Sistema de posicionamiento por radio frecuencia que utiliza sensores inerciales. Con la fusión de estos dos sistemas mejoramos la navegación. ; During the last few years, different navigation systems with varying degrees of accuracy have appeared, such as: LORAN (Long Range Navigation), Decca, GNSS (GLObal NAvigation Satellite System), the latter being the most widely used nowadays. GNSS, which includes GPS (Global Positioning System) and GLONASS (Global Navigation Satellite System) , consists of a constellation of satellites which are used for positioning and location anywhere on the globe. These systems were designed in order to position vehicles and aircraft for military purposes. With the widespread use of such systems for civilian use, GPS have extended their use, evolving and providing accuracy to a few meters. But the GPS might not be the best choice for higher accuracy applications. In our research field , we need to know very precisely the current position of a moving platform. Among the commercially available systems, none fits our specifications, therefore a system to improve positioning has been implemented. The systems used in this project are: the estimation technique TDOA (Time Difference of Arrival), which combined with the multilateration algorithm (MLAT) allows us to measure the phase difference of the chirp signal (frequency varies depending on the time) and transform to positions difference. We will also use some inertial sensors (accelerometer and gyroscope), which through the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) and sensor fusion will be responsible for improving the accuracy of this estimate. In this thesis, we will consider two scenarios to test the EKF with different dynamic equations of motion. The first stage is the simulation of four transmiting transmit antennas (slaves) arranged in a square, distributed in a particular geographical area in which the vehicle (or master receiving antenna) must calculate its position within that area with EKF and inertial sensors support. The second stage will be a case in which we have three transmitting antennas placed in a triangle shape. In this case the receiving antenna will be located within the area of the triangle and it will be really moving in one dimension to further evaluate the results with EKF. In this context, the intention of this thesis has been to implement improvements in the positioning system, introducing elements that provide additional or redundant information and process it for this purpose. ; A lo largo de los últimos años han ido apareciendo diversos sistemas de radionavegación con distintos grados de precisión, entre otros: LORAN (Long Range Navigation), Decca, GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System), siendo este último el más utilizado en la actualidad. El sistema GNSS, que engloba los sistemas GPS (Global Positioning System) y GLONASS (GLObal NAvigation Satellite System), está conformado por una constelación de satélites, que se utilizan para determinar el posicionamiento y localización en cualquier parte del globo terrestre. Estos sistemas fueron ideados con la finalidad de posicionar vehículos y aeronaves en un ámbito militar. Con la generalización de dichos sistemas para usos civiles, los sistemas GPS han extendido su uso, evolucionando y aportando una precisión de hasta unos pocos metros. Pero el GPS podría no ser la mejor opción para aplicaciones de mayor precisión. En nuestro ámbito de investigación, se requiere conocer de forma muy precisa la posición en cada momento de una plataforma en movimiento. Entre los sistemas disponibles a nivel comercial, ninguno se ajusta a nuestras especificaciones, por lo que se ha implementado un sistema a medida para mejorar el posicionamiento. Los sistemas utilizados en este proyecto son: la técnica de estimación TDOA (Time Difference Of Arrival), que combinada con el algoritmo de multilateralización (MLAT) nos permite medir la diferencia de fase de la señal chirp (que varía su frecuencia en función del tiempo) y convertirla a diferencias de posición. También usaremos unos sensores inerciales (acelerómetro y giroscopio), que a través del Filtro Extendido de Kalman (EKF) y la fusión de sensores se encargarán de mejorar la precisión de esta estimación. En esta tesis, evaluaremos dos escenarios para probar el EKF con diferentes ecuaciónes dinámicas de movimiento. El primer escenario es la simulación de cuatro antenas transmisoras (slaves) dispuestas en forma de cuadrado, distribuidas en un área geográfica concreta, en la cual se halla el vehiculo (antena receptora o master), que debe calcular su posicion dentro de esa area con la ayuda del EKF y los sensores inerciales. El segundo escenario será un caso práctico en el cual disponemos de tres antenas transmisoras colocadas en forma de triángulo. En este caso, la antena receptora se situará dentro del área del triángulo y se irá moviendo milimétricamente en una única dimensión para posteriormente evaluar los resultados con el EKF. En este contexto, la intención de esta tesis ha sido implementar mejoras en el sistema de posicionamiento, introduciendo elementos que proporcionan información adicional o redundante y procesarla con este fin. ; Al llarg dels darrers anys han anat apareixent diversos sistemes de radionavegació amb diferents graus de precisió, entre d'altres: LORAN (LOng RAnge Navigation), Decca, GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System), sent aquest últim el més utilitzat en l'actualitat. El sistema GNSS, que engloba els sistemes GPS (Global Positioning System) i GLONASS (GLObal NAvigation Satellite System), està conformat per una constel•lació de satèl•lits, que s'utilitzen per determinar el posicionament i localització en qualsevol part del globus terrestre. Aquests sistemes van ser ideats amb la finalitat de posicionar vehicles i aeronaus en un àmbit militar. Amb la generalització d'aquests sistemes per a usos civils, els GPS han estès el seu ús, evolucionant i aportant una precisió de fins a uns pocs metres. Però el GPS podria no ser la millor opció per a aplicacions de major precisió. En el nostre àmbit de recerca, es requereix conèixer de forma molt precisa la posició en cada moment d'una plataforma en moviment. Entre els sistemes disponibles a nivell comercial, cap s'ajusta a les nostres especificacions, pel que s'ha implementat un sistema a mida per millorar el posicionament. Els sistemes utilitzats en aquest projecte són: la tècnica d'estimació TDOA (Time Difference Of Arrival), que combinada amb l'algoritme de multilateralització (MLAT) ens permet mesurar la diferència de fase del senyal chirp (que varia la seva freqüència en funció del temps) i convertir-la a diferències de posició. També farem servir uns sensors inercials (acceleròmetre i giroscopi), que a través del Filtre Estès de Kalman (EKF) i la fusió de sensors s'encarregaran de millorar la precisió d'aquesta estimació. En aquesta tesi, avaluarem dos escenaris per provar el EKF amb diferents equacions dinàmiques de moviment. El primer escenari és la simulació de quatre antenes transmissores (slaves) disposades en forma de quadrat, distribuïdes en una àrea geogràfica concreta, en la qual es troba el vehicle (antena receptora o màster), que ha de calcular la seva posició dins d'aquesta àrea amb l'ajuda del EKF i els sensors inercials. El segon escenari serà un cas pràctic en el qual disposem de tres antenes transmissores col•locades en forma de triangle. En aquest cas, l'antena receptora es situarà dins l'àrea del triangle i s'anirà movent mil•limètricament en una única dimensió per posteriorment avaluar els resultats amb el EKF. En aquest context, la intenció d'aquesta tesi ha estat implementar millores en el sistema de posicionament, introduint elements que proporcionen informació addicional o redundant i processar-la amb aquesta finalitat.
In the new issue, our scientific journal offers you thirteen scientific articles. As always, we try to offer a wide variety of topics and areas and follow current trends in the history of science and technology. In the article by Olha Chumachenko, оn the basis of a wide base of sources, the article highlights and analyzes the development of research work of aircraft engine companies in Zaporizhzhia during the 1970s. The existence of a single system of functioning of the Zaporizhzhia production association "Motorobudivnyk" (now the Public Joint Stock Company "Motor Sich") and the Zaporizhzhia Machine-Building Design Bureau "Progress" (now the State Enterprise "Ivchenko – Progress") has been taken into account. Leonid Griffen and Nadiia Ryzheva present their vision of the essence of technology as a socio-historical phenomenon. The article reveals the authors' vision of the essence of the technology as a sociohistorical phenomenon. It is based on the idea that technology is not only a set of technical devices but a segment of the general system – a society – located between a social medium and its natural surroundings in the form of a peculiar social technosphere, which simultaneously separates and connects them. Definitely the article by Denis Kislov, which examines the period from the end of the XVII century to the beginning of the XIX century, is also of interest, when on the basis of deep philosophical concepts, a new vision of the development of statehood and human values raised. At this time, a certain re-thinking of the management and communication ideas of Antiquity and the Renaissance took place, which outlined the main promising trends in the statehood evolution, which to one degree or another were embodied in practice in the 19th and 20th centuries. A systematic approach and a comparative analysis of the causes and consequences of those years' achievements for the present and the immediate future of the 21st century served as the methodological basis for a comprehensive review of the studies of that period. The article by Serhii Paliienko is devoted to an exploration of archaeological theory issues at the Institute of archaeology AS UkrSSR in the 1960s. This period is one of the worst studied in the history of Soviet archaeology. But it was the time when in the USSR archaeological researches reached the summit, quantitative methods and methods of natural sciences were applied and interest in theoretical issues had grown in archaeology. Now there are a lot of publications dedicated to theoretical discussions between archaeologists from Leningrad but the same researches about Kyiv scholars are still unknown The legacy of St.Luke in medical science, authors from Greece - this study aims to highlight key elements of the life of Valentyn Feliksovych Voino-Yasenetskyi and his scientific contribution to medicine. Among the scientists of European greatness, who at the turn of the XIX and XX centuries showed interest to the folklore of Galicia (Halychyna) and Galician Ukrainians, contributed to their national and cultural revival, one of the leading places is occupied by the outstanding Ukrainian scientist Ivan Verkhratskyi. He was both naturalist and philologist, as well as folklorist and ethnographer, organizer of scientific work, publisher and popularizer of Ukrainian literature, translator, publicist and famous public figure. I.H.Verkhratskyi was also an outstanding researcher of plants and animals of Eastern Galicia, a connoisseur of insects, especially butterflies, the author of the first school textbooks on natural science written in Ukrainian. A new emerging field that has seen the application of the drone technology is the healthcare sector. Over the years, the health sector has increasingly relied on the device for timely transportation of essential articles across the globe. Since its introduction in health, scholars have attempted to address the impact of drones on healthcare across Africa and the world at large. Among other things, it has been reported by scholars that the device has the ability to overcome the menace of weather constraints, inadequate personnel and inaccessible roads within the healthcare sector. This notwithstanding, data on drones and drone application in Ghana and her healthcare sector in particular appears to be little within the drone literature. Also, little attempt has been made by scholars to highlight the use of drones in African countries. By using a narrative review approach, the current study attempts to address the gap above. By this approach, a thorough literature search was performed to locate and assess scientific materials involving the application of drones in the military field and in the medical systems of Africans and Ghanaians in particular. The paper by Artemii Bernatskyi and Vladyslav Khaskin is devoted to the analysis of the history of the laser creation as one of the greatest technical inventions of the 20th century. This paper focuses on establishing a relation between the periodization of the stages of creation and implementation of certain types of lasers, with their influence on the invention of certain types of equipment and industrial technologies for processing the materials, the development of certain branches of the economy, and scientific-technological progress as a whole. The paper discusses the stages of: invention of the first laser; creation of the first commercial lasers; development of the first applications of lasers in industrial technologies for processing the materials. Special attention is paid to the "patent wars" that accompanied different stages of the creation of lasers. A comparative analysis of the market development for laser technology from the stage of creation to the present has been carried out. Nineteenth-century world exhibitions were platforms to demonstrate technical and technological changes that witnessed the modernization and industrialization of the world. World exhibitions have contributed to the promotion of new inventions and the popularization of already known, as well as the emergence of art objects of world importance. One of the most important world events at the turn of the century was the 1900 World's Fair in Paris. Thus, the author has tried to analyze the participation of representatives of the sugar industry in the World's Fair in 1900 and to define the role of exhibitions as indicators of economic development, to show the importance and influence of private entrepreneurs, especially from Ukraine, on the sugar industry and international contacts. The article by Viktor Verhunov highlights the life and creative path of the outstanding domestic scientist, theorist, methodologist and practitioner of agricultural engineering K.G.Schindler, associated with the formation of agricultural mechanics in Ukraine. The methodological foundation of the research is the principles of historicism, scientific nature and objectivity in reproducing the phenomena of the past based on the complex use of general scientific, special, interdisciplinary methods. For the first time a number of documents from Russian and Ukrainian archives, which reflect some facts of the professional biography of the scientist, were introduced into scientific circulation. The authors from Kremenchuk National University named after Mykhailo Ostrohradskyi presented a fascinating study of a bayonet fragment with severe damages of metal found in the city Kremenchuk (Ukraine) in one of the canals on the outskirts of the city, near the Dnipro River. Theoretical research to study blade weapons of the World War I period and the typology of the bayonets of that period, which made it possible to put forward an assumption about the possible identification of the object as a modified bayonet to the Mauser rifle has been carried out. Metal science expert examination was based on X-ray fluorescence spectrometry to determine the concentration of elements in the sample from the cleaned part of the blade. In the article by Mykola Ruban and Vadym Ponomarenko on the basis of the complex analysis of sources and scientific literature the attempt to investigate historical circumstances of development and construction of shunting electric locomotives at the Dnipropetrovsk electric locomotive plant has been made. The next scientific article continues the series of publications devoted to the assessment of activities of the heads of the Ministry of Railways of the Russian Empire. In this article, the authors have attempted to systematize and analyze historical data on the activities of Klavdii Semyonovych Nemeshaev as the Minister of Railways of the Russian Empire. The article also assesses the development and construction of railway network in the Russian Empire during Nemeshaev's office, in particular, of the Amur Line and Moscow Encircle Railway, as well as the increase in the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway. The article discusses K.S.Nemeshaev's contribution to the development of technology and the introduction of a new type of freight steam locomotive for state-owned railways. We hope that everyone will find interesting useful information in the new issue. And, of course, we welcome your new submissions. ; In the new issue, our scientific journal offers you thirteen scientific articles. As always, we try to offer a wide variety of topics and areas and follow current trends in the history of science and technology. In the article by Olha Chumachenko, оn the basis of a wide base of sources, the article highlights and analyzes the development of research work of aircraft engine companies in Zaporizhzhia during the 1970s. The existence of a single system of functioning of the Zaporizhzhia production association "Motorobudivnyk" (now the Public Joint Stock Company "Motor Sich") and the Zaporizhzhia Machine-Building Design Bureau "Progress" (now the State Enterprise "Ivchenko – Progress") has been taken into account. Leonid Griffen and Nadiia Ryzheva present their vision of the essence of technology as a socio-historical phenomenon. The article reveals the authors' vision of the essence of the technology as a sociohistorical phenomenon. It is based on the idea that technology is not only a set of technical devices but a segment of the general system – a society – located between a social medium and its natural surroundings in the form of a peculiar social technosphere, which simultaneously separates and connects them. Definitely the article by Denis Kislov, which examines the period from the end of the XVII century to the beginning of the XIX century, is also of interest, when on the basis of deep philosophical concepts, a new vision of the development of statehood and human values raised. At this time, a certain re-thinking of the management and communication ideas of Antiquity and the Renaissance took place, which outlined the main promising trends in the statehood evolution, which to one degree or another were embodied in practice in the 19th and 20th centuries. A systematic approach and a comparative analysis of the causes and consequences of those years' achievements for the present and the immediate future of the 21st century served as the methodological basis for a comprehensive review of the studies of that period. The article by Serhii Paliienko is devoted to an exploration of archaeological theory issues at the Institute of archaeology AS UkrSSR in the 1960s. This period is one of the worst studied in the history of Soviet archaeology. But it was the time when in the USSR archaeological researches reached the summit, quantitative methods and methods of natural sciences were applied and interest in theoretical issues had grown in archaeology. Now there are a lot of publications dedicated to theoretical discussions between archaeologists from Leningrad but the same researches about Kyiv scholars are still unknown The legacy of St.Luke in medical science, authors from Greece - this study aims to highlight key elements of the life of Valentyn Feliksovych Voino-Yasenetskyi and his scientific contribution to medicine. Among the scientists of European greatness, who at the turn of the XIX and XX centuries showed interest to the folklore of Galicia (Halychyna) and Galician Ukrainians, contributed to their national and cultural revival, one of the leading places is occupied by the outstanding Ukrainian scientist Ivan Verkhratskyi. He was both naturalist and philologist, as well as folklorist and ethnographer, organizer of scientific work, publisher and popularizer of Ukrainian literature, translator, publicist and famous public figure. I.H.Verkhratskyi was also an outstanding researcher of plants and animals of Eastern Galicia, a connoisseur of insects, especially butterflies, the author of the first school textbooks on natural science written in Ukrainian. A new emerging field that has seen the application of the drone technology is the healthcare sector. Over the years, the health sector has increasingly relied on the device for timely transportation of essential articles across the globe. Since its introduction in health, scholars have attempted to address the impact of drones on healthcare across Africa and the world at large. Among other things, it has been reported by scholars that the device has the ability to overcome the menace of weather constraints, inadequate personnel and inaccessible roads within the healthcare sector. This notwithstanding, data on drones and drone application in Ghana and her healthcare sector in particular appears to be little within the drone literature. Also, little attempt has been made by scholars to highlight the use of drones in African countries. By using a narrative review approach, the current study attempts to address the gap above. By this approach, a thorough literature search was performed to locate and assess scientific materials involving the application of drones in the military field and in the medical systems of Africans and Ghanaians in particular. The paper by Artemii Bernatskyi and Vladyslav Khaskin is devoted to the analysis of the history of the laser creation as one of the greatest technical inventions of the 20th century. This paper focuses on establishing a relation between the periodization of the stages of creation and implementation of certain types of lasers, with their influence on the invention of certain types of equipment and industrial technologies for processing the materials, the development of certain branches of the economy, and scientific-technological progress as a whole. The paper discusses the stages of: invention of the first laser; creation of the first commercial lasers; development of the first applications of lasers in industrial technologies for processing the materials. Special attention is paid to the "patent wars" that accompanied different stages of the creation of lasers. A comparative analysis of the market development for laser technology from the stage of creation to the present has been carried out. Nineteenth-century world exhibitions were platforms to demonstrate technical and technological changes that witnessed the modernization and industrialization of the world. World exhibitions have contributed to the promotion of new inventions and the popularization of already known, as well as the emergence of art objects of world importance. One of the most important world events at the turn of the century was the 1900 World's Fair in Paris. Thus, the author has tried to analyze the participation of representatives of the sugar industry in the World's Fair in 1900 and to define the role of exhibitions as indicators of economic development, to show the importance and influence of private entrepreneurs, especially from Ukraine, on the sugar industry and international contacts. The article by Viktor Verhunov highlights the life and creative path of the outstanding domestic scientist, theorist, methodologist and practitioner of agricultural engineering K.G.Schindler, associated with the formation of agricultural mechanics in Ukraine. The methodological foundation of the research is the principles of historicism, scientific nature and objectivity in reproducing the phenomena of the past based on the complex use of general scientific, special, interdisciplinary methods. For the first time a number of documents from Russian and Ukrainian archives, which reflect some facts of the professional biography of the scientist, were introduced into scientific circulation. The authors from Kremenchuk National University named after Mykhailo Ostrohradskyi presented a fascinating study of a bayonet fragment with severe damages of metal found in the city Kremenchuk (Ukraine) in one of the canals on the outskirts of the city, near the Dnipro River. Theoretical research to study blade weapons of the World War I period and the typology of the bayonets of that period, which made it possible to put forward an assumption about the possible identification of the object as a modified bayonet to the Mauser rifle has been carried out. Metal science expert examination was based on X-ray fluorescence spectrometry to determine the concentration of elements in the sample from the cleaned part of the blade. In the article by Mykola Ruban and Vadym Ponomarenko on the basis of the complex analysis of sources and scientific literature the attempt to investigate historical circumstances of development and construction of shunting electric locomotives at the Dnipropetrovsk electric locomotive plant has been made. The next scientific article continues the series of publications devoted to the assessment of activities of the heads of the Ministry of Railways of the Russian Empire. In this article, the authors have attempted to systematize and analyze historical data on the activities of Klavdii Semyonovych Nemeshaev as the Minister of Railways of the Russian Empire. The article also assesses the development and construction of railway network in the Russian Empire during Nemeshaev's office, in particular, of the Amur Line and Moscow Encircle Railway, as well as the increase in the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway. The article discusses K.S.Nemeshaev's contribution to the development of technology and the introduction of a new type of freight steam locomotive for state-owned railways. We hope that everyone will find interesting useful information in the new issue. And, of course, we welcome your new submissions. ; In the new issue, our scientific journal offers you thirteen scientific articles. As always, we try to offer a wide variety of topics and areas and follow current trends in the history of science and technology. In the article by Olha Chumachenko, оn the basis of a wide base of sources, the article highlights and analyzes the development of research work of aircraft engine companies in Zaporizhzhia during the 1970s. The existence of a single system of functioning of the Zaporizhzhia production association "Motorobudivnyk" (now the Public Joint Stock Company "Motor Sich") and the Zaporizhzhia Machine-Building Design Bureau "Progress" (now the State Enterprise "Ivchenko – Progress") has been taken into account. Leonid Griffen and Nadiia Ryzheva present their vision of the essence of technology as a socio-historical phenomenon. The article reveals the authors' vision of the essence of the technology as a sociohistorical phenomenon. It is based on the idea that technology is not only a set of technical devices but a segment of the general system – a society – located between a social medium and its natural surroundings in the form of a peculiar social technosphere, which simultaneously separates and connects them. Definitely the article by Denis Kislov, which examines the period from the end of the XVII century to the beginning of the XIX century, is also of interest, when on the basis of deep philosophical concepts, a new vision of the development of statehood and human values raised. At this time, a certain re-thinking of the management and communication ideas of Antiquity and the Renaissance took place, which outlined the main promising trends in the statehood evolution, which to one degree or another were embodied in practice in the 19th and 20th centuries. A systematic approach and a comparative analysis of the causes and consequences of those years' achievements for the present and the immediate future of the 21st century served as the methodological basis for a comprehensive review of the studies of that period. The article by Serhii Paliienko is devoted to an exploration of archaeological theory issues at the Institute of archaeology AS UkrSSR in the 1960s. This period is one of the worst studied in the history of Soviet archaeology. But it was the time when in the USSR archaeological researches reached the summit, quantitative methods and methods of natural sciences were applied and interest in theoretical issues had grown in archaeology. Now there are a lot of publications dedicated to theoretical discussions between archaeologists from Leningrad but the same researches about Kyiv scholars are still unknown The legacy of St.Luke in medical science, authors from Greece - this study aims to highlight key elements of the life of Valentyn Feliksovych Voino-Yasenetskyi and his scientific contribution to medicine. Among the scientists of European greatness, who at the turn of the XIX and XX centuries showed interest to the folklore of Galicia (Halychyna) and Galician Ukrainians, contributed to their national and cultural revival, one of the leading places is occupied by the outstanding Ukrainian scientist Ivan Verkhratskyi. He was both naturalist and philologist, as well as folklorist and ethnographer, organizer of scientific work, publisher and popularizer of Ukrainian literature, translator, publicist and famous public figure. I.H.Verkhratskyi was also an outstanding researcher of plants and animals of Eastern Galicia, a connoisseur of insects, especially butterflies, the author of the first school textbooks on natural science written in Ukrainian. A new emerging field that has seen the application of the drone technology is the healthcare sector. Over the years, the health sector has increasingly relied on the device for timely transportation of essential articles across the globe. Since its introduction in health, scholars have attempted to address the impact of drones on healthcare across Africa and the world at large. Among other things, it has been reported by scholars that the device has the ability to overcome the menace of weather constraints, inadequate personnel and inaccessible roads within the healthcare sector. This notwithstanding, data on drones and drone application in Ghana and her healthcare sector in particular appears to be little within the drone literature. Also, little attempt has been made by scholars to highlight the use of drones in African countries. By using a narrative review approach, the current study attempts to address the gap above. By this approach, a thorough literature search was performed to locate and assess scientific materials involving the application of drones in the military field and in the medical systems of Africans and Ghanaians in particular. The paper by Artemii Bernatskyi and Vladyslav Khaskin is devoted to the analysis of the history of the laser creation as one of the greatest technical inventions of the 20th century. This paper focuses on establishing a relation between the periodization of the stages of creation and implementation of certain types of lasers, with their influence on the invention of certain types of equipment and industrial technologies for processing the materials, the development of certain branches of the economy, and scientific-technological progress as a whole. The paper discusses the stages of: invention of the first laser; creation of the first commercial lasers; development of the first applications of lasers in industrial technologies for processing the materials. Special attention is paid to the "patent wars" that accompanied different stages of the creation of lasers. A comparative analysis of the market development for laser technology from the stage of creation to the present has been carried out. Nineteenth-century world exhibitions were platforms to demonstrate technical and technological changes that witnessed the modernization and industrialization of the world. World exhibitions have contributed to the promotion of new inventions and the popularization of already known, as well as the emergence of art objects of world importance. One of the most important world events at the turn of the century was the 1900 World's Fair in Paris. Thus, the author has tried to analyze the participation of representatives of the sugar industry in the World's Fair in 1900 and to define the role of exhibitions as indicators of economic development, to show the importance and influence of private entrepreneurs, especially from Ukraine, on the sugar industry and international contacts. The article by Viktor Verhunov highlights the life and creative path of the outstanding domestic scientist, theorist, methodologist and practitioner of agricultural engineering K.G.Schindler, associated with the formation of agricultural mechanics in Ukraine. The methodological foundation of the research is the principles of historicism, scientific nature and objectivity in reproducing the phenomena of the past based on the complex use of general scientific, special, interdisciplinary methods. For the first time a number of documents from Russian and Ukrainian archives, which reflect some facts of the professional biography of the scientist, were introduced into scientific circulation. The authors from Kremenchuk National University named after Mykhailo Ostrohradskyi presented a fascinating study of a bayonet fragment with severe damages of metal found in the city Kremenchuk (Ukraine) in one of the canals on the outskirts of the city, near the Dnipro River. Theoretical research to study blade weapons of the World War I period and the typology of the bayonets of that period, which made it possible to put forward an assumption about the possible identification of the object as a modified bayonet to the Mauser rifle has been carried out. Metal science expert examination was based on X-ray fluorescence spectrometry to determine the concentration of elements in the sample from the cleaned part of the blade. In the article by Mykola Ruban and Vadym Ponomarenko on the basis of the complex analysis of sources and scientific literature the attempt to investigate historical circumstances of development and construction of shunting electric locomotives at the Dnipropetrovsk electric locomotive plant has been made. The next scientific article continues the series of publications devoted to the assessment of activities of the heads of the Ministry of Railways of the Russian Empire. In this article, the authors have attempted to systematize and analyze historical data on the activities of Klavdii Semyonovych Nemeshaev as the Minister of Railways of the Russian Empire. The article also assesses the development and construction of railway network in the Russian Empire during Nemeshaev's office, in particular, of the Amur Line and Moscow Encircle Railway, as well as the increase in the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway. The article discusses K.S.Nemeshaev's contribution to the development of technology and the introduction of a new type of freight steam locomotive for state-owned railways. We hope that everyone will find interesting useful information in the new issue. And, of course, we welcome your new submissions.
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With the failure of Ukraine's 2023 counteroffensive despite billions in armaments and months of training, the post mortems have begun.
They follow: The West was too slow in providing missiles and aircraft; Russia had too much time to prepare trenches and minefields; Ukraine needed more time to learn combined-arms tactics and employ Western armor effectively. Yet underlying all these excuses was a broader analytical failing that has yet to be acknowledged: flawed and often facile historical analogies led defense planners to underestimate Russia's resilience.
Even today, with the horrific costs of overconfidence plain to all and Ukraine at a crucial crossroads, the same flawed analysis of the Russian adversary persists.
Time and again, policymakers and commentators based their expectations of the war based on flawed historical parallels. One example is Russia's acceptance of mass casualties and use of "human wave" attacks where they lose three or more soldiers for every Ukrainian casualty.
Time and again — right up to the present — commanders and commentators cite this as a sign of severe Russian weakness. Whether discussed in the jargon of an "asymetrical attrition gradient," or simply referring to Russian soldiers as "cannon fodder," analysts frequently note that such profligacy with human lives is a legacy of ponderous Soviet and Tsarist armies.
But what they fail to note is that this tactic often brought victory. Tsarist armies took massive casualties in battles with Swedish, Persian and Turkish forces as they built the Russian empire. In defeating Napoleon, the Russians suffered as many casualties as the French despite the advantage of fighting on their home ground and their familiarity with the Russian winter.
Soviet Marshal Zhukov absorbed 860,000 casualties to the Germans' 200,000 at the Battle of Kursk in World War II. He also lost 1,500 tanks to the Germans' 500, yet Kursk is remembered as a great triumph that crushed Hitler's final hopes of victory. Can one imagine Germany celebrating its superior casualty ratio while being defeated by Stalin's hordes?
However shocking this tactic may be, it is a resource that Moscow has and Kyiv does not. Consider the battle for Bakhmut and the daily bulletins trumpeting Ukraine's success in killing thousands of Russians, right up to the moment that Bakhmut fell to Wagner Group mercenaries — weirdly reminiscent of the Pentagon's body-count bulletins in the Vietnam war.
At Bakhmut Ukraine lost the indispensable cream of its army to hordes of dispensable Russian convicts-turned-storm troopers in doomed defense of a strategically insignificant town that President Zelenskyy vowed would not fall. The average age of Ukrainian soldiers is now 43.
Losing Bakhmut hurt Ukrainian morale, but it is Russian morale that pundits say is shot. And they remind us that military disasters sparked Russian uprisings in the past — in 1905 after defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, or the debacle of WWI that led to the collapse of the Romanov dynasty in 1917.
Given their hardships and suffering, why wouldn't Russians do it again and overthrow Putin? Pundits often ignore that, after a decade of economic chaos and global humiliation in the 1990s, Putin is respected for restoring stability and national pride. Tsar Nicholas II, by contrast, was rather more like Boris Yeltsin — weak and out of touch, reliant on hated advisers, presiding over chaos.
It's also likely that, unlike a distant debacle with Japan or European carnage triggered by an Austro-Serbian dispute, many Russians believe in this war because they see Crimea and Donbas as historically and culturally Russian.
Whether it stems more from deep-seated imperial attitudes or a decade of anti-Western propaganda, Russians still back Putin and even take pride in standing up to the best NATO can throw at them. An effort to appreciate the views of Putin and his people is not being "pro Russian" even if we find those views wrong or repugnant.
On the contrary, such an approach is key to "thinking in time" with accurate historical analogies, and vital to avoiding the conceit of assuming that Russian soldiers or citizens will behave as we would.
On the eve of Ukraine's counteroffensive, U.S. Joint Chiefs chairman General Mark Milley declared that Russians "lack leadership, they lack will, their morale is poor, and their discipline is eroding." Of course, if your main historical lesson is that Russian armies crack under strain, then you look closely for signs of dissent and soon find a looming collapse.
This is how superficial history joins with confirmation bias to produce flawed analysis. Stymied by fierce Russian fighting, Ukrainians troops themselves told Milley he was wrong: "We expected less resistance. They are holding. They have leadership. It is not often you say that about the enemy."
As Kyiv's crisis deepens and recriminations spill out in public, commanders at all levels of the Ukrainian Armed Forces agree that they and their NATO advisers badly misjudged Russian tenacity: "This big counteroffensive was based on a simple calculation: when a Moskal [slur for ethnic Russian] sees a Bradley or a Leopard, he will just run away."
But what about taking the fight to Russia? Former CIA Director General David Petraeus predicted that Russian resolve could "crumble" in response to Ukrainian drone attacks on Moscow. Such strikes "bring the war to the Russian people" and might convince Putin's regime that, like the USSR's Cold War quagmire in Afghanistan, Russia's current war in Ukraine is "ultimately unsustainable."
In fact the old Soviet elite did not see the Afghan war as unsustainable, nor were they much concerned about public opinion. It took both a generational transition and a bold new leader who prioritized improving ties with the West — Mikhail Gorbachev — to finally manage an exit.
The point is not that war isn't costly. The Afghan war was, and the Ukraine war is even more so. The point is that accepting defeat in a major war that was justified as a vital national interest is unlikely until there is both a new leader and turnover in the ruling elite.
As for "bringing war to the Russian people" by bombing Moscow, when did that ever work? NATO brought the Kosovo War to the Serbian people in 1999 by bombing Belgrade, and it only rallied them to the side of dictator Slobodan Milošević; 25 years later, Serbs remain strongly pro-Russian and anti-NATO. And when Chechen rebels bombed Moscow and other Russian cities in the early 2000s, it only rallied Russians around Putin and helped justify his increasingly authoritarian rule. These aren't mere historical quibbles, but illustrations of flawed analogies that framed both strategic expectations and tactical decisions. And they have cost dearly, in both Ukrainian lives and now Western support. Confidence in Washington-Brussels elites falls even as officials still claim that Ukraine is winning and Putin "cannot outlast" the West.
In fact, as NATO empties its warehouses of equipment and misses deadlines for producing new munitions, it's hard to conclude otherwise unless one is trapped in another oversimplified WWII analogy: that of America as the "arsenal of democracy."
Many have contrasted America's innovative private arms producers with Russia's technology-starved state factories, predicting that Moscow would soon exhaust its munitions. Instead, Russia has consistently belied the "all brawn and no brains" narrative, not only outproducing the West in tanks, artillery and shells but defying sanctions to develop new precision-guided bombs, drones and missiles. Perhaps those discounting Russian ingenuity forgot the Katyusha multiple-rocket launcher, a legendary artillery weapon that both the Germans and Americans copied in WWII. With a looming crisis in efforts to keep Kyiv supplied with munitions, it is useful to look closer at American arms production in WWII, when the "arsenal of democracy" was in certain respects more like Putin's economy than Biden's. But today Washington faces a complex set of institutional obstacles: "least-cost production models," contractor aversion to stockpiling, export restrictions, and environmental regulations the likes of which do not trouble Putin. A final lesson from WWII's "armaments race" is a caution against technological hubris such as that seen in today's gushing about the superiority of Western Leopard or Abrams tanks over the Russian T-72 and T-80. Germany's Tiger tank was clearly superior to the Soviet T-34 in WWII, but the latter was cheap, reliable, and easy to produce in numbers; at Kursk, Soviet tanks outnumbered German ones by 2:1. So as NATO planners and media pundits take up the "cannon fodder" refrain again with reference to the heavy losses Russians are taking as they advance in the battle for Avdiivka, these planners and pundits would do well to consider a quip famously attributed to Soviet wartime leader Josef Stalin: "Quantity has a quality all its own."
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The ongoing conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is a pivotal event in the modern history of Sudan. With hundreds, possibly thousands of civilians killed in the conflict, there has been a deep sense of horror particularly in Sudan's capital Khartoum, resulting in 2.5 million residents of the city fleeing to nearby regions of Sudan, or neighboring countries Chad and Egypt.For those remaining in Khartoum, fear and anxiety are constant, as gunfire, heavy artillery, and smoke rise above the city, fighter jets fly at low altitude over residential areas. The current war will have a devastating mental health impact, in addition to its many fatalities and physical injuries. Children in particular are more likely to suffer severe depression, flashback and post-traumatic events as a result of exposure to the horrific violence and abuses.Exacerbating these anxieties is the use by both the SAF and RSF of psychological warfare. Through social media, both sides have shared graphic content from the battlefield, intended to intimidate their opponents and influence public opinion in their favor. Much of this content has been impossible to verify independently. The SAF has struggled to gain legitimacy with the public, discredited for being part of the former regime of Omar al-Bashir, Sudan's long-time former dictator. The SAF leadership claims to be fighting for stability in Sudan, despite allowing the proliferation of former regime-backed militias since the ousting of Bashir in 2019.Meanwhile, the RSF leadership has used media outlets to claim they are fighting against the SAF for being part of the former regime. Their stated intention is to restart the process of handing power from the military to civilian politicians in the framework agreement signed with the Forces of Freedom and Change, which came to an end with the military takeover in October, 2021. However, the RSF's claim is grossly misleading, as the RSF has been accused of committing genocide in Darfur since 2003.In both cases, the message is clear. Each side wishes to give the perception that it is winning the war on the ground. But, neither has been strong enough to achieve outright control of Khartoum. Hence, they merely seek to mislead people who are not residents of the city.The current war in Sudan arguably represents a long power struggle between the RSF, currently led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo or "Hemedti," and remnants of the Bashir regime that dominate the SAF, headed by Lieutenant-General Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan. Since the Bashir regime was toppled, its supporters have used the transition period to organize.The SAF has targeted activists, members of resistance committees and politicians with arbitrary arrests and accusing them of backing the RSF. Over the last four years, they have waged a war against Sudan's demand for democracy. Effectively blocking all political efforts to ensure a smooth post-2019 transition, they have sought to prevent the outcome of a credible civilian democratic government. They have instigated violence, attacked civilians, and portrayed the revolution as a project planned in the West to divide Sudan.Furthermore, the SAF's leadership has made use of Sudan's lucrative black market to sabotage any economic progress. They have done so through raising the foreign currency rate against the Sudanese pound and creating shortages in the country, prompting the Sudanese people to feel economic pressure and protest against the civilians in power, providing justification for the military counterparts to launch their takeover. The emergence of numerous militias was encouraged, and the security forces that once maintained the Bashir regime's security turned a blind eye to crimes such as robbery, burglary, and aggravated bodily harm.Historically, the SAF is the oldest security institution of the state, and civilian political parties have used it to capture power in 1958, 1969 and 1989. After al-Bashir's coup in 1989, the Sudanese Islamists Movement, precursor of the National Congress Party (NCP), stacked senior officer positions in the SAF with their supporters.Simultaneously, the regime created various security institutions and militias to counterbalance the threat of a further coup, and to crush rebellions in outlying areas of Sudan. One of these security forces was the RSF, which originated in the early 2000s as the Janjaweed, Arab militiamen used by Bashir to defeat insurgencies in Darfur. Most Janjaweed fighters were of the Rizigat tribe, which includes the Mahria branch of which Hemedti is a member. In 2017, Sudan's parliament passed the Rapid Support Forces Act legitimating the militia. When Bashir felt threatened by his competitors within the NCP, he summoned the RSF to Khartoum to protect him; ultimately, it was the RSF's desertion of Bashir which sealed his regime's fate.After Bashir was toppled in 2019, Burhan became the president of Sudan, appointing Hemedti as his deputy in August 2019. Burhan's focus was on staying in power and preventing the transition to civilian rule. Burhan feared that out of power, he may be prosecuted for his claimed role in the Darfur genocide alongside Hemedti. To reduce any possibility of being ousted, he empowered Hemedti by abolishing article 5 of the RSF Act, allowing the RSF to act independently of the SAF command structure, while establishing loose ties to Burhan. Hemedti was able to increase the number of his forces from 20,000 to over 100,000, most being trained in SAF camps in Khartoum. The RSF was tasked with protecting strategic sites in Khartoum, including the presidential palace, general command, Khartoum airport, and the building of Sudan's Television and Broadcast Corporation. Burhan also retired several SAF generals who had criticized the expansion and new roles of the RSF.Ironically, Burhan's focus on staying in power resulted in his clash with Hemedti, who had his own presidential ambitions. Over time, Burhan and Hemedti started to compete with one another, regionally and internationally. Hemedti cemented his ties with Russia through the Wagner Group, a relationship with its origins in Bashir's request for Russia's help in protecting his regime in 2017. In 2018, it emerged that Wagner was contracted to train the regime's security forces, including the RSF, in riot control.Hemedti's relationship with Wagner expanded through gold smuggling operations that helped Russia offset the sanctions for its invasion of Ukraine, and the RSF's support and Hemedti's influence for Wagner's extraction of resources in the Central African Republic (CAR). In January 2023, Hemedti used his forces to close the Sudanese-CAR border, to prevent CAR opposition forces from using Sudanese territory. Wagner has supplied the RSF with anti-aircraft missiles that have deterred the SAF from attacking its positions in Khartoum in the current conflict.The RSF-Wagner relationship has deepened as a result of both paramilitary groups' relationship with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE is a key destination of Sudan's mineral resources, for example receiving 40 percent of Sudan's gold exports. Geopolitically, Wagner, Hemedti and the UAE are all backers of Libya's Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar. Hemedti sent 1000 RSF fighters to support Haftar's attempt to take over Libya's capital Tripoli in 2019, when Egypt refused to send ground forces to support Haftar despite also being an ally. There are indications that, in return, the UAE has been supporting Hemedti and the RSF in Sudan's current conflict.Burhan has also developed close regional alliances. Burhan received military training in Egypt, and the Egyptian Armed Forces today sees the SAF as the only institution that can hold Sudan together, and represent Egypt's own interests in the country. The Egyptian leadership deeply distrusts Hemedti and the RSF, who they view as a mercenary group with no loyalty to the state. Egypt has accordingly provided the SAF with covert air defence aid in its current conflict with the RSF.Burhan also uses his position as the president of Sudan, and commander of the SAF, to win the backing of Saudi Arabia. Strategically, Saudi Arabia needs to ensure the security of its Red Sea investments that are part of its Vision 2030. Saudi Arabia has also proven to be interested in investing in and deepening trade relations with Sudan, putting it in competition with the UAE's influence represented in Hemedti and the RSF.The current conflict has militarily incapacitated the forces of both Burhan and Hemedti, with Khartoum becoming a graveyard for their soldiers. The fighting has shown that both sides are just interested in cementing their own regimes in a post-conflict scenario. It remains to be seen how civilians will be able to resist whichever party, with its regional backers, emerges victorious from the violence, and continue Sudan's long journey towards democracy.
The objective of this report is to assess important developments in the global aviation industry and how this affects civil aviation in Norway and Europe. The report is based on an academic literature review and other secondary sources. The challenges brought about by deregulation and the emergence of low cost carriers (LCCs) as well as more recently, the 'Middle East 3' airlines (Emirates, Etihad Airways and Qatar Airways), call for major political attention from a range of stakeholders. With this in mind, we have drawn on a wide literature, both geographically and chronologically speaking, with a view to drawing insights from experiences of deregulation. An appraisal of the American deregulation experience is provided, which results in various unintended consequences whose ripple-effects continue to shape the sector. In particular, we point to changes in the field of labour, in the broad sense, and the network infrastructure. With regard to the former, it is apparent that a job in aviation no longer carries the prestige it once did. Intense competition has led to increased labour productivity and wage cuts. The example of Colgan Air bears out some of the risks identified with increased pressures and strains in aviation. However, it would be spurious to assume a connection between inferior labour conditions and LCCs. In terms of network and infrastructure, research identified so-called 'pockets of pain' where fare prices remain high while connectivity remains relatively low. Also, airline consolidation has not delivered the certainty purported by the economic theory. Despite initial innovations by LCCs, these airlines, in terms of service and fares, are now largely indistinguishable from their U.S. legacy counterparts. Today, we can speak of four major U.S. airlines. Consequently, yet another industry is deemed 'too big to fail' and its costs, some of which can be the result of poor decision-making, are borne by the general public. For some, this oligopolistic tendency is best addressed through further liberalization. This raises an important question regarding the efficient market hypothesis and the spatial boundaries of deregulation. While the European experience of deregulation in the aviation sector, by comparison, has been more piecemeal it has by no means been less complex. On the contrary, a variety of social and fiscal regimes has complicated matters considerably. This heterogeneity has implications for the industry structure, business and employment models as well as regulatory oversight mechanisms. In particular, LCCs adopt different business or employment models thereby defying a 'one-size-fits-all' approach. While intrinsically linked, it is important, for analytical purposes, to distinguish between the business and employment models that are adopted by airlines. Hence, understanding the specific models that LCCs adopt is critical to drafting a relevant and effective aviation strategy. In addition to the standard employment relationship, typified by the legacy carriers and some LCCs, this report examines four possible employment models that LCCs might use. Approaches can vary whether we speak of pilots or cabin-crew. By providing practical examples, it is possible to discern the increasingly contentious nature of such employment arrangements. For too long aviation has operated under the radar of public imagination. The findings of the so-called Ghent Report from 2015, which highlights the extent of atypical employment in the case of pilots, should not be overlooked. Nor should the potential consequences for flight safety be underestimated. Phenomena such as zero hour contracts and 'bogus' self-employment are becoming increasingly commonplace in the cockpits of aircraft. To boot, young and inexperienced pilots are entering schemes called pay-to-fly (P2F) on revenue-earning flights. There is an onus on politicians to be up to speed on such developments and their deleterious effects on the aviation sector. Equally, there is a responsibility on the media not to be co-opted by industry and to report accurately on such practices. This is in the public interest. For the best part, we have focused on the different employment and business models adopted by two LCCs that are of particular relevance to the Norwegian context, namely Ryanair and Norwegian Air Shuttle (NAS). Clearly, there is a preference for litigation in the legal arena where loopholes make a mockery of national legal systems. This is especially the case with Ryanair, and the Cocca case is demonstrable of this. This case can also help explain Ryanair's departure from Rygge airport. More recently there is evidence that NAS is becoming just as inclined to challenge, what might hitherto have been taken as granted, in a courtroom be it in Norway or further afield. In terms of business models, there is a marked difference between the two LCCs. For instance, NAS has created a number of subsidiaries (e.g. Norwegian UK). Since, May 2013, Norwegian has entered the long-haul market to Asia and the U.S. and has created two subsidiaries, Norwegian Long Haul (NLH) and Norwegian Air International (NAI), registered in Norway and Ireland, and with Norwegian and Irish AOCs, respectively. The decision to register NAI in Ireland has been the source of controversy, which is exemplified by the unprecedented delay in the U.S. DOT granting NAI a foreign carriers permit. The principal reason for this is that there is a genuine concern that NAI will operate trans-Atlantic flights with 'crews of convenience' from Asia. NAI deny any such intentions. Ryanair's corporate structure, on the other hand, is less fragmented; however, the Irish airline has a clear preference for the use of secondary airports, the use of which have been central to its competitive business strategy. This has put airports in direct competition with one another with, at times, perverse outcomes. In doing so, Ryanair seeks to extract concessions from airports. Negotiations take place under the threat of severe service reduction or even complete base abandonment. Furthermore, it is not unusual for such negotiations to be conducted in the public realm. Ryanair has become synonymous with publicity stunts in a bid to build their brand or strengthen their bargaining hand. The Rygge debacle is emblematic of such antics. While it is possible to discern variations between different airlines with regard to employment models vis-à-vis pilots there is a degree of commonality in consequential terms. The question is whether a culture of safety, integral to the aviation sector, is being replaced by a culture of fear? By removing any semblance of security, through employment legislation or trade union membership, a pilot's future employment is at the whim of the airline bosses. In such an environment, pilots are reluctant to raise their heads above the parapet for fear of being identified as being a troublemaker. Such a development inevitably impinges on the question of flight safety. To demonstrate the risks pilots run in highlighting safety concerns, we present the case of Captain Coleman. This case is indicative not only of the intimidating environment created through atypical employment, but also how regulatory oversight is compromised. The use of different business and employment models creates procedural ambiguity, which leads to a knowledge gap with regard to airline employees and/or a regulatory gap when it comes to determining with which regulatory agency responsibility actually lies. Individually or accumulatively, such ambiguity negatively affects a culture of safety. In light of these developments in the European aviation industry, a number of recommendations are made which should inform Norway's aviation strategy. These recommendations can be divided into four broad approaches: i) ensuring the continuance of a culture of safety is paramount; ii) addressing regulatory loopholes that facilitate social dumping by clarifying key concepts such as 'operator' and 'home base' is necessary to create a level playing field; iii) when engaging with the ME3s, a European strategy is essential so as to counter a divide and conquer strategy; and iv) increased demand for aviation must be met with a commitment to well-trained pilots with pay-to-fly schemes being prohibited. Naturally, these recommendations require political will. In addition, regulatory agencies, including the tax authorities, must work in close cooperation with each other. Addressing social dumping and regime shopping also requires cross-border action and greater coordination between national regulatory agencies, as well as an enhanced role for organized labour, so as to ensure that regulatory and knowledge gaps are closed. While the success of airlines' decisions are reliant on good timing, such a comfort cannot be afforded to the question of regulatory oversight. Hence, political will and the enactment of rules will not suffice. Coordinated and proactive oversight, both within and between countries, is fundamental.
Between 2000 and 2005 infrastructure made a contribution of 1 percentage point to Senegal's improved per capita growth performance, placing it in the middle of the distribution among West African countries during the period. Raising the country's infrastructure endowment to that of the region's middle-income countries (MICs) could boost annual growth by about 2.7 percentage points. Senegal has made significant progress in some areas of its infrastructure. In the transport sector, road standards are adequate and their quality average. Senegal has also strengthened the road institutional framework with the creation of the Second Generation Road Fund (FERA) and the Road Maintenance Executing Agency. It has also managed to have a toll road concession granted for the Dakar-Diamniadio Toll Highway. The tariffs in the railway sector are internationally competitive, and there has been improvement in the financial viability of ports. After Nigeria, the country stands as an emerging hub and a major player in air transport. Also, Senegal has managed to introduce private participation in electricity generation, and the unbundling of the electricity sector is under way even as the country actively participates in the regional power market. The country is on track to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in improved water. In the information and communication technology (ICT) sector there has been an impressive expansion of the mobile and Internet markets. Senegal already spends around $911 million per year on infrastructure, equivalent to about 11 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP). Almost $312 million a year is lost to inefficiencies of various kinds, associated mainly with under-pricing in the power and water sectors, poor financial management of utilities, and inefficient allocation of resources across sectors. If Senegal could raise tariffs to cost-recovery levels and reduce operational inefficiencies in line with reasonable developing-country benchmarks, it could substantially boost its infrastructure sector.
n/a ; Timeline of key events: March 2011: Anti-government protests broke out in Deraa governorate calling for political reforms, end of emergency laws and more freedoms. After government crackdown on protestors, demonstrations were nationwide demanding the ouster of Bashar Al-Assad and his government. July 2011: Dr. Nabil Elaraby, Secretary General of the League of Arab States (LAS), paid his first visit to Syria, after his assumption of duties, and demanded the regime to end violence, and release detainees. August 2011: LAS Ministerial Council requested its Secretary General to present President Assad with a 13-point Arab initiative (attached) to resolve the crisis. It included cessation of violence, release of political detainees, genuine political reforms, pluralistic presidential elections, national political dialogue with all opposition factions, and the formation of a transitional national unity government, which all needed to be implemented within a fixed time frame and a team to monitor the above. - The Free Syrian Army (FSA) was formed of army defectors, led by Col. Riad al-Asaad, and backed by Arab and western powers militarily. September 2011: In light of the 13-Point Arab Initiative, LAS Secretary General's and an Arab Ministerial group visited Damascus to meet President Assad, they were assured that a series of conciliatory measures were to be taken by the Syrian government that focused on national dialogue. October 2011: An Arab Ministerial Committee on Syria was set up, including Algeria, Egypt, Oman, Sudan and LAS Secretary General, mandated to liaise with Syrian government to halt violence and commence dialogue under the auspices of the Arab League with the Syrian opposition on the implementation of political reforms that would meet the aspirations of the people. - On October 26, the Ministerial Committee held discussions in Damascus with President Assad. - The establishment of the Syrian National Council (SNC) in Istanbul, the first opposition coalition of different groups, but failed to gain international recognition because of deep divisions. November 2011: Syrian government agreed to implement a new Arab Action Plan (attached) endorsed by LAS Ministerial Council to end all acts of violence, release detainees, withdraw Syrian military and armed forces from cities, and ensure freedom of movement for journalists and observers throughout the country. -LAS Ministerial Council suspended the membership of Syria (November 16), and imposed economic sanctions (November 27) and some member states withdrew their ambassadors from Damascus, as it failed to comply with the Action Plan. December 2011: Negotiations with Damascus were resumed and an agreement is finally reached on the implementation of the Action Plan. LAS Observer Mission was deployed in Syria to monitor the implementation of the plan (December 24). - The Mission later submitted a report (attached) covering the period from 24 December 2011 to 18 January 2012 in accordance with the mandate conferred by the protocol concluded between the Syrian government and LAS. The report was divisive among the members of the Arab League, as it blamed both the regime and the opposition for the violence. January 2012: LAS Ministerial Council adopted resolution 7444 (attached) which called on the Syrian President to immediately hand over power to his deputy in order to begin the process of a political transition, which would include negotiations with the opposition, the formation of a national unity government, and the holding of elections. The resolution also, requested the Chair of the Arab Ministerial Committee and the Secretary General to brief the United Nations Security Council on the developments and get it to endorse the plan. - On January 22, Saudi Arabia withdrew its monitors, followed by the other GCC members on January 24. - On January 28, the Secretary-General of LAS announced the suspension of the activities of the observer mission, given the serious deterioration of the security situation. - On January 31, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, Chair of the Arab Ministerial Committee and Dr. Nabil Elaraby, Secretary General of the League of Arab States briefed the Security Council (attached) on Arab efforts and called on the council to adopt a draft resolution submitted by Morocco, supporting Arab League resolution 7444 (which called on the Syrian President to hand over power to his deputy) February 2012: - On February 4, Russia and China vetoed a draft Security Council resolution (attached), tabled by Morocco (the Arab member of the Security Council) and others. - On February 12, the Arab League adopted its resolution 7446 (attached), practically "transferring the file" to the United Nations Security Council. - On February 16, the issue was taken to the General Assembly, which adopted its Resolution 66/253, calling-among other things- for the appointment of a Special Envoy. - On February 23, former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan was appointed as the Joint Special Envoy (JSE) of the United Nations and the League of Arab States on the Syrian crisis, to facilitate a peaceful Syrian-led and inclusive political solution. - On February 24, and upon the initiative of President Sarkozy of France, the first meeting of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People was held in Tunis, with the participation of more than 60 countries and representatives from the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the European Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab Maghreb Union and the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States to discuss the worsening situation in Syria. The group noted the Arab League's request to the United Nations Security Council to issue a resolution to form a joint Arab-UN peacekeeping force following a cessation of violence by the regime, and called on LAS to convene a meeting of all disparate opposition groups to agree on a clear statement of shared principles for a transition in Syria. The meeting recognized the SNC as a legitimate representative of Syrians seeking peaceful democratic change. Text of the Conclusions of the Meeting. March 2012: The SNC formed a military council to organize and unify all armed resistance. - The JSE, Kofi Anan, submitted a six-point peace plan to the UN Security Council (which the council adopted in April in its resolution 2042), that called for commitment to a Syrian-led political process, achieve an effective United Nations supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties, ensure provision of humanitarian assistance, intensify the release of arbitrarily detained persons, ensure freedom of movement for journalists and respect the freedom of demonstrating peacefully. It was later approved by the Syrian government, and the opposition remained skeptical. April 2012: United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) was established by United Nations Security Council resolution 2043 (attached) initially for a 90-day period, to monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and to monitor and support the full implementation of the Joint Special Envoy's six-point plan on ending the conflict in Syria. June 2012: The Action Group for Syria, with the participation of the Secretary Generals of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and the European Union High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, chaired by the JSE, met in Geneva and adopted the Geneva Final Communique (attached) which called for the establishment of a transitional governing body, with full executive powers, as part of the agreed principles and guidelines for a Syrian-led political transition. July 2012: The Syrian Opposition meeting was held under the auspices of LAS in Cairo, and reached an agreement on a national compact and a detailed transition plan. The two documents complemented the guidelines and principles laid out by the Action Group in Geneva. August 2012: UNSMIS mandate came to an end owing to an intensification of armed violence and use of heavy weapons. - Prime Minister Riad Hijab defected, and US President Obama's first direct threat of force against Syria, if Assad's regime deploys or uses chemical or biological weapons, calling such action a "red line" for the US. - Joint Special Envoy, Kofi Annan announced his resignation because of the Security Council failure to reach binding resolutions; Lakhdar Brahimi succeeded Annan as the Joint Special Representative of the United Nations and the League of Arab states for Syria (JSR). September 2012: Egypt hosted the high level preparatory meeting of the regional Quartet on Syria on September 10, which included Turkey and Saudi Arabia key backers of the Syrian Revolution, and Iran the major supporter of al-Assad regime, in an initiative to bring together regional powers to voice their positions on how to end the Syrian conflict. - On September 17, the Quartet's ministerial meeting took place in Cairo; Saudi Arabia opted out while Iran proposed a peace plan which called on all parties to cease violence and stop all financial and military support to the opposition, and suggested the deployment of observers from the quartet's nations to Syria. The participants failed to reach an agreement. October 2012: a four-day ceasefire attempt was announced towards late October, in respect to Eid al-Adha Holiday, which was breached on the first day in Homs, Aleppo and Damascus. November 2012: National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC) was formed in Qatar, responding to repeated calls from their Western and Arab supporters to create a cohesive and representative leadership, it excluded Islamist militias. December 2012: US, Britain, France, Turkey and Gulf states formally recognized SOC as "legitimate representative" of the Syrian people. January 2013: the Emir of Kuwait hosted the first pledging conference on Syria, international donors pledged more than $1.5bn to help civilians affected by the conflict in Syria. March 2013: LAS Ministerial Council adopted resolution 7595 (attached) to recognize SOC as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Syrian people and called on the SOC to establish an executive body to take up Syria's seat. April 2013: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State, released a recorded audio message announcing Jabhat al-Nusra as an extension of al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria. The leader of al-Nusra, Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, refused the merger. Divisions among the jihadists emerged. - Hezbollah's involvement deepened when it led the ground assault on Al-Qusayr, a Sunni town in Homs province by the Lebanese border. August 2013: The Assad regime was accused of using chemical weapons in Eastern Ghouta to kill hundreds of civilians. The government denied using chemical weapons. President Obama sought congressional authorization for the use of force. September 2013: UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2118 (attached) requiring the Syrian regime to dismantle its chemical weapons arsenal by mid-2014, and avoid military strikes. December 2013: US and Britain suspended "non-lethal" support for rebels in northern Syria after reports Islamist rebels seized some bases of Western-backed Free Syrian Army. January 2014: the Geneva II Conference on Syria was held in Montreux on January 22, and attended by 37 states, 4 organizations and both Syrian parties. Iran was invited by SG Ban Ki- Moon on January 19, the Opposition declared its refusal to attend if Iran was not excluded, the US viewed Iran's invitation "as conditioned on Iran's explicit and public support for the full implementation of the Geneva Communique"; Iran refused any preconditions to the talks, and refused to endorse the Geneva Communique specially the transitional governing body. February 2014: two rounds of negotiations to discuss: 1- ending violence and 2-combating terrorism, 3-transitional governing body, national institutions, and 4- national reconciliation and national debate. The Syrian government refused to discuss a transitional government and insisted on discussing combating terrorism. The talks came to a halt. May 2014: JSR Brahimi announced his resignation because of the lack of progress and failure to agree on an agenda. - Iran proposed a political settlement of four points; a comprehensive cease-fire at national level, forming a national unity government consisting of the regime and the internal Syrian opposition, by transferring presidential powers to the government whereby the government will enjoy wide-ranging powers in years to come, and preparation for presidential and parliamentary elections. - Syrian rebels withdrew from the Old City of Homs, under an Iranian brokered deal and facilitated by the UN, after three years of Syrian government bombardment and siege. June 2014: President Assad held presidential elections, he was re-elected for another seven-year term allegedly winning 88.7% of the votes. July 2014: UN Secretary-General announced the appointment of Staffan de Mistura as his Special Envoy for Syria (SE)- NOT as a joint envoy with LAS. August 2014: US-led coalition began its airstrikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and expanded its strikes to Syria the following month, focusing on the city of Raqqa. September 2014: SE held his first round of consultations with concerned capitals, since taking up his office, it included his a visit to Damascus where he met with President Assad, senior officials and the tolerated internal Syrian opposition. October 2014: SE focused on establishing a series of local ceasefires, "freeze zones", starting with Aleppo, which aimed at the de-escalation of violence and allowance of the return of normalcy to it. February 2015: SE briefed the Security Council members on the 17th, announcing Syria's willingness to halt all aerial bombardment over Aleppo for a period of six weeks. It was not clear when would the freeze go into effect, reporting that a date would be announced from Damascus. June 2015: Egypt hosted the second Syrian Opposition meeting in Cairo, which excluded the National Coalition and announced a new road map to resolve the crisis which did not abolish Assad's government. July 2015: SE announced that his office would facilitate intra-Syrian working groups to generate a "Syrian-owned framework document" on the implementation of the Geneva Communiqué. Main themes of the groups were Safety and Protection for All, Political and Constitutional Issues, Military and Security Issues, and Public Institutions, Reconstruction and Development. September 2015: Russia conducted its first airstrikes against IS in Syria. The US and the Syrian Opposition claim it is targeting rebel-held areas instead. October 2015: First meeting of International Syria Support Group (ISSG) took place in Vienna, it included China, Egypt, the EU, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the United States. They agreed on a nine-point plan, but still had substantial divisions on the future of Assad. It was the first time Iran and Saudi Arabia were brought to the same table. November 2015: Second meeting of the ISSG was held in Vienna adding LAS to its members. They set a time frame to prepare for a parallel ceasefire and political process by January 2016 that would lead to credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance within six months, followed by the drafting of a constitution and elections within 18 months. Jordan was tasked to develop a list of groups and individuals identified as terrorists, and Saudi Arabia to hold a meeting to unify the Syrian opposition and prep for the talks with the government. December 2015: - Syrian political and armed opposition factions met in Riyadh, to agree on a common position to negotiate with Syrian government, and resulted in the formation of the High Negotiating Committee (HNC). The main Kurdish group was excluded, while Islamist hardliners such as Jaysh Al-Islam and Ahrar Al-Sham were present. - The Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) joined the follow-up meeting of the ISSG in New York, Saudi Arabia and Jordan briefed the group on their tasks. There was no agreement on the list of identified terrorists, especially with Russia's insistence on adding Ahrar Al-Sham to the list, which is considered pivotal to the unified Opposition bloc. - UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2254 (attached) which reaffirmed the road map set out by the ISSG and urged the Support Group to apply pressure on the Syrian parties to put an immediate end to the indiscriminate use of weapons against civilians, and allow unimpeded access to humanitarian aid convoys. January 2016: the SE sent out invitations to the Syrian participants, in accordance with the parameters outlined in Security Council resolution 2254, to start on the 25th with proximity talks and had expected to last for six months. The HNC requested assurances of goodwill from the government as precondition to beginning of talks, such as release of prisoners or lifting of sieges. February 2016: Talks were delayed and lasted two days before they were suspended for three weeks. - The ISSG met on the margins of the Munich Security Conference and decided that humanitarian access will commence same week of meeting to besieged areas, and an ISSG task force would elaborate within one week modalities for a nationwide cessation of hostilities. - The US and Russia announced the adoption of the terms for a cessation of hostilities in Syria, and proposed that the cessation of hostilities commence at 00:00 (Damascus time) on February 27, 2016. The cessation of hostilities does not apply to "Daesh", "Jabhat al-Nusra", or other terrorist organizations designated by the UN Security Council. - The Security Council endorsed the announcement in its resolution 2268 (attached). March 2016: SE announced March 9 set as target date of resumption of talks in Geneva. On March 14, SE resumed the intra-Syrian proximity talks in Geneva, which mainly discussed procedural matters to reach a shared list of principles and relied on Security Council resolution 2254 as its agenda. - SE briefed the Security Council on the cessation of hostilities which lowered overall levels of violence and more than 238,000 people had been reached with humanitarian aid. - On the same day, President Putin announced the withdrawal of most Russian forces from Syria, after it had largely fulfilled their objectives in Syria, and SE stated that it would have a positive impact on the negotiations. - On March 17, the PYD announced the establishment of a federal system in Kobane, Afrin and Cizire cantons in northern Syria, and its Constituent Assembly of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria-Rojava (DFNS) announced its final declaration. Both the Syrian government and other opposition affiliates denounced the plan, as well as the United States. - On March 24, the SE ended the first round by submitting a paper on the commonalities between the Syrian sides regarding the future of Syria and would help structure the next round that would address political transition. - Syrian government forces retook Palmyra from the Islamic State, with Russian air assistance. April 2016: The SE paid visits to Amman, Beirut, Damascus and Tehran ahead of the new round of talks. - The third round of proximity talks were set to start on April 13, which coincided with the parliamentary elections in the government-controlled areas in Syria. The SE met with the High Negotiations Committee delegation (Syrian Opposition) in Geneva and was expected to meet with the Syrian Government delegation within the following days. - During the 13-27 April round of negotiations, the SE developed a Mediator's Summary that identified eighteen points necessary to move forward on political transition arrangements. - on April 28, airstrikes in Aleppo on al-Quds hospital supported by both Doctors Without Borders and the International Committee of the Red Cross, which killed dozens of civilians and medical personnel. May 2016: The Security Council adopted unanimously resolution 2286 (attached) which called for the protection of civilians and medical facilities during armed conflict. - On May 4, the US-Russia brokered a 48-hour ceasefire in which helped reduce the violence, and was later extended for another 72 hours. - On May 9, France held a ministerial Friends of Syria meeting in "Paris Format", attended by the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, the European Union, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and Jordan, and issued a statement that called on the resumption of negotiations, unimpeded access of humanitarian assistance and the implementation of international law obligations to the protection of civilians. - Later on the same day, the United States and Russia issued a joint statement on Syria to reconfirm their commitment to intensify their efforts to implement a nationwide ceasefire and promote humanitarian assistance in accordance to security council resolution 2254. - On May 17, the fourth meeting of the ISSG took place in Vienna and reaffirmed its determination to strengthen the cessation of hostilities, to ensure full and sustained humanitarian access in Syria, and to ensure progress toward a peaceful political transition. Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands and Spain joined the group. June 2016: The SE announced that the time is not yet right for a resumption of the intra-Syrian talks because of the escalation of violence in Aleppo, Idlib, Latakia and other rural areas around Damascus, but the intention is to begin an official third round as soon as possible. - Riad Hijab, the Coordinator of the Opposition High Negotiations Committee, proposed a nationwide truce throughout the month of Ramadan. - On June 16, Jan Egeland Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria announced that 16 of the 18 besieged areas have been reached since the humanitarian taskforce started in late February. - On June 21, the SE briefed the United Nations General Assembly on the situation in Syria regarding the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian assistance access, as for the resumption of talks, it is yet to be decided and the OSE currently holds technical meetings with the parties on core issues. July 2016: - On July 6, the Syrian army declared a three-day nationwide "regime of calm" in respect to Eid al-Fitr holidays nonetheless pro-regime forces continued to engage in clashes and airstrikes across the country, particularly near the flashpoints of Damascus and Aleppo City. - On July 14, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to discuss a proposal for bilateral military cooperation in the Syria; The proposal calls for the establishment of a 'Joint Implementation Group' (attached) based in Amman, Jordan to "support deliberate targeting" of Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and "maximize independent but synchronized efforts" against ISIS in Syria, according to a draft memorandum leaked by the Washington Post. - On July 25, Stephen O'brien, the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, briefed the security council (attached) on the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Aleppo due to the escalation of violence over the Castello Road, the last access route in and out of eastern Aleppo, and the continuous attacks on medical facilities. O'brien called on the security council not to allow turning Aleppo into another besieged area where 250,000 to 275,000 people reside, and called to establish a weekly, 48-hour humanitarian pause to enable humanitarian aid deliveries across borders. - On July 28, the Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced, right after the Syrian government announced it has cut off the Castello Road and encircled the city of Aleppo, setting up three humanitarian corridors in Aleppo City to allow in food and medical aid, and help people flee the besieged city; the fourth corridor would be established in northern Aleppo near the Castello Road to allow the withdrawal of armed insurgents, and appealed to the Syrian government to provide guarantees to the amnesty provided to rebels to lay down their weapons. - On the same day, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, Jabhat al-Nusra's Leader announced split from al- Qaeda and mentioned that its new name would be Jabhet Fateh al-Sham, in order to get the group off the terrorist list and "to remove the excuse used by the international community – spearheaded by America and Russia – to bombard and displace Muslims in the Levant: that they are targeting al-Nusra Front, which is associated with al-Qaida". - On July 29, the SE commented on the Russian initiative in a press stakeout, that it should take into consideration a few improvements such as putting the 48-hour humanitarian pause into place on a sustainable basis irrespective of the humanitarian corridors; and suggested "to actually leave the delivery of aid through corridors to the UN and its partners"; and stressed that civilians should leave voluntarily, and given the option of leaving to areas of their own choice. August 2016: - On August 1, a Russian helicopter was downed near Saraqeb, in rebel-held Idlib province, on its way back to Russia's main air base in Hmyeim in the western province of Latakia, killing the five Russian military personnel on board. The downing of the helicopter marked the single deadliest event for Russia since its air campaign began in Syria on September 29, 2015. No group claimed the shooting down of the helicopter. - Since then, Russian warplanes conducted retaliatory airstrikes against several small opposition-held areas in the vicinity of Saraqeb. Syrian rebels accuse Russia of using incendiary munitions while conducting airstrikes against Idlib City on August 7, suggesting that Russia intended to achieve punitive and deterrent effects against opposition forces in the province. - In the early weeks of August, rebel forces launched a major assault, known as the "battle for Aleppo", on government-held southwestern towns of Aleppo City, to break the siege, and control supply lines in the south connected to eastern Aleppo. They claimed breaking the siege and capturing Ramouseh Artillery Academy, parts of the cement plant and Khan Touman-Ramouseh road. Intense fighting between warring parties continues to claim control over previously lost vicinities. - On August 9, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Turkish President Recep Tayip Erdogan in St. Petersburg, after the Turkish President officially apologized for the downing of a Russian military aircraft on June 27, 2016, and announced during a press conference that they discussed lifting of Russia's ban on imports of Turkish products, resumption of charter flights, the Turkish Stream project, Syrian settlement, and anti-terrorism efforts. - On August 10, Lieutenant-General Sergei Rudskoi, a senior Russian Defence Ministry official, announced a daily three-hour ceasefires in Aleppo, starting August 11, to allow humanitarian convoys enter the city safely, and would run from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. local time. - On August 16, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that Russian aircrafts took off from Iranian airbase Hamedan to carry out airstrikes on ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra-held facilities in the provinces of Aleppo, Idlib and Deir ez-Zour. - On August 18, the SE adjourned the HTF meeting as humanitarian convoys could not reach any of the besieged towns during the month, and called for at least a 48 hour humanitarian pause in Aleppo to deliver UN humanitarian assistance, through the Castello Road, to all parts of Aleppo City. - Also, on August 18, the Syrian government forces, unprecedentedly, launched strikes against Kurdish forces in Hasakeh in Northern Syria, after pro-government National Defense Forces (NDF) were engaged in clashes with the military wing of the Kurdish Workers Party, known as Asayish. The Syrian government claimed that "Asayish had escalated their acts of provocation attacking state establishments, stealing oil and cotton, disrupting examinations, carrying out abductions, and causing a state of chaos and instability, in addition to targeting positions of the Syrian Arab Army which required a suitable response by the Army as it targeted the sources of artillery fire and the gatherings of armed elements responsible for these criminal actions." - On August 19th, while the Kurdish fighters pushed back government forces and their allies, the Pentagon threatened to shoot down Syrian government aircrafts as they pose a threat to the US Special Forces deployed in the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) area. - On August 21, it was announced that a truce agreement had been reached between YPG and NDF, through Russian mediation, to start on August 21, 2016 at 17:00, which involved evacuating the wounded and transporting them to hospitals in Qamishli, and restore the situation to how it was prior to the clashes and hold talks on August 22 to resolve the remaining unresolved issues. - On August 22, most likely the ceasefires agreement failed as fighting escalated. - On August 24, Turkey and the International Coalition Air Forces launched "Operation Euphrates Shield" offenses to support the Free Syrian Army aligned with U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces SDF against IS militants in Jarablus, in northern Syria. - On August 26, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, addressing a joint press conference after their meeting in Geneva, announced that they failed to reach a breakthrough deal on military cooperation and a nationwide cessation of hostilities in Syria, saying they still have issues to resolve before an agreement could be announced. - On August 27, Kurdish militias targeted Diyarbakir airport in southeast Turkey, near the borders with Syria. Turkey retaliated by warplanes and artillery on targets held by Kurdish-backed forces the following day, despite US pentagon's criticism of the fighting. September 2016: - On September 4, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildrim announced that Turkish military forces and Ankara-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) had successfully purged the border region, from Azaz to Jarablus, from "terrorist organizations." - On September 9, the US and Russia reached a deal which called for a nationwide ceasefire in Syria, and unimpeded humanitarian access to all besieged areas starting on September 12th. If sustained for seven continuous days, the U.S. and Russia would establish a Joint Implementation Center (JIC) in order to share intelligence and coordinate airstrikes against both ISIS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra). - On September 21, the cessation of hostilities deal was implemented with regular violations, while the Syrian government continued to block humanitarian access to opposition-held districts of Eastern Aleppo City despite the agreement. - On September 17, the US-led coalition accidentally launched an air strike on Syrian government forces in Deir ez-Zour. - On September 19, a UN humanitarian convoy was shelled near Urum al-Kubra near Aleppo, killing 20 humanitarian aid workers and drivers, and destroying 18 out of 31 trucks. The US blamed Russia and the Syrian government for the attack; the latter declared unilaterally the end of the ceasefire agreement. - On September 20, the UN temporarily suspended its humanitarian aid to Syria after the attack, while international powers failed to reach a consensus to restore the ceasefire during an acrimonious UN Security Council Meeting on September 21st as well as two separate meetings of the International Syria Support Group on September 20 and September 22. - On September 22, the Syrian government announced a new military offensive in the rebel-held eastern Aleppo, and further escalation in a bombing campaign by Russian and Syrian airstrikes that had already intensified the day before. - On September 25, the Security Council Meeting discussed the recent escalation of violence in Aleppo after the Syrian government announced its intention to retake all of Aleppo City, and the SE called on the Security Council to "to press for a cessation of violence, and for the protection of civilians, and the civilian infrastructure; secondly to press for weekly 48-hour pauses in the fighting to ensure that the United Nations and its partners can reach eastern Aleppo, without preconditions from either the Government or the Opposition; and thirdly to press for medical evacuations of urgent cases." - On September 27, the Syrian government launched a large scale ground offensive in eastern Aleppo, and state media announced that it recaptured the central district of Al-Farafirah northwest of the Aleppo Citadel. - On September 29, the YPG set conditions to participate in operations to seize IS-held Raqqa City: the US provides arms to the YPG, recognizes its autonomy of the Federation of Northern Syria, and ensures that the Syrian Kurds are officially invited to participate in peace talks. October 2016: - On October 1, continuous airstrikes in eastern Aleppo damaged a major hospital codenamed M10, which was partially closed because of the raids. - On October 2, Stephen O'brien, the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, urged warring parties and their supporters to bring about a cessation of all hostilities, a medical evacuation system for eastern Aleppo, and regular unimpeded humanitarian access to eastern Aleppo, and he reiterated his plea to the Security Council for a 48-hours weekly humanitarian pause in fighting, at the very least. - In an official statement, the Syrian Army offered amnesty to fighters and their families to leave Aleppo under guarantee of safe passage to other rebel-held areas, after the Syrian regime forces recaptured strategic areas on the northern outskirts of the city. - On October 3, the EU announced an emergency humanitarian initiative for Aleppo, in cooperation with the United Nations and civil society organizations, in order to facilitate the urgent delivery of basic life-saving assistance to civilians in eastern Aleppo, and ensure medical evacuations with focus on women, children and the elderly. The EU has mobilized 25 million euros to support its humanitarian partners' response to cover medical, water and sanitation, and food assistance in Aleppo. The HNC issued a statement welcoming the European initiative to protect civilians in Aleppo. - The Security Council began negotiations over a draft resolution, circulated by France and Spain, which demanded all parties to the Syrian conflict "implement and ensure full implementation of cessation of hostilities, including an end to all aerial bombardments", and called on the US and Russia to "undertake joint efforts to stabilize the situation in Syria, with special measures for the Aleppo region", as well as the UN Secretary-General to propose options for a UN-supervised monitoring mechanism of the ceasefire and to "take further measures" in case of non-compliance of any party, without invoking chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault headed to Moscow and Washington to push for a vote on the draft resolution. - The United States suspended talks with Russia on trying to end the violence in Syria and accused Moscow of not complying with its commitments under the ceasefire agreement and would withdraw all personnel that were dispatched to prepare for military cooperation with Russia. - On October 4, Prince Zeid Ra'ad, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, warned over the use of incendiary weapons in Syria, and demanded bold initiatives such as limiting the use of the veto by the permanent members of the Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Russia rejected Zeid's call. - The Russian Defense Ministry declared its deployment of S-300 missile system to its Tartus naval base in Syria. - On October 6, the SE offered in a press conference to escort up to 1000 al-Nusra fighters to bring an end to the bombardment by Russian and Syrian forces to Idlib or anywhere else of their choice. While the Russian Defense Ministry announced it would shoot down US-led coalition jets if the US launches airstrikes against pro-government forces in Syria, after American officials had discussed using limited airstrikes to force government forces to halt its raids on Aleppo. - On October 7, Russia called for a Security Council emergency meeting to hear the SE's briefing (attached) on the situation in Aleppo, while the Russian Parliament ratified Moscow's deal with Syria on its "indefinite" deployment of forces. - On October 8, the Security Council held a meeting on Aleppo, and voted on the Russian-drafted resolution calling for the revival of the ceasefire deal, without mention of ending military fights in the city, and on the French-drafted resolution. The French draft received eleven votes in favor, China and Angola abstained, while Russia and Venezuela voted against. The Russian text only received four votes in favor of China, Egypt and Venezuela, Angola and Uruguay abstained, while the remaining nine council members voted against. - On October 9, France announced its intention to call the ICC for war crimes investigation in Syria, and shall contact the ICC Prosecutor on how to launch these investigations, putting into consideration that the only way is through the Security Council referral, which had been vetoed before by Russia in May 2014. - On October 13, the Deputy Special Envoy for Syria Ramzy Ezzeldin Ramzy confirmed the Syrian Government's approval of the October aid plan and for convoys to reach 25 of 29 besieged and hard-to-reach areas across Syria, but not to eastern Aleppo and three parts of the rural Damascus province. - On October 15, US Secretary of State John Kerry hosted a meeting on Syria in Lausanne, with the participation of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and seven foreign ministers from the region, from Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt, with the presence of the SE. The meeting failed to reach a joint statement on how to end the bombardment of Aleppo or on the aid delivery to the besieged towns. - On October 16, the UK's Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson held a meeting with his US, French and German counterparts and "like-minded" Gulf Arab states on the Syrian conflict in London. The UK and the US announced their consideration of imposing more sanctions against Russia and the Syrian Government to halt their ongoing raids on Aleppo. - On October 17, the European Council condemned the Syrian regime and Russia for their deliberate and indiscriminate bombardment of civilians and infrastructure in Eastern Aleppo, and called for a monitored cessation of hostilities, lift of sieges, and a nationwide sustainable humanitarian access. - On October 18, the Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced the cease of Russian and Syrian airstrikes on Aleppo to hold an 8-hour humanitarian pause on October 20th, in order to allow civilians and medical evacuations through six humanitarian corridors, and expected militants would withdraw with their weapons through two corridors, one via the Castello Road and the other near the souq al-Hai area in the south of the city. It was later announced that the eight-hour pause will be extended to eleven hours for four days. The armed opposition groups (AOGs) rejected the proposal in a joint statement claiming that "the initiative came at the same time as forced displacement operations are being carried out by the Assad regime in the Damascus suburbs of al-Mouadamiya, Qudsiya and al-Hama, and before that in Daraya." - On October 20, in conclusion of the EU summit, the EU failed to reach an agreement on imposing sanctions on Russia for the escalation of violence in Aleppo, and stated that "the EU is considering all available options should the current atrocities continue." The unilateral ceasefire took effect, and the Syrian Army declared that it would last for three days while artillery exchanges erupted around a crossing point near the rebel-controlled Bustan al-Qasr district shortly after the pause began. The Secretary-General and the SE briefed the General Assembly in an informal session on the situation in Syria, in response to an initiative led by Canada, after the Security Council failed to take action to end the aerial bombardment on Aleppo and revive peace efforts. - On October 21, the United Nations Human Rights Council held a special session on the deteriorating situation of human rights in Aleppo, upon the request of Britain (letter attached) that was submitted on behalf of a core group of 11 Western and Arab states. The Council adopted a resolution by a 24 in favor vote, seven against and 16 abstentions. It urged "the immediate implementation of the cessation of hostilities, and demanded that the regime and its allies put an immediate end to all aerial bombardments of and military flights over Aleppo city. The Council demanded that all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities and its supporters, promptly allowed rapid, safe, unhindered and sustained humanitarian access, including across conflict lines and borders." The Council further "requested the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic to conduct a comprehensive, independent special inquiry into the events in Aleppo, and identify all those responsible for alleged violations and abuses of international human rights law. It further requested the Commission of Inquiry to support efforts to ensure that perpetrators of alleged abuses and violations be held accountable, and to provide a full report of the findings of its special inquiry to the Human Rights Council no later than its thirty-fourth session." - On October 22, the humanitarian pause expired without any evacuations made and without further renewal despite the UN request. No medical evacuations had been made as no security guarantees had not been granted as requested by the UN. - On October 23, Turkey intensified its strikes targeting IS militants and Kurdish YPG forces in the town of al-Bab, in an attempt to sweep them away from its borders. The Turkish-backed FSA gained control over three areas of Tuways, al-Gharz and Tlatinah south of Akhtarin in northern Aleppo two days later. - On October 25, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated Moscow's willingness to restore the ceasefire in Aleppo and that the Western-backed opposition forces should be separated from terrorist groups in order to be able to move forward; after the UN had blamed all parties for the failure of evacuating injured people in Eastern Aleppo during the three-day ceasefires and called for "a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire so that life-saving humanitarian activities, including medical evacuations, can resume," meanwhile the Syrian Ambassador to Moscow ruled out any opportunity to restore the ceasefires. - On October 26, a school in the village of Haas, in rebel-held Idlib, was hit by a raid of airstrikes, causing the death of twenty-two children and six teachers. The UN Secretary-General called for an immediate investigation on this attack, as it could amount as war crimes if deliberate. Russia denied its responsibility and claimed that the damage was not consistent with an airstrike. - On October 27, Virginia Gamba, the head of the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism, presented the mechanism's findings to the Security Council. The report indicated that of the nine cases the JIM investigated, the Syrian regime used chlorine gas against civilians in three cases and the IS used mustard gas in one case. In the remaining five cases, the JIM investigated allegations that the government dropped chlorine bombs in rebel-held areas. While the JIM could not make a conclusive determination in three of these five cases, it was able to establish that government airstrikes had occurred and the presence of a toxic substance, but it was unable to fully determine the link between the two, or the actors responsible. Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin questioned the JIM's findings, and expressed reservations over the US-draft resolution to extend the mandate of the mechanism for another year, which would end on 31 October 2016. - The EU added ten top Syrian officials to its sanctions list who are held responsible for "violent repression against the civilian population in Syria." - On October 28, Syrian rebels relaunched Aleppo counter-attack aiming to break the siege imposed on Eastern Aleppo. The factions included the FSA and Jaish al-Fath targetting government-held Western Aleppo. - Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem met with his Russian and Iranian counterparts in Moscow to discuss counterterrorism, the cessation of hostilities and improvement of humanitarian operations, and the resumption of the intra-Syrian talks. The three ministers held a joint press conference following their meeting. - On October 30, SE condemned Syrian rebels for the indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas in Western Aleppo, raising the number of casualties in the last 48 hours. - On October 31, the Security Council extended the mandate of the UN-OPCW JIM until November 18, 2016. November 2016: - On November 1, in a teleconference with the leaders of the Russian Armed Forces, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu mentioned that Russia had halted air strikes on eastern Aleppo for 16 days, following western criticism over a Russian-Syrian government assault that killed civilians and destroyed infrastructure. - On November 2, DM Shoigu announced that it would enforce a 10-hour humanitarian pause in Aleppo on November 4, to allow civilians and fighters to exit the city through eight safe corridors. - On November 4, despite the announced unilateral ceasefire in Aleppo, there were no sign of civilians or fighters leaving the city, and opposition fighters vowed to continue fighting to break the siege. - On November 6, the SDF declared the launch of Operation "Wrath of the Euphrates" in the IS capital of Raqqa, which aimed at surrounding and isolating the city as an initial phase, in coordination with the US-led coalition airstrikes. The SDF had rejected any Turkish role to liberate the city. - On November 8, the Russian Defense Minister Shoigu announced that the first attack from the Admiral Kuznetsov, the aircraft carrier, and heavily armed escort ships were to bomb rebel positions in Aleppo. - On November 10, Jan Egeland, Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria, declared in a press stakeout following the weekly HTF meeting that Eastern Aleppo had run out of food rations, and that the UN had proposed an initiative of four elements which included delivery of food and medical supplies, medical evacuations and access for health workers. - On November 11, the OPCW Executive Council condemned all parties for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, after voting on a US-tabled text in a closed session. The text was supported by 28 members, including Germany, France, the United States and Britain; it was opposed by Russia, China, Sudan and Iran, and there were nine abstentions. - On November 15, Russia launched its "major operation" targeting the IS and Jabhat al-Nusra's positions in Idlib and Homs provinces. Heavy airstrikes and barrel bombs pounded Eastern Aleppo after the pause declared by Russia and the Syrian Government on October 18. It is considered the first mission operated from the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. - The Third Committee of the UN General Assembly adopted a draft resolution tabled by Saudi Arabia on the human rights situation in Syria, by a vote of 116 in favor, to 15 against with 49 abstentions. It called upon the Syrian regime and the IS to cease using chemical weapons, and stop their attacks on civilians. - On November 17, the UN Security Council adopted the US-draft resolution to extend the mandate of the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism to 18 November 2017. - On November 20, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem held talks with the SE in Damascus, on the latest escalation of violence, the targeting of medical facilities and infrastructure, and the humanitarian initiative in Eastern Aleppo. The UN proposal of the withdrawal of al-Nusra fighters while maintaining the opposition's local administration of Eastern Aleppo; the proposal was rejected by the Syrian Government and called it a violation of "national sovereignty". - On November 23, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean Ayrault announced that France would hold a meeting on Syria early December 2016. - On November 24, Jan Egeland Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria briefed the press on the HTF meeting and the assistance deliveries of the month of November, not being able to reach besieged areas because of the absence of government approvals for convoys to enter and the escalation of violence. Egeland stated that the UN had received written approvals of the AOGs in eastern Aleppo and Russian support of the UN four-point plan, and still waiting for the government's approval. - On November 27, the rebels in Khan al-Shih town, in the outskirts of Damascus, handed in their weapons, as part of a local agreement with the Syrian government to withdraw to rebel-held Idlib province, so as government siege would be lifted. It was the only town not under government control on a major supply route from Damascus to Quneitra, in southern Syria. - On November 29, Egypt, New Zealand and Spain put in blue their draft resolution calling to put an end to all attacks on Aleppo, and allow unimpeded humanitarian access for the period of 7-days with consideration of further extension. The draft was later vetoed on 5 December by Russia and China, Venezuela voted against, and Angola abstained. It is Russia's sixth veto on a Syria draft resolution, and China's fifth veto. - After the Acting High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Kim Won-soo briefed Council members during Syria's chemical weapons consultations; the P3 announced they would circulate a draft resolution to impose sanctions on Syria for its use of chemical weapons against its own population. - On November 30, upon the request of France and the UK to hold an emergency meeting on Aleppo, SE Staffan de Mistura, USG Emergency Relief Coordinator Stephen O'brien and UNICEF Regional Director Geert Cappelaere briefed the Security Council on the situation in Aleppo, who agreed on the growing number of civilians fleeing eastern Aleppo and the dire need for safe humanitarian access. December 2016: - On December 1, ten AOGs announced the formation of 'Jaysh Halab' in Eastern Aleppo, in an attempt to unite their efforts to lift the siege and restore the districts where the pro-government militias took over in northeast and east Aleppo. It was led by Abu Abdul Rahman Nour, a senior commander in 'Jabhat al-Sham'. While Jan Egeland, Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria, and the SE briefed the press on the humanitarian situation in Aleppo after the HTF meeting; they mentioned that over 400,000 IDPs are in west Aleppo, and UN convoys reached reached all towns under the Four-Towns Agreement, including Madaya, al-Foua and Kafraya, and Zabadani, and that the December Plan was yet to be approved by the Syrian government. - On December 3, the Syrian armed forces and its supporting militias advanced into east Aleppo, taking over 60 percent of the city that was once under rebel control since mid-2012. More than 80,000 civilians fled the area since the beginning of the regime's offense on November 15. - On December 7, AOGs called for a five-day ceasefire in Aleppo, and medical and civilian evacuations without mentioning the withdrawal of their fighters as demanded by Moscow and Damascus. Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Germany to discuss the evacuation of opposition-held districts of Eastern Aleppo, and no agreement was reached. While leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the United States released a joint statement on the situation in Aleppo calling for an immediate ceasefire and the resumption of political negotiations. - On December 8, the SE briefed the Security Council in closed consultations after the Russian announcement that it paused its operations in eastern Aleppo to allow the evacuation of civilians. Jan Egeland had said, after the weekly HTF meeting, that the co-chairs are "poles apart" on a united humanitarian diplomacy. IS launched a major offensive on Palmyra, seizing a number of gas fields in the north and few mountains in the south. - On December 9, the General Assembly adopted the Canadian-drafted resolution A/RES/71/130, which calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the implementation of resolutions 2268 and 2254. The resolution passed by a vote of 122 to 13, with 36 abstentions. Russia, Iran and China opposed the resolution. - On December 10, Paris hosted a meeting of "like-minded" counterparts on Syria; it brought together US Secretary of State John Kerry, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson and Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, along with Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. They discussed the humanitarian situation, and called for a ceasefire and a post Aleppo plan, as Syrian government forces neared victory over rebels there. - On December 11, ISIS recaptured the city of Palmyra in Eastern Homs Province forces despite heavy air support provided by Russia. - On December 13, the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon briefed the Security Council on the situation in Aleppo, the growing number of IDPs and allegations of torture and executions. Meanwhile, AOGs agreed to evacuate their remaining positions in eastern Aleppo after the Syrian government recaptured the city and following an agreement between Russia and Turkey. The evacuation was initially scheduled to take place on 14 December, but was delayed after Iran called for simultaneous evacuations from the besieged Shi'a-majority towns of Fu'ah and Kafraya in Idlib Province. - On December 15, the LAS held an emergency meeting at the level of representatives, based on Qatar's request, and adopted resolution 8105 condemning the attacks on civilians in Eastern Aleppo. - On December 19, the Security Council unanimously adopted the French-drafted resolution 2328 which demanded that the UN and other relevant agencies to carry out adequate and neutral monitoring of evacuations from eastern Aleppo, ensure the deployment of staff members for this purpose, and emphasized that the evacuations of civilians must be voluntary and to final destinations of their choice. Also, the LAS Ministerial Council welcomed resolution 8106 reiterating the necessity to establish a full cease-fire in Aleppo in accordance with the Security Council resolution 2328, and condemned terrorism in all its forms and crimes committed against civilians by ISIS, Fateh al- Sham Front, and that actions of both the Syrian regime and other militant groups may amount to war crimes. - Following the adoption of resolution 2328, the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria announced "the intention of the United Nations to convene the intra-Syrian negotiations mandated by Security Council resolution 2254 in Geneva on 8 February 2017." - On December 20th, the foreign and defense ministers of Russia, Turkey and Iran held parallel trilateral meetings in Moscow, despite the assassination of the Russian Ambassador to Turkey Andrey Karlov on December 19, and adopted the "Moscow Declaration" by which they agreed to act as guarantor powers for a peace accord between the Syrian government and the opposition. - On December 21, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution establishing a mechanism to assist in the investigation of serious crimes committed in Syria since 2011. The resolution received 105 votes for, with 52 abstentions, and 15 votes against (Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Burundi, China, Cuba, DPRK, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Nicaragua, Russia, South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe). The UN Secretary-General submitted the report of the UN Headquarters Board of Inquiry that was established to investigate the humanitarian convoy incident in Urum al-Kubra on 19 September 2016., which stated that there is no enough evidence to conclude that the convoy was deliberately attacked. - On December 22, the Syrian army announced its full control over Aleppo, after the evacuations of the remaining rebel fighters. Evacuations had faced many delays because of Iran's demands to evacuate 1500 individuals from the opposition-besieged towns of Zabadani and Madaya. On the following day, the Russian military deployed a battalion to clear the city from improvised explosive devices. - On December 23, USG Stephen O'brien briefed the Security Council, upon the request of France, "on the modalities of the evacuation of civilians and delivery of humanitarian aid in East Aleppo." Meanwhile, Syrian government forces bombed the water pumping station during its raid on opposition-held Wadi Barada, disrupting water supply to Damascus. - On December 26, Kazakhstan accepted the Russian proposal to host peace negotiations between the Syrian government and opposition forces to find a solution to the Syrian crisis, in January 2017. - On December 27, the Russian and Turkish foreign ministers agreed to implement a nationwide ceasefire in Syria, separate moderate opposition groups from UN designated terrorist groups, and prepare for the Astana talks. - On December 28-30, the DFNS met in the city of Rmeilan to approve the draft constitution, known as the social contract, which was adopted on January 29, 2014 to form its administrative system and prepare for elections. Kurdish leaders voted to drop the word "Rojava" from the official name to include other ethnic and religious components in northern Syria. - On December 29, Russia and Turkey submitted the countrywide ceasefire plan to the warring parties, which had taken effect at midnight on 30 December 2016 Damascus time. - On December 31, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2336 in support of the Russian- Turkish agreement and the meeting to be held in Astana on 23 January 2017. January 2017: - On January 2, the Russian and Turkish air raids targeted IS militants in northern Syrian city of al-Bab; while 10 rebel factions threatened they would suspend talks regarding Astana until the ceasefire is fully implemented because of "major and frequent violations" in the rebel-held areas of Wadi Barada and Eastern Ghouta near Damascus. - On January 5, the SE welcomed the nationwide ceasefire, and the Security Council resolutions on Aleppo and Astana talks, in a press briefing after the weekly HTF meeting. Jan Egeland Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria, voiced disappointment over the government's denied aid access to 5 out 21 locations including places in Rural Damascus, Homs and Hama. - On January 6, the Russian military started to cut down on its presence in Syria, Military Chief Valery Gerasimov mentioned that the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov would be the first to withdraw from the Mediterranean. - On January 8, Syrian government airstrikes resumed on Wadi Barada after failing to reach an agreement with opposition groups to repair the damaged water springs. Later on January 14th, the retired army officer Ahmad al-Ghadban who negotiated the deal to restore the water was killed amid heavy clashes between rebels and pro-regime forces. Both sides accused each other. - On January 12, the US imposed sanctions on 18 senior Syrian officials who were connected to the development and use of chemical weapons including chlorine gas against civilians. It marked the first time the US sanctioned Syrian military officials. While Russia and Turkey signed an agreement to coordinate their airstrikes against terrorists in Syria. - On January 13, the Syrian state television accused Israel of targeting Mezzeh Airbase outside of Damascus. - On January 14, IS launched a major offensive against pro-regime forces (Hezboallah) in Deir al-Zor Province, cutting the communication between the military base and the city. - On January 16, the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini will host an international conference on the future of Syria in Brussels, which "aims to identify with regional partners common ground on the post-conflict arrangements and examine the scope for reconsciliation and reconstruction of Syria." - On January 19, an agreement was reached in Wadi Barada, allowing regime maintenance teams to enter the area to fix the water pipes and grant rebels amnesty or safe passage to opposition-held Idlib. - On January 20, IS militants destroyed Palmyra's Tetrapylon with only four of sixteen columns still standing, and the facade of its Roman Theatre. The UNESCO condemned the act as a new war crime. - Russia and Syria concluded a bilateral agreement on expanding and modernizing of the Russian Naval Facility in Tartus. The agreement extends the current lease for the next forty-nine years with automatic extensions and permits the simultaneous deployment of up to eleven warships to the port. - On January 23-24, indirect talks between the Syrian government and opposition were held in Astana; the delegations refused to sign the joint declaration issued by Russia, Turkey and Iran, on setting up a "trilateral mechanism" to monitor and enforce the ceasefire. The new US administration was invited, despite Iran's objection, and was represented by its ambassador to Kazakhstan. The UN SE was present, and hoped Astana talks would support the intra-Syrian negotiations to be held in Geneva in February. - On January 24, the Russian delegation shared its draft of the Syrian Constitution with the Syrian delegations, and advocated the creation of a Constitutional Committee consisting of members of both delegations. - On January 23-24, Finland and UN agencies hosted the Helsinki Conference on Supporting Syrians and the Region, which launched the 2017-2018 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP). - On January 25, the US President Donald Trump called for establishing safe zones for refugees in Syria, after suspending visas for Syrians and other middle eastern states. President Trump later held telephone conversations with Saudi King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz and United Arab Emirates Armed Forces Deputy Supreme Commander Mohammed bin Zayed on January 29 to seek their support for his unidentified initiative. - On January 28-30, 1100 opposition fighters and 750 civilians evacuated Wadi Barada to Idlib Province, after reaching a reconciliation deal with pro-regime forces. The Syrian Forces reached Ain Fijeh spring to restore water to Damascus. - On January 30, the US delivered armored vehicles, medium and heavy weapons to SDF, in an attempt to isolate IS in al-Raqqa City. - On January 31, the SE briefed the Security Council in a closed session on the outcomes of the Astana talks and the upcoming intra-Syrian talks in Geneva, which was pushed to February 20. He mentioned if the Syrian opposition could not form an inclusive delegation by 8 February, he would select its representatives himself. The Council members welcomed the International Meeting on Syria in Astana, in a press statement. February 2017: - On February 6, high-level experts from Russia, Iran, Turkey, Jordan and the UN held their first technical meeting in Astana to discuss the implementation of the ceasefire mechanism, and cooperation on humanitarian issues; they agreed on the Concept Paper on the Joint Group. The Joint Group held its first meeting and managed to identify all areas controlled by IS and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham; the participants received two draft documents prepared by the Russians to be discussed in future Joint Group meetings, which are the Protocol to the Agreement on the mechanism to record violations of the cessation of hostilities in Syria announced on December 30, 2016 and the Procedure for imposing sanctions on violators, as well as the Regulation on Reconciled Areas. - On February 7, Amnesty International released its report (attached) on mass executions of as many as 13,000 detainees at Saydnaya Military Prison. Syrian authorities rejected the accusations. - On February 9, Russian airstrikes mistakenly kill three Turkish soldiers and injured eleven others near al-Bab city held by Turkish Armed Forces as part of Operation Euphrates Shield. Both sides agreed to strengthen their coordination. - On February 10-11, the HNC met in Riyadh and formed a delegation of 21 members, headed by Nasr al-Hariri; it included one representative each from the Cairo and Moscow groups. The HNC stated (Arabic statement attached) that the goal of the negotiations was a political transition under U.N. auspices in which Assad had no role in the future of the country. - On February 12, Turkish President Recep Erdogan stressed that the Operation Euphrates Shield aims to establish a five-thousand square kilometer 'safe zone' that includes Al-Bab, Manbij, and al-Raqqa City in Northern Syria. The safe zone would require the implementation of a no-fly zone, mentioning that he had discussed the issue with both the U.S. and Russia. - On February 13, the SE sent out invitations to the Syrian delegations for the intra-Syrian negotiations set to begin on February 23. - On February 15-16, the second round of talks took place in Astana a day later than scheduled; the opposition delegation was represented by only 9 armed groups from 14 groups which attended the first meeting; no direct meetings between the Syrian delegations were held and it ended without a final statement. The three guarantor states agreed to the Concept Paper on the Joint Group of the trilateral mechanism to observe the ceasefire, share information regarding the investigation of violations and promote confidence-building measures such as the release of detainees and abductees. - On February 17, a meeting between the "like-minded" states on Syria was held on the margins of the Bonn G20 Summit, and discussed Syria peace talks in Geneva. - On February 18, Turkey offered the US two proposals for an offensive against IS in al-Raqqa City that excludes the YPG. The preferred proposal calls for the insertion of opposition groups backed by Turkey into Tel Abyad in Northern al-Raqqa Province in order to advance against al- Raqqa City through a twelve-mile-wide corridor through terrain currently held by the SDF. The second proposal calls for opposition groups in Operation Euphrates Shield to advance more than one hundred miles from Northern Aleppo Province to Western al-Raqqa Province. - On February 21, the US CIA froze assistance to the FSA and its affiliated factions fighting in Northwestern Syria, after they came under an attack from Hay'at Tahrir al-sham HTS (successor of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) in January. The aid included salaries, training, ammunition and in some cases guided anti-tank missiles. - On February 23, a fourth round of the intra-Syrian talks commenced in Geneva with no expectations of a breakthrough; the SE reiterated that that resolution 2254 sets the framework of the negotiations, which calls for the establishment of credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance, and sets a timeline for drafting a new constitution and holding free and fair elections within 18 months. A day before in the ISSG Ceasefire Task Force meeting (CTF), Russia had called on the Syrian Government to halt aerial bombings during the discussions. - The Opposition groups backed by the Operation Euphrates Shield fully seized al-Bab in Northern Aleppo Province, after three months of clashes. - On February 24, the SE shared a paper on procedural issues, in bilateral meetings with the Syrian parties. The HNC held the Cairo and Moscow platforms responsible for the delay of direct talks, as they participated separately. - While Iraq conducted its first cross-border airstrikes against IS in Deir ez-Zour Province on the Syrian-Iraqi Border. The F-16 airstrikes were coordinated with the Syrian Government through a joint intelligence-sharing unit in Baghdad that includes Iraq, Syria, Russia, and Iran. Also, The U.S. provided intelligence in support of the operation. - On February 25, HTS claimed responsibility of a suicide attack on the State Security and Military Intelligence Offices in Homs City, killing at least forty pro-regime officers including Military Intelligence Branch Chief Brig. Gen. Hassan Dabul, so as to undermine the ongoing peace talks. The attacks prompted heavy airstrikes on al-Waer District, the Opposition's last strong-hold in the city. The HNC condemned the terrorist attack as per the Government's ultimatum. - On February 28, the UN Security Council voted on the French-British draft resolution which sought to ban the sale or supply of helicopters to the Syrian Government, and to blacklist 10 government and related entities involved in the production of chemical weapons. Nine countries voted in favor; Bolivia voted against the text, while Ethiopia, Egypt and Kazakhstan abstained. Russia casted its sixth veto backed by China. Britain and France had circulated the text in mid- December 2016, in response to the OPCW report findings proving government use of chlorine gas in three cases of the nine investigated cases. It was put on hold to asses US policy on Syria, the US later became a co-penholder after its unilateral sanctions on 18 Syrian senior officials on January 12. March 2017: - On March 1, the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Syria issued its report on the violations committed by warring parties in the last battle of eastern Aleppo, and considered the targeting of vital civilian infrastructure, withholding the distribution of humanitarian aid, and the use of civilians as human shields and forced evacuation agreements amount to war crimes. - On March 2, the Syrian forces backed by Russian airstrikes and Shi'a militias recaptured the city of Palmyra for the second time after heavy clashes. - On March 3, the fourth round of talks concluded with a political agenda for the upcoming round, which comprises of three baskets addressing the establishment of credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance, drafting a new constitution, and holding free and fair elections within 18 months. A fourth basket was added upon the request of the Syrian Government to address "strategies of counter terrorism, security, governance and also medium-term confidence building measures." - On March 6, Russia announced a ceasefire in Eastern Ghouta until March 20, despite the continuation of airstrikes and mutual shelling. - On March 7, the US-allied SDF agreed to handover six villages near Manbij, on the frontline with Turkey-backed rebels to Syrian government control, under a Russian-brokered deal, in an attempt to stop further Turkish incursion. - On March 8, the SE de Mistura briefed the Security Council on the course of the talks, which aims to address the aforementioned baskets in parallel, and concluded that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed unless the sides decide otherwise." The Syrian groups are invited to resume talks on March 23. - Meanwhile, Russian, US, Turkish high-level military officials met in Antalya to discuss additional coordination measures and "operational de-confliction of military operations" in northern Syria. - On March 13, a Russian-brokered agreement was reached to evacuate rebel fighters from Homs city, which would be carried out within six to eight weeks, between 10,000-15,000 people were expected to leave Homs in weekly batches. The neighborhood was besieged by regime forces since 2013. - On March 14, the EU unveiled its plan in Syria "in contributing to a lasting political solution under the existing UN-agreed framework and in helping to build resilience and stability in the country, as well as supporting post-agreement reconstruction once a credible political transition is underway." - On March 14-15, the third round of talks was held in Astana, even though the AOGs had called for the postponement of the meeting to assess the commitment to the declared ceasefire in Eastern Ghouta. Invitations were sent to the United Nations, the United States and Jordan. On March 14, preliminary consultations were held while a plenary meeting was due on March 15. The results of the intra-Syrian consultations were expected to be discussed. Talks failed to reach any significant agreement, and the three guarantor states issued a joint statement, and scheduled the next high-level meeting in Astana on May 3-4, 2017 and agreed to hold preliminary expert consultations on April 18-19, 2017 in Tehran. - On March 15, two suicide bombs targeted Damascus on the sixth war anniversary; one of them hit the main judicial building, and both killed 74 people and wounding a hundred other. It was later claimed by Fateh al-Sham Front. - On March 18, rebels began to evacuate al-Waer neighborhood in Homs City, to the opposition-held northern town of Jarablus on the borders with Turkey. - On March 20, the EU imposed sanctions against four Syrian high-ranked military officials related to the use of chemical weapons. The ban includes assets freeze and travel ban, and it is considered the first time the EU blacklists military officials. - On March 21, the US-led coalition dropped the SDF fighters on the southern side of the Euphrates to to cut the Aleppo - al-Raqqa Highway. the SDF launched an operation to seize the Tabqa Dam west of al-Raqqa City on March 22 with extensive support from the US. - On March 22, a US-led coalition strike on a center for displaced families in al-Mansoura town held by ISIL in northern Raqqa, killed 33 people. Earlier this month, the coalition declared that its raids in Syria and Iraq unintentionally killed at least 220 civilians. - On March 23-31, the fifth round of talks in Geneva was held despite of the escalation of fighting in Damascus and Hama; the SE shared non-papers with all Syrian sides with some political principles reached during the five rounds, and received their comments and amendments. - On March 24, Russia proposed a draft resolution on the use of chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq, that was reviewed in April 2016 and the UN Security Council did not support it. It was co-authored by China and Russia. Meanwhile, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution condemning the indiscriminate attacks against civilians, forced displacement of populations, and called to hold all those responsible to account. - On March 27, the second phase of evacuations from al-Waer neighborhood took place, moving 466 citizens and 129 fighters. Meanwhile, the UN SE briefed the LAS Ministerial Council on the recent developments of the Geneva intra-Syrian talks and the Astana process. - On March 28, Russia condemned the US-led coalition airstrikes on the Tabqa Dam, and accused it of trying to "completely destroy critical infrastructure in Syria and complicate post-war reconstruction as much as possible." It further claimed that the coalition destroyed four bridges over the Euphrates river. - On March 29, the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres addressed the annual Arab Summit, which was held in the Dead Sea, Jordan. He appealed to the Arab leaders to set aside differences and end the Syrian war. - An agreement was brokered by Iran and Qatar to swap Shi'ite citizens from the two pro-government towns of al-Foua and Kafraya, in the northwestern province of Idlib besieged by rebel fighters, with Sunni fighters and their families from the opposition-held towns of Zabadani and Madaya besieged by pro-government forces. The agreement was due to start on April 4 and would last 60 days; it included a ceasefire in the areas south of Damascus, aid deliveries, and the release of 1,500 prisoners held by the government. - On March 31, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson disclosed during his visit to Ankara that "longer-term status of President Assad will be decided by the Syrian people" and defeating ISIL is its priority, while U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley said the priority was no longer "getting Assad out"; it was later reiterated by the White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer's briefing. April 2017: - On April 3, the European Foreign Affairs Council chaired by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini took place in Luxembourg, and adopted the EU Strategy on Syria. It held the Syrian regime responsible for the violations against human rights, and reaffirmed that "there can be no lasting peace in Syria under the current regime." - On April 4-5, the EU and its co-sponsors hosted the Brussels Conference on Supporting the future of Syria and the region. The co-chairs declaration took note of UN appeals requesting $8 billion in 2017 to cover the required needs inside Syria and its neighboring countries, and announced pledges raised worth about $11 billion for humanitarian aid programs. - On April 4, an alleged chemical attack on Khan Shaykhun in the province of Idlib was carried out during a Syrian government air raid on the city, which claimed the lives of at least 72 civilians. Russia denied its responsibility and claimed that Syrian airstrikes targeted a rebel chemical weapons warehouse which leaked poisonous gas. While the implementation of the evacuation deal of 30,000 people from the four towns of Kafraya, al-Foua, Madaya and Zabadani was delayed because of reservations of their residents. All 16,000 residents of al-Foua and Kafraya are expected to leave under the deal. - On April 5, the UN Security Council was briefed on the attack by the Acting High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Kim Won-soo on the reported use of chemical weapons in Khan Shaykhun. The US, UK and France had informally circulated a draft resolution which demands that the Syrian government must provide the JIM and the FFM with flight plans and logs of April 4, the names of all helicopter squadron commanders and provide access to air bases where investigators believe chemical attacks may have been launched. Russia criticized the text, and produced its own draft; it did not condemn neither the attack nor the Syrian government, but rather expressed deep concern over the alleged "incident with chemical weapons" and called for a full-scale investigation. Later on April 6, the ten elected members (E10) of the Security Council met at ambassador level to express their frustration for not being included in the negotiating process and discussed an alternative text which would substitute language in the P3 draft on the Syrian government's obligation to provide information on its activities with agreed language from resolution 2118. Neither resolution were tabled for a vote. - On April 6, the US waged retaliatory airstrikes against al-Shayrat airbase outside of Homs, where the chemical attack was launched. 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles had hit the airfield in Syria. The missiles were aimed at Syrian fighter jets and other infrastructure. - On April 7, Bolivia called for a Security Council briefing after the US airstrikes, and Russia announced its suspension of "the Memorandum of Understanding on Prevention of Flight Safety Incidents in the course of operations in Syria signed with the US." - On April 11, the White House released a declassified report drawn up by the National Security Council which confirmed that the Assad regime used sarin gas on its own people, and accused Russia for shielding for its allies. - On April 12, the Security Council held a meeting to vote on the P3 revised draft resolution (4th draft), which incorporated the language from resolution 2118 proposed in the E10 draft; after the SE had provided the council with his monthly briefing on the assessment of the intra-Syrian talks held in Geneva. Ten members voted in favor of the text, China, Ethiopia and Kazakhstan abstained, while Bolivia joined Russia in voting against it. It is Russia's eighth veto against a Syria-related resolution. - On April 14, the evacuation of residents from the Shi'ite towns of al-Foua and Kafraya (besieged by opposition groups) began and their convoys headed towards the government-held Aleppo; meanwhile rebel fighters and their families left the town of Madaya (besieged by government forces) and headed towards Idlib. While the evacuation from Zabadani was delayed and expected to begin later the day. The four towns agreement began with the exchange of thirty prisoners and nine bodies on April 12. The evacuations resumed after a suicide attack that targeted a government loyalties convoy killing some hundred people including women, children and rebel fighters on April 15. - On April 19-20, over 2000 opposition fighters and civilians were evacuated from the besieged towns of Zabadani and Madaya in exchange for the evacuation of nearly 8000 pro-regime fighters and civilians from the besieged towns of al-Foua and Kafraya in Idlib Province. - On April 24, the US sanctioned 271 Syrians employed by the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center, related to the development of chemical weapons. The sanction froze the individuals' assets and prohibited US companies to conduct business with them. May 2017: - On May 3-4, military experts from the three guarantors held technical consultations ahead of the two-day fourth round of the Astana process, with the participation of the Director of the UN Mine Action Service Agnes Marcaillou. The SE de Mistura and Nawaf Uasfi Tel, Political Adviser to Jordan's Foreign Minister attended as observers, and the US was represented at a higher-level (for the first time) by US Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs Stuart Jones. - Despite the Syrian Opposition delegation suspended their participation in opposition to the ongoing bombardments across Syria, the three guarantors signed the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in Syria, setting up four "de-escalation zones" in Idlib, parts of Homs, Eastern Ghouta, and parts of Deraa and al-Quneitra provinces in southern Syria. The Syrian government welcomed the Russian initiative while the Opposition rejected Iran's involvement as a guarantor. - On May 5, Russia sought UN endorsement to the agreement reached in Astana, and circulated a draft resolution calling on member states to contribute to the implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation zones in Syria. The resolution failed to pass for a vote on May 8, as western member states had reservations on the draft. - On May 6, Riad Seif was elected as the sixth president of the SOC, beating Khaled Khoja with 58 votes from the 102 member coalition. He would replace the current head Anas al-Abdeh, who was elected in March 2016. Also, Abdulrahman Mustafa and Salwa Ktaw were elected as vice presidents. - On May 8, the evacuation process of the government-besieged Damascus suburb of Barzeh began, around 1,022 people, including 568 rebels, headed towards Idlib and northern town of Jarablus near the Turkish borders; the second convoy of 700 rebels moved on May 12. While Walid al-Muallem, the Syrian Foreign Minister, rejected any international forces under UN supervision to monitor the de-escalation zones deal. Meanwhile, the White House approved providing arms to Kurdish fighters as support to their operation to retake al-Raqqa City, despite Turkey's strong opposition. - On May 16, the FFM's report confirmed the use of sulfur mustard in the attack on Aleppo on Sept. 16, 2016, and was made public. The report was raised to the UN Security Council on May 5. The FFM, also, confirmed in its report, regarding its investigation of the April 4 attack on Khan Shaykhun, the use of sarin-gas or a sarin-like substance. The FFM is only mandated for indicating whether chemical weapons were used, while the JIM is mandated to determine responsibility for the attacks. - While the US Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned ten additional entities for providing support to the Syrian regime. - On May 16-19, the UN SE held the sixth round of the Intra-Syrian talks in Geneva, which ended without covering the four baskets of the agenda, only focusing on the constitutional issues. The SE shared a proposal with the parties to establish "a Technical Consultative Mechanism on Constitutional and Legal Issues;" the proposal would identify "options for the process of constitutional drafting, and for the conduct of a national conference/national dialogue, and identify for review specific options for ensuring a sound constitutional and legal basis for any framework agreed in Geneva embodying a package and including providing for credible, all-inclusive, non-sectarian governance," and that is through UN-facilitated expert-level meetings with both Syrian sides. - On May 18, while the EU Parliament adopted a resolution pertaining the EU Strategy on Syria, which the European Council for Foreign Affairs had passed on 3 April 2017; the US-led coalition's airstrikes destroyed a pro-Syrian regime convoy of the Iraqi Shi'ite militia of Kata'ib Imam Ali, that advanced along the Damascus-Baghdad Highway towards al-Tanf base (where the US, UK and Jordan train fighters of Jaysh Mughawir al-Thawra against IS in Eastern Syria). - On May 20-21, the evacuation of nearly 3000 people, some 700 fighters and their families, was completed from al-Waer district, the last opposition-held district in the province of Homs. According to Talal Barazi, Governor of Homs, more than 14,000 people had left al-Waer in several phases since the "reconciliation deal" began to be implemented in March. Among them were some 3,700 rebels, allowed to leave with their light weapons. Russia later deployed 50 to 150 Military Police into the district. - On May 22, the SE briefed the Security Council on the latest developments, and on the last round of the Intra-Syrian talks. He commended the Astana process for the reduction of violence in the agreed de-escalation areas, and urged its guarantors to finalize their agreement addressing the subjects of detainees, abductees and humanitarian demining. The SE asserted that the rounds' focus on legal and constitutional issues does not rule out "the principle of parallelism" in addressing the agenda, and that a new consultative process at a technical level was introduced to discuss relevant constitutional and legal matters. - On May 25, NATO leaders agreed in Brussels to become full members of the Global Coalition against ISIS; the organization would not engage in combat operations, but would provide air refueling to the Coalition's aircrafts, capacity building through the deployment of special forces to train local partners, and would establish an intelligence information cell to ensure information-sharing on foreign fighters. - On May 29, the final convoy of fighters and their families moved from the opposition-held besieged district of Barzeh in Damascus to Idlib Province; estimately more than 4000 fighters and civilians were evacuated from Barzeh and Eastern Ghouta under the Russian-brokered deal. - On May 30, the US delivered its first shipment of arms to the Kurdish-led SDF, which had advanced against IS in the eastern outskirts of al-Raqqa, seizing eight villages and taking control over the Ba'ath Dam. - On May 31, Russia's Grigorovich-Class Frigate Admiral Essen and Kilo-Class Submarine Krasnodar launched four cruise missiles targeting IS near Palmyra; it targetted arms depots of fighters relocating from al-Raqqa to Eastern Homs. Russia had notified the US, Turkey, and Israel of the strikes-On June 2, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini met with newly-elected President of the Syrian Opposition Council (SOC), Riad Seif, and Syrian Interim Government (SIG) Prime Minister, Jawad Abou Hatab, to discuss the political process and EU support for Syrian resilience. Both parties reiterated their commitment to the UN-led Geneva process. June 2017: -On June 4, pro-government forces gained control of Maskanah city, the last remaining ISIS stronghold in Aleppo governorate. The advances brought pro-government forces within 10 km of Raqqa's provincial border. -US-backed SDF captured a hydroelectric facility (Baath Dam) from ISIS militants, securing the final of three major dams along the Euphrates river. -On June 5, pro-government forces captured the areas of al-Alb, Bir Dahlon and Sharot Dahlon in Eastern Homs governorate, reportedly capturing over 6,000 sq km of ISIS-held territory. -On June 6, US-backed SDF announced the launch of the fifth phase of the campaign to capture Raqqa, ISIS' self-declared capital, with forces advancing from the north, east and west and the US-led Coalition supporting the offensive with air and artillery strikes. - The US-led Coalition conducted airstrikes against pro-government forces advancing near al- Tanf, a de-confliction zone in southeastern Syria. This marks the second strike in the area in less than a month, amid escalating tensions between the US and Iran-backed forces over control of Syria's southeastern frontier. - On June 8, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with the UNSE de Mistura in Moscow to discuss "the consolidation of the cessation of hostilities, the fight against terrorism, the continuation of the political settlement on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2254," according to the Russian Presidential Envoy for the Middle East and North Africa and Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov. The consultations were held prior to the fifth round of the Astana Process, which was set to take place in June, but was later postponed till the month of July. -On June 9, during a press briefing in Geneva at the conclusion of a meeting of the humanitarian task force set up by the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), the SE declared that the time was not right to resume the UN-led intra-Syrian talks. -On June 13, the WFP delivered food to more than 80,000 displaced people in seven hard-to-reach areas in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor governorates in northern Syria, where regular deliveries of humanitarian assistance had been suspended for over three years. -On June 14, Chairman of the CoI, Paulo Pinheiro, expressed concern for the "staggering loss of civilian life" caused by US-led Coalition airstrikes as part of the Raqqa campaign, stating that airstrikes had led to the displacement of 160,000 civilians. He also stressed that the Astana agreement had led to a reduction in violence in just one of the four zones outlined in the memorandum. -On June 15, during a briefing to Council members, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, noted that "some progress" had been made in the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of chemical weapons in Syria. However, she highlighted the continued lack of safe access to two above-ground stationary facilities scheduled for destruction under OPCW supervision. -Pro-government forces targeted the opposition-held neighborhoods of Jobar and Eastern Ghouta in the first major attack since the announcement of four "de-escalation zones" at the Astana talks in May. Syrian Armed Forces seized the Arak gas field in the region of Badiya, which had been captured by IS since 2015; the SAF declared that it recaptured 20 percent of the Badiya region. -On June 16, the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria declared that it had facilitated a meeting of technical experts from three opposition groups: the High Negotiating Committee, the Cairo Platform and the Moscow Platform as part of a technical consultation process announced at the end of the sixth round of intra-Syrian talks. The meetings focused on the timeline and process for drafting a new constitution. -On June 17, the SE announced that the seventh round of intra-Syrian talks would begin in Geneva on July 10, with further rounds tentatively planned for August and September. -The Syrian government declared a 48-hour ceasefire in the southern city of Daraa. The agreement, reportedly brokered by Russia, the US and Jordan, comes after an escalation in violence between pro-government forces and AOGs in Daraa. -On June 18, US-led coalition forces shot down a piloted Syrian government aircraft in southern Raqqa province. According to the Coalition statement, the aircraft was downed after it displayed hostile intent and advanced on coalition forces. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) released a statement following the incident claiming that the US shot down the Syrian jet while it was conducting an offensive against ISIS, and accusing the US of failing to use the "de-confliction channel". The MOD statement announced that Russia was cutting off participation in the de-confliction channel pending an investigation and that all kinds of airborne vehicles operating in combat mission zones west of the Euphrates River would be tracked by Russia as air targets. -Iran launched several ballistic missiles targeting ISIS positions in eastern Syria, reportedly carried out in retaliation for a terrorist attack in Tehran two weeks prior. This was Iran's first missile attack abroad in 15 years and its first in the Syrian conflict, representing an escalation of its role. -On June 19, the Syria Institute and PAX published the Sixth Quarterly Siege Watch Report, covering events from February to April 2017. -On June 20, an American fighter jet downed an "Iranian-made" armed drone in southern Syria after it "displayed hostile intent" when it approached coalition forces stationed at a base located in a de-escalation zone. It marked the second time in a month that the US had shot down an armed drone near Tanf camp. -On June 21, after opening a new front to the south of Raqqa, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) came within several kilometers of fully encircling the city after having already surrounded Raqqa to the north, east and west. - Turkey deployed reinforcements to the towns of Azaz and Marea in northern Syria, held by turkey-backed Syrian opposition forces, in preparation of anticipated battles with its rival Kurdish forces. - French President Emmanuel Macron, contradicting previous French policy, that France sees "no legitimate successor" to Assad and no longer considers his departure as a precondition to resolve the ongoing conflict. On July 5, the president met with Riad Hijab, Head of the HNC, to reiterate France's support to the Syrian Opposition. -On June 22, Turkish and Russian troops were deployed to Syria's northern Idlib province as part of a de-escalation agreement brokered by Russia, Turkey and Iran in May. - WFP announced that the first aid convoy had reached 15000 civilians in the city of Qamishli by land route, since it had been inaccessible in 2015, and humanitarian aid was sent through air drops instead. -On June 24, the Syrian government released 672 detainees in a move it said was aimed at bolstering the reconciliation process. -On June 27, the SE briefed the Council on the situation in Syria, expressing his readiness to facilitate direct talks between the Syrian government and opposition either at a formal or technical level. -On June 28, OPCW-JIM published its sixth report updating the SC on the status of its review of two cases identified by the FFM concerning incidents reported in Umm Hawsh in Aleppo Governorate in September 2016 and Khan Shaykhun in Idlib Governorate on April 4, 2017. -On June 29, OCHA head Stephen O'brien briefed the Council on the humanitarian situation in Syria, noting that despite a reduction in violence in some areas of the country, humanitarian convoys remained unable to reach civilians in besieged and hard-to-reach places due to bureaucratic restrictions. O'brien also detailed the Secretary-General's monthly report on the situation in Syria, released June 23, that highlighted the Astana memorandum signed by Iran, Russia and Turkey in May and the escalation of anti-ISIS operations in Syria. -The OPCW released a report on progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons program, verifying the destruction of 25 of the 27 chemical weapons production facilities previously declared by the Syrian government. However, the OPCW continues to express consideration that the initial declaration was incomplete. July 2017: -On July 1, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched a strike against pro-government positions near al-Baath in Quneitra governorate in response to two stray artillery shells fired from Syria that landed in the Golan Heights. This is the fifth Israeli strike on pro-government positions near the area of al-Baath within a week. -On July 3, the UNSC appointed Catherine Marchi-Uhel to head the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, the UN legal team tasked with collecting and preserving evidence of the most serious crimes committed in Syria since 2011 to be used by national courts or an international tribunal. The Mechanism was established by the General Assembly on December 21, 2016 despite fierce resistance from Russia, which had previously used its veto status to block criminal investigations into the conflict. -The Syrian Army announced the suspension of all combat operations in the southern governorates of Daraa, Suweida and Quneitra for four days ahead of upcoming peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan. It is the second unilateral ceasefire by the Syrian Army; it had announced a ceasefire in Daraa along the border with Israel on June 17. -On July 4-5, the fifth round of Astana talks co-sponsored by Russia, Iran and Turkey, convened in the Kazakh capital. The talks failed to finalize details on the boundaries and monitoring mechanisms of the four safe zones agreed to during the fourth round of Astana talks in May. In a joint statement, the guarantors welcomed the establishment of an expert-level joint working group tasked with finalizing the operational and technical parameters of the de-escalation zones, and scheduled the next Joint Working Group meeting in Tehran, on August 1-2. -On July 6, Edmond Mulet, head of the three-member leadership panel of the OPCW-JIM briefed Security Council members on the June 28 report of its investigations into the culpability for chemical attacks in Syria and urged the international community to allow the Mechanism to conduct its work in an independent and impartial manner. -On July 7, the United States, Russia and Jordan reached a ceasefire and "de-escalation" agreement for southwestern Syria to take effect July 9. The specificities of an enforcement mechanism and the precise boundaries of the ceasefire zone. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that the ceasefire would cover the areas of Daraa, al-Suweida and Quneitra governorates without providing exact boundaries. The ceasefire agreement in southwestern Syria is separate from the Astana memorandum, and was reached during the meeting between US President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Hamburg. The SG welcomed the ceasefire announcement, calling it a significant step towards reducing violence and humanitarian access in Syria; while Israel voiced its objections on the deal. -On July 10, the seventh round of UN-led intra-Syrian talks convened in Geneva. The UN-sponsored talks were scheduled to focus on four points: drafting a new constitution, combating terrorism, governance and elections. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed hope that the talks would help solidify de-escalation zones created through the Astana process. The SE stated that de-escalation zones can be beneficial but must only be interim measure to avoid the partition of Syria. The Geneva talks ended July 14 with no apparent progress. Representatives of the HNC accused the Syrian government of refusing to enter into serious negotiations. The SE noted that there had been "no breakthrough, no breakdown" during the talks and expressed hope that recent international momentum would push the parties face-to-face for substantive discussions. -On July 11, SOHR reported that it had "confirmed information" that ISIS leader Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi had been killed in the eastern province of Deir Ezzor. US-led Coalition Spokesperson Colonel Ryan Dillon could not confirm the report, nor could various media sources or Iraqi or Kurdish officials. -On July 12, following the opening of a land route connecting Aleppo to Hasakah governorate, WFP announced that it had successfully delivered food aid to two locations in the Raqqa governorate for the first time in three years. -On July 13, Brett McGurk, US Special Envoy for the Global Coalition fighting ISIS, revealed that Russia had expressed willingness to deploy military police to monitor compliance and prevent violations of the recently implemented ceasefire in southwestern Syria. -On July 14, Russia's parliament approved an agreement between Russian and Syrian officials that provides for the long-term deployment of Russian aircraft and personnel to Syria. Defense Minister Nikolay Pankov said the deal will help legalize Russia's military activities in Syria "within an international framework". -France proposed the creation of a contact group comprised of permanent members of the UN Security Council and regional actors to support UN efforts to formulate a political road map after the conflict ends. -On July 17, the EU added 16 scientists and military officials to the list of those targeted by sanctions against the Syrian regime due to their suspected involvement in a chemical attack against civilians in April. - The Syrian army, backed by Iranian-militias managed to seize oil fields of Wahab, al Fahd, Dbaysan, al-Qseer, Abu al Qatat and Abu Qatash and several other villages in the southwest of Raqqa province, while Russian strikes targeted the town of Sukhna, the gateway to Deir ez-zour. - The Turkish state-run Andalou Agency exposed ten US military locations in northern Syria, giving exact numbers of US and French special forces stationed there. The US-led Coalition against ISIS condemned Turkey for "leaking sensitive military information shared between two allies." -On July 19, it was made public that President Donald Trump ended a covert CIA program that provided arms and training to Syrian rebel groups. The program was a central feature of the Obama Administration's policy in Syria. -On July 20, 150 fighters from the Turkey-backed Euphrates Shield operation had crossed from Turkey through Bab alhawa to support Ahrar al-Sham in its fight against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), dominated by the Fateh al-Sham faction formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, in Idlib. -On July 21, the SG submitted to the Security Council the forty first report on the humanitarian situation in Syria for the period from 1 to 30 June 2017, highlighting the approximately 20,000 people displaced across northeast Syria in June due to the Raqqa offensive. According to the report, the Syrian government removed medical supplies sufficient for more than 84,000 treatments. -Hezbollah and the Syrian Army launched a joint offensive against militant groups in the town of Arsal and the western Qalamoun mountain range along the Lebanon-Syrian border, an area purported to hold over 3,000 militants, including al-Qaeda-linked insurgents and members of ISIS. -On July 24, 14 heads of mission in Geneva signed a letter addressed to Security Council President, Chinese Ambassador Liu Jieyi, raising "serious concerns" about the implementation of seven Security Council resolutions on humanitarian access and urging Liu to raise the issue at the upcoming Council meeting. The signatories include the United States, Saudi Arabia, Britain, France Turkey, Qatar, Japan, Australia, the European Union, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Canada and Italy. -General Sergei Rudskoi, chief of the Russian General Staff, announced the deployment of Russian military police to monitor compliance after a ceasefire, mediated by the Egyptian government, was declared in the Eastern Ghouta area of Damascus on July 22. Despite the reported ceasefire, part of the four proposed "de-escalation zones" outlined in the Astana memorandum, Syrian government forces continued to attack several towns in Eastern Ghouta. -On July 26, fighting on the Syrian-Lebanese border near the town of Arsal halted after a ceasefire agreement was reached between Hezbollah and HTS. The cessation of hostilities ended a six-day campaign to drive al-Qaeda-linked militants from the border region, which is also home to tens of thousands of refugees. The agreement included the evacuation of some 1000 HTS fighters, along with more than 6000 Syrians (in nearby refugee camps) from the Lebanese border town of Arsal to rebel-controlled Idlib province, as well as exchange of prisoners between Hezboallah, HTS and the Lebanese Armed Forces, which later took place on August 1. -On July 27, Ursula Mueller, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, briefed Council members on the humanitarian situation in Syria, noting that despite reduced violence, there had not been a noticeable increase in areas reached for aid delivery. -The Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates addressed two letters to the UNSG and the Security Council calling for immediate action in the militant-besieged towns of Kefraya and al-Foua. -The US-led coalition fighting ISIS told its local Syrian allies that they must exclusively fight ISIS, a directive that prompted Shohada al-Quartyan to depart a joint coalition base in Southern Syria to carry out independent operations against Syrian regime forces. -On July 28, the OPCW released its monthly report, noting that the security situation now allows safe access to confirm the condition of the final two above-ground facilities with planning underway to verify their destruction. -On July 30, for the first time in five years, UN aid was delivered to almost 7,2000 people in besieged al-Nashabiye located in Eastern Ghouta, a rebel-held area on the outskirts of Damascus. August 2017: -On August 2, the evacuation of at least 7,000 people, including al-Qaeda-linked fighters and refugees, from Lebanese border enclave of Arsal for rebel-controlled Idlib province commenced. The transfer agreement, the largest formal repatriation of refugees to Syria since 2011, was carried out without the involvement of aid groups generating concern about the welfare of the refugees. -On August 3, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced a ceasefire in northern Homs and southern Hama, in what is being billed as the third of four planned ceasefires agreed to under the Astana memorandum. Russia deployed police military to several checkpoints in northern Homs, later on August 4. Opposition groups called for a guarantor role for Turkey. According to SOHR, the ceasefire, which covered territory populated by more than 147,000 people, held for the first 10 hours before experiencing repeated violations by pro-government and rebel forces. -The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria of the Human Rights Council (CoI) called on the international community to recognize the crime of genocide being committed against the Yazidis in Iraq. -On August 8, experts from the guarantor states met in Tehran to discuss ways to strengthen the de-escalation zones and determine the agenda for the upcoming sixth round of Astana talks. -On August 8-11, twenty-four FSA-affiliated groups formed new group "Liwa Tahrir Deir ez- Zour" to liberate the province of Deir ez-Zour from IS; the new faction welcomed any cooperation with local and international parties, ruling out the SDF. -On August 9, OCHA expressed concern about the safety and protection of an estimated 10,000- 25,000 people trapped inside Raqqa without access to safe drinking water for 48 days. Due to the fighting on the ground, the UN has currently no access to Raqqa city. - Russian Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzya briefed the Security Council on the progress of establishing de-escalated zones in Syria, behind closed doors, and called on the UN to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in those areas. -On August 10, SDF US-backed forces encircled ISIS militants in central Raqqa, effectively cutting off ISIS' last remaining route to the Euphrates. -On August 12, the Syrian government captured al-Sukhna, the final ISIS stronghold in Homs governorate, as part of its multi-pronged campaign to take eastern Syria. The recent gains position the pro-government coalition 50 km (30 miles) away from Deir ez-Zour province, the last major ISIS foothold in Syria. -On August 14, approximately 300 FSA-affiliated Saraya Ahl al-Sham fighters and 3,000 refugees began evacuating the Lebanese border town of Arsal as part of a repatriation agreement brokered in early August between Lebanese and Syrian officials. Lebanon's Maj. Gen. Abbas Ibrahim, who is overseeing the transfer, said that civilians will head to the government held area of Assal al-Ward. The rebel fighters and their families are destined for the rebel-held town of al- Ruhaiba in the Eastern Qalamoun region where, according to Hezbollah's Al-Manar TV, they have been granted amnesty by the Syrian government. Their departure leaves the Islamic State as the last militant force straddling the border near Arsal. -Nearly 50,000 people remain stranded on the Jordanian border, in an area known as the berm, and are facing an increasing scarcity of food, healthcare and other basic services. The UN stressed that it will continue to support Jordanian authorities in the protection of affected Syrians. -On August 17, the UNSC adopted a presidential statement, read by Council President for August and Ambassador of Nigeria, Joy Ogwu, in support of a political transition process in Syria in accordance with the principles of the Geneva Communique. The adoption of the text signals, for the first time in two years, the consensus of the Council and its five permanent members on the need to establish a transitional government. -On August 17-20, Damascus hosted the 59th International Trade Fair, for the first time since 2011, and involved hundreds of delegations and private companies from at least forty-three states including Russia, Iran, China, and Egypt. -On August 20, President Assad announced in a speech before Syrian diplomats that Syria would not work with any Western nations until they ended their support for opposition and insurgent groups. -On August 21, UN experts launched an investigation into purported weapons deals between Syria and North Korea after two shipments to a Syrian government agency responsible for its chemical weapons program, the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), were intercepted. -Saudi-based High Negotiations Committee (HNC) met with delegations from the moderate Cairo and Moscow camps in Riyadh in an effort to establish a unified front for upcoming peace talks. Despite pressure from international allies calling for a more pragmatic approach, the HNC refused to accept a transition scenario in which Assad retained power. -On August 22, the next round of Astana talks was pushed back from late August to mid- September to allow the guarantor states to hold a technical meeting to set the meeting agenda. -On 23 August, a joint monitoring center was established in Amman for the southwestern de-escalation zone, which is located in the provinces of Daraa and Quneitra. The center is tasked with ensuring ceasefire compliance, ensuring humanitarian access and other forms of civilian assistance. -On August 24, the UN called for a humanitarian pause in US-led Coalition airstrikes on Raqqa to permit civilians to leave the city. This comes after the release of an Amnesty International report calling for greater protection efforts for the estimated 20,000 remaining civilians in Raqqa. -On August 25, the Russian army announced that it had dismantled the two remaining Syrian chemical weapons facilities targeted for destruction by OPCW. The OPCW has not confirmed the Russian report. -On August 28, hundreds of ISIS fighters and their families were evacuated from the Lebanese- Syrian border to militant-held eastern Syria following simultaneous Lebanese army and Hezbollah campaigns against ISIS positions. The transfer marks the first time ISIS agreed to a forced evacuation from territory it held in Syria. - The Secretary-General presented his monthly report on the situation in Syria, highlighting the recent efforts to reduce violence through de-escalation agreements and expressing hope that the Astana guarantors will reach an agreement on the finalization of operational and technical modalities for all de-escalation areas. -On August 30, Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura briefed the Security Council on the political path forward which includes a new round of Astana and Geneva talks. The SE highlighted the important role Syrian opposition allies stand to play in fostering cohesion and unity among the AOGs. - In his final address to the Council after two years as Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Stephen O'Brien appealed to members of the Council to take action to end the civil war in the name of common humanity, calling for a referral to the International Criminal Court. -On August 31, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, stressed that the protection and assistance of citizens must take priority before defeating the Islamic State, citing reports of heavy civilian casualties in Raqqa as evidence of the threat the remaining 20,000 civilians face. -US airstrikes stalled a convoy of 300 ISIS fighters and their families in a government-controlled part of the Syrian desert in an effort to prevent their advancement into ISIS-held territory near the Iraqi border. The convoy was traveling from the Syrian-Lebanese border to Syria's eastern province as part of an evacuation deal brokered between ISIS, Hezbollah and the Syrian Army. -Pro-government forces captured strategic al-Bishri mountain overlooking ISIS-controlled Deir Ezzor province, bringing government coalition forces within close range of ISIS positions. September 2017: On September 1, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian rejected a role for Assad in a political transition in Syria. -The Syrian Islamic Council called for Syria's AOGs to end their fragmentation and unite as one armed body under the Ministry of Defense in the Syrian Interim Government. Ahrar al-Sham, Failaq al-Sham, Liwa Ansar al-Sunnah and Jabha al-Shamiya supported the initiative. -SDF spokesperson, Jihan Ahmad, announced that the SDF had gained control over an estimated 65 percent of Raqqa city after capturing the Old City, the Great Mosque and al-Dariya neighborhood. SOHR reported that the SDF were still fighting to gain control over pockets of the Old City but added that the US-backed opposition forces held more than 90 percent of the surrounding area. -On September 2, Russian Aerospace Forces reported they had destroyed a convoy of 12 ISIS trucks carrying ammunition and weapons in Deir Ezzor province. -It was made public that the British Ministry of Defense had quietly halted its FSA training program and called back its training forces from Syria in late June 2017. -On September 3, pro-government coalition forces gained control of the remaining ISIS stronghold in Hama Governorate after capturing the town of Uqayribat and its surrounding areas. -On September 4, Syrian Interim Government Prime Minister Jawad Abu Hatab was appointed interim Defense Minister as part of a unification initiative launched by the Syrian Islamic Council in early September. Free Syrian Army factions formed a committee to select a Chief of Staff in consultation with the Prime Minister. -On September 5, the Secretary-General submitted the OPCW's forty seventh monthly report on the progress to eliminate chemical weapons in Syria to the Security Council. The report highlighted the preparations underway to confirm the status of the two remaining stationary above-ground facilities now that the security situation allows safe access and the upcoming high- level consultations with Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister, Dr. Faisal Mekdad, to clarify outstanding issues regarding the Syrian government's initial declaration. -Pro-government coalition forces reached the western perimeter of Deir Ezzor city, breaking a three-year ISIS siege of the government-held areas that had impacted 93,500 people. In support of the offensive, a Russian warship located in the Mediterranean Sea launched cruise missiles at ISIS positions near Deir Ezzor. -On September 6, SE Mistura said he expects a national ceasefire to follow shortly after ISIS has been pushed from its strongholds in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor. Although he stressed that the government "cannot announce victory", he called on opposition forces to accept defeat and focus on winning the peace through negotiations in October. -The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria released a report on the major human rights and humanitarian law violations committed between March and July 2017. The Commission accused the Syrian government of using sarin gas in the April 4 Khan Sheikhoun attack and found US forces culpable of not taking "all feasible precautions" to protect civilians in the March 16 attack on al-Jinah Mosque. -According to Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, experts from Russia, Iran and Turkey made progress towards an agreement "on the parameters, configuration and methods of ensuring security in the de-escalation zone in the Idlib province" in Syria. -On September 7, Israel conducted airstrikes on the Scientific Studies and Research Center, a facility believed to house a chemical weapons manufacturing center, and a military base storing surface-to-surface missiles near government-stronghold Masyaf in Hama province. The Syrian Foreign Ministry called on the Security Council to denounce the airstrikes. -US-led coalition forces fighting ISIS announced that airstrikes had killed two ISIS leaders near Mayadin in the Deir Ezzor province on September 4, 2017. -The Head of the High Negotiations Committee, Riyad Hijab, rejected the SE Mistura's call for the opposition to accept defeat, declaring the UN mediation process a failure and calling on Syrians to demonstrate in support of the continuation of the revolution. On September 8, a convoy of 42 trucks carrying humanitarian aid for 80,000 people reached Deir Ezzor for the first time by land in three years. -US-led coalition surveillance aircraft departed its position monitoring an 11-bus convoy of ISIS fighters and their families after attempting to prevent its advance into ISIS-held territory in Deir Ezzor since August 29. The surveillance aircraft departed the airspace at the request of Russian military officials who were conducting an operation with pro-government forces close to the convoy's position. -The Syrian National Coalition (NCSRF) condemned calls from "regional and external parties" for Western-backed opposition groups Ahmed Al-Abdu and Ussoud Al-Sharqiya to cease fighting government forces in southeastern Syria and withdraw to Jordan. Both groups refused the request. -On September 9, pro-government forces broke a years-long siege of Deir Ezzor airbase and captured the Damascus-Deir Ezzor highway from ISIS. -SDF launched Operation Jazeera Storm to liberate Deir Ezzor province from ISIS. -On September 10, SDF reached the industrial zone to the east of Deir Ezzor city putting the US-backed coalition within 15 km (10 miles) of pro-government forces positioned to the west of the Euphrates river. -On September 11, the Jordanian Foreign Minister, Ayman Safadi, and Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, declared the ceasefire brokered by Jordan, Russia and the United States in the southern Syrian provinces of Daraa, Quneitra and Suweida on July 9 a success and reiterated their commitment to the establishment a de-escalation zone in the area as a step towards achieving a comprehensive cessation of hostilities and a political solution to the crisis. On September 12, pro-government coalition forces continued their push into ISIS-held territory in Deir Ezzor city. Russia and Syria warplanes conduct heavy bombardment in support, killing an estimated 69 people over the course of 72 hours. -Hezbollah leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, declared the war in Syria over, referring to the remaining fighting as "scattered battles". -ISIS defectors have massed in Syria's Idlib province with many planning to cross into Turkey before continuing to other parts of the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. -Iran and Syria sign a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in Syria's electricity sector. The arrangement, part of a series of bilateral deals formalizing Iran's role in Syria's reconstruction process, provides for the establishment of a new power generation station in Latakia and the rehabilitation of gas units and power generating plants in Damascus, Aleppo, Deir Ezzo and Homs. -On September 13, the remaining buses of the convoy of ISIS fighters and their families stranded for over two weeks in the Syrian desert reportedly reached Mayadin, in militant-held Deir Ezzor province, following the withdrawal of US surveillance aircraft on September 8 in respect of de-confliction arrangements with Russia. -The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that pro-government coalition forces controlled 85 percent of Syrian territory. SOHR disputed the claim, saying government forces held 48 percent of Syria. -Experts from Russia, Iran and Turkey met ahead of the sixth round of talks in Astana, Kazakhstan to "lay the groundwork" for negotiations on the establishment of de-escalation zone in Idlib province. -On September 14, Col. Ryan Dillon, spokesperson for the US-led coalition fighting ISIS, said SDF forces will not enter Deir Ezzor city, and will instead focus operations on areas south of the city along the Euphrates river. He also said US-backed SDF was in control of 63 percent of Raqqa city. -On September 15, Ahmad Abu Khawla, commander of the SDF-affiliated Deir Ezzor Military Council, declared that it will not allow government forces to cross to the eastern banks of the Euphrates river. -Representatives from Russia, Iran and Turkey reached an agreement on the delineation and monitoring mechanism for the implementation of a de-escalation zone in Idlib province and agreed to position observers in "safe zones". Russia circulated a draft resolution among the permanent members of the Council to welcome the outcome of the Astana talks. -On September 16, the SDF and US Coalition officials accused pro-government forces of attacking one of their positions in the industrial zone east of Deir Ezzor city, injuring 6 SDF fighters. According to US Coalition sources, Russia conducted the airstrike after the United States had denied its request to target the area. Russian Defense Ministry spokesperson Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov rejected the allegations, saying warplanes carried out "pinpoint strikes only on Islamic State targets that have been observed and confirmed through several channels." -High-level consultations commenced between the Syrian government and the OPCW aimed at clarifying all outstanding issues regarding Syria's initial declaration of its chemical weapons facilities. -On September 17, a convoy of 80 Turkish military vehicles deployed to Turkey's southern border, close to the Bab Al-Hawa and Rihaniyah crossings with Syria's Idlib Governorate, ahead of the implementation of a de-escalation zone agreement brokered at the recent Astana talks. -On September 18, pro-government coalition forces crossed to the eastern bank of the Euphrates river to within five kilometers of SDF positions. In the first sign of direct contact between the SDF and the pro-government forces, US-led coalition spokesperson Col. Ryan Dillon said "open lines" of communication were being maintained to prevent clashes between the two forces as they converge on ISIS positions. -After capturing the Deir Ezzor Military Airporst from ISIS fighters, pro-government forces began operating combat and supply missions from the airport. -The World Food Programme (WFP) reached formerly besieged parts of Deir Ezzor city by land for the first time since May 2014. WFP has discontinued its high-altitude airdrop operations in favor of road deliveries which will allow for more affordable, sustainable humanitarian access. -In a meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, Members of the "Friends of Syria" Group agreed they will not support reconstruction in Syria until there is a political transition "away from Assad." -During its 36th session, the Human Rights Council held an interactive dialogue with the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria to discuss the continued targeting of civilians and the use of chemical weapons in the conflict, appealing to all parties to redouble their efforts to protect civilians and preserve civilian infrastructure. -On September 19, AOGs led by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), the Turkistan Islamic Party and Free Syrian Army affiliates launched an offensive against pro-government forces in northern Hama province in an effort to dismantle the de-escalation zone agreement on Idlib province brokered at the recent Astana talks. The offensive sparked intense Russian and Syrian bombardment of opposition-held territory in Hama and Idlib Governorates. Syrian government forces claimed the airstrikes targeted "terrorist supply lines" but SOHR alleged the strikes hit hospitals and towns, killing civilians. -The Syrian government asserted it will not accept Turkish forces on Syrian soil, effectively contradicting
In: Decision analysis: a journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, INFORMS, Band 8, Heft 4, S. 322-327
ISSN: 1545-8504
Ali E. Abbas (" From the Editors: Probability Scoring Rules, Ambiguity, Multiattribute Terrorist Utility, and Sensitivity Analysis ") is an associate professor in the Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign. He received an M.S. in electrical engineering (1998), an M.S. in engineering economic systems and operations research (2001), a Ph.D. in management science and engineering (2003), and a Ph.D. (minor) in electrical engineering, all from Stanford University. He worked as a lecturer in the Department of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford and in Schlumberger Oilfield Services, where he held several international positions in wireline logging, operations management, and international training. He has also worked on several consulting projects for mergers and acquisitions in California, and cotaught several executive seminars on decision analysis at Strategic Decisions Group in Menlo Park, California. His research interests include utility theory, decision making with incomplete information and preferences, dynamic programming, and information theory. Dr. Abbas is a senior member of the IEEE and a member of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). He is also an associate editor for the Decision Analysis and Operations Research journals of INFORMS. Address: Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, 117 Transportation Building, MC-238, 104 South Mathews Avenue, Urbana, IL 61801; e-mail: aliabbas@illinois.edu . J. Eric Bickel (" From the Editors: Probability Scoring Rules, Ambiguity, Multiattribute Terrorist Utility, and Sensitivity Analysis ") is an assistant professor in both the Graduate Program in Operations Research (Department of Mechanical Engineering) and the Department of Petroleum and Geosystems Engineering at the University of Texas at Austin. In addition, Professor Bickel is a fellow in both the Center for International Energy and Environmental Policy and the Center for Petroleum Asset Risk Management. He holds an M.S. and Ph.D. from the Department of Engineering–Economic Systems at Stanford University and a B.S. in mechanical engineering with a minor in economics from New Mexico State University. His research interests include the theory and practice of decision analysis and its application in the energy and climate-change arenas. His research has addressed the modeling of probabilistic dependence, value of information, scoring rules, calibration, risk preference, education, decision making in sports, and climate engineering as a response to climate change. Prior to returning to academia, Eric was a senior engagement manager for Strategic Decisions Group. He has consulted around the world in a range of industries, including oil and gas, electricity generation/transmission/delivery, energy trading and marketing, commodity and specialty chemicals, life sciences, financial services, and metals and mining. Address: Graduate Program in Operations Research, University of Texas at Austin, 1 University Station, C2200, Austin, TX 78712-0292; e-mail: ebickel@mail.utexas.edu . Vicki M. Bier (" From the Editors: Probability Scoring Rules, Ambiguity, Multiattribute Terrorist Utility, and Sensitivity Analysis" and "Target-Hardening Decisions Based on Uncertain Multiattribute Terrorist Utility ") is a full professor in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, where she is currently department chair and also directs the Center for Human Performance and Risk Analysis. She is also the president of the Decision Analysis Society. Her research interests include applications of operations research, risk analysis, and decision analysis to problems of homeland security and critical infrastructure protection. Address: Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Mechanical Engineering Building, Room 3270A, 1513 University Avenue, Madison, WI 53706; e-mail: bier@engr.wisc.edu . David V. Budescu (" From the Editors: Probability Scoring Rules, Ambiguity, Multiattribute Terrorist Utility, and Sensitivity Analysis ") is the Anne Anastasi Professor of Psychometrics and Quantitative Psychology at Fordham University. He held positions at the University of Illinois and the University of Haifa, and visiting positions at Carnegie Mellon University, University of Gotheborg, the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University, the Hebrew University, and the Israel Institute of Technology (Technion). His research is in the areas of human judgment, individual and group decision making under uncertainty and with incomplete and vague information, and statistics for the behavioral and social sciences. He is on the editorial boards of Applied Psychological Measurement; Decision Analysis; Journal of Behavioral Decision Making; Journal of Mathematical Psychology; Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition (2000–2003); Multivariate Behavioral Research; Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (1992–2002); and Psychological Methods (1996–2000). He is past president of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making (2000–2001), fellow of the Association for Psychological Science, and an elected member of the Society of Multivariate Experimental Psychologists. Address: Department of Psychology, Fordham University, Bronx, New York, NY 10458; e-mail: budescu@fordham.edu . John C. Butler (" From the Editors: Probability Scoring Rules, Ambiguity, Multiattribute Terrorist Utility, and Sensitivity Analysis ") is a clinical associate professor of finance and the academic director of the Energy Management and Innovation Center in the McCombs School of Business at the University of Texas at Austin, and he is the secretary/treasurer of the INFORMS Decision Analysis Society. Butler received his Ph.D. in management science and information systems from the University of Texas at Austin in 1998. His research interests involve the use of decision science models to support decision making, with a particular emphasis on decision and risk analysis models with multiple performance criteria. Butler has consulted with a number of organizations regarding the application of decision analysis tools to a variety of practical problems. Most of his consulting projects involve use of Visual Basic for Applications and Excel to implement complex decision science models in a user friendly format. Address: Energy Management and Innovation Center, McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712-1178; e-mail: john.butler2@mccombs.utexas.edu . Stephen P. Chambal (" A Practical Procedure for Customizable One-Way Sensitivity Analysis in Additive Value Models ") earned a Ph.D. from Arizona State University in industrial engineering and is vice president for the Perduco Group responsible for strategic business development for federal services. The Perduco Group provides high-end operations research and business intelligence support to the Department of Defense. Dr. Chambal recently retired from the U.S. Air Force after more than 24 years of honorable service. Most recently, he served as the director of Operational Analysis for the Air Force Institute of Technology. Dr. Chambal enlisted in the Air Force in 1986 and obtained his commission from the Air Force Academy in 1993. He held various assignments within the scientific analysis career field, including test, space, and special programs and has authored or coauthored numerous articles, white papers, and conference presentations. Address: 256 Earlsgate Road, Dayton, OH 45440; e-mail: stephen.chambal@theperducogroup.com . Philippe Delquié (" From the Editors: Probability Scoring Rules, Ambiguity, Multiattribute Terrorist Utility, and Sensitivity Analysis ") is an associate professor of decision sciences at the George Washington University and holds a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Professor Delquié's teaching and research are in decision, risk, and multicriteria analysis. His work addresses behavioral and normative issues in preference assessment, value of information, nonexpected utility models of choice under risk, and risk measures. Prior to joining the George Washington University, Delquié held academic appointments at INSEAD, École Normale Supérieure, France, and the University of Texas at Austin, and visiting appointments at Duke University's Fuqua School of Business. Address: Department of Decision Sciences, The George Washington University, Funger Hall, Suite 415, Washington, DC 20052; e-mail: delquie@gwu.edu . Alex J. Gutman (" A Practical Procedure for Customizable One-Way Sensitivity Analysis in Additive Value Models ") is a research associate for the Air Force Institute of Technology's (AFIT) Center for Operational Analysis. He holds an M.S. and B.S. in mathematics from Wright State University and is currently a Ph.D. student at AFIT. His research interests include decision analysis, algorithm design, and design of experiments. He is a member of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), the Military Operations Research Society (MORS), and the International Test and Evaluation Association (ITEA). Address: Department of Operational Sciences, Air Force Institute of Technology, Dayton, OH 45433; e-mail: agutman@afit.edu . David J. Johnstone (" Tailored Scoring Rules for Probabilities ") is the National Australia Bank Professor of Finance at the University of Sydney. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Sydney. His research is primarily in the statistical foundations of financial markets and financial decisions. His professional activities involve more conventional subjects in finance, particularly business valuation and capital budgeting. Address: Discipline of Finance H69, University of Sydney Business School, Sydney NSW 2006, Australia; e-mail: david.johnstone@sydney.edu.au . Victor Richmond R. Jose (" Tailored Scoring Rules for Probabilities ") is an assistant professor of Operations and Information Management in the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University. His main research interests lie in decision analysis and the use of Bayesian statistical methods in management science, operations research, and risk analysis. Address: Operations and Information Management Department, McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057; e-mail: vrj2@georgetown.edu . Yucel R. Kahraman (" A Practical Procedure for Customizable One-Way Sensitivity Analysis in Additive Value Models ") is a recent graduate of the Air Force Institute of Technology, where he received his M.Sc. in operations research. He graduated from ISIKLAR Military High School in Bursa in 1985 and entered the Turkish Air Force Academy in Istanbul. He graduated in 1993 with a bachelor's degree in aeronautical engineering. He completed pilot training at Laughlin AFB in Del Rio, Texas, and has flown fighter aircraft for the Turkish Air Force for 10 years. Address: Department of Operational Sciences, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2950 Hobson Way, WPAFB, Ohio 45433-7765; e-mail: yucelrkahraman@gmail.com . L. Robin Keller (" From the Editors: Probability Scoring Rules, Ambiguity, Multiattribute Terrorist Utility, and Sensitivity Analysis ") is a professor of operations and decision technologies in the Merage School of Business at the University of California, Irvine. She received her Ph.D. and M.B.A. in management science and her B.A. in mathematics from the University of California, Los Angeles. She has served as a program director for the Decision, Risk, and Management Science Program of the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF). Her research is on decision analysis and risk analysis for business and policy decisions and has been funded by NSF and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Her research interests cover multiple attribute decision making, riskiness, fairness, probability judgments, ambiguity of probabilities or outcomes, risk analysis (for terrorism, environmental, health, and safety risks), time preferences, problem structuring, cross-cultural decisions, and medical decision making. She is currently Editor-in-Chief of Decision Analysis, published by the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). She is a Fellow of INFORMS and has held numerous roles in INFORMS, including board member and chair of the INFORMS Decision Analysis Society. She is a recipient of the George F. Kimball Medal from INFORMS. She has served as the decision analyst on three National Academy of Sciences committees. Address: Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697-3125; e-mail: lrkeller@uci.edu . Kenneth C. Lichtendahl Jr. (" From the Editors: Probability Scoring Rules, Ambiguity, Multiattribute Terrorist Utility, and Sensitivity Analysis ") is an assistant professor who teaches quantitative analysis courses in Darden's MBA program at the University of Virginia. His research focuses on eliciting, evaluating, and combining expert probability forecasts for use in dynamic decision situations. His current research projects include the performance of inference in Bayesian models of dynamic expert forecasts and the formulation optimal strategies in forecasting competitions. Lichtendahl joined the Darden faculty in 2006. Previously, he served as a visiting instructor in the economics department at Duke University. Currently, he also serves as a business consultant and director for the Tradewinds Beverage Company, which he cofounded in 1992. Address: Darden School of Business, University of Virginia, 100 Darden Boulevard, Charlottesville, VA 22903; e-mail: lichtendahlc@darden.virginia.edu . Jason R. W. Merrick (" From the Editors: Probability Scoring Rules, Ambiguity, Multiattribute Terrorist Utility, and Sensitivity Analysis ") is a professor in the Department of Statistical Sciences and Operations Research at Virginia Commonwealth University. He has a D.Sc. in operations research from George Washington University. He teaches courses in decision analysis, risk analysis, and simulation. His research is primarily in the area of decision analysis and Bayesian statistics. He has worked on projects ranging from assessing maritime oil transportation and ferry system safety, the environmental health of watersheds, and optimal replacement policies for rail tracks and machine tools. He has received grants from the National Science Foundation, the Federal Aviation Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, the American Bureau of Shipping, British Petroleum, and Booz-Allen-Hamilton, among others. He has also performed training for Infineon Technologies, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, and Capital One Services. He is an associate editor for Decision Analysis and Operations Research. He is the information officer for the Decision Analysis Society. Address: Department of Statistical Sciences and Operations Research, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284; e-mail: jrmerric@vcu.edu . Ahti Salo (" From the Editors: Probability Scoring Rules, Ambiguity, Multiattribute Terrorist Utility, and Sensitivity Analysis ") is a professor of systems analysis in the Department of Mathematics and Systems Analysis at Aalto University. His research interests include topics in portfolio decision analysis, multicriteria decision making, risk management, efficiency analysis, and technology foresight. He is currently president of the Finnish Operations Research Society (FORS) and represents Europe and the Middle East in the INFORMS International Activities Committee. Recently, he has been appointed Editor-in-Chief of the EURO Journal on Decision Processes, launched by the Association of European Operational Research Societies (EURO). Professor Salo has been responsible for the methodological design and implementation of numerous high-impact decision and policy processes, including FinnSight 2015, the national foresight exercise of the Academy of Finland and the National Funding Agency for Technology and Innovations (Tekes). Address: Systems Analysis Laboratory, Aalto University, P.O. Box 11100, 00076 Aalto, Finland; e-mail: ahti.salo@aalto.fi . Chen Wang (" Target-Hardening Decisions Based on Uncertain Multiattribute Terrorist Utility ") is currently a Ph.D. student in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. She holds a master's degree in industrial engineering also from the same department. Chen works as a research assistant in the Center for Human Performance and Risk Analysis, under the supervision of Professor Vicki M. Bier. Her research interests include application of operations research and decision analysis in security problems and critical infrastructure protection. Address: 3239 Mechanical Engineering, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1513 University Avenue, Madison, WI 53706; e-mail: cwang37@wisc.edu . Jeffery D. Weir (" A Practical Procedure for Customizable One-Way Sensitivity Analysis in Additive Value Models ") is an associate professor in the Department of Operational Sciences at the Air Force Institute of Technology. He has a Ph.D. in industrial and systems engineering from Georgia Tech. He teaches courses in decision analysis, risk analysis, and multiobjective optimization. His research interests are in the areas of decision analysis and transportation modeling. A former officer in the U.S. Air Force, he has worked on a wide variety of projects ranging from scheduling and routing aircraft, determining the value of future intelligence information, assessing the impact of FAA regulation changes to passenger and aircrew safety, and mode selection for multimodal multicommodity distribution networks. He has received grants from the Defense Intelligence Agency, U.S. Transportation Command, Air Force Material Command, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, Air Force Research Laboratory, and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, among others. Address: Department of Operational Sciences, Air Force Institute of Technology, Dayton, OH 45433; e-mail: jweir@afit.edu . Robert L. Winkler (" Tailored Scoring Rules for Probabilities ") is James B. Duke Professor in the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University and also holds an appointment in the Department of Statistical Science at Duke. His primary research areas include decision analysis, Bayesian statistics, probability forecasting, competitive decision making, and risk analysis. Address: Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, 100 Fuqua Drive, Box 90120, Durham, NC 27708-0120; e-mail: rwinkler@duke.edu . George Wu (" From the Editors: Probability Scoring Rules, Ambiguity, Multiattribute Terrorist Utility, and Sensitivity Analysis ") has been on the faculty of the University of Chicago Booth School of Business since September 1997. His degrees include A.B. (applied mathematics, 1985), S.M. (applied mathematics, 1987), and Ph.D. (decision sciences, 1991), all from Harvard University. Prior to joining the faculty at the University of Chicago, Professor Wu was on the faculty at Harvard Business School. Wu worked as a decision analyst at Procter & Gamble prior to starting graduate school. His research interests include descriptive and prescriptive aspects of decision making, in particular, decision making involving risk, cognitive biases in bargaining and negotiation, and managerial and organizational decision making. Professor Wu is a coordinating editor for Theory and Decision, an advisory editor for Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, and an associate editor of Decision Analysis. He is on the editorial board of the Journal of Behavioral Decision Making and is a former department editor of Management Science. Address: Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60636; e-mail: wu@chicagobooth.edu . Alexander Zimper (" Do Bayesians Learn Their Way Out of Ambiguity? ") is a professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Pretoria and holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Mannheim. He started out as a specialist on iterative solution concepts for strategic games, but his current research interests concern topics in economic theory in the broadest sense. He does not believe that there is one big truth out there but rather that classical as well as bounded-rationality approaches provide us with structures that may improve—within their respective limits—our understanding of reality. His most recent work is on plausible refinements of Roy Radner's rational expectations equilibrium, existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium price function in a Lucas fruit-tree economy with ambiguous beliefs, overreaction and underreaction in asset markets, and optimal liquidity provision under demand deposit schemes. His work in decision theory mainly concerns dynamically inconsistent behavior arising from ambiguity attitudes and, in particular, Bayesian learning modeled within nonadditive probability spaces. Address: Department of Economics, University of Pretoria, Private Bag X20, Hatfield 0028, South Africa; e-mail: alexander.zimper@up.ac.za .
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Six years after former President Donald Trump's withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, the disastrous consequences of this decision are still adding up. In addition to Iran being closer than ever to a nuclear weapons capability, now we must consider how the declining security situation in the Middle East has raised the stakes significantly. Trump promised a "better deal" but instead we got an increasingly costly blunder that may be impossible to fix.To fully understand the enormity of Trump's decision to leave the Iran deal, consider this: When the U.S. and Iran were complying with the deal, it was estimated that it would take Iran about one year to produce enough fissile material (in this case, weapons grade uranium) for a nuclear bomb (known as the "breakout" time). The states negotiating with Iran (the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, France, and Germany) assessed that this would be enough time to respond to possible violations and prevent Iran from producing a bomb. Even if Iran were to acquire sufficient fissile material, it could still take another year for Iran to make a deliverable nuclear weapon. As of May, 2018, the deal was working and considered (by most) to be a great success.Then President Trump unilaterally left the deal, calling it a "horrible one-sided deal that should have never, ever been made." And now we are in a much worse place. Iran says it has no intent to produce nuclear weapons and U.S. intelligence sees no current efforts by Tehran to weaponize, yet Tehran is believed to be not one year but just weeks from being able to produce enough fissile material for a bomb if it chooses to do so. At the same time, the ability of international inspectors to detect violations in a timely manner has eroded. As one U.S. official said of Iran, "they are dancing right up to the edge."Worse still, relations between the United States and Iran have been so damaged by Trump's withdrawal that it does not appear as though the deal can be resurrected. Any efforts to stabilize the U.S.-Iran relationship have been severely complicated by the recent exchange of direct attacks between Israel and Iran. Just as we need a non-military approach more than ever, the prospects for a diplomatic solution appear distant. What's worse is that increasing tensions may be pushing Tehran closer to a political decision to go nuclear. The danger of an Iranian bomb and the related risk that Israel could attack Iran's nuclear sites could lead to wider military conflict in the region. Of course, it did not have to be this way. The deal was working until Trump abandoned it and, if he had not, it could still be working today.How did we get here?To comply with the Iran deal, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA, Tehran agreed to significantly limit its nuclear program. Under the deal:Iran agreed to reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98% to 300kg and limit uranium enrichment to 3.67%, suitable for civilian nuclear power but well below highly enriched (20%) or weapons grade (90%). Those limits would have lasted for 15 years.Tehran limited the number of uranium centrifuges in operation by two-thirds and committed not to build any new enrichment facilities for 15 years. The Fordow enrichment plant (designed as a secret, underground facility) was prohibited from enriching uranium, and limited enrichment could take place only at the Natanz facility.Iran agreed to redesign another nuclear facility to produce much less plutonium and its spent fuel would be shipped out of country. Iran agreed to provisionally implement additional safeguards under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).A year after President Trump's withdrawal, Iran began to retaliate by incrementally breaching the terms of the deal. Tehran lifted the cap on its uranium stockpile, increased enrichment beyond the allowed 3.67% and resumed and expanded activity at prohibited nuclear facilities.Many of Iran's advances were taken in response to provocative actions from the U.S. and Israel. In early 2020, the Trump administration killed Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani, leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and soon after Tehran announced that it would no longer abide by its enrichment commitments under the deal. But, even so, Tehran said it would return to compliance if the other parties did so and met their commitments on sanctions relief.In late 2020, Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was assassinated near Tehran, reportedly by Israel. Soon after, Iran's Guardian Council approved a law to speed up the nuclear program by enriching uranium to 20%, increasing the rate of production, installing new centrifuges, suspending implementation of expanded safeguards agreements, and reducing monitoring and verification cooperation with the IAEA. The Agency has been unable to adequately monitor Iran's nuclear activities under the deal since early 2021.Iran began enriching uranium to 20% in early 2021 at Fordow and then to 60% at Natanz a few months later after an act of sabotage damaged Natanz. Since then, Iran has been steadily increasing the rate of enriched uranium production. The latest IAEA report (February 2024) estimates Iran's enriched uranium stockpile to stand at 5,525kg, more than 27 times the level permitted under the deal, with 833kg enriched to 20-60%.How close to a bomb?Iran is steadily advancing its nuclear program, getting ever closer to becoming a "threshold state" with the ability to make a weapon while making no overt move to build one.The U.S. government estimated in March 2022 that Iran would need as little as one week to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one nuclear weapon, according to a State Department official. During a March 2023 congressional hearing, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley testified that Iran could produce this amount of enriched uranium "in approximately 10-15 days."In its 2024 annual threat assessment, the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence concluded that "Tehran has the infrastructure and experience to quickly produce weapons-grade uranium, if it chooses to do so."And in March 2024, France, Germany, and the UK estimated that Iran had acquired enough highly enriched uranium that, if enriched further to 90%, would theoretically be enough for three nuclear explosive devices.There is greater uncertainty about how long it would take Iran to build a nuclear weapon once it has the required weapons-grade uranium. Such steps, referred to as "weaponization," include producing uranium metal and shaping it into bomb parts, producing high explosives and electronics, and fitting it all into a device that could be used for a demonstration test. It would presumably take longer to produce a bomb that could be delivered by aircraft or a warhead small enough to fit onto a ballistic missile.According to official U.S. assessments, Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in late 2003 and has not resumed it. Reportedly, this program's goal, according to U.S. officials and the IAEA, was to develop an implosion-style nuclear weapon for Iran's Shahab-3 ballistic missile. A State Department official stated in April 2022 that Iran would need approximately one year to complete the necessary weaponization steps.We cannot put Humpty Dumpty back together againMuch of Iran's uranium activities can be reversed; centrifuges can be disassembled, facilities can be closed, and uranium stocks can be blended down or shipped out of the country, as was done under the terms of the original deal. However, after years of operating more sophisticated centrifuges, Iran has acquired technical knowledge that cannot be undone.But more importantly, we have lost the political opportunity to reach a comprehensive deal with Iran. The Iran nuclear deal would not have been possible without the active support of Russia and China. Yet these countries are no longer aligned with the West on these issues and Iran is actively supporting Russia in its war with Ukraine and selling oil to China. Iran does not need sanctions relief from the United States as much as it once did.It was often said that although the Iran deal did not solve all the problems in the U.S.-Iran relationship, it solved an important one by taking an Iranian nuclear bomb out of the equation. That even if the myriad problems in the Middle East continued, at least we would not be facing those challenges and Iran on the nuclear threshold. And now that is exactly where we are.The lessons of this tragic tale are clear: a meaningful nuclear agreement is much harder to create than to destroy; if we are lucky enough to get one it should be protected; and if we lose it, we should try to replace it.The Iran deal was a truly remarkable achievement, and we would be much better off today if the United States had rejected the fantasy of a "better deal" and remained in compliance with the one we had. Trump's decision (aided by then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and then-national security adviser John Bolton) to walk away was an historic and utter failure. Now, the prospects of finding a new diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear crisis are daunting. But we must try; the alternatives are worse.
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Today marks a solemn anniversary in Brazil: 60 years ago, the Brazilian military seized power from the government of João Goulart, marking the start of over two decades of military rule. Brazil's 2014 Truth Commission report is the country's only formal investigation into this period of dictatorial rule. The commission's 2,000-page report revealed some grisly details of the dictatorship's human rights abuses, identified over 400 individuals killed by the military, and shed light on Brazil's role in destabilizing other Latin American countries.To assist with the Truth Commission, then-Vice President Joe Biden hand-delivered declassified State Department records to former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff — who herself had been imprisoned and tortured by the military regime. The records offered details about the dictatorship and Washington's enabling of abuses, including a cable from former Ambassador to Brazil William Rountree arguing that condemning the regime's human rights "excesses" would be "counterproductive." Biden's delivery of the declassified records was symbolic, since the U.S. had supported the coup. The U.S. solidified its support for the putschists the year prior, drew up plans for a U.S. invasion if deemed necessary, and sent a naval task force to Brazil to support the military plotters. In the end, direct U.S. involvement wasn't needed — Goulart fled to Uruguay by April 4. The coup was carried out by Brazil's generals, but Washington celebrated it as a victory for its interests nonetheless. On the one hand, U.S. support for the coup laid bare the hypocrisy of America's supposed commitment to sovereignty and democracy. Gone was the Kennedy administration's promise to reject a "Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war." The Cold War logic of siding with anti-communist dictators for the purpose of defeating the Soviet Union prevailed. Washington may have lost China, but it won Brazil — or so the thinking went. However, even the most cynical arguments for aligning with undemocratic regimes for a strategic purpose often failed to bear fruit, given that many of these regimes departed from U.S. policy on key issues. Many historians of the U.S.-Brazil relationship contend that during this period their ties at times more closely resembled rivals rather than close partners. Rubens Ricupero, a former diplomat and minister of finance of Brazil, writes that, "Little by little, doubts turn[ed] into disappointment, and this le[d] to gradual disengagement in relation to the regime they had helped to create."When it first took power, Brazil's military dictatorship closely followed Washington's lead. Goulart was out, as was his "Independent Foreign Policy," a non-alignment stance that emphasized self-determination, decolonization, and non-intervention, devised by the ousted president's predecessor, Janio Quadros. In line with Washington's desires, the dictatorship, which rotated through five different military general-presidents between 1964 and 1985, broke off relations with Cuba and even assisted the U.S. in its occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1965.Washington also saw Brazil as a key ideological partner in destabilizing leftist regimes across Latin America. As one Brazilian general put it, the United States wanted Brazil "to do the dirty work." And it did. Most prominently, the Brazilian regime played a critical role in the overthrow of the democratically-elected government of Salvador Allende in Chile,. even secretly bringing members of the Chilean military to Brazil to discuss the potential coup. Brazil under the generals also participated in Operation Condor, the secret cooperation of right-wing military dictatorships in much of Latin America to assassinate, or "disappear" perceived leftists and other dissidents during the 1970s.Over time, the Brazilian regime's alignment with the U.S. waned and tensions bubbled up. Dr. Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira writes in his book "Brazil-United States: An Emerging Rivalry," that "automatic alignment with State Department guidelines could no longer continue for long, as it no longer effectively corresponded to the national interests of a developing country that aspired to become a power." Despite the fact that the U.S. wanted the benefits of outsourcing its dirty work, it was not willing to accept the consequences that came with greater military autonomy for Brazil. Dr. Eduardo Svartman, a political science professor at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, told Responsible Statecraft that one early issue that emerged was over Brazil's request for F-5 fighter jets."In the eyes of American politicians, if the great threat in Latin America was communist insurgents, there was no point to sell or transfer modern supersonic fighter jets to Latin American countries when helicopters would do the job much better," Svartman said. The Brazilian government disagreed, believing it was important to have a modern military in order to project power in South America. The generals accordingly grew more reliant on Europe, buying several Mirage fighter aircrafts from France. They eventually pushed the F-5 sale through several years later, but it was an early lesson that the U.S. may not be their most reliable partner. Though the U.S. remained an important supplier of critical components for Brazil's burgeoning national arms industry, Brazil's supply of U.S.-made arms imports decreased from 92% to 14% of its total arsenal over the course of the dictatorship. The U.S. also grew frustrated with Brazil's move towards positions associated with the non-aligned movement. Though Brazil was never a full member of the movement, in the early 1970s, it supported the decolonization of the Lusophone countries in Africa, emphasized non-intervention, and recognized the MPLA in Angola. Elements of the Independent Brazilian Foreign Policy had returned. Perhaps the biggest source of tension between the U.S. and Brazil was over the development of a nuclear program. Brazil refused to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, arguing that nuclear technology was vital for its development. After the U.S. suspended the supply of enriched uranium for Brazil's research reactors, the regime turned to West Germany and negotiated a major nuclear agreement in 1975.In an internal report, the CIA claimed that Brazil's nuclear ambitions posed a "fundamental challenge" to U.S.-Brazil relations. Without informing the Brazilians, newly-elected Vice President Walter Mondale tried to lobby the German government to cancel the agreement. Washington also grew frustrated with the generals' authoritarianism and human rights abuses. The regime passed a series of "institutional acts" — the first of which came just days after the coup — that gave them sweeping powers, including suspending the rights of opposition leaders and power to declare a recess in Congress. Ricupero writes that "with each new attack on the legal order or violation of rights, the embassy in Rio de Janeiro was forced into dialectical contortions to calm the State Department's unrest." Pressure on rising authoritarianism and the nuclear issue came to a head during the Carter administration, which applied human rights as a criteria for military assistance more directly. After the Carter State Department criticized Brazil for its human rights abuses in 1977, the Brazilian government retaliated by suspending the Joint Military Commission between the U.S. and Brazil, its Naval Mission, and a long-standing bilateral military accord. According to Washington's then-ambassador to Brasilia, Robert Sayre, "U.S.-Brazil relations just went to pieces."Despite a brief rapprochement with the election of Ronald Reagan as president in 1980, Brazil became critical of Washington's revival of more interventionist policies under his administration. Washington's decision to side with Britain against neighboring Argentina during the Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982 confirmed Brazilian suspicions that the U.S. was not a reliable partner. For the first time ever, "the hypothesis of war with the United States became an object of study in the Armed Forces," writes Bandeira.Brazil also opposed the so-called Reagan Doctrine, which sought to overthrow leftist governments in Central America and southern Africa. The U.S. had become not just a distant partner but something altogether new: an emerging rival. Many of these disputes between the two countries remained well into the period of democratization that began in 1985. There is a lot that is still unknown about this chapter in Brazil's history, and the U.S.' relationship to the military regime. Peter Kornbluh, a senior analyst at the National Security Archive who also served as the liaison between the U.S. and Brazilian governments for the Truth Commission, estimates there are still thousands of records that remain classified, including many sensitive records from the CIA and the Department of Defense. "[T]he degree to which the United States is sitting on documentation about repression in Brazil is the degree to which the United States is not assisting Brazilian society in reminding itself about the horrors of what happened behind closed doors in secret detention centers," Kornbluh told Responsible Statecraft.To start, President Biden could honor a request from 16 Brazilian civil society organizations to declassify these records. The groups' appeal states that declassification would "provide valuable information about human rights violations committed during the Brazilian dictatorship and clarify the degree of the United States' involvement in or knowledge of these events. This act of transparency would also strengthen the foundations of the U.S.-America relationship, fostering trust and collaboration on important issues such as human rights, democracy, and regional stability." The Luiz Inácio "Lula" da SiIva government is unlikely to formally request these documents from Biden himself. In an effort to appease leaders of the Brazilian Armed Forces who still hold the 21-year dictatorship in high regard, Lula controversially canceled all formal demonstrations of the 60th anniversary. But even without an official commemoration, millions of Brazilians from Manaus in the Amazon to Florianopolis in the far south are organizing demonstrations to send a message of "dictatorship never again."
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The Iraqi army captain who assassinated King Faisal II and his family in 1958 claimed, "All I did was remember Palestine, and the trigger on the machine-gun just set itself off." Although Iraqi historians refute this assertion and maintain the officer was a delusional madman, in the days leading up to the massacre of the royal family, the Iraqi opposition had been emboldened by growing anti-Israel sentiment and a perception that the Iraqi monarchy leaned too heavily toward Western nations which enabled Israeli aggression toward Arab states. Six decades later, the Palestinian question still enrages the "Arab Street." The war in Gaza raises concerns of violent regional spillover and Iraq would not be not immune from the consequences. Unlike the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon, however, it is unlikely that armed conflict will come to Iraq as sympathy for the Palestinians will not trump war fatigue. Yet, there are reasons to fear the indirect costs of war. Chief among those concerns revolve around neighboring Iran being involved in a wider conflict, but no less significant could be the effects on the internal politics of Iraq, its economy, and its international relations. Much will depend on the skills of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani to balance the pressure from his political opponents and the armed militias.Internal politicsAll politics are local, and in Iraq they are often armed. Unlike the dictatorships, dynasties, and monarchies surrounding it, Iraq remains a parliamentary democracy, generally responsive to public sentiment but also coercion from armed militias outside of government control.Iraq's recent history shows the best and worst of democracy, free speech, and the right to assemble. In October 2019, widespread street protests over corruption, unemployment, inadequate services, and poor living conditions brought down the government of Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi. The Tishreen ("October") protesters demanded the resignation of Abdul-Mahdi, commitments to reform, and early elections. While authorities responded with a relatively heavy hand, the government fell within two months. Abdul-Mahdi's replacement, Mustafa al Kadhimi, enjoyed a full term in office but the process of replacing him with the current prime minister, Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani came after Iraq went through the longest period without a formal government in its modern history. Among other factors, his appointment was fiercely opposed by the powerful rabble-rousing Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr when Sadr was unable to form a government. Sadr's party resigned en masse from Parliament but not before his followers stormed the Council of Representatives in July 2022 twice, and occupied the Presidential Palace the following month. The departure of the Sadrists from the palace led to a deadly firefight in the Green Zone which soon spread to Iraq's southern provinces. Against this backdrop of violence and turmoil, the Sudani government came to power in October 2022 fully understanding the need to remain sensitive to public opinion and well armed political opponents. The Sudani government also remains under pressure from militias, a delicate balancing act for a country beholden to the accomplishments of these groups in the fight against Daesh, or ISIS. These militias enjoy quasi-political influence on the Iraqi body politic and are closely tied to Iran. Sudani's political opponents have been closely watching for a misstep (common to all opposition parties worldwide), not least Sadr, who has already called on his supporters to join "peaceful" demonstrations in protest of Israel's war on Gaza. Rarely are Sadrist demonstrations peaceful as shown by the sit-ins in 2021 and the violent attacks into the protected Green Zone in 2022.Against this backdrop, Sudani maintains a careful reading of internal politics. While he may not be ousted by demonstrations like Abdul-Mahdi or fend off assassination attempts as did Khadimi, participating in internal politics remains a risky business in Iraq; so is international diplomacy.External relations While Prime Minister Sudani has demonstrated strong skills in managing Iraq's internal politics, external relations with Iran and the United States could provide the missteps his opponents seek. Despite strong condemnation of the attacks into Gaza, Iran-backed militias have significantly ramped up their drone and rocket attacks on U.S. military bases in Iraq and Syria.In response, a parade of U.S. officials from CIA Director William Burns to Secretary of State Antony Blinken (adorned in body armor) have visited Iraq since October 7 persuading, cajoling, and warning Sudani of the consequences of continued attacks on U.S. personnel. Sudani issued stern warnings that Iraqi territory should not be used as a proxy battlefield, and that continued attacks by these groups may provoke U.S. action against Iran even in the absence of proof that these attacks were "explicitly ordered" by Tehran. Arresting a small number of suspects in the attacks has, for the moment, kept the diplomatic situation somewhat calm. Sudani seems to have found a way to acquiesce to Washington's demands while placating Iran and the militias. Keen on maintaining positive relations with both Iran and the U.S., while remaining attentive and in tune to sentiments on the street, Sudani cannot risk being perceived as cowering to Western pressures at a time when public opinion is overwhelmingly in support of Gaza. But that balancing act will require continued statesmanship to uphold Iraq's sovereignty without being labeled by detractors as a puppet of any hegemon, whether Iran or the U.S. A tipping point, however, may be if the war in Gaza continues. The recent outcry against the December 25 airstrikes by the U.S. military in response to a rocket attack which seriously injured an American soldier is the most recent example. Not only did Sudani call the rocket attack an act of terrorism, but also condemned the American strike as a serious violation of Iraqi sovereignty and announced that "the Iraqi government is heading towards ending the presence of international coalition forces."Economic effectsWhile Iraq's economy has shown some signs of recovery in recent months — 25 percent of Iraqis reportedly live below the poverty line — unemployment is forecasted to reach 40 percent, and climate change has contributed to water scarcity. There is little appetite for yet another war in Iraq when average Iraqis are battling to get by.In the event the Gaza conflict expands, Iraqis could be affected by events such as the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Blocking maritime traffic through the Suez Canal and rerouting traffic around the Cape of Good Hope in Africa could affect the relatively modest inflation rate in Iraq at a time when the Iraqi dinar has also gone through a significant depreciation. While the economic situation in Iraq is far better than regional neighbors such as Iran, Turkey, and Egypt, expectations from consumers used to relatively stable prices are high and even a small amount of economic turbulence on top of anger at the situation in Gaza could challenge the Sudani government. As former Iraqi Energy Minister Luay Al Khateeb puts it, "If the Gaza war engulfs Iran, this will lead to major consequences on Iraq's political and economic stability. The ramifications will force Iran to prioritize its needs to meet local demand on power sector and gas supplies and cut natural gas electricity exports to Iraq."Iraq currently imports electricity and gas from Iran that total close to 40 percent of its power supply. "Iran's force majeure cuts will compromise Iraq's national grid to disable 50 percent of Iraq's service sectors and investment projects, affecting the country's revenue; [it will have a] negative impact on GDP and will most certainly ignite unprecedented populous protests against the government and the political system at large," says Al Khateeb. "For Iraq to avoid such a situation, a quick short term resolution will come at a major cost to compensate for the losses by importing expensive diesel and securing more financial allocation for power generation maintenance that will eventually increase the budget deficit beyond control."Iraq's former Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Dr Ali Allawi concurs."A war certainly would lead to Iranian cutbacks of gas supplied to Iraq," he says, adding, "It would also be used to pressure Iraq to drop its public neutrality between the U.S. and Iran. The Iraqi public is decidedly in favor of Palestine, and the Gaza war has made the Iranian connection less contentious than before."While international actors seek to contain the violence inside of Israel and Gaza, regional actors seem intent on expanding the war well beyond those borders. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and Iran-backed militias seem hell-bent on spreading the flames. The United States blames Iran as the source of regional provocations and even if inaccurate, the U.S. has put its forces on war footing, sending aircraft carriers and increased intelligence and other combat capabilities into the region, ostensibly to deter and contain the conflict — moves that inadvertently increase the dangers.of that very conflagration either by mistake, miscalculation, or misstep. The recent American-led maritime mission, Operation Prosperity Guardian, will increase the number of international warships in the Red Sea and should a Houthi missile sink a commercial tanker or a U.S. warship, the responses and counter-responses may make the war in Gaza seem minor.The Middle East has not seen this level of instability in decades and Iraq is not immune from that instability. Even if, to date, it has not been directly affected by the Gaza war or a wider regional conflict, Iraq it is already feeling its indirect effects through increased tensions between the U.S. and Iran, large scale street protests in support of Palestine, Iranian -backed militias attacking U.S. personnel, domestic political opponents, and impacts on the Iraqi economy. While Prime Minister Sudani has deftly managed those challenges to date, it remains problematic whether he, or Iraq, can weather the storms blowing in from Gaza for much longer.
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The 2024 presidential candidates are not holding back. Across the board they are issuing strident condemnations of Hamas's brutal attacks against Israel and support for Israel's ensuing war in Gaza.Nearly all are using the events to blame Biden Administration policies in the Middle East.Only one, Republican Vivek Ramaswamy, has urged restraint on the part of the U.S., pointing to his colleagues' anti-Iran rhetoric as a possible slide into war for Washington and a broader Middle East conflagration.Republicans overall offered the most bombastic takes, with Trump proclaiming that his Abraham Accords had brought "peace" to the Middle East before Biden came in and blew it all up.The accords, which sought U.S. normalization with Arab states, were only signed by Morocco, Bahrain, UAE, and Sudan (whose government was overthrown this year and is in the middle of another civil war) before Trump left office. While "peace" is clearly in the eye of the beholder, these agreements were not only upheld, but the Biden White House has praised and sought doggedly to expand them, reportedly offering Saudi Arabia all sorts of concessions to join.That the accords left the actual peace process – between Israel-Palestine – off the table, is being blamed in part for the tinderbox that led to last weekend's attacks.Beyond that, candidates are demanding reprisals, blaming Iran, and warning of terror attacks in the U.S.Cornel West, who is running as an independent primary candidate on Biden's left flank, was the only one to offer a warning against civilian killings on both sides, and lays blame for Hamas's action at the feet of US-Israeli policies.Here's how they all line up:The 2024 Democrats:President Biden: "In this moment we must be crystal clear: We stand with Israel. And we will make sure Israel has what it needs to take care of its citizens, defend itself and respond to this attack. There's no justification for terrorism. There's no excuse."Marianne Williamson: "Innocent civilians who had nothing to do with the actions of the Israeli government are, even as I write this, either being tortured or killed or are dead already. Children have been taken hostage. A nation is terrorized. (...) And yes, I know. These events did not occur in a vacuum. I could write about — and indeed I have, and at length — the myriad injustices Palestinians have endured at the hands of Israel. (...) I will have much to say in the coming days about what is happening in Israel and how I feel the United States should respond. For now, I stand with Israel. And I stand with the Palestinian people. I do not stand with Hamas, nor will I ever. For their cause is not justice. Their cause is terror.2024 RepublicansDonald Trump: "The atrocities we are witnessing in Israel would never have happened if I was president." (...) "less than four years ago, we had peace in the Middle East with the historic Abraham Accords. Today we have an all-out war in Israel, and it's going to spread very quickly. What a difference a president makes."Later he added in a Truth Social post, in all-caps: "CROOKED JOE BIDEN MUST TAKE BACK AND FREEZE THE 6 BILLION DOLLARS RIGHT NOW, BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE. HOW COULD ANYONE BE SO INCOMPETENT AND STUPID? BIDEN CAUSED THIS WAR, AND IT WILL ONLY GET WORSE!!!This has become a ubiquitous charge lobbed against the White House by Republicans in the wake of the Hamas attacks. The U.S. had unfrozen $6 billion in Iranian oil profits that were being held by South Korea, in exchange for the release of U.S. hostages last month. The money is currently held by Qatar, which was expected to be doled out for humanitarian needs in Iran. None of that money has left Doha, according to reports.Gov. Ron DeSantis: Proposed anti-Iran sanctions for the state of Florida on Tuesday, calling the Tehran government a "clearinghouse for terrorist funding in the region." Meanwhile, he said, "Israel, with the full support of the United States, should kill Hamas members and extinguish their entire infrastructure,"He also blamed Biden for unfreezing $6 billion for Iran.Amb. Nikki Haley: Her message to Israel was simple. "Finish them. Hamas did this, you know Iran's behind this. Finish them.""What happened to Israel could happen here in America," Haley said in a separate interview. "I have been terribly worried about the fact that Iran has said that the easiest way to get into America is through the Southern border … we don't need to wait for another 9/11."Vice President Mike Pence: "Biden should demand the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages in Gaza and direct JSOC (Joint Special Operations Command) to be prepared to mobilize US Special Forces with Israeli Defense Forces to get our people home. Hamas gives 'em up, or we go get 'em."In response to a report that Biden is considering sending a second aircraft carrier, Pence said "Just do it!"Pence also attacked what he said were "voices of appeasement" in the GOP, including Ramaswamy, Trump, and DeSantis, who have all urgedrestraint and questioned U.S. interests in the Ukraine War. "This is also what happens when you have leaders in the Republican Party signaling retreat on the world stage."Sen Tim Scott: "The last thing we need is a Joe Biden wing of the Republican Party on foreign policy," echoing Pence on the issue of Israel and Hamas.He also called the attacks "an assault on Western Civilization. The truth is though, Joe Biden funded these attacks on Israel. America's weakness is blood in the water for bad actors, but this is worse than that. We didn't just invite this aggression, we paid for it."Later, he added, "at least 9 Americans have been killed at the hands of evil Hamas terrorists. It's time to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with Israel, who has the resources and the power to wipe Hamas off the map."Gov. Chris Christie: "What I would be doing is making sure, one, that Israel has everything that it needs to be able to take whatever actions it needs to take." In this interview, he also criticizes "irresponsible" GOP House members for removing Speaker Kevin McCarthy and paralyzing the House in a time of crisis.More Christie: "Biden's appeasement of Israel's enemies has invited this war against Israel. Appeasement anywhere never works. We must do whatever it takes to support the State of Israel in its time of grave danger, and we must end the scourge of Iran-backed terrorism. This terrorism is funded by Biden's idiotic release of $6 billion to the Iranians."The Hamas war against Israel is now the second war started under Biden's failed presidency, first by Russia in Ukraine and now by Hamas in Israel. Both could have been deterred by strong American leadership."Christie also blamed U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan as signaling weakness.Vivek Ramaswamy: He pushes for strong support of Israel and blasts Hamas, but warns of a wider war that could include the U.S. He presented a 6-point plan on X, which included critiques of Haley and Pence for escalatory rhetoric:"These histrionics are unhelpful & unserious. The U.S. should provide Israel with diplomatic support, intelligence-sharing, and necessary munitions to defend its own homeland, while taking special care to avoid a broader regional war in the Middle East that would *not* advance U.S. interests."The 2024 independentsRobert F. Kennedy Jr.: "This ignominious, unprovoked, and barbaric attack on Israel must be met with world condemnation and unequivocal support for the Jewish state's right to self-defense. We must provide Israel with whatever it needs to defend itself — now. As President, I'll make sure that our policy is unambiguous so that the enemies of Israel will think long and hard before attempting aggression of any kind."I applaud the strong statements of support from the Biden White House for Israel in her hour of need. However, the scale of these attacks means it is likely that Israel will need to wage a sustained military campaign to protect its citizens. Statements of support are fine, but we must follow through with unwavering, resolute, and practical action. America must stand by our ally throughout this operation and beyond as it exercises its sovereign right to self-defense."Cornel West: In an interview with POLITICO, West said that "Israel and [the] United States are primarily responsible" for the violence that took place near the Gaza strip that has resulted in more than 1,000 deaths and hundreds more in retaliatory strikes. But, he added, "Hamas must take responsibility for killing innocent folk.""The United States bears some responsibility, no doubt about that. And I think that Hamas and [Islamic J]ihad bear responsibility for killing innocent people," he said. "Palestinians have a right to defend themselves in the same way that Israel has a right to defend itself. There's no doubt about that. But neither has a right to kill innocent people."He added that "the state of Israel has been doing that for 75 years."Earlier, West said, "I would stop the killing of innocent people — be they Palestinians or Israelis — by calling for an end to the vicious U.S.-supported Israeli occupation. This violent resistance to oppression is the desperate language of an occupied people."
