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From earliest times, hostile propaganda has been in wide use among men & between nations; it has also been deeply resented & even violently resisted. But only recently has the world developed a system of principles & norms designed to curb & even to outlaw its use. Similar to the evolution of internat'l rules intended to proscribe aggressive war, the culmination of the movement to curb internat'l COMM considered dangerous to peace has come only in the 20th cent. Attention has focused not only on propaganda leading to acts of subversion & to outright aggression & war, but also on propaganda that is defamatory of a sovereign state & of its leaders & representatives. So extensive is this body of norms that today, as the hostile propaganda between nations continues unabated, esp in times of stress, the real need is not so much for more rules to be drafted or new treaties to be signed & ratified. What we require is the establishment of authoritative & acceptable means for the interpretation of the existing norms & their effective enforcement. HA.

Historians have all but dispensed with a conventional chronology that marks the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) as the origin of a modern state-centric territorial sovereignty. Instead, they are accumulating evidence that, since at least the early nineteenth century, sovereignty stretches back to the imperial practice of intervention into polities elsewhere on humanitarian grounds. Imperial sovereignty was less uniform than imperial officials and cartographers asserted; instead, as Lauren Benton has argued, it was (and is) usually "more myth than reality, more a story that polities [told] about their own power than a definite quality that they possess[ed]". Then there is the increasing number of historical examples of nonnormative, quasi-invisible forms of extra-territoriality that shaped the global imperial political architecture of the late nineteenth century: from the remaining principalities of the Holy Roman empire, and the conceptually distinctive practices of the Habsburgs as they separated cultural sovereignty from political sovereignty within their imperial territory, to the European claims to commercial and municipal authority in the treaty ports that dotted China's seaboard and river system, carving out the spoils of war.

Award date: 1990 ; Supervisor: A. Cassese ; First made available online 3 September 2015

This article is a plea for adopting a reinvigorated, analytic perspective on contemporary international law, building on MacCormick's powerful insights into law's essential structure. The article proposes that international law as whole forms an institutional normative order. The idea of institutional normative order has certain conditions. These link a normative conception of international law with the means of achieving it. The article makes three arguments on these conditions. It first argues that the function of international law is to create order in the sense of orderliness for its principal users, States and international organizations. It then claims that international law establishes normative order through international rules that are binding from the viewpoint of States and international organizations. An international process of rule-making embedded in State practice turns norms into such rules. The process is being held as a bindingness-creating mechanism because it formalizes rules through recognized means and organizes collective consent to authorize them. States and international organizations then apply these rules by exercising international legal powers under a defeasible presumption of legality. Third, the article argues that this normative order becomes institutionalized. The institutions of international law are grounded in ideas about agencies, arrangements, and master-norms that integrate the mass of international rules and principles. The article exemplifies these arguments for UN-driven international law with the relating recent jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and Annex vii tribunals, and the Court of Justice of the European Union. The upshot of this idea of international law as institutional normative order is unity, or indeed a system. No part of international law can be seen outside of this context and hence the burden of argumentation is on those wishing to make the case for divergence.