover the increased costs of default. The largest funds are pension reserve funds have been generated in Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Luxembourg.

Author's introductionMost research on race and ethnicity focuses on discrimination patterns against entire groups, such as African Americans, Latina/os, Asian Americans, or American Indians. The study of colorism is unique because it investigates intraracial hierarchies of skin color. Studies of colorism examine how the actual lightness or darkness of a person's skin tone affects his or her life opportunities such as education, income, and housing. This is a crucial line of inquiry because a significant amount of race/color discrimination lies hidden within communities of color. Investigating colorism also exposes centuries‐old colonial ideologies that valorize white culture and white beauty. Many recent studies of skin tone stratification focus on both the historical and contemporary factors that maintain a light‐skinned elite in communities of color. Ultimately, colorism research enables a deeper understanding of systemic racism around the world.Author recommendsRussell, Kathy, Midge Wilson, and Ronald Hall 1992. The Color Complex. New York, NY: Doubleday.This book was groundbreaking in that it was one of the first popular books on the topic of colorism. Focused primarily on African Americans, the authors provide a journalistic account of the manifestations of colorism and the sociological, historical, and psychological causes of it. This book is a great overview of colorism in the African American community.Rondilla, Joanne and Paul Spickard 2007. Is Lighter Better? Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.Rondilla and Spickard have written the first book on colorism in the Asian American community. This book is broad and thorough covering topics such as color and identity, mother–daughter relationships and the color/beauty nexus, and the global sales of skin‐bleaching products. The book is empirical, historical, and theoretical.Hunter, Margaret 2005. Race, Gender, and the Politics of Skin Tone. New York, NY: Routledge.Hunter creates a persuasive argument that skin color discrimination is alive and well in the USA. She pays particular attention to the African American and Mexican American communities in her studies that cover income disparities, educational gaps, marriage market politics, and cosmetic surgery. The book uses both statistics and interviews with women of color as evidence for its claims.Herring, Cedric, Verna M. Keith, and Hayward Derrick Horton (Eds.) 2004. Skin/Deep: How Race and Complexion Matter in the 'Color‐Blind' Era. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.This edited volume covers a broad range of topics, including the biracial baby boom, the 'neo‐mulatto' elite, the Latin Americanization thesis of racial formation, and the persistent role of colorism in African American communities. The contributors are primarily sociologists arguing that the form of racism and racial discrimination is changing in the new post‐Civil Rights era.Allen, Walter, Edward Telles, and Margaret Hunter 2000. 'Skin Color, Income, and Education: A Comparison of African Americans and Mexican Americans.'National Journal of Sociology 12: 129–80.The authors present a thorough analysis of the structural and social–psychological factors that affect colorism in the African American and Mexican American communities. Using two national survey data sets, Allen, Telles, and Hunter suggest that colorism is an ongoing phenomenon in both groups providing the light skinned with significant advantages in income and educational attainment.Brunsma, David L. and Kerry A. Rockquemore 2001. 'The New Color Complex: Appearances and Biracial Identity.' Identity 1: 225–46.This article takes up the important issue of biracial identity and its relationship to physical appearance. Moving away from a more traditional stratification model, the authors ask what it means to be darker or lighter as a mixed‐race person, and how one's physical appearance affects his or her racial self‐identification.Mire, Amina 2001. 'Skin‐Bleaching: Poison, Beauty, Power, and the Politics of the Colour Line.'Resources for Feminist Research 28 (3–4): 13–38.In this lengthy and rigorous article, Mire suggests that the postcolonial, global phenomenon of skin‐bleaching has strong and deep roots in the European colonial experience. She uses a feminist lens to understand why women's bodies are often the site of poisonous skin‐bleaching creams and how the interlocking systems of racism and patriarchy work together to oppress women in postcolonial nations around the world.Online materials'Color Coding and Bias in Hollywood'This video excerpt features Henry Louis Gates informally interviewing a group of African American women actors. They discuss the color line and skin tone in the entertainment industry. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UeGsIuBxDFk 'Black Students Still Favor Lighter Skin, Study Finds'This research report describes two recent surveys of college students and their attitudes toward skin color in dating and friendship. http://www.blackcollegewire.org/studentlife/070611_colorism/ 'A Girl Like Me'This short video features interviews with African American girls and women reflecting on the meaning of skin color in their own lives. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=17fEy0q6yqc 'Club Slammed Over 'Light‐Skinned' Promotion'This news article describes the controversy surrounding the owner of a Detroit area nightclub who promoted the club by offering light‐skinned black women free admission. http://www.cnn.com/2007/LIVING/wayoflife/10/18/skintone.club.ap/index.html?iref=newssearch 'Indian Men Go Tall, Fair, and Handsome'This article describes the new skin‐bleaching product, Fair and Handsome, marketed to men in India. Skin‐bleaching, once a primarily female activity, has crossed the gender line. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4396122.stm Sample syllabusRacial and Ethnic Relations (excerpt of syllabus).Course descriptionThis course is designed to introduce students to the exciting and influential field of racial and ethnic studies. With racial inequality as an enduring part of the American landscape, it is important that we all learn as much as we can about racial and ethnic issues. In this course, we will learn about many different aspects of racial and ethnic studies, including segregation, separatism, assimilation, immigration, and multiracial identity. We will discuss many different racial and ethnic groups in this course and we will focus on Latinos, Asian Americans, whites, African Americans, and American Indians.Week 1: Definitions of raceF. James Davis, Who Is Black? One Nation's DefinitionGeorge Martinez, 'Mexican Americans and Whiteness'Hector Tobar, 'A Battle Over Who Is Indian'Video: 'Race: The Power of An Illusion, Part I'Week 2: Interracial marriage and biracial identityMaria P. P. Root. 'Five Mixed‐Race Identities'Mary Texeira. 'The New Multiracialism'Video: 'Just Black'Week 3: Skin tone, inequality, and internalized racismMaxine Leeds Craig, Ain't I a Beauty Queen? Black Women, Beauty, and the Politics of Race Margaret Hunter, 'The Persistent Problem of Colorism: Skin Tone, Status, and Inequality' Video: 'A Question of Color'Week 4: The paradox of AmericanizationNazli Kibria, 'Becoming Asian American'Renato Rosaldo, 'Cultural Citizenship, Inequality, and Multiculturalism'Video: 'Fear and Learning at Hoover Elementary'Focus questions

Eduardo Bonilla‐Silva suggests that the racial hierarchy in the USA is increasingly resembling that of Latin America, with whites at the top, light‐skinned and mixed‐race people in the middle, and darker‐skinned people of color at the bottom. What evidence is there for and against this position?
What are the challenges for scholars who are researching 'across the color line' or researching 'across the skin tone line?'
Describe some aspects of US culture that perpetuate the valorization of whiteness? Are there any trends or movements that resist definitions of white beauty?
Eight‐five percent of cosmetic surgery in the USA is done on women's bodies. What does this tell us about how US culture views women's bodies?
Describe three strategies for combating colorism within communities of color and in the larger US context. What kind of attitudinal and structural changes must take place for significant changes to occur?

Project ideaConduct your own content analysis. Choose 10 magazines geared toward African Americans (or another community of color). Analyze the advertisements in each magazine by counting the number of images of light‐, medium‐, and dark‐skinned people featured in the advertisements. Also pay attention to the types of advertisements that people of different skin tones appear in (for example, beauty advertisements, travel advertisements, or advertisements for household products). By counting and categorizing in this way, you should find some interesting patterns that reveal deeper ideological meanings about skin tone and status in our society.

The thesis provides a complex analysis of the technologies of political marketing in the activities of political parties. Theoretical and methodological basis of research of problem fields are identified and patterns of formation and development of political marketing in political science are defined. The aim of the research was to determine the patterns of political marketing in Ukraine and specifics use of marketing techniques in political parties. The differences of scientific categories «marketing technologies of political party» and «technologies of political marketing» which are using by political parties are highlighted. The marketing technologies of political parties is meant as the totality of methods and means for promoting political products. The technologies of political marketing are defined as a set of practices in creating, maintaining and developing political relations between political actors by using political market products.According to the marketing strategy of positioning the Ukrainian political parties and key party product (ideology / «package of programs» / image ideology) the essence of technologies of political marketing that are used by political parties in their work, namely in design of party image, definition of party people, naming, creating ideological platform, design of party symbols and branding, are singled out in the research. Delimitation between scientific categories «party goods» and «party brand» is proposed. The term «party brand» provides for rooting in the public consciousness, symbolic content, emotional load and is the possibility to combine in itself few political goods. Party brand as result of political marketing is interpreted by the author as a unique offer of specific political party. Acquisition of traits of this unique offer in the marketing party strategy helps to create lasting image and form stable political reputation on the market. The author emphasized that the party proposals are updated by the election campaigns because the main function of political parties is electoral and the essence of parties is defined as organizations designed to gain and exercise of state power. Elections as a concentrated expression of the political market is a mechanism of legitimation of power to political parties. It is proposed the author's synthesis of areas of general marketing principles and Jean Baudrillard's concept of postmodern. It allowed investigating features of political marketing at essentially new level: the change from rational forms of symbolization to branding and sensory-emotional forms of symbolic exchange.It is proved that to the forefront of the political market political product should get, efficiency which is due not so much situational expectations as authentic mental peculiarities of the people combined with the current trends of global political market.The author identified four stages of political marketing in Ukraine that are determined by the characteristics of the party and electoral systems, the level of competition on the political market, the choice of means and methods of party activity:- stage of nucleation of political market (1991–1997);- stage of formation and development of political marketing technologies (1998–2003);- stage of amplification technologizing and virtualization election campaigns (2004–2009);- stage of expansion of technologies and their diversity (from 2010 – till now).It is substantiated that using of technologies of political marketing in the activities of political parties leads to the changes in their form and content, demonstrates successful participation of the same party in three electoral cycles, which is the evidence of party's institutionalization. As a result, specific partypolitical structuring from atomized to systems of almost large parties took place. In this regard, necessity to create brands in the party-political space of modern Ukraine, that driven by the desire of parties to ensure strategic planning for political product in the long term, is argued. The author proved dependence of dynamics of political marketing technologies in the activities of political parties with correlation between the type of party system, electoral law and the polarization of Ukrainian society.In the research, it is stressed that in the election campaigns in the late XX - XXI centuries in Ukraine ideological factor plays less important role than in the elections early 1990s. The current electoral process is not a competition of ideologies but a competition of symbols which main task is to engage to the side of the candidate a significant number of voters. The features of party proposals during parliamentary campaigns 2012, 2014 is analysed. The specific of personal factors and party imaging products in the design of the brand party is revealed. It is emphasized that party products and brands are the carriers of information. For example, names of political parties not only provide for information about specific political party, but about the laws of functioning of the political life in Ukrainian society, political power, the level of political culture.The role of the names and symbols of Ukrainian political parties is found out. It is concluded that by using symbolic form political party decrypts the meaning of the name, identifies itself ideologically, recalls the essence of their programmatic objectives, says the goal of the current campaign and immediate tasks. The content invested in party symbols is revealed. The author analyses its colours, which are powerful way of manipulating the human psyche. It is proved that the party proposals acquire symbolic and cease to carry a meaning and be based on real public demand. Political symbols become tools of manipulation and suggestion of populist ideas. On the one hand, it brings instant benefits to political parties, but on the other - leads to a decline in political culture and civic activity. The research substantiated that for design of effective symbolism must consider the level of political culture of the electorate, traditions, level of political education, voter mentality. It is emphasized that Ukrainian society tend to personalize perception of political power, which reduces the totality of power relations to a figure of specific political leader. The author highlighted that political parties are mass political organizations in which leadership can be distributed among several politicians.It was found that the challenges in 2014 led to new tendencies in the party system in Ukraine, namely the enhancing the process creation of parties, also inclusion in party lists ATO members, civil society activists, journalists, volunteers. It was due to public demand for «new faces», new alliances between political forces. A high level of personalization for Ukrainian politics connected primarily with the fact that most voters are not able to make a political choice, based on their own real interests. Ordinary citizens associate realization their life aspirations and dreams with the active leader of political force who is trying to act as a hero, a saviour. It is accentuated attention that political parties do not compete for the effective implementation of social development programs, but compete for the distribution of power. In their activities, profitable for a narrow circle of persons, but not national interests are dominated. Populism and excessive social orientation of the election programs of political parties are typical characteristics of modern political market in Ukraine.It is concluded that during the current transitional period the domestic party market has not reached a level that would satisfy the needs of society, political goods have not met the expectations and hopes. They are made without targeting consumers and based on stereotypical thinking. The party market does not match a model of «free competition», which makes it difficult to promote party products. Political parties are not associated with specific results of which should be designed to meet the most important values and needs of citizens. The research presents practical recommendations to improve political marketing technologies considering domestic political consumer. ; В исследовании осуществлен комплексный анализ технологий политического маркетинга в деятельности политических партий. Определены теоретико-методологические основы исследования проблемного поля, закономерности становления и развития политического маркетинга в политической науке.Выяснены теоретические основы изучения и использования в политической практике технологий политического маркетинга политическими партиями; обобщены и указано на расхождение содержания научных категорий «технологии политического маркетинга» и «маркетинговые технологии политической партии».Согласно маркетинговой стратегии позиционирования украинских политических партий и ключевого партийного продукта, предложено систематизировать технологии, которые используют политические партии в своей деятельности: конструирование имиджа партии; нейминг (разработка названия политической партии); определение бренд-персон политической партии; создание идеологической платформы и формирования программы партии; разработка дизайна партийной символики и рекламной продукции; партийный брендинг.Предложена целесообразность сочетания основ общего маркетинга и постмодернистской концепции Ж. Бодрийяра, что позволило исследовать особенности технологий политического маркетинга на принципиально новом уровне: замена рациональных форм символизации имиджевыми и чувственно-эмоциональными формами символического обмена.Обосновано, что на первый план партийного рынка должен выйти политический продукт, дееспособность которого обусловливается не столько ситуационными ожиданиями граждан, сколько аутентичными ментальными особенностями народа в сочетании с актуальными тенденциями мирового политического рынка. Указано на различия научных категорий «партийный товар» и «партийный бренд», суть последнего заключается в его укорененности в массовом сознании, символическом наполнении, эмоциональной нагрузке и возможности объединять в себе несколько политических товаров.Выделены четыре этапа динамики украинского политико-партийного рынка в условиях независимости. Обосновано, что использование технологий политического маркетинга в деятельности политических партий приводит к изменению их формы и содержания, демонстрируя успешное выступление одной и той же партийной силы в течение трех электоральных циклов, что свидетельствует о партийной институционализации, и обусловливает определенное партийно-политическое структурирование от авторизированной к системе почти крупных политических партий.Раскрыта специфика персонального фактора и визуализации партийных продуктов в конструировании бренда партии. Проанализированы особенности партийных предложений парламентских кампаний 2012, 2014 гг. Доказано, что в условиях нынешнего переходного периода отечественный партийный рынок не достиг того уровня, который бы удовлетворял потребности общества, политические товары не соответствуют ожиданиям и надеждам, создаются без ориентации на потребителя, базируются на стереотипном мышлении. ; У дослідженні здійснено комплексний аналіз технологій політичного маркетингу в діяльності політичних партій. Визначено теоретико- методологічні засади дослідження проблемного поля, закономірності становлення та розвитку політичного маркетингу в політичній науці. Метою дисертаційного дослідження було з'ясування закономірності розвитку політичного маркетингу в Україні та специфіку використання маркетингових технологій у діяльності політичних партій. Виділено розбіжності змісту наукових категорій: «маркетингові технології політичної партії» і «технології політичного маркетингу», що використовують політичні партії. Під маркетинговими технологіями політичних партій розуміється сукупність прийомів і засобів просування політичних продуктів, а технології політичного маркетингу визначаються як сукупність практик створення, підтримки та розвитку політичних взаємовідносин між акторами політичного ринку за допомогою політичних продуктів.Згідно маркетингової стратегії позиціонування українськими політичними партіями та ключового партійного продукту (ідеологія / «пакет програм» / іміджева ідеологія), у дослідженні виокремлено та розкрито зміст технологій політичного маркетингу, які використовують політичні партії у своїй діяльності, а саме: неймінг, конструювання іміджу партії, визначення партійних персон, створення ідеологічної платформи, розробка дизайну партійної символіки, брендинг. Запропоновано розмежовувати наукові категорії «партійного товару» та «партійного бренду», зміст останнього полягає в його вкоріненості у масовій свідомості, символічному наповненні, емоційному навантаженні та можливості об'єднувати у собі декілька політичних товарів. Партійний бренд, як результат політичного маркетингу, тлумачиться автором як своєрідна унікальна пропозиція конкретної політичної партії. Набуття її ознак в маркетинговій стратегії партії сприяє створенню довготривалого іміджу, формуванню її стабільної репутації на політичному ринку. Автором наголошено, що партійні пропозиції актуалізуються виборчими кампаніями, бо головна функція політичних партій – електоральна – визначається самою сутністю їх як організацій, призначених для завоювання й здійснення державної влади. Саме вибори як концентроване вираження політичного ринку є механізмом легітимації влади для політичної партії.Запропоновано доцільність поєднання основ загального маркетингу та постмодерністської концепції Ж. Бодрійяра, що дозволило дослідити особливості технологій політичного маркетингу на принципово новому рівні: заміна раціональних форм символізації іміджевими та чуттєво- емоційними формами символічного обміну. Доведено, що на перший план партійного ринку повинен вийти політичний продукт, дієздатність якого обумовлюється не стільки ситуаційними очікуваннями громадян, скільки аутентичними ментальними особливостями народу в поєднанні з актуальними тенденціями світового політичного ринку.Виокремлено чотири етапи політичного маркетингу в діяльності політичних партій України, які визначаються особливостями партійної та виборчої систем, рівнем конкуренції на політичному ринку, вибором засобів і методів партійної діяльності:- етап зародження політичного ринку (1991–1997 рр.);- етап формування та розвитку технологій політичного маркетингу (1998–2003 рр.);- етап посилення технологізації та віртуалізації передвиборчих кампаній (2004–2009 рр.);- етап розширення технологій та їх урізноманітнення (з 2010 р. – по теперішній час).Обґрунтовано, що використання технологій політичного маркетингу у діяльності політичних партій призводить до зміни їх форми і змісту, демонструючи успішний виступ однієї і тієї ж партійної сили протягом трьох електоральних циклів, що є свідченням партійної інституціоналізації, та обумовлює певне партійно-політичне структурування: від атомізованої до майже системи крупних партій. Можна говорити про певні перспективи щодо стабілізації української партійної системи: маємо зменшення фрагментації партійної системи у поєднанні зі зростанням ролі партійних організацій. У зв'язку з цим аргументовано необхідність створення брендів у партійно-політичному просторі сучасної Україні, щ обумовлюється прагненням партій до забезпечення стратегічного планування політичного продукту на довгострокову перспективу. Доведена залежність динаміки розвитку технологій політичного маркетингу в діяльності політичних партій від кореляції між типом партійної системи, виборчим законодавством і поляризацією українського суспільства.У роботі підкреслено, що у виборних кампаніях кінця ХХ – початку ХХІ ст. в Україні ідеологічний чинник відіграє менше значення, ніж на виборах початку 1990-х років. Сучасний виборчий процес – це змагання не ідеологій, а символів, основним завданням яких є залучати на сторону кандидата значну кількість виборців. Проаналізовано особливості партійних пропозицій парламентських кампаній 2012, 2014 рр. Розкрито специфіку персонального чиннику та візуалізації партійних продуктів у конструюванні бренду партії. Наголошено, що партійні товари та бренди є носіями інформації. Наприклад, назви політичних партій дають відомості не тільки про конкретну політичну силу, а й про закономірності функціонування політичного життя українського суспільства, політичної влади, рівень політичної культури. З'ясовано роль назви та символіки українських політичних партій. Зроблено висновок, що через символічні форми політична партія розшифровує значення своєї назви, ідеологічно ідентифікує себе, нагадує про суть своїх програмових завдань, заявляє про мету поточної кампанії і найближчі цілі. Розкрито зміст, вкладений в партійну символіку. Аналізується її колірна гама, яка є потужним засобом маніпулювання людської психіки.Доведено, що партійні пропозиції набувають символічності та перестають нести у собі смислове навантаження, спиратися на реальний суспільний попит. Політичні символи стають інструментами маніпулювання та навіювання популістських ідей, що, з одного боку, приносить миттєву вигоду політичним партіям, з іншого – веде до зниження рівня політичної культури та громадської активності. У дослідженні обґрунтовано, що при розробці ефективної символіки необхідно враховувати рівень політичної культури електорату, традиції, рівень політичної освіченості, менталітет виборця.Наголошено, що для українського суспільства притаманне персоніфіковане сприйняття політичної влади, яке редукує всю сукупність владних відносин до фігури конкретного політичного лідера. Підкреслено, що політичні партії – це масові політичні організації, в яких лідерство може бути розподілено серед кількох політиків. З'ясовано, що виклики 2014 р. призвели до нових тенденцій у партійній системі України, а саме активізації процесу партієтворення, включення у партійні списки учасників АТО, громадських активістів, журналістів, волонтерів, що було зумовлено суспільним запитом на «нові обличчя», створення нових союзів між політичними силами. Характерний високий рівень персоніфікації для української політики пов'язується, насамперед, з тим, що більшість не здатна здійснити політичний вибір, що заснований на їх власних реальних інтересах. Пересічні громадяни пов'язують втілення своїх життєвих сподівань та мрій з політичною активністю лідера сили, який намагається виступати в ролі героя, рятівника. Акцентовано увагу, що політичні партії змагаються не за втілення ефективніших програм розвитку суспільства, а за розподіл владних повноважень; у їх діяльності переважають вузькопартійні, а не загальнонаціональні інтереси. Популізм, надмірна соціальна орієнтованість передвиборчих програм політичних партій – типова характеристика сучасного політичного ринку України.Зроблено висновок, що за умов нинішнього перехідного періоду, вітчизняний партійний ринок не досяг того рівня, який би задовольняв потреби суспільства, політичні товари не відповідають очікуванням та надіям, створюються без орієнтації на споживача, базуються на стереотипному мисленні. Партійний ринок не відповідає моделі «вільної конкуренції», що зумовлює труднощі просування на ньому партійних продуктів. Партії не асоціюються з конкретними результатами діяльності, що мають бути спрямовані на задоволення найбільш значимих цінностей, потреб громадян.У роботі запропоновано практичні рекомендації щодо вдосконалення технологій політичного маркетингу з урахуванням споживача вітчизняного політичного товару.

Si observamos la cronología del conflicto sirio, desde las protestas pacíficas en 2011 hasta la guerra abierta que vivió el país hasta finales de 2018, llama la atención la gran cantidad de información producida en este período, que contrasta con las décadas anteriores de silencio informativo. Durante décadas de dictadura de los Asad en Siria, poco se supo de este país ubicado en el epicentro de una región estratégica y sacudida por guerras, ocupaciones y golpes de estado. La represión ejercida por la familia que ostentaba el poder había resultado en un país hermético que aislaba a su ciudadanía y que apenas recibía cobertura, con la excepción de cuestiones puntuales vinculadas a la geoestrategia internacional. A partir de marzo de 2011, en el contexto de las movilizaciones bautizadas como "Primavera Árabe" que se extendieron por Oriente Próximo y el norte de África y que encontraron en Siria una de sus máximas expresiones, tanto la propia población siria como el resto del mundo pudieron asomarse a la realidad de lo que hasta entonces había sido un país en el que todas las instituciones sufrían un fuerte control y que reprimía con brutalidad cualquier forma de disidencia. La dificultad de comprender las claves del conflicto sirio que se desarrolló en los años posteriores remite en a medida a esas largas décadas de silencio casi absoluto en torno a Siria. En 2011, el país pasó en pocos meses de ser un agujero negro informativo a ser "el conflicto más mediado de la historia" (O'Callaghan et al., 2014), con un flujo incesante de contenidos producido en su mayoría por la propia ciudadanía, ansiosa de canalizar unas necesidades expresivas reprimidas durante décadas. Sin embargo, estos contenidos no siempre contaban con un contexto que permitiera su comprensión al resto del mundo. Frente a una cantidad ingente de mensajes, vídeos e imágenes, muchos de ellos muy gráficos y violentos, difíciles de procesar y contextualizar, se impusieron discursos centrados en aspectos militares y geoestratégicos. A medida que las manifestaciones pacíficas devenían en un levantamiento armado tras la brutal represión del régimen, avanzaba una batalla por la hegemonía del país condicionada por la influencia de las distintas potencias –estadounidense, rusa, iraní, saudí, turca–, una influencia que se impuso también en el ámbito mediático eclipsando las cuestiones internas y las motivaciones, avances e iniciativas de la propia ciudadanía siria. A la ausencia de contexto para comprender un país aislado durante décadas se sumó la propaganda desplegada tanto por el régimen como por distintos grupos de la oposición, en una batalla por la legitimidad recrudecida en paralelo a los enfrentamientos sobre el terreno. Ante el ruido y la propaganda mediática, y sin corresponsales internacionales que pudieran retransmitir la realidad sobre el terreno, las voces de la población siria continuaron narrando su propia realidad, pero con un eco mediático e internacional que se mitigaba a medida que el conflicto se enquistaba. A pesar de los discursos oficiales y de la tendencia a la militarización que copaba la cobertura mediática, proliferaron los proyectos de construcción y reconstrucción sobre el terreno. Se sucedieron las campañas que denunciaban tanto los abusos del régimen como de los distintos grupos extremistas que buscaban imponer sus propias agendas sobre la población local. Surgieron un gran número de iniciativas ciudadanas impregnadas de creatividad y florecimiento artístico que rompieron con las largas décadas de represión y censura. Entre estos esfuerzos destaca la comunicación, sostenida desde el inicio del levantamiento, de un pequeño pueblo del norte de Siria, en la provincia de Idlib: Kafranbel. Un pueblo cuya actividad lo colocó en el centro de la diana de los ataques, primero del régimen y, una vez liberado de este, de distintos grupos extremistas que buscaron ocupar su lugar. Este trabajo de investigación se centra en un aspecto no explorado que creemos de gran importancia en el contexto mediático actual: partiendo de la relevancia de Kafranbel, realizamos una cronología a través de la recopilación y organización de los carteles existentes, o de los que hemos podido identificar en el largo proceso de búsqueda por distintos canales y plataformas de internet, y analizamos las claves y rasgos característicos del "storytelling digital" de este pueblo, paradigmático del contexto sirio. O, dicho de otro modo, de la comunicación sostenida en el tiempo a través de la voz colectiva, y "desde abajo", del pueblo de Kafranbel. Partimos en esta investigación de la importancia del acercamiento a la guerra "desde abajo", tal como lo plantea Joshka Wessels en Syrian masquerades of war (Wessels, 2015), donde analiza cómo los habitantes de Kafranbel proporcionan un análisis desde la base de cuestiones que a menudo se analizan sin contar con la relevancia de las dinámicas internas y sus consecuencias en quienes las sufren. También del trabajo desarrollado por Christine Sylvester, cuyo libro War as experience (La guerra como experiencia) ha sido un gran hallazgo a la hora de encauzar esta investigación. Sylvester enfatiza la necesidad empírica de promover acercamientos a la guerra que partan de las personas que la sufren ("study up"), en lugar de los acercamientos dominados por las élites, los estados y las estructuras de poder ("study down") (Sylvester, 2013, p. 109). Esta visión "desde abajo" ha sido, según la autora, tradicionalmente descuidada en su ámbito de especialización, las Relaciones Internacionales, y consideramos de gran importancia, para una mejor comprensión del mundo y en particular de los conflictos, ponerla en valor también el ámbito que ocupa esta investigación. El asesinato a finales de 2018 de Raed Fares y Hammod Junaid, dos de los artífices de los carteles elaborados desde Kafranbel, a la vez que el anuncio de las autoridades locales y geopolíticas del "fin de la guerra", marcaron el fin de un ciclo y dieron paso a otro en el que destaca la recuperación del territorio por parte del régimen sirio y sus aliados geoestratégicos. Desde este contexto de re-normalización del régimen, y de creciente incomprensión o indiferencia hacia la realidad de la población siria, ofrecemos un análisis del comienzo del proceso revolucionario y de su evolución a través de la voz colectiva y "desde abajo", del pueblo de Kafranbel. ; If we look at the chronology of the Syrian conflict, from the peaceful protests in 2011 until the open war the country suffered until late 2018, we notice the huge amount of information produced during this period, which contrasts with the fifty previous years of information vacuum. For decades under the Assad regime, little was known about this country located in the epicenter of a strategic region, shaken by wars, occupations and coups. The repression exercised by the ruling family resulted in the country being shut off from the rest of the world and rarely got any media coverage, with the exception of issues related to international geopolitics. After March 2011, in the context of the mobilisations named by media as the "Arab Spring" which spread throughout the Middle East and North Africa region and reached Syria, both the Syrian people and the rest of the world could get a glimpse at the reality of a country that suffered severecontrol and where any form of dissident was brutally repressed. The fact that Syria was, and continues to be, a difficult conflict to understand is linked to those long decades of nearly absolute silence. In 2011, the country went from being an information black hole to "the most mediatized conflict in history" in just a few months (O'Callaghan et al., 2014), providing a constant flow of content produced mostly by citizens, eager to channel expressive needs that had been long repressed. However, this content didn't always include context that allowed the rest of the world to understanding it. As a huge number of messages, videos, images, many of them extremely graphic and difficult to process and contextualize, continued to be produced, discourses focused on military and geopolitical aspects started gaining ground. As the peaceful demonstrations became an armed uprising after the brutal repression unleashed against protesters, a battle for the control of the country continued to develop under the influence of major powers –US, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey…, an influence that was captured by media, eclipsing internal dynamics and motivations, advances and initiatives by Syrian civil society. In addition to the absence of context to understand a country isolated for fifty years, the propaganda displayed by the regime and by different opposition groups escalated, feeding a media battle in parallel to the confrontations on the ground. With so much noise and propaganda, and with few foreign correspondents to share the reality from the ground, a diversity of voices from the Syrian people continued to share their own reality, but with less and less international and media amplification. Despite official discourses and the tendency to militarization that captured media attention, projects of building and rebuilding continued to happen on the ground. Campaigns were launched xi by activists denouncing both abuses by the regime and by different extremist groups that tried to impose their agendas on the local population. A great number of citizen initiatives were born, full of creativity and artistic flourishing that broke with the long decades of censorship. Among these efforts there is the communication, sustained from the beginning of the uprising, of a small town in northern Syria, in the Idlib province: Kafranbel, a town that became the target of attacks, first by the Syrian regime and, after the town liberated itself from the regime, by extremist groups trying to fill its place. This research focuses on an unexplored aspect that we consider of key relevance in the current media context: the "digital storytelling" of the town of Kafranbel. We offer a chronology of the existing banners through different internet channels and platforms and analyze the characteristics of the town's "digital storytelling". In other words, we focus on the sustained communication of the war "from below" through the collective voice of a small Syrian town. A key idea that our research revolves around stems from the approach to war studies "from below", as Joshka Wessels poses on Syrian masquerades of war (Wessels, 2015), where she analyses how the people of Kafranbel offer insights on internal dynamics and the consequences of the war on those who suffer it. Equally relevant is the work of Christine Sylvester, whose book War as experience has been key in channeling this research in a fruitful direction. Sylvester emphasizes the empirical need to promote approaches to war that stem from those who suffer it ("study up") as opposed to those dominated by the elites, states and power structures ("study down") (Sylvester, 2013, p. 109). This view "from below" has been traditionally dismissed in the author's area of work, International Relations. We consider it key to a better understanding of the world, and of conflicts in particularly, and have chosen to apply it in our research area: Communications. The assassination of Raed Fares and Hammod Junaid, two of the most relevant actors in Kafranbel's storytelling process, at the end of 2018, coincided with the announcement by the Syrian regime and its allies of the "end of the war". This marked the end of a cycle and gave way to another period, marked by the regime recovering most of the territory it had lost, including the town of Kafranbel. From this context of re-normalization of the regime, and increasing misunderstanding or indifference to the reality suffered by the Syrian population, we offer an analysis of the beginning of the revolutionary process and its evolution through a powerful collective voice from "below". ; Programa de Doctorado en Investigación en Medios de Comunicación por la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid ; Presidente: Ignacio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño.- Secretario: Eduardo Francisco Rodríguez Gómez.- Vocal: María Ángeles Blanco Ruiz

Author's introductionSchool shootings are among the most shocking crimes to occur in recent decades, and scholars have responded the need to understand these events. Muschert presents a framework for understanding school‐related shooting incidents, including a typology of five varieties of school shootings and a multilevel examination of the causes.Description of courseJuvenile delinquency is designed to introduce students to the social phenomenon of youth crime, the social/institutional contexts that affect it, and the social control responses to delinquency. This is a senior‐level read/writing intensive course, and as such will require significant student participation, preparation, and research. In addition to engaging the topic of delinquency in general, the course will also place a research‐intensive focus on the topic of school shootings.Focus questions

What are the types of school shootings, and how do they differ with regards to the identities and motivations of the perpetrators?
What role does the mass media play in influencing public opinion about school shootings?
What appear to be the causes of school shootings, and which cause is a necessary prerequisite for a school shooting to occur?

Course goalsBy the end of the semester, students should understand the following:

Social scientific perspectives on juvenile delinquency.
The difference between social scientific perspectives on delinquency and 'common sense'/pop cultural perspectives.
The recent cultural focus on the delinquency and victimization of youth in American society.
Institutional causes of delinquency, including family, schools, and peer groups.
The juvenile justice system, including police, courts, and corrections.

Required textsBooks

Lotz, Roy 2005. Youth Crime in America: A Modern Synthesis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. ISBN 0‐13‐026184‐X.
Wooden, Wayne S. and Randy Blazak 2001. Renegade Kids, Suburban Outlaws: From Youth Culture to Delinquency (2nd Edition). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. ISBN 0‐534‐52754‐X.

Articles

Armstrong, Edward G. 1993. 'The Rhetoric of Violence in Rap and Country Music.'Sociological Inquiry 63: 64–83.
Boettcher, Jennifer 2006. 'Framing the Scholarly Communication Cycle.'Online 30 (3): 24–26.
Harper, Timothy 2000. 'Shoot to Kill.'Atlantic Monthly 286 (4): 28–30.
Hawkins, Donald T. 1999. 'What Is Credible Information?' Online 23 (5): 86.
Henry, Stuart 2000. 'What Is School Violence? An Integrated Approach.'Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 568: 16–29.
Muschert, Glenn W., Melissa Young‐Spillers and Dawn Carr 2006. '"Smart" Policy Decisions to Combat a Social Problem: The Case of Child Abductions 2002–2003.'Justice Policy Journal 3 (2): 1–32. http://www.cjcj.org/pdf/smart_policy.pdf.
Muschert, Glenn W. 2007. 'The Columbine Victims and the Myth of the Juvenile Superpredator.'Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice 5 (4).
Muschert, Glenn W. 2007. 'Research in School Shootings.'Sociology Compass 1 (1): 60–80.
Muschert, Glenn W. and Ralph W. Larkin 2007 (forthcoming). 'The Columbine High School Shootings.' In Crimes of the Century, edited by Frankie Bailey and Steve Chermak. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 2006. 'Juvenile Arrests 2004.' Washington, DC: US Department of Justice. http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/214563.pdf.

Author recommendsRecommended texts are grouped by topic area relevant to the further study of school shootings.ScheduleSchool violenceHenry, Stuart 2000. 'What Is School Violence? An Integrated Definition.'Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 567: 16–29.Henry offers a broad definition of school violence, which includes any action or policy that leads to the harm of students, faculty, and administrators. In all, this article encourages readers to understand the issue of school violence as multifaceted in its causes, effects, and solutions.Hunnicut, Susan 2006. School Shootings. Farmington Hills, MI: Greenhaven Press.Designed for secondary educational settings, this book offers a series of paired articles offering opposing viewpoints on social issues related to school shootings, including media violence, bullying, and guns. Other topics include adolescent brain development, warning signs, and the relevancy of race in school shooting debates. Such a format of readings can be useful for stimulating classroom debate.Case studies of school shooting incidentsCaputo, Philip 2005. 13 Seconds: A Look Back at the Kent State Shootings. New York, NY: Chamberlain Bros.This book is a case study and social history of perhaps a quintessential government‐type school shooting. Caputo, who is best known for his memoirs of the Vietnam War, reflects on the May 4, 1970, shootings at Kent State University in Ohio. The author situates the event in the wider phenomenon of official responses to student social protests during the 1960s and 1970s.Eglin, Peter and Stephen Hester 2003. The Montreal Massacre: A Story of Membership Categorization Analysis. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.This book is a case study of the 1989 mass murders occurring in Montréal, in which a shooter entered a technical college and targeted female students. This book does a good job of clarifying an underlying gender dynamic that is present in many school shooting incidents, and examines the news media dynamic coverage following the incident.Kirk, Michael, Miri Navasky, and Karen O'Connor 2000. 'Frontline: The Killer at Thurston High.' Alexandria, VA: PBS Video.This PBS Frontline documentary video examines the rampage‐type school shootings that occurred in 1998 in Springfield, Oregon. In 90 minutes, the documentary examines the shooter's learning disability, fascination with guns, and troubled family relationship. Additional resources related to the video are available at the PBS website: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline//shows/kinkel/.Larkin, Ralph 2007. Comprehending Columbine. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.This book is a case study of a rampage‐type school shooting that occurred in 1999 in Littleton, Colorado. The author conducted interviews with eyewitnesses, and situates the analysis within the wider community and cultural context in which the event occurred. The author interweaves the multiple‐levels of factors leading up to this quintessential rampage school shootings, including psychological states of the perpetrators, an intolerant community setting, the failure of authority figures to react, and the influence of white male rage.Moore, Mark H., Carol V. Petrie, Anthony A. Braga, and Brenda L. McLaughlin 2003. Deadly Lessons: Understanding Lethal School Violence. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.This book includes six case studies of school‐related shootings, and was commissioned by the US National Research Council and Institute of Medicine of the National Academies of Science. Particularly of note are the studies conducted of the lesser‐known targeted school shooting incidents that occurred in New York and Chicago. In addition, this book is an excellent academic treatment of the problem of school shootings. Strong points include the attempt to conduct a cross‐case analysis linking the six case studies (Chapter 8) and an attempt to situate the problem of school shootings within school violence in general (Part II).Newman, Katherine 2004. Rampage: The Social Roots of School Shootings. New York, NY: Basic Books.This book links two case studies conducted in towns where two rampage‐type school shootings occurred, Paducah, Kentucky, and Jonesboro, Arkansas. Social scientists lived in the communities while researching the cases, resulting in an insightful examination of the community antecedents and effects of the shooting incidents. The author situates the two case studies within research about the problem of school shootings in general (Chapter 10), positing five factors that may cause such incidents. These include the social marginality of the shooter(s), psychological problems of the shooter(s), the availability of violent cultural images, the failure of surveillance systems to prevent attacks, and the availability of guns.FearAltheide, David L. 2002b. Creating Fear: News and the Construction of Crisis. New York, NY: Aldine de Gruyter.This book examines the role that fear plays in guiding contemporary social action. The author argues that news media play a crucial role in creating fear, as they attach emotionally evocative frames to social problems. Thus, contemporary society is becoming more fear‐oriented and reactionary. Particularly relevant to the study of school shootings is the examination (Chapter 7) of the medias characterization of youth as increasingly involved in crimes, as victims and/or victimizers.Glassner, Barry 1999. The Culture of Fear: Why Americans Are Afraid of the Wrong Things. New York, NY: Basic Books.This popular book examines how people fear relatively rare events such as school shootings and airline crashes, rather than fearing more common risks such as automobile crashes, drug and alcohol addiction, and food poisoning. The author examines the mass media's coverage of crime (Chapter 2) and the role that these images play in creating public opinion about youth. The author makes a call for a sober assessment of the risks facing modern society, and advocates the sober development of public policy.MediaBonilla, Denise M. 2000. School Violence. New York, NY: H.W. Wilson.This book is an edited volume, including articles derived from mainstream news media, commenting on school shooting incidents. The news media are among the first commentators for any social problem, and they frequently play a significant role in shaping public opinion about emergent problems. This volume will aid in understanding the media discussion occurring during the late 1990s.Simpson, Roger and William Coté 2006. Covering Violence: A Guide to Ethical Reporting about Victims and Trauma. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.This book is an examination of the challenges faced by journalists who report on horrible crimes and natural disasters. This will be helpful for those wishing to understand the professional and psychological challenges faced by those covering school shootings, and for those who wish to understand how to minimize the negative impact of news reporting on the individuals (mostly children) and communities who witness school shootings.Policy responsesCornell, Dewey G. 2006. School Violence: Fears Versus Facts. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.This book identifies 19 myths about youth violence, including those relevant to school violence in general, including rampage shootings. The author shows how fear of school violence has resulted in misguided responses including boot camps to zero tolerance policies. This book is accessible to college students, educators, law enforcement personnel. The author asserts that student threat assessment is a more flexible and less punitive alternative to zero tolerance policies.McCabe, Kimberly A. and Gregory M. Martin 2005. School Violence, the Media, and Criminal Justice Responses. New York, NY: Peter Lang Pub.McCabe and Martin offer an historical overview of school violence in the USA, from the colonial period to present day. The authors examine the role of bullying and teachers' perceptions of violence in schools. Suggestions about how teachers may prevent and respond to school violence are offered.Online materialsNational Center for Education Statistics. 'Indicators of School Crime and Safety.' (http://nces.ed.gov/programs/crimeindicators/).Published with the cooperation of the US Bureau of Justice Statistics, this annual report from the US Department of Education surveys victimization of students and teachers in US schools. In addition, the report surveys specific forms of criminality, including gun availability, gang involvement, hate crimes, and substance abuse.National School Safety Center (http://www.schoolsafety.us/).Provides information about school crime prevention and response.See in particular, the report 'School Associated Violent Deaths'. (http://www.schoolsafety.us/pubfiles/savd.pdf), which is a good source of sober information about rates of homicide and suicide in US schools.Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/).Web site run by the US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, which provides information, news, statistics, conferences, and reports about juvenile delinquency and juvenile justice. Their annual reports on juvenile arrests present aggregate data derived from Uniform Crime Reports compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.Research project ideaStudents can learn about school‐related shootings by conducting case studies as individual or group research projects. Assign or have students select a school‐related shooting incident, and have them research the details of the case using any available library and Internet resources. The book Deadly Lessons of Moore et al. (2003) provides an extensive list of data points in table 8.2 (pp. 266–83) that students can research relevant to their own case. Such topics include the details of the incident, community setting, school setting, background and preparatory actions of the perpetrators, community responses, and the legal disposition of the case. Students should connect their case study with Muschert's article 'Research in School Shootings', by exploring the variety of causes that contributed to the incident they studied.

Documents CIDOB: 15Winner of the Global Talent Award, launched by CIDOB and Banco Sabadell Foundation in the framework of Programa Talent Global.







ABSTRACTThis study offers a comprehensive overview of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process as a facilitator of the peace talks between the Venezuelan government and the opposition. It explains what Norway does as a facilitator (the process), as well as how (approach) and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests), not only in terms of the characteristics making Norway a suitable facilitator, but also its interests and motivations. The main goal is to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. The study concludes that, for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and role conception. 1. INTRODUCTIONSince the early 2010s, Venezuela has been embroiled in a grave economic, political, and humanitarian crisis resulting in institutional disarray that reached critical point in 2017. It was in this year that the constitutional order was broken after Decision 156 of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice in Venezuela, whereby this organ attributed to itself the functions of the National Assembly, the country's legislative organ. Deemed unconstitutional by the political parties with a majority in the National Assembly, this move led to mass protests. The government reacted by calling for a new constitution to be drafted by a newly created Constituent National Assembly which, in August 2017, granted itself powers to pass legislation, thus overriding the National Assembly (Bronstein & Cobb, 2017). This was not recognised by the National Assembly but, in 2018, the Constituent National Assembly went ahead and blocked the participation of the main opposition parties in the presidential elections that year. These elections were rejected by a broad sector of the international community, among them the European Union (EU) and the Lima Group.1From 2017, Norway, with a population of just 5.5 million, has been exploring possibilities in Venezuela for political dialogue between the government of Nicolás Maduro and the opposition, first through the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF), an independent foundation that receives funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and later, after 2019, with direct state involvement. Norway has built an image as a peace broker with its success in processes like the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), and in the talks between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). But why did Norway decide to facilitate the peace talks in Venezuela? How does Norway approach peacebuilding in this conflict? This article aims to analyse the causes, process, approaches, and motivations for Norwegian mediation in Venezuela, in order to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. I therefore explore the comprehensive role of Norway in the Venezuelan peace talks, the background, the process, and Norway's possible interests as a facilitator. I argue that,for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general, but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and the way it perceives its role as a peace-making nation. As mentioned above, the Norwegian state became officially involved in the Venezuelan conflict in 2019. The domestic situation had come to a head on 23rd January when Juan Guaidó, leader of the opposition and president of the National Assembly, rejected the authority of Nicolás Maduro and declared himself acting president of Venezuela. However, the strategy failed when the military remained loyal to Maduro. Negotiation then became a last resort (NUPI 2020) and Norway began to facilitate negotiations between government and opposition, first in Oslo and then in Barbados, in 2019. These efforts led to further discussion between the parties through 2021 and 2022, in Mexico. In 2022, the war in Ukraine prompted changes in the positions regarding Venezuela of certain actors, notable among them the United States (U.S.) and the EU. As the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (Remacha, 2023) points out, U.S. concerns about energy security made it necessary to find a way of guaranteeing the international supply, and Venezuela was (and is) considered to be a strategic source. Contacts between the U.S. and Venezuela were made in 2022, and talks began about removing the sanctions imposed on the country. Given its economic situation, and the presidential elections due in 2024, Venezuela welcomed the rapprochement. If the sanctions were to be removed (at least partially), it was necessary to resume dialogue with the opposition, so in November 2022, negotiations recommenced in Mexico with Norway's mediation. Significant progress was made, and the release of previously frozen international funds was agreed upon (up to 3,000 million dollars earmarked mainly for public health, education, and food), as well as the lifting of some sanctions. Maduro's government is also aware that the 2024 elections should be held according to a model that respects democratic safeguards, with unrestricted participation by the opposition, so that results will be internationally recognised. Venezuela would then be able to resume relations with countries and regions like the U.S. and the EU, thus enabling international investment, particularly in the oil industry, and an improved economic situation (NUPI, 2020). Although the presidential crisis formally lasted until 5th January 2023 when Guaidó's acting presidency was abolished by the National Assembly, the political crisis with the opposition continues to the present day, in November 2023. 1.2. Research goals and objectivesThis study aims to explore the role of Norway as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace talks, focusing on what it does (the process), how (approach), and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests). It seeks to demonstrate that, given Norway's national conception as a peacemaker, its strategy in Venezuela expresses a broad foreign policy endeavour that has humanitarian but also reputational and political motivations. More broadly, the importance of soft power tools for state actors to achieve their foreign policy objectives is discussed. Constructivism and Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) help to explain Norway's self-image as a peacemaker, while idealism and realism, together with Touval's "mediation as foreign policy" theory shed light on Norway's use of mediation as a foreign policy tool. Qualitative methods based on analysis of primary and secondary sources, complemented with semi-structured interviews with experts and officials of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have been used. 1.3. Relevance and justificationNorway is a small country in terms of population but one with a notable ability to influence international affairs thanks to soft power. One of ways it exercises its influence is its internationally recognised image as a peacemaker, evidenced through its involvement in several peace processes. Indeed, since 1993, Norway has been engaged in 11 different peace processes (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019) with some major successes but also others that were limited. The case of Norwegian facilitation of the Venezuelan peace talks is studied for two main reasons. First, is its relevance in terms of policy significance, as it is an ongoing process, which leads to questions about why Norway acts as a facilitator, and the possible interests it has in doing so, apart from the goal of peace itself. Second, is the practical reason of the author's knowledge of the three languages relevant for this research (English, Spanish, and Norwegian), which is a valuable asset in terms of good understanding of the information from primary and secondary sources written in the three languages. This is an advantage in the research, as it allows cross-checking of information, and offers a broader perspective on the topic. 2. NORWAY AS A PEACEBUILDING NATIONScholars offer several explanations of Norway's involvement in peace processes arising from international conflicts. The result of a pragmatic foreign policy, it combines idealist and realist elements in a seemingly contradictory policy which, in fact, accommodates different domestic interests and maintains inter-party foreign policy consensus (Riste, 2001; Ekengren, 2022).From a constructivist perspective, the notion of Norway as a nation for peace partly comes from its conception of its role as a small, rich, peaceful state, with a clear focus on human rights and humanitarian assistance (Leira et al., 2007). While it is true that the so-called value-oriented (idealist) diplomacy wasstrengthened, above all in the 1990s, with the increased involvement of Norway in several peace processes, its self-image as a peacebuilding nation has always been present (Leira, 2015). The Norwegian peace activist and later Foreign Affairs Minister, Halvdan Koht (1873-1965), argued in 1902 that, although the fact of its being a small state could limit its flexibility in foreign policy actions, Norway could and should secure its status by promoting peace and development. More than 80 years later, in 1989, Jan Egeland, who would become State Secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1990 to 1997, argued that a small, rich country like Norway could be more effective in promoting human rights and peace than old colonial powers or superpowers with their historical baggage and policies based on self-interest and dominance (Sørbø, 2018).Moreover, the notion of status, which is closely linked with the concept of identity, has been prominent in Norway since the nation's beginnings. Leira (2015) describes the pursuit of status as a peace-making nation in the 19th and early 20th century as a way of achieving independence (through moral authority), a means of saving money (as the policy for peace was cheaper than power politics), and as sound realpolitik for a small state. He also refers to the words of Ole Jacob Broch in 1864 when he argued that, when small states need to "engage in the strife of other states", they should do it decisively because, "for them, honour and prestige are even more important than for the greater powers" (Broch cited in Leira 2015, p.22).The role performance of Norway, or itsbehaviour with, and approach to foreign policy actions is, according to Gulbrandsen (2022), influenced by the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1998), dictated by the image the state has of itself, and constituting a basis for adopting a role in any specific context. In Holsti's view (1970), the main explanation for the role performance of a state arises from policy makers' conceptions of the role of the nation in a system (National Role Conception), but adoption of a role is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment. In this case, if the Norwegian government and the Norwegian people have an image of Norway as a nation for peace, and if the external image they project in other countries is also that of a nation for peace, the logic of appropriateness and the role prescription will dictate that Norway will have to behave as a nation for peace, and thus engage in peacebuilding policy.For Skånland (2010) the Norwegian involvement in peace processes is the result of a discursive construction, amplified by the media, above all after 1993. Media coverage of the Norwegian involvement in the Middle East peace process gave a very positive picture of Norway in general, an image that was strengthened thanks to the perceived successes in the peace processes of Sri Lanka, Guatemala, and Mali. All this crystallised into three main discursive constructions: (1) the decisive significance of the Norwegian contribution for the outcome of peace processes, (2) the importance of peace promotion as a foreign policy tool, and (3) Norway's distinctive approach for peace promotion.Other authors emphasise Norway's peace engagement efforts from a more realist perspective and, in particular, as a policy instrument in its own right (Touval, 2003). Some, like Matlary (2002) argue that mediation is used as an institutionalised strategy for dealing with some of the challenges of being a small state, as well as for promoting Norway's interests in the international arena, and having some influence in international relations. As Stokke (2014) notes, although it has a small population, Norway has a disproportionate importance in other areas (fishing, oil and gas, shipping etc.), thus implying interests beyond its borders as well as influence in other domains because of this prominence. According to Matlary (2002), some Norwegian interestsidentified from a realpolitik standpoint are security (addressed through NATO), economic interests vis-à-vis the EU, access to political decision-making power in the EU and, outside the West, considerable economic interests in oil prices and oil export. Matlary, who collected data through a series of anonymous interviews with diplomats and politicians, alludes to the effects of value-oriented diplomacy in matters of matters and concludes that, apart from a good image and profile, what value-oriented diplomacy provides is access to other arenas where one needs the best possible entry. Her interviewees referred, above all, to access to the leaders of the U.S. Department of State through the policy of peace engagement, especially in the Middle East and, to a much lesser extent, to leaders of EU states. However, she says, it was difficult to collect specific insights into the effects of such access, a perspective shared by Stokke (2010, p.166) who argues that "the extent and manner in which recognition is translated into international influence is complex and may vary from one policy field to another and between different arenas of international relations. This means that it is notoriously difficult to detect and measure the direct benefits from peace engagement". Finally, another interesting perspective is that provided by Neumann (2011). For him, the peace and reconciliation efforts of medium and small countries are a means to maintain a system with which they are reasonably satisfied, because they are not as well equipped as bigger powers to deal with other (more violent) types of conflict resolution methods, and he refers specifically to the institutionalisation of peace and reconciliation efforts by Norway.To conclude, Norway's peacebuilding policy may be understood as apparently idealist (value-oriented diplomacy) and based on a self-image as a nation for peace, which includes both idealist (moral responsibility) and realist (influence in the international arena and security) motivations. Until now, there have been no major conflicts between those two angles (Stokke, 2014), but in an increasingly polarised world, it is becoming more and more difficult for Norway to maintain a balanced policy in peacebuilding processes. 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKThis study draws on the theory of constructivism to explain Norway's national role conception and considers the notions of idealism and realism to explain mediation as its foreign policy. A theoretical framework based on such apparently antagonistic ideas is, perhaps, not very common but, as Barkin (2003) puts it, a constructivist epistemology and a classical realist theory are, in fact, compatible and, moreover, this kind of framework can be useful in International Relations (IR) theory, as it can specify the relationship between the study of power in IR and the study of IR as social constructions. Indeed, constructivism and perceptions can—and are—often applied to fulfil or justify realist objectives and policies.For the purposes of this study, I consider that mediation as foreign policy is a result of idealist (value-oriented) and realist (power) motivations arising from a constructed national identity and role conception.3.1. Constructivism and national role conceptionFor Barnett (2018), constructivism as an international relations social theory is "concerned about how to conceptualise the relationship between agents and structures, but it is not a substantive theory" (p.88). The basic premise is that the world is socially constructed, which means that "social reality is a product of human consciousness. Consciousness is created and constituted through knowledge that shapes meaning and categories of understanding and action; such knowledge and meanings can be institutionalised in social life; and this institutionalisation, in turn, shapes the construction of social reality" (p.88). These categories shape not only external reality but also its actors, which is an indicator of the importance of the social construction of interests and identity. For example, Norway's identity may shape its national interests, and one of those interests might be security, but the concept of security and how it can be achieved may be linked to Norway's identity.National Role Conceptions, a concept first developed by Holsti (1970), is defined as "the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform [...] in the international system" (p. 245-246). These are, as mentioned in section 2, the main explanation for the role performance of a state, understood by Holsti as the "general policy behaviour of governments" (p. 245). Role performance is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment and have, as some of their sources, system-wide values, the structure of the international system, and the traditions, rules and expectations of states expressed through various legal instruments (p. 246).The notion of national role conception is related to that of politics of identity, which, in Aggestam's words (1999), is a set of ideas that policymakers use to create a sense of solidarity and cohesion and thus to legitimise general trust in a nation's foreign policy. She argues that speeches sometimes reveal subjective we-feelings of a cultural community related to territory, myths, rituals, institutions, and customs, and she refers to the "institutionalisation" of national identity, which makes identity constructions relatively resistant to change. Moreover, citing March & Olsen (1998), she indicates that certain practices and rules of behaviour that legitimise and explain specific identity constructions are reinforced by such institutionalisation.The starting point of the present study is, therefore, the idea that Norway's national role conception is that of a small, rich, peaceful, democratic state, whose official discourse in peace engagement, especially since the 1990s, emphasises its altruistic contribution as a "peaceful nation that has the values, competences and economic resources" for such an endeavour, but whose work is also "beneficial for Norway's own interests" (Stokke, 2014, p.8).3.2. Idealism, realism, and mediation as foreign policyThere is no generally accepted definition of idealism because there is no settled ontology of the term but, according to Wilson (2012), it generally refers to any goal, idea, or practice that is considered impractical from a state perspective, for example the prohibition and disarmament of nuclear weapons, or global eradication of poverty. In IR it is normally used in both the broad and narrow senses. Broadly speaking, idealism seeks to transcend anarchy to create a more harmonious world order while, in the narrow sense, it is a doctrine tied to the inter-war period (1919-1939) and seen as emphasising the growing interdependence of mankind. I shall focus on the first meaning, which refers to "an approach to international politics that seeks to advance certain ideals or moral goals, for example, making the world a more peaceful or just place" (Wilson, 2019).Realism is a substantive theory of IR that considers states to be the main actors in the international arena, and mainly concerned with the pursuit of their own national interests, security, and struggle for power. Realists view the international arena as a sphere without justice, and with active or potential conflict among its members. They show scepticism about the relevance of ethical norms (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). This theory has a variety of ramifications but in this study I consider, first and foremost, classical realism because, although idealism is usually heavily criticised by realists, according to Barkin (2003), classical realism perceives the art of international politics as "the practical balancing of the demands of power on the one hand and morality on the other—a dialectic between power and morality [...]. Idealism, for the classical realist, is necessary to inform our actions and underlie our interests in the pursuit of international politics, but realism will always remain a necessary part of relations among states" (p.333). Also relevant is the perspective of neoclassical realism because, while classical realism focuses on the system-level factors, neoclassical realism considers domestic-level factors as variables that can shape foreign policy, which is highly pertinent if NRC theory is used to explain Norway's behaviour in the international arena. Neoclassical realism considers that "objective reality exists, but decision making is impaired by uncertainty and the complexity of the environment" (Rathbun, 2008, p.296).According to Touval (2003), mediation as foreign policy needs to be understood as a policy instrument, as distinct from mediation theory. He argues that it derives from the mediator's perception of the international system, its foreign policy objectives and strategies, and domestic needs. I would also argue that it stems from the mediator's own national role conception and self-perception. Touval (2003) considers that ending a conflict is no longer the main concern of the mediating state, but only a part of a broadly conceived foreign policy as the mediation is also shaped by affairs that are external to the conflict. He highlights three issues arising from a state's international and domestic concerns: (1) mediation is perceived by the public and the officials engaged in it as a moral obligation, which is seldom criticised; (2) foreign and domestic motivations, apart from being an incentive for states to engage in mediation, also shape their strategies and tactics of the mediation; (3) the mediation is evaluated not only in terms of settlement of a dispute, but also the primary goals motivating the mediation. Beriker (2017) offers an expanded perspective of Touval's work, arguing that once mediation is proven to be a viable foreign policy tool, engaging in mediation enables medium-sized powers to create a political space that otherwise would not be available. 4. METHODOLOGYThis study is both descriptive and explanatory, as it inquires more deeply into the events as well as exploring why and how Norway became involved in the Venezuela peace process from 2017 to May 2023. In a deductive approach, existing theories —NRC, mediation as foreign policy, idealism, and realism— are drawn on to explain Norway's behaviour in its peacebuilding policy. The epistemology used is empiricism, since the focus is explanation rather than interpretation, and the ontology is pragmatist because, while the world is understood as existing independently from social actors, the influence of these actors to shape social realities should also be taken into account, together with the fact that, in some cases, this may affect realities existing independently of them.The methods are qualitative, as information provided with quantitative methods would be too superficial for a study that seeks to determine the existence and the characteristics of Norway's engagement in the Venezuelan peace process. The analysis is primarily based on a range of online primary and secondary sources, including government reports, memorandums of understanding, recorded interviews, articles, and academic publications. I consulted these sources, first, for better understanding of the issues and to organise this material around the research question, as well as to identify possible gaps of knowledge. I then conducted semi-structured interviews, with an official from the Norwegian MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and a Norwegian academic, to fill some of the previously identified knowledge gaps, to record their perceptions, and to triangulate the documentary information thus gathered.The first interview, conducted by videoconference on 2 August 2023, was with Professor Benedicte Bull, from the University of Oslo and, inter alia, president of the Nordic Institute for Latin American Studies, whose research has been focused on Venezuela in recent years. The second was with David C. Jourdan, who coordinates the Norwegian MFA's facilitation team in the Venezuelan peace process. This interview was conducted in Oslo on 8 August 2023. Both Bull and Jourdan have given their consent to use their names in the present study. NOREF was also contacted but stated that it could not give interviews on the Venezuelan peace process. 5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION5.1. Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace processNo official documentary information about the specific manner Norway engaged in the Venezuela conflict during 2017 and 2018 has been found, apart from the mere fact stated in the NOREF website that it was engaged in talks on the conflict in those years. According to its strategic plan 2019-2023, NOREF is a "non-state actor that is able to complement formal Norwegian peacemaking efforts [... and] build directly on the Norwegian tradition of informal conflict resolution". This makes it possible "to support formal peace processes (track I), and informal back-channel conflict diplomacy (track 1.5 and 2)" (NOREF, 2019). This institution has a permanent staff of professionals, experts in conflict resolution, and is governed by a board whose director is appointed by the Norwegian MFA, and whose members come, in general, from different areas of the public sector. In the interview with David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), he confirmed that NOREF's engagement consists of track 2 approaches. Moreover, he stressed that, although NOREF receives public funds and works closely with the Norwegian state, it is a separate, independent institution. Norway's involvement in the peace process after 2019, when it became public, is described in some detail below. 2019: the first official talksAccording to the Norwegian MFA (2023), Norway has been involved in Venezuela since 2018. However, it was only in May 2019 that talks between the Venezuelan parties, facilitated by Norway, first became public. In this early stage, the negotiations between the delegations of Nicolás Maduro and Juan Guaidó lasted until August 2019, and although significant progress was made, no agreements for solving the political conflict were reached. However, the Norwegian MFA (2023) stresses that these negotiations were a stepping-stone for further talks between the parties, which signed a collaboration agreement in June 2020, with the objective of using frozen funds in the U.S. for a joint response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with support from the Pan American Health Organisation. Several newspaper articles describing the negotiations during that year provide additional information that has been used in this study.In May 2019, Juan Guaidó sent a delegation to Oslo to participate in exploratory talks with representatives of Maduro's government to try to find a solution to the political crisis the country had faced since Guaidó declared himself acting president of Venezuela at the beginning of that year (NRK, 2019a), information that was confirmed by Jorge Valero, Venezuela's ambassador to the UN in Geneva, and the UN spokesperson in New York, Stephane Dujarric. The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) reported the talks for the first time on 15 May but, according to an anonymous source, this was the second time that the parties had been in Oslo, and negotiations had previously been taking place in Cuba.Shortly afterwards, on the night between 16 and 17 May, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release confirming that there had been contacts between key political actors in Venezuela as a part of an exploratory phase aiming to find a solution to the country's situation. The Maduro government representatives present at the talks were Héctor Rodríguez, governor of the province of Miranda, and Jorge Rodríguez, minister of Communication. The opposition representatives were Gerardo Blyde, member of parliament, and Fernando Martínez Mattola, who had been minister during the government of President Carlos Andrés Pérez.In the last week of May 2019, the Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the parties would travel again to Oslo during the following week to continue with the process (NRK, 2019b). Almost at the same time, Juan Guaidó insisted that the meetings in Oslo were not part of a dialogue or negotiation, but a mediation in Norway (El Nacional, 2019). According to Voice of America/Voz de América (VOA) (2019a), Nicolás Maduro appeared a few days later on the Venezuelan public TV channel after the opposition declared that the conversations in Oslo that week had ended on 29 May without any agreement being reached. Maduro stated that conversations had been taking place in secret during the three previous months, that he was proud of his delegation, and that dialogue with the opposition had been constructive. Moreover, he insisted on his wish to find a peaceful solution for Venezuela. Indeed, VOA pointed out that Dag Nylander, a Norwegian diplomat who would become chief facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, had been travelling to Caracas and meeting with the political actors involved in the crisis since January 2019.The peace talks resumed one month later in Barbados. On 11 July 2019, after three days of conversations, Norway announced that the negotiations would continue (Reuters, 2019). Yet, only a few weeks later, the Maduro government withdrew from the talks when the U.S. president, Donald Trump, announced his decision to block U.S. citizens from engaging in business in Venezuela and to freeze the country's assets in the U.S. According to the Venezuelan government, this had been instigated by Juan Guaidó, while the opposition accused the government of reneging on its commitment to dialogue. Norway's facilitator, Dag Nylander, took note that the planned meetings would not take place and emphasised Norway's role as a facilitator acting at the request of the parties and planning the meetings according to their availability. He added that the facilitation process would continue as long as the parties wished, and provided that there was a realistic position on a solution in the best interests of the Venezuelan people (VG, 2019).According to Bull (2023), Norway, as the facilitating country, was displeased when the talks went public in May, believing that this was premature and that it would complicate the peace process. She also stresses that the Trump administration had no clear strategy for ending the conflict and that, when the U.S. sanctions were announced, there had not been any proper coordination with Norway. She also notes that mentions of the U.S. seem to refer to a single homogeneous actor, when the reality is that there are many actors involved, among them the Pentagon and the Department of State, and these actors may work in different directions, sometimes disrupting a given policy. The Norwegian MFA (2023) confirms it was not aware of the U.S. sanctions that were announced in early August 2019. Both parties and facilitator were taken by surprise.2021: The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding and negotiation rounds in MexicoA year and a half later, in March 2021, new exploratory talks began after the Biden administration's position on Venezuela allowed the parties to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which led to the launch of a new negotiation process, starting in August that year. On 5 August, the Mexican President, Manuel López Obrador confirmed that Mexico would host talks between the government of Venezuela and the opposition (Reuters, 2021) and, a few days later, the Norwegian government confirmed its involvement with a tweet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021a). The new negotiation process was launched in Mexico City on 13 August, with Dag Nylander as chief facilitator, Jorge Rodríguez representing the Venezuelan (Maduro's) government, and Gerardo Blyde representing the Unitary Platform (the opposition). A MoU —which I refer to in more detail in section 5.3— was released, defining the objective, agenda, method, and composition of the negotiation team. The Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs, Ine Eriksen Søreide, declared in a press note that the parties were ready to negotiate constructively and that, in the process, they would consult members of civil society as well as political actors. She also noted that there was mutual agreement on the sensitive nature of the negotiations, which was necessary for giving the parties space to make progress (Norwegian MFA 2021b).A second round of negotiations took place at the beginning of September 2021. The parties released a joint statement reporting that two agreements had been reached, the first being to act jointly in the claim of Venezuelan sovereignty over Guyana Esequiba, and the second, a "partial agreement on the social protection of the Venezuelan people". The parties conveyed that the points to be addressed in the following round of negotiations would be "respect for the Constitutional Rule of Law", protection of the national economy, and measures for the social protection of the Venezuelan people.Between the second and the third rounds of negotiation, Erna Solberg, the Norwegian Prime Minister, spoke at the UN General Assembly on 21 September, referring to Venezuela as a country where human right violations were occurring. Her comment was criticised by Dag Nylander as it could, he said, damage the credibility of Norway's role. In a tweet on 25 September, the MFA reaffirmed its commitment as an impartial facilitator in the negotiations and declared that the statement in the UN should not be interpreted as being inconsistent with that (NRK, 2021). The Venezuelan government responded to this diplomatic hitch with a slight delay in proceedings when its representatives arrived one day late at the negotiation round scheduled in Mexico from 24 to 27 September, but which finally took place after 25 September (Euronews, 2021).After this third round of negotiations, the parties released a new joint statement, focused this time on the issue of inclusion and, specifically, on the need for a gender focus in the negotiations, identification of inclusive consultation mechanisms for political and social actors, and condemnation of xenophobic attacks on Venezuelan migrants that had recently occurred in Chile. According to an article by Diego Santander in the Spanish newspaper El Mundo (2021), this third round was so fraught with problems that no specific agreements were reached. Maduro's delegation insisted on its plans to include Alex Saab in the negotiation. Saab, a Venezuelan businessman, was accused of being Maduro's front man, and a key figure in the international economic and financial activities to circumvent the U.S. economic sanctions against his government. However, Saab had been arrested for money laundering in June 2020 in Cabo Verde and was extradited to the U.S. on the weekend of October 16.Negotiations, set for 17 October, were suspended on 16 October when the Maduro government decided not to participate in the next round of negotiations, because of Saab's extradition, which Jorge Rodríguez referred to as a "kidnapping" as it had been carried out "without a warrant and without due process" and accused the U.S. of trying to prevent the dialogue (Gilbert, 2021). The Norwegian government then tweeted that it was still convinced that the negotiations were the only solution for Venezuela, and that it would keep working to encourage the parties to continue (Norwegian MFA, 2021c). In Bull's opinion (2023), while the U.S. system may have its faults, the legal proceedings are independent from political powers so, on that occasion, there was little that U.S. politicians could do to stop the extradition.2022 — 2023: talks after the beginning of the war in UkraineIn March 2022, a new chapter of the dialogue began after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A U.S. delegation formed by members of the Department of State visited Caracas to meet with the Venezuelan government and discuss an eventual isolation of Vladimir Putin. Some analysts also indicated that Venezuela was seen as a possible alternative oil supplier if the U.S. opted to restrict oil exports from Russia, which meant that removal of the sanctions on Venezuela could be considered (VOA, 2022a). Indeed, in May 2022, the U.S. announced that economic sanctions against Venezuela would be eased as a gesture in favour of reactivating the dialogues and also allowing the U.S. company Chevron to negotiate potential future activities with the state-owned oil and natural gas company PDVSA (Agobian, 2022). According to the Norwegian MFA (2023), these actions were a catalyst for the reactivation of the negotiations.Immediately after the announcement, Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde met to discuss renewal of the talks (Ocando Alex, 2022a) but, by the end of May, according to Reuters, the Venezuelan government had demanded the withdrawal of Norway as a facilitator, and the presence of Russia (formally an accompanying country in the negotiations after 2021) as conditions for reactivating the negotiations. However, convinced that the Norwegians were their only guarantee for a successful process, the opposition disagreed (Oré, 2022). Bull (2023) specifies that the stance of the Venezuelan government might have been because it saw Norway as taking an excessively "pro-allies" position after the start of the war in Ukraine. She adds that Norway prefers to involve Russia and other big powers in the negotiations rather than excluding them, as they would provide legitimacy to the Mexico talks as the only acceptable platform for solving the Venezuelan political crisis. When interviewed, David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), made it clear that Norway was never asked to relinquish its role as facilitator. Management of the process resides with the parties, which have remained committed to the MoU that names Norway as the facilitating country.On 21 and 22 June 2022, the Norwegian government held the Oslo Forum, an annual retreat focused on conflict mediation and peace processes. Around 100 conflict mediators, experts, peace process actors, and high-level decision makers from around the world gathered at Losby Gods Manor with the goal of sharing their experience on conflict resolution and peace diplomacy (Norwegian MFA, 2022). Among the peace process actors who attended the Oslo Forum were Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde. A Norwegian source told VOA (2022b) that it was "probable" that the conversations would be initiated again, but "not immediately".On 14 September 2022, a group of 18 countries from the Americas and Europe agreed to call upon Maduro and the opposition to urge a resumption of the negotiations in Mexico (Ocando Alex, 2022b).Official negotiations began again on 26 November 2022. This time, a joint statement was issued indicating that the main agenda of the meeting would be social protection of the people. A partial agreement was reached, in which the measures agreed upon were: 1) creation of an organism to implement specific actions and programmes for the social protection of the Venezuelan people (Mesa Nacional de Atención Social, or MNAS); 2) creation of an organism auxiliary to the MNAS to evaluate its processes and the effects of implementation of the measurements adopted; 3) definition of the social areas which, requiring the most urgent attention, needed to be addressed through specific programmes, in particular the public health system, the national electrical system, development of the World Food Programme, educational infrastructure, and rebuilding of the infrastructure damaged as a consequence of the torrential rains in the latter half of 2022; 4) requesting from the UN support for the design and creation of a fund for social support of the Venezuelan people; 5) identification of frozen assets belonging to the Venezuelan state that might be progressively accessed and incorporated into this fund; 6) creation of a commission to assess and verify implementation of the agreement.After this meeting, the negotiations stalled again when the Venezuelan government accused the opposition of not complying with the agreement reached but, mainly and above all, because the frozen US$3,000 million that were to be incorporated into the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People had not yet been released (August 2023). According to Maduro, this was a condition sine qua non for resuming the talks. The Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, organised a conference on 25 April 2023 in Bogotá, with representatives from numerous countries to discuss the Venezuelan situation. The shared positions of the Venezuelan government and the opposition were explained to the international community, in particular regarding the removal of sanctions, free elections, and reactivation of the peace talks. One of the shared positions for renewal of the talks was that of establishing the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde, 2023). The message that came out of the Venezuela Conference of Bogotá was very clear: the UN trust fund for Venezuela should be set up as swiftly as possible. According to a Reuters report by Spetalnik, Sequera and Armas (2023), on 19 May the Biden administration notified the UN that the money could operate within the U.S. financial system, and that there would be no risk of creditors seizing it to repay the outstanding Venezuelan debt. Accordingly, the UN-administered fund could have been operative at the end of May 2023. However, the decision to establish the trust fund ultimately lies with the UN Secretariat in New York and some insiders allude to the complexity of the process involved and stress that establishing the fund depends on a number of factors. As of late August 2023, it had not been established by the UN. 5.2. Norway's distinctive approach to peace diplomacyIn an interview for the Centre of Humanitarian Dialogue, when asked about the distinctive approach of Norwegian diplomacy in international conflicts, Dag Nylander (2020) identified four main elements: (a) collaboration with Norwegian and international NGOs, (b) low-key diplomacy, (c) long-term commitment, and (d) the ability to make quick decisions.[5] In this section, these four elements will be briefly discussed.Norway's distinctive approach to its engagement in peace processes and with non-state actors was defined after the decentralisation of its foreign policy in the early 1990s. Humanitarian assistance and development policies called for closer cooperation between the Norwegian MFA and non-governmental actors and, according to Lehti (2014), this approach was extended to the area of peace-making. In the 1990s the Ministry responded positively to proposals and initiatives from various NGOs and well-connected individuals with regard to conflictive areas. The range of actors involved in peace-making was broadened, and Norway was then able to act beyond the bounds of government-centred diplomacy with a distinctive, more informal approach to peace diplomacy. Ann Kelleher and James Taulbe (2006) refer to this approach as "Track I½ Diplomacy", understanding Track I diplomacy as that with official representatives of governments and Track II diplomacy as that involving unofficial representatives and sectors of the civil society. An important feature of the collaboration between the state, NGOs and research institutions is that it is extensively funded by the state (Bandarage, 2011). Indeed, some Norwegian NGOs receive more than 90% of their funding from the state which, in Kelleher's view (2006), almost makes them quasi-governmental organisations.As for low-key diplomacy, Nylander (2020) affirms that activities pertaining to peace diplomacy rarely appear in the news, and that they are discreet and unnoticed, often with the involvement of low-level and mid-level diplomats, an approach that allows flexibility in seeking opportunities and in dealing with problems with relative freedom.Norway's long-term commitment to peace diplomacy is based on a broad political consensus for the promotion of peace and reconciliation. Hence, changes of government will not influence the country's engagement in any given conflict. According to the MFA (2000), the goal is not only ending violence but also support for economic, social, and political processes that lead to durable liberal peace in the country concerned.Finally, the ability of Norwegian diplomats to make quick decisions stems from the smallness of the country, not only in terms of population but also social distance. Dag Nylander (2020) mentions that the distance between a diplomat in the field and the ministry of Foreign Affairs is very short, and that it takes just a quick phone call or a text message, sometimes directly to the Minister, to obtain any clearance that may be needed. 5.3 Norwegian approach to facilitation the Venezuelan peace processNorway's approach to facilitation in Venezuela is consistent with its work in other peace processes. It began with secret talks between the parties (low-key diplomacy) and then, having advanced towards a more public and official format, it was formalised with the MoU signed in Mexico on 13 August 2021. In the MoU, the parties defined the agenda and methods for the talks. David Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023) highlighted the importance of this Memorandum, which contains not only the agenda and format for the negotiations, but also a shared vision of the process and the country.As for the method, it is important to mention that it is based on a "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" principle (comprehensive approach), although partial agreements can be reached if the parties consider that a subject has been sufficiently discussed and urgent action is required. This was the case with the two partial agreements on the Guyana Esequiba, and Social Protection of the Venezuelan people signed at the end of the talks in Mexico. This approach has its advantages, such as ensuring "big picture" negotiation, but it also comes with the risk the parties can renege anytime on anything they have agreed to. It was first used in other peace processes including Britain-Ireland in 1995, Palestine-Israel, and in Cyprus and Colombia. The Norwegian MFA (2023) emphasises that understanding the needs of the parties and ensuring that they are in charge of the process, has been key to making progress throughout the negotiations. The Venezuelan conflict is political in nature and requires political solutions, and the negotiation process provides a confidential space where the two parties have an opportunity to reconcile their interests. David Jourdan, sharing the MFA's approach to the political process, points out that Norway has probably been a more active facilitator in the Venezuelan negotiations than in other peace processes.An essential point of the MoU is participation, as it establishes mechanisms of consultation for political and social actors. The aim is for the process to be as inclusive and legitimate as possible. However, there is little information available as to whether this is actually the case and David Jourdan (2023) admits that it is not yet possible to speak of results in this area.Moreover, it should be noted that the Norwegian approach to facilitation, based on discretion and confidentiality, is one thing and how the parties actually behave is quite another matter. On more than one occasion, as can be seen in several documents and declarations, the Norwegian government has emphasised the need for the parties to be careful with their public declarations. In an interview with El País in February 2023, Anniken Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, wryly acknowledges an anecdote sometimes repeated by high-profile Venezuelan politicians, according to which politicians will normally control themselves in public but, in private, tell someone else what they really think but, in Venezuela, the opposite occurs: what is said in private becomes amplified in front of a microphone (Lafuente 2023). Vicente Díaz, former director of the Venezuelan National Electoral Council, who participated in the talks held in the Dominican Republic, Oslo, and Barbados says that, since the process in Mexico was "very public" (as occurred in the Dominican Republic), it created difficulties for the parties, since national and international expectations were generated, which meant that more attention was given to audiences than to the talks (openDemocracy 2022). 5.4 Norwegian interests in VenezuelaIn this section and in keeping with the theoretical framework described above, I discuss four possible reasons for Norway's mediation in the Venezuelan conflict: (a) peace and stability (value-oriented diplomacy), (b) reputation, (c) political interests, and (d) economic interests.Value-oriented diplomacy focused on peace promotion makes sense for Norway, a country whose identity as a peaceful country and peace broker has existed at least since the late 19th century. Those values are so widely embedded that a broad political consensus exists among the population over a peace promotion policy, supported institutionally and by an extensive network of non-state actors coordinated by the state. Norway's constructed identity as a peace broker (especially intensified since the 1990s) means that the country acts as such. Moreover, promotion of such values makes even more sense when security has become globalised, and when a conflict in a faraway country can have humanitarian, political, economic, and ecological consequences in distant parts of the world. In this sense, value-oriented diplomacy may acquire realist motivations although, according to Bull (2023), this is discourse that appeared, above all from the 1980s, to justify Norway's involvement in peace processes. One of its proponents was the diplomat and former Labour Party politician, Jan Egeland.Ensuring peace and stability in Venezuela could, for example, (1) help to mitigate the external displacement crisis, which mainly affects neighbouring countries like Colombia and Ecuador as well as the U.S. and others in Europe, with all the humanitarian and economic consequences for those receiving refugees; (2) ensure Venezuela's participation, as a democratic state, in international organisations, thus promoting democratic values and human rights; (3) promote social and economic development in the country, which would create value for its nationals as well as attracting international investment and; (4) finally, through social and economic development, reduce the presence of paramilitary organisations in the country, including the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), which is involved in drug trafficking. During the interview with David Jourdan (2023), we shared these points and he replied that this may well be so, but that such possibilities could also arise as a consequence of a political settlement that includes the removal of the sanctions. He added that the main reasons for Norway's peace diplomacy are the goals of preventing and reducing human suffering, as well as contributing to peaceful societies and stability.Peace diplomacy does not give rapid results (when it actually gives results), but Norway sees it as a policy consistent with its values, and as one whose long-term effects are sufficiently relevant as to justify investment in it.When it comes to image and reputation, Norway's approach on peace has been used as a public diplomacy branding tool, together with the country's natural environment and gender equality, to solve one of the image problems of small countries: invisibility.Indeed, discretion and a low profile do not necessarily mean invisibility, and as long as the right aspects of Norway's peace diplomacy are emphasised in a public diplomacy strategy —for example its role as a facilitator, an engaged partner, and good multilateralist— the discretion that peace diplomacy requires would not be jeopardised (Leonard and Small, 2003). Success in mediation of the Venezuelan conflict would, of course, be positive for Norway's image as a peace broker, although this constructed image is also enhanced through pertinent media coverage mentioning the Norwegian involvement during the Venezuelan peace process. This can be explained by NRC theory since the Norwegian image is constructed not only through success in a certain process but also through the mediating process itself. To give one example, the Google search "peace talks Venezuela Norway" offers almost 4.85 million results, while the Spanish search with "mediación de paz Venezuela Noruega" offers 1.28 million results. Moreover, when Norway uses the word "facilitation"2 it transfers responsibility for the results to the parties, implying that it has the role of supporting and accompanying them, but it will not be responsible if the parties decide that they do not want to continue with the process. This safeguard for Norway's image as a peace broker applies to the Venezuelan case.Political influence has also been identified as one of Norway's possible interests. As Matlary (2003) notes, access to key international actors can result from Norway's engagement in peace processes, including in the case of Venezuela, especially in a context of international energy insecurity, and political tensions due to the high-profile conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In my interview with David Jourdain (2023), "close dialogue with key international stakeholders" together with increased political capital were mentioned as benefits that Norway could reap by engaging in Venezuela. He also pointed out that one of the key features of this conflict is the importance of the U.S. as an actor with the capacity to contribute to the outcome of the peace process.The U.S. is now particularly concerned to find new energy suppliers, and ensuring political stability in Venezuela could provide international legitimacy for oil and gas transactions with its government. Giovanna de Michele, internationalist lecturer at the Central University of Venezuela, told VOA that the best way to extract oil from Venezuela would be through U.S. companies, but the sanctions would have to be eased if this was to happen (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde 2023). Norway offers an internationally recognised platform for making this possible: the talks in Mexico. It could therefore be a key actor in helping to resolve the political crisis in Venezuela while also supporting an ally, which would contribute to its status as a reliable partner of the U.S. However, as Matlary notes, it is difficult to quantify or define the scope of the access Norway gleans from its peace policy.Finally, with regard to economic interests, there are currently no Norwegian state-owned companies operating in Venezuela, although they can be represented through the investments of the Norwegian National Pension Fund3 in foreign companies that do operate in the country, for example, some Colombian companies, among them Bancolombia, Banco Popular, Banco Davivienda, and Cementos Argos. And, at the beginning of 2023, Ecopetrol, which is financed by Norfund, asked the U.S. for permission to negotiate with the state-owned company PDVSA to explore gas imports from Venezuela to Colombia (Quesada 2023). Among Norwegian investments in the U.S. are Chevron and Occidental Petroleum Corp, and the U.S. has recently given permission to Chevron to negotiate with the PDVSA and, at the end of 2022, a United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) court found that Venezuela was liable for discriminatory conduct in its payment of dividends from an oil and gas venture and ordered Venezuela to pay US$105 million to a Barbadian subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum Corp (Ballantyne 2022). If an improved political situation in Venezuela increases the revenues of these companies, it could also be positive for Norwegian investments.It should be added that, until 2021, Statoil (later Equinor), the national oil company of Norway, was present in Venezuela where it invested more than one billion dollars between 1995 and 2013 and participated in the Sincor heavy crude oil project with Total and PDVSA. However, due to concerns about the workforce and practical difficulties, Equinor pulled out of the project and transferred its 9.67% participation to CVP, a subsidiary of PDVSA, although it did keep its 51% stake in the exploration license of block 4 on Plataforma Deltana off Cocuina(Øye Gjerde, n.d.). Accordingly, Equinor participation in Venezuela is currently on hold but a greater presence in Venezuela of Norwegian companies, in particular from the oil and gas sector is possible if the country's situation improves.To sum up, although economic links between Norway and Venezuela do exist, they would seem to be limited and not sufficient to explain Norway's participation as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace process. 6. CONCLUSIONSThe core question of this study is why and how does Norway facilitate the Venezuela peace talks? The results suggest that, for Norway as a facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, the main goals of mediation-as-foreign-policy are humanitarian, security (better understood as promoting stability in the region), projection of its image as a peaceful nation and a peacemaker, and of its status vis-à-vis key international actors (especially the U.S.).All these goals can be explained through the Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) and Norway's own role prescription as a small, democratic, and peaceful nation, which means it would promote these values through altruistic (idealist) and non-altruistic (realist) actions and perspectives.Interestingly, economic factors do not seem to play a major role as a mediation-as-foreign-policy objective. The economic ties between Norway and Venezuela are presently not significant and, thanks to the diversification of the investment portfolio of the Norwegian National Pension Fund, Venezuela only represents a very small part of Norwegian economic interests.It is therefore relevant to consider the importance of constructivist aspects such as national values and self-conception in shaping the foreign policy of small countries, despite the apparent predominance of realpolitik aspects in an international context of increasing competition. These constructivist aspects offer key information for understanding and explaining the behaviour of small countries and should not be overlooked.Besides, it is worth reflecting on the definition of a mediation success in real, and in mediation-as-foreign policy terms. In the real sense, mediation is successful when it produces long-term reconciliation between the parties, in the eyes of a domestic audience while, for an audience external to the conflict, mediation may be successful simply when a peace agreement between the parties is signed. Meanwhile, for the mediating country or its allies, a mediation is deemed effective when foreign policy objectives are achieved. The approach used by Norwegian mediators in the Venezuelan process is similar to that of previous peace processes. It starts with the organisation of secret meetings and then advances towards a more public and official format. However, some distinctive traits of this peace process have been (1) a somewhat more active role of Norway as a facilitator when compared to other peace processes, (2) the weighty influence of the U.S. in causing setbacks or advances in the negotiations , and (3) premature publicity of this process, when the parties have been too eager to share their views with the press and the public, which may have been an obstacle for achieving progress. Despite these challenges, as of November 2023, Norway has continued to honour its long-term commitment to achieving a peaceful solution to the Venezuelan conflict.This study has created a first timeline of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process by means of consulting information in primary and secondary sources and, when relevant, adding further details obtained in interviews with two experts. This timeline provides an overview of the main milestones of the peace process while highlighting Norway's role as a facilitating country. Possible reasons for its engagement in the Venezuelan peace process have been identified. At a tactical level, the moral and security elements seem to be a high priority for people working in the field. These actors have considerable expertise in conflict resolution and perform their duties diligently. At a more strategic and state-centred level, besides the moral and security components, attention is given to building political capital by means of offering an attractive image to international stakeholders, especially close allies like the U.S. This is, therefore, an excellent example of the importance of peace diplomacy as a soft power tool for a middle-level country like Norway.The limits of the study arise from the nature of an ongoing mediation process. Since silence sometimes carries more weight than words and as discretion is necessary for the process to move forward, only limited information could be directly obtained from relevant actors in the peace talks. In terms of Norway's interests in certain areas, the limits of qualitative methods have not allowed quantification of the importance of each of these interests. The aim of the interviews was to obtain in-depth information that could confirm that such interests exist, and to provide distinctive details that might enrich knowledge of this peace process, rather than quantifying the results. Finally, now that Norway's possible interests as a facilitator have been identified, future research could be addressed at quantifying the weight of each of them in Norway's peacebuilding policy over the last two decades. 7. ReferencesAggestam, Lisbeth. "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy". ARENA Center for European Studies Working Paper, vol. 99/8 (1999). 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International Studies, vol. 49, no. 3-4, (September 2014), p. 207-231, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/002088171453233 Stokke, Kristian. "The Soft Power of a Small State: Discursive Constructions and Institutional Practices in Norway's Peace Engagement". Power, Conflict, Democracy Journal, vol. 2, no.1, (2010), p. 138-173, DOI: 10.22146/pcd.25724 Touval, Saadia. "Mediation and Foreign Policy". International Studies Review, vol.5, no. 4, (December 2003), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1079-1760.2003.00504009.x, p. 91–95. The Venezuelan Negotiation Process, Oslo, regjeringen.no (2023) [Date accessed 13.05.2023]: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/norways_engagement/venezuela_negotiations/id2674295/ Voz de América. "Diálogo: Opción que Guaidó y Maduro no descartan para salvar a Venezuela". Voz de América, (30 May 2019), (on-line), [Date accessed 12.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/venezuela-noruega-negociaciones-para-poner-fin-a-la-crisis-/4936901.html Voz de América. "Tras fracaso en Barbados, Venezuela sigue esperando una solución". Voz de América, (11 August 2019), (on-line) [Date accessed 14.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/tras-fracaso-en-barbados-venezuela-sigue-esperando-una-solucion/5037644.html Voz de América. "Funcionarios de EE.UU. viajan a Venezuela y se reúnen con oficiales del gobierno: según medios". Voz de América, (6 March 2022), (on-line) [Date accessed 18.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/funcionarios-eeuu-viajaran-venezeula-reunen-oficiales-gobierno-/6472694.html Voz de América. "Gobierno y oposición de Venezuela coinciden en Noruega". Voz de América, (20 June 2022), (on-line) [Date accessed 18.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/delegaciones-maduro-dialogo-noruega-/6625220.html Wilson, Peter. "Idealism in international relations" in: Dowding, Keith (ed.) Encyclopedia of Power, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p. 332-333.Notes:1- Originally consisting of 12 Latin American nations and formally created on 8 August 2017, the Lima Group is a multilateral body whose goal is to explore mechanisms for a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Venezuela and restoration of a democratic order (Government of Colombia 2017).2- In this study, I use the terms "mediation" and "facilitation" interchangeably. However, mediation normally involves a formal mandate from the parties of a conflict, covering involvement in both the substance and process of the negotiation, while a facilitator is less directive (Greminger 2007).3- The Norwegian National Pension Fund, the world's largest sovereign fund, has investments in over 9,000 companies in 70 countries (Oljefondet n.d.). Key words: Venezuela, Norway, national role conception, mediation, peacebuilding, foreign policy, conflict resolutionDOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/docCIDOB.2024.15/enE-ISSN: 2339-9570

Documents CIDOB: 15Winner of the Global Talent Award, launched by CIDOB and Banco Sabadell Foundation in the framework of Programa Talent Global.ABSTRACTThis study offers a comprehensive overview of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process as a facilitator of the peace talks between the Venezuelan government and the opposition. It explains what Norway does as a facilitator (the process), as well as how (approach) and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests), not only in terms of the characteristics making Norway a suitable facilitator, but also its interests and motivations. The main goal is to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. The study concludes that, for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and role conception. 1. INTRODUCTIONSince the early 2010s, Venezuela has been embroiled in a grave economic, political, and humanitarian crisis resulting in institutional disarray that reached critical point in 2017. It was in this year that the constitutional order was broken after Decision 156 of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice in Venezuela, whereby this organ attributed to itself the functions of the National Assembly, the country's legislative organ. Deemed unconstitutional by the political parties with a majority in the National Assembly, this move led to mass protests. The government reacted by calling for a new constitution to be drafted by a newly created Constituent National Assembly which, in August 2017, granted itself powers to pass legislation, thus overriding the National Assembly (Bronstein & Cobb, 2017). This was not recognised by the National Assembly but, in 2018, the Constituent National Assembly went ahead and blocked the participation of the main opposition parties in the presidential elections that year. These elections were rejected by a broad sector of the international community, among them the European Union (EU) and the Lima Group.1From 2017, Norway, with a population of just 5.5 million, has been exploring possibilities in Venezuela for political dialogue between the government of Nicolás Maduro and the opposition, first through the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF), an independent foundation that receives funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and later, after 2019, with direct state involvement. Norway has built an image as a peace broker with its success in processes like the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), and in the talks between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). But why did Norway decide to facilitate the peace talks in Venezuela? How does Norway approach peacebuilding in this conflict? This article aims to analyse the causes, process, approaches, and motivations for Norwegian mediation in Venezuela, in order to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. I therefore explore the comprehensive role of Norway in the Venezuelan peace talks, the background, the process, and Norway's possible interests as a facilitator. I argue that,for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general, but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and the way it perceives its role as a peace-making nation. As mentioned above, the Norwegian state became officially involved in the Venezuelan conflict in 2019. The domestic situation had come to a head on 23rd January when Juan Guaidó, leader of the opposition and president of the National Assembly, rejected the authority of Nicolás Maduro and declared himself acting president of Venezuela. However, the strategy failed when the military remained loyal to Maduro. Negotiation then became a last resort (NUPI 2020) and Norway began to facilitate negotiations between government and opposition, first in Oslo and then in Barbados, in 2019. These efforts led to further discussion between the parties through 2021 and 2022, in Mexico. In 2022, the war in Ukraine prompted changes in the positions regarding Venezuela of certain actors, notable among them the United States (U.S.) and the EU. As the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (Remacha, 2023) points out, U.S. concerns about energy security made it necessary to find a way of guaranteeing the international supply, and Venezuela was (and is) considered to be a strategic source. Contacts between the U.S. and Venezuela were made in 2022, and talks began about removing the sanctions imposed on the country. Given its economic situation, and the presidential elections due in 2024, Venezuela welcomed the rapprochement. If the sanctions were to be removed (at least partially), it was necessary to resume dialogue with the opposition, so in November 2022, negotiations recommenced in Mexico with Norway's mediation. Significant progress was made, and the release of previously frozen international funds was agreed upon (up to 3,000 million dollars earmarked mainly for public health, education, and food), as well as the lifting of some sanctions. Maduro's government is also aware that the 2024 elections should be held according to a model that respects democratic safeguards, with unrestricted participation by the opposition, so that results will be internationally recognised. Venezuela would then be able to resume relations with countries and regions like the U.S. and the EU, thus enabling international investment, particularly in the oil industry, and an improved economic situation (NUPI, 2020). Although the presidential crisis formally lasted until 5th January 2023 when Guaidó's acting presidency was abolished by the National Assembly, the political crisis with the opposition continues to the present day, in November 2023. 1.2. Research goals and objectivesThis study aims to explore the role of Norway as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace talks, focusing on what it does (the process), how (approach), and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests). It seeks to demonstrate that, given Norway's national conception as a peacemaker, its strategy in Venezuela expresses a broad foreign policy endeavour that has humanitarian but also reputational and political motivations. More broadly, the importance of soft power tools for state actors to achieve their foreign policy objectives is discussed. Constructivism and Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) help to explain Norway's self-image as a peacemaker, while idealism and realism, together with Touval's "mediation as foreign policy" theory shed light on Norway's use of mediation as a foreign policy tool. Qualitative methods based on analysis of primary and secondary sources, complemented with semi-structured interviews with experts and officials of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have been used. 1.3. Relevance and justificationNorway is a small country in terms of population but one with a notable ability to influence international affairs thanks to soft power. One of ways it exercises its influence is its internationally recognised image as a peacemaker, evidenced through its involvement in several peace processes. Indeed, since 1993, Norway has been engaged in 11 different peace processes (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019) with some major successes but also others that were limited. The case of Norwegian facilitation of the Venezuelan peace talks is studied for two main reasons. First, is its relevance in terms of policy significance, as it is an ongoing process, which leads to questions about why Norway acts as a facilitator, and the possible interests it has in doing so, apart from the goal of peace itself. Second, is the practical reason of the author's knowledge of the three languages relevant for this research (English, Spanish, and Norwegian), which is a valuable asset in terms of good understanding of the information from primary and secondary sources written in the three languages. This is an advantage in the research, as it allows cross-checking of information, and offers a broader perspective on the topic. 2. NORWAY AS A PEACEBUILDING NATIONScholars offer several explanations of Norway's involvement in peace processes arising from international conflicts. The result of a pragmatic foreign policy, it combines idealist and realist elements in a seemingly contradictory policy which, in fact, accommodates different domestic interests and maintains inter-party foreign policy consensus (Riste, 2001; Ekengren, 2022).From a constructivist perspective, the notion of Norway as a nation for peace partly comes from its conception of its role as a small, rich, peaceful state, with a clear focus on human rights and humanitarian assistance (Leira et al., 2007). While it is true that the so-called value-oriented (idealist) diplomacy wasstrengthened, above all in the 1990s, with the increased involvement of Norway in several peace processes, its self-image as a peacebuilding nation has always been present (Leira, 2015). The Norwegian peace activist and later Foreign Affairs Minister, Halvdan Koht (1873-1965), argued in 1902 that, although the fact of its being a small state could limit its flexibility in foreign policy actions, Norway could and should secure its status by promoting peace and development. More than 80 years later, in 1989, Jan Egeland, who would become State Secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1990 to 1997, argued that a small, rich country like Norway could be more effective in promoting human rights and peace than old colonial powers or superpowers with their historical baggage and policies based on self-interest and dominance (Sørbø, 2018).Moreover, the notion of status, which is closely linked with the concept of identity, has been prominent in Norway since the nation's beginnings. Leira (2015) describes the pursuit of status as a peace-making nation in the 19th and early 20th century as a way of achieving independence (through moral authority), a means of saving money (as the policy for peace was cheaper than power politics), and as sound realpolitik for a small state. He also refers to the words of Ole Jacob Broch in 1864 when he argued that, when small states need to "engage in the strife of other states", they should do it decisively because, "for them, honour and prestige are even more important than for the greater powers" (Broch cited in Leira 2015, p.22).The role performance of Norway, or itsbehaviour with, and approach to foreign policy actions is, according to Gulbrandsen (2022), influenced by the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1998), dictated by the image the state has of itself, and constituting a basis for adopting a role in any specific context. In Holsti's view (1970), the main explanation for the role performance of a state arises from policy makers' conceptions of the role of the nation in a system (National Role Conception), but adoption of a role is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment. In this case, if the Norwegian government and the Norwegian people have an image of Norway as a nation for peace, and if the external image they project in other countries is also that of a nation for peace, the logic of appropriateness and the role prescription will dictate that Norway will have to behave as a nation for peace, and thus engage in peacebuilding policy.For Skånland (2010) the Norwegian involvement in peace processes is the result of a discursive construction, amplified by the media, above all after 1993. Media coverage of the Norwegian involvement in the Middle East peace process gave a very positive picture of Norway in general, an image that was strengthened thanks to the perceived successes in the peace processes of Sri Lanka, Guatemala, and Mali. All this crystallised into three main discursive constructions: (1) the decisive significance of the Norwegian contribution for the outcome of peace processes, (2) the importance of peace promotion as a foreign policy tool, and (3) Norway's distinctive approach for peace promotion.Other authors emphasise Norway's peace engagement efforts from a more realist perspective and, in particular, as a policy instrument in its own right (Touval, 2003). Some, like Matlary (2002) argue that mediation is used as an institutionalised strategy for dealing with some of the challenges of being a small state, as well as for promoting Norway's interests in the international arena, and having some influence in international relations. As Stokke (2014) notes, although it has a small population, Norway has a disproportionate importance in other areas (fishing, oil and gas, shipping etc.), thus implying interests beyond its borders as well as influence in other domains because of this prominence. According to Matlary (2002), some Norwegian interestsidentified from a realpolitik standpoint are security (addressed through NATO), economic interests vis-à-vis the EU, access to political decision-making power in the EU and, outside the West, considerable economic interests in oil prices and oil export. Matlary, who collected data through a series of anonymous interviews with diplomats and politicians, alludes to the effects of value-oriented diplomacy in matters of matters and concludes that, apart from a good image and profile, what value-oriented diplomacy provides is access to other arenas where one needs the best possible entry. Her interviewees referred, above all, to access to the leaders of the U.S. Department of State through the policy of peace engagement, especially in the Middle East and, to a much lesser extent, to leaders of EU states. However, she says, it was difficult to collect specific insights into the effects of such access, a perspective shared by Stokke (2010, p.166) who argues that "the extent and manner in which recognition is translated into international influence is complex and may vary from one policy field to another and between different arenas of international relations. This means that it is notoriously difficult to detect and measure the direct benefits from peace engagement". Finally, another interesting perspective is that provided by Neumann (2011). For him, the peace and reconciliation efforts of medium and small countries are a means to maintain a system with which they are reasonably satisfied, because they are not as well equipped as bigger powers to deal with other (more violent) types of conflict resolution methods, and he refers specifically to the institutionalisation of peace and reconciliation efforts by Norway.To conclude, Norway's peacebuilding policy may be understood as apparently idealist (value-oriented diplomacy) and based on a self-image as a nation for peace, which includes both idealist (moral responsibility) and realist (influence in the international arena and security) motivations. Until now, there have been no major conflicts between those two angles (Stokke, 2014), but in an increasingly polarised world, it is becoming more and more difficult for Norway to maintain a balanced policy in peacebuilding processes. 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKThis study draws on the theory of constructivism to explain Norway's national role conception and considers the notions of idealism and realism to explain mediation as its foreign policy. A theoretical framework based on such apparently antagonistic ideas is, perhaps, not very common but, as Barkin (2003) puts it, a constructivist epistemology and a classical realist theory are, in fact, compatible and, moreover, this kind of framework can be useful in International Relations (IR) theory, as it can specify the relationship between the study of power in IR and the study of IR as social constructions. Indeed, constructivism and perceptions can—and are—often applied to fulfil or justify realist objectives and policies.For the purposes of this study, I consider that mediation as foreign policy is a result of idealist (value-oriented) and realist (power) motivations arising from a constructed national identity and role conception.3.1. Constructivism and national role conceptionFor Barnett (2018), constructivism as an international relations social theory is "concerned about how to conceptualise the relationship between agents and structures, but it is not a substantive theory" (p.88). The basic premise is that the world is socially constructed, which means that "social reality is a product of human consciousness. Consciousness is created and constituted through knowledge that shapes meaning and categories of understanding and action; such knowledge and meanings can be institutionalised in social life; and this institutionalisation, in turn, shapes the construction of social reality" (p.88). These categories shape not only external reality but also its actors, which is an indicator of the importance of the social construction of interests and identity. For example, Norway's identity may shape its national interests, and one of those interests might be security, but the concept of security and how it can be achieved may be linked to Norway's identity.National Role Conceptions, a concept first developed by Holsti (1970), is defined as "the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform [...] in the international system" (p. 245-246). These are, as mentioned in section 2, the main explanation for the role performance of a state, understood by Holsti as the "general policy behaviour of governments" (p. 245). Role performance is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment and have, as some of their sources, system-wide values, the structure of the international system, and the traditions, rules and expectations of states expressed through various legal instruments (p. 246).The notion of national role conception is related to that of politics of identity, which, in Aggestam's words (1999), is a set of ideas that policymakers use to create a sense of solidarity and cohesion and thus to legitimise general trust in a nation's foreign policy. She argues that speeches sometimes reveal subjective we-feelings of a cultural community related to territory, myths, rituals, institutions, and customs, and she refers to the "institutionalisation" of national identity, which makes identity constructions relatively resistant to change. Moreover, citing March & Olsen (1998), she indicates that certain practices and rules of behaviour that legitimise and explain specific identity constructions are reinforced by such institutionalisation.The starting point of the present study is, therefore, the idea that Norway's national role conception is that of a small, rich, peaceful, democratic state, whose official discourse in peace engagement, especially since the 1990s, emphasises its altruistic contribution as a "peaceful nation that has the values, competences and economic resources" for such an endeavour, but whose work is also "beneficial for Norway's own interests" (Stokke, 2014, p.8).3.2. Idealism, realism, and mediation as foreign policyThere is no generally accepted definition of idealism because there is no settled ontology of the term but, according to Wilson (2012), it generally refers to any goal, idea, or practice that is considered impractical from a state perspective, for example the prohibition and disarmament of nuclear weapons, or global eradication of poverty. In IR it is normally used in both the broad and narrow senses. Broadly speaking, idealism seeks to transcend anarchy to create a more harmonious world order while, in the narrow sense, it is a doctrine tied to the inter-war period (1919-1939) and seen as emphasising the growing interdependence of mankind. I shall focus on the first meaning, which refers to "an approach to international politics that seeks to advance certain ideals or moral goals, for example, making the world a more peaceful or just place" (Wilson, 2019).Realism is a substantive theory of IR that considers states to be the main actors in the international arena, and mainly concerned with the pursuit of their own national interests, security, and struggle for power. Realists view the international arena as a sphere without justice, and with active or potential conflict among its members. They show scepticism about the relevance of ethical norms (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). This theory has a variety of ramifications but in this study I consider, first and foremost, classical realism because, although idealism is usually heavily criticised by realists, according to Barkin (2003), classical realism perceives the art of international politics as "the practical balancing of the demands of power on the one hand and morality on the other—a dialectic between power and morality [...]. Idealism, for the classical realist, is necessary to inform our actions and underlie our interests in the pursuit of international politics, but realism will always remain a necessary part of relations among states" (p.333). Also relevant is the perspective of neoclassical realism because, while classical realism focuses on the system-level factors, neoclassical realism considers domestic-level factors as variables that can shape foreign policy, which is highly pertinent if NRC theory is used to explain Norway's behaviour in the international arena. Neoclassical realism considers that "objective reality exists, but decision making is impaired by uncertainty and the complexity of the environment" (Rathbun, 2008, p.296).According to Touval (2003), mediation as foreign policy needs to be understood as a policy instrument, as distinct from mediation theory. He argues that it derives from the mediator's perception of the international system, its foreign policy objectives and strategies, and domestic needs. I would also argue that it stems from the mediator's own national role conception and self-perception. Touval (2003) considers that ending a conflict is no longer the main concern of the mediating state, but only a part of a broadly conceived foreign policy as the mediation is also shaped by affairs that are external to the conflict. He highlights three issues arising from a state's international and domestic concerns: (1) mediation is perceived by the public and the officials engaged in it as a moral obligation, which is seldom criticised; (2) foreign and domestic motivations, apart from being an incentive for states to engage in mediation, also shape their strategies and tactics of the mediation; (3) the mediation is evaluated not only in terms of settlement of a dispute, but also the primary goals motivating the mediation. Beriker (2017) offers an expanded perspective of Touval's work, arguing that once mediation is proven to be a viable foreign policy tool, engaging in mediation enables medium-sized powers to create a political space that otherwise would not be available. 4. METHODOLOGYThis study is both descriptive and explanatory, as it inquires more deeply into the events as well as exploring why and how Norway became involved in the Venezuela peace process from 2017 to May 2023. In a deductive approach, existing theories —NRC, mediation as foreign policy, idealism, and realism— are drawn on to explain Norway's behaviour in its peacebuilding policy. The epistemology used is empiricism, since the focus is explanation rather than interpretation, and the ontology is pragmatist because, while the world is understood as existing independently from social actors, the influence of these actors to shape social realities should also be taken into account, together with the fact that, in some cases, this may affect realities existing independently of them.The methods are qualitative, as information provided with quantitative methods would be too superficial for a study that seeks to determine the existence and the characteristics of Norway's engagement in the Venezuelan peace process. The analysis is primarily based on a range of online primary and secondary sources, including government reports, memorandums of understanding, recorded interviews, articles, and academic publications. I consulted these sources, first, for better understanding of the issues and to organise this material around the research question, as well as to identify possible gaps of knowledge. I then conducted semi-structured interviews, with an official from the Norwegian MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and a Norwegian academic, to fill some of the previously identified knowledge gaps, to record their perceptions, and to triangulate the documentary information thus gathered.The first interview, conducted by videoconference on 2 August 2023, was with Professor Benedicte Bull, from the University of Oslo and, inter alia, president of the Nordic Institute for Latin American Studies, whose research has been focused on Venezuela in recent years. The second was with David C. Jourdan, who coordinates the Norwegian MFA's facilitation team in the Venezuelan peace process. This interview was conducted in Oslo on 8 August 2023. Both Bull and Jourdan have given their consent to use their names in the present study. NOREF was also contacted but stated that it could not give interviews on the Venezuelan peace process. 5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION5.1. Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace processNo official documentary information about the specific manner Norway engaged in the Venezuela conflict during 2017 and 2018 has been found, apart from the mere fact stated in the NOREF website that it was engaged in talks on the conflict in those years. According to its strategic plan 2019-2023, NOREF is a "non-state actor that is able to complement formal Norwegian peacemaking efforts [... and] build directly on the Norwegian tradition of informal conflict resolution". This makes it possible "to support formal peace processes (track I), and informal back-channel conflict diplomacy (track 1.5 and 2)" (NOREF, 2019). This institution has a permanent staff of professionals, experts in conflict resolution, and is governed by a board whose director is appointed by the Norwegian MFA, and whose members come, in general, from different areas of the public sector. In the interview with David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), he confirmed that NOREF's engagement consists of track 2 approaches. Moreover, he stressed that, although NOREF receives public funds and works closely with the Norwegian state, it is a separate, independent institution. Norway's involvement in the peace process after 2019, when it became public, is described in some detail below. 2019: the first official talksAccording to the Norwegian MFA (2023), Norway has been involved in Venezuela since 2018. However, it was only in May 2019 that talks between the Venezuelan parties, facilitated by Norway, first became public. In this early stage, the negotiations between the delegations of Nicolás Maduro and Juan Guaidó lasted until August 2019, and although significant progress was made, no agreements for solving the political conflict were reached. However, the Norwegian MFA (2023) stresses that these negotiations were a stepping-stone for further talks between the parties, which signed a collaboration agreement in June 2020, with the objective of using frozen funds in the U.S. for a joint response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with support from the Pan American Health Organisation. Several newspaper articles describing the negotiations during that year provide additional information that has been used in this study.In May 2019, Juan Guaidó sent a delegation to Oslo to participate in exploratory talks with representatives of Maduro's government to try to find a solution to the political crisis the country had faced since Guaidó declared himself acting president of Venezuela at the beginning of that year (NRK, 2019a), information that was confirmed by Jorge Valero, Venezuela's ambassador to the UN in Geneva, and the UN spokesperson in New York, Stephane Dujarric. The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) reported the talks for the first time on 15 May but, according to an anonymous source, this was the second time that the parties had been in Oslo, and negotiations had previously been taking place in Cuba.Shortly afterwards, on the night between 16 and 17 May, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release confirming that there had been contacts between key political actors in Venezuela as a part of an exploratory phase aiming to find a solution to the country's situation. The Maduro government representatives present at the talks were Héctor Rodríguez, governor of the province of Miranda, and Jorge Rodríguez, minister of Communication. The opposition representatives were Gerardo Blyde, member of parliament, and Fernando Martínez Mattola, who had been minister during the government of President Carlos Andrés Pérez.In the last week of May 2019, the Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the parties would travel again to Oslo during the following week to continue with the process (NRK, 2019b). Almost at the same time, Juan Guaidó insisted that the meetings in Oslo were not part of a dialogue or negotiation, but a mediation in Norway (El Nacional, 2019). According to Voice of America/Voz de América (VOA) (2019a), Nicolás Maduro appeared a few days later on the Venezuelan public TV channel after the opposition declared that the conversations in Oslo that week had ended on 29 May without any agreement being reached. Maduro stated that conversations had been taking place in secret during the three previous months, that he was proud of his delegation, and that dialogue with the opposition had been constructive. Moreover, he insisted on his wish to find a peaceful solution for Venezuela. Indeed, VOA pointed out that Dag Nylander, a Norwegian diplomat who would become chief facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, had been travelling to Caracas and meeting with the political actors involved in the crisis since January 2019.The peace talks resumed one month later in Barbados. On 11 July 2019, after three days of conversations, Norway announced that the negotiations would continue (Reuters, 2019). Yet, only a few weeks later, the Maduro government withdrew from the talks when the U.S. president, Donald Trump, announced his decision to block U.S. citizens from engaging in business in Venezuela and to freeze the country's assets in the U.S. According to the Venezuelan government, this had been instigated by Juan Guaidó, while the opposition accused the government of reneging on its commitment to dialogue. Norway's facilitator, Dag Nylander, took note that the planned meetings would not take place and emphasised Norway's role as a facilitator acting at the request of the parties and planning the meetings according to their availability. He added that the facilitation process would continue as long as the parties wished, and provided that there was a realistic position on a solution in the best interests of the Venezuelan people (VG, 2019).According to Bull (2023), Norway, as the facilitating country, was displeased when the talks went public in May, believing that this was premature and that it would complicate the peace process. She also stresses that the Trump administration had no clear strategy for ending the conflict and that, when the U.S. sanctions were announced, there had not been any proper coordination with Norway. She also notes that mentions of the U.S. seem to refer to a single homogeneous actor, when the reality is that there are many actors involved, among them the Pentagon and the Department of State, and these actors may work in different directions, sometimes disrupting a given policy. The Norwegian MFA (2023) confirms it was not aware of the U.S. sanctions that were announced in early August 2019. Both parties and facilitator were taken by surprise.2021: The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding and negotiation rounds in MexicoA year and a half later, in March 2021, new exploratory talks began after the Biden administration's position on Venezuela allowed the parties to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which led to the launch of a new negotiation process, starting in August that year. On 5 August, the Mexican President, Manuel López Obrador confirmed that Mexico would host talks between the government of Venezuela and the opposition (Reuters, 2021) and, a few days later, the Norwegian government confirmed its involvement with a tweet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021a). The new negotiation process was launched in Mexico City on 13 August, with Dag Nylander as chief facilitator, Jorge Rodríguez representing the Venezuelan (Maduro's) government, and Gerardo Blyde representing the Unitary Platform (the opposition). A MoU —which I refer to in more detail in section 5.3— was released, defining the objective, agenda, method, and composition of the negotiation team. The Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs, Ine Eriksen Søreide, declared in a press note that the parties were ready to negotiate constructively and that, in the process, they would consult members of civil society as well as political actors. She also noted that there was mutual agreement on the sensitive nature of the negotiations, which was necessary for giving the parties space to make progress (Norwegian MFA 2021b).A second round of negotiations took place at the beginning of September 2021. The parties released a joint statement reporting that two agreements had been reached, the first being to act jointly in the claim of Venezuelan sovereignty over Guyana Esequiba, and the second, a "partial agreement on the social protection of the Venezuelan people". The parties conveyed that the points to be addressed in the following round of negotiations would be "respect for the Constitutional Rule of Law", protection of the national economy, and measures for the social protection of the Venezuelan people.Between the second and the third rounds of negotiation, Erna Solberg, the Norwegian Prime Minister, spoke at the UN General Assembly on 21 September, referring to Venezuela as a country where human right violations were occurring. Her comment was criticised by Dag Nylander as it could, he said, damage the credibility of Norway's role. In a tweet on 25 September, the MFA reaffirmed its commitment as an impartial facilitator in the negotiations and declared that the statement in the UN should not be interpreted as being inconsistent with that (NRK, 2021). The Venezuelan government responded to this diplomatic hitch with a slight delay in proceedings when its representatives arrived one day late at the negotiation round scheduled in Mexico from 24 to 27 September, but which finally took place after 25 September (Euronews, 2021).After this third round of negotiations, the parties released a new joint statement, focused this time on the issue of inclusion and, specifically, on the need for a gender focus in the negotiations, identification of inclusive consultation mechanisms for political and social actors, and condemnation of xenophobic attacks on Venezuelan migrants that had recently occurred in Chile. According to an article by Diego Santander in the Spanish newspaper El Mundo (2021), this third round was so fraught with problems that no specific agreements were reached. Maduro's delegation insisted on its plans to include Alex Saab in the negotiation. Saab, a Venezuelan businessman, was accused of being Maduro's front man, and a key figure in the international economic and financial activities to circumvent the U.S. economic sanctions against his government. However, Saab had been arrested for money laundering in June 2020 in Cabo Verde and was extradited to the U.S. on the weekend of October 16.Negotiations, set for 17 October, were suspended on 16 October when the Maduro government decided not to participate in the next round of negotiations, because of Saab's extradition, which Jorge Rodríguez referred to as a "kidnapping" as it had been carried out "without a warrant and without due process" and accused the U.S. of trying to prevent the dialogue (Gilbert, 2021). The Norwegian government then tweeted that it was still convinced that the negotiations were the only solution for Venezuela, and that it would keep working to encourage the parties to continue (Norwegian MFA, 2021c). In Bull's opinion (2023), while the U.S. system may have its faults, the legal proceedings are independent from political powers so, on that occasion, there was little that U.S. politicians could do to stop the extradition.2022 — 2023: talks after the beginning of the war in UkraineIn March 2022, a new chapter of the dialogue began after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A U.S. delegation formed by members of the Department of State visited Caracas to meet with the Venezuelan government and discuss an eventual isolation of Vladimir Putin. Some analysts also indicated that Venezuela was seen as a possible alternative oil supplier if the U.S. opted to restrict oil exports from Russia, which meant that removal of the sanctions on Venezuela could be considered (VOA, 2022a). Indeed, in May 2022, the U.S. announced that economic sanctions against Venezuela would be eased as a gesture in favour of reactivating the dialogues and also allowing the U.S. company Chevron to negotiate potential future activities with the state-owned oil and natural gas company PDVSA (Agobian, 2022). According to the Norwegian MFA (2023), these actions were a catalyst for the reactivation of the negotiations.Immediately after the announcement, Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde met to discuss renewal of the talks (Ocando Alex, 2022a) but, by the end of May, according to Reuters, the Venezuelan government had demanded the withdrawal of Norway as a facilitator, and the presence of Russia (formally an accompanying country in the negotiations after 2021) as conditions for reactivating the negotiations. However, convinced that the Norwegians were their only guarantee for a successful process, the opposition disagreed (Oré, 2022). Bull (2023) specifies that the stance of the Venezuelan government might have been because it saw Norway as taking an excessively "pro-allies" position after the start of the war in Ukraine. She adds that Norway prefers to involve Russia and other big powers in the negotiations rather than excluding them, as they would provide legitimacy to the Mexico talks as the only acceptable platform for solving the Venezuelan political crisis. When interviewed, David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), made it clear that Norway was never asked to relinquish its role as facilitator. Management of the process resides with the parties, which have remained committed to the MoU that names Norway as the facilitating country.On 21 and 22 June 2022, the Norwegian government held the Oslo Forum, an annual retreat focused on conflict mediation and peace processes. Around 100 conflict mediators, experts, peace process actors, and high-level decision makers from around the world gathered at Losby Gods Manor with the goal of sharing their experience on conflict resolution and peace diplomacy (Norwegian MFA, 2022). Among the peace process actors who attended the Oslo Forum were Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde. A Norwegian source told VOA (2022b) that it was "probable" that the conversations would be initiated again, but "not immediately".On 14 September 2022, a group of 18 countries from the Americas and Europe agreed to call upon Maduro and the opposition to urge a resumption of the negotiations in Mexico (Ocando Alex, 2022b).Official negotiations began again on 26 November 2022. This time, a joint statement was issued indicating that the main agenda of the meeting would be social protection of the people. A partial agreement was reached, in which the measures agreed upon were: 1) creation of an organism to implement specific actions and programmes for the social protection of the Venezuelan people (Mesa Nacional de Atención Social, or MNAS); 2) creation of an organism auxiliary to the MNAS to evaluate its processes and the effects of implementation of the measurements adopted; 3) definition of the social areas which, requiring the most urgent attention, needed to be addressed through specific programmes, in particular the public health system, the national electrical system, development of the World Food Programme, educational infrastructure, and rebuilding of the infrastructure damaged as a consequence of the torrential rains in the latter half of 2022; 4) requesting from the UN support for the design and creation of a fund for social support of the Venezuelan people; 5) identification of frozen assets belonging to the Venezuelan state that might be progressively accessed and incorporated into this fund; 6) creation of a commission to assess and verify implementation of the agreement.After this meeting, the negotiations stalled again when the Venezuelan government accused the opposition of not complying with the agreement reached but, mainly and above all, because the frozen US$3,000 million that were to be incorporated into the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People had not yet been released (August 2023). According to Maduro, this was a condition sine qua non for resuming the talks. The Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, organised a conference on 25 April 2023 in Bogotá, with representatives from numerous countries to discuss the Venezuelan situation. The shared positions of the Venezuelan government and the opposition were explained to the international community, in particular regarding the removal of sanctions, free elections, and reactivation of the peace talks. One of the shared positions for renewal of the talks was that of establishing the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde, 2023). The message that came out of the Venezuela Conference of Bogotá was very clear: the UN trust fund for Venezuela should be set up as swiftly as possible. According to a Reuters report by Spetalnik, Sequera and Armas (2023), on 19 May the Biden administration notified the UN that the money could operate within the U.S. financial system, and that there would be no risk of creditors seizing it to repay the outstanding Venezuelan debt. Accordingly, the UN-administered fund could have been operative at the end of May 2023. However, the decision to establish the trust fund ultimately lies with the UN Secretariat in New York and some insiders allude to the complexity of the process involved and stress that establishing the fund depends on a number of factors. As of late August 2023, it had not been established by the UN. 5.2. Norway's distinctive approach to peace diplomacyIn an interview for the Centre of Humanitarian Dialogue, when asked about the distinctive approach of Norwegian diplomacy in international conflicts, Dag Nylander (2020) identified four main elements: (a) collaboration with Norwegian and international NGOs, (b) low-key diplomacy, (c) long-term commitment, and (d) the ability to make quick decisions.[5] In this section, these four elements will be briefly discussed.Norway's distinctive approach to its engagement in peace processes and with non-state actors was defined after the decentralisation of its foreign policy in the early 1990s. Humanitarian assistance and development policies called for closer cooperation between the Norwegian MFA and non-governmental actors and, according to Lehti (2014), this approach was extended to the area of peace-making. In the 1990s the Ministry responded positively to proposals and initiatives from various NGOs and well-connected individuals with regard to conflictive areas. The range of actors involved in peace-making was broadened, and Norway was then able to act beyond the bounds of government-centred diplomacy with a distinctive, more informal approach to peace diplomacy. Ann Kelleher and James Taulbe (2006) refer to this approach as "Track I½ Diplomacy", understanding Track I diplomacy as that with official representatives of governments and Track II diplomacy as that involving unofficial representatives and sectors of the civil society. An important feature of the collaboration between the state, NGOs and research institutions is that it is extensively funded by the state (Bandarage, 2011). Indeed, some Norwegian NGOs receive more than 90% of their funding from the state which, in Kelleher's view (2006), almost makes them quasi-governmental organisations.As for low-key diplomacy, Nylander (2020) affirms that activities pertaining to peace diplomacy rarely appear in the news, and that they are discreet and unnoticed, often with the involvement of low-level and mid-level diplomats, an approach that allows flexibility in seeking opportunities and in dealing with problems with relative freedom.Norway's long-term commitment to peace diplomacy is based on a broad political consensus for the promotion of peace and reconciliation. Hence, changes of government will not influence the country's engagement in any given conflict. According to the MFA (2000), the goal is not only ending violence but also support for economic, social, and political processes that lead to durable liberal peace in the country concerned.Finally, the ability of Norwegian diplomats to make quick decisions stems from the smallness of the country, not only in terms of population but also social distance. Dag Nylander (2020) mentions that the distance between a diplomat in the field and the ministry of Foreign Affairs is very short, and that it takes just a quick phone call or a text message, sometimes directly to the Minister, to obtain any clearance that may be needed. 5.3 Norwegian approach to facilitation the Venezuelan peace processNorway's approach to facilitation in Venezuela is consistent with its work in other peace processes. It began with secret talks between the parties (low-key diplomacy) and then, having advanced towards a more public and official format, it was formalised with the MoU signed in Mexico on 13 August 2021. In the MoU, the parties defined the agenda and methods for the talks. David Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023) highlighted the importance of this Memorandum, which contains not only the agenda and format for the negotiations, but also a shared vision of the process and the country.As for the method, it is important to mention that it is based on a "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" principle (comprehensive approach), although partial agreements can be reached if the parties consider that a subject has been sufficiently discussed and urgent action is required. This was the case with the two partial agreements on the Guyana Esequiba, and Social Protection of the Venezuelan people signed at the end of the talks in Mexico. This approach has its advantages, such as ensuring "big picture" negotiation, but it also comes with the risk the parties can renege anytime on anything they have agreed to. It was first used in other peace processes including Britain-Ireland in 1995, Palestine-Israel, and in Cyprus and Colombia. The Norwegian MFA (2023) emphasises that understanding the needs of the parties and ensuring that they are in charge of the process, has been key to making progress throughout the negotiations. The Venezuelan conflict is political in nature and requires political solutions, and the negotiation process provides a confidential space where the two parties have an opportunity to reconcile their interests. David Jourdan, sharing the MFA's approach to the political process, points out that Norway has probably been a more active facilitator in the Venezuelan negotiations than in other peace processes.An essential point of the MoU is participation, as it establishes mechanisms of consultation for political and social actors. The aim is for the process to be as inclusive and legitimate as possible. However, there is little information available as to whether this is actually the case and David Jourdan (2023) admits that it is not yet possible to speak of results in this area.Moreover, it should be noted that the Norwegian approach to facilitation, based on discretion and confidentiality, is one thing and how the parties actually behave is quite another matter. On more than one occasion, as can be seen in several documents and declarations, the Norwegian government has emphasised the need for the parties to be careful with their public declarations. In an interview with El País in February 2023, Anniken Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, wryly acknowledges an anecdote sometimes repeated by high-profile Venezuelan politicians, according to which politicians will normally control themselves in public but, in private, tell someone else what they really think but, in Venezuela, the opposite occurs: what is said in private becomes amplified in front of a microphone (Lafuente 2023). Vicente Díaz, former director of the Venezuelan National Electoral Council, who participated in the talks held in the Dominican Republic, Oslo, and Barbados says that, since the process in Mexico was "very public" (as occurred in the Dominican Republic), it created difficulties for the parties, since national and international expectations were generated, which meant that more attention was given to audiences than to the talks (openDemocracy 2022). 5.4 Norwegian interests in VenezuelaIn this section and in keeping with the theoretical framework described above, I discuss four possible reasons for Norway's mediation in the Venezuelan conflict: (a) peace and stability (value-oriented diplomacy), (b) reputation, (c) political interests, and (d) economic interests.Value-oriented diplomacy focused on peace promotion makes sense for Norway, a country whose identity as a peaceful country and peace broker has existed at least since the late 19th century. Those values are so widely embedded that a broad political consensus exists among the population over a peace promotion policy, supported institutionally and by an extensive network of non-state actors coordinated by the state. Norway's constructed identity as a peace broker (especially intensified since the 1990s) means that the country acts as such. Moreover, promotion of such values makes even more sense when security has become globalised, and when a conflict in a faraway country can have humanitarian, political, economic, and ecological consequences in distant parts of the world. In this sense, value-oriented diplomacy may acquire realist motivations although, according to Bull (2023), this is discourse that appeared, above all from the 1980s, to justify Norway's involvement in peace processes. One of its proponents was the diplomat and former Labour Party politician, Jan Egeland.Ensuring peace and stability in Venezuela could, for example, (1) help to mitigate the external displacement crisis, which mainly affects neighbouring countries like Colombia and Ecuador as well as the U.S. and others in Europe, with all the humanitarian and economic consequences for those receiving refugees; (2) ensure Venezuela's participation, as a democratic state, in international organisations, thus promoting democratic values and human rights; (3) promote social and economic development in the country, which would create value for its nationals as well as attracting international investment and; (4) finally, through social and economic development, reduce the presence of paramilitary organisations in the country, including the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), which is involved in drug trafficking. During the interview with David Jourdan (2023), we shared these points and he replied that this may well be so, but that such possibilities could also arise as a consequence of a political settlement that includes the removal of the sanctions. He added that the main reasons for Norway's peace diplomacy are the goals of preventing and reducing human suffering, as well as contributing to peaceful societies and stability.Peace diplomacy does not give rapid results (when it actually gives results), but Norway sees it as a policy consistent with its values, and as one whose long-term effects are sufficiently relevant as to justify investment in it.When it comes to image and reputation, Norway's approach on peace has been used as a public diplomacy branding tool, together with the country's natural environment and gender equality, to solve one of the image problems of small countries: invisibility.Indeed, discretion and a low profile do not necessarily mean invisibility, and as long as the right aspects of Norway's peace diplomacy are emphasised in a public diplomacy strategy —for example its role as a facilitator, an engaged partner, and good multilateralist— the discretion that peace diplomacy requires would not be jeopardised (Leonard and Small, 2003). Success in mediation of the Venezuelan conflict would, of course, be positive for Norway's image as a peace broker, although this constructed image is also enhanced through pertinent media coverage mentioning the Norwegian involvement during the Venezuelan peace process. This can be explained by NRC theory since the Norwegian image is constructed not only through success in a certain process but also through the mediating process itself. To give one example, the Google search "peace talks Venezuela Norway" offers almost 4.85 million results, while the Spanish search with "mediación de paz Venezuela Noruega" offers 1.28 million results. Moreover, when Norway uses the word "facilitation"2 it transfers responsibility for the results to the parties, implying that it has the role of supporting and accompanying them, but it will not be responsible if the parties decide that they do not want to continue with the process. This safeguard for Norway's image as a peace broker applies to the Venezuelan case.Political influence has also been identified as one of Norway's possible interests. As Matlary (2003) notes, access to key international actors can result from Norway's engagement in peace processes, including in the case of Venezuela, especially in a context of international energy insecurity, and political tensions due to the high-profile conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In my interview with David Jourdain (2023), "close dialogue with key international stakeholders" together with increased political capital were mentioned as benefits that Norway could reap by engaging in Venezuela. He also pointed out that one of the key features of this conflict is the importance of the U.S. as an actor with the capacity to contribute to the outcome of the peace process.The U.S. is now particularly concerned to find new energy suppliers, and ensuring political stability in Venezuela could provide international legitimacy for oil and gas transactions with its government. Giovanna de Michele, internationalist lecturer at the Central University of Venezuela, told VOA that the best way to extract oil from Venezuela would be through U.S. companies, but the sanctions would have to be eased if this was to happen (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde 2023). Norway offers an internationally recognised platform for making this possible: the talks in Mexico. It could therefore be a key actor in helping to resolve the political crisis in Venezuela while also supporting an ally, which would contribute to its status as a reliable partner of the U.S. However, as Matlary notes, it is difficult to quantify or define the scope of the access Norway gleans from its peace policy.Finally, with regard to economic interests, there are currently no Norwegian state-owned companies operating in Venezuela, although they can be represented through the investments of the Norwegian National Pension Fund3 in foreign companies that do operate in the country, for example, some Colombian companies, among them Bancolombia, Banco Popular, Banco Davivienda, and Cementos Argos. And, at the beginning of 2023, Ecopetrol, which is financed by Norfund, asked the U.S. for permission to negotiate with the state-owned company PDVSA to explore gas imports from Venezuela to Colombia (Quesada 2023). Among Norwegian investments in the U.S. are Chevron and Occidental Petroleum Corp, and the U.S. has recently given permission to Chevron to negotiate with the PDVSA and, at the end of 2022, a United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) court found that Venezuela was liable for discriminatory conduct in its payment of dividends from an oil and gas venture and ordered Venezuela to pay US$105 million to a Barbadian subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum Corp (Ballantyne 2022). If an improved political situation in Venezuela increases the revenues of these companies, it could also be positive for Norwegian investments.It should be added that, until 2021, Statoil (later Equinor), the national oil company of Norway, was present in Venezuela where it invested more than one billion dollars between 1995 and 2013 and participated in the Sincor heavy crude oil project with Total and PDVSA. However, due to concerns about the workforce and practical difficulties, Equinor pulled out of the project and transferred its 9.67% participation to CVP, a subsidiary of PDVSA, although it did keep its 51% stake in the exploration license of block 4 on Plataforma Deltana off Cocuina(Øye Gjerde, n.d.). Accordingly, Equinor participation in Venezuela is currently on hold but a greater presence in Venezuela of Norwegian companies, in particular from the oil and gas sector is possible if the country's situation improves.To sum up, although economic links between Norway and Venezuela do exist, they would seem to be limited and not sufficient to explain Norway's participation as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace process. 6. CONCLUSIONSThe core question of this study is why and how does Norway facilitate the Venezuela peace talks? The results suggest that, for Norway as a facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, the main goals of mediation-as-foreign-policy are humanitarian, security (better understood as promoting stability in the region), projection of its image as a peaceful nation and a peacemaker, and of its status vis-à-vis key international actors (especially the U.S.).All these goals can be explained through the Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) and Norway's own role prescription as a small, democratic, and peaceful nation, which means it would promote these values through altruistic (idealist) and non-altruistic (realist) actions and perspectives.Interestingly, economic factors do not seem to play a major role as a mediation-as-foreign-policy objective. The economic ties between Norway and Venezuela are presently not significant and, thanks to the diversification of the investment portfolio of the Norwegian National Pension Fund, Venezuela only represents a very small part of Norwegian economic interests.It is therefore relevant to consider the importance of constructivist aspects such as national values and self-conception in shaping the foreign policy of small countries, despite the apparent predominance of realpolitik aspects in an international context of increasing competition. These constructivist aspects offer key information for understanding and explaining the behaviour of small countries and should not be overlooked.Besides, it is worth reflecting on the definition of a mediation success in real, and in mediation-as-foreign policy terms. In the real sense, mediation is successful when it produces long-term reconciliation between the parties, in the eyes of a domestic audience while, for an audience external to the conflict, mediation may be successful simply when a peace agreement between the parties is signed. Meanwhile, for the mediating country or its allies, a mediation is deemed effective when foreign policy objectives are achieved. The approach used by Norwegian mediators in the Venezuelan process is similar to that of previous peace processes. It starts with the organisation of secret meetings and then advances towards a more public and official format. However, some distinctive traits of this peace process have been (1) a somewhat more active role of Norway as a facilitator when compared to other peace processes, (2) the weighty influence of the U.S. in causing setbacks or advances in the negotiations , and (3) premature publicity of this process, when the parties have been too eager to share their views with the press and the public, which may have been an obstacle for achieving progress. Despite these challenges, as of November 2023, Norway has continued to honour its long-term commitment to achieving a peaceful solution to the Venezuelan conflict.This study has created a first timeline of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process by means of consulting information in primary and secondary sources and, when relevant, adding further details obtained in interviews with two experts. This timeline provides an overview of the main milestones of the peace process while highlighting Norway's role as a facilitating country. Possible reasons for its engagement in the Venezuelan peace process have been identified. At a tactical level, the moral and security elements seem to be a high priority for people working in the field. These actors have considerable expertise in conflict resolution and perform their duties diligently. At a more strategic and state-centred level, besides the moral and security components, attention is given to building political capital by means of offering an attractive image to international stakeholders, especially close allies like the U.S. This is, therefore, an excellent example of the importance of peace diplomacy as a soft power tool for a middle-level country like Norway.The limits of the study arise from the nature of an ongoing mediation process. Since silence sometimes carries more weight than words and as discretion is necessary for the process to move forward, only limited information could be directly obtained from relevant actors in the peace talks. In terms of Norway's interests in certain areas, the limits of qualitative methods have not allowed quantification of the importance of each of these interests. The aim of the interviews was to obtain in-depth information that could confirm that such interests exist, and to provide distinctive details that might enrich knowledge of this peace process, rather than quantifying the results. Finally, now that Norway's possible interests as a facilitator have been identified, future research could be addressed at quantifying the weight of each of them in Norway's peacebuilding policy over the last two decades. 7. ReferencesAggestam, Lisbeth. "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy". ARENA Center for European Studies Working Paper, vol. 99/8 (1999). 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"Idealism in international relations" in: Dowding, Keith (ed.) Encyclopedia of Power, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p. 332-333.Notes:1- Originally consisting of 12 Latin American nations and formally created on 8 August 2017, the Lima Group is a multilateral body whose goal is to explore mechanisms for a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Venezuela and restoration of a democratic order (Government of Colombia 2017).2- In this study, I use the terms "mediation" and "facilitation" interchangeably. However, mediation normally involves a formal mandate from the parties of a conflict, covering involvement in both the substance and process of the negotiation, while a facilitator is less directive (Greminger 2007).3- The Norwegian National Pension Fund, the world's largest sovereign fund, has investments in over 9,000 companies in 70 countries (Oljefondet n.d.).Key words: Venezuela, Norway, national role conception, mediation, peacebuilding, foreign policy, conflict resolution

acts. The research is based on relevant data from the field of environmental protection in four language versions of the EU acquis: Bulgarian, Greek, Polish and English. The aims of the research are the following: • to characterize a linguistic area of high social prestige (triggered by extralinguistic factors and its scientific context valued by the contemporary world), indicative of the advancement of civilization; • to study in a comparative plan the terminology coined for the basic notions (concepts) of the selected thematic field (i.e. environmental protection); • to present in a systematic way diverse data concerning a particular current topic in order to raise awareness about the process of terminology development and international exchange of terminology in the relevant field; • to draw general theoretical conclusions on trends of development in contemporary European languages for specific purposes (hereinafter LSP) based on cited linguistic terminology data. One of the secondary goals of this monograph is to raise awareness of scientific achievements originating in "smaller" nations, which may remain unnoticed in the European, let alone wider, fora. To achieve the research goals set, the author deemed it necessary to address thematic fields such as: the theory of terminology, lexicography, law, European integration, environmental protection etc., thus rendering the present study interdisciplinary. However, the primary focus of the study is on the linguistic analysis, since its theoretical and methodological apparatuses are grounded in the well-established theses of lexicography, theory of terminology, comparative and applied linguistics, as well as translation studies. The objectives of the monograph (dependent on the defined goals), which determined the methodological choices made, are as follows: to study the extralinguistic context and EU legal sources; to choose a representative thematic field; to assemble a representative database of relevant specialized notions (concepts) and analyse their term-formation in a comparative plan; to select an appropriate research method linked to the design of an algorithm for language comparison, excerption and a comparative analysis of terminological material. Our research on the European Acquis terminology has been determined by the wide linguistic and extralinguistic context, referring to: • the essence and characteristics of LSP; the specific features of the language of law (as an LSP and the existing dichotomic perception of it as the language of law and the language of lawyers; • the EU language of law as a subtype of legal language and thus LSP; • the essence and characteristics of terminology as the core of a LSP, especially the legal terminology; • the internationalization and Europeanization of terminology as developmental trends of LSPs. The enumerated linguistic issues are directly connected to extralinguistic factors, such as: • harmonization of the EU law; EU multilingualism; • European integration and adoption of the EU law by the accession countries; • translation (overt and covert) of the European Union Acquis; • the role of subjective factors (institutional as well as human, e.g. translators, experts, ministries, NGOs etc.) in the process of creating the European Union terminology. The first chapter of the monograph introduces a theoretical model of the research composed of basic theses which can be generalized as follows: • The European Union law is formulated in a LSP. • Terminology is the core of each LSP, including the EU legal language. • A term is a language unit which is defined in a specialized text and is an element of a LSP. A term signifies a specialized notion, has a restricted (professional) scope of use; it is systemic, conventional, context-independent , and expressively- neutral. • A term is recognized as belonging to the EU legal language if it is defined (has a legal definition) in an EU legal act. • In all language versions of the European Union law, identical and equivalent terms are used, defined in the EU legal acts by means of identical legal definitions. • The definitiveness of a term is used as a strict criterion to distinguish between terms and non-terms. • An identical legal definition worded in the different linguistic versions of the harmonized EU law justifies comparability of the terms between languages. • Undertaking an analysis of two Slavonic languages – Bulgarian and Polish, and two non- Slavonic ones, belonging to different language groups (and therefore, bound by diverse normative traditions): Greek and English, makes it possible to study processes of terminological internationalization. Internationalization is thus interpreted as the formation of a common pool of proportionate in form and semantics language units, presented in at least three languages, at least two of which belonging to different language groups. • The EU environmental law is a topical and extremely dynamic field of interdisciplinary and supranational nature, which makes it possible to claim that its terminology is representative of the state and development of the EU terminology as a whole. • The contents of the term 'environment' encompasses such elements as: human being, flora and fauna, soil, water, air, climate, and other. • LSPs are indicative as to the civilisational stage of development of a social community, hence, studying the EU LSP can contribute to the study of certain aspects of the European civilization. The second chapter of the monograph is devoted to the analysis proper of the terminological data, which is preceded by the presentation of the methodological choices made. The following basic concepts have been thoroughly analysed: environment , human , animals , plants , water , air , land /soil , impact (on the environment). Тhe chapter also discusses the work procedures for excerpting terminological material. The methods for comparative analysis used, based on standard comparative algorithm are presented as follows: determining the comparability of objects based on assumed tertium comparationis (the criterion of comparability); confirming similarities and differences of the studied objects; outlining and defining common features, tracing trends of further development of the phenomena. Detailed comparative procedures allowing to recognize similarities and differences between the terms used to signify the specialised notions in the four languages, include the following parameters: source of a term, outer form of a term, and inner form of a term. Each of the parameters has been thoroughly discussed. The outcomes of particular concepts analyses were presented in a form of autonomic and uniformly-structured parts in order to facilitate their individual interpretation. The descriptive way of presenting the results was preferred to a strictly formalized one in order to make the text easier to read; besides, data of different kind and order cannot be presented in a formalized way. It is also believed that a formalized approach would have left out some crucial aspects of the terminological naming process, for instance the component of evaluation in some of the terminological units. As many as 800 terminological units in the four studied languages were included in the analysis (presented in the order corresponding to their "seniority" as official languages of the European Union: English, Greek, Polish, and Bulgarian). All analysed units are quoted along with their Celex numbers that indicate the relevant legislative act of the EU from which they are excerpted. The most important conclusions of the monograph are the following: • (The source of a term parameter): the overwhelming majority of terms in each of the languages have their origin in the native tongue. English terms are most often semantic neologisms, whereas in the other languages being terminologically secondary, they are translated borrowings (calques), among which the most numerous are the phraseological calques. Analogous terminological units that occur in all four languages must be deemed Europeisms or internationalisms (in a wider sense) on the grounds of semantic and/or formal convergence in the four languages, of which three are not genetically connected. Basic concepts from the field of environmental protection, which are elementary (universal) notions co-creating crucial fragments of their respective linguistic world-images, are signified by old native words. On a regular basis there is no formal (material) convergence in the studied languages – except for Bulgarian and Polish. The European legislator fixes old words (e.g. river, air, animal etc.) as terms and assigns new terminological meanings to them which then become common (standardized) for each and every language version of the harmonized European Union law. What demands close attention is a relatively small share of material internationalisms, which can be explained by the aptitude of nominators to preserve the national character of terms in the context of European multilingualism. This tendency is most evident in Greek terminology. • (The outer form of a term parameter) A dominant structural type among the studied terms in all four languages are the two-component terms consisting of a head-noun and a subordinate component/member which is an adjective in Greek, Polish and Bulgarian, and a noun used attributively in English (N+N structures) The noticeable categorical monotony of the terminology is another feature thereof – substantive units are commonly recognized as the most proper form of a term. • The conclusion that can be drawn as regards the term inner form is that essential semantic features present in a meaning (definition) of a term usually serve as a foundation of the terminological naming process. The analysis shows that predominantly there is a dependence of form components on contents components of a given term. In cases of loan translations/ calques such a dependency is established both in the primary English term and in its calques in the other languages. The comparative analysis of this parameter shows the relation of the meaningful elements of the terms (words and morphemes) between the four languages, as well as their relation to a given semantic feature of concept. This is yet another proof for the convergence of terminologies. One of the effects of convergence is the unquestionable enhancement of comprehension of stakeholders of LSPs, lacking fluency in the target foreign langauge. • Some conclusions were also reached as to similarities and differences according to language type: synthetic vs. analytic; Balkan vs. non-Balkan; using Latin script vs. using other writing system (alphabet). A crucial general conclusion is related to the scale of convergence processes taking place in contemporary specialized languages of integrated Europe. What is established is the inter-language iso-semanticity, very similar to iso-semanticity occurring among the Balkan languages, that is an independent material rendering in each language provided there are identical semantic features, which may be referred to Stanisław Gajda's conclusion concerning the genesis of European language league (GAJDA, 2008). In conclusion, the research addresses the area of intensified convergence processes leading to inter-language iso-semanticity, which stems not so much from language interference as from the impact of English (as a language of high social and communicative prestige in the contemporary world) on the remaining languages included in the study. The original author's contributions can be summed up as follows: • synthesis and systematization of knowledge stemming from different fields yet relating to the selected topic; • contrastive analysis of four languages in a rare (unique) configuration; • practical and applied aspect of the results obtained from the analysis of a large representative corpus of terms from the EU legal field of environmental protection • (the corpus's) linguistic and historical value; should it happen that the EU's LSP becomes yet another rejected "newspeak", the author has nevertheless been able to study the potential of the linguistic teams and language systems to create specialized languages (language subsystems) with the aim to attain particular goals and meet civilization needs at a particular historical moment.

Author's introductionAlthough criminologists have long dominated the field of school violence research, there has been a growing body of research by cultural sociologists in this area as well. In many ways, a cultural approach to understanding school violence has taken school violence beyond the realm of just criminal and physical acts of violence. These scholars have begun to examine verbal, emotional, sexual, and racial expressions violence, as well as violence that is perpetuated by institutions, what Bourdieu has called symbolic violence. Courses that take this perspective explore how cultural concepts, or what Swidler calls a 'cultural toolkit', can be used as a lens for analyzing the experiences and practices of school violence. This can include, for example, an examination of how the dominant American ideology of meritocracy and competition can foster fights between middle school students, or how a feminine identity might push girls to be relationally aggressive towards each other rather than physically aggressive. In this regard, cultural sociology broadens our understanding of what constitutes school violence to uncover a wide spectrum of behaviors, attitudes and beliefs that may indeed lead to more overt expressions of violence. In doing so, a cultural approach can also help educators rethink discipline policies that have been created to resolve this social problem.Author recommendsSwidler, Ann 1986. 'Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.'American Sociological Review51: 273–86.Swidler's concept of a cultural toolkit provides a strong foundation for any cultural sociology course. Swidler defines a cultural toolkit as the symbols, stories, rituals, beliefs, ideologies and practices of daily life through which people use to shape their behavior. This paper presents a broad understanding of culture, which Swidler argues is not a unified system, but rather a set of complex and changing concepts from which we select different pieces from in order to construct different strategies of actions. When considering cultural approaches to school violence, it is useful to consider this broad definition of culture.Henry, Stuart 2000. 'What is School Violence? An Integrated Definition.'Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science567: 16–30.Henry provides a definition of school violence that transcends physical violence and interpersonal violence between students to include psychological, emotional, ethical and moral violence that occurs not only between students, but also includes harm committed by teachers and organizations against students. This latter form of harm can include tracking, school security, sexual harassment, or essentially anything that hinders the creativity, learning and academic success of a student. Henry argues that school violence must include symbolic violence, which he defines as the use of authority, power, and coercion to dominate an individual or group of people.Ferguson, Ann Arnett 2000. Bad Boys: Public Schools in the Making of Black Masculinity. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Ferguson builds on Bourdieu's concept of symbolic violence and Foucault's theory of disciplinary power to examine an intervention program for 'at‐risk' students, which was comprised of mainly 5th and 6th grade African‐American males. Her ethnography provides a great example of the benefit of using a cultural approach to studying violence, discipline and punishment in schools. For example, Ferguson argues that fighting among boys should be seen as a symbolic expression of masculinity and a space for boys to do emotional work, as well as a site for the production of power and a form of resistance to authority. Her work also explores how teachers and administrators can enact a form of symbolic violence onto students. She observed how the cultural behaviors of African‐American boys, for example, their use of Black English, was often translated by the teachers as 'problem behavior' and resulted in their label of 'Troublemaker'. Such labels often condemned the boys to the bottom rung of the social order and negatively impacted their academic success.Spina, Stephanie Urso, ed. 2000. Smoke and Mirrors: The Hidden Context of Violence in Schools and Society. New York, NY: Rowan and Littlefield.This edited collection examines school violence as a complicated and multi‐faceted phenomenon, exploring how political, economic, ideological and discursive practices contribute to school violence. This interdisciplinary book includes chapters from Donna Gaines, Henry Giroux, Peter McLaren, Stanley Aronowitz, and Paulo Freire and Donald Macedo. The authors expand the definition of violence by arguing that youth violence, adult violence and societal violence are all intricately connected, and therefore prevention of school violence would requires educators to move beyond reform that only takes place in the school system. Instead, violence prevention needs to implore a broader strategy for change that includes schools, families, communities, and beyond.Brown, Lyn Mikel 2003. Girlfighting: Betrayal and Rejection among Girls. New York, NY: New York University Press.Mikel Brown conducted qualitative interviews with more than 400 girls from first grade through high school who were from different economic, racial and geographic backgrounds. She begins the book by analyzing the cultural messages that girls receive in the media; messages and images that she argues provide girls with a context for fighting among their peers. She draws on Paulo Freire's notion of horizontal violence to look at how girls' meanness to other girls is a result of their struggle to make sense of gender‐saturated images of beauty and heterosexuality that often reinforce their subordinate status in the world. Girlfighting then becomes an avenue to power for young girls in a culture that is rife with sexism. Unlike many other recent books on relational aggression among girls, Mikel Brown interrogates the complicated intersections of race, ethnicity, and class as it relates to girlfighting.Casella, Ronnie 2001. 'Being Down': Challenging Violence in Urban Schools. New York, NY: Teachers College Press.Casella's ethnography of Brandon High School, a small city school in a diverse neighborhood in upstate New York, takes a cultural‐ecological approach to school violence, capturing systemic, interpersonal and hidden forms of violence. He provides a thoughtful critique of intervention strategies that have been created to deal with school violence, such as peer mediation programs, the use of police officers in the hallways, and D.A.R.E. programs, because these programs only address individual acts of violence and do not account for the realities of urban environments, prejudice, economic injustice and poverty that underlie and contribute to school violence.Merten, Don E. 1994. 'The Cultural Context of Aggression: The Transition to Junior High School.'Anthropology and Education Quarterly25(1): 29–43.Don Merten has published several articles that provide a useful framework for examining aggressive behavior from a cultural standpoint. The data from this article come from a larger ethnographic project of predominantly middle class students in a suburban area who recently transitioned from elementary to junior high school. Merten argues that middle class culture promotes and celebrates individualism, success and hierarchy, which in turn creates a culture that promotes aggressive behavior among students, because students learn that meanness can be an easy avenue for gaining power and status in the hierarchy of cliques in schools.Morris, Edward 2005. '"Tuck in that Shirt!" Race, Class, Gender and Discipline in an Urban School.'Sociological Perspectives48(1): 25–48.Morris draws on Bourdieu's classic reproduction theory to look at the relationship between cultural capital and bodily discipline as it relates specifically to clothing styles and manners. This article is based on an ethnographic study of an urban middle school in Texas that recently enlisted a 'Standard Mode of Dress' uniform policy. The regulation of dress became a constant source of conflict between the students and staff at the school, but had the most punitive effect on poor and racially ethnic minority students, whose cultural styles tended to be negatively stereotyped by the teachers. These students were more likely to punished for violating the policy, even though all social class and racial groups, to some degree, violated the policy. This harsher punishment engendered resistance and alienation among the minority students, which Morris argues had the potential of pushing these students away from school, further reproducing the very inequalities that the school was trying to change.Online materials http://nces.ed.gov/programs/crimeindicators/crimeindicators2008/ The National Center for Education Statistics puts out an annual report on indicators of School Crime and Safety. The indicators in this report are based on information drawn from a variety of data sources, including national surveys of students, teachers, and principals. The report covers not just overt forms of school violence, such as bringing a weapon to school, fighting, and teacher injuries, but also covers bullying, victimization, student perceptions of school safety, and availability and use of drugs and alcohol. http://www.cdc.gov/HealthyYouth/yrbs/index.htm The Youth Risk Behavioral Surveillance System is a school‐based survey conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The survey is conducted every 2 years and provides a representative sample of 9th through 12th graders in public and private schools in the United States. The YRBSS asks a wide variety of questions, but most relevant to school violence include self‐reported responses about behaviors that might lead to unintentional injuries and violence, such as carrying a weapon to school, being threatened by a weapon or being in a fight on school grounds. These data serve a useful comparison between student self‐reporting of violent behavior and school reporting of incidents of school violence. http://www.sshs.samhsa.gov/default.aspx The Safe Schools/Healthy Students website is a federal initiative by the U.S. Departments of Education, Justice, and Health and Human Services. It provides many useful resources, including links federal reports on school safety, a list of related websites, and video podcast discussions of school violence that can be used in the classroom. http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2001/uslgbt/toc.htm 'Hatred in the Hallways: Violence and Discrimination against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Students in U.S. Schools' is a report conducted by the Human Rights Watch. Data consists of interviews with 140 students, ages 12–21, and 130 parents, teachers, administrators and counselors across seven states, in every region of the U.S. The findings discuss a broad spectrum of violent behavior, including verbal harassment, homophobia, and physical violence. It can be useful for classroom discussion because each finding section of the report includes a 'case study' of one of the participants with direct quotes from their interview. http://www.aauw.org/research/hostile.cfm 'Hostile Hallways: Bullying, Teasing and Sexual Harassment in School' is a national report conducted by American Association of University Women on 8th to 11th grade students. The study found that 8 in 10 students experienced some form of harassment during their time in school. Both the executive summary and entire report are available to download on the website.Sample syllabusCourse outline and selected reading assignmentsSection 1: Introduction to cultural sociologyDefining CultureSwidler, Ann 1986. 'Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.'American Sociological Review 51: 273–86.Jepperson, Ronald and Ann Swidler 1994. 'What Properties of Culture Should We Measure?'Poetics 22: 359–71.Cultural Capital and Symbolic ViolenceBourdieu, Pierre and Jean‐Claude Passeron 1977. Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture. London: Sage.Lareau, Annette, and Elliott B. Weininger 2003. 'Cultural Capital in Educational Research: A Critical Assessment.'Theory and Society 32: 567–606.Reproduction TheoryMacLeod, Jay 1987. Ain't No Makin' It: Aspirations and Attainment in a Low Income Neighborhood. Oxford: Westview Press. Read Chapter 2, 'Social Reproduction in Theoretical Perspective.' Pp. 11–24 and Chapter 8, 'Reproduction Theory Reconsidered,' pp. 135–54.Cultural PedagogyGiroux, Henry 2000. 'Representations of Violence, Popular Culture and Demonization of Youth.' Pp. 93–105 in Smoke and Mirrors: The Hidden Context of Violence in Schools and Society. Edited by Stephanie Urso Spina. New York, NY: Rowan and Littlefield.Section 2: Broadening the definition of school violenceHenry, Stuart 2000. 'What is School Violence? An Integrated Definition.' Annals of the American Academy of Political and social Science 567: 16–30.Watkinson, Ailsa 1997. 'Administrative Complicity and Systemic Violence in Education.' Pp. 3–24 in Systemic Violence in Education: Promise Broken. Edited by Juanita Ross Epp and Ailsa M. Watkinson. Albany, NY: State University of NY Press.Urso Spina, Stephanie 2000. 'Violence in Schools: Expanding the Dialogue.' Pp. 1–40 in Smoke and Mirrors: The Hidden Context of Violence in Schools and Society. New York, NY: Rowan and LittlefieldCasella, Ronnie 2001. 'What is Violent about School Violence? The Nature of Violence in a City School.' Pp. 15–46 in Preventing Violence in Schools: A Challenge to American Democracy. Edited by Joan Burstyn. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.Elliott, Delbert S., Beatrix Hamburg, and Kirk R. Williams 1998. 'Violence in American Schools: An Overview.' Pp. 3–30 in Violence in American Schools. Edited by Delbert S. Elliott, Beatrix A. Hamburg, and Kirk R. Williams. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Newman, Katherine 2004. Rampage: The Social Roots of School Shootings. NY: Basic Books. Read Part I, Chapters 1–3, pp. 3–76.Section 3: Ideology and aggressionMerten, Don 1994. 'The Cultural Context of Aggression: The Transition to Junior High School.'Anthropology and Education Quarterly, v. 25 (1): 29–43.Willis, Paul 1977. Learning to Labour: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs. Farnborough, England: Saxon House.Newman, Katherine 2004. Rampage: The Social Roots of School Shootings. NY: Basic Books. Read Part II, Chapters 4–7, pp. 77–178.MacLeod, Jay 1987. Ain't No Makin' It: Aspirations and Attainment in a Low Income Neighborhood. Oxford: Westview Press. Read Chapter 6, 'School: Preparing for Competition,' pp. 83–111.Devine, John 1997. Maximum Security: The Culture of Violence in Inner‐City Schools. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Read Chapter 1, 'Schools or 'Schools'? Competing Discourses on Violence,' pp. 19–46.Section 4: Cultural scripts – masculinityKimmel, Michael S. and Matthew Mahler 2003. 'Adolescent Masculinity, Homophobia, and Violence.'The American Behavioral Scientist 46(10): 1439–58.Ferguson, Ann Arnett 2000. Bad Boys: Public Schools in the Making of Black Masculinity. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Read Chapter 4, 'Naughty by Nature,' pp. 77–99 and Chapter 6, 'Getting into Trouble,' pp. 163–96.Bender, Geoff 2001. 'Resisting Dominance? The Study of a Marginalized Masculinity and its Construction within High School Walls.' Pp. 61–78 in Preventing Violence in Schools: A Challenge to American Democracy. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.Klein, Jessi and Lynn S. Chancer 2000. 'Masculinity Matters: The Omission of Gender from High‐Profile School Violence Cases.' Pp. 129–62 in Smoke and Mirrors: The Hidden Context of Violence in Schools and Society. New York, NY: Rowan and Littlefield.Section 5: Cultural scripts – femininityEder, Donna 1985. 'The Cycle of Popularity: Interpersonal Relations among Female Adolescents.'Sociology of Education 58(3): 154–65.Merten, Don 1997. 'The Meaning of Meanness: Popularity, Competition, and Conflict Among Junior High School Girls.'Sociology of Education 70(3): 175–91.Merten, Don 2005. 'Transitions and 'Trouble': Rites of Passage for Suburban Girls.'Anthropology and Education Quarterly 36(2): 132–48.Artz, Sibylle 2004. 'Violence in the Schoolyard: School Girls' Use of Violence.' Pp. 167–90 in Girls' Violence: Myths and Realities, edited by Christine Alder and Anne Worrall. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.Morris, Edward W. 2007. ''Ladies' or 'Loudies'? Perceptions and Experiences of Black Girls in Classrooms.'Youth & Society 38: 490–515.Mikel Brown, Lyn 2003. Girlfighting: Betrayal and Rejection among Girls. NY: New York University Press.Section 6: Culture resources and school violence – languageLanguage and Symbolic ViolenceFerguson, Ann Arnett 2000. Bad Boys: Public Schools in the Making of Black Masculinity. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Read Chapter 7, 'Unreasonable Circumstances,' pp. 197–226.Youth Talk about ViolenceDiket, Read M. and Linda G. Mucha 2002. 'Talking about Violent Images.'Art Education March: 11–7.Morrill, Calvin, Christine Yalds, Madelaine Adelman, Michael Musheno, and Cindy Bejarano 2000. 'Telling Tales in School: Youth Culture and Conflict Narratives.'Law & Society Review 34(3): 521–65.Burman, Michele 2004. 'Turbulent Talk: Girls Making Sense of Violence.' Pp. 81–103 in Girls' Violence: Myths and Realities. Edited by Christine Alder and Anne Worrall. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.Obidah, Jennifer 2000. 'On Living (and Dying) with Violence: Entering Young Voices in the Discourse.' Pp. 49–66 in Smoke and Mirrors: The Hidden Context of Violence in Schools and Society. New York, NY: Rowan and Littlefield.Section 7: Culture resources and school violence – clothingClothing and School Safety DebatesHolloman, Lillian and Velma LaPoint, Sylvan I. Alleyne, Ruth J. Palmer, and Kathy Sanders‐Phillips 1996. 'Dress‐Related Behavioral Problems and Violence in Public School Settings: Prevention, Intervention, and Policy—A Holistic Approach.'The Journal of Negro Education 65(3): 267–281.Stanley, M. Sue 1996. 'School Uniforms and Safety.'Education and Urban Society 28(4): 424–35.Gereluk, Dianne 2008. 'Limiting Free Speech in the United States.' Pp. 41–64 in Symbolic Clothing in Schools: What Should Be Worn and Why. New York, NY: Continuum.Brunsma, David L., ed. 2006. Uniforms in Public Schools: A Decade of Research and Debate. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Education.Clothing, School Policies and Symbolic ViolenceHorvat, Erin McNamara 1999. '"Hey, Those Shoes are Out of Uniform": African American Girls in an Elite High School and the Importance of Habitus.'Anthropology and Education Quarterly 30(3): 317–42.Morris, Edward 2005. '"Tuck in that Shirt!" Race, Class, Gender and Discipline in an Urban School.'Sociological Perspectives 48(1): 25–48.Ferguson, Ann Arnett 2000. Bad Boys: Public Schools in the Making of Black Masculinity. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Read Chapter 3, 'School Rules,' pp. 49–73.FilmsTough guise: violence, media, and the crisis in masculinity (2002)This Media Education Foundation film explores the relationship between popular culture and the construction of violent masculinity. Of particular relevance to this class, the film examines how the construction of masculinity relates to school shootings. The film is directed by Sut Jhally and narrated by Jackson Katz. This film could be used in the section Cultural Scripts – Masculinity.Wrestling with manhood: boys, bullying and battering (2004)This Media Education Foundation film, written and directed by Sut Jhally, examines the relationship between professional wrestling and the construction of masculinity. The film looks at how wrestling contributes to homophobia, violence against women and bullying in school. This film could be used in the section Cultural Scripts – Masculinity.School violence: answers from the inside (2000)This film originally aired on PBS''In the Mix,' a television series created by and for teens. The film examines stereotyping and conflict in schools through the eyes and voices of teenagers attending a diverse suburban high school. This film could be used in the section Cultural Resources – Language.The killer at Thurston high (2000)This PBS Frontline film focuses on Kip Kinkel, who in 1998, at the age of 15, shot his mother and father, and then opened fire at his school in Springfield, Oregon, killing two and injuring 25. He is currently serving 111 years in prison. The film provides an understanding of the tragedy through multiple viewpoints, including interviews with Kip's sister, teachers and psychiatrists. This film could be used in the section Broadening the Definition of School Violence.Mean girls (2004)Written by Tina Fey and based on Rosalind Wiseman's book, Queen Bees and Wannabes: Helping Your Daughter Survive Cliques, Gossip, Boyfriends, and Other Realities of Adolescence, this fictional account of 'mean girls' is a film that most college students will be familiar with. Clips from the film can be used in the section Cultural Scripts—Femininity to begin a discussion about relational aggression between girls in schools. It can also be used to examine the role that racism and classism play in our public perception of violent behavior, particularly since 'mean girls' in this film tend to be constructed as white and upper class, whereas in contrast, 'violent girls' in film have historically been constructed as poor, young women of color.Project ideas1. Social Policy and Intervention. This assignment is intended to get students critically thinking about how educators approach school violence. Have students pick either a national intervention program, such as D.A.R.E., or a local school policy created to deal with school violence. Begin by analyzing how school violence is defined and what type of intervention/prevention is being proposed. Require students to use a cultural approach to understand and critique the policy. In writing the paper, students should consider the following questions. How would a cultural sociologist define violence? What types of violence are missing from this policy? How would this policy be different if it took into account a cultural approach? The book, 'Being Down': Challenging Violence in Urban Schools (2001) by Ronnie Casella provides a good background resource for completing this assignment.2. Observation Project: Clothing and School Safety. Students will begin by gaining permission to observe at a local middle school or high school. Begin by analyzing the school policy towards clothing. Some schools might have an official uniform policy, whereas others might have policies regarding certain types of clothing (i.e. gang clothing, clothing with profanity, etc.) Next, spend several days observing students in non‐classroom settings, like the hallways, cafeteria, bus or playground. Take detailed fieldnotes. Pay particular attention to the clothing that students wear, any discussion made about clothing by either students or teachers, the relationship between clothing and identity, how clothes are used as a site of resistance, and how clothes might cause conflict between students, or between students and teachers. (You may also want to informally interview students about their perception of the school's policy on clothing, how they negotiate rules about clothing, and how they see clothing policies as contributing to conflict and violence, as well as school safety.) As a class, develop a coding scheme for the fieldnotes. Each student will then individually write an analysis paper on the relationship between clothing, conflict, discipline policies, and school violence.3. Mean Girls: Examining Relational Aggression in Schools. There has been much public attention in recent years to 'mean girls.' As a class, view the film Mean Girls during the course section, Cultural Scripts – Femininity. As a class, develop an interview guide with about six open‐ended questions (i.e. What were your experiences with 'mean girls' in high school? How did you or a close friend deal with being the victim of relational aggression? To what extent did you ever participate in being a 'mean girl'? How did teachers at your school respond to relational aggression between girls?) Next, have students interview six female students using the class interview guide. Students can work individually or in groups to write a paper that compares and contrasts the social construction of mean girls in the film with the actual perceptions of mean girls from their research participants. The analysis should be grounded in the social science research that students are reading on relational aggression.

Author's introductionThis article examines the process of social differentiation in the context of sex, gender and sexuality, providing insight into the ways in which all three rely on mutually exclusive and dichotomous categories. Intersexuality, transgender and bisexuality are all exceptions to these boxes and the boundaries around them that can call our categorizations and the decisions we make based upon them into question. Given that social inequality and stratification rely on our ability to make clear distinctions between categories (or boxes, as conceptualized here), the existence of individuals, experiences and identities that cross these boundaries problematizes the persistence of inequality.Author recommendsHere I focus on monographs and edited volumes rather than articles. Many of the chapters in these books began life as journal articles. When examining issues related to intersexuality, transgender and bisexuality, it is important to give voice to individual experiences rather than relying solely on 'expert' accounts by outsiders. These recommendations reflect a mix of scholarly approaches (empirical and theoretical) and narratives.Baumgardner, Jennifer. 2007. Look Both Ways: Bisexual Politics. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.Known for her third‐wave feminist work with co‐author Amy Richards, Baumgardner writes here about her experiences as a bisexual woman. She does a fine job of situating her experiences in a broader social and cultural context, offering a nice mix of the personal and the political. This book is an excellent example of the potential of theoretically informed memoir.Fausto‐Sterling, Anne. 2000. Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality. New York: Basic Books.As a pioneer among biologists questioning the dichotomy between male and female, Fausto‐Sterling challenges us to question our most basic assumptions about sex, gender and sexuality. In this book, she provides both an historical and a biological/medical perspective on the key issues. Her book is an excellent resource for social scientists who may feel ill‐prepared to answer their students' questions about natural‐science perspectives.Hutchins, Loraine and Lani Kaahumanu, eds. 1991. Bi Any Other Name: Bisexual People Speak Out. Los Angeles, CA: Alyson Books.This book of narratives was one of the first to give voice to the diverse experiences of bisexual people. Students reading this book will hear the stories of bisexual women and men, people of different races and religions, making sense of their experiences living outside the conventional boxes of sexuality.Kessler, Suzanne J. 1998. Lessons from the Intersexed. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.Kessler was doing research (talking to physicians, parents of intersexed children and intersexed adults) on these issues before they even appeared on most people's radar. This book examines key questions related to intersexuality, including the 'medical management' that has become so controversial. Kessler includes a glossary of terms that many readers will find useful.Meyerowitz, Joanne. 2002. How Sex Changed: A History of Transsexuality in the United States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Historian Meyerowitz provides a detailed overview of the social and cultural development of transsexuality in the United States during the twentieth century. She includes the perspectives of transgendered individuals themselves, as well as the wide‐ranging views of others involved in the debate, from doctors, journalists and lawyers to feminists and gay‐rights advocates.Nestle, Joan, Clare Howell and Ricki Wilchins, eds. 2002. GenderQueer: Voices from Beyond the Sexual Binary. Los Angeles, CA: Alyson Books.This volume of narratives written by people who identify as somehow differently gendered offers students windows into the day‐to‐day lives of people living outside the boxes and on the boundaries. Paired with academic accounts that offer theoretical and conceptual information, this book will show students what it means to live beyond conventional categories – both the pain and the joys of such existences are on display here.Preves, Sharon E. 2003. Intersex and Identity: The Contested Self. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.As one of the first studies to provide first‐person accounts of the experiences of intersexed people, Preves's book offers incredible insights into the consequences of how our society has reacted to intersexuality. Intersex and Identity is also a fine piece of sociology, integrating medical sociology, sociology of gender and the social psychology of Erving Goffman into a compelling theoretical perspective.Rust, Paula C. Rodriguez, ed. 2000. Bisexuality in the United States: A Social Science Reader. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.Rust brings together 30 articles that provide a variety of perspectives on bisexuality, many of them her original contributions to this literature. Anthologies like this one provide an important service, offering overviews of a variety of topics and gathering diverse perspectives in one volume.Serrano, Julia. 2007. Whipping Girl: A Transsexual Woman on Sexism and the Scapegoating of Femininity. Emeryville, CA: Seal Press.Transwoman Serrano provides a compelling account that links our culture's responses to transgender individuals (especially transwomen) to its negative valuation of femininity. Some of what she argues is sure to be controversial; but she examines issues like 'cissexual privilege' (i.e. privileges afforded to those people who do 'normal' genders) as no one else has.Stryker, Susan and Stephen Whittle, eds. 2006. The Transgender Studies Reader. New York, NY: Routledge.While a bit heavy on humanities perspectives, this volume provides an invaluable resource on transgender issues. It gathers important historical documents as well as contemporary perspectives by and about transgender people. Everything from Janice Raymond's infamous diatribe against transwomen to Gayle Rubin's call for feminists to accept and celebrate gender diversity is included here.Online materialsBisexual Resources Center http://www.biresource.org/ This website provides links to 'all things bisexual.' From resources to information about events and conferences to links to bi and bi‐inclusive groups around the world, it can all be found here. Through virtual storefronts, one can purchase books, art and the newest edition of the Bi Resource Guide. Links to 'sibling sites' provide users with access to even more information.Intersex Society of North America website http://www.isna.org/ Intersex Society of North America (ISNA) was one of the first organizations to bring intersexed people together and work to protect their rights. Their site includes a list of frequently asked questions; a section on intersexuality and the law; a library of bibliographies, books and videos; and a section on intersex in the news that also documents mass media portrayals of intersexuality. Note that, in an attempt to get people to rethink the concept of intersexuality, ISNA has started to use the term 'disorders of sexual development.'Trans‐Academics.org website http://www.trans‐academics.org/ This website is a project of the Association for Gender Research, Education, Academia & Action (AGREAA). It provides a reference library, educational materials (including documents on terminology and syllabi), a document for those considering doing research with transgender subjects, links to academic transgender studies programs, and a list of community announcements. Approximately twenty syllabi are posted here.TransBiblio: A Bibliography of Print, AV and Online Resources Pertaining to Transgendered Persons and Transgender Issues http://www.library.uiuc.edu/wst/Transgender%20Bibliography/transbiblio.htm One of the first links on this page is to a list of transgender definitions. Many versions of such a list exist on the Web. Such lists are an important resource for students: most transgender terms are new to them and it helps to have a list to keep referring back to; definitions also provide a good starting point for discussion of relevant issues (e.g., names, pronouns and language). This website indexes: films, autobiography/biography/interviews, cultural and historical studies, other directories and bibliographies, fiction/poetry/drama, literary and cinematic studies, periodicals and journals, photographic and pictorial works, and other websites and online resources. It includes articles on cross‐dressing, gender identity and expression, intersexuality, legal and employment issues, medical and health issues, psychology and counselling, public policy, religion/ethics/spirituality, theory and politics, and transsexualism (general, female‐to‐male and male‐to‐female).FilmsThere are a number of feature films about transgender and bisexual topics, some better than others. Boys Don't Cry (Kimberly Peirce, 1999) and Transamerica (Duncan Tucker, 2005) provide much material for discussion. Note that Boys Don't Cry is very violent at the end (it depicts the rape and murder of Brandon Teena and is based on a true story). Chasing Amy is one of the few feature films that provides a complex portrait of bisexuality. Here are a few documentaries to consider. Hermaphrodites Speak (Cheryl Chase, 1997, 30 minutes)The camera work leaves something to be desired and the voices are sometimes difficult to hear – but this is a film that should not be missed. A small group of intersexed people gathered at the first Intersex Society of North America conference to talk about their experiences. They sit together outside on a blanket, talking matter of factly and compellingly about their lives. (Available for purchase at ISNA website.) No Dumb Questions (Melissa Regan, 2001, 24 minutes)This short film documents the experiences of a family (mother, father and three daughters, ages 6, 9 and 11) who has learned that Uncle Bill is becoming Aunt Barbara. The focus is on the reactions of the various family members; Barbara appears only briefly (but significantly, as this is the first time the family has seen her as a woman) in the film. The different reactions of the daughters provide much material for class discussion. (Available for purchase from various outlets, including nodumbquestions.com.) Southern Comfort (Kate Davis, 2001, 90 minutes)Transman Robert Eads is dying from ovarian cancer. This film documents his life and family, providing a compelling portrait of the failure of the medical profession to provide care to transgender individuals and of the creation of support networks by trans people. Of all the films I have ever shown in a class, none has outraged my students more than this one. It does an excellent job of showing the daily lives of transgender folks and documenting their loves and struggles. (Available for purchase from various outlets.)Sample syllabus Topics for lecture and discussion Week I: Making Sense of Sex, Gender and Sexuality Reading:Connell, Robert William. 2002. 'Difference and Bodies.' Pp. 28–52 in Gender. Malden, MA: Polity Press.Jackson, Stevi. 2005. 'Sexuality, Heterosexuality and Gender Hierarchy: Getting Our Priorities Straight.' Pp. 15–37 in Thinking Straight: The Power, the Promise and the Paradox of Heterosexuality. New York, NY: Routledge.Johnson, Allan. 2005. 'Ideology, Myth, and Magic: Femininity, Masculinity and "Gender Roles".' Pp. 78–98 in The Gender Knot: Unraveling our Patriarchal Legacy (revised and updated edition). Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.Lorber, Judith. 1994. '"Night to His Day": The Social Construction of Gender' and 'Believing Is Seeing: Biology as Ideology.' Pp. 13–54 in Paradoxes of Gender. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Weeks II–III: Beyond Dichotomies The Social Construction of Sex Reading:Fausto‐Sterling, Anne. 2000. 'The Five Sexes, Revisited.'The Sciences 40: pp. 18–23.Preves, Sharon E. 2003. 'Beyond Pink and Blue.' Pp. 1–22 in Intersex and Identity: The Contested Self. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. The Social Construction of Gender Reading:Dozier, Raine. 2005. 'Beards, Breasts and Bodies: Doing Sex in a Gendered World.'Gender & Society 19: 297–316.Lucal, Betsy. 1999. 'What It Means to Be Gendered Me: Life on the Boundaries of a Dichotomous Gender System.'Gender & Society 13: 781–797. The Social Construction of Sexualities Reading:Ault, Amber. 1999. 'Ambiguous Identity in an Unambiguous Sex/Gender System: The Case of Bisexual Women.' Pp. 167–185 in Bisexuality: A Critical Reader. New York, NY: Routledge.Clausen, Jan. 1999. 'Introduction.' Pp. xv–xxix in Apples and Oranges: My Journey through Sexual Identity. Boston. MA: Houghton Mifflin.Putting It All Together ...Reading:Lucal, Betsy. 2008. 'Building Boxes and Policing Boundaries: (De)Constructing Intersexuality, Transgender and Bisexuality.'Sociology Compass 2: 519–536, DOI: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2008.00099.x.Etc ...Focus questions

What are some ways in which our society supports the idea that sex, gender and sexuality each comprise two mutually exclusive categories? In other words, how do we contribute to building the boxes that Lucal discusses?
Think of an experience from your own life that was a result of people (perhaps yourself) policing the boundaries of the sex, gender or sexuality categories. Describe this experience (its context, your reaction, etc.). How did it feel to be policed in this way? How does 'policing' relate to the concept of norms?
Imagine that you are the parent of an infant born with an intersexed condition. What would you do? What are the pros and cons of medical and surgical intervention? How do these considerations relate to the concept of boxes and boundaries?
Consider a day in the life of a transgendered person, from waking up in the morning to going to bed at night. List all the times throughout the day when this person will be expected to place themselves in one of the gender boxes. Reflect on your list: What would a day in this life be like?
Make a list of stereotypes of and slang terms for bisexuals, gays and lesbians (together and separately) and heterosexuals. How are these lists similar and different? How do these lists relate to the idea of boxes and boundaries?

Seminar/project idea Individual project: considering the wider social context Choose a social institution (e.g. family, education, mass media, religion, health and medicine) related to sex, gender and sexuality. Within that social institution, choose a narrower topic (e.g. access to health care, having and raising children, sitcom images). Do some research on how this specific topic relates to the lives of intersexed, transgender and bisexual individuals. Prepare an oral presentation for your class in which you compare and contrast the issues facing these three groups in the context of this topic. (Keep in mind, of course, that individuals might be members of more than one of these groups.) How are the issues facing each group in this context similar? How are they different?

Author's introductionListening to popular music, accessed via Web 2.0 technologies, such as P2P networks and pay‐per‐track sites, and played‐back on MP3 players, is a central, arguably defining activity of contemporary youth consumer culture. For example, how many of our current undergraduates do not possess some kind of MP3 device, via which they can access their preferred choice of music whenever they want? Very few, I suspect. The above article explored the difficulties we currently face in trying to explain this example of apparently mundane youth practice. Because as soon as we begin to ask why this form of music consumption is popular, what it might mean to individual listeners, and the processes that make it possible and even desirable as something to do, we realize that the extant approaches that could provide possible answers, lie across a range of disciplines: youth studies, popular music studies and media communications. And this is because this taken‐for‐granted contemporary youth consumer practice, is actually the most visible point in a complex set of overlapping industry and organizational practices that make possible the production, mediation and consumption of popular music, in this form. The problem the above‐referenced article raised was that the hitherto existing academic subject domains of youth studies, popular music and media communications, all clearly have a part to play in providing a possibly adequate explanation of this phenomena. Or at least they would be able to do so, if they could be more fruitfully integrated. Because of their origins and development they have remained more or less separate areas of enquiry, with different theoretical and methodological values and concerns, which has resulted in a lack of integration of key areas, such as the relationship between the cultural and structural in youth music consumption and the role of media industries in 'framing' such a process; areas that would appear to be essential to explaining the production, mediation and 'uses' of youth music consumption. However, in the article, I also suggest that there are signs of the emergence, in some recent popular music and culture textbooks, of a more integrated approach, one that examines popular music as a media culture industry that serves a youth demographic. The value of this, is that it appears to offer a way of bringing youth studies, popular music and media studies closer together in the ways in which it is possible to explore the linkages between production, mediation and consumption of music commodities and youth consumer practices. In what follows I identify and comment on these texts and also those texts that offer accessible accounts of popular music and the music industries as well as youth consumption.Author recommendsWall, Tim. 2003. Studying Popular Music Culture. London, UK: Arnold.This book presents itself as an undergraduate 'text book' with panels on case studies, suggestions for student projects and the like. But unlike perhaps other examples of this style the author offers an innovative combination of popular music and media culture approaches, taking the form of concise summaries, analytical points (sometimes with models) and applied thinking‐through of ideas. For example, the section on Popular music histories and the frameworks that inform them, offers a range of student activities based around empirical analysis (historical schematics), theory (models of emergence, innovation, revolution, incorporation and decline), and applied thinking. Accessible to all undergraduates.Longhurst, Brian. 2007. Popular Music and Society. Oxford, UK: Polity, 2nd edn.Another would‐be undergraduate core text. Well‐organized and very clearly written, again using topic‐based panels but in this volume comparatively substantial exerts from classic texts are included with questions. Longhurst's strength is the way the book is informed by knowledge of social theory happening in different areas. This is evident in the section on audiences (in the revised edition), which provides a balanced but also critically informed overview of the most up‐to‐date work in (so‐called) post‐subcultural studies. Accessible to all undergraduates.Osgerby, Bill. 2004. Youth Media. London, UK: Routledge.Osgerby is a cultural historian who is not surprisingly strong on narratives of periods and points of change. The scope of this book is impressive and so is the detail and range of references. Despite the fact that the book is narrative driven the author also pays attention to shifts and changes in theoretical arguments. It also offers a useful guide to further reading. Accessible to all undergraduates.Frith, Simon and Andrew Goodwin. (eds) 1990. On Record: Rock, Pop and the Written Word. London, UK: Routledge.This classic text is still probably the best collection of popular music and music industry related articles and chapter extracts. It includes seminal work that is not easily available elsewhere, such as many pieces mentioned in my article. Another plus point is that the pieces are not edited down, an unfortunate aspect of many newer volumes. I am at a loss as to understand why a 2nd updated version of this text has never emerged. For advanced undergraduates.Bennett, Andy, Jason Toynbee and Barry Shank. 2006. The Popular Music Studies Reader. London, UK: Routledge.This volume offers itself as an update to research in the field of popular music studies in the absence of a revised edition of Frith and Goodwin's tome (p. 6). I think it largely does meet its remit, offering a wide range of themed sections, of which the section on the music industry and music media are especially relevant to the points in my article, as well as the section on Popular music and Everyday life (see the chapters by De Nora and Bull, for example). Each of the themed sections has an editor introduction, which is useful. The selection of texts is generally representative of (mostly) recent work, although occasionally eclectic. Also the volume, despite or perhaps because of its impressive breadth, does drastically edit down material to fit. For advanced undergraduates.Negus, Keith. 1995. 'Popular Music: Between Celebration and Despair.' Pp. 379–93 in Questioning the Media, edited by John Downing, Ali Mohammadi and Anabelle Sreberny‐ Mohammadi. London, UK: Sage.I can't think of a better piece to begin a popular music and media course than this one, although the imaginative use of Sinead O'Connor's song and video 'Nothing Compares to You', to illustrate the theory of 'articulations', may now be somewhat time‐bound. Showing the video (its on You Tube) helps! Accessible to all undergraduates.Negus, Keith. 1996. Popular Music in Theory. Cambridge, UK: Polity.This book explicitly sets out to provide a guide to theory and debates in popular music studies and, as one of the few 'theory' books in this area, it achieves an impressive level of clarity and accessibility, without compromising on debate. I have found Negus consistently useful in my own attempts to guide students through areas of debates. The sequence of topics, beginning with Audiences, although integral to the way the book develops, does not always map onto the ways that courses are taught in this area. But an essential theory book accessible to undergraduates.Nixon, Sean. 1997. 'Circulating Culture.' Pp. 177–220 in Production of Culture/Cultures of Production, edited by Paul Du Gay. London, UK: Sage.An elegant theoretical attempt to re‐model the structure/culture/biography 'circuit of culture' framework inherited from Birmingham CCCS work and part of a volume concerned with the folding back of consumption into the flexible production of post‐Fordist or late‐capitalist niche product‐driven markets. See also the extended debate about cultural intermediaries in Cultural Studies (2002) vol. 16. For advanced undergraduates.Peterson, Richard A. 1994. 'Cultural Studies through the Production Perspective: Progress and Prospects.' Pp. 163–189 in The Sociology of Culture: Emerging Theoretical Perspectives, edited by Diane Crane. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.An impressive, accessible and wide‐ranging discussion of the Culture of Production approach from one of its originators. For advanced undergraduates.Miles, Steven. 2003. 'Researching Young People as Consumers: Can and Should We Ask Them Why?' Pp. 170–185 in Researching Youth, edited by Andy Bennett, Andy Cieslik and Steven Miles. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmilan.Although Miles has written full‐length texts on Consumption (1998) and Youth Lifestyles (2000) it is this short think‐piece that I would recommend, not least because I quote it and borrow some of its insights in my article, but also because it represents a thoughtful attempt to try and develop an approach to youth studies that foregrounds the cultural meanings surrounding commodity consumption as the link between media‐industries/commerce and the meaning frameworks/structural situation of youth. For advanced undergraduates.Willis, Paul. 1990. Common Culture: Symbolic Work at Play in the Everyday Cultures of the Young. Milton Keynes, UK: Open University Press.Although the examples in this survey and summary of research into youth and commodity culture now seem dated (cassette taping culture, for example), nonetheless it represents a seminal attempt to re‐think subcultural theory in terms of ordinary everyday cultural practices. Obviously, given its perspective 'from below' it has very little to say about the media culture industries themselves. For advanced undergraduates.Online materialsCamp Chaos Entertainment (1998) Napster Bad video (uploaded May 2000):http://www.campchaos.com/blog‐archives/2006/05/napster_bad.htmlCamp Chaos Entertainment (1998) Sue All the World video (uploaded July 2000): http://www.campchaos.com/blog‐archives/2006/05/napster_bad_sue_all_the_world.htmlAs is well‐known, a number of high profiles music artists got involved in the debate about 'free' music, the most lampooned of which is Lars Ulrich (of Metallica) who became (literally) a cartoon effigy of apparent music company greed and control when he threatened to sue fans. These two wickedly satirical animations are great to use as stimulus material for students beginning to think about these issues. But beware – some Metallica fans will not be amused!History of R&B indies: http://www.history‐of‐rock.com/independent.htmThis site relates to the material on Indie Case Studies (see Sample Lect 6), in this case US R&B, blues and soul indies.Progressive rock labels: http://www.my‐generation.org.uk/harvest.htm
Great site on the progressive rock labels (with cool images of vinyl – if you happen to be a vinyl fetishist, like me), both genuine indies, pseudo indies and notable artists and brief history.Reynold's on Post‐Punk: http://www.simonreynolds.net/Music journalist, Simon Reynolds on the neglect of the post‐punk 'indie' project and the idea of an alternative mainstream. Some good links to debates, notes and interviews.RIAA link: http://www.riaa.com/The Recording Industry Association of America records data (in terms of unit sales) of artists and albums, in the largest single popular music market in the world – the US. Very useful in trying to determine the relative popularity of artists/genres/and particular albums….EveyHit WebPage: http://www.everyhit.co.uk/EveryHit.com is a UK search engine/data base that allows analysis of artists, chart positions and duration of Top 20, Top 10 and No. 1s. This can be very useful in trying to decide things like how diverse markets are, how volatile, how consistent artists, genres and trends are; the composition of top 20s over time, etc.BPI site: http://www.bpi.co.uk/index.aspThe home page of the British Phonographic Institute – UK equivalent to the RIAA. Although data breakdown is only available to subscribers the site does offer year‐end reports on sales and artists which can be e‐mailed to your account or printed.Global Artists Sales: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Best_selling_music_artists#World.27s_best_sellerThis link tries to categorise artists in terms of units of global sales but does not have the precision of the RIAA. Useful for all kinds of arguments, like who is the globally highest selling rap artist?Rock bottom: The music industry in trouble by Charles Shar Murray: http://www.independent.co.uk/arts‐entertainment/music/features/rock‐bottom‐the‐music‐industry‐in‐trouble‐656952.htmlA contemporary 'think piece' by a former doyen of the United Kingdom 'national' rock press, bemoaning the corporate–logic driving a 'worried' music business and the 'narrow‐cast' nature of music consumption, essentially separate markets connected by niche media.Sample syllabusWeek 5Lecture: industryOver the next two sessions we are going to be looking at research into the music business. As Keith Negus has argued 'whether in the words of academic theorists, journalists, fans or musicians, the music industry frequently appears as villain: a ruthless corporate 'machine' that continually attempts to control creativity, compromises aesthetic practices and offers audiences little real choice' (1996: 36). This week's lecture will survey the research that has underpinned and fed into such arguments, from the seminal Peterson and Berger model of how oligopoly = lack of diversity in music markets, to those studies that have sough to continue, revise and update this model to take account of the contemporary global music business. While it is clearly the case that popular music production is currently in the hands of even fewer global media corporations this is not necessarily repeating the same patterns of production and consumption as in the past. While clearly the overall aims of such firms is to exercise as much control as possible over the production of popular music, as in the past, this strategy has not always produced the standardized and stylistically conservative sounds, aimed at a homogenized mass audience, that critics have claimed. One of the ways to begin to explore this is to look at the changing relationship between majors and independents over time and how the strategies of both have lead to an increasingly more complex commercial relationship between the two. This does not mean that the idea of the big, bad music business has gone away or that arguments do not continue to rage over: commerce versus creativity, independents vs. majors and production determining consumption, as we will see.
Seminar: The case of the Sony/BMG merger.
Reading
Longhurst, Brian. 1995. Popular Music and Society Oxford: Polity. Pp. 29–53 in 'The Pop Music Industry.'Negus, Keith. 1996. Popular Music in Theory. Pp. 36–65 in 'Industry.' Cambridge: Polity, ch. 2.Rowe, David. 1995. Popular Cultures: Rock Music, Sport and the Politics of Pleasure. pp. 18–49 in 'Rock industry: Song and Business Cycle.' London: Sage.Frith, Simon. 1988/2005 'The Industrialization of Popular Music.' Pp. 231–8 in The Popular Music Studies Reader, edited by A. Bennett, B. Shank and J. Toynbee. London: Routledge, ch. 26.Chapple, S. and Garofalo, R. 1977. Rock 'n' Roll is Here to Pay: The History and Politics of The Music Industry. Chicago: Nelson Hall.Harker, Dave. 1980. One for the Money: Politics and the Popular Song. London: Hutchinson.Hull, Geoffrey, P. 2000. 'The Structure of the Recorded Music Industry.' Pp. 76–98 in The Media and Entertainment Industries: Readings in Mass Communications Needham Heights, edited by A.N. Greco. MA: Allyn & Bryce.Sanjek, R and Sanjek, D. 1991. The American Popular Music Business in the 20th Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Burnett, Robert. 1996. The Global Jukebox: The International Music Industry. London: Routledge.Hesmondhalgh, David. 2002. The Cultural Industries. London: Sage, pp. 1–24.Week 6Lecture: Indies vs. MajorsThis second lecture on the music business shifts the emphasis away from political economy models to those that focus on the micro picture of the organizational logic that informs the typical record company within the wider logic of the record industry. Hirsch's (1972/1990) seminal model of the record company as a cultural system that selects and filters product along a linear production line, is relevant here. This is because the inherent instability of popular taste and the difficulty faced by big corporations in anticipating changes in taste, result in the formation of two contradictory tendencies. First, an attempt to control the stages of production, through horizontal and vertical integration and the like. Second the attempt to strategically manage artist and repertoire, genre categories and output itself. It is the second dimension that has become subject to more recent research scrutiny in terms of the 'management of creativity' within the music business and more specifically, the role of record company personnel as 'cultural intermediaries'. This revised theoretical model and a number of case studies of significant independent companies, such as those associated with punk and post‐punk, indie and dance labels, has led to a revised account of the relationship between the smaller or independent labels and the big corporations in terms of concepts such as niche markets, symbiosis and flexible specialization.
Seminar: The progressive underground and the post‐punk indie experiment: what have we learned?
Reading
Longhurst, Brian. 1995. Popular Music and Society. Pp. 55–90 in 'The Social Production of Music.' Oxford: Polity.Negus, Keith. 1992. Producing Pop: Culture and Conflict in the Popular Music Industry. Pp. 135–150. London: Arnold, 'Between Success and Failure: Collaboration in the Music Industry.' Pp. 38–61. 'Priorities and prejudice; Artist and Repertoire and the Acquisition of Artist., Pp. 62–79 'Images, Identities and Audiences.'Negus, Keith. 1995. 'Where the Mystical Meets the Market: Creativity and Commerce in the Production of Popular Music'Sociological Review43(2): 316–341.Rowe, David. 1995. Popular Cultures: Rock Music, Sport and the Politics of Pleasure. Pp. 18–49 in 'Rock Industry: Song and Business Cycle.' London: Sage.Indie case studies – from R&B pioneers, through the Progressive rock underground to Post‐Punk DIY, Hardcore/Alt, DanceIndustrial to Rap:George, Nelson. 1988. The Death of Rhythm and Blues. Pp 147–169 in 'Crossover.' New York: Plume.Ward, Brian. 1998. Just My Soul Responding: Rhythm and Blues, Black Consciousness and Race Relations. Pp. 21–29 in 'Majors and Independents.' London and New York: Routledge.Stump, Paul. 1998. The Music's All that Matters: A History of Progressive Rock. 'Samplers, Subsidiaries and Showmen.' London: Quartet, ch. 3.Reynolds, Simon. 2005. Rip it Up and Start Again: Post‐Punk 1978–84. London: Faber and Faber.Young, Robert. 2006. Rough Trade. London: Black Dog Publishing.Hesmondhalgh, David. 1998. 'The British Dance Music Industry: A Case Study in Independent Cultural Production,'British Journal of Sociology49(2): 234–51.Goshert, John, C. 2000. 'Punk' after the Pistols: American Music, Economics and Politics in the 1980s and 1990s. Popular Music & Society Spring, 24(1): 85–106.Wilson, Tony. 2002. 24 Hour Party People: What the Sleeve Notes Never Tell You. Oxford: 4 Books Pan Macmillan.Hesmondhalgh, David. 1996. 'Flexibility, post‐Fordism and the Music Industries'Media, Culture and Society18(3): 469–88.Negus, Keith. 1999. 'The Music Business and Rap: Between the Street and the Executive Suite.'Cultural Studies13(3): 488–508.Week 9Lecture: consumptionThe dominant characterization of the popular music consumer in administrative and 'effects' research has been overwhelmingly the vulnerable, gullible, easily influenced and therefore potentially 'dangerous' individual especially as this characterization coincided and reinforced images of damaged children, dangerous adolescents and troubling youth found in moral panics accompanying the spread and popularity of popular music cultures. Left and radical theories did not fare much better since they too, following Adorno, tended to characterize the consumer of popular music culture as a potential recruit of authoritarian politics or at the very least a passive conformist to the status quo. More recently such views have been challenged by the rise of 'active audience' theories. But it remains the case that we know very little of the detail of how people actually consume music and therefore of the sorts of connections that exist between this activity and other issues such as changing conceptions of social identity, gender and ethnicity, locality and age.
Seminar: Exploring music consumption: technologies and 'uses'
.
Reading
Longhurst, Brian. 1995. Popular Music and Society. Pp. 195–225 in 'Effects, Audiences and Subcultures.' Oxford: Polity.Shuker, Roy. 1994. Understanding Popular Music. Pp. 225–36 in 'My Generation': Audiences, Fans and Subcultures.' London: Routledge, ch. 9.Shuker, Roy. 2001 Understanding Popular Music. Pp. 193–206 in 'My Generation': Audiences and Fans, Scenes and Subcultures.' London: Routledge, 2nd edn., ch.11.Hesmondhalgh, David. 2002. 'Popular Music Audiences and Everyday Life.' Pp. 117–130 in Popular Music Studies, edited by D. Hesmondhalgh and K. Negus. London: Arnold.DeNora, Tia. 2000. Music in Everyday Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.DeNora, Tia. 2005. 'Music and Self‐identity.' Pp. 141–147 in The Popular Music Studies Reader, edited by A. Bennett, B. Shank and J. Toynbee. London: Routledge, ch. 16.Bull, Michael. 2005. 'No Dead Air! The iPod and the Culture of Mobile Listening'Leisure Studies, 24(4): 343–55, October.Willis, Paul. and Team. 1996. Moving Culture. Pp. 19–26. Buckingham: Open University Press, 'Music.' London: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, ch. 4.Peterson, Richard A. 1994. 'Measured Markets and Unknown Audiences: Case Studies from the Production and Consumption of Music.' in. Pp. 171–85. Audience Making: How the Media Create the Audience, edited by, J.S. Ettima and D.C. Whitney. London: Sage.Du Gay, Paul and Negus, Keith. 1994. 'The Changing Sites of Sound: Music Retailing and Composition of Consumers.'Media, Culture and Society16(3): 395–413.Music Consumers (ideologies of consumption):Adorno, Theodor. 1990/1941. 'On Popular Music.' Pp. 301–314 in On Record, edited by S. Frith and A. Goodwin. London: Routledge.Adorno, Theodor. 1991. 'On the Fetish Character of Music and the Regression of Listening' in The Culture Industry: Selected Essays On Mass Culture. London: Routledge.Gendron, Bernard. 1986. 'Theodore Adorno Meets the Cadillacs.' Pp. 18–36 in Studies in Entertainment, edited by T. Modleski. Bloomington: Bloomington Indiana Press.Riesman, David. 1990/1950 'Listening To Popular Music.' Pp. 5–13 in On Record, edited by S. Frith and A. Goodwin. London: Routledge.Horton, Donald. 1990/1957. 'The Dialogue of Courtship in Popular Song.' Pp. 14–26 in On Record, edited by S. Frith and A. Goodwin London: Routledge.Hall, Stuart and Whannel, Paddy. 1990/1964. 'The Young Audience.' Pp. 27–37 in On Record, edited by S. Frith and A. Goodwin. London: Routledge.Buxton, David. 1990/1983. 'Rock Music, the Star System, and the Rise of Consumerism.' Pp. 427–40 in On Record, edited by S. Frith and A. Goodwin. London: Routledge.Frith, S. and Goodwin, A. 1990. 'From Subcultural to Cultural Studies.' Pp. 39–42 in On Record, edited by S. Frith and A. Goodwin. London: Routledge.Studies of listening/consuming music and 'meaning':Cavicchi, David. 1998. Tramps Like Us: Music and Meaning Among Springsteen Fans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Adams, Rebecca G. 2000. Deadhead Social Science: You ain't Gonna Learn What You Don't Want to Know. AltaMira Press.Williams, Christina. 2001. 'Does it Really Matter? Young People and Popular Music.'Popular Music20(2): 223–42.Week 10Lecture: subcultures, scenes & tribesFor many years the concept of subculture was thought to provide the most consistent explanation of how class based youth groups were able to make a youth culture out of materials they 'borrowed' from the dominant commercial culture. The resultant style that such groups exhibited was understood to comprise a combination of dress, argot and ritual. It was assumed that this framework could also explain the connections to types of music preference and its use within particular subcultures, such as Ska in the skinhead culture or R&B in the Mod type. This musical connection seemed to become more explicit with Punk – the first post‐war youth subculture to be defined explicitly by the music it preferred. However, after Punk, it became apparent to a growing number of theorists that music based mass movements, like acid house and rave, did not sit very well within the subculture framework and that subsequent changes in youth styles and activities pointed to features – like the cross‐class, mixed ethnic and gender camaraderie of outdoor rave culture and the fluid and changing composition of groups – that were not easily accommodated within the old subcultural model. This impasse has led a number of contemporary theorists to offer a range of alternative ways of understanding youth practices, particularly in relation to urban dance cultures, such as: bunde, neo‐tribe, pseudo‐tribe, scene and post‐subculture. However, it remains the case that the CCCS model of subculture still casts a long shadow over the study of youth and this has lead some commentators to argue that the study of popular music would be better of without it. Others have responded to this position by arguing that what is needed is a greater integration of youth theories with more detailed empirical work on the ordinary consumption of youth that might tease out the connections between music, meaning and identities.
Seminar: Subcultural styles: I can't hear the music over the theory!
Reading
Longhurst, Brian. 1995. Popular Music and Society. Pp. 210–25 in 'Culture, Subculture and Music.' Oxford: Polity.Shuker, Roy. 1994. Understanding Popular Music. Pp. 237–50 'Youth Subcultures, Style and Rock.' London: Routledge.Shuker, Roy. 2001. Understanding Popular Music. Pp. 206–16 in 'Subcultures and Style.' London: Routledge, 2nd edn.Brown, Andy R. 2003. 'Heavy Metal and Subcultural Theory: A Paradigmatic Case of Neglect?,' Pp. 209–22 in The Post‐Subcultures Reader, edited by D. Muggleton and R. Weinzierl. Oxford: Berg.Brown, Andy R. 2007. 'Rethinking the Subcutural Commodity: Exploring Heavy Metal T‐Shirt Culture(s).' Pp. 63–78 in Youth Cultures: Scenes, Subcultures and Tribes, edited by P. Hodkinson and W. Deicke. London: Routledge.Frith, Simon. 1978. The Sociology of Rock. Pp. 37–58 in ch.3, 'Youth and Music.' London: Constable.Frith, Simon. 1983. Sound Effects: Youth, Leisure and the Politics of Rock. Pp. 202–234 in ch.9 'Youth and Music,' London: Constable.Willis, P. 1990/1978. 'The Golden Age.' Pp. 43–55 in On Record, edited by S. Frith and A. Goodwin. London: Routledge.Willis, Paul. 1978. 'Profane Culture.' London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.Hebdige, Dick. 1990/1979. 'Style as Homology and Signifying Practice.' Pp. 56–65 in On Record, edited by S. Frith and A. Goodwin. London: Routledge.McRobbie, Angela. 1990/1980. 'Settling Accounts with Subcultures: A Feminist Critique.' Pp. 66–80 in On Record, edited by S. Frith and A. Goodwin. London: Routledge.Clarke, Gary. 1990/1981. 'Defending Ski‐Jumpers: A Critique of Theories of Youth Subcultures.' Pp. 81–95 in On Record, edited by S. Frith and A. Goodwin. London: Routledge.Wicke, Peter. 1990. Rock Music: Culture, Aesthetics and Sociology. Pp. 73–90 in 'My Generation: Rock Music and Sub‐cultures.' Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. 4.Negus, Keith. 1996. Popular Music in Theory. Pp. 99–135 in 'Identities,' Cambridge: Polity, ch. 4.Thornton, Sarah. 1995. Club Cultures: Music, Media and Subcultural Capital. Cambridge: Polity,Thornton, Sarah. 1997. 'The Social Logic of Subcultural Capital.' Pp. 200–209 in The Subcultures Reader, edited by K. Gelder and S.Thornton. London: Routledge.Bennett, Andy. 1999. 'Subcultures or Neo‐Tribes? Rethinking the Relationship Between Youth, Style and Musical Taste'Sociology33(3): 599–561.Hodkinson, Paul. 2002. Goth: Identity, Style and Subculture. Oxford: Berg, Pp. 9–33.Weinzierl, Rupert and Muggleton, David. 2003. 'What is "Post‐subcultural Studies" Anyway?' Pp. 3–23 in The Post‐Subcultures Reader, edited by D. Muggleton and R. Weinzierl. London: Berg.Purcell, Nancy, J. 2003. Death Metal Music: The Passion and Politics of a Subculture. North Carolina and London: McFarland and Co.Laughey, Dan. 2006. Music & Youth Culture. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.Hesmondhalgh, David. 2005. 'Subcultures, Scenes or Tribes? None of the Above.'Journal of Youth Studies8(1): 21–40.

Since the Ukraine war, the G7 has re-energised, focusing on the growing geopolitical challenges that the West faces from an assertive Russia and a rising China. The non-aligned position adopted by many developing countries in the G20 regarding Russia's invasion of Ukraine surprised, if not shocked, the West. Against this background, the G20 has become a much more fraught space to build consensus on many global challenges between the advanced economies and the developing ones. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there have been serious efforts by Western countries to understand the position of developing countries and persuade them that the West still has much to offer, not least in the area of climate and energy transitions. Climate and energy transitions feature in both the G7 and the G20 agendas, albeit the composition of each group means the emphases may differ. South Africa, a leading voice in Africa on these issues, will assume the G20 presidency in December, where climate and the just energy transition will be important themes.
This article discusses the Italian G7 outcomes on climate through the prism of South Africa's engagement on these issues. While South Africa's energy and climate challenges are not the same as those facing many other African states, South Africa has been a key proponent of African positions in both formal and informal (clubs) forums.South Africa and the global climate agenda
South Africa is one of the world's highest emitters of greenhouse gases, ranking 17th globally and producing 534.53 million tonnes in 2022.[1] The country has committed to meet emission reduction targets (between 350-420 megatons by 2030), as agreed in its revised Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC).[2] The ultimate goal is to reach net-zero by 2050 and to engineer inclusive and sustainable growth through a just transition.[3] South Africa's latest Integrated Resource Plan (IRP)[4] provides for an energy mix of 44 per cent coal,[5] 28 per cent gas, 22 per cent renewables and 6 per cent nuclear energy by 2030. South Africa has admitted that it is unlikely to achieve its emission reduction goals for 2030, but has reiterated its commitment to its net zero target.[6]
With abundant coal reserves and some 90,000 people working in the sector, abandoning coal in the short run is not feasible. The cost of the transition is estimated at 98.7 billion US dollars over the next five years.[7] The country was the first to enter into a Just Energy Transition Partnership, announced at COP26 with France, Germany, the UK, the US and the EU. More recently these partners have been joined by others. The total amount committed thus far is about 12 billion US dollars.[8] The Just Energy Transition Investment Plan guides the allocation of transition finance and identifies three priority sectors (electricity, new energy vehicles and green hydrogen), while emphasising skills development and strengthening capacity at local government level on the just transition. The partnership is a mix of grant funding (4 per cent of the initial agreement), concessional loans (63 per cent), commercial loans and guarantees. The scale of financing and technical support needed, not only for a carbon-intensive country like South Africa, but also for the rest of the continent, is substantial.
South Africa is an important African voice on development and climate issues in many key fora: the BRICS group,[9] the G20 (which South Africa chairs in 2025) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In those fora, it has sought to articulate not only its own interests, but amplify the concerns and priorities of the African continent. South Africa's and Africa's position on the responsibilities of the G7 and the advanced industrialised economies on the climate agenda is based on the "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" (CBDR-RC) principle, as set out in the 2015 Paris agreement. This means that the industrialised economies, responsible for most CO2 emissions since the industrial revolution, must carry the largest responsibility for mitigation and contribute towards financing and technology transfer for developing economies to adapt to climate change, address climate-related loss and damage and transition away from fossil fuels.
During climate negotiations, South Africa has advocated for a greater focus on adaptation financing for fellow developing economies. It has emphasised that the quality of financing is as important as the quantity and has highlighted that the financial risk burden is not equally shared, as it rests entirely on recipient countries.
Furthermore, South Africa and the rest of the continent are concerned about unilateral climate actions taken by advanced economies, which carry negative consequences for many African countries as they manifest as green protectionism. Both the European Union and the US (both part of the G7) have adopted policies that can be construed as green protectionism in recent years. In the EU the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) imposes carbon tariffs at the border for imported goods based on their level of embedded emissions. The South African government has criticised this as violating World Trade Organisation rules. Once implemented in full, South Africa stands to lose approximately 110 million US dollars in export revenue per year as steel, iron and aluminium are impacted.[10] This will also have detrimental impacts on other African economies.[11] Major economies in the Global South regard CBAM as an example of "unilateral measures and discriminatory practices".[12] The BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China negotiating group within the UNFCCC) ministerial statement at COP28 re-emphasised this point.[13] The 2023 BRICS Johannesburg Declaration criticised green protectionism, while emphasising a preference for technology-neutral approaches to mitigation and transition.[14]The Italian G7 and the energy agenda for Africa
The G7's commitments on climate, energy and Africa during Italy's presidency warrant careful consideration given Europe's geopolitical context and the role it plays in financially supporting aspects of the green transition in South Africa and elsewhere on the continent. Italy's G7 presidency had a specific focus on Africa, which manifested both through a bilateral Italian initiative, the Mattei Plan for Africa, and the G7.
In January, Italy hosted the inaugural Italy-Africa Summit in Rome, attended by 21 heads of state or government, intending to recalibrate Italy's relationship with Africa and where the Mattei Plan was launched. Its financial commitment was 5.5 billion euros – of which 3 billion comes from Italy's Climate Fund.
In parallel, the G7 Summit hosted this June in Apulia adopted the Energy for Growth in Africa Initiative. It aims to support African states in the green energy transition by developing clean energy infrastructure, supply chains and generation capacity. The Initiative noted that Africa had "significant but largely untapped clean energy potential [that] needs massive investments".[15] Its objective therefore is to "develop bankable clean energy projects" and attract private capital through the catalytic use of public finance and technical assistance as well as encouraging concessional finance flows to the continent. Importantly, the Initiative emphasises coordination with existing programmes, especially the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), adopted during the 2022 G7 Summit and largely seen as a counter to China's Belt and Road initiative. In a summit side event, G7 leaders met with Italian and US businesses to support flagship PGII projects and committed to coordinating between the various G7 initiatives (PGII, Mattei Plan and the EU Global Gateway) as well as to developing synergies with the Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa. Importantly, the Mattei Plan has launched new financial instruments in collaboration with the African Development Bank, open to international partners' contributions, and the Italian G7 presidency also committed to establishing a secretariat to enhance investment coordination in the context of the PGII. These are all positive developments for tackling the climate challenge on the continent. Their success is critically predicated on being able to leverage the private sector's involvement in these projects and ensure effective coordination, which the Secretariat could help foster.
Access to critical minerals also featured in the G7 communiqué, as these are crucial for the green energy transition. Africa possesses significant reserves of these minerals, 30 per cent of the global total, according to the IMF.
The G7 in Apulia urged the establishment of international partnerships "to make critical minerals and critical raw materials supply chains more diversified, transparent, resilient, responsible, circular, resource efficient, and sustainable".[16] The communiqué also emphasised that the G7 would support "local value creation in critical minerals supply chains". Various plans have been developed by G7 members including the US's Minerals Security Partnership (MSP). As geopolitical rivalries between the west and China intensify, so too does the scramble to secure the minerals that are essential for decarbonisation. For South Africa and the continent such a scramble is seen as a potential threat that would make it very difficult for them to maintain a balance between rival geopolitical camps. The heightened emphasis in European and other western capitals on critical minerals and sustainable value chains is regarded in some African capitals as code for excluding China. The African Development Bank is currently developing a critical (green) minerals strategy to be able to exercise agency in response to these developments. African Union Chairman, Moussa Faki, stated at the January summit in Rome that African countries need to be free to choose their partners.[17] There is a fear that African countries' actions might be constrained by policies and regulations adopted by western countries in this regard. The critical minerals debate in Africa is also framed as one that can contribute to African industrialisation and local development, rather than simply replicating extractive models of the past.
Lastly, the G7 communiqué focused less on the necessity of focusing on some of the transformational issues that would help tackle climate and the energy transition. Some of these transformational issues were highlighted in a letter penned to the G7 before the summit by 49 African parliamentarians, urging debt forgiveness and restructuring; reform of the international financial architecture; and delivering on climate and finance commitments.[18]
While recognising that countries should not have to choose between investing in their development and repaying creditors is significant, the G7 communiqué ignored the CBDR-RC principle of the Paris Agreement that remains at the core of developing country calls for the industrialised economies to live up to their historic responsibilities.
The G7 committed to "evolve the international financial architecture to make it fit for the challenges of today's world" but provided no specifics,[19] although Africa has already made a number of proposals on reforms.[20]Looking ahead
The G7, both as a grouping and through its individual members, is an important partner for Africa. Members are significant investors and trading partners. They are also significantly ramping up support for Africa's decarbonisation efforts. This creates opportunities for building bridges between the outcomes of the Italian G7 presidency and the incoming South African G20 presidency on climate action and the just energy transition. South Africa's G20 presidency aims to emphasise solidarity, equality and sustainable development, in which the just energy transition will be an important pillar. This will be the first time that a G20 summit is held on the African continent and South Africa will highlight African developmental priorities. The G7 is part of the G20 and it would be important for it to show concrete deliverables on its various African undertakings, while also recognising in practical terms the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. This also includes taking time to consult with African stakeholders on initiatives in advance of initiatives. At a time of geopolitical fragmentation, the G7 should prioritise emphasising its value addition within the more inclusive G20, with an acute sensitivity to the fact that Africans are articulating more specific agendas and that the G7 is a powerful force in many formal multilateral institutions where reforms are necessary to enable easier energy and economic transitions.Elizabeth Sidiropoulos is the Chief Executive of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). Alex Benkenstein is Programme Head of SAIIA Climate and Natural Resources Programme. Jordan Mc Lean is a researcher in the SAIIA Climate and Natural Resources Programme. Krissmonne Olwagen is a Konrad Adenauer Stiftung research scholar in the office of the Chief Executive of SAIIA. This commentary was prepared within the framework of the project Nexus25–Shaping Multilateralism. Views expressed are the author's alone.[1] Joint Research Centre and IEA, GHG Emissions of All World Countries, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2023, https://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/report_2023?vis=ghgtot#emissions_table.[2] South Africa Government, South Africa: First Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement, updated September 2021, p. 15, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-06/South%20Africa%20updated%20first%20NDC%20September%202021.pdf.[3] Presidential Climate Commission (PCC), A Framework for Just Transition in South Africa, June 2022, https://pccommissionflo.imgix.net/uploads/images/22_PAPER_Framework-for-a-Just-Transition_revised_242.pdf.[4] The IRP is designed to secure affordable and stable electricity supply. Full text available in Government Gazette, No. 49974 (4 January 2024), https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202401/49974gon4238.pdf.[5] Julia Evans, "'A Shoddy Piece of Work' – Experts Decry South Africa's New Blueprint for Energy", in Daily Maverick, 10 January 2024, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/?p=2009357.[6] Tim Cocks, "South Africa Appeals to Donors to Delay Its Climate Targets, Minister Says", in Reuters, 16 July 2024, https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/south-africa-appeals-donors-delay-its-climate-targets-minister-says-2024-07-16.[7] PCC, South Africa's Just Energy Transition Investment Plan, November 2022, p. 14, https://www.climatecommission.org.za/publications/sa-jet-ip.[8] Ethan van Diemen, "New Investment Pledges Boost South Africa's Just Energy Transition Funding Pool to $11.8bn", in Daily Maverick, 1 October 2023, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/?p=1879356.[9] The BRICS comprises Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and enlarged to include Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran and the United Arab Emirates at the Johannesburg XV BRICS Summit in 2023.[10] "EU Carbon Price on Imports 'Violates' WTO Rules, Says Patel as SA Heads for Clash with Bloc", in African Climate Wire, 24 May 2024, https://africanclimatewire.org/?p=1231.[11] Olivia Rumble and Andrew Gilder, "The Impact of CBAM on African Economies and the Role of the AfCFTA", in SAIIA Policy Briefings, No. 290 (March 2024), https://saiia.org.za/?p=63502.[12] South Africa et al., BASIC Ministerial Joint Statement at the UNFCCC's Sharm El Sheikh Climate Change Conference (COP27/CMP17/CMA4), 15 November 2022, https://www.dffe.gov.za/node/1794.[13] Brazil et al., BASIC Ministerial Joint Statement on Climate Change, 16 October 2023, https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/basic-ministerial-joint-statement-on-climate-change.[14] BRICS, Johannesburg II Declaration: BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Mutually Accelerated Growth, Sustainable Development and Inclusive Multilateralism, Sandton, 23 August 2023, http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/230823-declaration.html.[15] G7, G7 Leaders' Statement on Energy Growth in Africa, 14 June 2024, https://europa.eu/!9J9Mpt. Signatories included: G7, Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria and South Africa.[16] G7, Apulia G7 Leaders' Communiqué, 14 June 2024, https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/Apulia-G7-Leaders-Communique.pdf.[17] African Union, Speech by H.E. Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, at the Italy – Africa Summit: A Bridge for Common Growth, 29 January 2024, https://au.int/en/node/43449.[18] Enyinnaya H. Abaribe et al., "'Three Things We Need G7 To Do': An Open Letter from 49 MPs across Africa", in African Arguments, 12 June 2024, https://africanarguments.org/?p=44790.[19] G7, Apulia G7 Leaders' Communiqué, cit.[20] African Development Bank, 2024 Annual Meetings: African Countries Urged to Define Common Position for Reform of the Global Financial Architecture, 24 April 2024, https://www.afdb.org/en/node/70281.

U studiji se, nasuprot uvriježenim mišljenjima, dokazuje da su blokovi sjevernog dijela Dioklecijanove palače bili izvorno projektirani i izvedeni za potrebe gineceja kojemu se u Notitia Dignitatum spominje nadstojnik (Procurator gynaecii lovensis Dalmatiae -Aspalato). Opskrbljivao ga je akvedukt kapaciteta 1500 1/sec. = 129.600 m3 na dan. Problem obilnog ispiranja riješen je odgovarajucim kanalizacijskim sistemom koji je postojao samo duž ulica sjevernog dijela Palače u kojem su se nalazili pogoni carskih tkaonica. Tehnologija je (uz sustav bazena arheološki uočenih u prizemlju Papalićeve palače) ukljucivala sumporavanje, za što su bili na raspolaganju brojni izvori sumporne vode uz samu Palaču. Čitava građevina savršeno se uklapa u dugački niz tetrarhijskih javnih radova. Bila bi to izvorna, osnovna funkcija građevine u koju se Dioklecijan povukao nakon što je 305. g. bio prisiljen na abdikaciju. ; In scholarly literature, the term "city" was first mentioned by Lj. Karaman, talking of the beginnings of medieval Split in Diocletian's Palace, and then by Andre Grabar in his Martyrium (I: 232-233).2 Noel Duval, in a series of studies he wrote, asks whether Diocletian's residence should be classified as palatium, villa, castrum, urban settlement or some special type of architecture, considering that in comparison with genuine imperial palaces like those in Constantinople, Antioch, Philippopolis and Ravenna, it was wanting a number of "attributes": proposed the term "chateau".3 -5 The term was thoroughly investigated by Slobodan Čurčić, discussing late antique palatine architecture, showing convincingly that the urban character of these residences was undoubted (of Antioch , Nicomedia, Salona, Constantinople, Split) - although the miniature municipal quarters in them had an only slightly more than symbolic significance.6 Diocletian's building in Split really does not have the external look of a Roman imperial villa. In Split, in particular with respect to the two architectural masses in the northern part of the building, we note, its innate anti-landscape character, both the internal and the external disposition of the architectural elements, which is almost inorganically formalised. Not even in the narrow residential area, within which the halls are interconnected only via the "cryptoportico" having no direct contacts with the surrounding landscape, we do not find any of the characteristics that in the nature of things we would expect in a residence in which, it was always considered, the emperor intended to while away his final years. The Split edifice is really primarily an example of fortification. But here too we can be surprised. The sentry patrol corridor should be on the top of the walls and should be protected with a parapet, while here it is on the first floor, perforated with hardly defensible apertures (3 x 2m). The building was clearly primarily motivated by the desire to impress the surroundings, with its emphatic delineation of military presence and power. The Golden and Silver Gates and the great apertures of the sentry corridor on the three sides of the walls onto the mainland must have been walled up before the Byzantine-Gothic wars of the 530s.7 But it would seem that we can understand its form - so very particular that it evades the usual, in some sense fossilized, terminology – only through some new reading of the original meaning and purpose of the building itself. In author's opinion, this is proffered by a very simple question. The aqueduct that brought water into the palace from the source of the river Jadro was, in the design and execution of the imperial architects, undoubtedly related to the construction of his final dwelling place. Although it is a rare specimen of a Roman monument of this kind that is still being used today (reconstructed in 1878), in the literature and in research it has been almost entirely neglected, and has certainly never been interpreted in the original context. The aqueduct provided 1500 l/ sec. (129.600 m3 a day), which in terms of our standards would be enough for a population of 173,000. 8,9 The sheer amount of water inevitably leads to the question of what it was meant for, because it far exceeded the needs of the relatively modest bath complexes in the Palace. The answer might be hidden in an almost neglected item of information from Notitia Dignitatum OC XI 48 (ed. 0 . Seeck, 150) where there is a mention of the Procurator genaecii Iovensis Dalmatiae - Aspalato- warden of the imperial weaving shop for the production of woollen clothing for the army that worked in Split, under the title of Jupiter. So far it has always been thought, on the rare occasions when this fact has been mentioned at all (and then only by-the-bye) that this gynaeceum was only after Diocletian's death "inscribed" into the Palace, which was for the whole of the 5th century a kind of pensiopolis of dethroned emperors or pretenders to the throne. It has been considered that the northern part of the Palace was reserved for the Imperial Guard, for stables and the like. 10,11 Notitia Dignitatum, a long list of all the senior offices in the Empire, civilian and military, is certainly of a composite character. The basic text was created probably in about 408 (in partibus Occidentis changes were recorded up to 420), but it conceals a lot of information about the periods before the revision of the basic copy, mirroring the order that Diocletian had brought into the state, which certainly relates to the Split gynaeceum, which alone of the 14 such complexes located in the most important cities of the empire bears the characteristic predicate Iovense: it must in itself constitute a terminus post quem non to do with the origin of the factory of military uniforms of wool in the building in Split. 12,13,15 Although the gynaecea were never mentioned in the context of Diocletian's reforms, it is generally accepted that they were created at the time of the first Tetrarchy. The concentration of the labour force, the range of specialised jobs, the degree of organisation and their connection with urban centres makes them, in the judgement of historians, the closest to the modern industrial factory. State factories (fabricae) were set up in the late Empire to eliminate or at least to alleviate the difficulties concerning the supply of the state and the army with certain products. It was necessary to clothe the approximately half a million soldiers that Diocletian 's army reforms had raised, as well as no small number of clerks. Archaeology, however, has never made any direct contribution to the understanding of their internal organisation, except in the case of the otherwise well documented gynaeceum in Carthage, which lay in the heart of the city, on the edge of the celebrated Circular Harbour. 16,17 The state operated, through the comes sacrarum largitionum, a number of weaving mills, both for woolen and linen fabrics, and dyeworks 18 The Split gynaeceum should have probably been in some kind of complementary relationship with the gynaeceum moved to Salona, perhaps for security reasons, from Bassiana (Donji Petrovci, Pannonia Inferior) also noted by Notitia Dignitatum, XI, 46 (Procurator gynaecii Bassanensis Pannoniae Secundae translati Salonis). In Salona, thus, there was a large cloth dyeworks (In Not. dign. the Procurator bafii Salonitani Dalmatiae was also mentioned) and weaving mill. At Five Bridges in Salona artisan workshops were actually found, probably a dyer's workshop, and fulling mills for cloth and the dyeing of cloth. Also to be seen is the reservoir from which the water to drive the mills ran, and a building for the habitation of the workers. 19 In one inscription in Salona, a magister conquilarius is mentioned (CIL III 2115 + 8572), clearly the head of the state workshops in which purple was extracted from shellfish, perhaps for the gynaeceum in Aspalathos. 22 Another inscription found in Salona mentions a certain Hilarus, who was the purpurarius, dyer of red garments or, perhaps, negotiator artis purpurae. 23 That the Salona baffeum and the Split gynaeceum were mentioned only in the Notitia Dignitatum, says that their production was a strictly channelled state monopoly, and that the products from them did not make their way to the general market as other goods did. The army was supplied directly, without the agency of merchants. Although not all the technological details of the gynaeceum, the fullonica and the baffeum have been revealed, we can conjure up in the northern half of the Palace an image of the whole system of pools in which the fabrics were washed, softened and finished by being trampled on with bare feet in a solution of potash , fuller's earth, human and animal urine. Here then there was a very large demand for water.28 Garments were rubbed with chalk, and fumigated with sulphur. It is particularly important to remember that the technology included, among other things, sulphur treatment (sulfure sulfire ), for which there were the many springs of sulphurous water alongside the Palace itself, which were used for the washing and bleaching of cloth right up to the first half of the 20th century, by St Francis church on the Shore.29 The problem of copious rinsing was solved by the extraordinarily handled sewage system that existed only along the the cardo and decumanus and the perimeter streets of the northern part of the Palace , in which the mentioned plant was located. Among other things, the extreme western part of the sewer under the decumanus, at the exit from the Palace, has been explored. It passed under the western gate (Porta ferrea), and moved in a gentle arc towards the south-west, finishing some forty metres further in a stone portal (below the kitchen of today's Hotel Central). Thence in an open channel all this water flowed into the bay of the sea, in the immediate vicinity of the grandest corner of the Palace.30 The monumental cross-section of this sewage system corresponds perfectly to the cross-section of the aqueduct. We should underscore the fact that the sewage system was located only along the streets of the northern part of the Palace, while we might expect it to be primarily in the residential southern part, which also shows that it was constructed for the purpose of the production inside the gynaeceum. Unfortunately, there are practically no archaeological records of the small finds from investigations of the northern part of the Split building. But, during excavations of the crossing place of the cardo and decumanus (in order to establish the original level of the street and the Peristyle) M. Suić in 1974 did observe, "a very thick layer of fine sediment of a markedly red colour of non-organic origin", which had been deposited in the cloaca, and which had retained its intensity for centuries. This must prove the existence of fullonica, which must have been located within the gynaeceum.31, 32, 55, 56 Gynaeciarii, like other craftsmen, were associated into corporations or collegia, but were not able to leave their work, being nexu sanguinis ad divinas largitiones perlinenles, which makes the construction of the northern part of the Palace, in which they lived alongside their workshops even more logical. 36 - 4 0 Their patron saint in 5th c. might have been, as I have already speculated, St Martin - patron of soldiers and weavers -to whom the little church in the sentries' walk over the Golden Gate, walled-in very early on, was dedicated. 41 All this also suggests that Christianity was alive in the Palace from day one. Along with the bishop and the praetorians, the weavers were probably that industrial revolutionary guard of the time. It is not at all surprising that a martyr like St. Anastasius - a fullo, the co-patron of Split, should have come precisely from the milieu of the fullers, probably working in the baffeum in Salona. In Split, Diocletian's gynaeceum was probably reliant upon a manufacture that already existed, one linked with the sulphurous water and perhaps on the broom, genisla acanlhoclada, from which a colouring agent for dying the cloth was obtained, and according to which, it is believed, Aspalathos actually obtained its name.43 There was raw material in Dalmatia within reach. Immediately following the Second World War there were about one million sheep in the central hinterland of the Adriatic coast. Delm or Dalm in Old Illyrian means shepherd, herder, flock, and hence Delminium means the place of pasture, and delme- dalme still today in Albanian means sheep.44 - 49 Evidence of the organised weaving industry in Roman Dalmatia can be seen in the form of the weaving industry around Split, which all the way through the Middle Ages and until quite recently was different from that in the other regions. 51 The Gynaeceum iovense might have been special precisely in the fact that this was not a remodelled and expanded production area already in existence, the expropriation of some extant minor complexes (as is assumed to have happened in Carthage), but a green field project, an exemplarily constructed industrial unit. And for this reason, of all such establishments, it was the only one to have such a flowery dedication and name. At the end one should also draw attention to an almost neglected reference concerning the palace, that is, the first description of it, uttered by the most authoritative mouth of all. In the Oralio ad Sanclorum coelum which he delivered in Antioch in 325, Emperor Constantine said that the colossal pile of the palace was a "loathed dwelling" in which the Emperor Diocletian shut himself up after this abdication: "After the massacre in the persecutions, after he had condemned himself by depriving himself of power, as a man of no utility, acknowledging the damage he had done with his imprudence, he remained hidden in his really contemptible dwelling place". 61 This surprising statement of Constantine might be an allusion to the fact that Diocletian had to spend his last days in a building that in spite of all the sumptuousness of its centre and the residential quarters looking onto the sea- must also have had the features of a military factory, to which the form of the castrum must have been in all respects much more suitable than to a charming imperial residence. The whole of the building fits perfectly in with the long series of tetrarchic public works. It is important to stress the autonomy of the cardo and the decumanus (12 metres broad) with their own lastricatus and their own porticatus, independent of the blocks that they hid. I would even say that the form of the castrum is more logical for a gynaeceum than it is for a palace. What should be actually highlighted is the surprising pragmatism, as well as the great social focus of the lllyrian emperors, who really did want to renew the "fervent patriotism and iron duty in the evil days" (Syme). Probus in Egypt worked on an important improvement of the navigation of the Nile; temples, bridges, porticoes, palaces, all were put up by the army. Galerius himself was a devotee of public works, and undertook an operation worth of a monarch, says Gibbon, diverting the excess of water from Lake Pelso (Balaton) to the Danube, at the border with Noricum. He had the endless woods all around cleared, and gave the whole reclaimed area between the Drava and the Danube to his Panonian subjects to be cultivated, naming it Valeria after his wife. 65, 66 Most of the buildings that Diocletian put up were of a utilitarian purpose, such as mints and the factories that Lactantius mentions, or border forts, roads and bridges. Dozens of extant inscriptions tell us of the dedications of new and restored temples, aqueducts, nymphea and public buildings - "vetustatu con lapsum" or "Ionge incuria neglectum"- dilapidated from age and long neglect. 67 According to Lactantius's writing, Diocletian had an infinitam cupiditatem aedificandi, an infinite desire to build. 68 Today we are apt to count mostly the imperial palaces in connection with this statement, and to forget the whole framework of comprehensive public works that were undertaken during the first tetrarchy. Twenty years of relaxation from civil wars and barbarian invasions, and the gradual suppression of local unrest, led to the renovation of the prosperity in cities all round the Empire, hence the major number of public dedications, the revival of overall construction activity. The Tetrarchan New Deal - with Diocletian as the Roosevelt of the ancient world - is often understood in a formalist way, as a series of legislative and political attempts to halt inflation, overlooking exploits like Galerius's round Balaton, or this one in Split. The construction of the Split Palace, then, no kind of imperial Xanadu, as it is often held to be, justified its investment. More than that: its existence enabled antiquity in Dalmatia, even after the 7th century catastrophe, not to be extinguished with a sudden death, but over long centuries to be merged into the modern age, remaining until this day a lesson in and criterion for every creative architectural operation into the tissue of the city, which developed organically within the precise, almost dry geometry of the Emperor's palace-cumfactory. * The article was published in English, in: Das Imperium zwischen Zentralisierung und Regionalisierung: Palaste- Regionen- Volker (ed. A. Demand, A. Goltz und H. Schlange-Schoningen), Berlin - New York 2004: 141-162.