Suchergebnisse

Seit Beginn der 1990er Jahre hat sich die Kritik von NGOs an den internationalen wirtschaftspolitischen Institutionen verstärkt, so dass Weltbank, Internationaler Währungsfonds (IWF) und Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) zunehmend unter Legitimationsdruck geraten. Prominente Beispiele für das kritische Auftreten von NGOs gegenüber diesen internationalen Organisationen sind die internationale Kampagne "Jubilee 2000" für den Schuldenerlass hoch verschuldeter armer Entwicklungsländer oder die Demonstrationen anlässlich der WTO-Ministerkonferenz in Seattle 1999 und der Weltbank/IWF-Jahrestagung in Prag 2000, wo viele NGOs die Reformierung oder sogar die Abschaffung dieser Organisationen forderten. Die Autorin geht in ihrem Beitrag der Frage nach, welche neuen Räume der politischen Teilhabe diese drei internationalen Organisationen für NGOs geschaffen haben. Sie untersucht, welche Partizipationsmöglichkeiten für NGOs bestehen, wie sich diese in den letzten Jahren verändert haben und wie sie sich im einzelnen unterscheiden. Sie gibt zunächst einen Überblick über die Ziele und Funktionen von Weltbank, IWF und WTO sowie über die an sie adressierte Kritik. Im Anschluss daran diskutiert sie einige der zentralen Argumente zu den Chancen und Risiken einer Einbeziehung von NGOs in diese internationalen Organisationen und analysiert die Gründe für den unterschiedlichen Grad ihrer Partizipation. (ICI2)

Why do some civil wars turn into interstate wars? I analyze an asymmetric information model of civil war onset, rebel-sided intervention, and interstate retaliation with endogenous stakes. Interstate war occurs when rebels believe that the threat of intervention will compel the government to acquiesce, the third party believes that the government will tolerate an intervention, but they both underestimate the government's resolve. The model also has implications for civil wars. Retaliation can deter intervention and rebellion, but intervention can compel the government to give up power, so predicting civil war requires accounting for this triadic interaction.

Why do some civil wars turn into interstate wars? I analyze an asymmetric information model of civil war onset, rebel-sided intervention, and interstate retaliation with endogenous stakes. Interstate war occurs when rebels believe that the threat of intervention will compel the government to acquiesce, the third party believes that the government will tolerate an intervention, but they both underestimate the government's resolve. The model also has implications for civil wars. Retaliation can deter intervention and rebellion, but intervention can compel the government to give up power, so predicting civil war requires accounting for this triadic interaction.

Efforts to resolve interstate disputes are often characterized by repeated engagement and evolving strategies. What explains a state's decision to continue conflict resolution efforts but escalate their management strategy? Drawing from foreign policy literature, I argue that third parties escalate policies in response to past failures, shifting conflict dynamics and their relationship with the disputants. Analysis of management efforts from 1946 to 2001 reveals that the changing nature of the conflict, policy failures and relationships between the third party and disputants are integral to understanding the management decision process, but the effects of these factors depend on the management history.

Rivalries are likely to persist as long as contentious issues remain unresolved. Due to differing issue characteristics, some issues may be more intractable than others and therefore especially likely to prolong rivalry. In this study, I argue that rivalries rooted in territorial issues tend to be enduring due to broad-bases of domestic support for continuing to pursue territorial claims and loose linkages between territorial issues and particular political leaders, resulting in the persistence of territorial conflict over time despite changes of leadership. Alternatively, ideological and regime-related conflicts tend to be relatively fleeting due to narrow societal salience and close connections between such issues and particular political leaders, facilitating rivalry termination through leadership change. The empirical results reveal that territorial rivalries (as well as positional rivalries concerning influence/prestige) tend to be more enduring than rivalries rooted in ideological or regime-related conflict and that unlike territorial rivalries, ideological rivalries tend to terminate upon irregular changes of leadership.