Suchergebnisse

Memories of old conflicts often shape domestic politics long after these conflicts end. Contemporary debates about past civil wars and/or repressive regimes in different parts of the world suggest that these are sensitive topics thatmight increase political polarization, particularly when transitional justice policies are implemented and political parties mobilize discontentment with such policies. One such policy recently debated in Spain is removing public symbols linked to a past civil war and subsequent authoritarian regime (i.e., Francoism). However, the empirical evidence on its impact is still limited. This article attempts to fill this gap by examining the political consequences of street renaming. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we show that the removal of Francoist street names has contributed to an increase of electoral support for a new far-right party, Vox,mainly at the expense of a traditional right-wing conservative party, PP.Our results suggest that revisiting the past can cause a backlash among those ideologically aligned with the perpetrator, and that some political parties can capitalize on this. ; The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council grant numbers ES/S009965/1.

This article analyses the parliamentary elections held in the Republic of Moldova in 2021, as a result of which the right-wing party, formerly in opposition, won, and was able to form its own single-party government with a parliamentary majority, which has not happened in Moldova exactly 20 years – since 2001. In this article thebasic positions of the "left" and "right" political camps in the Republic of Moldova before the elections are analysed; as well as the mechanics of the electoral campaign and the voting process in different socio-geographical profiles. In 2021 The Republic of Moldova, for the first time in many years, faced the phenomenon of "overturning elections"; understanding the mechanics of which contributes to the development of a much better political and electoral process in general. At the same time, despite the special nature of the 2021 elections, the electoral political process in the Republic of Moldova continues to show several fixed tendencies, such as the geographical polarization of Moldovan voters residing in the EU or Russia, and the overall objective decrease of interest in the electoral process in general, regardless of the degree of the political and social representation of the political parties represented in the elections.

In this paper we leverage a sudden shift in refugee settlement policy to study the electoral consequences of refugee settlements. After the 2013 Norwegian parliamentary election, the newly elected right-wing government made a concerted effort to spread newly arrived immigrants across the country, with the consequence that some municipalities with limited experience in settling refugees accepted to do so. We propose that such policy changes have political consequences, increasing the salience of immigration issues and shifting voters' preferences to the right. We further propose that successful refugee integration can move (parts of) the electorate to the left, with stronger political polarization as a possible effect of the policy change. Applying difference-in-differences techniques, we find no evidence of unidirectional shifts in voter sentiments, but support for the hypothesis of stronger political polarization. ; publishedVersion ; © 2021 The Authors. European Journal of Political Research published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Consortium for Political Research This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.

This article deals with the evolution of French politics between 2017 and 2020. Using systematic surveys, which are conducted by the Center for the Study of French Political Life and in which the author is directly involved he shows that President Macron's policies have not succeeded in dissipating a democratic crisis affecting trust in political institution. The sanitary crisis had a great impact on the political situation in the country. In France, the crisis associated with Covid-19 was manifested not in the confrontation of political forces, but in the criticism of the government by civil society and in the growth of populism. In this respect, France is very different from Germany, where there is a general public consensus, and Great Britain, where confidence in the system-forming parties remains. Populism has gained ground in French politics and explains, more than any other factor, both the distrust in the Presidency and in government health policies. The rise of left-wing and rightwing populism has not led to the disappearance of the division between left and right. A shift toward right values and State intervention can be observed in French public opinion, changing the electoral game for the 2022 presidential campaign.

As of 2021, Europe is entering a new period in two respects. One is that the COVID-19 virus effect that has continued since 2020 has be controlled due to the vaccine program, and the world after COVID-19 has become visible. The other is that the rift between the United States and Europe, which emerged during the four-year U.S. Trump administration, is showing signs of healing with the birth of the U.S. Biden administration, and is able to produce a unity that regards China as a common enemy. Otherwise, there are still many unstable factors in the situation surrounding Europe. Regional powers such as Russia and Turkey, which had been the target of democratization support from Europe, have become more authoritarian, and instead, have intervened in Europe in various ways, threatening European values such as democracy and human rights. However, Europe's greatest threat is within not without. The possibility that the right wing will take power in major European countries cannot be ruled out, in which case the existence of the G7 and EU itself will be threatened. It is also a concern that the nature of European populism has changed from the former "politics to gain popularity" to a politics that controls and manipulates citizens.

This paper investigates the salience of and the position on Differentiated integration (DI) for the Austrian government. The analysis is based on both an analysis of government programmes, programmatic government speeches and parliamentary debates between 2004 and 2019/20. It shows that DI is overall not a salient issue in Austria, at least with regard to general DI concepts and models. Specific instances of DI were, of course, subjects of intense debates but, with very few exceptions such as the financial transaction tax as an instance of enhanced cooperation, rarely discussed with specific reference to DI. Overall, most Austrian parties are also not generally in favour of DI, quite the opposite. The dominant vision of the EU is that of a community of closely cooperating Member States with the same rights and responsibilities where opt-outs are seen as cherry picking. Only one party has forcefully supported the development of a core Europe, namely the right-wing populist Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria, BZÖ). In this case, however, DI is mainly regarded as a means to exclude groups of Member States (especially the financially more vulnerable or net recipients) from areas of integration.

This article analyses the parliamentary elections held in the Republic of Moldova in 2021, as a result of which the right-wing party, formerly in opposition, won, and was able to form its own single-party government with a parliamentary majority, which has not happened in Moldova exactly 20 years – since 2001. In this article the basic positions of the "left" and "right" political camps in the Republic of Moldova before the elections are analysed; as well as the mechanics of the electoral campaign and the voting process in different socio-geographical profiles. In 2021 The Republic of Moldova, for the first time in many years, faced the phenomenon of "overturning elections"; understanding the mechanics of which contributes to the development of a much better political and electoral process in general. At the same time, despite the special nature of the 2021 elections, the electoral political process in the Republic of Moldova continues to show several fixed tendencies, such as the geographical polarization of Moldovan voters residing in the EU or Russia, and the overall objective decrease of interest in the electoral process in general, regardless of the degree of the political and social representation of the political parties represented in the elections.

In the aftermath of the attempted 1965 coup, many dissidents, leftists, and suspected Communists were either 'eradicated' or incarcerated in prisons all over Indonesia. Since their release, these political prisoners continue to face state-enforced discrimination and stigmatisation. The marginalization of ex-political prisoners by both the state and local communities has continued through Indonesia's democratic transition following President Suharto's downfall in 1998. This is compounded by the presence of right-wing groups who continue to harass them, labelling them as neo-Communists inimical to the Indonesian body politic. Through direct engagement with former political prisoners, I aim to understand rehabilitative efforts through support groups. In preliminary interviews, many eks-tapol refer to the need to 'straighten' history. This discourse highlights their need to be recognized as 'whole' citizens of Indonesia. I explore the state's struggle to address this dark chapter in Indonesian history, what it means to 'straighten' history and how eks-tapol engage with support groups to re-define their position within the community, denoting a strengthened sense of dignity and humanity. It is hoped that this research will contribute to efforts to understand and protect the rights of eks-tapol and other victims of political persecution in Southeast Asia.

Vaccine hesitancy is one of the major obstacles for successfully combating the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. To achieve a sufficiently high vaccination rate, calls for compulsory vaccinations have been discussed controversially. This study analyses what drives citizens' attitudes towards compulsory vaccination during the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, we are interested in the impact of party- and expert cues on public attitudes. We further expect populist attitudes to be an important indicator of the rejection of compulsory vaccination due to their scepticism towards science. To test these expectations, we rely on a cueing experiment conducted on a sample of 2265 German citizens. We test for the effects of in-party and out-party cues as well as public health expert cues. We find evidence for in-party cues, meaning that respondents adjust their position on this issue in the direction of their most preferred party. Similar results can be found for public health expert cues. However, there is no evidence for out-party cues. Further analyses reveal that support for compulsory vaccinations is not affected by left-right placement directly. Instead, only the combination of right-wing attitudes and populism negatively affects support for compulsory vaccination.

Abstract
The organizers of the Anti-Milo Toolkit aimed to contribute to a broader counter-movement that would make it easier for university campuses to challenge and de-platform white supremacist and fascist speakers sheltered under the auspices of "free speech." This toolkit gathers info-tracts, syllabi, flyer templates, and other activist materials collected and widely distributed across campuses in preparation to protest Breitbart journalist Milo Yiannopoulos's 2016 "Dangerous Faggot Tour." Yiannopoulos was slated to speak at thirteen college campuses in support of an alt-right platform founded upon the weaponization of "free speech," xenophobia, and transphobia. In addition to providing materials for protest, the authors of the "Anti-Milo Toolkit" take critical aim at appropriation of liberal-academic vocabularies by right-wing groups and Yiannopoulos's history of outing trans and undocumented students at his events, and call for widespread action against the spread of violent rhetoric targeting marginalized communities in order to maintain the university as a space of sanctuary. Because of its accessibility via digital channels and its wide range of short and readable pieces written in a variety of styles, and because of the collective's wide network of organizing connections, the kit circulated very broadly.

The sociological survey conducted in 2020 revealed the ambiguous, contradictory nature and average level of legal literacy of students, since the prevailing majority of young people are only superficially acquainted with their civil rights and, especially – responsibilities. Young people more positioned the law as a mechanism for regulating their permissiveness rather than as a mechanism regulating their behavior within a certain framework. At the same time, the level of self-assessment of legal literacy of students, especially of technical specialties, is higher than the real average. The prospects for the development of legal literacy of students directly depend on the intensification and diversity of social and legal interactions and on the rationalization of their life world, as a whole. In many ways, the degree of legal loyalty of students will depend on the level of their involvement in legal communication. The significant potential to increase the level of right-wing loyalty of students is seen in the promotion and dissemination of legal knowledge and increasing their demand by real life practices. The course of jurisprudence should be strengthened within the framework of general educational training, as well as the range of relevant educational programs at various levels should be expanded.

Drawing on ethnographic research conducted in Wrocław, Poland, the paper analyzes grassroots workings of European sexual citizenship. Against this backdrop, it attempts to problematize a concept of Europeanization as vertical and horizontal diffusion which spreads specific ideas, practices, and institutions among actual and prospective EU Member States. Whereas (neo)liberal LGBT rights, seen as a symbol of Europeanness, have definitely inspired struggles for sexual freedom in Poland, abstract notions of Europe and Europeanization do not form an important point of reference, at least at a local level. Moreover, premises of European sexual citizenship are in many ways contested by non-heteronormative persons unwilling (or unable) to use this frame for the conceptualization of their own experiences. On the other hand, because the EU and neoliberalism constitute significant antagonists of Polish right-wing nationalism, this allows for a certain resignification of interrelated phenomena criticized elsewhere as 'homonormative' and 'homonationalist.' While these phenomena undoubtedly trigger specific inclusions and exclusions, they also have the potential to contribute to critical citizenship. Consequently, instead of grasping Europeanization in a teleological way, the paper argues for taking it as an image that may fuel social change, variously conceived of.

AbstractSocial media has been integral for the organization and success of right‐wing populist movements in the United States and Europe. Within online communities, discussions take place in which ideologies are formulated, iterated upon, and disseminated. One particular forum, hosted on the popular website reddit.com, r/The_Donald, has received media attention for its political influence. Despite the influence of online spaces in populist, far‐right movements, relatively little attention has been paid to qualitative content of discussions that take place within such spaces, including r/The_Donald. Guided by a social representations approach, we analyzed how discussions on r/The_Donald represent sociopolitical groups. We focused on discussions of political affiliations, race relations, immigration, and culture. From a dataset of 8,198 posts, we selected 1,292 segments from 883 unique Reddit usernames and analyzed them using qualitative content analysis. The results showed that the majority of posts discussed liberals, race relations, and conspiracy theories, and in these posts, liberals and liberal ideas were delegitimized and mocked through their representations. These posts represented conservatives through antinomic contrast and comparison to liberals and liberal policies. The meanings of those representations in intergroup relations are discussed.

In the 2017 Czech parliamentary election, the Czech Pirate Party (Pirates) gained 10.79% of the votes – an unprecedented success, compared to most of the pirate parties across Europe. However, as their electoral gain varies widely across the Czech Republic's territory, this article analyses all (more than 6000) Czech municipalities in the elections of 2010, 2013, and 2017 to explain this variation. Overall, the success of the Pirates was driven especially by obtaining much more support in larger municipalities with younger populations (although not only those aged 18–24 but also older ones), lower unemployment, higher turnout, and lower support for leftist parties. Thus, from a spatial perspective, the patterns of Pirate voting largely resembled long-term spatial support for Czech rightist parties and we can conclude that the Pirates made considerable inroads to regions which had historically been strongholds of the Civic Democratic Party, as the former main party of the right, but also strongholds of minor right-wing ('liberal centre') parties of the 1990s and early 2000s. Success of the Pirates thus was based especially on votes from municipalities located in more developed areas, where the Pirates received many more votes than in structurally disadvantaged regions.

The German federal election of 2017 saw significant losses for the two German mainstream parties (Volksparteien) and governing coalition partners, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD). The major beneficiary was the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a right-populist party, which almost tripled its amount of votes received from the 2013 federal election. Making use of data from a Voting Advice Application, this article seeks to explore the AfD's extraordinary electoral success with particular attention to the party's capacity to attract voters from the two mainstream and traditionally powerful parties. Drawing on the literature on radical right-wing parties in Europe and tracking the route of AfD from a single-issue Eurosceptic party to a radical party with broader programmatic appeal, this work tests hypotheses regarding demographic, political and attitudinal determinants of voting for AfD, in general, and switching one's vote to AfD from CDU/CSU or SPD more specifically. In line with previous literature, individual-level analyses show that voting for the AfD seems to be more tangentially related to demographic variables, such as sex, age and education and more strongly connected to political concerns, e.g. "conservative" self-placement and attitudes toward specific policies, immigration and Euroscepticism in particular.